Content Type: Article

  • EBA Publishes Final Draft Risk Retention RTS

    EBA Publishes Final Draft Risk Retention RTS

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    EBA Publishes Final Draft Risk Retention RTS

    April 21, 2022

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The European Banking Authority (“EBA”) on 12 April 2022 published the final draft technical standards on the risk retention requirements for securitisations (the “RTS”). This follows on from last year’s consultation on the proposals (the “Consultation”). In order to become law, the RTS is required to be adopted by the European Commission, and will come into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    The RTS largely replicates the Consultation, including provisions concerning the securitisation of non-performing exposures, recognising synthetic excess spread as a form of risk retention and contemplating the authorisation of resecuritisations for legitimate purposes. However, it is worth noting the following in particular:

    • The EU Securitisation Regulation stipulates that an entity shall not be considered to be an originator (for risk retention purposes) where the entity has been established or operates for the sole purpose of securitising exposures. The Consultation and RTS provide guidance to be taken into account when determining this, including that “the entity does not rely on the exposures to be securitised, on any interests retained or proposed to be retained in accordance with this Regulation or on any corresponding income from such exposures and interests as its sole or predominant source of revenue”. It had been hoped, and requested by market participants, that the reference to “or predominant” would be deleted but the EBA has instead retained this wording. In the EBA’s analysis of the responses to the Consultation, which accompanies the RTS, it explicitly rejects that request. However, in our view, this is not necessarily a requirement that is obliged to be satisfied by an entity in order for it to be an originator risk retainer provided there are sufficient other elements which demonstrate it is an entity of substance.
    • The RTS also clarifies the circumstances when the risk retainer entity can transfer or sell the retained interest, such that this would now be permissible both in the event of the retainer’s insolvency and “when the retainer is, for legal reasons beyond its control and beyond the control of its shareholders, unable to continue acting in that capacity”.
    • Some amendments have also been made in the RTS around when fees payable to the risk retainer may be construed as reducing the retained interest below that required. By and large, the intention here is to remove vagueness present in the language of the Consultation.
    • When observing the “no cherry picking” provisions of the EU Securitisation Regulation, the RTS now states that only assets retained on an originator’s balance sheet which satisfy the particular securitisation’s eligibility criteria are to be taken into account. It is also provided that exposures which an originator has contractually committed to securitise will also be excluded.
    • In the EBA’s analysis of the responses to the Consultation, it also refers to receiving enquiries as to whether origination structures seemingly akin to CLO conditional sale arrangements are permissible for creating an originator to act as risk retainer. Unsurprisingly, the EBA responded that such questions are outside the scope of the mandate for the RTS.

    Authored by Phillip J. Azzollini, Daniel V. Oshinsky, Martin Sharkey and Craig Stein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert or would like assistance with risk retention structures, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Daniel V. Oshinsky

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Martin Sharkey

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Platform Investments in Renewable Energy Projects

    Platform Investments in Renewable Energy Projects

    ARTICLE

    Platform Investments in Renewable Energy Projects

    April 20, 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Investments in renewable energy assets have become increasingly popular with institutional and private equity investors—and not to mention family offices—because of their reputation as a relatively safe and stable investment, along with the growing trend of investors searching for investments pursuing certain environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals. However, in recent years, because of the “seller’s market” and capital chasing too few well-structured projects, investors have experienced decreased returns and increased risk when investing directly in project acquisitions.

    Considering these challenges, a recently accelerating trend is investing in development and management teams and creating a captive “platform” for future investments. Either through the purchase of a development company, the hiring of experienced personnel to create their own development platform or investments via co-development agreements, investors are exploring a variety of structures to mitigate risks associated with platform investing. Read the full article, “Platform investments in renewable energy,” to find out what investors should know before selecting a platform investment structure.

    In depth
    Authors

    Christopher Gladbach

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • The Autorité de la Concurrence Fines Cofepp for Acquiring Control of MBWS Without Prior Notification of the Transaction

    The Autorité de la Concurrence Fines Cofepp for Acquiring Control of MBWS Without Prior Notification of the Transaction

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Autorité de la Concurrence Fines Cofepp for Acquiring Control of MBWS Without Prior Notification of the Transaction

    April 19, 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    By a decision dated 12 April 2022, the French Competition Authority (FCA) fined the Compagnie Financière Européenne de Prises de Participation (“Cofepp”) up to 7 million euros, for having closed the takeover of the company Marie Brizard Wine & Spirits (i) without first notifying the operation to the FCA and (ii) prior to its authorization.

    This new gun-jumping decision rendered by the FCA, following the Marine Harvest judgment of the European Court of Justice in 2020, sends a very strong message to companies in their activities of external growth, in particular when they take minority and then gradually controlling stakes and, to a certain extent, a very useful message since it provides indications on the tipping point between absence of control vs. control and therefore no notification vs. mandatory notification.

    Read the full client alert, “Concentration en France: l’Autorité de la concurrence rappelle avec force qu’anticiper n’est pas jouer,” in French.

    In depth
    Authors
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  • SEC Examinations: What Private Fund Managers Can Expect in 2022

    SEC Examinations: What Private Fund Managers Can Expect in 2022

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Examinations: What Private Fund Managers Can Expect in 2022

    April 19, 2022

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The SEC has pivoted from the retail-oriented examination focus of the past several years. Private funds are now the number one examination priority. We have seen this in the work we do with our clients on examinations, and it is confirmed in the 2022 Examination Priorities released on March 30, 2022.[1] Private fund managers can take steps now to be prepared.

    Examination Focus on Private Fund Managers

    More private fund managers are being examined by the SEC than in recent years, and it appears this will continue. During the tenure of former Chair Jay Clayton, and continuing through 2021, protection of retail investors played the most prominent role in the exam priorities. For 2022, the Division of Examinations has placed private fund managers at the top of the priorities list.[2] That approach is consistent with the increase in examination activity of private fund managers we have seen in the past six months. 

