Content Type: Article

  • The European Commission Publishes Final Implementing Regulation on Proceedings Pursuant to the Foreign Subsidies Regulation

    The European Commission Publishes Final Implementing Regulation on Proceedings Pursuant to the Foreign Subsidies Regulation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The European Commission Publishes Final Implementing Regulation on Proceedings Pursuant to the Foreign Subsidies Regulation

    July 17, 2023

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Last Step Towards a New Regulatory Framework for M&A Transactions Within the European Union

    On July 10, 2023, the European Commission (the “Commission”) published its final regulation for implementing the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). The Implementing Regulation (the “IR”) clarifies practical and procedural aspects related to the application of the new EU rules to address distortions caused by foreign subsidies in the EU internal market. This much-awaited text provides businesses and their advisors with guidance on how the new regime will work in practice. On July 12, 2023, just a few days after the release of the IR, the Commission released a new Communication with further details concerning the conduct of proceedings under the FSR, including the submission of documents.

    In depth

    Background on FSR

    As a short reminder, on December 23, 2022, the Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of December 14, 2022, on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The FSR tackles foreign subsidies granted by non-EU governments to companies active in the EU and which distort the internal market.

    The new FSR rules which took effect on July 12, 2023, apply to M&A transactions as of October 12, 2023, in which (i) a buyer and/or a target that received combined aggregate foreign financial contributions exceeding EUR 50 million in the last three years prior to the conclusion of the transaction agreement, and (ii) at least one of the merging companies, target, or joint-venture is established in the EU and has EU turnover of at least EUR 500 million. Transactions that meet these two cumulative thresholds will need to be notified and approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

    For a more detailed discussion of the key principles of the FSR, please see our previous article: EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation Enters into Force in 2023.

    Background on the Implementing Regulation

    On February 6, 2023, the Commission published a draft regulation for implementing the FSR (the “Draft Implementing Regulation”) and invited stakeholders to give feedback by March 6, 2023.

    Various comments were submitted to the Commission by different stakeholders, including companies, associations, and law firms. Generally, the comments criticized the administrative burden imposed on companies related to the information collection and disclosures required by the regulation. The Commission appears to have largely considered some of this feedback. Consequently, the IR provides that the level of information required in the notification form varies based on the potential distortive effect on the internal market of the foreign financial contribution.

    Although some concessions were made by the Commission in the IR, it is critical to stress that all financial contributions received from non-EU governments (including member States of the European Economic Area like Norway, or the United Kingdom as former member State of the EU), foreign public authorities, and even private companies whose actions can be attributed to the foreign country, still count towards the EUR 50 million jurisdictional threshold. It is disappointing that although stakeholders requested clarification of the definition of “financial contribution,” the IR remains silent and does not provide a more precise definition of foreign financial contributions.

    New Exemptions from Disclosure in the Form FS-CO

    The original scope of the required information to be collected for the notification was a source of major concern for stakeholders. Many felt that the administrative burden imposed on the notifying parties was disproportionate to achieving the aims of the FSR. Therefore, stakeholders asked the Commission to narrow the scope of the information required to what is available and necessary to assess the existence of distortive foreign subsidies.

    A welcomed major improvement to the FSR notification form (the “Form FS-CO”), annexed to the IR, is that the following foreign financial contributions are exempt from disclosure – but still count for the jurisdictional threshold:

    • Foreign financial contributions below a de minimis threshold of EUR 1 million.
    • All foreign financial contributions awarded in the same country in the three years prior to the signing of the transaction agreement if the expected aggregate value is less than EUR 45 million.
    • The supply/purchase of goods/services at market terms in the ordinary course of business (e.g., outcome of public bids), except ordinary course financial services agreements with public authorities must still be disclosed.
    • Deferrals of payment of taxes or of social security contributions, tax amnesties, and tax holidays as well as normal depreciation and loss-carry forward rules that are of general application (if such measures are “selective” or “specific”, they need to be disclosed); and
    • Applications of tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation.

    Notably, private equity funds are subject to a specific disclosure regime. On the Form FS-CO, only foreign financial contributions received by the fund involved in the transaction and its controlled portfolio companies must be reported. Foreign financial contributions made to other funds managed by the same investment firm (or by portfolio companies controlled by those funds), but with a majority of distinct investors, are not required to be reported and will not be factored into the total amount for the jurisdictional threshold. These exemptions are only available to investment firms that meet specific requirements.

    Mandatory Disclosure under the Form FS-CO

    Foreign financial contributions that fall into one of the categories considered “most likely to distort” competition in the EU internal market must be reported if the individual amount of the contribution is EUR 1 million or more. This EUR 1 million reporting threshold applies to five specified categories of foreign subsidies in the FSR of “most likely” to distort the EU internal market (listed under article 5(1) of the FSR).

    Based on the IR, notifying parties will be well advised to seek a waiver from the Commission during pre-notification discussions to alleviate the quantity of data to be collected. However, this will be on ad hoc basis, and we expect guidance from the Commission early next year to give potential acquirers more predictability and transparency regarding the scope of financial contributions that need to be reported.

    Takeaways & Next Steps

    The final text of the Implementing Regulation was the last legal instrument that needed to be adopted before the FSR took effect on July 12, 2023. Transactions that sign on or after this date, but have not closed by October 12, 2023, and which meet the applicable thresholds, must be notified to the Commission.

    Although the Commission alleviated some of the administrative burden on companies contemplating M&A transactions in terms of the exemptions from disclosure in the Form FS-CO, the initial data and information collection of all foreign financial contributions remains an obligation for companies to determine if the jurisdictional thresholds are met, thus triggering a notification obligation. In addition to this collection exercise, companies will need to make their own assessment on whether certain financial contributions received are foreign subsidies that are likely to be distortive and thereby need to be reported. This quasi-shifting of the burden of proof will constitute an additional obligation to be undertaken by the acquirers and may lead to frequent substantive discussions between the Commission and the notifying party[ies].

    The impact of the FSR on deal risk and timing should be considered by merging parties during negotiations. The risks inherent to a Commission investigation pursuant to the FSR must be considered in the usual contractual provisions (such as conditions precedent, cooperation obligations, long-stop date, and representations and warranties). Due diligence of a target must also include a review of foreign financial contributions, particularly those that are reportable. Companies now contemplating M&A transactions must factor in and closely coordinate all regulatory processes entailed by merger control, foreign direct investment screening, and FSR review.

    *Trainee Francesca Casalone also contributed to this article.

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  • New EU-US Data Privacy Framework: What Companies Need to Know

    New EU-US Data Privacy Framework: What Companies Need to Know

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New EU-US Data Privacy Framework: What Companies Need to Know

    July 14, 2023

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 10, 2023, the European Commission adopted its adequacy decision for the EU-US Data Privacy Framework (DPF). The decision concluded that the United States does ensure an adequate level of protection for transferring personal data from the European Union to the United States. In this On the Subject, we analyze this impactful decision and highlight compliance obligations for US companies seeking to become DPF-certified.

    In depth

    EU-US CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER BACKGROUND

    The DPF creates a lawful transatlantic framework that allows the free flow of data from the EU to DPF-certified companies located in the United States. It will no longer be necessary for these transferring entities to implement additional safeguards (e.g., binding corporate rules, the European Commission’s standard contractual clauses, industry-specific codes of conduct or EU certification mechanisms) to ensure that personal data continues to be protected under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

    The adequacy decision is the result of lengthy negotiation between the Biden administration and the European Commission following the European Court of Justice’s Schrems I and Schrems II rulings, which invalidated prior frameworks for EU-to-US cross-border data transfers. In Schrems II, the European Court of Justice found that the now-invalidated Privacy Shield failed to provide Europeans with effective redress rights or adequate protection against interception of their data by US intelligence authorities. Following Schrems II, the United States took steps to implement additional protections addressing these concerns about US surveillance law, which included issuing Executive Order 14086 in late 2022, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities.” These steps helped pave the way for approval by EU member states and final adoption by the European Commission.

    FRAMEWORK SUBSTANCE

    The DPF includes provisions similar to those of its predecessors—such as purpose limitations, data retention requirements, data minimization, data security and data accuracy principles—but it also includes provisions designed to address the concerns raised by the European Court of Justice in Schrems I and II. Specifically, the DPF includes enhanced data protection safeguards, including limiting US intelligence services’ access to EU personal data to that which is necessary and proportionate. Potentially most significantly for EU individuals, the DPF also establishes the Data Protection Review Court, whose role is to “handle and resolve” EU individuals’ complaints regarding concerns over US intelligence activities related to their data.

