CLIENT ALERT

What the California LWDA’s modified PAGA regulations mean for employers

November 19, 2026

Read time: 28 min

Summary

This article provides an overview and strategic thoughts about the 2026 modifications to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) regulations (adopted, as of this writing, but not yet approved; see below). We also suggest ways to strengthen and leverage arbitration agreements and class-action waivers given current case law.

Overview

On November 1, 2026, the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) adopted and released modified text of the first regulations in PAGA’s 22-year history. The Office of Administrative Law (OAL) must still review and approve the regulations, after which they will be filed with the secretary of state before they become operative.

Once effective, the regulations will change PAGA’s pre-litigation process from an informal, letter-based exercise into a structured administrative proceeding. That proceeding will include a mandatory notice form, a certification requirement modeled on Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, special obligations for “high-frequency” and “non-compliant” filers, detailed cure procedures, and much closer agency oversight of settlements.

The regulations are the latest chapter in a story we have tracked for years. That story runs from Viking River Cruises v. Moriana and Adolph v. Uber Technologies, through Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, to the California Legislature’s 2024 compromise reforms. That legislation changed who can sue and what they can recover. The 2026 regulations, however, go after issues the statute left mostly alone: how the notice process works for PAGA claims, who is filing such notices, and how they are settled.

For employers, the regulations offer meaningful defensive leverage, along with new procedural traps and some open questions about the agency’s authority.

California courts, however, are moving on a different track. In Castillo v. Belkorp AG, LLC, the California Court of Appeal (Fifth Appellate District) held that a plaintiff may plead only nonindividual PAGA claims under the amended statute, which can leave no individual claim to compel to arbitration. In Molina v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc., the California Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) addressed the enforceability of a mandatory employment arbitration agreement under Labor Code section 432.6 where the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not apply. The California Supreme Court’s pending review in Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center Medical Group, Inc., raises a related question as to whether the parties’ contractual selection of the FAA is sufficient to invoke federal preemption even absent evidence that the underlying transaction involves interstate commerce.

The lesson for employers is that arbitration is only as effective as two things allow: the enforceability of the agreement and the nature of the claims asserted. Even a valid, FAA-governed agreement may not provide a way to compel arbitration of a complaint that pleads only non-individual PAGA claims.

1. Background

Historically, PAGA’s prelitigation notice process often functioned as a notice-and-wait step: Employees or their counsel sent a notice to the LWDA and the employer, waited 65 days, and then filed suit if the LWDA did not intervene. Courts required notices to identify the “facts and theories” supporting the alleged violations but did not require plaintiffs to prove those allegations before obtaining representative discovery. Recent PAGA developments have reshaped the litigation landscape: Viking River and Adolph addressed arbitration of individual PAGA claims and continued standing for non-individual claims, Estrada limited manageability-based challenges, and the 2024 reforms tightened standing, expanded cure rights, and created compliance-based penalty caps.

The 2024 reforms did not, however, change the volume or character of PAGA notices. The LWDA’s own data makes its case for regulation. From July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025, 8,846 PAGA notices were filed. According to the final statement of reasons, eight law firms would meet the 200-notice firm threshold and 12 individual attorneys would meet the 100-notice attorney threshold for that fiscal year, and this small group is responsible for a disproportionately large share of all notices filed. The regulations are the agency’s answer to frivolous, template-driven notices and repeat filers.

The 2024 reforms changed who may sue. The regulations address the notice process for claims, who is allowed to file them, and how they are settled. Together they make PAGA more procedurally demanding. As Section 3 explains, however, the courts have not made representative PAGA claims any easier to send to arbitration.

2. The LWDA’s new regulations: Greater scrutiny of PAGA notices and settlements

Where the rulemaking stands

The LWDA adopted modified PAGA regulations on November 1, 2026, following a public hearing and comment process. The regulations still must be reviewed and approved by OAL and filed with the secretary of state before they become effective.

As of November 5, 2026, we have not located any public record that the file has been submitted to OAL, approved, or filed with the secretary of state, and the LWDA’s rulemaking page still describes the regulations as proposed. We are also not aware of any court challenge to the regulations. Because the agency adopted the text as modified on August 3, the analysis below is based on that text. Until the regulations take effect, the obligations described below are prospective, and employers should build them into protocols without treating them as currently binding.