    The Division of Examinations will continue to review the key issues for private fund managers, including: fiduciary duties, compliance programs, fees and expenses, custody, fund audits, valuation, conflicts of interest, disclosure of investment risks and controls around material non-public information. 

    Fees and expenses continues to be a key focus area. The Commission has made it very clear in its private fund adviser rule proposal that it views private fund fees and expenses to be too opaque in many instances. The proposed rulemaking will not decrease the focus on these issues. Indeed, we see it continuing on examinations, and the 2022 Examination Priorities also identify fees and expenses as a key focus area. Managers should consider, first and foremost, whether their disclosures and processes with respect to fees and expenses are both well designed and effective in practice. The SEC identifies some specific fee calculation issues, but by no means are these the only issues they are reviewing on examinations. The specific fee calculation issues identified are:

    1. The calculation of post-commitment period management fees and the impact of valuation practices at private equity funds;
    2. Advisory fee calculation errors, including, but not limited to, failure to adjust management fees in accordance with investor agreements;
    3. Inaccurate calculations of tiered fees, including failure to provide breakpoints and aggregate household accounts; and
    4. Failures to refund prepaid fees for terminated accounts or pro-rated fees for onboarding clients.

    Preparation for examination on fees and expenses can include a de novo analysis of the relevant disclosures and procedures as well as a review of the testing processes and results.

    The Examination Priorities identified several other focus areas specific to private funds:

    1. Potential preferential treatment of certain investors by registered investment advisers (“RIAs”) to private funds that have experienced issues with liquidity, including imposing gates or suspensions on fund withdrawals;
    2. Compliance with the custody rule, including the “audit exception” to the surprise examination requirement and related reporting and updating of Form ADV regarding the audit and auditors that serve as important gatekeepers for private fund investors;
    3. The adequacy of disclosure and compliance with any regulatory requirements for cross trades, principal transactions or distressed sales; and
    4. Conflicts around liquidity, such as RIA-led fund restructurings, including stapled secondary transactions where new investors purchase the interests of existing investors while also agreeing to invest in a new fund.

    Examination Focus on Emerging Risk Areas

    Emerging risk areas such as ESG disclosures, digital assets and the use of developing financial technologies, including alternative data research products, will receive continued scrutiny in 2022.

    The Focus on ESG Investing

    The SEC continues to identify its concern that advisers are making unsupported claims about their use of ESG. The Examination Priorities reinforce the observations in the Division of Examinations’ April 2021 Risk Alert, as well as the 2021 Examination Priorities and numerous public statements by Chair Gensler and other SEC officials cognizant that RIAs are increasingly offering and evaluating investments that employ ESG strategies. The SEC’s concern is that  false or misleading statements or omissions could be used by advisers to present a “greener” picture of the adviser’s activities. The exam staff will continue to focus on whether advisers are:

    • Accurately disclosing their ESG investing approaches and have adopted and implemented policies, procedures and practices designed to prevent violations of the federal securities laws in connection with their ESG-related disclosures, including review of their portfolio management processes and practices;
    • Voting client securities in accordance with proxy voting policies and procedures and whether the votes align with their ESG-related disclosures and mandates;
    • Overstating or misrepresenting the ESG factors considered or incorporated into portfolio selection (e.g., greenwashing), such as in their performance advertising and marketing.

    With such intense focus on the accuracy of representations related to ESG investing, it can be useful for managers to maintain records that will support any claims about ESG that the adviser makes. In particular, affirmative representations about the role of ESG in the adviser’s investment strategies may be scrutinized. While there are no specific requirements as to what would support such representations, managers should consider what they would be producing to the exam staff if requested to support such representations during an exam.

    The Focus on Cybersecurity

    The SEC has proposed a sweeping new rule concerning the cybersecurity obligations of investment fund managers. We have seen these issues as focus areas in private fund manager examinations for the past several years, and the 2022 Examination Priorities indicate that focus will continue. The exam staff will review business continuity and disaster recovery plans and will assess whether firms have measures in place to: 1) safeguard customer accounts and prevent unauthorized account access, 2) oversee vendors and service providers, 3) address malicious email activities, 4) respond to incidents, including ransomware attacks, 5) identify and detect identity theft red flags and 6) manage operational risk resulting from dispersed employees in a work-from-home environment.

    In recent exams, the exam staff has shown a particular interest in how advisers respond to and document cyber incidents, including the decision whether or not to report such incidents to investors or other affected parties. As advisers consider their cybersecurity programs, the proposed cybersecurity rules for RIAs can offer some guidance. While the full scope will be refined during the comment process, the proposed rules require policies and procedures, at least annual testing and an accompanying written report, cyber incident reporting to the SEC and investor disclosures of risks and incidents in Form ADV.    

    The Focus on Emerging Technologies and Crypto Assets

    The Examination Priorities reflect the exam staff’s ongoing concerns about automated investment advice, including mobile apps and other digital engagement practices, as well as an increased focus on crypto investing. Investment by fund managers in crypto assets are an area we increasingly see on examinations. The Examination Priorities stated that examinations of market participants engaged with crypto assets “will continue to review the custody arrangements for such assets and will assess the offer, sale, recommendation, advice, and trading of crypto-assets.”[3]

    The exam staff clearly expects firms to determine whether they have sufficient understanding of the assets to satisfy their fiduciary duties and standards of care. Advisers can also expect examiners to evaluate whether advisers “routinely review, update and enhance their compliance practices (e.g. crypto asset wallet reviews, custody practices, anti-money laundering reviews, and valuation procedures), risk disclosures, and operational resiliency practices[.]”[4]