    The European Commission will carry out periodic reviews of the DPF together with representatives of the European Data Protection Authorities and the relevant US authorities. The first review will take place in 2024, as the DPF requires the first review to be completed within a year. Per the DPF, this first review should be designed to ensure that all relevant features of the DPF have been fully and effectively implemented as planned.

    CERTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT PROCESS

    The DPF will be administered by the US Department of Commerce, which will process certification applications and monitor whether participating companies continue to meet certification requirements. Compliance under the DPF will be enforced by the US Federal Trade Commission.

    The US International Trade Administration has already launched a website dedicated to the DPF and allowing for self-certification. However, that website appears “under construction” and is not yet accepting applications.

    In the meantime, the old Privacy Shield website provides a set of FAQs related to certification under the new DPF. While the DPF does “not create new substantive obligations for participating organizations” that were already subject to the Privacy Shield, there are certain important steps that companies must take, including:

    • Updating privacy policies to incorporate the new DPF terms in lieu of Privacy Shield terms
    • Ensuring that existing Privacy Shield certifications are brought up to date, including through recertification and paying the required fees.

    US-based organizations that self-certified their commitment to comply with the Privacy Shield must comply with the DPF principles, including by updating their privacy policies by October 10, 2023. Those organizations do not need to make a separate, initial self-certification submission to participate in the DPF and may begin relying immediately on the DPF.

    Many companies may have let their Privacy Shield certifications lapse following the uncertainty created by Schrems II, so there is no better time to check those certifications. If a company was not previously certified under the Privacy Shield, there is work to do with respect to creating internal and external policies.

    POSSIBLE SCHREMS III STILL TO COME

    The European Commission’s adequacy decision eases the burden of global commerce for many businesses. However, the future of the DPF remains uncertain. Privacy advocacy organization NOYB, which challenged both the Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield in Schrems I and II, has already publicly stated that it will appeal the framework for being a substantial “copy” of the Privacy Shield and its predecessors that fails to address the same concerns related to “fundamental” surveillance issues. For instance, the organization argues that the DPF does nothing to provide non-US citizens with reasonable privacy protections afforded to US citizens under the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution.

    ***

    Despite the impending challenge to the DPF decision, many businesses may nonetheless consider certifying under DPF because the certification process could still reduce compliance and contractual burdens otherwise incurred during the appeal. Companies interested in evaluating the merits of DPF certification should contact the authors or their regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    Amy C. Pimentel

    Partner

    Boston

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  • Proposed HSR Changes: What Fund Managers Need to Know

    Proposed HSR Changes: What Fund Managers Need to Know

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Proposed HSR Changes: What Fund Managers Need to Know

    July 14, 2023

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Proposed HSR Rulemaking Would Significantly Impact Investment Funds

    On June 27, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) — in consultation with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) — proposed sweeping changes to the premerger notification form and associated instructions and the premerger notification rules implementing the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Antitrust Improvements Act. The new HSR form would require parties to reportable transactions to provide substantially more information and documents than they do currently, regardless of whether the proposed transaction affects competition.

    The proposed overhaul of the HSR Act filing requirements — the first of its kind in over 45 years since the HSR program’s inception — are detailed in a 133-page Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) published on June 29, 2023, triggering a 60-day public comment period that will end on Aug. 28, 2023 (although the FTC may extend the comment period depending on public response). After the comment period has expired, the FTC will review the public comments and potentially make revisions before issuing its final rule, which would take effect 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

    If implemented, the NPRM’s changes to the HSR framework would disproportionately and acutely affect all types of investment funds, from hedge funds acquiring minority stakes to private equity funds buying portfolio companies. The HSR changes would burden them with significantly expanded and intrusive disclosure requirements, hampering their ability to execute deals quickly and increasing their legal costs.

    HSR Filings: What Would the NPRM Change?

    The HSR Act enables premerger screening of transactions for competitive issues by requiring parties to reportable transactions to file an HSR form with the FTC and DOJ, and to observe a statutorily prescribed waiting period prior to closing, unless an exemption applies. FTC Chair Lina Khan stated that the information currently collected by the HSR form is insufficient for the agencies to assess, within the initial waiting period, whether a proposed transaction may violate the antitrust laws. Chair Khan asserted that the proposed changes are intended to address the gaps routinely encountered by agency staff, including insufficient information about deal rationale, the structure of investment vehicles, and information about labor markets and research and development activity. The amendments also would fulfill a new requirement under the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2022 that HSR notifications include information regarding subsidies from certain foreign governments or entities that have been identified as economic or strategic threats to U.S. interests.

    Although the agencies have proposed some deletions to the HSR form, the proposed amendments generally would add many burdensome requirements. The changes would increase dramatically the resources, time and expense required to make an HSR filing for all transactions, regardless of their potential competitive impact (or lack thereof).

    The FTC itself estimates that the proposed changes could increase the time required to prepare and submit an HSR filing by a likely-underestimated average of 107 hours, with a range of 12 to 222 additional hours per filing depending on the particulars of the deal. The ability of investment funds to navigate nimbly the open market already is constrained by the 30-day waiting period when an HSR filing is required. The proposed HSR changes would further encumber investors, requiring a minimum of 12 additional hours to prepare filings for even the simplest of transactions with no competitive issues. Investors with complex fund and transaction structures may need weeks instead of days to prepare their HSR filings, and possibly even months if the transaction involves any competitive overlaps between the parties.

    Investment Funds in the Crosshairs

    Some of the proposed changes to HSR reporting appear to be directed at private equity and other investment funds. For example:

    • Limited partners. The current HSR form requires disclosure of the general partners of limited partnerships and the identities of shareholders of five percent or more of corporate entities. Asserting that limited partner (“LP”) identities are critical to assessing potential antitrust violations, the FTC is proposing the disclosure of LPs with a stake of five percent or more at each level of an investment structure, even though LPs generally do not exert influence or control over the fund or the fund’s portfolio companies. Protecting the identity of LP investors traditionally is paramount for investment firms, so the new disclosure requirements likely would negatively impact fundraising and potentially deal volume. The new form also would require the disclosure of significant creditors (lending 10 percent or more of the overall target value), option holders, management firms and investors with board appointment rights, as well as the submission of an organization chart for all funds and master limited partnerships.
    • Prior transactions in overlapping businesses. For any potential overlaps, the current HSR form requires disclosure of acquisitions of control of entities with annual net sales or total assets of $10 million and of asset acquisitions that were of reportable size in the previous five years. The new HSR form would double the reporting period to 10 years and require disclosure of acquisitions of control of any size (capturing startups and nascent companies that currently would be excluded), as well as acquisitions of substantially all of the assets of an entity regardless of transaction size (in addition to asset acquisitions of reportable size). These additional reporting requirements are squarely aimed at private equity firms’ “roll-up strategies,” as noted in the NPRM and which both the FTC and DOJ have been vocal about the need to police. Investors will need to be mindful of potential antitrust concerns raised by any transaction — even if it is not reportable or exempt from the HSR Act — given that a subsequent reportable deal may require its disclosure. In addition to being subject to scrutiny themselves upon disclosure, these prior transactions could affect the agency’s assessment of the competitive effects of the transaction under review.
    • “Interlocking” board directors. Consistent with the DOJ’s and FTC’s stated intent to increase their scrutiny of companies with interlocking directorates, the NPRM seeks disclosure of the officers, directors or board observers (or similar positions for noncorporate entities) of an acquiring firm and all entities within it, as well as the other boards on which those individuals currently serve or have served within the last two years. The FTC also seeks information regarding prospective officers, directors or board observers post-transaction for both parties and any new entities created as a result of the transaction (or who would have authority to choose them). The recordkeeping demands presented by this new disclosure requirement would be particularly challenging for large investors with complex organizational structures. Notably, three of the four interlocks most recently unwound by DOJ involved private equity firms.

    Additional Changes That Would Affect Investment Funds

    All of the changes proposed in the NPRM would apply to all reportable transactions, regardless of their potential (or lack of) competitive effect. Many of those changes would significantly affect investment funds, even when their deals do not raise antitrust concerns.

