ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
US Supreme Court Rules “Booking.com” Can Be Registered as a Trademark
July 8, 2020
Read time: 8 min
On June 30, 2020, by an 8–1 vote, the US Supreme Court rejected a ¬per se rule by the US Patent and Trademark Office that a generic word followed by “.com” is necessarily generic and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. In doing so, the Supreme Court agreed with the judgments of the district court and circuit courts below, which likewise found that the proper test is whether the public perceives “booking.com” as identifying a single source for travel booking services.
Trademarks identify and distinguish the goods and services of a single party, and the federal Lanham Act establishes a system of trademark registration. Among other requirements for registration, a trademark must be distinctive, as judged along a spectrum of trademark distinctiveness. Inherently distinctive trademarks, in order of most to least strength, include fanciful or made-up words (e.g., Kodak); arbitrary marks that are existing words that have no connection to the underlying goods or services (e.g., Camel cigarettes); and then suggestive marks, which require some mental thought to connect them to an attribute of the products or services (e.g., Tide laundry detergent). Descriptive words are not inherently distinctive (e.g., Best Buy), but can still be protectable and registerable, but only upon proof of acquired distinctiveness (i.e., “secondary meaning”) arising from extensive use and advertising by the trademark owner. At the low end of the spectrum of distinctiveness are generic terms, which merely refer to a category or class of goods or services (e.g., wine or art) and are therefore never protectable or registerable as trademarks.
In 2011–2012, Booking.com filed applications to register its domain name, Booking.com, as a trademark. The US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused registration, citing policy developed from a 132-year-old Supreme Court case which held that the addition of “Company” to a generic word does not render the resulting name (i.e., “Generic Company”) distinctive. (See Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 US 598 (1888). At the time Goodyear was decided, “Goodyear Rubber” was considered generic for a kind of vulcanized rubber made by the Goodyear Company; therefore, the Supreme Court in Goodyear reasoned that “Goodyear Rubber Company” was necessarily generic.)
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the PTO’s refusal of registration, whereafter Booking.com challenged the PTO decision in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which reversed the refusal of registration. The district court found that “‘Booking.com’—unlike ‘booking’—is not generic” and that the consuming public “primarily understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus, rather it is descriptive of services involving ‘booking’ available at that domain name.” The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Virginia federal court (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 3), and the PTO sought certiorari from the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 11), and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg delivered the opinion of the Court, with which six other justices joined. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a short concurring opinion, and Justice Stephen Breyer dissented. The question under review by the Court was “whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (‘.com’) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.”
Both parties in Booking.com agreed that “booking” is generic for the kind of travel booking services offered by Booking.com. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that the Goodyear principle should not automatically be extended to domain names:
A ‘generic.com’ term might also convey to consumers a source-identifying characteristic: an association with a particular website. As the PTO and the dissent elsewhere acknowledge, only one entity can occupy a particular Internet domain name at a time, so ‘[a] consumer who is familiar with that aspect of the domain-name system can infer that BOOKING.COM refers to some specific entity.’
Rejecting the PTO’s bright-line rule against registration of “generic.com” domain names, the Supreme Court said that the question of whether Booking.com is generic “turns on whether that term, taken as a whole, signifies to consumers the class of online hotel reservation services.” The Supreme Court found the PTO’s reliance on Goodyear to be flawed because it ignored “the bedrock principle of the Lanham Act” that the question of whether a term is generic must be answered by asking how consumers perceive the term.
The record in the case reflected that Booking.com entered extensive evidence of consumer recognition that Booking.com referred to a single source rather than a genus. In particular, a so-called Teflon survey, which is a well-recognized measure for genericness, found that approximately 75% of surveyed consumers believed Booking.com identifies a single source rather than a class or genus of services. At oral argument, Chief Justice of the United States John Roberts mirrored this finding, noting that someone looking to make a hotel reservation would not make a “booking.com,” but rather would simply make a “booking” (perhaps at Booking.com).
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment of the Court that there is no per se rule against registration of a generic word followed by “.com,” but expressed some concern about whether the PTO has the resources to conduct its own Teflon surveys for genericness and to critique survey evidence submitted by trademark applicants and their experts.