    The Focus on Alternative Data Oversight

    Following the Commission’s enforcement action against alternative data provider, App Annie, in September 2021, it is not surprising that the 2022 Examinations Priorities identifies managers’ oversight of service providers, and in particular the use of alternative data, as a priority for the third consecutive year. What the exam staff is looking for in particular is whether firms “are implementing appropriate compliance and controls around the creation, receipt, and use of potentially [sic] MNPI.”[5] In a possible expansion of its focus, the exam staff included not only “alternative data” but also “data gleaned from non-traditional sources,” which seems to be a nod to dynamic and rapidly changing investment research offerings that can present MNPI risks. Although the exam staff has yet to issue its much-anticipated alternative data risk alert, the exam staff has been keenly focused on the acquisition and use of alternative data. We expect the exam staff to continue reviewing firm’s policies and procedures around the use of alternative data and web scraping and inspect diligence files to evaluate whether managers are appropriately considering the risks associated with such data sets.

    The Focus on Compliance Programs

    We have seen in examinations during the past year an increased focus on the compliance program itself. Deficiency letters have cited perceived inadequacies in both the chief compliance officers (“CCOs”), who design and implement the compliance program, as well as in the leadership of the adviser, who are responsible for supporting the CCO with resources and the appropriate “tone from the top” regarding compliance. The Examination Priorities include a two-page discussion about compliance. The exam staff stresses how important it is for the compliance program to have “participation and input across all business and operational lines.”[6] The exam staff also emphasizes how important it is for the compliance program to be flexible and adapt to change, as well as to incorporate periodic reviews and testing. In recent examinations and in the Examination Priorities, the exam staff has made clear its expectations of advisers and their CCOs.

    Examination Outcomes

    The majority of examinations result in a deficiency letter and no other action by the Commission.  Private fund managers are, however, well aware of the fact that examinations can lead to referrals to the SEC’s Enforcement Division. In 2021, the number of enforcement referrals increased by 46%.[7] The increase in referrals highlights the need for exam preparedness and for a thoughtful and diligent approach to the examination process. There is also another outcome of examinations that does not get discussed often – the return of funds to investors. The exam staff keeps track of the amounts that firms return to their investors in connection with examinations. In 2021, the amount of these returns was 41% higher than the prior year.[8] The Examination Priorities indicate that the exam staff expects an increase in the number of referrals to the Enforcement Division and the amount of funds returned to investors as a result of the examination process. During an examination it is particularly important to consider any position the exam staff takes with respect to fees or expenses charged to client funds and investors as well as any other potential monetary benefit or harm.  

    As the SEC considers the most significant rulemaking for private funds since Dodd-Frank, and the Enforcement Division expands its efforts directed at private fund managers, the Division of Examinations has directed resources to continue drilling down on issues specific to private fund managers. Accordingly, preparing for examination requires careful attention, review and reconsideration of important aspects of the manager’s business. 

    Authored by Marc E. Elovitz, Kelly Koscuiszka, Tinika M. Brown, Meghan J. Carey, Christopher S. Avellaneda and Tarik M. Shah.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] 2022 Examination Priorities, Division of Examinations (March 30, 2022) at https://www.sec.gov/files/2022-exam-priorities.pdf (the “Examination Priorities”).

    [2] See 2021 Examination Priorities, Division of Examinations (March 3, 2021) at https://www.sec.gov/files/2021-exam-priorities.pdf at 28 (the “2021 Examination Priorities”); Examination Priorities at 11.

    [3] Examination Priorities at 16.

    [4] Id.

    [5] Id. at 17.

    [6] Id. at 6-7.

    [7] In fiscal year 2020, there were 130 referrals to the Enforcement Division. See 2021 Examination Priorities at 9. In fiscal year 2021, there were 190 referrals to the Enforcement Division. See Examination Priorities at 3. 

    [8] In fiscal year 2020, examinations resulted in firms returning more than $32 million to investors. See 2021 Examination Priorities at 9. In fiscal year 2021, examinations resulted in firms returning more than $45 million to investors. See Examination Priorities at 3.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Christopher S. Avellaneda

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Tarik M. Shah

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Recent Litigation Shines Spotlight on Hospital and Physician Group Transactions

    Recent Litigation Shines Spotlight on Hospital and Physician Group Transactions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Recent Litigation Shines Spotlight on Hospital and Physician Group Transactions

    April 18, 2022

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Department of Justice recently intervened in an qui tam alleging false and fraudulent claims involving the acquisition of physician practice locations by a health system and subsequent management of the health system’s hospital service locations by a physician group. The Department of Justice alleged that these arrangements were prohibited by the Anti-Kickback Statute.

    STAY CURRENT ON THE 340B LITIGATION THAT MAY IMPACT YOUR BUSINESS

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    In depth

    On April 11, 2022, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a press release announcing that it had intervened in an ongoing qui tam suit against a health system (Health System) that sought to establish a comprehensive cancer service line by acquiring numerous physician office locations from a physician group (Group) and converting the locations to provider-based locations of the Health System’s hospitals. The Health System also engaged the Group to provide professional services and to manage the cancer center service line across the Health System’s hospitals. DOJ alleged that the management of the cancer center service line by the Group following the acquisition was constructed to provide unlawful kickbacks to the physician owners of the Group, violating the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act.

    Summary of Allegations

    The key arrangement at issue in the litigation arose from the Health System’s acquisition of five physician office locations from the Group, and associated arrangements for the subsequent operation of the Health System’s cancer center service line between December 26, 2011, and February 23, 2019. The Health System and the Group relied on several different contractual relationships to achieve a cancer center partnership:

    1. An asset purchase agreement, pursuant to which the Health System purchased assets of the Group, including substantially all equipment, inventory and offices of the Group’s existing outpatient cancer service locations
    2. An employee lease and administrative services agreement, pursuant to which the Health System obtained the services of all non-physician clinical and non-clinical personnel employed by the Group
    3. A professional services agreement (PSA), pursuant to which the Health System obtained the professional services of physicians for the cancer center service locations
    4. A management services agreement (MSA), pursuant to which the Health System paid the Group for the management of both inpatient and outpatient services furnished by the cancer center service line.

