Content Type: Article

  • Real Estate Update: News on the new Heating System Law/Amendment of the Building Energy Law

    Real Estate Update: News on the new Heating System Law/Amendment of the Building Energy Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Real Estate Update: News on the new Heating System Law/Amendment of the Building Energy Law

    July 11, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundestag is now to decide on the bill, also known as the Heating Act, “to amend the Building Energy Act, to amend the Heating Costs Ordinance and to amend the Sweeping and Inspection Ordinance” after the parliamentary summer break in September. However, according to the coalition factions, changes to the present draft law are not planned. The law is still to come into force on 1 January 2024.

     

    In depth
    Authors
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  • CMS Releases Proposed Remedy for 340B-Acquired Drugs Purchased in CYs 2018–2022

    CMS Releases Proposed Remedy for 340B-Acquired Drugs Purchased in CYs 2018–2022

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Releases Proposed Remedy for 340B-Acquired Drugs Purchased in CYs 2018–2022

    July 10, 2023

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 7, 2023, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released the proposed rule, Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System: Remedy for 340B-Acquired Drugs Purchased for Calendar Years 2018–2022, to address how CMS plans to restore payments to hospitals affected by prior CMS policy to reduce Medicare payments on 340B drugs for most 340B hospitals paid under the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) from January 1, 2018, through September 27, 2022.

    In depth

    CMS intends to implement two key adjustments to remedy the 340B reimbursement rate reductions. First, CMS proposes to make one lump-sum payment to affected 340B hospitals based on the difference between what individual affected hospitals were paid at the reduced payment rate of average sales price (ASP) minus 22.5% and what the hospitals would have been paid at the full OPPS rate of ASP plus 6%. CMS estimates the total amount of these lump-sum payments to be approximately $9 billion. Second, CMS proposes to recoup $7.8 billion in corresponding “budget neutrality” payments made on all other items and services to all hospitals paid under OPPS through a 0.5% annual reduction in the OPPS conversion factor beginning in calendar year (CY) 2025.

    Comments for the proposed rule are due September 5, 2023.

    We previously analyzed the 340B payment reductions and litigation in a series of articles:

    IN DEPTH

    Background

    Beginning in 2018, CMS implemented a reduction to payments for 340B drugs to most 340B hospitals reimbursed by Medicare under OPPS, lowering the reimbursement amounts from ASP plus 6% to ASP minus 22.5%. Prospective payment system (PPS)-exempt cancer hospitals, PPS-exempt children’s hospitals and rural sole community hospitals are paid under OPPS, but were not subject to the payment cuts.

    As required by the Social Security Act, the payment reduction was implemented in a “budget neutral” manner, such that the estimated amount of the OPPS payment reduction for 340B drugs was used to increase payments on other items and services paid to all hospitals under OPPS. The 340B payment cuts were immediately subject to litigation, for which additional information can be found in the above-referenced articles. Ultimately, the US Supreme Court found that the 340B payment cuts were not consistent with federal laws governing Medicare payments for drugs under OPPS and the payment rule was vacated.

    In the 2023 OPPS Final Rule, CMS finalized its proposal to return payments for 340B drugs to the full OPPS payment rate of ASP plus 6%. However, the 2023 OPPS Final Rule did not address remedies for payments made between 2018 and 2022. This proposed rule is intended to address the outstanding issue of remedies.

    Remedy for the 340B-Acquired Drug Payment Policy for CYs 2018–2022 Proposed Rule: Lump Sum

    In this proposed rule, CMS proposes a remedy for the historical 340B payment reduction in two parts: (i) one lump-sum payment to each affected 340B hospital, which covers the difference in what the hospital was paid under the reduced payment rate for 340B drugs and what it should have been paid under the full OPPS payment rate; and (ii) a decrease in the OPPS conversion factor by 0.5% each year for most hospitals paid under OPPS, beginning in CY 2025, until the amount of payments under the reduced conversion factor offsets the amount of the increased budget neutrality payments made in connection with the reduced 340B drug payments.

    Specifically, CMS proposes to calculate the amount that each affected 340B hospital would have been paid for 340B drugs under the full OPPS rate from January 1, 2018, through September 27, 2022 (the last date that CMS imposed the reduced payment rate), and then subtract that figure from the amount that the hospital was actually paid for such drugs during the same period. CMS believes that this approach will come as close as possible to making the affected hospitals whole as to the 340B payment cuts, without manually reprocessing all claims during the period that the cuts were in place. Under this proposed methodology, CMS estimates that it will make these lump sum payments totaling $9 billion to 1,649 340B hospitals.

    Of note, while CMS estimates that from CY 2018 through September 27, 2022, affected hospitals received $10.5 billion less in 340B drug payments than they would have without the vacated policy, CMS estimates that affected hospitals have already been paid $1.5 billion in true-up payments due to claim reprocessing at the higher rate that occurred on most claims for 340B drugs during CY 2022.

    CMS intends to implement the lump-sum payment by issuing instructions to the Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) to issue payments within 60 calendar days of a MAC’s receipt of instruction, which CMS expects to be provided in late 2023 or early 2024. CMS is proposing to not apply interest to the lump-sum remedy payments, but is proposing to incorporate the necessary increased payments for beneficiary cost-sharing amounts into the payments.

    Remedy for the 340B-Acquired Drug Payment Policy for CYs 2018–2022 Proposed Rule: Offset by Decreasing the OPPS Conversion Factor 0.5% Each Year

    Due to statutory budget neutrality requirements under OPPS, when CMS reduced payments for 340B drugs beginning CY 2018, CMS increased payment to all hospitals for other items and services paid under OPPS. CMS estimates that an additional $7.8 billion was paid under this budget neutrality adjustment between CY 2018 and CY 2022. The differential between the $7.8 billion in increased budget neutrality payments and $10.5 billion in reduced payments for 340B drugs reflects the lack of accuracy in CMS’s budget neutrality calculation, which was made prior to the implementation of the adjustments in 2018 and was not recalculated or revised during the period that the cuts and corresponding increased payments were in place.

    CMS now proposes, beginning in CY 2025, to reduce all payments for non-drug items and services to all OPPS providers, except “new providers” enrolled in Medicare after January 1, 2018, by 0.5% each year until the estimated overpayment amount of $7.8 billion is offset. CMS currently expects this process will take approximately 16 years.

    ANALYSIS

    Several issues remain outstanding, following the release of the proposed rule:

    A key concern is whether CMS’ methodology to recoup amounts paid at higher rates for non-drug items and services provided from CY 2018 through 2022 will actually reset payments to the amounts that would have been received by hospitals had the 340B payment cuts never been implemented. CMS acknowledges that the reduced conversion factor will not precisely recoup amounts paid to each hospital under the prior budget neutrality adjustment. The extent to which the recouped payments match the prior payments in excess of what would have otherwise been received will be dependent on each hospital’s historic and future mix of items and services subject to the corresponding adjustments. CMS addresses this concern by stating that some imprecision is inherent in budget neutrality calculations, and the alternative would require that CMS recalculate the additional amount that each hospital received under the prior policy and then apply a specific reduction to each hospital, a process that CMS believes would impose significant burdens and payment delays.