Justice Breyer dissented from the judgment of the Court. He believes that Goodyear is not inapposite as a result of the development of the internet and the domain name system. Breyer expressed concern about the potential anti-competitive effects of permitting a party to monopolize a generic term merely by adding a necessary top-level-domain extension, such as “.com.” Breyer noted that generic domains such as Wine.com are easier for consumers to find and remember, and the Court’s decision “will lead to a proliferation of ‘generic.com’ marks … [which] will tend to inhibit, rather than to promote, free competition in online commerce.”
Practical Considerations
The Supreme Court recognized that that affirmance of the PTO’s per se rule would have “opened the door to cancellation of scores of currently registered marks.” Indeed, Justice Ginsberg noted that that PTO’s own past practice of granting trademark registration for “generic.com” domain names such as Art.com and Dating.com appears inconsistent with the per se rule that the PTO was advancing in Booking.com. Booking.com’s brief to the Court also noted that other existing trademark owners such as Arthritis Foundation and Container Store have been able to register their trademarks despite the Court’s Goodyear decision, which purportedly prevented trademark protection for a generic word plus a corporate designation.
Addressing the concerns in Justice Breyer’s dissent that it would be anticompetitive for Booking.com to enjoy a monopoly on the generic word “booking,” the Court noted Booking.com’s concession at oral argument that “Booking.com” would be a weak mark, for which it would be harder to show a likelihood of confusion against future users of “booking.” The Court also recognized that a party using “booking” in a “non-trademark sense” would have available to it a defense that the use is a fair use that is beyond the reach of the trademark laws.
The question arises why trademark owners need to secure trademark registration for domain names if the ensuing scope of the registration would be severely limited. The practical answer is that ownership of a trademark registration is a gateway to remedies offered to trademark owners under the Lanham Act. For example, owners of trademark registrations are in better stead for cost-effective arbitrations against typosquatters like “Bookking.com” under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) for confusingly similar domain names, and ownership of a registration would make it easier for a party like Booking.com to stop an airport gift shop from selling merchandise bearing the trademark “Booking-it.com.”
The Supreme Court’s decision provides a good opportunity for companies to reevaluate whether acquiring a “generic.com” domain name would be good for their businesses. However, successful protection and exploitation of generic terms in brands or domain names requires careful planning and resources to ensure that the public understands the brands or names as source identifiers rather than mere generic words.
* * *
The Supreme Court’s opinion is United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al v. Booking.com B.V., 591 US ___ (2020). Oral argument in the Booking.com case was the first case ever argued by telephone in the history of the Supreme Court, which resumed oral arguments by telephone after a pause in arguments due to COVID-19.
Preparing for the Unknown: How to Anticipate and Address Future Workplace Problems
ARTICLE
Preparing for the Unknown: How to Anticipate and Address Future Workplace Problems
July 8, 2020
Read time: 1 min

A Socially Distanced Ceremony: Virtual Execution of Estate Planning Documents
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
A Socially Distanced Ceremony: Virtual Execution of Estate Planning Documents
July 6, 2020
Read time: 9 min
Remote witnessing and notarization is quickly becoming the new normal for executing estate planning documents. Instead of an in-person meeting, a witness or notary who is outside the physical presence of the signatory uses two-way audio-video communication technology to witness or notarize an act. As of June 2020, at least 44 US states have allowed some form of remote witnessing and/or notarization, either permanently by statute or temporarily by governor’s order.
Just as states have different execution requirements for wills, trusts, powers of attorney and advance healthcare directives (or healthcare powers of attorney), the requirements for remote execution of those documents during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic vary significantly across jurisdictions. For example, while some states have allowed for remote witnessing, others have temporarily suspended witness requirements for all documents other than wills. Some states require notaries to be specially registered as an “online notary” or require the use of specific software for the videoconference to be recorded. A sample of the execution requirements for Illinois, Florida and New York are discussed below, followed by a brief overview of the status of remote executions in England and offshore jurisdictions.
ILLINOIS
On March 26, 2020, Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker issued Executive Order 2020-14, which was amended and re-issued by Executive Order 2020-33 on April 30, 2020, and again re-issued by Executive Order 2020-39 on May 29, 2020. These orders allow for remote witnessing and notarization procedures. On June 12, 2020, Governor Pritzker signed SB 2135 into law, providing statutory authorization for virtual executions.
Under the new law, the requirement that a person “appear before” an Illinois notary public under the Illinois Notary Act is satisfied if the notary public performs a remote notarization via two-way audio-video communication technology. The notary public is required to be physically within the State of Illinois while performing the notarial act.
