Content Type: Article

  • IRS Announces 2023 Limits for Health Savings Accounts, High-Deductible Health Plans and Excepted Benefit HRAs

    IRS Announces 2023 Limits for Health Savings Accounts, High-Deductible Health Plans and Excepted Benefit HRAs

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Announces 2023 Limits for Health Savings Accounts, High-Deductible Health Plans and Excepted Benefit HRAs

    April 29, 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced (See Revenue Procedure 2022-24) cost-of-living adjustments to the applicable dollar limits for health savings accounts (HSAs), high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) and excepted benefit health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) for 2023. All of the dollar limits currently in effect for 2022 will change for 2023, with the exception of one limit. The HSA catch-up contribution for individuals ages 55 and older will not change as it is not subject to cost-of-living adjustments.

    The table below compares the applicable dollar limits for HSAs, HDHPs and excepted benefit HRAs for 2022 and 2023.

    HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN LIMITS 2022 Δ 2023
    HDHP – Maximum annual out-of-pocket limit (excluding premiums)
    Self-only coverage $7,050 ↑ $7,500
    Family coverage $14,100 ↑ $15,000
    HDHP – Minimum annual deductible
    Self-only coverage $1,400 ↑ $1,500
    Family coverage $2,800 ↑ $3,000
    HSA – Annual contribution limit
    Self-only coverage $3,650 ↑ $3,850
    Family coverage $7,300 ↑ $7,750
    Catch-up contributions (ages 55 and older) $1,000 = $1,000
    Excepted Benefit HRA
    Annual contribution limit $1,800 ↑ $1,950

    NEXT STEPS

    Plan sponsors should update payroll and plan administration systems for the 2023 cost-of-living adjustments and incorporate the new limits in relevant participant communications, such as open enrollment and communication materials, plan documents and summary plan descriptions.

    For further information about applying the new HSA, HDHP and excepted benefit HRA plan limits for 2023, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors below.

    In depth
    Authors

    Jacob M. Mattinson

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • State Law Privacy Video Series | Loyalty Programs

    State Law Privacy Video Series | Loyalty Programs

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / VIDEO

    State Law Privacy Video Series | Loyalty Programs

    April 28, 2022

    Read time: 3 min

    Overview

    California, Virginia and Colorado have new privacy laws coming into effect in 2023. But now is the time to start preparing your business or organization for compliance.

    In this video series, we examine the different aspects of these laws and provide you the knowledge and tools you need for proper compliance.

    In depth

    Privacy laws can be tricky when it comes to loyalty programs—where retailers provide consumers discounts or other rewards based on repeat business. A recent enforcement sweep in California highlights how the new California privacy laws differ from the laws in other states.

    In this next video, Associate Austin Mooney takes a look at each of the requirements and what businesses need to do now to ensure they are operating in compliance.


    McDermott’s State Law Privacy Video Series: Loyalty Programs overview, 2022 (runtime: 4m)

    Conclusion
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  • Developments in UK Life Sciences – Spring Update 2022

    Developments in UK Life Sciences – Spring Update 2022

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Developments in UK Life Sciences – Spring Update 2022

    April 28, 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

     

    In depth
    Tabs

    Sharon Lamb

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Ludovica Rabitti

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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    Endnotes

  • Biden Administration Takes Action to Improve Competition, Transparency and Quality for Hospitals and Nursing Homes

    Biden Administration Takes Action to Improve Competition, Transparency and Quality for Hospitals and Nursing Homes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    Biden Administration Takes Action to Improve Competition, Transparency and Quality for Hospitals and Nursing Homes

    April 27, 2022

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently published detailed databases summarizing changes of ownership of Medicare-enrolled hospitals and skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). The databases currently include information from 2016 to 2022, but the data will be updated and released quarterly. CMS also released the skilled nursing facility prospective payment system (SNF PPS) proposed rule (the Proposed Rule), including proposed updates to payment based on quality and value-based care measures.

    In depth

    Consistent with the Biden-Harris administration’s stated goals of improving transparency, safety, accountability and quality in healthcare, and specifically in nursing homes, on April 20, 2022, the White House issued the first-ever release of public data by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) on changes of ownership involving hospitals and nursing homes enrolled in Medicare. Relatedly, on April 11, 2022, CMS also issued the fiscal year (FY 2023) proposed rule for Medicare payment policies and rates for nursing homes under the Skilled Nursing Facility Prospective Payment System (SNF PPS) (the Proposed Rule). The Proposed Rule includes a number of potential metrics for the SNF Quality Reporting Program and the SNF Value-Based Program for FY 2023. We discuss these developments in turn in this alert.