    • Expanded document production. The NPRM seeks various additional documents, significantly increasing the cost and time required to collect, review and produce HSR documents. For example, the new HSR form would require drafts of certain “Item 4” documents, documents created by or for non-officer “supervisory deal team leads,” and ordinary course strategic plans in overlap markets, as well as all agreements (including all schedules and exhibits) related to the transaction, including agreements between the parties and agreements with third parties (e.g., supply or licensing agreements) that were in effect at the time or within one year of filing.
    • Document retention. HSR filers will need to certify that they have taken steps to preserve documents and relevant information, including on all communications and messaging platforms, and also identify their communications, document and data storage systems.
    • Subsidies from foreign entities or governments of concern. The proposed changes include the requirement that parties provide data about any subsidies they have received from certain foreign governments and other entities of concern, as mandated by the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2022. This disclosure requirement may apply to investors partnering with sovereign wealth funds and other foreign entities.
    • Shift to narrative-based notification. The current HSR form generally requires information to be provided in an objective format, mostly in list form, with only the transaction description requiring a narrative response, as well as the production of existing documents the parties have collected in the ordinary course of business. If a transaction is deemed to potentially raise antitrust concerns, the agencies may conduct a more in-depth investigation and request additional information and documents through the “Second Request” process. Transactions that do not raise any antitrust concerns (which comprise the vast majority of reported transactions) are allowed to proceed with limited burden on filers.  

    The proposed changes would subject all HSR filers to the expanded information and document requests more typical of Second Requests. Parties would be required to create new information, including comprehensive descriptions of the transaction and its strategic rationale, analysis of the relevant horizontal and vertical markets and the transaction’s potential competitive impact, as well as providing a transaction diagram and projected closing timeline. The proposed more subjective, narrative responses are akin to the merger review processes in the European Union and other foreign jurisdictions. And while Chair Khan described these proposed amendments as consistent with the format of those jurisdictions, the new HSR requirements would exceed their foreign counterparts in many respects. For example:

    • The EU and most other jurisdictions generally require filings only for acquisitions of control or a substantial minority position. In contrast, hundreds of noncontrolling acquisitions are HSR-reportable each year, even when the shares held represent a fractional minority position. Moreover, the EU allows parties self-reporting overlaps with combined market shares of 20 percent or less to submit a “short form” that is less burdensome. The NPRM does not provide a fast track process, nor does it account for the degree to which the transaction may affect competition.
    • The extensive information and documents required under the proposed framework for transactions involving any overlaps at all are required in the EU only for transactions presenting substantial overlaps (e.g., a 20 percent combined market share). Requiring the collection of documents from employees other than officers and directors also goes beyond the typical EU approach.
    • The EU allows a pre-notification process to ensure that filings will be deemed complete once formally submitted. Without a similar pre-notification process, HSR filers have no way to ensure that their submissions will be deemed complete and their waiting periods will run as anticipated. The newness, subjectiveness and breadth of the proposed changes also increase the risk that an HSR filing could be “bounced” (i.e., deemed incomplete and rejected), restarting the waiting period.
    • More difficult to file on a letter of intent. Parties currently may file on the basis of preliminary agreements, such as a letter of intent (“LOI”) or an indication of interest, and may, but are not required to, provide draft agreements. Under the proposed rules, parties must submit a draft agreement or term sheet that details the “scope of the entire transaction that will be consummated,” including considerable detail on deal structure. Given that deal structures often are revised during negotiations, this requirement may curtail the ability of parties to “start the HSR clock” by filing on the basis of a “bare bones” LOI or preliminary term sheet. Parties also will need to weigh the benefits of submitting an HSR filing on the basis of an LOI given the significantly increased burden and costs that would be imposed by the new rules and the recently revamped filing fee framework that may require fees up of to $2.25 million for the largest transactions.
    • Extensive disclosure requirements for transactions with overlaps or vertical elements. Investment firms with portfolio companies in the same lines of business as the other party will be required to provide additional information for each overlapping product or service, such as details on revenues (in addition to reporting revenues by NAICS code separately for each controlled entity, the NPRM seeks projected revenues by NAICS code for overlapping products and services under development), top customers (including contact information), licensing arrangements and non-compete or non-solicitation agreements, or, if the product or service is not yet in the market, then research and development information. Investors with portfolio companies in an upstream or downstream business must provide details regarding sales to the other party and the other party’s competitors.

    Key Takeaways

    • Proposed changes are extensive and would apply to all HSR filers. The proposed changes to the HSR framework would substantially affect filers in all deals, including the vast majority that raise no antitrust concerns, as is the case for many investors acquiring minority stakes. Even though the FTC and DOJ reported in their most recent HSR Annual Report that only 1.9 percent of the 3,520 filings made in 2021 triggered an in-depth investigation, the agencies have proposed significant increased disclosure requirements enabling a level of scrutiny during the initial waiting period that currently is required only for the small percentage of deals that raise competitive issues.
    • Extensive additional lead time required for HSR preparation. Investment funds acquiring minority stakes would need to account for the additional time and cost required to prepare an HSR filing under the proposed framework, even if the transaction poses no legitimate competitive concerns. Buyout firms or groups will need to build sufficient time into their deal timetable to accommodate the proposed HSR changes and should rethink commitments to submit filings within the five to 10 business days provided in many purchase agreements, particularly where there are any potential competitive issues or overlaps in products or services. To meet deal timetables, parties may be forced to begin preparing HSR filings long before a definitive deal is agreed upon and will risk incurring those upfront costs even if deal negotiations fall apart.
    • Expanded and more intrusive disclosure requirements. Significant among the many increased disclosure requirements is that buyers would be required to identify limited partners and provide the structure of their investment entities.
    • Mitigation of risks needed for document creation and retention. Parties will need to be mindful about wording and perceptions when preparing documents, including drafts prepared months before an HSR filing will be submitted. Care should be taken to avoid, for example, defining a “market” (as it may limit or be inconsistent with the market to be defined in the competitive analysis required by the proposed HSR form), overstating a party’s competitive significance, or using “buzz words” that tend to interest antitrust regulators (e.g., “dominate,” “control,” “leverage,” etc.). Filers also will need to implement appropriate document retention policies.
    • Will agency review of transactions actually be more efficient and effective? It is possible that the purported benefits of the NPRM’s proposed changes will allow the agencies to review transactions within the initial waiting period or even to resume the granting of early termination (which has been “temporarily” suspended since February 2021). It also is possible that agency staff — already overtaxed by hundreds of HSR filings per month — will fall further behind when those filings will entail extensive and subjective narrative responses, and be accompanied by a vastly increased number of documents that currently are requested only when deals actually raise antitrust concerns.

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz and Ngoc Pham Hulbig.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2023 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Federal Trade Commission Proposes Stiff Penalties for Fake Reviews, Sets Sights on Social Media Influencers

    Federal Trade Commission Proposes Stiff Penalties for Fake Reviews, Sets Sights on Social Media Influencers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Trade Commission Proposes Stiff Penalties for Fake Reviews, Sets Sights on Social Media Influencers

    July 13, 2023

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In back-to-back announcements, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sent a clear message that it will ramp up its focus on regulating influencer endorsements and combating deceptive and fake reviews.

    The announcements included Endorsement Guide updates and a new proposed rule (for public comment) to ban fake reviews or testimonials. The changes will impact advertisers and businesses that market their products through paid promotional content, produce paid promotional content or publish reviews of their products and services.