Any act of witnessing required by Illinois law also may be completed by two-way audio-video communication technology, following specific procedures as described in the statute.
Will: Illinois law requires a will to be signed by the testator (or by some person in her presence and by her direction) in the presence of two credible witnesses. A notary is not required.
Revocable Trust: In Illinois, a revocable trust does not need to be witnessed or notarized to be effective.
Healthcare Power of Attorney: Illinois law requires a healthcare power of attorney to be signed before one witness. The witness is subject to certain qualifications.
Property Power of Attorney: Illinois law requires a property power of attorney to be signed before at least one witness and acknowledged before a notary public. The witness is subject to certain qualifications.
FLORIDA
Non-testamentary documents (e.g., powers of attorney) may be witnessed and notarized electronically under Florida’s new Remote Online Notarization law that became effective on January 1, 2020. Not all Florida notaries are able to perform a valid remote online notarization. In order to become a remote online notary, a Florida notary public must complete special registration and training requirements.
For testamentary documents, effective July 1, 2020, Florida allows a will to be executed electronically, provided that the testator and the witnesses are supervised by a notary public authorized to perform remote online notarizations and the ceremony is authenticated as a part of an online notarization session as provided under Florida’s Remote Online Notarization law. There are extra steps to verify the signatory’s identity and location, and certain qualifying statements to ensure the remote execution can proceed. For example, if the testator has any physical or mental condition or long-term disability that impairs his ability to perform the normal activities of daily living or requires assistance with daily care, then his signature may only be validly witnessed in person.
Will: Florida law requires a will to be signed by the testator (or by some person in her presence and by her direction) in the presence of two witnesses. A notary public is not required for the will to be valid, but is required if the will is to be made “self-proving.” A self-proving affidavit eliminates the need to find the witnesses to have them testify in court about the execution of the will when it is submitted to probate after the testator’s death—which may be many years after the will was executed. In a self-proving affidavit, each witness swears before a notary public as to the facts needed to probate the will. Since the self-proving affidavit may be signed at any time, including after the testator’s death, a notary public is not required for the execution of a will, but is nonetheless advisable—otherwise, there is a risk of not being able to find the witnesses when they are needed.
Revocable Trust: In Florida, a revocable trust executed by a Florida domiciliary that contains testamentary provisions is required to be executed with the same formalities required for a will.
Designation of Healthcare Surrogate: Florida law requires a designation of healthcare surrogate to be signed before two witnesses, who are subject to certain qualifications.
Declaration of Preneed Guardian: Florida law allows a person to name a preneed guardian by making a written declaration that names such guardian to serve in the event of that person’s incapacity. This declaration must be signed before at least two witnesses.
Property Power of Attorney: Florida law requires a durable property power of attorney to be signed before at least two witness and acknowledged before a notary public. A durable power of attorney with estate planning “superpowers” (e.g., creating an inter vivos trust) can be executed remotely as of July 1, 2020.
NEW YORK
New York’s solution to the witnessing of estate planning documents and remote notarization came in the form of Executive Order 202.7 and Executive Order 202.14.
Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Executive Order 202.7 on March 19, 2020, authorizing audio-video notarization provided certain conditions are met. While the notary public is not required to be in the signatory’s presence, all other requirements of notarization must be met. For example, the notary must write the expiration date of his license and the county in which he is commissioned on the document.
Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Executive Order 202.14 on April 7, 2020, authorizing audio-video witnessing for wills, lifetime trusts, the statutory gift rider to a power of attorney, and healthcare proxies.
These executive orders are valid for 30 days each but have been extended several times, usually just before the prior executive order expired. Executive Order 202.38 extended Executive Orders 202.7 and 202.14 through July 6, 2020, and they likely will be extended again.
Will: Pursuant to statute, in order to execute a will in the State of New York, the will must be signed by the testator (or by another person in her presence at her direction). The testator may either sign in the presence of, or acknowledge her signature to each of, two attesting witnesses. There is no need for a notary public unless a self-proving affidavit is being executed.
Lifetime Trust Agreement: Execution of lifetime trust agreements (whether revocable or irrevocable) in New York is also governed by statute. Each trust agreement must be signed by the settlor and at least one trustee (unless the settlor is the sole trustee) before at least two witnesses who sign the trust agreement, or acknowledged before a notary public. The revocation or amendment of a lifetime trust must be signed by the person or persons authorized to revoke or amend the trust before at least two witnesses who sign the revocation or amendment, or acknowledged before a notary public, unless the governing instrument provides otherwise.