    CMS decided against collecting a lump-sum payment recoupment from hospitals to not overwhelm hospitals impacted by this remedy and to partially account for reliance interests in the money paid to hospitals for non-drug items and services over the applicable period. To reduce the impact further, CMS could decide to impose the offset adjustment at smaller decreases to the conversion factor and extend the reduction for a longer period of time. CMS invites comments on the estimated budget neutrality offset calculations, the annual percent reduction method, and whether an alternative option would be appropriate. CMS is also asking for feedback on the alternative timelines for maintaining budget neutrality and whether hospitals need additional time (e.g., from starting the effective date of the prospective offset policy beginning CY 2025 to CY 2025) to prepare following any finalized policy.

    In addition, due to the CY 2018 OPPS rule that cut 340B payments but ultimately increased non-drug items and services by 3.19% for all OPPS providers, beneficiaries paid more in cost sharing for these non-drug items and services. The proposed rule is silent on whether CMS is quantifying or returning these payments in this rule, although the application of the reduced conversion factor will correspondingly reduce beneficiary cost-sharing obligations. CMS explicitly addresses their approach to beneficiary cost-sharing obligations as to the lump sum payments, but not as to the future adjustments to offset the budget neutrality payments.

    Finally, the proposed rule is silent on whether and how CMS expects Medicare Advantage plans to address past payments to 340B hospitals. The issue implicates the contracts between hospitals and Medicare Advantage plans. Hospitals should review any contracts they have with Medicare Advantage plans in considering whether to submit comments in response to the proposed rule.

    Comments for the proposed rule are due September 5, 2023.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Travis Jackson

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Steven J. Schnelle

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Deepika Raj

    Associate

    Los Angeles

    Kelsey R. Reinhardt

    Associate

    Los Angeles

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  • A Million Reasons to Share: OIG’s Final Rule on Information Blocking Enforcement

    A Million Reasons to Share: OIG’s Final Rule on Information Blocking Enforcement

    ARTICLE / INFORMATION BLOCKING / REPORT

    A Million Reasons to Share: OIG’s Final Rule on Information Blocking Enforcement

    July 7, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    On July 3, 2023, the US Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) published its long-awaited final rule implementing the 21st Century Cures Act provisions authorizing OIG to investigate claims of information blocking and impose civil monetary penalties of up to $1 million per information blocking violation. In this Special Report, we discuss key takeaways from the final rule and recommended action items before the rule goes into effect on September 1, 2023.

    In depth
    Tabs

    James A. Cannatti III

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Key Takeaways | What the Money Thinks: Investing in Innovative Care Delivery

    Key Takeaways | What the Money Thinks: Investing in Innovative Care Delivery

    ARTICLE

    Key Takeaways | What the Money Thinks: Investing in Innovative Care Delivery

    July 7, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    During this session, digital health investors and finance experts discussed the trends they are watching in today’s market. The group also shared ideas on how companies can stand out from their competitors in the bid for limited investor dollars, and the role of venture capital and venture capital-backed companies in solving today’s healthcare challenges.

    Session panelists:

    • Bill Evans, Founder and General Partner, Rock Health
    • Anna Fagin, Principal, Town Hall Ventures
    • Adam Heller, Managing Director, Healthcare Investment Banking, Ziegler Healthcare Investment Banking
    • Fazeela Abdul Rashid, Partner, Revolution Growth
    • Moderator: Dale Van Demark, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery
    In depth

    Top takeaways included:

    1. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the adoption of digital health, and while digital healthcare delivery is here to stay, some correction in the market is expected. While the healthcare system was moving towards digital health due to technological advances, the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated patients’ and providers’ wiliness to utilize technology. This increased utilization has provided tangible evidence that digital health solutions have real efficacy, clinical quality, and can help lower costs and bring better, more efficient outcomes. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic distorted the market, as providers had no choice but to supply care virtually, and there was abundant capital for startups. As the pandemic unwinds and the market tightens, the panelists expect to see correction in the market.
    2. In this constrained capital market, successful digital health companies are those that can demonstrate they are self-sustaining, able to be a long-term solution and can add value. Investment funds have been funneled towards operating and managing portfolio companies, with fewer new investments as a result. With this in mind, new entrepreneurs in the digital health ecosystem need to demonstrate that they can make a core, clear difference, adding true efficiency to the healthcare system and demonstrating where their value resides.
    3. Digital health tools can address inequities in the health care system—but not every solution addressing inequity is venture-backable. There is a tremendous opportunity for digital health tools to address inequity if founders and investors are willing to ask hard questions and commit to addressing inequity as part of their goals. Returns can be equipped by mission, rather than acting in conflict with the mission. However, not every business that can affect outcomes is designed for scale and is venture-backable. The panelists agreed that it is okay that not everything is venture-backable—there are many ways to fund a business and many issues in the healthcare system that require different stakeholders.
    4. For ventures that are looking for capital right now, focus on finding the right partners and demonstrating value. The panelists recognized that it is a difficult time for ventures that are looking for funding, but urged companies not to give up if they have something unique and visionary. Even in this market, the panelists agreed that finding the right partner is key—the relationship must work in both directions and align with the venture’s vision. The panelists also advised that successful ventures that will be those that can achieve early, quick wins to demonstrate that their business model has value.
    Authors
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  • OIG Final Rule Expands OIG Enforcement Authority to Grant and Contract Fraud

    OIG Final Rule Expands OIG Enforcement Authority to Grant and Contract Fraud

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    OIG Final Rule Expands OIG Enforcement Authority to Grant and Contract Fraud

    July 7, 2023

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 27, 2023, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a final rule amending OIG’s civil money penalty (CMP) regulations implementing the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) amendment to the CMP Law (CMPL), which, among other things, authorizes HHS to impose CMPs, assessments and exclusions upon individuals and entities that engage in fraud and other misconduct related to HHS grants, contracts and other agreements (42 USC 1320a-7a(o)-(s)). OIG’s final rule also addresses the Cures Act amendment to the Public Health Services Act (42 USC 300jj-52) authorizing OIG to investigate claims of information blocking and providing the Secretary of HHS authority to impose CMPs for information blocking, as well as Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 increases to penalty amounts in the CMPL. We will be issuing a separate Special Report on the information blocking portion of OIG’s final rule.

    In depth

    This On the Subject discusses key provisions of OIG’s final rule involving the Cures Act CMP authorities for grant, contract and other agreement-related fraud or misconduct.