    I. Transparency on Hospital and Nursing Home Ownership

    Providers that participate in Medicare are required to enroll and provide detailed ownership information of all direct and indirect owners, regardless of whether such owners are organizations or individuals. Providers are also required to update their ownership information within 30 days of a change of ownership. CMS generally uses the Provider Enrollment, Chain and Ownership System (PECOS), an electronic online system, to maintain and update this enrollment and ownership information. While CMS has long maintained this information internally, on April 20, 2022, CMS released for the first time data on mergers, acquisitions, consolidations and changes of ownership from 2016 to 2022 for hospitals and nursing homes enrolled in Medicare.

    The database includes a Hospital Change of Ownership dataset and Skilled Nursing Facility Change of Ownership dataset, as well as an initial Summary Analysis from the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. The Hospital Change of Ownership dataset provides information on individual and organizational ownership interest and managerial control associated with the buyer and seller organizations, as well as the role of the owner, association date, address of the organizational owner and other ownership details. The SNF Change of Ownership dataset includes information on the buyer and seller organization’s legal business name, provider type, change of ownership type and the effective date of the change. CMS expects to release updated change of ownership data for both databases on a quarterly basis.

    The newly released information will permit the public to identify when (1) a Medicare-enrolled hospital or SNF has been purchased or leased by another organization, (2) a Medicare-enrolled hospital or SNF purchases or has been purchased by another enrolled provider, or (3) two or more enrolled Medicare hospitals or SNFs consolidate to form a new business entity. In addition to providing change of ownership information, the data includes detailed information about the direct and indirect owners of Medicare-enrolled hospitals and SNFs.

    The database was first announced in late February 2022 as part of the State of the Union Action Plan for Protecting Seniors by Improving Safety and Quality of Care in the Nation’s Nursing Homes. The data is intended to enable researchers, enforcement officials and the public to analyze trends and examine the relationship between ownership of healthcare facilities and variables such as costs and outcomes on patients. CMS noted that making change of ownership information public will permit researchers to identify trends and issues related to changes of ownership and consolidation, particularly in relation to healthcare prices, accessibility and quality. The release of the database is in furtherance of the Biden-Harris administration’s policy intentions stated in the 2021 Executive Order on Promoting Competition, wherein the administration expressed concerns that hospital consolidation has resulted in increased healthcare prices and inadequate options in some areas of the country. In the announcement accompanying its release, CMS indicated that publishing the database is “one of many” initiatives to increase transparency and boost competition in healthcare, and we expect to see further developments on this matter throughout the coming year.

    CMS noted that making ownership information publicly available will permit researchers and policymakers to understand in more detail how healthcare facilities are owned and where ownership of healthcare facilities may be more concentrated. CMS also noted that the data may be used by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission in connection with review of mergers and acquisitions for compliance with federal antitrust law.

    In addition to promoting competition, CMS highlighted that making change of ownership data public may be useful in tracking healthcare quality. CMS pointed to academic research on acquisition of SNFs by private equity and other private investment firms to highlight potential quality of care concerns with these acquisitions. CMS is interested in understanding the impact of different ownership types on the quality of care furnished by healthcare entities.

    II. Skilled Nursing Facility Prospective Payment System (SNF PPS) Proposed Rule

    Further building upon the White House’s stated commitment to improving safety and quality in nursing homes, CMS recently published its annual SNF PPS Proposed Rule. In addition to proposed rate adjustments, the Proposed Rule discusses a number of elements showcasing CMS’ continued efforts to prioritize the value, rather than volume, of certain services patients receive in nursing homes. A summary of these elements is outlined below.

    1. Updated Payment Rates and Recalibrated Parity Adjustment

    CMS estimates that the SNF PPS will result in a net decrease of approximately $320 million in Medicare Part A payments to SNFs in FY 2023 compared to FY 2022. This estimate reflects a $1.4 billion (3.9%) increase in the FY 2022 SNF PPS unadjusted federal per diem rates and a $1.7 billion (4.6%) proposed reduction in aggregate SNF spending. The reduction in SNF spending, in turn, reflects a proposed recalibration of the parity adjustment initially used under the Patient Driven Payment Model (PDPM). The PDPM, which CMS expected to be budget-neutral and neither increase nor decrease aggregate SNF spending, went into effect on October 1, 2019. However, the PDPM instead caused an unintended increase in SNF payments of approximately 5%, or $1.7 billion, in FY 2020. As a result, and after considering stakeholder feedback received in the FY 2022 SNF PPS rulemaking cycle, CMS is proposing a parity adjustment to the PDPM that would reduce SNF spending by 4.6% in FY 2023.

    2. Minimum Staffing Requirements

    CMS is soliciting input in the Proposed Rule to guide its establishment of minimum staffing requirements (e.g., nurses, aides and other professionals) for long-term care facilities to ensure resident needs are met and to improve resident function and quality of life. CMS intends to issue additional proposed rules on minimum staffing level requirements for nursing homes within the next year.