    The MSA required the Group to provide extensive management services to several Health System hospitals. The MSA incorporated both a base management fee and various incentive compensation components. The Health System and the Group obtained several independent third-party valuation opinions to support the fees under the MSA, including the six inpatient oncology service locations included in the MSA, both at the outset of the arrangement and as the fees under the MSA were modified over time.

    DOJ alleged that the Health System acquired physician practice assets and then entered into the subsequent management agreement with the Group for the cancer center service locations to avoid a formal joint venture or other partnership that would have been noncompliant with regulatory requirements. The Health System allegedly failed to follow the requirements of the contractual arrangements with the Group and paid the Group for the management of the cancer center service line without requiring the Group to actually furnish the management services contemplated by the agreement between the parties. DOJ specifically alleged, based on statements from Group witnesses, that the Group did not actually provide any management services at some of the inpatient service locations included in the MSA and reflected in the fees paid by the Health System to the Group. Several of the Health System’s hospitals included in the MSA allegedly did not maintain inpatient cancer units and did not require management. The MSA contemplated that the Group would provide six part-time medical directors (presumably for the six inpatient locations), but DOJ alleged that the Group only ever formally identified two Group physicians to serve as medical directors. Similarly, while the MSA required the Group to maintain documentation demonstrating the management services furnished by the Group’s physicians, allegedly no documentation or exhibits were created to set forth the duties and responsibilities of the medical directors, and the Health System allegedly never requested documentation of the management services furnished before paying the Group.

    Over the eight years that the cancer center arrangements were in place, the Group sought an increase in compensation under the MSA. The Health System and the Group obtained several valuation opinions from valuators to support the higher fees. DOJ alleged that the parties used several different valuation firms and provided financial information that did not match the services contemplated to be furnished under the MSA’s terms.

    DOJ also alleged that the Health System and the Group repeatedly referred to the arrangements for the cancer center service line as a “partnership” and referred to the MSA as a “co-management” agreement, even though the Group was purportedly managing the Health System’s cancer service line. DOJ also alleged that the Group continued to operate as an independent physician practice, even though the Group’s employees were leased on a full-time basis to the Health System. The Group’s separate operations included growing the Group’s business that was unrelated to the Health System by opening new locations.

    Between 2012 and 2018, the Health System paid the Group more than $280 million for professional services under the PSA and more than $27 million for management services under the MSA. DOJ alleged that over the entire duration of the financial arrangement between the Health System and the Group, the Health System paid, either directly or indirectly, more than $300 million to the Group, including other payments to the Group.

    DOJ reviewed the Medicare reimbursement paid to the Health System for services furnished through the Group’s physicians and referrals for inpatient services from the Group’s physicians and estimated that Medicare paid the Health System approximately $353 million for such services. DOJ also compared the reimbursement received by a separate health system that formerly received the majority of the referrals from the Group for cancer services and alleged that the other health system’s inpatient and outpatient reimbursement for services from the Group’s physicians was “cut in half” over the course of the financial relationship between the Health System and the Group.

    In August 2018, the Group notified the Health System that it wanted to unwind the arrangements between the parties. This notification occurred after the Health System was served with a civil investigative demand seeking information related to the underlying qui tam suits, but the Health System alleged that this was the natural end to the parties’ partnership. The Group paid the Health System for assets and real estate used in the arrangement, and the parties’ arrangements came to an end in February 2019.

    Procedural History

    The qui tam suit was originally filed by the former CEO of one of the Health System’s hospitals, and a former member of the Health System’s board of directors also joined the case as a relator (collectively, the Relators). After investigating for two years, both DOJ and the state of Tennessee originally declined to intervene on September 3, 2019.

    DOJ’s intervention decision occurred relatively late in this case and after considerable litigation between the Relators and the Health System. In February 2021, the Group entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in the Group’s dismissal from the case without prejudice as to the United States. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement with the Relators, the Group provided documents to the Relators and agreed to make witnesses available for the Relators to intervene. The Relators filed a third amended complaint that incorporated information learned from the Group to make new allegations in the case. A key new allegation included in the third amended complaint related to statements made during interviews by members of the Group that they provided no inpatient management services during the affiliation with the Health System. Only after these new allegations were made and DOJ conducted its own interviews of individuals affiliated with the Group did DOJ decide to intervene in the case.

    DOJ stated during proceedings related to its motion to intervene that it would seek to assert claims against the Group if permitted to intervene in the litigation. In its order filed March 11, 2022, the district court failed to find good cause to reinsert the Group in the litigation, concluding that it would prejudice the Group and would cause undue delay. Accordingly, DOJ’s complaint in intervention was limited to claims against the Health System.

    This case is ongoing, and there have been no judicial findings regarding the allegations at issue. The Health System has not yet filed a response to the complaints in the case but has indicated that the arrangements were structured by counsel and that it may be considering an advice of counsel defense. The Health System has vigorously denied and defended against DOJ’s assertions and allegations, and has indicated that it intends to continue to litigate the case and defend itself against the allegations.

    Practical Implications

    DOJ has rarely examined management arrangements between health systems and physician groups, particularly the type of complicated regulatory structures required to implement and operationalize service line management agreements. The Health System and the Group both appear to have relied on health regulatory counsel to structure the arrangements at issue and obtained independent valuation opinions to support the fees paid by the Health System to the Group. This case demonstrates DOJ’s willingness to take on more complicated regulatory structures and allege Anti-Kickback Statute violations where, in DOJ’s view, doing so appears warranted by the underlying facts of an arrangement.