    The Basis for Liability

    OIG finalized its proposal to add a new section 1003.700 that lists the new CMP offenses created by the Cures Act related to fraud and other misconduct involving grants, contracts and other agreements for which the Secretary of HHS provides funding when a person, excluding a program beneficiary:

    • Knowingly presents or causes to be presented a specified claim under such grant, contract or other agreement that a person knows or should know is false or fraudulent.
    • Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used any false statement, omission or misrepresentation of a material fact in any application, proposal, bid, progress report or other document that is required to be submitted in order to directly or indirectly receive or retain funds provided in whole or in part [by such Secretary] pursuant to such grant, contract or other agreement.
    • Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used false records or statements material to false or fraudulent specified claims under such grant, contract or other agreement.
    • Knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used false records or statements material to an obligation to pay or transmit funds or property to [such Secretary] with respect to such grant, contract or other agreement, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit funds or property [to such Secretary] with respect to such grant, contract or other agreement.
    • Fails to grant timely access upon reasonable request to OIG personnel who are carrying out audits, evaluations, investigations and other statutory functions related to such grants, contracts and other agreements.

    Key Definitions

    OIG finalized, without change, several key definitions for the terms “obligation,” “recipient,” “specified claim,” “reasonable request” and “other agreement.” Notably, OIG adopted the statutory definition of “other agreement,” which remains quite broad. The definition includes a non-exhaustive list of arrangements that could constitute “other agreements”: cooperative agreements, scholarships, fellowships, loans, subsidies, payments for a specified use, donation agreements, awards and subawards (regardless of whether one or more of the persons entering into the agreement are a contractor or subcontractor).

    As noted in the final rule preamble, OIG received comments requesting more detail on which arrangements could constitute “other agreements” under the regulations. But OIG declined to modify the definition, stating “[i]t is not possible to identify with specificity all the various types of agreements that may fall under the definition […].” And OIG continues to take the “know it when we see it” approach, referencing in the final rule preamble its statement in the proposed rule preamble that “when OIG investigates potential misconduct and decides whether to impose sanctions, it will evaluate matters on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the funding arrangement at issue constitutes an ‘other agreement’ […].”

    Further, OIG appears to maintain a view that the statutory authorities related to grant CMPs as broadly expanding OIG’s CMP jurisdiction beyond federal healthcare programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, to many other HHS programs, such as National Institutes of Health or Centers for Disease Control and Prevention grants or any number of contracts that HHS enters into to manage its programs. Specifically, OIG stated in the final rule preamble that “[a]ny person that receives HHS funding directly or indirectly through an agreement is potentially subject to liability under the CMPL if they engage in any of the improper conduct identified in the regulation […].” Given OIG’s apparent interpretation of the authority and the current focus on COVID-19 funding, it would not be surprising to see OIG attempt to apply this authority to Provider Relief Fund payments, which HHS administered as a grant through the Health Resources and Services Administration.

    But as we have previously noted, the placement of this statute in the Social Security Act (SSA) (which governs the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as grants to states for unemployment compensation and other programs and the Social Security income benefit) raises a question of how far these CMP authorities extend to other HHS programs that are not contained in the SSA. The Cures Act does not define “grant” or “contract” in its CMPL amendment, and neither does OIG in its final rule. The nature of the CMPL, including being part of the SSA, suggests that these CMPs could arguably be limited to the grants, contracts and other agreements governed by the SSA. OIG received limited comments on the CMP authority and commenters did not appear to raise this issue, based on OIG’s preamble summary of the comment letters.

    Penalties, Assessments and Exclusion
    The final rule also implements the statutory penalties for each of the five offenses, which range from a maximum of $10,000 to $50,000 per offense, as measured by the applicable offense trigger (such as each claim, each false record or statement, or each day an overpayment is retained or access is not granted). OIG also may impose an assessment of not more than three times the amount involved with the improper conduct and may impose an exclusion from federal healthcare programs.

    The Cures Act includes federal and state healthcare program exclusion as a potential consequence of offenses involving grants, contracts or other agreements. Federal and state healthcare program exclusion is consistent with the traditional scope of the CMPL as pertaining to offenses involving the federal healthcare programs. There is, however, a disconnect in providing for exclusion as a consequence for an offense that was not connected to federal or state healthcare programs for which an HHS debarment could apply. OIG did not receive comments regarding exclusion from federal healthcare programs and did not address the topic in the final rule preamble.

    Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
    As under the proposed rule, OIG’s final rule lists factors for OIG to consider when determining the severity of penalties and assessments, as well as the period of exclusion. The factors are categorized into mitigating and aggravating factors. The list of aggravating factors is not all-inclusive, and both the aggravating and mitigating factors largely mirror the factors related to the fraudulent or false submission of healthcare claims.

    The final rule provides that it is a mitigating factor if all of the following conditions are met:

    • All the violations included in an action were of the same type and occurred within a short period of time.
    • There were few such violations.
    • The total amount claimed or requested related to the violations was less than $5,000.

    The final rule non-exclusive list of aggravating factors includes the following:

    • The violations were of several types or occurred over a lengthy period of time.
    • There were many such violations (or the circumstances indicate a pattern of false or fraudulent specified claims, requests for payment or a pattern of violations).
    • The amount requested, claimed or related to the violations was $50,000 or more.
    • The violation resulted, or could have resulted, in physical harm to any individual.

    Although OIG received several comments requesting modification, OIG declined to modify the mitigating and aggravating factors lists in the final rule. Specifically, OIG noted that because the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in 42 CFR 1003.720 (related to grants, contracts and other agreements) and 1003.220 (related to federal healthcare programs) provide guidelines for OIG to evaluate the same factors, and relate to damages sustained by HHS, the dollar thresholds should be consistent. Additionally, OIG declined to add a good-faith assessment to the final rule’s mitigating factor. OIG noted it would account for a party’s good-faith effort to comply, consistent with 42 CFR 1003.140. Hence, OIG did not think it was necessary to explicitly include a good-faith effort factor.

    OIG Enforcement
    OIG emphasized the final rule is not limited to intentional or egregious wrongdoing. A commentor highlighted that grants and other agreements are complex and regulatory requirements change, which should be taken into consideration, and that, because of the complex nature of such arrangements, the scope should be limited to intentional or egregious wrongdoing. OIG said, however, that it will not limit the scope, but rather contemplate all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of wrongdoing in connection with the factors in the Cures Act and the final rule.

    Recommendations for Recipients of HHS Funding
    Given the broad scope of the final rule, it adds a new enforcement avenue applicable to stakeholders in the healthcare industry and potentially beyond to organizations not familiar with OIG’s CMPL process or enforcement activities. Grantees, contractors and other recipients of HHS funds should continue to carefully review the myriad grant and contracting-related rules and guidance to ensure compliance. Recipients of HHS funding should consider revisiting their internal compliance policies to ensure that they appropriately address arrangements that fall within the new CMPL scope. Additionally, entities should engage with, if applicable, technical assistance centers early on in the funding process regarding grant and other funding compliance. Leveraging such resources sooner rather than later can help manage risks.