    In depth

    SUMMARY: ENDORSEMENT GUIDES UPDATES

    Incorporating feedback from public comments, the final revised Endorsement Guides reflect revisions targeting deceptive reviews and endorsements. The changes include:

    • Outlining how a business may not deceptively manage reviews to distort what consumers think of a product. Although editing, curating and organizing reviews is permitted under certain circumstances, those actions must apply to both positive and negative reviews. For example, the FTC states that it is deceptive to list all positive reviews before negative reviews because consumers may not read through all reviews to reach the negative ones.
    • Addressing incentivized reviews, reviews by employees and fake negative reviews of a competitor. Disclosures are required when reviews and endorsements are made in exchange for compensation. As a rule, the FTC requires those making public endorsements to disclose if they are being compensated in any way to advertise those products (including receiving the endorsed product for free, monetary compensation, publicity or an incentive such as entry into a sweepstakes). Additionally, review sites with material connections to brands they are reviewing must disclose these relationships and cannot state that they are “independent.” Sites that pay or accept payment for reviews also cannot state that their rankings are “objective.”
    • Defining “clear and conspicuous” and clarifying that a platform’s built-in disclosure tools may be inadequate. Adequate disclosure is the responsibility of the influencer, not the platform. Just because a platform offers a feature that allows users to disclose paid endorsements does not mean that those endorsements meet the “clear and conspicuous” requirement of the Endorsement Guides. According to the FTC, an adequate disclosure must be placed where users are likely to see it, it must stand out and be easily readable, and it must be clear. The FTC notes that the phrase “contains paid content” may not be adequate on its own. For example, if an influencer advertises multiple products in one video—without identifying which product they were paid to include—the disclosure lacks clarity in the FTC’s opinion.
    • Altering the definition of “endorsement” to clarify the extent to which it includes fake reviews, virtual influencers and social media tags. The FTC clarifies that tags in social media posts can constitute endorsements but are not always considered as such. Additionally, the updated Endorsement Guides expand the definition of “endorser” to include fake review writers and non-existent entities that purport to give endorsements.
    • Clarifying the potential liability of advertisers, endorsers and intermediaries. Advertisers must now monitor and take responsibility for the actions of their endorsers, and advertisers can be liable for endorsers’ violations (in addition to the endorsers’ individual liability). An advertiser’s liability could extend to “deceptive endorsements” and not just whether an endorser’s statement is true. For example, an advertiser could be held liable for publishing an advertisement containing an endorser who makes a truthful statement that reflects atypical results of using the product.
    • Emphasizing that child-directed advertising remains of special concern. Practices that would not ordinarily be questioned in advertisements directed toward adults may be questioned when directed to minors. However, the FTC has not imposed specific requirements for child-directed advertising.

    In addition to the updated Endorsement Guides, the FTC published an updated comprehensive FAQs resource. This resource now provides specific guidance for influencers regarding disclosure of material connections on various social media platforms and sets out specific FTC views on influencer monitoring for brands and platform disclosure tools. This updated FAQ also incorporates additional guidance on using and publishing online reviews.

    SUMMARY: PROPOSED RULE BANNING FAKE REVIEWS AND TESTIMONIALS

    The FTC’s proposed “Rule on the Use of Consumer Reviews and Testimonials” seeks to update FTC authority “to attack deceptive advertising in the digital age.”

    If the proposed rule takes effect, violations will carry a fine of up to $50,120 per violation for businesses and individuals. Marketers that rely on, solicit or post customer reviews should be aware of the unfair or deceptive acts or practices involving consumer reviews or testimonials that the FTC seeks to ban. These potentially prohibited practices include:

    • Selling or obtaining fake consumer reviews and testimonials. The proposed rule would prohibit businesses from writing or selling consumer reviews or testimonials by someone who does not exist, did not use or experience the product or service, or falsely portrayed their experiences. The proposed rule would further prohibit businesses from obtaining such reviews or displaying such testimonials if they knew or should have known that the statements were fake or false.
    • Review hijacking. The proposed rule would prohibit businesses from using or repurposing a consumer review written for one product such that it deceptively appears to have been written for a substantially different product.
    • Buying positive or negative reviews. The proposed rule would prohibit businesses from offering compensation or any incentive conditioned on writing positive or negative consumer reviews.
    • Writing insider reviews and consumer testimonials. The proposed rule would prohibit a company’s officers and managers from writing reviews or testimonials of its products or services without clearly disclosing their relationship to the company. This prohibition would also apply to these employees’ relatives.
    • Running company-controlled “independent” review websites. The proposed rule would prohibit businesses from creating or controlling a website that claims to provide independent opinions about a category of products or services that includes its own products or services.
    • Review suppression via intimidation or other illicit means. The proposed rule would prohibit businesses from using intimidation, threats or false accusations to prevent or remove a negative consumer review. It would also prohibit businesses from misrepresenting that the reviews on its website represent all reviews submitted when negative reviews have been suppressed or deleted.
    • Selling fake social media indicators. The proposed rule would prohibit businesses from selling false and deceptive indicators of social media influence, such as fake followers or views.

    The FTC is seeking public comment on the proposed rule, which has not yet been published in the Federal Register. Businesses that could be impacted by this rule are encouraged to submit comments within 60 days after its publication.

    Royce Brosseau, a summer associate in the Washington, DC, office, also contributed to this article.

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  • Just Catching Up? For SECURE 2.0’s Catch-Up Contributions, Age Is More Than Just a Number

    Just Catching Up? For SECURE 2.0’s Catch-Up Contributions, Age Is More Than Just a Number

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Just Catching Up? For SECURE 2.0’s Catch-Up Contributions, Age Is More Than Just a Number

    July 12, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In this series of articles, we explore the implications of SECURE 2.0’s changes to catch-up contributions and how employers should respond.


    Nearly all employers offer eligible participants the opportunity to make additional catch-up contributions to their retirement plans. Doing so provides a great way for older workers to literally “catch up” by saving more money as they get closer to retirement age, money they may not have been able to save earlier in their careers.

    Under current law, those contributions—up to an extra $7,500 for 2023—are equally available to employees who are age 50 or older. However, beginning in 2025, the SECURE 2.0 Act makes so-called “super-catch-up contributions” available to employees who reach ages 60, 61, 62 or 63 during the year. For those employees, employers may increase the catch-up contribution limit to the greater of:

    • $10,000 (which will be indexed for cost-of-living increases starting in 2026); or
    • 150% of the regular age 50 catch-up contribution limit (which is already separately indexed for cost-of-living increases).

    For all other catch-up contribution-eligible employees—including those who will not reach at least age 60 during a given year, or who will attain age 64 or older in such a year—the ordinary catch-up contribution limit will remain in place.

    Discussions about the obstacles to implementing this change have taken a bit of a backseat to the much-talked-about challenges of the act’s new Roth catch-up contribution requirement. But those obstacles have also left many employers feeling like the new super-catch-up-contribution limit is anything but super. Many employers have emphasized that, currently, payroll providers and recordkeepers need only track one age and one limit for catch-up contributions. But employers that add super-catch-up contributions will need to track three separate age categories—age 50 through age 59 (regular catch-up), age 60 through 63 (super-catch-up), and age 64 and older (back to regular catch-up)—and two separate limits. As a result, adding this new feature will require employers and their service providers to develop new processes to monitor these various ages and limits and to audit that information to ensure it is properly applied.

    That alone would be a tall order for most employers, but when combined with the many other changes under SECURE 2.0, it seems even more daunting. The bit of good news for employers is that, unlike the new Roth catch-up contribution requirement (which is effective beginning in 2024), this change won’t apply until 2025. In addition, as it stands now, we expect the change to be optional. Such treatment is consistent with other special catch-up contribution features (e.g., the special 403(b) catch-up), which remain optional for employers. It is also consistent with the lack of a Roth-catch-up-like universal availability requirement for the super-catch-up-contribution feature. However, further guidance would help confirm that employers are free to choose if, and when, to add this to their plans. In either case, because nearly all employers currently offer regular catch-up contributions to employees, most expect this feature to become commonplace, meaning employees are likely to expect it to be made available to them.

    For any questions regarding SECURE 2.0 changes, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.