    3. SNF Quality Reporting Program Proposed Measures

    Pursuant to the SNF Quality Reporting Program, CMS publishes quality measures that SNFs must report on an annual basis. Beginning with the FY 2025 program year, CMS is proposing the adoption of the Influenza Vaccination Coverage among Healthcare Personnel (HCP) measure, which would report the percentage of HCP who receive an annual influenza vaccine from the time the vaccine first becomes available through March 31 of the following year. Monitoring and reporting influenza vaccination rates among HCP is essential because HCP are at risk for (1) acquiring influenza from residents and (2) exposing influenza to residents, given the fact that influenza vaccination coverage among HCP is typically lower in long-term care settings relative to other care settings. CMS proposes to reduce by 2% the annual rate update of SNFs that fail to meet the reporting requirements.

    4. SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program Proposed Measures

    CMS is proposing four measures as part of the SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program to incentivize SNFs paid under the SNF PPS based on the quality of care they provide to Medicare beneficiaries.
    First, the Nursing Home Staff Turnover measure would identify staff turnover levels in nursing homes by reporting the percentage of total nurse staff that left the SNF over the last 12-month period. This measure is supported by data from CMS showing that as the average staff turnover decreases, a facility’s overall rating on CMS’ Nursing Home Five Star Quality Rating System increases. This purportedly suggests that lower turnover results in higher overall quality. Through a Request for Information, CMS is requesting stakeholder input on this measure for future inclusion in the Value-Based Purchasing Program.

    Second, the Skilled Nursing Facility Healthcare Associated Infections Requiring Hospitalization measure would assess SNF performance on infection prevention and management, which CMS proposes implementing during the FY 2026 program year.
    Third, the Total Nursing Hours per Resident Day measure would use auditable electronic data to calculate total nursing hours per resident, which CMS proposes to implement as part of the FY 2026 program year.

    Finally, the Adoption of the Discharge to Community – Post Acute Care Measure for SNFs would assess the rate of successful discharges to community from a SNF setting, which CMS is proposing to implement during the FY 2027 program year.

    III. Key Takeaways

    The Biden-Harris administration is taking numerous steps to achieve its goals of improving safety, accountability, oversight and transparency in the hospital and senior-services industry for patients and staff. CMS highlighted that it will be publishing minimum staffing levels for SNFs and will continue explicitly tying payment for SNF services to staff-turnover levels.

    While CMS has previously released provider enrollment files to the public, the release of change of ownership information will permit researchers and the public to more closely scrutinize acquisitions and sales of Medicare hospitals and SNFs. The release also includes more detailed ownership information than has previously been released. CMS has explicitly noted that it is hoping for closer scrutiny of this information to inform policymaking, including research on the impact of ownership on the quality and cost of healthcare furnished by Medicare providers. Medicare-enrolled hospitals and SNFs should be aware that this information is now publicly available and may prompt public scrutiny.

    This remains an extremely active regulatory space, and we will continue to monitor it and report on further developments.

    Authors

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    George Tzanetakos

    Partner

    Chicago

    Evelyn S. Atwater

    Associate

    Chicago

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  • Climate Change Regulatory Update for US Insurers: April 2022

    Climate Change Regulatory Update for US Insurers: April 2022

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Climate Change Regulatory Update for US Insurers: April 2022

    April 27, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    If anyone believed that the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) release of proposed climate change-related disclosure requirements last month might have been an isolated matter, of immediate importance only to the approximately 110 insurers that are SEC registrants, developments during the past month paint a different picture. In early April, state insurance regulators in favor of requiring insurers to provide climate risk disclosure in line with the SEC’s direction achieved only partial success; however, last week, Connecticut joined New York by proposing a comprehensive climate change regulatory framework for insurers. Meanwhile, additional guidance on climate change risk disclosure from the SEC signaled that the agency will continue to focus on the topic.

    In depth

    FULL NAIC PASSES ON REVISED CLIMATE DISCLOSURE SURVEY

    In an unusual move, following over a year of deliberation and drafting by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) Climate and Resiliency Task Force to update and revise the NAIC’s existing climate disclosure form (the NAIC Survey) and following the vote by NAIC’s Executive Committee to approve the new version of the NAIC Survey earlier this month, NAIC leadership determined that its full membership need not discuss the NAIC Survey or vote to adopt it. Subsequent news reports, based on carefully drafted press releases from California, Washington and the NAIC itself, have stated that the NAIC acted to adopt the revised NAIC Survey.

    The reality is that during the NAIC’s Plenary session on April 8, 2022, NAIC President Dean Cameron asserted that because filing the NAIC Survey is voluntary—and limited to the 15 US jurisdictions that require certain domestic insurers to submit it—there was no need for the full membership to vote on it (or even discuss it). Whether this maneuver was prompted by a widening split on climate change issues among regulators remains to be seen as the work of the Climate and Resiliency Task Force continues.