    If you have questions or would like assistance assessing potential exposure under these new CMP authorities, please do not hesitate to contact your regular McDermott lawyer or any of the authors of this On the Subject.

    The final rule can be found here.

    Authors

    James A. Cannatti III

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Get Ready to Update Your Binding Corporate Rules Regulators Expand Requirements

    Get Ready to Update Your Binding Corporate Rules Regulators Expand Requirements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Get Ready to Update Your Binding Corporate Rules Regulators Expand Requirements

    July 7, 2023

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    At the end of June, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) published its Recommendations (Recs) on Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs). Among other things, the Recs require existing and in process BCRs to:

    • Incorporate the requirements stemming from the Schrems II Judgement of the Court of Justice of the EU (including to carry out a documented assessment of the company’s ability to comply with its BCR commitments in the face of government requests for data).
    • Include much more granular information on the BCR audit program.
    • Expand third-party beneficiary rights.
    • Provide an exhaustive list of all legal bases for processing, which companies intend to rely on.
    • Incorporate wording that more closely and explicitly tracks the language of the GDPR.
    • Incorporate (even more) accountability obligations and new/improved commitments as outlined more fully below.

    In 2024 all current BCR holders must bring their Controller BCRs in line with the Recs as part of their annual update. All new and ongoing BCR applications will have to be brought in line with the Recs before progressing in the approval process, subject to the limited exceptions we outline below.

    Given the breadth of the changes, BCR holders should ensure that they have enough time to make the relevant changes in their documentation, as well as implement the necessary internal processes to meet this deadline.

    Below, we explain what BCRs are, how they work, and which companies generally implement them, along with a list of key changes ushered in by the new Recs.

    In depth

    WHAT ARE BCRs?

    Under the GDPR, companies must implement one of the approved mechanisms for transferring personal data subject to the GDPR to a country outside of the EEA that is not recognized by the European Commission as providing an adequate level of protection to that of the GDPR (adequate countries include Canada, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and others) 1.

    BCRs are one of the approved data transfer safeguard mechanisms (along with others, such as EU Standard Contractual Clauses). BCRs are a set of binding policies and other commitments, adopted and implemented by businesses of the same group that afford protections to personal data transferred under the BCRs, which are essentially equivalent to the protections to personal data provided under the GDPR.

    HOW DO THEY WORK?

    BCRs can be used to by companies to safeguard and therefore, transfer personal data subject to the GDPR between entities of the same group bound by the BCRs (so-called ‘Controller BCRs’), or to its processor’s group of companies, which adopted their own BCRs (so-called ‘Processor BCRs’). Large service providers acting as vendors typically have Processor BCRs in place to facilitate transfers of personal data from their customers to their group of companies.

    One of the groups’ companies within the EEA serves as a ‘guarantor’ for the compliance of the group (including in terms of liability for other group members) and generally administers the BCRs overall (acting as an ‘EU entity with delegated data protection responsibilities’).

    BCRs are subject to the approval of all competent EU regulators working under the umbrella of the European Data Protection Board – the EDPB – , led by the lead supervisory authority for BCRs (the ‘BCR Lead’)

    The BCR Lead is generally determined internally by the group based on (i) where the group’s EEA headquarters are; (ii) the location of the EU entity with delegated data protection responsibilities (or another entity within the company best suited to administer the BCRs); (iii) the place where most decisions are taken in terms of why and how personal data are processed; or (iv) the entity, where most data transfers originate. However, the BCR Lead may not accept the company’s internal determination if it does not reflect reality.

    WHO SHOULD (NOT) USE BCRs?

    Controller BCRs

    BCRs are best suited for multinational companies (corporate groups) with entities both inside and outside of the territory of the EEA that regularly transfer personal data outside the EEA. BCRs allow multinationals to cover a wide variety of intra-group data transfers without drafting and maintaining separate contracts between individual members of the corporate group.

    Processor BCRs

    BCRs are a useful tool for multinationals, which in addition to internal transfers, need to cover data transfers from their EEA B2B customers to themselves in their role as vendor (i.e., processor under the GDPR). BCRs are often used by large service providers, allowing them to receive personal data from their B2B customers without concluding rather lengthy Standard Contractual Clauses (completing the required detailed annexes), cutting down the time needed to conclude data protection agreements.

    The Good, the Bad, and…the Ugly?

    BCRs also mean regular, and at least at the time of the initial approval process, very close contact with EU regulators. Moreover, the approval process can be lengthy, depending on the BCR Lead’s country of establishment. Companies seeking BCRs therefore need to have a certain level of privacy compliance maturity, given that at least initially, they will be under quite intense regulatory scrutiny. The big advantage is that once the approval process is over, BCR companies are generally more trusted by the regulators and transfers subject to BCRs tend to be scrutinized less.

    WHAT’S NEW?

    The Recs have i) updated and streamlined the standard application form companies for Controller BCRs; and ii) introduced a slew of changes to BCR content to match regulator expectations. Some of the changes are limited to smaller clarifications of commitments already contained in the previous regulatory guidelines from 2018 (e.g., updates to the complaint handling process – such as the requirement that the data subject be informed not only of delays for the reply to the complaint, but also of the consequences of delays and of actions taken).

    We have focused on a few key changes that companies with existing Controller BCRs will need to reflect in their documentation and internal practices.

    Schrems II Comes to BCRs

    The Court of Justice of the European Union’s Schrems II judgment is reflected in BCR requirements in a number of ways, in particular, in relation to potential BCR non-compliance caused by the requirements of law in a third country (such as undue access to personal data by law enforcement authorities), and relevant prior assessment of the same.

    a) Laws and Practices in Third Countries Affecting compliance with the BCRs

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    • Documented assessment of whether third country laws (including disclosure requirements, government access or access in transit) could prevent fulfilment of the BCR obligations (this assessment has to be made available to authorities upon request).
    • If group members have reason to believe third country laws/practices would prevent them from complying with BCRs, they need to notify each other and identify supplementary measures they could adopt to mitigate the inherent risk in the situation.
    • When group members cannot find sufficient supplementary measures, or upon instruction by the competent regulator they must suspend the transfer until they find a suitable solution. These measures may include technical (such as encryption), organizational (such as access restrictions), or contractual (such as additional contractual commitments) actions adopted by the members.
    • If suitable supplementary measures cannot be found, data transferred prior to suspension, and any copies, would need to be returned to the data exporter (in the EEA) or wholly destroyed.
    • Companies must also continuously monitor developments in third countries that could affect their initial assessment.

    b) Data Importer’s Obligations Regarding Government Access Requests

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    • When data importers receive a legally binding disclosure request or become aware that they are subject to direct access by a third country public authority, they must notify the data exporter and, where possible, the data subject (Recs specify the data to be disclosed).
    • If such notification is prohibited, the data importer must make and document their best efforts to waive the prohibition.
    • The data importer must also review the legality of the request for disclosure and challenge the request if, based on assessment, the request might be unlawful under the laws of the country of destination, applicable obligations under international law, and/or principles of international comity. If necessary, a possibility of an appeal must be pursued. Both cases should be documented and, if possible, under relevant third country law, be made available to the data exporter’s competent EU regulators.
    • If a request is challenged, the data importer should seek interim measures with suspensive effects until the final decision is made, and avoid disclosing the personal data requested until required to do so under applicable procedural rules.