A Rule 11–style pleading standard for PAGA notices

The most consequential change for everyday practice is the notice standard in section 17420 (and section 17450 for Division 5 safety claims). Every notice must be filed on an LWDA-prescribed form that states the claimant’s dates of employment, workplace location, position, and job duties, and that identifies the specific Labor Code sections allegedly violated. Most importantly, it must contain “a short and plain statement of the facts and theories supporting each violation alleged and personally suffered by the claimant.”

The regulation then rules out the template approach explicitly. Conclusory statements, generalized allegations “without supporting facts particular to the claimant’s circumstances or working conditions,” and restatements of the law are “not sufficient.” The “personally suffered” language ties the notice requirement directly to the 2024 standing amendment. There is one carve-out: Claimants represented by qualifying nonprofit legal aid organizations must separately identify the violations they personally suffered and state the basis for violations asserted on behalf of others.

The final statement of reasons characterizes the notice standard as guidance on existing law, not a new pleading burden, citing Ibarra and Brown for the requirement that PAGA notices be specific enough for the LWDA to assess the alleged violations and for the employer to respond; employers should frame the regulation as confirmation of the existing “facts and theories” standard.

Section 17420(f) then adds the certification. By signing, the claimant or counsel certifies, after reasonable inquiry, that the claims are not presented for an improper purpose, have legal support, and have evidentiary support or are likely to after investigation. The regulation’s reference note cites Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, and the language closely tracks it. Amended notices carry the same certification (§ 17420.5(a)).

Three points stand out:

Certification without a sanctions process.

The regulation creates a certification requirement modeled on Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, but it does not include section 128.7’s safe-harbor motion process or sanctions mechanism. Enforcement would be indirect – through the LWDA’s non-compliant filer process or in court through exhaustion arguments – and the LWDA’s ability to issue deficiency notices is permissive, not a determination that a notice is sufficient. (§ 17420(h))

Stronger exhaustion arguments.

Section 17420(g) provides that a PAGA action or settlement may not include violations or theories unless the violation and supporting facts and theories were first alleged in a notice or amended notice and the administrative requirements were satisfied. The LWDA describes this as a restatement of existing exhaustion principles under Labor Code section 2699.3 and LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC; together with the new specificity requirements, it gives employers a stronger basis to challenge claims that exceed the notice or that the plaintiff did not personally experience. (§ 17420(g))

Likely challenges to agency authority.

Plaintiffs are likely to argue that section 17420(g) improperly limits what courts may adjudicate, while employers will argue that it implements the existing “facts and theories” exhaustion requirement. Employers should therefore rely on section 17420(g) together with the existing case law, rather than on the regulation alone. (§ 17420(g))

Targeting repeat filers

Section 17415 creates two designations, each with different consequences.

An attorney who filed 100 or more PAGA notices, or a law firm that filed 200 or more, in the preceding 12 months is a high-frequency filer. Qualifying nonprofit legal aid organizations are exempt.

Every notice a high-frequency filer submits must include a bold, 12-point cover letter announcing that status. Each claimant must also sign a personal certification that the violations “accurately describe the violations I believe I personally suffered during my employment within the past year” and are not presented “to harass or annoy the employer.”

The claimant certification may prove to be the most useful provision in the package for employers. It is a signed statement in the employee’s own name, tied to the one-year limitations period and to personal experience. It is not made under penalty of perjury, and the LWDA rejected requests to require that. It can still be explored at deposition and compared against the employee’s actual job duties and records. It is also strong impeachment material when a notice lists violations that could not have applied to the claimant’s position, which is exactly the problem the 2024 reform was meant to fix. The agency justified the requirement by describing cure proceedings in which employees directly contradicted allegations made on their behalf.

Settlement: The end of the late-amendment release

The settlement provisions will change how PAGA cases resolve, possibly more than any other part of the package.