    ***

    Read First Article: Just Catching Up? SECURE 2.0 Roth Catch-Up Contribution Requirement Leaves More Questions than Answers

    Read Second Article: Just Catching Up? All for One, or None for All, Catch-Up Contributions Under SECURE 2.0

    Read Third Article: Just Catching Up? Wages, by Any Other Name, Not So Sweet for Employers Under SECURE 2.0

    Read Fourth Article: Just Catching Up? Payroll Challenges Plague Roth Catch-Up Contribution Implementation

    Read Fifth Article: Just Catching Up? Oops! Congress Clarifies Catch-Up Contributions Are Here to Stay

    In depth
    Authors

    Brian J. Tiemann

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • EU Top Court Sheds Light on Untested Crossroads Between Competition and Privacy Law

    EU Top Court Sheds Light on Untested Crossroads Between Competition and Privacy Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    EU Top Court Sheds Light on Untested Crossroads Between Competition and Privacy Law

    July 12, 2023

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 4, 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued a ruling in the case involving Meta Platforms Inc., Meta Platforms Ireland, and Facebook Deutschland (Meta). The judgement explores the intersection of competition and privacy law with potentially significant impact on a wide range of businesses, including website/app and online social network operators. Key issues to consider include:

    • Companies’ GDPR compliance can also be considered by national competition authorities (NCAs) during their investigation of competition law infringements, whether these concern an abuse of dominant position or an anticompetitive agreement. More broadly, it cannot be excluded that the NCAs could take other types of EU legislation into consideration.
    • A company’s dominant position on a market does not preclude but is an important factor in assessing the validity of users’ consent with its processing of their personal data – such a determination may hinder certain data processing activities of entities subject to the Digital Markets Act (EU) 2022/1925 (DMA).
    • Simple processing of data about user visits to websites/apps referring to a special of category personal data (without users entering any information/logging in) may mean that this special category of personal data is actually revealed. Any sharing of the visit data with third parties is subject to users’ consent.
    • Should companies wish to rely on the “performance of a contract” as legal grounds for the provision of an online (social network) service with personalized content, they need to be able to demonstrate the content personalization is “objectively indispensable” for the provision of such service.
    • Companies that target individuals with personalized advertising on the basis of their “legitimate interests” as legal grounds are reminded that they should carefully balance their legitimate interests against those of the individuals, and if necessary, implement safeguards and document their legitimate interest assessment. Consent is the only alternative to legitimate interest as legal grounds for personalized advertising.

    Given the breadth of the CJEU’s key findings, companies should thoroughly consider their potential implications. We explore these in more detail below.

    In depth

    Background

    On July 4, 2023, the CJEU issued a preliminary ruling on several questions referred to it by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court in Germany, concerning the interplay between data protection and competition law (Judgement)[1]. The case involving Meta follows a decision by the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) finding an abuse of Meta’s dominant position on the market for online social networks for private users in Germany by Meta’s data collection and processing as provided for in its then general terms. The FCO’s investigation focused on user and device-related data collected through Facebook, other Meta-group services (such as WhatsApp, Oculus, Masquerade, and Instagram) and third-party websites/apps, and combined with Facebook’s user data. The FCO found Meta’s then general terms, which make use of Facebook subject to such processing, inconsistent with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

    We outline key findings of the CJEU, as well as potential implications stemming from its Judgement.

    Competition Authority’s Powers to Analyze Compliance with Privacy Rules | A Duty of Sincere Cooperation

    What Does the Judgement Say?

    The CJEU was asked, inter alia, to clarify whether the NCA, which is not a national data protection authority (DPA), could find that a company’s conduct breached the GDPR and issue an order to end such breach, for the purpose of enforcing competition law.

    Considering that access to personal data and the fact that it is possible to process such data have become a significant parameter of competition between companies in the digital economy (see Paragraph 51 of the Judgement), the CJEU recalled that there is no provision in the GDPR nor any other instrument of EU law that prevents the national competition authorities from finding, in the performance of their duties, that a data processing operation carried out by an undertaking in a dominant position and liable to constitute an abuse of that position does not comply with that regulation (see Paragraph 43 of the Judgement).

    The CJEU considered that NCAs are bound by a duty of “sincere cooperation” when they must examine whether a company’s conduct is compliant with the provisions of the GDPR. In general terms, they are required to consult and cooperate sincerely with the national data protection authority concerned or the lead data protection authority (see Paragraph 54 of the Judgement). The CJEU requires that an NCA must:

    • ascertain whether that conduct or similar conduct has already been the subject of a decision by the competent DPA, and if so, they must not depart from it;
      consult and seek a DPA’s cooperation in order to dispel its doubts or to determine whether it must wait for the DPA to take its decision before starting its own assessment where:
      a) the NCA has doubts as to the scope of the assessment carried out by the DPAs,
      b) the conduct in question or similar conduct is simultaneously under examination by DPAs, or
      c) in the absence of investigation by DPAs, the NCA takes the view that an undertaking’s conduct is not consistent with the provisions of the GDPR.
    • When a DPA is consulted, it must respond within a reasonable period of time. Absent such a timely response, the NCA may continue its own investigation.

    Potential Implications

    • Businesses will need to be more cautious as their GDPR compliance could now be investigated not only by a DPA but also by NCAs. The latter, of course, will have to carry out this investigation in light of their powers, i.e., finding infringements of competition law. This adds another enforcement risk to consider.
    • Although the judgement relates to a NCA decision on abuse of a dominant position, it cannot be excluded that a similar reasoning will be applied to other types of competition law infringements.
    • The judgment’s wording can be taken as opening the door for NCAs wanting to investigate and sanction conduct contrary to other types of EU legislation (e.g., telecommunications legislation) in order to find breaches of competition law, whether under Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU or their national equivalents.

    Can a Dominant Company Ever Get Freely Given Consent for Data Processing from Its Users?

    What Does the Judgement Say?

    The CJEU found that the fact that the operator of an online social network holds a dominant position on the social network market does not automatically prevent the users of that social network from giving their free consent (in line with the GDPR) to the processing of their personal data by that operator. It emphasized, however, that dominance is an important factor in determining whether the consent is freely (i.e., validly) given to the operator and that the operator bears the burden of proof.

    The CJEU also concluded that where consent for specific data processing is required, but not given by the user, the operator shall offer (if necessary, for an appropriate fee), a version of the network without such processing. It also clarified that where consent is required, a separate consent would be needed for processing data related to their conduct on and off Facebook.

    Potential Implications

    • Similar to the application of the GDPR by NCAs, DPAs might be tempted to consider the application of key competition law concepts, such as finding a company holding a dominant position, in their assessment of GDPR infringements.
    • Given that the DMA requires end user consent for certain processing of personal data (e.g., combining personal data from the core platform services with further core platform/other gatekeeper’s/ third-party services)[2]. A conclusion that such consent is invalid, if requested by a company with a dominant position, would render processing of personal data by gatekeepers[3] for such purposes impossible.
    • The finding definitively closes the door on the possibility for providers to refuse access to the part of their service, for which processing of user data is not based on consent, to those users who refuse to give such consent. The finding is in line with the EDPB Guidelines on consent[4].

    A More Expansive Interpretation of What Entails Special Categories of Personal Data?

    Special categories of personal data[5] can only be lawfully processed by businesses (i.e., data controllers, such as website/app/online social network operators) relying on a very restricted list of legal bases (e.g., individual making such data manifestly public/giving their consent).

    What Does the Judgement Say?

    The Judgement confirms that when an online social network user visits and enters, as the case may be, information into a website/app, which refers to a special category of personal data (e.g., health-related, political party websites, etc.), processing of such data by an online social network operator (e.g., collection via cookies/other trackers) will be considered ‘processing of special categories of personal data’. A mere processing of information about user visits may reveal sensitive information about them, even if they do not actively enter any data (e.g., by logging-in).

    Furthermore, by visiting such websites/apps, the user does not manifestly make such data public. Where a user enters their data into/interacts with the website/app by clicking on a button (e.g., ‘Like’, ‘Share’, enters login credentials), this may be considered as making their data manifestly public if i) this is their prior choice (e.g., through settings); and ii) the user was fully aware that this will make their data publicly accessible to an unlimited number of persons. The CJEU also concluded that the user can expect that data about their visit to any such website/app will only be shared with third parties subject to their explicit consent.

    Potential Implications

    • Businesses will need to reassess whether simple processing of data about user visits to websites/apps referring to special categories of personal data (where users do not enter data in the website/app), means that such information is actually revealed.
    • Keep in mind that even if a business decides that visit data from the website/app with special category data connotation does not automatically reveal special category data, the CJEU nevertheless seems to expect that sharing of such data with third parties would be subject to explicit consent (which is a legal basis reserved for special category data).
    • Businesses will also need to consider whether their current website/app settings provide the user with a sufficient prior, actual and informed choice to make their data manifestly public.
    • Businesses which process and share user data via cookies, pixels and other online trackers are required to obtain users’ consent. This is typically done via cookie/online tracker consent banners linked to cookie/online tracker policies. Businesses will have to check if such consent is sufficient for them to process and share special categories of personal data.

    “Contract Performance” as Legal Grounds for the Provision of Online Social Network Services

    What Does the Judgement Say?