    CONNECTICUT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT PUBLISHES PROPOSED CLIMATE RISK REGULATORY BULLETIN

    During the NAIC’s Spring National Meeting, Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Andrew Mais announced that he expected Connecticut to follow New York’s lead by publishing proposed climate change risk regulatory guidance for insurers. (Connecticut is one of the 15 US jurisdictions that requires certain domestic insurers to file either the NAIC Survey or the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) report form.) Late on April 22, 2022, the Department released its proposed bulletin addressed to insurers domiciled in Connecticut, setting forth climate change-related governance, organizational structure and risk analysis/disclosure requirements. Public comments will be accepted for one month. Once the bulletin is finalized, the Department expects that it will direct insurers to:

    • “Integrate the consideration of climate risks into its governance structure at the group or insurer entity level.
    • Incorporate climate risks into the insurer’s existing financial risk management.
    • Appropriately disclose its climate risks and engage with the [TCFD], the NAIC Climate Risk Disclosure Survey, and other initiatives when developing its disclosure approaches.”

    Affected insurers will need to implement governance and organizational structure changes by January 1, 2023.

    SEC ACTION

    On April 12, 2022, speaking at a virtual conference sponsored by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), SEC Chair Gary Gensler and SEC Director of the Division of Corporation Finance Renee Jones spoke at length about the development of the proposed rules. The key takeaways from their remarks are summarized as follows:

    • The proposed rules are another in a long tradition of SEC rulemaking that require issuers to provide full and fair financial and business operation disclosures so that investors can make decisions.
    • Specifically, the proposed rules follow the development of risk factors in the 1960s, management discussion and analysis requirements from the 1970s, up to the SEC’s publication of its first round of climate-related disclosure guidance in 2010.
    • Because issuers have been making climate-related disclosures for some time, now is appropriate to standardize communications from issuers to investors, focusing on material matters—particularly in relation to forecasts and risk factors.
    • The SEC is attempting to build on what companies/issuers have already started—particularly issuers who have been using the TCFD framework—to develop clear “rules of the road” so that issuers can provide investors with consistent, comparable and decision-useful information.
    • Requiring disclosure in Forms 10-K is appropriate because that’s where investors tend to look to find information relevant to their decision-making, and there are applicable controls (e.g., in SOX §302) that the SEC believes are helpful.
    • Disclosures concerning greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets or transition plans (IF established by an issuer) should be accompanied by explanations as to how the issuer plans to meet those targets or fulfill their transition plan.
    • Forward-looking statements with respect to emission reduction targets, transition plans, use of scenario analyses and the like should be protected by the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act if they are accompanied by meaningful cautionary language that explains why actual results may differ from those forecasted.
    • Disclosure of the financial impacts, expenditures and estimates and assumptions relating to climate events or risks will be required in the disaggregated form if the climate-related portion of any financial statement line item exceeds 1%.
    • Because Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions involve facilities owned or activities controlled by registrants, all should be able to quantify and disclose those.

    Scope 3 emission disclosures will be phased in and required only for larger companies if the emissions are material or if the issuer made commitments with respect to such emissions. Chair Gensler and Director Jones’ remarks following up on related SEC staff activity include:

    Proxy Statements

    At the end of March, the SEC staff wrote to two of the approximately 110 insurers registered with the SEC to advise them that proxy solicitation materials must include shareholder proposals seeking, as the SEC’s March 31, 2022, letter to one major insurer put it, to have “the Company issue a report addressing if and how it intends to measure, disclose, and reduce the GHG emissions associated with its underwriting, insuring, and investment activities, in alignment with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5° C. goal, requiring net zero emissions.” Whether shareholders will approve such proposals remains to be seen, however, these two examples are additional evidence that investors, including some of the largest fund managers, are prepared to try to require companies to disclose more—not less—about existing and future GHG emissions.

    Carbon Footprints

    The SEC staff is believed to be reviewing so-called “carbon footprint” disclosures by registrants. Areas of interest to SEC staff reportedly include calculation methodologies used by registrants, as well as prior public statements and other communications concerning carbon footprints.

    Registrants should also recall the Division of Corporation Finance staff’s September 2021 sample comment letter on climate disclosures, available here. It will be interesting to read what registrants decide to disclose and report vis-à-vis state insurance regulatory climate disclosure “requirements” in light of the NAIC’s April 8, 2022, decision to forego both discussion and voting on the proposed revised NAIC Survey.