    The allegations in this case appear to raise significant questions with respect to the Group’s behavior rather than that of the Health System. In particular, the partnership between the Group and the Health System resulted from proactive outreach from the Group to both the Health System and a competitor. The Group solicited requests for proposals from both the Health System and the competitor before ultimately establishing the partnership with the Health System. The Group also allegedly changed its practice patterns and referrals for inpatient cancer care after the relationship with the Health System was established, according to DOJ’s complaint. An important reason for DOJ’s reversal of its original decision not to seek intervention appears to be statements from Group members during interviews, and DOJ also sought to intervene against the Group.

    In addition to the notable allegations and unique features of this enforcement action, it is notable what the government did not include in its complaint. When hospitals acquire physician practices (or assets associated with physician practices), a common business goal is to take advantage of favorable reimbursement that is available for hospitals. In this case, the Health System acquired the physician practice locations and converted the locations to provider-based locations of the Health System’s hospitals. Medicare pays for services furnished at “provider-based” locations at a higher rate than services furnished in “freestanding” (i.e., not part of a Medicare hospital) locations. Provider-based status can also be relevant with respect to services covered and paid by non-Medicare payors. Provider-based status is also relevant for purposes of the 340B drug pricing program for participating covered entities that wish to register a provider-based facility as a “child site” eligible to purchase drugs at 340B prices. In this case, converting the former physician practice locations to provider-based status enabled the Health System to take advantage of favorable 340B drug pricing for drugs used at the cancer care service locations at issue. A Medicare regulation establishes a series of detailed operational and administrative requirements that must be satisfied in order for a location to qualify as a provider-based location of a hospital. The Medicare provider-based regulation is intended to ensure that all provider-based locations of a hospital function as an integral part of the hospital. Neither the Relators nor DOJ alleged that the cancer care service locations at issue failed to comply with these Medicare reimbursement requirements.

    While the Relators’ operative complaint includes broad allegations related to purported violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark Law, DOJ’s complaint in intervention is narrowly focused on the Anti-Kickback Statute allegations.

    Key Takeaways

    • Carefully consider the ongoing operational and compliance monitoring responsibilities that entering into a partnership between a health system and a physician group entails. Agreements for these types of partnerships can be constructed (with health regulatory counsel advice) as low-risk arrangements but require significant time and expense. More importantly, the time and expense of monitoring the arrangement to ensure it remains consistent with guidance from legal counsel is significant. Providers should ensure that appropriate legal and compliance resources are devoted to providing regular oversight and monitoring of partnerships and management arrangements between health systems and physician groups. Arrangements that involve significant compensation between the health system and a physician group may be subject to closer scrutiny from regulators in the future. As this case demonstrates, even when set up properly, ongoing monitoring is crucial to ensure that parties can defend the arrangement if necessary.
    • Parties to management arrangements between a hospital and a physician group should carefully review the fair market value support documenting the service fees paid to the physician group, and should ensure that the arrangement is bolstered by supporting documentation such as timesheets, regular meeting minutes and other appropriate contemporaneous documentation.
    • This case highlights both the importance of fair market valuation opinions and the risks involved if valuation opinions do not support the terms of a party’s agreement. DOJ alleged that, to support an increase in the fees under the MSA, the parties obtained multiple valuations and used the higher valuation to support increased fees. Both parties to an arrangement should invest appropriate time and attention to ensure valuation opinions properly reflect the terms of the parties’ business arrangements, including modifications to fees and services over the course of an arrangement.
    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • California Extends, Intends to Update COVID-19 Cal/OSHA ETS

    California Extends, Intends to Update COVID-19 Cal/OSHA ETS

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California Extends, Intends to Update COVID-19 Cal/OSHA ETS

    April 15, 2022

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    UPDATE (04/25/2022):

    On April 21, 2022, the Cal/OSHA Standards Board approved the Third Readoption of the ETS. Per Governor Newsom’s Executive Order N-23-21, the Third Readoption will be effective upon filing by the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) with the Secretary of State and will remain in effect for no longer than December 31, 2022. The Second Readoption is set to expire in May 5, 2022, and it is expected that the Third Readoption will be filed and become effective on or around that date. Employers in California should update their COVID-19 ETS policies to ensure continued compliance with Cal/OSHA’s changes in the Third Readoption, which are summarized in the article below.

     


    On February 28, 2022, California Governor Gavin Newsom extended the second readoption of the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health’s (Cal/OSHA) COVID-19 Prevention Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) currently in effect, moving the ETS’s expiration date to May 5, 2022. The Cal/OSHA Standards Board has also proposed that a new version be implemented via a third readoption of the ETS, which will be discussed as an agenda item at its upcoming meeting on April 21, 2022.

    Our prior client alert outlined the material changes between the original Cal/OSHA ETS and the second readoption that took effect on January 14, 2022, which can be found here. The proposed Third Readopted ETS, if implemented, will make some additional material changes and clarifications, including acceptable return-to-work criteria, elimination of certain cleaning and social distancing requirements, and creation of a “returned case” category of workers recovered from COVID-19, discussed in detail below.

    In depth

    The proposed Third Readopted ETS maintains the majority of the current Cal/OSHA ETS requirements. Generally, California employers must continue to maintain a COVID-19 prevention program that is effective, that addresses, identifies and evaluates COVID-19 health hazards, and that provides for employee training on COVID-19 and other safety matters.

    We highlight the proposed revisions that the Cal/OSHA Third Readopted ETS makes to the current Cal/OSHA Second Readopted ETS in the following chart.