Power of Attorney: A New York power of attorney must be signed and dated by the principal and agent and must be notarized, but there is no requirement that the principal and agent both sign within a specified period of time, or even that the principal be competent when the agent signs. To permit the agent to make gifts of greater than a de minimis amount, the principal must execute a statutory rider that must be notarized and witnessed by two witnesses.
Health Care Proxy: A health care proxy must be signed and dated in the presence of two witnesses who must also sign.
ENGLAND & OFFSHORE
Unlike many US states, England has not passed any emergency legislation providing for witnessing of documents via audio-visual technology. Although the Law Commission has recommended that video witnessing for deeds be considered further, currently a witness must be physically present when a document is signed in order for it to be validly witnessed.
A limited exception applies in respect of wills executed by certain people. The formal requirements for an English will are set out in section 9 of the Wills Act 1837. This section provides that a will must be in writing and signed in the presence of two witnesses. The witnesses are also required to attest and sign the will or acknowledge their signatures in the presence of the testator. However, section 1 of the Wills Act 1963 provides that a will shall be treated as properly executed where its execution conformed with the internal law (a) of the place where the will was executed; (b) where, at the time the will was executed or when the testator died, the testator was domiciled or had his habitual residence; or (c) in force in a state of which the testator was a national either when the will was executed or at the date of the testator’s death.
For example, if the testator is a national of a state other than England, and that state allows witnessing of wills by video or holographic wills, the testator would not need to comply with the formal witnessing requirements under section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 to have a valid will under English law.
Unless a person falls within one of these exceptions, a will must be witnessed in accordance with the formal requirements, requiring two present witnesses. Witnesses must not include anyone who is a beneficiary of the will or the testator’s spouse or civil partner. In the current environment, the best option is to have two members of another household witness the signing of a will while observing social distancing.
The vast majority of offshore jurisdictions have also maintained the status quo, requiring witnesses to be physically present. Jersey has temporarily relaxed its witnessing requirements, passing emergency legislation that allows for remote witnessing of wills until 30 September 2020 (unless extended).

21 Key Issues In Negotiating Merger And Acquisition Agreements For Technology Companies
ARTICLE
21 Key Issues In Negotiating Merger And Acquisition Agreements For Technology Companies
July 3, 2020
Read time: 1 min

Improper Use of Voluntarily Communicated Trade Secrets Sufficient to Maintain Action for Misappropriation in Texas
ARTICLE
Improper Use of Voluntarily Communicated Trade Secrets Sufficient to Maintain Action for Misappropriation in Texas
July 1, 2020
Read time: 4 min
The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, under Texas law, a plaintiff can sustain an action for trade secret misappropriation even if the plaintiff voluntarily communicated the alleged trade secrets to the defendant. Hoover Panel Systems, Inc. v. HAT Contract, Inc., Case No. 19-10650 (5th Cir. June 17, 2020) (per curiam).
HAT Contract hired Hoover Panel Systems to design and manufacture a power beam for desks in an open office environment. The parties engaged in oral negotiations that culminated in a written contract, which provided that “any . . . proprietary information shall be considered confidential and shall be retained in confidence by the other party.” The contract also provided that the “parties agree to keep in confidence . . . all information disclosed by the other party, which the disclosing party indicates is confidential or proprietary or marked with words of similar import.” Hoover developed a prototype and forwarded it to HAT, but never marked any information as confidential. HAT approved the prototype and placed several orders, although far fewer than Hoover expected. Hoover discovered that HAT had sent the prototype to at least one overseas manufacturer and was using it to manufacture products similar to those Hoover manufactured.
Hoover sued HAT in state court. HAT removed to federal court. Hoover then amended its complaint to recite causes of action for breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. HAT asserted affirmative defenses of waiver and ratification and a counterclaim of bad faith, but the district court declined to consider the counterclaim as untimely filed. HAT moved for summary judgment on all of Hoover’s claims and its waiver and ratification defenses, which the district court granted. Both parties appealed.
Breach of Written Contract
The district court found that HAT had not breached the contract because Hoover had never marked any information confidential, which was a condition precedent to HAT’s obligation to maintain secrecy. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the contract amenable to multiple plausible interpretations, the correct one of which was a question of fact that precluded summary judgment.