    Authors

    Thomas M. Dawson

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • CFPB Invokes ‘Dormant’ Authority to Conduct Exams of Fintech Companies

    CFPB Invokes ‘Dormant’ Authority to Conduct Exams of Fintech Companies

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Invokes ‘Dormant’ Authority to Conduct Exams of Fintech Companies

    April 27, 2022

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) announced that it will conduct exams of nonbank covered entities who otherwise would not be subject to supervision if it believes they pose “risks to consumers.”[1] In addition, the CFPB outlined a process to publicly release the orders and opinions that come out of these supervision determinations.[2] This assertion of authority continues the CFPB’s aggressive pursuit of its mandate, and is expressly focused on keeping the “fintech” space in check.[3]

    A New Category of Supervision

    This announcement forecasts that the Bureau will seek to examine and supervise companies that previously have not been subject to CFPB supervision. This power can reach companies that are not federally registered banks or that are not already under the CFPB’s examination authority. While the Press Release expressly calls out the fintech industry, the Bureau’s authority could be used on other industries, like payment processors or cryptocurrency companies. On the one hand, the Bureau’s authority to conduct exams of certain covered entities — such as “larger participants” in the market for consumer financial products and services, and home mortgage lenders and servicers — is well established.[4] To date, the CFPB has exerted its supervisory authority to conduct exams of “nonbank entities in the mortgage, private student loan, and payday loan industries, regardless of size,” and certain companies involved in “consumer reporting, debt collection, student loan servicing, international remittances, and auto loan servicing,” depending on their size.[5]

    Here, the CFPB relies on its authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to supervise any “nonbank covered person” that “is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with regard to the offering or provision of consumer financial products or services.”[6] The CFPB anticipates examining entities “that may be fast-growing or are in markets outside the existing nonbank supervision program.”[7] In doing so, the CFPB aims “to hold nonbanks to the same standards that banks are held to.”[8] The Bureau previously implemented a policy statement about its risk-based authority in 2013 but has rarely made public reference to it since.[9] While this provision comes along with certain procedural safeguards like notice and a hearing, it is likely the Bureau will interpret “risks to consumers” very broadly, as it seeks to leverage its authority “to move as quickly as the market.”[10]

    This development continues the CFPB’s proactive stance under Director Chopra’s leadership. The prior administration criticized the first Director’s approach as “regulation by enforcement” that “pushed the envelope” on the Bureau’s jurisdiction.[11] Practitioners expected the Biden administration would push the envelope anew. The current administration quickly rescinded a policy statement that limited the “abusive” practices the Bureau would pursue, committing to use the full extent of its statutory authority.[12] Here, the Bureau plans to tap a “dormant” power to maximize its jurisdiction, subjecting more entities to supervisory examinations.

    CFPB exams are demanding and fast-paced. Exam staff request a large volume of material under very tight timelines with little indication of what the staff may be looking for. These exams can be wide ranging because the Bureau enforces roughly 20 separate federal statutes that cover almost every type of lending, servicing and collection for personal, family and household use in the United States. These statutes reach the covered entities that offer or provide consumer financial services, as well as those entities’ service providers.

    The CFPB also has broad authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to pursue any unfair, abusive or deceptive act or practice in connection with the offering or provision of any consumer financial product or service.[13] The Press Release highlights that the very conduct that “poses risks to consumers” may also qualify as “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices, or other acts or practices that potentially violate federal consumer financial law.”[14] Exams may identify “Matters Requiring Attention” that deserve prompt corrective action, and may result in enforcement. For example, the enforcement action the CFPB and the New York Attorney General recently filed against MoneyGram arose out of remittance rule compliance issues first flagged in a CFPB exam.[15]

    The Press Release indicates that fintech companies, payment processors and cryptocurrency companies will increasingly have to respond to exams even where there would be no other basis to expect the CFPB’s supervision.

    Public Determinations and Orders

    Together with the Press Release, the CFPB issued rule amendments that provide the procedure the Bureau will use to make public its decisions about which nonbank covered persons are subject to this new form of supervision. The Bureau asserts that publication is important to promote “transparency” about how the CFPB uses this power.[16]

    In the course of exerting this type of nonbank supervision, the Director issues rulings (1) that an entity qualifies as a nonbank posing risks to consumers, (2) setting the duration of exam supervision, which will typically be for two years and (3) responding to any request to terminate supervision thereafter.[17] The new amendments generally allow entities seven days to respond to the proposed publication, after which, the CFPB will decide whether to release the order publicly on its website.[18]

    Previously, exams that did not lead to enforcement always remained private. The CFPB provides strict protections for “confidential supervisory information.”[19] Thus, the notion that opinions and orders from the Director in the course of supervisory exams might become public is a significant change. While the Bureau is committing to redact commercially sensitive and personal information from the public versions of the orders, it remains to be seen whether the identities of the entities undergoing exams would be protected.[20] However, the entity would not generally be permitted to make its own public statements about the exam. As a result, the reputational harm an entity would suffer from the perception that it is posing serious “risks to consumers” would remain even if the exam confirms the entity is in compliance.

    Conclusion

    Although the rule amendments go into effect immediately, the CFPB is accepting public comments until at least May 25, 2022.[21]

    These rule amendments show the CFPB is committed to asserting its maximum authority under the law to bring fintech companies and other emerging players under its regulatory supervision to ensure their compliance with federal consumer financial protection law. Fintech companies should carefully examine their policies and procedures and confirm that they are in compliance with applicable consumer laws.