Plaintiffs commonly file an amended PAGA notice at or after mediation so that the settlement can release the broadest possible set of claims. Section 17420.5(d) restricts this practice. The original text banned it outright. The modified text allows it, but only if the amended notice includes several items: a list of new Labor Code sections, the specific facts supporting new violations or parties, an explanation of how the amendment and settlement serve PAGA’s worker-protection purposes, and, for each new violation, a description of the investigation or discovery conducted and how the claimant personally suffered from the alleged violation. The amendment must also exhaust the full review period before any amended complaint or settlement approval request that includes the new violations can be filed.

Cure procedures and opportunities with deadlines

Subchapters 3 and 4 put into operation the cure rights created by the 2024 reform. They also add details that work in both directions.

Employers with fewer than 100 employees in the preceding year may submit a confidential cure proposal within 33 days of receiving a PAGA notice, with a $75 fee. The process is limited: An employer may not use it again within 12 months for a violation of the same Labor Code provision, regardless of worksite, so multi-location employers should coordinate cure strategy centrally. Cure proposals and pre-conference statements are treated as confidential settlement communications, and the employer bears the burden of proving that any cure was completed. (§ 17430.5)

Procedural traps that apply to everyone

The regulations are strict about form, and that strictness applies to employers as well as claimants. A document “is not deemed filed” unless it is submitted through the correct link on the PAGA portal (§ 17410(b)). Documents subject to a fee are not filed until the fee is paid. Safety claims under Division 5 are not deemed filed with the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) unless the filer checks the designated box and lists the specific provisions. Each of these rules gives employers a possible exhaustion defense. Each is also a risk for an employer that submits a cure notice or response through the wrong link on day 33.

Two other provisions deserve attention. First, section 17460(a)(4) requires that any order or award “entered during arbitration” that disposes of PAGA claims be submitted to the LWDA. That gives the agency visibility into the individual arbitrations created by Viking River and Adolph. Second, once effective, the regulations will apply prospectively, but procedural obligations arising after the effective date – such as settlement-submission requirements – may apply in pending cases, leaving some room for disputes at the margins.

3. Recent arbitration decisions domplicate the defense strategy

The regulations make PAGA notices harder to file carelessly. Two published October 2026 California court of appeal decisions cut the other way on arbitration, which has been many employers’ primary tool for containing PAGA exposure since Viking River. They work through different mechanisms. Castillo concerns the claims a plaintiff chooses to assert. Molina concerns whether the arbitration agreement can be enforced at all.

In Castillo v. Belkorp AG, LLC (Oct. 23, 2026, F090527) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, a former service technician who had signed an onboarding arbitration agreement filed a complaint expressly limited to nonindividual PAGA claims and disclaimed any individual PAGA claim. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The Fifth District affirmed in a published opinion, holding that under the PAGA statute as amended in 2024, an aggrieved employee may bring a PAGA action consisting only of nonindividual claims.

The court separated two questions that are easy to run together. The first is standing. Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (c)(1) now requires the plaintiff to have personally suffered each alleged violation within the one-year limitations period. The second is the relief sought. The court concluded that nothing in the statute requires the plaintiff to seek individual PAGA penalties for the violations he experienced. Following its earlier decision in CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 872, the court read “and” in section 2699, subdivision (a) as permitting individual claims, nonindividual claims, or both, and it held that the 2024 amendments changed who qualifies as an aggrieved employee without dictating which claims that employee must pursue. Castillo therefore does not relax the personal-experience requirement. A plaintiff who pleads only nonindividual claims is necessarily asserting that he personally suffered each violation alleged.

The arbitration consequence follows directly. Viking River permits an agreement to compel arbitration of a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim, and Adolph lets the plaintiff litigate nonindividual claims in court while that arbitration proceeds. Both decisions involved actions that contained an individual claim. Castillo reasoned that when a plaintiff pleads none, there is no individual dispute to send to arbitration, and nonindividual claims are not arbitrable under either decision. Compelling arbitration of an existing individual claim is one thing. Using an arbitration agreement to manufacture an individual claim the plaintiff never asserted is another, and Castillo rejected it. The court also rejected the employer’s argument that an arbitrator must first decide the plaintiff’s standing.