Breach of Oral Contract, Promissory Estoppel, Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment
The district court found that Hoover could not maintain claims for breach of oral contract, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that because the alleged oral contract occurred prior to or concurrent with the written contract, it was merged into that contract under Texas law. Similarly, Hoover’s three quasi-contract theories failed because the subject matter of the quasi-contract was covered by the written contract.
Trade Secret Misappropriation
The district court found that Hoover could not show that HAT had “acquired . . . by improper means” the alleged trade secrets because Hoover had voluntarily communicated them to HAT. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that “a ‘breach of a duty to maintain secrecy’ is a way of establishing improper means.”
Waiver and Ratification
The Fifth Circuit held that a fact question existed as to whether HAT ever told Hoover it was sending the prototype to a third-party manufacturer, or whether Hoover ever authorized HAT to do so. The factual disputes regarding the extent to which Hoover knew about and/or approved HAT’s activities precluded summary judgment on both the waiver and ratification defenses.
Bad Faith Counterclaim
HAT had asserted its counterclaim two months after deposing one of Hoover’s witnesses and after the deadline to amend pleadings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider the counterclaim given the two-month delay.
Practice Note: This case raises a potential Erie concern, as the result seems inconsistent with the Texas Court of Appeals’ recent holding in Title Source Inc. v. HouseCanary, Inc., that the “acquired by improper means prong” can only be satisfied by a breach of a duty of secrecy if the defendant actually acquired the trade secrets by way of the breach. Trade secret litigants in federal court should pay close attention to developments in analogous state court actions.

Damages Award Crumbles in Texas Concrete Manufacturing Row
ARTICLE
Damages Award Crumbles in Texas Concrete Manufacturing Row
July 1, 2020
Read time: 5 min
The Supreme Court of Texas held that a limited partner had standing to sue for alleged loss in the value of its interest in the partnership, but reversed a damages award in favor of that limited partner for insufficient evidence. Pike v. Texas EMC Management, LLC, Case No. 17-0557 (Tex. June 19, 2020) (Busby, J) (Bland, J, dissenting).
Texas EMC Products (the partnership) was formed between investors (Wilson and Walker, both individually and through Walker’s company Few Ready Mix) and a Dutch company, EMC Cement BV, which held technology in “energetically modified cement.” Texas EMC Management, LLC, was the general partner. EMC Cement BV, Wilson and Walker were all limited partners with minority shares. The partnership established an EMC plant in Texas. Pike was hired as general manager of Texas EMC Management and the plant.
The partnership’s technology did not work as hoped, and the partnership never made a profit. At some point, Walker and Wilson refused to make further loans to the partnership, and the partnership defaulted on its loan. EMC Cement BV cancelled its license agreement with the partnership. Through Few Ready Mix, Walker and Wilson paid the bank the remaining balance of the loan, and Few Ready Mix held a foreclosure sale of the partnership’s property.
VHSC Cement purchased the property. VHSC had been formed less than a week before the foreclosure sale by two people affiliated with a California competitor. On the day of the foreclosure, VHSC hired Pike to be its president. VHSC continued to operate the plant without modification for six weeks. Subsequently, VHSC continued operating the plant but with different inputs and, eventually, with different equipment.
The partnership, Texas EMC Management and EMC Cement BV (collectively, EMC plaintiffs) sued Pike, Walker, Wilson and VHSC on a variety of theories, including trade secret misappropriation. The EMC plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent VHSC from using or disseminating the alleged trade secrets. The defendants counterclaimed, including for failure to pay the deficiency balance on the promissory note. After a jury verdict, the trial court awarded damages to the EMC plaintiffs, declined to enter an injunction, and entered judgment against the defendants on their counterclaim. Both parties appealed.
The court of appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and both parties petitioned for review, raising many of the same issues again at the Texas Supreme Court.
The Texas Supreme Court first found that EMC Cement BV had constitutional standing to bring suit to redress the alleged harm to the value of its share of the partnership. The majority reasoned that EMC Cement had the requisite injury-in-fact for standing, and whether it was authorized to bring suit was a question of capacity, not standing. Unlike standing, capacity is waivable. Thus, the Court found that it had jurisdiction over the dispute. Justice Bland, in dissent, argued that EMC Cement had no constitutional standing and would have dismissed the case. In his opinion, “[A] limited partner does not own the limited partnership’s claims. The partnership does.”