    Schulte Roth & Zabel’s lawyers are available to assist you in preparing a public comment or addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Schulte Roth & Zabel lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following attorneys:

    Donald J. Mosher – New York (+1 212.756.2187, donald.mosher@srz.com)

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471, melissa.goldstein@srz.com)

    Kara A. Kuchar – New York (+1 212.756.2734, kara.kuchar@srz.com)

    Adam J. Barazani – New York (+1 212.756.2519, adam.barazani@srz.com)

    Jessica Romano – New York (+1 212.756.2205, jessica.romano@srz.com>)

    Jessica Sklute – New York (+1 212.756.2180, jessica.sklute@srz.com)

    Noah N. Gillespie – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7483, noah.gillespie@srz.com)

    Hadas A. Jacobi – New York (+1 212.756.2055, hadas.jacobi@srz.com)

    Steven T. Cummings – New York (+1 212.756.2251, steven.cummings@srz.com)

    Rebecca A. Raskind – New York (+1 212.756.2396, rebecca.raskind@srz.com)


    [1] Press Release, CFPB Invokes Dormant Authority to Examine Nonbank Companies Posing Risks to Consumers (April 25, 2022), (“Press Release”).

    [2] CFPB, Policy Statement, Supervisory Authority Over Certain Nonbank Covered Persons Based on Risk Determination; Public Release of Decisions and Orders (April 25, 2022)(“Public Release Rule”).

    [3] Press Release at 1.

    [4] 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(A)-(B); 12 C.F.R. part 1090.

    [5] Press Release at 2.

    [6] 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C). Dodd-Frank defined “covered person” to include anyone “that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service” and their affiliate service providers. Id. § 5481(6).

    [7] Press Release at 2.

    [8] Id. at 1.

    [9] See CFPB, Final Rule, Procedural Rule to Establish Supervisory Authority over Certain Nonbank Covered Persons Based on Risk Determination, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,351 (July 3, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. part 1091).

    [10] Press Release at 1.

    [11] Mick Mulvaney, Opinion, The CFPB Has Pushed Its Last Envelope, Wall St. J. (Jan. 23, 2018); see also Neil Haggerty, ‘I am very excited to be here’: Kraninger signals new tone atop CFPB, Am. Banker (Dec. 11, 2018).

    [12] CFPB Policy Rescission Stakes Out Broad Enforcement Authority, SRZ Client Alert (March 22, 2021).

    [13] 12 U.S.C. § 5531.

    [14] Press Release at 2.

    [15] Press Release, CFPB and NY Attorney General Sue Repeat Offender MoneyGram For Leaving Families High and Dry (April 21, 2022).

    [16] Press Release at 2.

    [17] 12 C.F.R. §§ 1091.103(b)(2); .109(a); .113(e).

    [18] See generally Public Release Rule.

    [19] 12 C.F.R. § 1070.2(i)(1).

    [20] See Public Release Rule at 4.

    [21] Specifically, the CFPB will accept comments for 30 days after the Public Release Rule is published in the Federal Register. Anyone can submit a comment by email or on regulations.gov by following the instructions in the Public Release Rule. Comments by mail are accepted but discouraged. Note that comments are public records and will be posted online without any revisions.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • New York Says Less Than 10% Ownership of an Insurance Company Is Not a Safe Harbor

    New York Says Less Than 10% Ownership of an Insurance Company Is Not a Safe Harbor

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Says Less Than 10% Ownership of an Insurance Company Is Not a Safe Harbor

    April 26, 2022

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 19, 2022, the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) issued Circular Letter No. 5, reminding owners and potential purchasers of shares of insurance companies that acquiring less than 10% of the company’s voting securities is not necessarily a safe harbor from requiring regulatory prior approval. Other indicia of control, such as the ability to appoint board members and the terms and conditions of the proposed transaction, can result in NYDFS determining that the person “controls” the insurer and is therefore required to obtain approval before purchasing the shares and gaining such control.

    Every state requires prior approval or qualifying for an exemption before any person can obtain control of an insurer domiciled in a particular state. Control is presumed upon, but is not limited to, the direct or indirect acquisition of 10% or more of the voting securities of an insurance company. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Model Act (which every state has adopted in similar form) defines control as follows:

    The term “control” (including the terms “controlling,” “controlled by” and “under common control with”) means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract other than a commercial contract for goods or nonmanagement services, or otherwise, unless the power is the result of an official position with or corporate office held by the person. Control shall be presumed to exist if any person, directly or indirectly, owns, controls, holds with the power to vote, or holds proxies representing, ten percent (10%) or more of the voting securities of any other person. This presumption may be rebutted by a showing made in the manner provided by [the Act] that control does not exist in fact. The commissioner may determine…that control exists in fact, notwithstanding the absence of a presumption to that effect.