    Second Readopted ETS Third Readopted ETS
    Testing Options Defines a COVID-19 test as a cleared, approved or authorized test, including an EUA by the FDA, to detect current infection that is administered in accordance with the instructions and is “not both self-administered and self-read unless observed by the employer or an authorized telehealth proctor.” A COVID-19 test taken for return-to-work purposes may be both self-administered and self-read, but only if another means of independent verification of the results can be provided (e.g., a time-stamped photograph of the results).
    Face Covering Requirements A face covering generally must not let light pass through when held up to a light source, except that clear face coverings or cloth face coverings with clear plastic panels are OK if they otherwise meet the definition. Elimination of the light test and no requirement of masking indoors for anyone.
    Mask Accommodations If the employee’s medical or mental health condition or disability does not permit the employee to wear a non-restrictive alternative, the employee must be at least six feet apart from all other persons and either fully vaccinated or tested at least weekly for COVID-19 during paid time and at no cost to the employee. Social distancing is no longer required. In addition, the accommodated employee must test weekly regardless of vaccination status.
    Respirators and Face Coverings Provided by the Employer Employees who are not fully vaccinated may request a free respirator from the employer.

    Face coverings are recommended outdoors for people not fully vaccinated if six feet of distance cannot be maintained; the employer shall provide face coverings for all employees who are not full vaccinated and ensure they are worn when indoors or in vehicles.

    All employees may request a free respirator from the employer, irrespective of vaccination status.

    Face covering recommendations and requirements for non-fully vaccinated people are rescinded.

    Rules for Excluding Employees from the Workplace After “Close Contact” with a COVID-19-Positive Individual
    • Employees who were fully vaccinated before the close contact and who do not develop COVID-19 symptoms need not be excluded if they wear a face covering and maintain six feet of distance from others at the workplace for 14 days following the last date of close contact.
    • Employees who previously had COVID-19 within the last 90 days, returned to work under the return-to-work guidelines set forth in the Cal/OSHA ETS and are asymptomatic do not need to be excluded if they wear a face covering and maintain six feet of distance from others at the workplace for 14 days following the last date of close contact.
    • Employees not fully vaccinated and who have not had COVID-19 in the past 90 days and are asymptomatic must quarantine but may return to work after:
      • 14 days have passed since the last known close contact;
      • 10 days have passed since the last known close contact and the employee wears a face covering and maintains six feet of distance while at the workplace until 14 days following the last date of close contact; or
      • Seven days have passed since the last known close contact and the employee tested negative for COVID-19 at least five days since the last known close contact, wears a face covering and maintains six feet of distance while at the workplace until 14 days have passed following the last date of close contact.
    • Employees who had a close contact and develop COVID-19 symptoms are excluded from the workplace and returned upon the timeline applicable to symptomatic COVID-19 cases.
    Employers must review current CDPH guidance for persons who had close contacts, including any guidance regarding quarantine or other measures to reduce transmission. Employers shall develop, implement and maintain effective policies to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 by persons who had close contacts.

    The employer must demonstrate it has met the applicable requirements below:

    (A) COVID-19 cases, regardless of vaccination status or previous infection, who do not develop COVID-19 symptoms or whose COVID-19 symptoms are resolving, shall not return to work until:

    1. At least five days have passed from the date that COVID-19 symptoms began or, if the person does not develop COVID-19 symptoms, from the date of the first positive COVID-19 test;

    2. At least 24 hours have passed since a fever of 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit or higher has resolved without the use of fever-reducing medications; and

    3. A negative COVID-19 test from a specimen collected on the fifth day or later is obtained; or, if unable to test or the employer chooses not to require a test, 10 days have passed from the date that COVID-19 symptoms began or, if the person does not develop COVID-19 symptoms, from the date of first positive COVID-19 test.

    (B) COVID-19 cases, regardless of vaccination status or previous infection, whose COVID19 symptoms are not resolving, may not return to work until: 1) At least 24 hours have passed since a fever of 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit or higher has resolved without the use of fever-reducing medication; and 2) Symptoms are resolving or 10 days have passed from when the symptoms began. 

    (C) Regardless of vaccination status, previous infection or lack of COVID-19 symptoms, a COVID-19 case shall wear a face covering in the workplace until 10 days have passed since the date that COVID-19 symptoms began or, if the person did not have COVID-19 symptoms, from the date of their first positive COVID-19 test.

    (D) These requirements apply regardless of whether an employee has previously been excluded or other precautions were taken in response to an employee’s close contact or membership in an exposed group.

     

    Definition of Fully Vaccinated The definition of “fully vaccinated” was updated to acknowledge that those receiving “mix-and-match” vaccines may still qualify. “Fully vaccinated” means:

    • A person’s status two weeks after completing primary vaccination with a COVID-19 vaccine with at least the minimum recommended interval between doses in accordance with the approval, authorization or listing that is: (1) approved or authorized for emergency use by the FDA, (2) listed for emergency use by the World Health Organization (WHO) or (3) administered as part of a clinical trial; or
    • A person’s status two weeks after receiving the second dose of any combination of two doses of a COVID-19 vaccine that is approved or authorized by the FDA or listed as a two-dose series by the WHO. The second dose must not be received earlier than 17 days (21 days with a four-day grace period) after the first dose.

     

    The definition of “fully vaccinated” is deleted. Prior distinctions in the second readopted ETS between fully vaccinated and non-fully vaccinated people have been removed throughout the draft third readopted ETS.

    The draft Third Readopted ETS makes the following additional changes:

    • Required cleaning and disinfecting procedures, and references to contaminated objects or surfaces, have been deleted.
    • In an outbreak situation, employees who had close contacts must have a negative COVID-19 test taken between three and five days after the close contact or must be excluded and follow the return-to-work requirements starting from the date of the last known close contact. Further, physical partitions are no longer required.
    • A new definition for “returned case” has been added; this means a COVID-19 case who returned to work under Cal/OSHA requirements and did not develop any COVID-19 symptoms after returning. A person shall only be considered a returned case for 90 days after the initial onset of COVID-19 symptoms or, if the person never developed COVID-19 symptoms, for 90 days after the first positive test. If a period of other than 90 days is required by a CDPH regulation or order, that period shall apply.
    • The term “high-risk exposure period” was changed to “infectious period.”