Castillo is one side of an acknowledged split. One Court of Appeal decision now under review by the California Supreme Court, along with Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932 held that every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual claim, which can be compelled to arbitration. CRST, Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1, and Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533 reached the opposite conclusion. Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69 held that a motion to compel is properly denied when the complaint pleads only nonindividual claims, and that any argument that a PAGA action must include an individual claim belongs in a demurrer. The California Supreme Court granted review on its own motion in the pending lead review matter on its own motion to decide whether every PAGA action necessarily includes both individual and nonindividual claims and whether a plaintiff may bring only a nonindividual action. Review is also granted in Williams (S291199), CRST (S292005), Galarsa (S293545), and Rodriguez (S290182). The pending lead review matter, Williams, CRST, and Galarsa arose under the pre-2024 statute, so Castillo is significant as an application of the rule to the amended statute. The Supreme Court’s decision in the pending lead review matter will likely determine Castillo’s reach.

What does Castillo mean in practice?

Employers can no longer assume a motion to compel will succeed simply because the plaintiff signed an enforceable agreement. The first question is what the operative complaint and the LWDA notice assert. Counsel should determine whether any individual PAGA claim is pleaded, whether the plaintiff personally experienced each alleged violation within the limitations period, and whether the notice describes facts and theories for each violation.

4. The California Supreme Court may clarify the FAA’s reach

Molina left open when an agreement is “otherwise enforceable under the FAA.” The California Supreme Court is considering a closely related question in Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center Medical Group, Inc. (S294710, review granted Mar. 25, 2026). The issue is whether a contractual FAA selection triggers the FAA’s substantive provisions and preemption regardless of whether the underlying transaction involves interstate commerce.

The case arises from an unpublished Fifth District opinion (Dec. 15, 2025, modified Jan. 7, 2026, F088971) involving an arbitration agreement that selected the FAA “to the fullest extent allowed.” The court of appeal concluded that an FAA choice-of-law clause did not itself displace Labor Code Section 229 because federal preemption requires a contract involving interstate commerce, and it found the employer’s declaration too general to make that showing.

Barbosa turns on whether an arbitration agreement’s FAA clause can itself trigger federal preemption, or whether the employer must prove with evidence that the agreement involves interstate commerce before California statutes such as Labor Code sections 229 and 432.6 are displaced.

The connection to Molina is direct. If the California Supreme Court holds that a contractual FAA selection triggers the FAA’s substantive provisions and preemption regardless of interstate commerce, many agreements with FAA clauses may qualify as “otherwise enforceable under the FAA” for purposes of section 432.6, subdivision (f), which would substantially narrow Molina’s practical reach. If the Supreme Court instead requires an interstate-commerce nexus, employers will need to establish FAA coverage through evidence about the business and the employment relationship, and agreements that cannot meet that showing will remain exposed to section 229, section 432.6 under Molina, and similar state-law limits. We do not predict the outcome. Barbosa also does not address whether a plaintiff may plead only non-individual PAGA claims.

Barbosa has been fully briefed since July 14, 2026. The California Supreme Court extended the deadlines for amicus curiae applications into mid-September 2026, and it has deferred action in at least one other case pending Barbosa. As of November 5, 2026, we have not found any order setting the case for oral argument.

5. What employers should do now

Review your arbitration agreements and class action waivers for FAA governance. If your arbitration agreement is not governed by the FAA, reach out to counsel to determine the most effective way of rolling out enforceable amended agreements. Molina cautions that mandatory onboarding agreements may be unenforceable when the FAA does not apply.

The common thread is that arbitration, standing, exhaustion, compliance, and settlement can no longer be managed separately. The steps below can be taken now. Steps tied to the regulations should be built into protocols now but treated as legal obligations only after the regulations take effect.

With specific respect to arbitration agreements:

Review FAA governing-law provisions, but do not rely on them alone. An FAA clause does not by itself guarantee preemption, and Barbosa will decide whether it can. If an agreement does not invoke the FAA, work with counsel on whether and how to roll out a revised agreement.

Build the interstate-commerce record. Evaluate whether the employment relationship involves interstate commerce and identify evidence that would prove it, such as multistate operations, interstate customers and suppliers, and the employee’s own use of interstate channels. Prepare specific, quantified declarations. A vague declaration of the kind at issue in Barbosa may not be enough.