    Our experience leads us to believe that the fact NYDFS felt compelled to issue this circular at this time suggests that it may have recently reviewed a number of filings or otherwise became aware that applicants attempted to avoid or limit certain disclosures by using a complex ownership structure that limited ownership to below 10% but allowed the acquirer to obtain effective control over the insurer. Clearly the NYDFS believes that the purpose of the Insurance Holding Company Act is to require a regulatory filing and disclosure upon a change of control, and thus the purpose of the circular is to remind people of that fact and to caution them not to rely on the presumption of control at 10% ownership as a safe harbor or as a hard and fast rule.

    New York is not alone in looking at this issue, as we reported in December 2021 when the NAIC’s Financial Stability Task Force and Macroprudential Working Group developed a “List of Regulatory Considerations – PE Related and Other,” which has since been adopted by the Financial Stability Task Force. Private equity and venture capital investors who would prefer to limit disclosure of certain information should keep this in mind when structuring an insurance transaction in New York and elsewhere.

    Please contact one of the authors of this article if you would like to discuss this issue with respect to New York or any other state.

    In depth
    Authors

    Andrea T. Best

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    H. Michael Byrne

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Thomas M. Dawson

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Michael R. Halsband

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights

  • Agencies Provide Guidance on Impending Transparency in Coverage Rule Implementation

    Agencies Provide Guidance on Impending Transparency in Coverage Rule Implementation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Agencies Provide Guidance on Impending Transparency in Coverage Rule Implementation

    April 25, 2022

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 19, 2022, the US Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury (collectively, the Departments) released Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) regarding the implementation of certain reporting provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The FAQs were released to provide clarity on the required drug price disclosures identified in the Transparency in Coverage final rule (the Rule) issued on October 29, 2020.

    The Rule requires most non-grandfathered group health plans and health insurance issuers to: (1) upon request, disclose pricing information specific to participants, beneficiaries or enrollees (or their authorized representative) (collectively referred to herein as participants); and (2) provide public disclosures in machine-readable files regarding in-network, out-of-network and prescription drug prices. Please see our On the Subject here for an in-depth overview of the Rule.

    The Departments reiterated that the enforcement of the requirements related to machine-readable files disclosing in-network and out-of-network data will begin July 1, 2022 (enforcement of this part of the Rule related to prescription drugs has been delayed), and clear up confusion regarding reporting for certain alternative reimbursement arrangements. This On the Subject summarizes the safe harbor issued for disclosing rates on specific arrangements for which a dollar amount may not be available before the item or service is provided or rendered.

    In depth

    The Rules require plans and issuers to publish in the in-network machine-readable files all applicable rates (i.e., negotiated rates, underlying fee schedule rates or derived amounts), regardless of the type of payment model or models under which coverage is provided. The required rates must be reflected as dollar amounts. However, there are arrangements where a dollar amount can only be determined retrospectively because, for example, the agreement between the plan or issuer and the in-network provider states that the plan or issuer will pay a fixed percentage of the billed charges (i.e., such as “percentage-of-billed charges,” low-volume procedures or high-cost, outlier inpatient care), thus the dollar amount cannot be determined until a claim is made.

    In the FAQs, the Departments have provided an enforcement safe harbor for arrangements where a specific dollar amount cannot be determined to satisfy the reporting requirement. The safe harbor will not apply if the Departments determine that the arrangement at issue can sufficiently disclose a dollar amount.

    1. For a “Percentage-of-billed-charges” arrangement where dollar amounts cannot be assigned to an item or service for an in-network provider prior to a bill being generated, the plan or issuer may report a percentage number, in lieu of a dollar amount. The Departments provided specific language to use for percentage-of-billed-charges arrangements here.
    2. Under an alternative reimbursement arrangement, if the reporting tool or schema does not support the arrangement, or if the contractual arrangement requires the submission of additional information to describe the nature of the negotiated rate, plans and issuers may disclose it in an open text field a description of the formula, variables, methodology or other information necessary to understand the arrangement. The Departments provided additional guidance on specific language to use in the open text field here.

    This safe harbor will take effect simultaneously with the enforcement of the disclosure requirements on July 1, 2022.

    PRACTICAL APPLICATION

    Plans and issuers must post machine-readable files to disclose in-network and out-of-network data by July 1, 2022. This is a delay of the previous enforcement deadline of January 1, 2022. For the vast majority of self-insured group health plans, compliance with the Rule will require coordination with third-party administrators or other plan vendors. Plan sponsors should be well along the way to preparing to meet the Rule’s significant burden of complying with the disclosure obligation and, if not, should begin preparing as soon as possible. The added flexibility of the safe harbor should make this burden slightly easier to bear.

    For more information on whether and how these changes apply to your group health plan, please contact your regular McDermott employee benefits lawyer or one of the authors.