    California employers should work with counsel to monitor the status of the third readopted ETS, and if implemented, review their current Cal/OSHA ETS safety policies to ensure that their policy is updated with these latest changes once they are confirmed to be in place. For assistance with these updates, you may contact the authors of this article or your McDermott lawyer for more information.

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  • Cross-Border Financing Trends in Middle Market Transactions

    Cross-Border Financing Trends in Middle Market Transactions

    ARTICLE

    Cross-Border Financing Trends in Middle Market Transactions

    April, 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Aymen Mahmoud and Stephanie McCann contributed as editors to The Legal 500‘s Lending & Secured Finance Country Comparative Guide 2022. Read their chapter on Cross-Border Financing Trends in Middle Market Transactions here.

    In depth
    Authors

    Aymen Mahmoud

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Stephanie S. McCann

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Seventh Circuit Bars Bad Faith Asset Buyer Protection

    Seventh Circuit Bars Bad Faith Asset Buyer Protection

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Bars Bad Faith Asset Buyer Protection

    April 15, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Good-faith purchasers enjoy strong protection under [Bankruptcy Code (“Code”)] § 363(m),” but the silent asset buyer (“B”) with “actual and constructive knowledge of a competing interest” lacks “good faith,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on April 4, 2022. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (“ADM”) v. Country Visions Cooperative, 2022 WL 998984 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2022). Affirming the lower courts’ denial of B’s motion to enforce a “free-and-clear sale” provision in a plan confirmation order, the Seventh Circuit cited the bad faith of both the debtors and B, the asset purchaser. 

    Relevance and Context

    Bankruptcy court-approved asset sales are common. To encourage its participation in bankruptcy sales, Code § 363(m) provides that a purchaser of a debtor’s assets will be protected from reversal of the sale on appeal so long as the purchaser acted in “good faith.” But the Code does not define “good faith” purchaser. In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380, 390 (2d Cir. 1997). According to the traditional equitable definition, a good faith purchaser is “one who purchases the assets for value, in good faith and without notice of adverse claims.” Id., quoting Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1023 (4th Cir. 1985). A buyer’s good faith is evidenced “by the integrity of [its] conduct during the course of the sale proceedings.” Id. In Gucci, a fiercely litigious competitor of the Chapter 11 debtor bought the debtor’s assets (trademark and licensing rights). The court held the buyer to be a “good faith” purchaser under Code § 363(m), explaining how the “good faith” principle applied to asset sales. 

    A disgruntled bidder had appealed from the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale in Gucci, but failed to obtain a stay pending appeal, resulting in the consummation of the sale. According to the court, the buyer’s “conduct during the course of the sale proceedings” was entirely proper. Good faith could be lost, however, by “fraud, collusion between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders.” Id. The court rejected the disgruntled bidder’s arguments in Gucci that the buyer had acted in bad faith by waging a worldwide litigation strategy against the debtor for the purpose of devaluing the debtor’s trademarks as assets. The buyer’s litigation and alleged harassment campaign, said the court, was not aimed at “controlling the sale price or taking unfair advantage of the bidders.” Id., at 391. Instead, the successful purchaser was a competitor who had adopted “an aggressive litigation strategy” before bankruptcy “to protect its own trademarks from infringement,” and the litigation was a continuation of its “established business strategy.” Id. According to the court, “aggressive protection of trademarks is the reality of the designer retail business,” not “flagrant misconduct” during the sales transaction. Id., at 392. See also In re Old Cold LLC, 819 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2018) (good faith purchaser must not have knowledge of adverse claims); In re R.B.B., Inc., 211 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2000) (good faith status may be negated if “shell game” conducted); In re Burgess, 246 B.R. 352 (8th Cir. BAP 2000) (bad faith shown by misconduct surrounding the sale).

    Facts

    The debtors in the ADM case granted a right of first refusal (the “Right”) on their land to the entity known as C. The Right had a term of 10 years that entitled C to buy the land by matching any other person’s offer at a sale. The debtors started distributing their assets prior to bankruptcy but never notified C of the bankruptcy, never listed it as a creditor and never attempted to make it a party to the bankruptcy case. Nor did the debtors tell the bankruptcy court about the Right. 

    The bankruptcy court confirmed a chapter 11 plan in 2011. In that plan, the parcel’s buyer, B, became the owner of the land “free and clear of all other interests.” But “[n]o one offered [C] an opportunity to match the price that [B] paid.” 2022 WL 998984, at *1. 

    B later tried to sell the property again in 2015 without offering it to C. C sued in state court, “demanding compensation for the violation of the Right.” Id. B then asked the bankruptcy court “to enforce the free-and-clear aspect of the 2011 sale by barring [C] from seeking any remedy in state court,” relying on the terms of Code § 363(m). The bankruptcy court and district court rejected B’s request, holding that B “had not acquired the parcel in good faith, because it knew of the Right” and “failed to alert the bankruptcy judge.” Id.

    The Seventh Circuit

    The Seventh Circuit stressed the facts. First, C had “filed a copy of the Right in the local real estate records; even a cursory title search would have turned it up – indeed, did turn it up.” Id. Not only had B obtained the title report, but it also “knew that [C] was not a party to the bankruptcy.” It also knew that “about a week before the sale, counsel for [C] sensed that something was happening” and began to inquire how to protect “his client’s rights.” Although the bankruptcy court suspected “a form of fraud on the court,” she merely denied B’s motion to “stop the state litigation, which is ongoing.” Id.