Audit onboarding practices against section 432.6. Molina turned on how the agreement was presented. Review how agreements are delivered and described, whether a genuine option to decline exists, and how human-resources personnel explain it. Opt-out mechanisms need particular attention because subdivision (c) treats a required opt-out or other affirmative action as a condition of employment. Coordinate declarations in arbitration motions so they do not concede a condition of employment.

Review waivers and severability. Confirm that class, collective, and PAGA provisions are consistent with Viking River and Adolph, which allow arbitration of individual PAGA claims but not waiver of nonindividual claims. Include a robust severability clause, as our 2022 guidance recommended. Then decide whether revisions are warranted for new hires, existing employees, or both, and plan for changes once pending case decisions are decided.

PAGA notices and early motions

Build a day-one intake protocol for PAGA notices. Calendar the 33-day deadlines for employer responses and cures right away. Compare the notice’s specificity against the existing “facts and theories” standard and, once effective, section 17420(d)(2)(B). After the regulations take effect, also check the LWDA filer list and confirm the prescribed form, required certifications, and correct portal link.

Test standing and the claims pleaded. Use the claimant’s job title, duties, and location to identify violations the claimant could not have personally suffered within the one-year period. Compare the notice with the complaint and determine whether any individual PAGA claim is pleaded before moving to compel arbitration. Raise those issues early.

Choose the right motion. Where a complaint pleads only nonindividual claims, consider whether a demurrer or motion to strike on standing, pleading, or exhaustion grounds is the better first move. Under Castillo, those challenges do not belong in a motion to compel arbitration. Consider requesting a stay or other case management relief.

Cure and agency response

Approach cure strategically, not defensively. Cure rights under the 2024 reforms are available now. For eligible employers, especially those with multiple locations, decide in advance which violations are worth curing. Once the regulations take effect, the 12-month, same-provision limit means that using a cure at one location affects every other location. Respond to the LWDA selectively and with documentation, since an employer response is not confidential.

Settlement

Rework the settlement playbook. Identify overlapping PAGA notices and lawsuits early. Confirm that every claim to be released has been included in a notice and exhausted. Move notice amendments to the front of the process. For settlements likely to be filed after the effective date, plan for notice to other pending PAGA plaintiffs, the 21-day comment window, the 45-day agency review, and defense counsel’s verification of pending actions. Draft valuation memoranda on the assumption that competing plaintiffs and the LWDA will read them. Until the regulations take effect, these are planning steps rather than legal requirements.

Compliance

Keep strengthening compliance. The 2024 reforms cap penalties at 15% where the employer took all reasonable steps to comply before receiving a notice, and at 30% where it takes all reasonable steps within 60 days afterward. Those caps depend on a record. Continue wage-and-hour audits, document the remedial action taken in response, maintain lawful written policies, and train supervisors, as we recommended in our Estrada and 2024 reform guidance. The LWDA has confirmed that reasonable-compliance showings are made to the court, not the agency.

Keep enforcing arbitration agreements and expect visibility. Viking River-compliant agreements still matter. Individual awards will now be reported to the LWDA.

Looking ahead

Several developments will determine when and how the regulations affect employers. The regulations still must be approved by OAL and filed with the California secretary of state before taking effect, and once effective, key provisions – including the non-compliant filer rules, section 17420(g), and settlement-review requirements – may face challenges to the LWDA’s authority. On the judicial side, the California Supreme Court’s decision, argued November 3, 2026, will likely decide whether plaintiffs may plead only nonindividual PAGA claims. Its decision in Barbosa will clarify whether an FAA clause alone is enough to trigger preemption. Employers should also watch whether review is sought in Castillo or Molina.

What is already clear is the direction. Since 2022, the US Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court, the California Legislature, and now the LWDA have each reexamined PAGA’s original “notice-and-sue” model. California is making PAGA claims more procedurally demanding while preserving significant room for representative litigation. Employers that treat arbitration, statutory standing, administrative exhaustion, compliance, and settlement strategy as interconnected defenses, starting the day a notice arrives, will be best positioned to manage PAGA exposure.

Authors

Maria C. Rodriguez

Partner

Los Angeles

MiRi Song

Partner

Los Angeles

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