    Third-Party Beneficiary Rights

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    Prior to the Recs, Controller BCRs were required to confer the right to data subjects to enforce certain elements of the Controller BCRs as third-party beneficiaries. The Recs extend the list to include: i) an obligation to provide exhaustive list of all legal basis BCR members intend to rely on, ii) extended personal data breach notification requirements (see below), iii) obligations in case of government access requests, iv) extended list of information about BCRs, including v) right to information on any update of the BCRs and vi) list of BCR members, as well as vii) the third-party beneficiary clause itself.

    Access to the BCRs for Data Subjects and Public Version of the BCRs

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    In relation to Controller BCRs, data subjects must be provided with an extended list of up-to-date, clear, intelligible and transparent information, at minimum including: i) information on their third-party beneficiary rights, ii) a description of the scope of the Controller BCRs, iii) a list of the clauses relating to the Group’s liability and data protection principles, including lawfulness, security, data breach notifications, restrictions on onward transfers and clauses relating to data subject rights (which includes the right to lodge a complaint with EU regulators/ competent EU Member State courts). This information must be provided in full.

    As before, companies must decide how this information is made available to data subjects (e.g., published on its websites/ intranet, similarly to how EU privacy notices are presented to data subjects).

    If companies choose to publish only the required information for data subjects, rather than the entire BCRs, the BCRs need to specify this (i.e., BCR Lead needs to be made aware of this).

    Audits – Regular but not by the Data Protection Officer (‘DPO’)

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    Companies must specify the frequency of audits in advance and include action plans ensuring that corrective actions identified in the audits have been implemented. Audits cannot be carried out by the DPO if there is a risk of a conflict of interest.

    Legal Bases – Identifying Which Bases your Company Relies On

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    Companies must include an exhaustive list of all legal bases they intend to rely on for the data transfer, akin to what companies are required to do in their EU privacy notices.

    Personal Data Breach Notifications

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    Recs now fully replicate the relevant personal data breach provisions of the GDPR, additionally requiring i) notification to the competent EU regulators of any personal data breach (suffered by companies participating in the BCR) without undue delay but no later than 72 hours, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to data subjects’ rights and freedoms, and ii) notification without undue delay to the controller under the BCRs, when an entity acting as a processor under the BCRs becomes aware of a breach.

    The previous guidance only required internal and data subject notification of personal data breaches, including notification to i) the EU headquarters or the EU entity with delegated data protection responsibilities, ii) other relevant Privacy Officer/Function, and iii) data subjects when the personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to their rights and freedoms.

    Effects of Non-Compliance

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    The data importer is obliged to immediately return or delete (at the data exporter’s choice) the transferred personal data (and its copies) in its entirety if it is in substantial or persistent breach of the BCRs or fails to comply with a binding decision of a competent court or regulator, regarding its obligations. It also must certify deletion to the data exporter (which goes beyond what is strictly required under the GDPR).

    Until the data is deleted or returned, compliance with the BCRs must be ensured. If return/deletion is prohibited by applicable laws, compliance must continue, and processing can only be carried out as long as required by applicable law.

    BCR Updates – Data Subjects, Timing of Significant Changes and Other Notifications to BCR Lead

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    Previously, information to data subjects on changes to the BCRs or the of group entities bound by the BCRs were both necessary only upon data subjects’ request. Under the new Recs, companies must proactively provide this information regardless of whether it is requested. In this respect, companies may consider applying the same approach as they do to updates to their privacy notices (subject to Arts. 13 and 14 of the GDPR).

    Additionally, any changes that could hinder the level of the protection or significantly affect BCRs’ enforceability must no longer be communicated ‘promptly’ but must be provided to the BCR Lead in advance of such change.

    Companies were previously required to file an annual update with the BCR Lead, in case of any changes to the BCRs or to the list of BCR members, with a brief explanation of the reasons for the changes. Under the updated Recs, the BCR Lead (and by extension the other competent EU regulators), must be notified once a year even where no changes to the BCRs have been made.

    Assets – EU Entity with Delegated Data Protection Responsibilities

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    Confirmation that the EU entity responsible for BCRs has sufficient assets to enable itself to pay compensation for damages resulting from a breach of the BCRs on behalf of any group companies bound by the BCRs will now need to be filed with every annual BCR update or notification (see the point above re newly required notifications, even in cases where there are no changes to the BCRs).

    Cooperation Duty to Competent EU regulators

    What do Companies Need to Commit to?

    Previously, companies had an obligation to accept audits by competent EU regulators, with the new Recs, this now explicitly includes on-site inspections. In the case of dispute resolution with competent EU regulators, the courts of the EU Member State of that regulator will handle the dispute, in accordance with that EU Member State’s procedural law, giving an advantage to the regulators, especially over companies which may be offering services in such countries, but do not have active establishments there.

    WHAT ELSE TO LOOK OUT FOR?

    When are Companies Expected to Implement the Recs?

    All current holders must bring their Controller BCRs in line with the Recs as part of their 2024 annual update.

    All new and ongoing applications must be brought in line with the Recs before proceeding in the approval process – unless they are already in the ‘consolidated draft’ stage and the EDPB issues its opinion on their draft by the end of 2023. In such case, they will need to bring their Controller BCRs in line with Recs at the time of their 2024 annual update.

    Do Updates Mean Re-Approval of Existing BCRs by EU Regulators?

    The EDPB expects all BCRs, including those approved before the publication of the Recs, to be updated in line with the new Recs (as noted above). BCR holders will not need to seek a re-approval of their BCRs, after implementing the new Recs (subject to any other changes companies introduce outside of Recs, which may affect data subject protections and BCR enforceability).

    We expect a higher scrutiny will be applied to 2024 annual updates compared to current yearly updates companies typically file. Not all BCR Leads will, however, be able to pay close attention immediately, and companies should expect potential follow-up queries from regulators even several months after they have filed their update. The timing and quality of the regulatory review will likely depend on the quantity of BCR updates each regulator will have to deal with at one time, and the resources they have available to process these.