    Under the GDPR, the processing of personal data can be relied on as a necessity for the performance of a contract, which suffices as legal grounds for the usage of such data. In the case at hand, the CJEU was asked to assess whether certain processing activities related to the provision of online social media services can rely on the “contract performance” legal ground. The CJEU ruled, in line with the interpretation already held by the European Data Protection Board[6], that any such processing must be “objectively indispensable” for a purpose that is integral to services provided under a contract with the data subject. It does not suffice that the processing is merely useful for the performance of the contract, what matters is that the processing is essential for the proper performance of the contract, and there are no viable, less intrusive alternatives available. The CJEU emphasizes that it is up to the controller to be able to demonstrate that the processing in question is “objectively indispensable” to the performance of the main subject matter of the contract. Specifically regarding Meta’s reliance on the “contract” legal grounds, the CJEU ruled that the personalization of content in this case does not appear to be “objectively indispensable” for the provision of online social network services, as those services could also be provided to users through an equivalent alternative that does not involve personalized content.

    Potential Implications

    • Organizations should first of all check whether or not they are relying on the “completion of contract” legal grounds for the provision of an online (social network) service with personalized content. If so, and they wish to continue relying on this legal ground, they may consider documenting their reasons for doing so. As the CJEU emphasized controllers should be able to demonstrate the content personalization is “objectively indispensable” for the provision of the online (social network) service. If the conclusion of the analysis is the processing is not “objectively indispensable” for the provision of the online (social network) service, organizations should consider relying on alternative legal grounds.
    • Should organizations rely on alternative legal grounds, in particular consent, it remains to be seen whether national courts and supervisory authorities will interpret this Judgement as implying an obligation on all providers to offer users online (social network) services with both personalized and non-personalized content alternatives, (for those who decline consent).

    “Legitimate Interest” as Legal Grounds for Personalized Advertising on Online Social Networks

    What Does the Judgement Say?

    The CJEU first reiterated the three cumulative conditions which must be met to be able to rely on legitimate interests as legal grounds: (i) the pursuit of a legitimate interest, (ii) the necessity of processing data for that interest, and (iii) the absence of overriding interests or fundamental rights of the data subject. While the CJEU agreed that the processing of personal data for purposes of personalizing advertising can be a legitimate interest, it held that, despite the free nature of online social network services like Facebook, users cannot reasonably expect their personal data to be processed for personalized advertising. In line with previous positions taken by the European Data Protection Board[7], the CJEU considered the users’ interests and fundamental rights override the interest of the controller (Meta) to engage in personalized advertising, considering the extensive nature of this kind of processing (i.e., the volume and scope of personal data processed) and the significant impact on users, namely a feeling they may have that their private life is continuously being monitored. As a result, the data processing cannot be based on the controller’s legitimate interests.

    Potential Implications

    • As the DMA already imposes an obligation on gatekeepers such as Meta, who declared meeting the thresholds of the DMA, to obtain consent from users to process their personal data for the purpose of providing online advertising services (see Article 5(2) of the DMA), the impact on Meta of not being able to rely on its legitimate interests for the purposes of engaging in personalized advertising, may be limited.
    • However, for other organizations this Judgement reads as a reminder to carefully balance their legitimate interests against those of the individual, and if necessary to implement any safeguards and to document their legitimate interest assessment.
    Authors

    Stéphane Dionnet

    Partner

    Brussels

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  • Cross-Border M&A Comparison Table

    Cross-Border M&A Comparison Table

    ARTICLE

    Cross-Border M&A Comparison Table

    July 11, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Cross-border deals are complex and require mastery of multiple disciplines with unique considerations in different regions.

    Review our table comparing cross-border deal considerations for various topics across the United States, United Kingdom and France.

    For an in-depth look at this process from a US perspective, read Know Your Terminology: Nuances of Cross-Border M&A, United States.

    To learn more about the changing cross-border transactions landscape, visit our Cross-Border Investment Resource Center.

    In depth
    Authors

    Fabrice Piollet

    Partner

    Paris

    Andrew J. Warmus

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • Short-Term, Limited Duration Insurance: How Long is Too Long?

    Short-Term, Limited Duration Insurance: How Long is Too Long?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Short-Term, Limited Duration Insurance: How Long is Too Long?

    July 11, 2023

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 7, 2023, the US Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury (collectively, the departments) released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and Fact Sheet that proposes to revise the definition of short-term, limited-duration insurance (STLDI) to limit the duration of such coverage to three months or less.

    The NPRM also includes proposals to modify the conditions under which hospital indemnity and other fixed-indemnity insurance may be considered an excepted benefit and to clarify the tax treatment of benefit payments received under employer-provided accident and health plans, among other things.

    In depth

    Evolving Definition of STLDI

    STLDI is a type of health insurance that can, among other things, fill the temporary gaps in coverage that might occur when a consumer transitions from one plan to the next. Under the Public Health Service Act, STLDI is exempt from the definition of individual health insurance coverage, which means STLDI generally does not need to comply with federal individual market consumer protections. These protections include the Affordable Care Act’s prohibition on preexisting condition exclusions, the prohibition on discrimination based on health status, and the prohibition on lifetime and annual dollar limits for essential health benefits, among other standards. This means that STLDI also does not qualify as “minimum essential coverage” (MEC); however, following the repeal of the federal penalty for not maintaining MEC, this distinction from other types of health insurance is less significant for individual taxpayers.

    Initially, STLDI was defined as health insurance coverage that lasts up to 12 months after the original effective date of the contract. In 2016, the Obama administration amended the definition of STLDI to limit the maximum length of coverage to no more than three months. In 2018, the Trump administration reversed course on this policy, updating the definition to provide that STLDI includes coverage with an initial term of up to 12 months, which may be renewed or extended for up to 36 months in total. This significantly expanded the ability of health insurers to offer STLDI products.

    Proposal to Limit STLDI to No More Than Three Months of Coverage

    The Biden administration is now proposing to once again amend the definition of STLDI to revert to the limitations applicable under the Obama administration. Specifically, the proposed definition would limit the length of the initial contract term to no more than three months, with a maximum coverage period of no more than four months, taking into account any renewals and extensions. The definition would also provide that a renewal or extension includes the term of a new STLDI policy that is issued by the same issuer to the same consumer within a 12-month period.

    The NPRM also proposes revisions to the content and formatting of the notice that informs consumers purchasing STLDI about the differences between STLDI and comprehensive coverage.

    In the NPRM, the departments state that this proposal balances the need to ensure consumers have access to affordable health insurance options, while distinguishing STLDI from comprehensive coverage. The departments also state that the amendment is necessary to protect the risk pools and stabilize premiums in the individual market.

    Effective Date: A Bifurcated Approach

    If finalized, the new definition of STLDI would apply to policies sold on or after the effective date of the final rules. STLDI sold or issued before the effective date of the final rules could still have an initial contract term of up to 12 months, with a maximum duration of up to 36 months, to the extent permitted under state law. However, policies already in existence would still be required to comply with the revised notice standards.

    Request for Comments

    The departments are requesting comment on the proposed definition and, specifically, whether the initial duration of coverage should be longer than three months. The departments are also requesting feedback on:

    • Whether there are circumstances under which STLDI should be renewed or extended for periods of time beyond what would be permitted by the NPRM.
    • Whether there are additional ways to differentiate STLDI from comprehensive coverage options (e.g., limits on the sale of STLDI by a different issuer).
    • Ways to prevent or mitigate the potential for direct competition between STLDI and comprehensive coverage during the open enrollment period for individual market coverage, among other requests.

    Comments are due September 11, 2023. Please contact:

    • Kate McDonald
    • Emily Curran
    • Rachel Stauffer
    • Leigh Feldman
    Authors

    Kate McDonald

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Emily R. Curran

    Associate

    Washington, DC

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  • Vertical Agreements & Restriction of Competition by Object: What’s New in Europe?

    Vertical Agreements & Restriction of Competition by Object: What’s New in Europe?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Vertical Agreements & Restriction of Competition by Object: What’s New in Europe?

    July 11, 2023

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 29, 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a preliminary ruling in the Super Bock Bebidas vs. Autoridade da Concorrência case (C-211/22) on the questions referred by the Tribunal da Relaçao de Lisboa (Lisbon Court of Appeal). To some extent, the recent judgement is not particularly noteworthy or innovative, as it mainly applies well-established EU competition law principles prevalent through existing case law. However, the Super Bock case marks a significant step forward by introducing these principles for the first time in the context of vertical price-fixing agreements.