The Texas Supreme Court next found that the appellate court had erred in reinstating one category of damages that the jury had found but that the trial court had disregarded. The EMC plaintiffs had not challenged the trial court’s order disregarding the category of damages on appeal. The Texas Supreme Court held that it was error for the appellate court to grant relief on an issue not raised by the parties.
Next, addressing the damages the trial court had awarded, the Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ evidence was legally insufficient. The jury charge defined “value” as “market value,” but the expert evidence was not probative of the market value. Both damages experts had used models assuming large growth in the partnership’s revenue; the Texas Supreme Court found no explanation in the experts’ testimony for the difference between these assumptions and the reality of the partnership history, which had lost money every year and had never made a profit. The Court found that the expert testimony was conclusory and legally insufficient to establish damages. Because the plaintiffs had failed to establish damages, the Court reversed the damages award and entered a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiffs.
The Texas Supreme Court further reversed the initial appellate decision and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying an injunction because plaintiffs had not shown there was no adequate remedy at law. To the contrary, the Court explained that the plaintiffs’ damages model was premised on the notion that the future income streams from the use of the trade secrets could be measured monetarily. The Court distinguished between the availability of a remedy at law (as determined by the initial appellate court) and plaintiffs’ showing of entitlement to that remedy.
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict against VHSC on its loan deficiency counterclaim.

Patienten-Support-Programme in Zeiten der COVID-19-Pandemie
ARTICLE
Patienten-Support-Programme in Zeiten der COVID-19-Pandemie
July 1, 2020
Read time: 1 min

Preparing Your Responses: How to Tackle Opening-Day Obstacles
ARTICLE
Preparing Your Responses: How to Tackle Opening-Day Obstacles
July 1, 2020
Read time: 1 min

SEC Provides Further Guidance on COVID-19 Disclosure
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
SEC Provides Further Guidance on COVID-19 Disclosure
July 1, 2020
Read time: 8 min
On June 23, 2020, the Division of Corporation Finance (CF) and the Office of the Chief Accountant of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released guidance that provides additional views on disclosure related to COVID-19, supplementing earlier guidance provided on March 25, 2020 and April 3, 2020, respectively.
The latest guidance reiterates earlier statements encouraging companies to provide disclosures that allow investors to evaluate the current and expected impact of COVID-19 through the eyes of management and to proactively revise and update disclosures as facts and circumstances change.
In the new guidance, CF provided the following to help companies analyze their specific facts and circumstances:
- What are the material operational challenges that management and the Board of Directors are monitoring and evaluating? How and to what extent have you altered your operations, such as implementing health and safety policies for employees, contractors and customers, to deal with these challenges, including challenges related to employees returning to the workplace? How are the changes impacting or reasonably likely to impact your financial condition and short- and long-term liquidity?
- How is your overall liquidity position and outlook evolving? To the extent COVID-19 is adversely impacting your revenues, consider whether such impacts are material to your sources and uses of funds, as well as the materiality of any assumptions you make about the magnitude and duration of COVID-19’s impact on your revenues. Are any decreases in cash flow from operations having a material impact on your liquidity position and outlook?
- Have you accessed revolving lines of credit or raised capital in the public or private markets to address your liquidity needs? Are your disclosures regarding these actions and any unused liquidity sources providing investors with a complete discussion of your financial condition and liquidity?
- Have COVID-19-related impacts affected your ability to access your traditional funding sources on the same or reasonably similar terms as were available to you in recent periods? Have you provided additional collateral, guarantees or equity to obtain funding? Have there been material changes in your cost of capital? How has a change, or a potential change, to your credit rating impacted your ability to access funding? Do your financing arrangements contain terms that limit your ability to obtain additional funding? If so, is the uncertainty of additional funding reasonably likely to result in your liquidity decreasing in a way that would result in you being unable to maintain current operations?
- Are you at material risk of not meeting covenants in your credit and other agreements?
- If you include metrics, such as cash burn rate or daily cash use, in your disclosures, are you providing a clear definition of the metric and explaining how management uses the metric in managing or monitoring liquidity? Are there estimates or assumptions underlying such metrics the disclosure of which is necessary for the metric not to be misleading?
- Have you reduced your capital expenditures and if so, how? Have you reduced or suspended share repurchase programs or dividend payments? Have you ceased any material business operations or disposed of a material asset or line of business? Have you materially reduced or increased your human capital resource expenditures? Are any of these measures temporary in nature, and if so, how long do you expect to maintain them? What factors will you consider in deciding to extend or curtail these measures? What is the short- and long-term impact of these reductions on your ability to generate revenues and meet existing and future financial obligations?