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  • Ruling Delays Enforcement of Latest CCPA Regulations

    Ruling Delays Enforcement of Latest CCPA Regulations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ruling Delays Enforcement of Latest CCPA Regulations

    July 5, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 30, 2023, the California Superior Court hearing Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Privacy Prot. Agency, No. 34-2023-80004106 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), delayed enforcement of the latest California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) regulations until March 29, 2024. The ruling does not, however, impact enforcement of the CCPA itself or the regulations previously adopted by the California Attorney General.

    In depth

    The court concluded that it was the intent of the California voters who approved the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) by ballot initiative in 2020 to give businesses 12 months between the finalizing of any CCPA regulation and the start of enforcement. As a result, enforcement of any final regulation that the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) promulgates—including on future topics—can only occur 12 months after finalizing such regulation.

    The court, however, rejected the broader relief that the California Chamber sought. In addition to a 12-month enforcement delay, the California Chamber had sought an order requiring a stay of any enforcement of any CCPA regulation promulgated by the CPPA until the CPPA had finalized all the regulations required by the CCPA.

    Because it was not the subject of the California Chamber’s writ, this ruling does not impact the California Attorney General’s or the CPPA’s ability to enforce the CCPA itself or the CCPA regulations previously finalized by the California Attorney General. As a result, as of July 1, 2023, the California Attorney General or the CPPA can enforce both the CCPA as amended by the CPRA as well as the California Attorney General’s previously finalized CCPA regulations.

    In short, what this ruling has bought companies is time. Many companies sprinted to comply with CCPA regulations, finalized in March of this year, which often added significant details beyond the CCPA statutory text. The result has often been imperfect from an operational standpoint. Companies now can evaluate their CCPA compliance programs holistically and build programs that not only meet the requirements of the CCPA regulations but do so in an operationally sustainable manner.

    ***

    Creating a successful and effective privacy program will save organizations time in the long run, especially given the similarities across these laws. If you have questions or need assistance in readiness work for the new state consumer laws, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or reach out to Elliot Golding, Amy Pimentel or David Saunders.

    Check out our additional coverage on new state consumer privacy laws: 

    Oregon Joins the Consumer Privacy Trend

    Texas Consumer Privacy Law Nears Governor’s Signature

    Florida Adds a New Twist to Consumer Privacy Patchwork

    Tennessee Joins the Fray as Legislature Passes Consumer Privacy Law

    Consumer Privacy Law Comes to Big Sky Country as Montana Passes New Law

    Indiana Passes Consumer Privacy Bill

    Iowa’s New Privacy Law: The Basics

    Colorado Finalizes Sweeping New Privacy Rules; Iowa Joins the Fray

    Preparing for New Consumer Privacy laws in Colorado, Connecticut and Utah

    California Privacy Rights Act Takes Effect…Sort Of

    Authors

    Elliot R. Golding

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Amy C. Pimentel

    Partner

    Boston

    David P. Saunders

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Title VII, FLSA Amendments Expand Protections for Pregnant and Breastfeeding Workers

    Title VII, FLSA Amendments Expand Protections for Pregnant and Breastfeeding Workers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Title VII, FLSA Amendments Expand Protections for Pregnant and Breastfeeding Workers

    July 5, 2023

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Recent amendments to Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) impact how employers address pregnant and breastfeeding employees’ needs. Employers should reset their approaches to navigate the newly expanded protections available to pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth.

    In depth

    WHAT HAS CHANGED?

    The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) expanded Title VII’s existing protections on pregnancy discrimination. Under the PWFA, employers must now provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant workers for known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, even where those limitations fall short of a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The PWFA became effective on June 27, 2023.

    The Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP) amended the FLSA to require employers to provide reasonable break time and appropriate facilities for workers to express breast milk for a nursing child for one year after birth. This amendment expanded FLSA coverage for lactation rights and added enforcement provisions to allow lawsuits for violations. PUMP became effective on December 29, 2022.

    HOW DOES THE PWFA CHANGE THE STATUS QUO?

    While Title VII already prohibited employers from treating pregnant employees worse than other employees, there was a gap: pregnant workers with temporary conditions (e.g., morning sickness) lacked a true ADA disability and thus a basis for insisting on reasonable accommodations. The PWFA was enacted to close this gap between the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Title VII and the ADA.

    The PWFA mandates that employers provide reasonable accommodations for the “known limitations” related to a “qualified” employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, or related physical or mental medical conditions unless the employer can show that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship. This boils down to four main considerations:

    1. Who is a covered employer? The PWFA covers employers with 15 or more employees.
    2. What is a known limitation? Under the PWFA, a known limitation is any physical or mental condition that the pregnant employee has “communicated to the employer,” regardless of whether the condition is a disability as defined by the ADA.
    3. Who is a qualified employee? This is an employee who can perform essential job functions with or without accommodations. The PWFA states that an employee is qualified when the inability to perform essential functions “is for a temporary period,” the essential functions could be performed “in the near future” and the inability to perform essential functions can be reasonably accommodated.
    4. How are “undue hardship” and “reasonable accommodation” defined? The PWFA states that these terms “shall be construed” the same as under the ADA.

    HOW DOES THE PUMP ACT CHANGE THE STATUS QUO?

    The PUMP Act builds on 2010 amendments to the FLSA and further expands the workplace protections available to breastfeeding employees. The PUMP Act requires employers to provide breastfeeding employees with the following:

    • A reasonable amount of break time to express milk as needed for up to one year following the birth of an employee’s child; and
    • Space to express milk that is shielded from view, is free from intrusion from coworkers and the public and is not a bathroom.

    Employers should be familiar with these basic requirements, which arose from the 2010 FLSA amendments. The PUMP Act adds nuances, however:

    • FLSA-exempt employees are now included.
    • All employers are covered, but employers with fewer than 50 employees can exempt themselves with proof that providing the requirements to breastfeeding employees would impose an undue hardship on the business.
    • Remote employees are entitled to lactation breaks on the same basis as if they were working onsite.

    Employers do not need to pay for lactation breaks as long as the affected employees are completely relieved of their duties during the breaks. These protections also now come with enforcement mechanisms, including a private right of action for employees to sue their employer (although claims for failure to provide an appropriate space require 10 calendar days advance notice for the employer to comply).

    ARE THERE SUGGESTED BEST PRACTICES GOING FORWARD?

    Employers must prepare to engage in the PWFA interactive process with pregnant employees.

    Employers now have a duty to accommodate that will require more creative thinking in addressing workplace needs of pregnant employees. For example, a recent ADA case addressed the use of a “morning remote and afternoon in-office schedule,” which might also work for morning sickness. Montague v. U.S. Postal Serv. (5th Cir. 2023).

    Reasonable accommodations may also include appropriately sized uniforms and safety gear, preferred parking access, and exemptions from policies to allow pregnant workers more frequent bathroom breaks or access to water or food as necessary. Proposed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations are currently under review at the White House and, when published, will add more suggestions.