    In depth

    Background

    Super Bock Bebidas is a well-known Portuguese company that primarily produces bottled waters and beers. For the purpose of distributing beverages in hotels, restaurants and cafés, Super Bock concluded exclusive distribution agreements with independent distributors. Those distributors sell beverages purchased from Super Bock in almost the entirety of the Portuguese territory. In July 2019, Super Bock Bebidas S.A., along with one of its board members and a company director, were fined EUR 24 million by the Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC- the Portuguese Competition Authority) for fixing minimum resale prices and other resale conditions.

    Resale price maintenance (RPM) is a vertical agreement or concerted practice that occurs when a supplier and its distributors agree on the price to be charged by the retailer for the resale of the supplier’s products. In this specific case, the AdC found that Super Bock and its sales department had consistently established and enforced, over a period exceeding 10 years, the terms of business that all distributors were required to follow when reselling the products in Portugal. More specifically, the sales department of Super Bock regularly approved a list of minimum resale prices which were then communicated to the distributors either verbally or through written means such as email. The distributors usually adhered to these prices, and Super Bock monitored their compliance through a tracking system. When distributors deviated from the prescribed resale prices, Super Bock enforced retaliatory measures like removal of financial incentives, such as trade discounts on the purchase of products and the refusal to supply and replenish stocks. To mitigate the risk of facing these measures, distributors frequently sought guidance from Super Bock regarding the resale prices they should apply.

    The Competition, Regulation and Supervision Court in Portugal upheld the AdC decision. Super Bock brought an appeal against that judgment before the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa which subsequently submitted 6 questions to the CJEU. In particular, the referring court sought clarification on the interpretation of Article 101 on the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) within the context of vertical price-fixing agreement. In its June 2023 judgement, the CJEU grouped the questions around the following 4 issues.

    A Minimum Resale Price-Fixing Agreement Does Not Inherently Breach Competition Law

    The key issue in the Super Bock judgment is whether a vertical price-fixing agreement could be considered as a restriction of competition by object under Article 101 TFEU.

    As a reminder, Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits both horizontal and vertical agreements that have as their object (or alternatively, effect) the restriction of competition. Restrictions of competition by object are restrictions that by their very nature have the potential to restrict competition[1]. This means two things:

    • Once an agreement is classified as a restriction by object, the actual effects of the agreement do not need to be assessed;
    • The parties to the illicit agreement have to demonstrate efficiencies as outlined in Article 101(3) of the TFEU to be exempted from the prohibition set out in Article 101 – which is rather challenging. Another way for a vertical agreement to be exempted is to satisfy one of the EC block exemptions. However, it should be noted that some practices that generally constitute restrictions of competition by object are identified by the Commission in its notices, guidelines and block exemptions as ‘hardcore’ restraints. Such restraints are assumed to infringe Article 101(1) and presumed not to satisfy the criteria in Article 101(3). Once it has been established that a particular agreement contains a hardcore restriction, the agreement automatically cannot benefit from any of the Commission’s block exemption regulations.

    Article 4(a) of the Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Restrain (VBER) provides that minimum RPM arrangements are hardcore restrictions and are thereby presumed to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object. Therefore, minimum RPM arrangements are presumed anticompetitive, and the block exemption does not apply. It is important to note that while there is a possibility for minimum RPM to be exempted from Article 101(1) through an efficiency defense under Article 101(3) on a case-by-case basis, RPM faces challenges in fulfilling the conditions of Article 101(3). For instance, in the case of SA Binon & Cie v. SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse, which dealt with the legality of a clause in a selective distribution system allowing the distributor to set prices and enforce them on retailers, the CJEU ruled that “any price-fixing agreement constitutes, in itself, a restriction on competition and is therefore prohibited by [Article 101(1) TFEU].[2]” Consequently, RPM arrangements are unlikely to qualify for exemption under the VBER Regulation and the efficiency defense under Article 101(3), making them susceptible to being deemed void and unenforceable under Article 101 TFEU.

    Over time, the interchangeable use of the concept “hardcore restriction” under the VBER regulation and “by object restriction” under 101 TFEU has caused confusion. In the Coty[3] judgment, the CJEU first set out the distinction assessing whether a manufacturer’s restriction on its retailers, which forbids them from selling through third-party platforms to preserve the luxury image of the products, qualifies as a competition restriction “by object” under Article 101 TFEU. Furthermore, the CJEU examined whether such a restriction falls within the scope of passive sales restrictions as defined in Article 4(b) of the VBER. In its analysis of these two inquiries as distinct issues, the Coty case appears to have implicitly acknowledged that the equivalence between these two concepts is no longer justified without explicitly stating this conclusion.

    This distinction is now confirmed by the CJEU. In the Super Bock case, the Court upheld this approach by affirming that the classification of RPM as a “hardcore restriction” under the VBER Regulation does not inherently imply that it constitutes a “restriction by object.” More precisely, the CJEU ruled that it requires a contextual analysis of the “degree of harmfulness to competition”. The Court made it clear that a restriction by object may only be established after considering the content of the agreement, the economic and legal context of the case, as well as the nature of the goods and services affected. With this decision, the CJEU has simply applied long-established EU law principles[4] to vertical price-fixing agreements for the first time.

    The Unspoken Agreement in Supplier-Distributor Relationships

    In its second question, the referring court requested clarification on the notion of ‘agreement‘ as defined in Article 101 TFEU to ascertain whether, in the specific circumstances of the main proceedings, an agreement exists between Super Bock and its distributors.

    To answer this question, the CJEU unsurprisingly relied on previous case law by restating that an agreement requires a concurrence of wills between both parties[5]. More precisely, in the context of vertical price-fixing, the CJEU affirmed that for agreement to be characterized, it is necessary to establish whether the distributors have either implicitly or explicitly agreed to comply with the supplier’s request to maintain resale prices. The mere act of transmitting minimum prices and distribution margins to distributors, along with requests for compliance under the threat of retaliation or negative distribution margins, does not automatically imply the existence of an agreement.

    Thus, although it would seem that it is unilateral conduct for a supplier to send distributors lists with minimum prices and to ask these distributors to follow those prices, which it monitors under threat of retaliatory measures, the distributors’ acceptance and adherence to the suggested prices, without raising any objections to the supplier may imply a tacit agreement or acceptance of the supplier’s practice. The rest is in the hands of the referring court, who will have to provide final assessment on the facts in a subsequent ruling.

    Uncovering the Connection Between Supplier and Distributor Through Indirect Evidence

    Thirdly, the referring court asked if the existence of an agreement between a supplier and its distributors may be established solely on the basis of direct evidence.

    On the basis of a well-established case law[6], the CJEU reaffirmed that the principle of effectiveness is sufficient to establish the existence of an agreement on minimum resale prices not only through direct evidence, but also through coincidences and indicia (being objective and consistent). In the present case, an agreement could be inferred when a supplier invited its distributors to apply recommended minimum prices and that the distributors, in practice, followed the prices communicated by the supplier.

    Local Agreements May Still Affect Trade Between Member States and be Subject to EU Competition Law

    Finally, the referring court raised concerns regarding the scope of the agreement, as Super Bock’s direct sales did not cover the entirety of Portugal’s territory. They were confined to specific local areas until 2013, and subsequently expanded to include other territories in Portugal from 2014 onwards.

    The CJEU simply applied the applicable case law on this point. To determine if an arrangement has a significant impact on trade between Member States, it is essential to examine its economic and legal context. The Court, quoting Ziegler v Commission[7], reiterated that impact on cross-border trade usually results from a combination of multiple factors that, when assessed individually, may not be decisive. It is therefore necessary to ascertain, with a “sufficient degree of probability”, whether the agreement possesses a significant “direct or indirect, actual or potential influence” on trade between Member States, even if it covers only part of the territory of a Member State.[8]

    Thus, according to the CJEU, a vertical price-fixing agreement which applies to most, but not all, of a Member State’s territory, can still impact trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU.

    Conclusion & Key Takeaways

    The Super Bock judgment confirms that while a vertical price-fixing agreement could be considered as a by object restriction, it does not inherently constitute a violation of competition law. Rather, a case-by-case analysis must be conducted to determine the extent of harm the agreement poses to competition, i.e. by assessing the content of the agreement, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms part – the three legal pillars necessary to establish a restriction of competition by object.