- Are you able to timely service your debt and other obligations? Have you taken advantage of available payment deferrals, forbearance periods, or other concessions? What are those concessions and how long will they last? Do you foresee any liquidity challenges once those accommodations end?
- Have you altered terms with your customers, such as extended payment terms or refund periods, and if so, how have those actions materially affected your financial condition or liquidity? Did you provide concessions or modify terms of arrangements as a landlord or lender that will have a material impact? Have you modified other contractual arrangements in response to COVID-19 in such a way that the revised terms may materially impact your financial condition, liquidity and capital resources?
- Are you relying on supplier finance programs, otherwise referred to as supply chain financing, structured trade payables, reverse factoring or vendor financing, to manage your cash flow? Have these arrangements had a material impact on your balance sheet, statement of cash flows or short- and long-term liquidity and if so, how? What are the material terms of the arrangements? Did you or any of your subsidiaries provide guarantees related to these programs? Do you face a material risk if a party to the arrangement terminates it? What amounts payable at the end of the period relate to these arrangements, and what portion of these amounts has an intermediary already settled for you?
- Have you assessed the impact material events that occurred after the end of the reporting period, but before the financial statements were issued, have had or are reasonably likely to have on your liquidity and capital resources and considered whether disclosure of subsequent events in the financial statements and known trends or uncertainties in MD&A is required?
CF also indicated that companies receiving federal assistance (e.g., loans pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act) should consider the short- and long-term impact of that assistance on their financial condition, results of operations, liquidity and capital resources, as well as the related disclosures and critical accounting estimates and assumptions, focusing on the following questions:
- How does a loan impact your financial condition, liquidity and capital resources? What are the material terms and conditions of any assistance you received, and do you anticipate being able to comply with them? Do those terms and conditions limit your ability to seek other sources of financing or affect your cost of capital? Do you reasonably expect restrictions, such as maintaining certain employment levels, to have a material impact on your revenues or income from continuing operations or to cause a material change in the relationship between costs and revenues? Once any such restrictions lapse, do you expect to change your operations in a material way?
- Are you taking advantage of any recent tax relief, and if so, how does that relief impact your short- and long-term liquidity? Do you expect a material tax refund for prior periods?
- Does the assistance involve new material accounting estimates or judgments that should be disclosed or materially change a prior critical accounting estimate? What accounting estimates were made, such as the probability a loan will be forgiven, and what uncertainties are involved in applying the related accounting guidance?
Management should consider whether conditions and events, taken as a whole, raise substantial doubt about the company’s ability to meet its obligations as they become due within one year after the issuance of the financial statements, including the questions below:
- Are there conditions and events that give rise to the substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern? For example, have you defaulted on outstanding obligations? Have you faced labor challenges or a work stoppage?
- What are your plans to address these challenges? Have you implemented any portion of those plans?
Additionally, on June 23, 2020, the chief accountant of the SEC issued a statement regarding the importance of high-quality financial reporting in light of the significant impacts of COVID-19, supplementing an earlier statement provided on April 3, 2020.
Of note, the chief accountant remarked that changes to business and additional uncertainties may result in further risks of material misstatement to financial statements for which new or enhanced controls may need to be implemented. If any such changes materially affect, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, a company’s internal controls over financial reporting, such changes must be disclosed in quarterly filings in the fiscal quarter in which they occurred.
Furthermore, the chief accountant provided a reminder that US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) presumes a reporting entity has the ability to continue as a going concern and that in each reporting period, including interim periods, management should consider whether relevant conditions and events, taken as a whole, raise substantial doubt about a company’s ability to meet its obligations as they become due within one year after the issuance of such financial statements.
The chief accountant also addressed the role of audit committees, noting that in these times of rapid change and increased uncertainty, the need for the oversight role that audit committees play is as critical as ever and that the most effective audit committees are engaged, executing their responsibilities with diligence, and this engagement significantly enhances the financial reporting output.
Read the guidance, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) disclosure considerations regarding operations, liquidity, and capital resources” and the statement, “Statement on the continued importance of high-quality financial reporting for investors in light of COVID-19.”
DoJ Shines New Light on Compliance Program Expectations
ARTICLE
DoJ Shines New Light on Compliance Program Expectations
July 1, 2020
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