    Employers should update lactation policies in light of PUMP. A new Field Assistance Bulletin from the US Department of Labor will be helpful in assessing policies or answering questions case-by-case. This guidance stresses that a one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to assist in compliance.

    There are also updated posters to address these statutory amendments: an FLSA poster covering PUMP and a Title VII poster covering PWFA.

    Authors

    Melis Solaksubasi

    Associate

    Chicago

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  • Supreme Court Takes Up Constitutional Challenge to Section 965 Transition Tax

    Supreme Court Takes Up Constitutional Challenge to Section 965 Transition Tax

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Takes Up Constitutional Challenge to Section 965 Transition Tax

    July 5, 2023

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 26, 2023, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear a rare challenge under the Sixteenth Amendment and Tax Clauses to Section 965 of the tax code. In Moore v. United States, the justices will consider whether the one-time Section 965 transition tax violates the US Constitution as a “direct tax” that has not been apportioned among the states. The Court’s decision in Moore could potentially have far-reaching and major implications in many areas of tax.

    In depth

    BACKGROUND ON THE CASE AND SECTION 965

    Section 965 deems the accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income of specified foreign corporations, including controlled foreign corporations (CFCs), to be subpart F income and thus currently taxable to 10% US shareholders. Section 965 was enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) as part of the transition from a deferral system (where US shareholders were not currently taxed on most earnings of foreign subsidiaries but were taxed on distributions from foreign subsidiaries) to a territorial system under which companies are eligible for a 100% dividends received deduction with respect to distributions of foreign earnings.

    Moore concerns the tax liability of Charles and Kathleen Moore who, inspired by their friend’s mission to empower subsistence farmers in India, made a modest investment nearly two decades ago in a small social enterprise in Bangalore in exchange for approximately 11% of the stock of an Indian corporation. According to the record, the Indian corporation reinvested its earnings, the Moores never received any distributions on their investment and the Moores (under pre-2017 law) never incurred any tax liability on their investment. As a result of Section 965, however, the Moores were deemed to have earned income from their investment and were taxed accordingly.

    For the Moores, that meant a $15,000 tax bill. Tax revenue by reason of Section 965 has been estimated to be in the hundreds of billions.

    The Moores sued, arguing that by taxing them on gains to their investment that they never received, or “realized,” themselves as income, the government had imposed a direct tax, which the Constitution says must be apportioned among the states.

    Recently, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the tax, holding that there is no constitutional requirement that income taxed by the federal government be realized by the taxpayers. The Moores appealed to the Supreme Court, and on June 26, the Court agreed to hear the case next term.

    THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IN MOORE

    Moore involves the interplay of two provisions in the Constitution pertaining to taxation: the Tax Clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment.

    Article I of the Constitution provides that Congress may institute “direct taxes”—i.e., taxes levied directly on persons and their property—only if the revenue from the tax is apportioned among the states according to population. (See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I § 9, cl. 4.) In other words, the amount of tax revenue collected from each state relative to the total revenue nationwide must be equivalent to the state’s share of the national population. In practice, the apportionment requirement makes it all but impossible for Congress to institute direct taxes.

    A century later, when Congress attempted to institute a federal income tax, the Supreme Court held that a tax on income is a direct tax and must be apportioned. (See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895) on rehearing 158 U.S. 601 (1895).) The public backlash was intense, as an income tax had become a popular reform in that era. Several years later, the nation adopted the Sixteenth Amendment, which allows Congress “to lay and collect tax on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment.”

    The question in Moore is whether Section 965 is a tax on income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment or a direct non-income tax that must be apportioned among the states.

    The Moores’ position is that the Sixteenth Amendment’s exemption from apportionment is limited to taxes on realized gains based in part on case law, such as Eisner v. Macomber and Glenshaw Glass, and the text of the Sixteenth Amendment, which contemplates that “income” will be “derived” from a source. The Moores’ brief indicates that the Ninth Circuit’s holding opens the door to new federal taxes on wealth and property. (For example, the Biden administration’s FY24 Green Book includes a proposed “25-percent minimum income tax” that would “require prepayment of taxes on unrealized capital gains.”)

    The government’s position is that whether a taxpayer has realized income does not determine whether a tax is constitutional, and what constitutes a taxable gain is broadly construed. The government’s brief asserts that adopting the Moores’ position “would call into question the constitutionality of many other tax provisions that have long been on the books.”

    POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

    Section 965, a provision that resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in tax liability for taxpayers and which was a core part (and revenue raiser) of the TCJA, is at issue. It’s unclear as to how the Supreme Court ultimately will rule in this case, and the range of possibilities includes a ruling in favor of the government, a narrow ruling in favor of the Moores (e.g., that Section 965 is unconstitutional for a minority shareholder lacking the ability to compel distribution of the relevant earnings), or a broad ruling that could have reverberations throughout the tax law by calling into question the constitutionality of many different income imputation or acceleration regimes. For instance, depending on the Court’s rationale, a decision in favor of the Moores could question the validity of subpart F (which has previously been held to be constitutional by lower courts but never considered by the Supreme Court) or the global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) regime, even as applied to 100% controlling shareholders as opposed to minority shareholders. A broad ruling that invalidates all or some of Section 965, subpart F or GILTI could result in significant revenue loss to the US fisc, as well as adverse collateral consequences for taxpayers in certain situations, such as the treatment of prior distributions of foreign earnings that had been thought to be previously taxed earnings and profits and now could be viewed as distributions of untaxed earnings and profits, which may require the application of Section 245A rules in order for the distributions to be tax-free. The Court’s rationale could also preempt or support constitutionality challenges to wealth taxes that are being considered or call into question other portions of the tax code that are applying anti-deferral or mark-to-market principles.

    TAKEAWAYS

    Taxpayers should begin the process of considering the potential implications of the Supreme Court’s consideration of this case, including considering filing protective claims for refund for the transition tax or other taxes. Similar claims for refund may be warranted for corresponding state tax refunds. Taxpayers could also consider getting involved in amicus briefs to ensure that different perspectives are heard.

    Authors

    Caroline H. Ngo

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Timothy S. Shuman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Financial Titans Engage in Winner-Takes-All Battle:  The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas Upholds Serta’s 2020 Uptiering Transaction

    Financial Titans Engage in Winner-Takes-All Battle: The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas Upholds Serta’s 2020 Uptiering Transaction

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Financial Titans Engage in Winner-Takes-All Battle: The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas Upholds Serta’s 2020 Uptiering Transaction

    July 5, 2023

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Sophisticated financial titans engaged in a winner-take-all battle. There was a winner and a loser. Such an outcome was not only foreseeable, it is the only correct result. The risk of loss is a check on unrestrained behavior.”