    The responsibility now lies with the Portuguese court to ascertain whether, based on the specific factual evidence, the agreements in question are likely to violate competition law.

    In EU law, the relevance of this judgment will have to be considered in the context of the updated Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, which reaffirms that “the Court of Justice of the European Union has held on several occasions that RPM is a restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty”[9]. Despite being effective only from June 1, 2022, the new Guidelines appear to have quickly lost their relevance on this specific subject.

    On a broader scope, the approach adopted by the CJEU is also noteworthy as it seems to align with its US counterpart. In the United States, minimum RPM was traditionally seen as a per se violation (i.e. a category of agreements that are presumed to violate antitrust laws) for almost a century. However, in 2007, the US Supreme Court Leegin case shifted the approach to a rule of reason analysis, abandoning the automatic prohibition of minimum RPM. Sixteen years later, the Super Bock case has paved the way for EU law to adopt a more flexible and informal approach towards RPM, close to the one applied in the United States.

    *Trainee Mathilde Cosperec also contributed to this article.

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  • Supreme Court Limits the Lanham Act’s Extraterritorial Reach

    Supreme Court Limits the Lanham Act’s Extraterritorial Reach

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Limits the Lanham Act’s Extraterritorial Reach

    July 11, 2023

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a decision that may make it more difficult for brand owners to enforce their marks against infringers located outside of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and held that Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act are not extraterritorial and extend only to claims where the alleged infringing trademark use in commerce is domestic. Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., No. 21-1043, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2789 (June 29, 2023).

    Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. There were two separate concurrences, one by Justice Jackson and one by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett joined.

    In depth

    BACKGROUND

    This case focuses on the foreign reach of two Lanham Act provisions, namely, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), which prohibit the unauthorized use of protected marks in commerce, whether registered or unregistered, when such use creates a likelihood of consumer confusion.

    Hetronic, a US company that manufactures radio remote controls for heavy-duty construction equipment, sued six foreign distributors and one individual (which were collectively referred to as Abitron) in the US District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma for trademark infringement when Abitron reverse-engineered Hetronic’s products and began manufacturing and selling (mostly in Europe) their own copycat products bearing Hetronic’s “distinctive black-and-yellow color scheme.” The district court rejected Abitron’s argument that Hetronic sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, and a jury awarded Hetronic $96 million in damages related to Abitron’s global use of Hetronic’s marks. Abitron was also permanently enjoined from using the marks anywhere in the world.

    The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling but narrowed the injunction to only the countries where Hetronic currently marketed or sold its products. Abitron appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over the Lanham Act’s extraterritorial reach.

    OPINION OF THE COURT

    The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act provisions at issue in this case extend only to trademark infringement claims where the alleged infringing use in commerce is domestic. Applying the Court’s long-standing presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court explained that there are two steps in applying the presumption against extraterritoriality. The first step is to ask whether Congress has “affirmatively and unmistakably instructed” that a particular statute “should apply to foreign conduct.” If there are such explicit instructions, the provision is extraterritorial. Otherwise, the analysis then moves to step two, which sets out to determine whether a claim seeks a domestic or foreign application of a statute. To prove that a claim involves a domestic application of a statute, a plaintiff must establish that the conduct relevant to the statute’s “focus” occurred within the United States. Nevertheless, the Court clarified that there is no need to determine the focus of a statute at all if the claimed violations all took place outside the United States.

    Applying the first step of the analysis, the Court found that neither section of the Lanham Act at issue provides any express instruction about extraterritorial application, nor do they provide any indication that they would nevertheless apply abroad. When Hetronic pointed to the Foreign Commerce Clause to support its argument for extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act, the Court further confirmed that its precedent and presumption against extraterritoriality have held that “even statutes . . . that expressly refer to ‘foreign commerce’ when defining ‘commerce’ are not extraterritorial.” Therefore, the Lanham Act provisions were found not to apply extraterritorially.

    The Court then sought to determine whether Hetronic’s trademark infringement claims involve domestic applications of Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act by examining the “focus” of the statute and whether Hetronic can establish that the alleged conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States. Here, the parties argued over the “focus” of the Lanham Act provisions. Abitron claimed that the focus was preventing infringing use of trademarks, whereas Hetronic insisted they focus on protecting the goodwill of mark owners and on preventing consumer confusion. The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that the Lanham Act provisions in contention focus on likely consumer confusion only.

    Interestingly, all parties sought support for their respective positions in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., in which the Supreme Court applied the Lanham Act to trademark infringement and unfair competition activities that occurred via watch sales in Mexico but caused consumer confusion in the United States. The Court nevertheless rejected that reliance since the two-step extraterritoriality framework was developed several years after Steele. Further, the Court found that the parties missed the “focus” point by failing to examine the conduct at issue relevant to the statute’s focus and examining whether such conduct occurred in the United States or in a foreign country.

    The Court’s majority found that “use in commerce” is the conduct relevant to any potential focus of Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act. Thus, the Court openly criticized the concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor, which the majority interpreted as giving “the Lanham Act an untenably broad reach that undermines” the extraterritoriality framework of the Court.

    The majority cautioned against any approach that would threaten to negate the presumption against extraterritoriality and the potential for resulting “international discord.” Here, the Court separately cited the European Commission’s amicus curiae advising against applying the Lanham Act to trademark infringement occurring in the European Union. The Court concluded its reasoning with a reminder that “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world,” and therefore held that Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act are not extraterritorial and the infringing conduct, being “use in commerce” of a trademark, determines the dividing line between foreign and domestic application of these Lanham Act provisions. The Court, therefore, vacated the findings of the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

    CONCURRENCE

    Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Barrett, arguing that the Lanham Act extends “to activities carried out abroad when there is a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States.” While Justice Sotomayor agreed with the majority’s conclusion, she opined that the majority’s approach converted the “Court’s extraterritoriality framework into a myopic conduct-only test,” and disagreed with the majority’s second step of the framework. Citing the US government’s amicus curiae brief, which took the position that the focus of the Lanham Act provisions in contention is likely consumer confusion, according to Justice Sotomayor, since the statutory focus is to protect against consumer confusion, it covers foreign infringement activities if there is a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States caused by those activities (provided other conditions for liability are met). The concurrence also stated that the Court deviated from its well-established precedent, which otherwise “supports the view that an application of a statute can be considered domestic even when foreign conduct is implicated.” Taken together, Justice Sotomayor concluded that the use of a trademark is actionable under the Lanham Act when it results in a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States, regardless of foreign conduct.

    The concurrence fears that the majority’s approach would essentially absolve defendants who sell infringing products in foreign markets that ultimately reach the United States. But any resulting consumer confusion in the United States, Justice Sotomayor noted, would fall “squarely within the scope of the interests that the Lanham Act seeks to protect.”

    Addressing the majority’s “overblown” concern over international discord, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that “purely foreign sales with no connection to the United States are unlikely to confuse consumers domestically.” Moreover, there are procedural options available to foreign defendants for dismissing the case when applicable, such as for lack of personal jurisdiction, or due to forum non conveniens. Lastly, the concurrence clarified that the amicus brief filed by the European Commission only warns against the adoption of the sweeping view that all foreign uses that might confuse consumers abroad fall under the scope of the Lanham Act (consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s opinion).

    Justice Jackson filed a separate concurring opinion, despite joining in full in the majority opinion. This concurrence aimed at addressing two things: what it means to “use [a trademark] in commerce” and (2) how “that meaning guides the permissible-domestic-application question.” Since the majority did not elaborate on these aspects, Justice Jackson aimed to do so in her concurrence (and reading this concurrence prior to reading the majority opinion might be beneficial in better understanding its holding).

    Justice Jackson stated that “use in commerce” does not solely depend on where the mark is first affixed or where the item is first sold; rather, a “use in commerce” occurs wherever the mark serves its source-identifying function. This, according to Justice Jackson, is the “use in commerce” to which the Lanham Act provisions refer, which should make the permissible domestic application inquiry “straightforward.” Namely, if a trademark is serving a source-identifying function as intended by Congress and is in domestic commerce, then the provisions of the Lanham Act may reach the infringer.

    Amit Saha, a summer associate in the San Francisco office, also contributed to this article.

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