    The Court of Appeals said this was a “statutory case”: [i]f “ADM did not buy the parcel in ‘good faith’ in 2011, then it loses no matter what the Constitution has to say about the sort of notice [C] should have received.” Id. at *2. 

    First, the debtors had acted in bad faith. “They knew of the Right yet they did not notify [C] about the bankruptcy.” Id. Nor did they serve C “with process,” as required by both the Code and Bankruptcy Rules. Code § 363(b)(1), (d)(f); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(f). The debtors also failed to tell the bankruptcy court about C’s interest in the property being sold. 

    The dispute in the Seventh Circuit, though, was between B and C, not against the debtors. In the end, B never “bought the parcel in good faith.” Id. “[S]omeone who has both actual and constructive knowledge of a competing interest, yet permits the sale to proceed without seeking the judge’s assurance that the competing interest-holder may be excluded from the proceedings, is not acting in good faith.” Id. Constructive knowledge was “established by the Rights’ presence in the real estate records. Actual knowledge was established by [B’s] possession of a title search report showing the Right, plus the fact that B learned of [C’s] inquiries.” Id.

    The bankruptcy court could have resolved any competing claims to the debtor’s assets, “even to extinguish them, but only if the claimants received proper notice as litigants.” Id. Here, the bankruptcy court had never learned of the Right in 2011 and “did not purport to extinguish it without compensation to [C].” Because B was not a good-faith purchaser, it must “defend the state litigation” brought by C. Id. 

    Comments

    The ADM decision is sensible, based on indisputable facts. B’s conduct during the course of the sale – concealment of known material facts in an attempt to impair the rights of C – was fatal. 

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • No Breach of Contract Where Company Disclosed Its Own Non-Public Information

    No Breach of Contract Where Company Disclosed Its Own Non-Public Information

    ARTICLE

    No Breach of Contract Where Company Disclosed Its Own Non-Public Information

    Apr 14, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a trade secret lawsuit against a consultant that allegedly failed to prevent its client from disclosing its own proprietary information during a call with a potential buyer. Protégé Biomedical, LLC v. Duff & Phelps Securities, LLC, and Philip I. Smith, Case No. 21-1368 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2022) (per curiam) (Erickson, J., dissenting).

    Protégé entered into an agreement with Duff & Phelps to help Protégé find a buyer for its business. Under the agreement, Duff & Phelps received immunity from certain types of claims, its employees were shielded from individual liability and it owed no fiduciary duties to Protégé.

    One of Protégé’s competitors, Z-Medica, was identified as a potential buyer. One of Duff & Phelps’s employees, Philip Smith, facilitated execution of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) by a member of Z-Medica’s board of directors. Protégé assumed that the NDA would also bind Z-Medica and thus participated in conference calls with Z-Medica in which Protégé revealed non-public information. In Z-Medica’s view, however, the board member signed the NDA in his personal capacity and not as Z-Medica’s representative. As a result, Z-Medica used the information it received from Protégé to create its own competing product.

    Protégé sued Z-Medica. After settling with Z-Medica, Protégé sued Duff & Phelps and Smith in state court for breach of contract, unlawful practice of law, negligence, breach of professional services and breach of fiduciary and principal-agent duties. Duff & Phelps removed the case to federal court on the ground that Smith, the only non-diverse defendant, had been fraudulently joined. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Protégé appealed.

    The Eighth Circuit first analyzed whether the case belonged in federal court. The Court upheld the district court’s determination that Smith was fraudulently joined. The Court stated that fraudulent joinder occurs when there is no reasonable basis in fact and law for the claims brought against the non-diverse defendant. Here, the Court found that there was no reasonable basis for Protégé to allege breach of contract against Smith since he was never a party to the contract between Protégé and Duff & Phelps. The Court found that Protégé’s unlawful practice of law claim against Smith also constituted fraudulent joinder because Smith never gave legal advice to Protégé. The Court noted that the contract immunized Smith from Protégé’s other claims and thus, without any viable claims against Smith, the case was properly in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

    Turning to the merits of the claims against Duff & Phelps, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim. The Court reasoned that Protégé’s breach of contract claim was predicated on an alleged failure by Duff & Phelps to prevent Protégé from disclosing its proprietary information. However, the agreement only made Duff & Phelps responsible for its own conduct, not for Protégé’s conduct. The Court explained that Protégé’s other claims failed for the same reason.

    Judge Erickson dissented, disagreeing with the majority on the issue of whether Smith was fraudulently joined. In Judge Erickson’s view, there was no fraudulent joinder and the case should not have been dismissed against either party. In his view, Smith, acting on behalf of Duff & Phelps, signed both the contract and the NDA at issue and, therefore, it was not fraudulent to name the employer and the employee whose conduct had been called into question as a defendant. Because there was no fraudulent joinder (and therefore no diversity), jurisdiction was proper in state court.

    If jurisdiction in federal court was proper, Judge Erickson would reverse the dismissal of the breach of contract, negligence and breach of professional services claims because the complaint was well pleaded and Duff & Phelps undertook the duty to obtain NDAs. He stated that it should be left to a fact-finder to determine whether Duff & Phelps’s conduct caused Protégé to disclosure its confidential business information and to determine whether that conduct amounted to gross negligence, ordinary negligence or no claim at all.

    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes

  • Healthcare Enforcement Quarterly | Q1 2022

    Healthcare Enforcement Quarterly | Q1 2022

    ARTICLE

    Healthcare Enforcement Quarterly | Q1 2022

    April 2022

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Julian L. André

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Benton Curtis

    Partner

    Miami

    Matthew L. Knowles

    Partner

    Boston

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Laura McLane

    Partner

    Boston

    Dana M. McSherry

    Partner

    Boston

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Mara Theophila

    Partner

    Boston

    Paul M. Thompson

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Dexter Golinghorst

    Associate

    Chicago

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