    On June 6, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a highly anticipated decision permitting Serta Simmons’ 2020 “uptiering” transaction under the terms of a 2016 credit agreement and determining that Serta Simmons entered into the transaction through good-faith, arm’s-length negotiations. While there have been a handful of court rulings in recent years related to similar uptiering transactions, many have been at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment phase and, unlike this decision, not been issued following a full blown trial. Judge David Jones sided fully with the Debtors and the parties with whom they entered into the uptiering transaction — providing no support for the dissenting creditors. See Memorandum Opinion [ECF No. 1045], In re Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 23-90020 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 6, 2023). The ruling provides some new insight (but not much clarity) into how courts will view this type of controversial transaction gaining greater use. However, it is likely to further embolden certain favored creditors to push aggressively in conjunction with the borrower at the expense of other minority lenders.

    Liability Management Transactions

    Commercial borrowers have found themselves able to negotiate increasingly high degrees of flexibility in loan documentation in recent years. This looseness in credit documentation allows borrowers to manage their capital structures by enabling them to take advantage of creative liability management transactions.

    These liability management transactions have often taken the form of “drop-down” and “uptiering” transactions. In a typical drop-down transaction, (1) the borrower forms or designates an unrestricted subsidiary,[1] (2) the borrower sells, contributes or transfers assets to the subsidiary in a manner that is permitted under the existing credit agreement’s covenant baskets that causes a release of the liens of the existing lenders on the assets and (3) the subsidiary incurs new financing that is secured by a first priority lien on the transferred assets such that it is structurally senior to the existing debt.

    In an uptiering transaction like the one engaged in by Serta, the borrower offers existing lenders the ability to participate in a new credit facility that is senior to the existing facility. These lenders also often negotiate to exchange at least a portion of their existing exposure into the new senior facility. These transactions require amendments to the applicable debt and lien baskets under the existing agreement, typically with the support of majority holders only, often without the opportunity for minority lenders to participate.

    The Serta 2016 Credit Agreement

    Serta entered into negotiations with a series of lenders in 2016, leading to credit facilities providing for $1.95 billion and $450 million in first and second lien term loans, respectively. The first lien credit agreement contained multiple provisions providing Serta with the flexibility it relied on in crafting its liability management transactions.

    One provision, section 9.05(g) of the 2016 Credit Agreement, addresses the assignment of loans to Affiliated Lenders (defined to include the borrower), stating in relevant part that:

    Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, any Lender may, at any time, assign all or a portion of its rights and obligations under this Agreement in respect of its Term Loans to any Affiliated Lender on a non-pro rata basis (A) through Dutch Auctions open to all Lenders holding the relevant Term on a pro rata basis or (B) through open market purchases, in each case with respect to clauses (A) and (B), without the consent of the Administrative Agent;

    Another provision provided that the pro rata sharing provisions in the credit agreement did not apply to “any payment obtained by any Lender as consideration for the assignment of or sale of a participation in any of its Loans to any permitted assignee or participant, including any payment made or deemed made in connection with” a Dutch Auction or open market purchase described above. The 2016 Credit Agreement also allowed for modification by a simple majority of creditors when the amendment occurs in connection with a transaction entered into pursuant to a Dutch Auction or an open market purchase.

    Serta Faces Financial Troubles

    Facing an upcoming debt maturity, a souring consumer market and complications from the global pandemic, Serta began exploring ways to raise new capital and right-size its balance sheet in early 2020. Failing to address the company’s liquidity needs likely would have led to a chapter 11 filing or liquidation. Serta’s lenders, including lenders party to the 2016 Credit Agreement, formed two ad hoc groups. Each group, understanding the economic reality facing the company and recognizing that the 2016 Credit Agreement offered a great deal of flexibility, aimed to engage the company in a drop-down or uptiering transaction.

    Anticipating engaging Serta in a drop-down transaction, the first group of lenders approached the company about their proposed refinancing strategy. The Bankruptcy Court found that these lenders “recognized that the ‘looseness’ of the 2016 Credit Agreement allowed for (i) a liability management solution; and (ii) the stripping of first lien lender protections.”

    The second group of lenders then proposed a competing uptiering transaction contemplating the creation of a new priority debt tranche consisting of $200 million of new money plus $875 million of exchanged first and second lien loans purchased at considerable discounts.

    Serta accepted the second group’s proposal and announced the transaction publicly shortly thereafter. The first group then filed suit in New York state court, arguing that the terms of the 2016 Credit Agreement did not allow Serta to issue superpriority loans to the second group in exchange for existing loans and subordinate the first group. Serta and its affiliated debtors filed for chapter 11 protection on Jan. 23, 2023, three years after the transaction. Serta and certain of the new lenders then filed a complaint against, amongst others, the objecting lenders, seeking a determination that (i) the Transaction was permitted under the terms of the 2016 Credit Agreement and (ii) Serta and the new lenders did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

    The Decision

    In March 2023, Judge David Jones held that, as a matter of law, the 2016 Credit Agreement allowed Serta to repurchase its debt on a non-pro rata basis pursuant to the plain language of the agreement. See Hearing Transcript [ECF No. 133], Serta Simmons Bedding LLC v. AG Centre Street P’Ship (In re Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC), Adv. Pro. No. 23- 9001 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2023). In his June opinion, Judge Jones finds that the transaction was both permitted by the terms of the 2016 Credit Agreement and the result of good-faith, arm’s-length negotiations.

    Judge Jones states that “[t]he parties were keenly aware that the 2016 Credit Agreement was a “loose document” and understood the implications of that looseness.” New York law, which governs the 2016 Credit Agreement, implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of each contract and, in reviewing the actions of a contracting party, the court’s inquiry must be objective and focus on the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff at the time of contracting. Judge Jones concludes that “[t]here is no evidence of a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by either [Serta], the [participating lenders] or any of the other counter-defendants. There is no evidence of a breach of the 2016 Credit Agreement. The parties could have easily avoided this entire situation with the addition of a sentence or two to the 2016 Credit Agreement. They did not. And this litigation ends with each party receiving the bargain they struck — not the one they hoped to get.”

    Takeaways

    1. Borrowers, lenders and distressed investors must understand the degree to which credit documents allow for liability management transactions. “While the result may be harsh,” Judge Jones found that equity has no role where sophisticated parties negotiate, contract and participate in credit agreements that include the potential for uptiering or drop-down transactions.
    2. Courts have considered several similar transactions in recent years. They have issued an array of divergent opinions. While each case will hinge on the facts and particular language of the relevant credit agreements, Judge Jones has further cleared the way for Borrowers to rely on controversial transactions to the extent the transactions conform to the plain language of the credit agreements. This is likely to increase willingness by borrowers and selected lenders to push aggressively against minority lenders to ensure sufficient funding.

    Authored by Douglas S. Mintz, Ned S. Schodek, Peter J. Amend and Robert D. Brown.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] A non-guarantor subsidiary could also potentially be used, although being restricted it would still be subject to covenants in the existing credit agreement.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2023 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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