    Authors

    Jacob M. Mattinson

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • Russian Sanctions Update: FinCEN and NYDFS Issue Guidance

    Russian Sanctions Update: FinCEN and NYDFS Issue Guidance

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Russian Sanctions Update: FinCEN and NYDFS Issue Guidance

    April 25, 2022

    Read time: 25 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In response to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, President Biden has imposed broad sanctions on a multitude of individuals and institutions connected to Russia and Belarus.[1] These sanctions have targeted dozens of individuals, entities, and financial institutions, including the Russian Central Bank, the Russian sovereign wealth fund, large publicly traded Russian banks and corporations, Russia’s energy sector, Russian imports and exports, and luxury assets belonging to oligarchs with ties to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.[2]

    To address these developments, both the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) have released guidance outlining the steps that financial institutions and other regulated entities should take to meet their regulatory obligations arising from these sanctions-related developments. FinCEN has also released a related advisory that provides financial institutions with typologies and indicators associated with kleptocracy and other forms of foreign public corruption, which FinCEN identifies as widespread throughout the Russian government.[3] We discuss each of these publications below.

    FinCEN Alert on Russian Sanctions Evasion

    In a March 7, 2022 alert to all financial institutions (the “Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert”),[4] FinCEN outlines red flag indicators to assist in identifying potential sanctions evasion activity as well as ransomware attacks and other cybercrimes in connection with the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert reiterates financial institutions’ reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and their reporting obligations to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, such as filing reports regarding blocked financial accounts, payments or transfers in which an OFAC-designated country, entity or individual has any interest.[5]

    Red Flags Relating to Sanctions Evasion Attempts Using the U.S. Financial System

    The Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert cautions regulated financial institutions that sanctioned entities could use non-sanctioned Russian and Belarusian financial institutions and financial institutions in third countries to evade sanctions. Sanctions evasion activities could be conducted by a variety of actors. FinCEN points to the following red flags as indicators of potential sanction evasion activities:

    • Use of corporate vehicles (i.e., legal entities, such as shell companies, and legal arrangements) to obscure (i) ownership, (ii) source of funds, or (iii) countries involved, particularly sanctioned jurisdictions.
    • Use of shell companies to conduct international wire transfers, often involving financial institutions in jurisdictions distinct from company registration.
    • Use of third parties to shield the identity of sanctioned persons and/or Politically Exposed Persons (“PEPs”) seeking to hide the origin or ownership of funds, for example, to hide the purchase or sale of real estate.
    • Accounts in jurisdictions or with financial institutions that are experiencing a sudden rise in value being transferred to their respective areas or institutions, without a clear economic or business rationale.
    • Jurisdictions previously associated with Russian financial flows that are identified as having a notable recent increase in new company formations.
    • Newly established accounts that attempt to send or receive funds from a sanctioned institution or an institution removed from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).[6]
    • Non-routine foreign exchange transactions that may indirectly involve sanctioned Russian financial institutions, including transactions that are inconsistent with activity over the prior 12 months. For example, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation may seek to use import or export companies to engage in foreign exchange transactions on its behalf and to obfuscate its involvement.

    Red Flags Relating to Sanctions Evasion Using CVC

    The Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert further warns that sanctioned persons, illicit actors, and their related networks or facilitators may attempt to use convertible virtual currency (“CVC”) and other anonymizing tools to evade sanctions. Specifically, CVC exchangers and administrators and other financial institutions may observe transactions tied to CVC wallets or other CVC activity associated with sanctioned Russian, Belarusian and other affiliated persons. FinCEN lists the following red flag indicators of potential customer sanctions evasion attempts using CVC:

    • A customer’s transactions are initiated from or sent to the following types of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses: non-trusted sources; locations in Russia, Belarus, FATF-identified jurisdictions with anti-money laundering (“AML”)/Counter-Financing of Terrorism (“CFT”)/Counter-Proliferation deficiencies, and comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions; or IP addresses previously flagged as suspicious.
    • A customer’s transactions are connected to CVC addresses included in OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”).
    • A customer uses a CVC exchanger or foreign-located money services business (“MSB”) in a high-risk jurisdiction with AML/CFT deficiencies, particularly for CVC entities and activities, including inadequate know-your-customer (“KYC”) or customer due diligence (“CDD”) measures.

    Red Flags Relating to Possible Ransomware Attacks and Other Cybercrime

    Reiterating the danger of potential Russian cyberattacks, FinCEN warns financial institutions of the following red flag indicators of ransomware and other cybercrime:

    • A customer receives CVC from an external wallet, and immediately initiates multiple, rapid trades among multiple CVCs with no apparent related purpose, followed by a transaction off the platform. This may be indicative of attempts to break the chain of custody on the respective blockchains or further obfuscate the transaction.
    • A customer initiates a transfer of funds involving a CVC mixing service.
    • A customer has either direct or indirect receiving transaction exposure identified by blockchain tracing software as related to ransomware.

    Separately, the Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert stresses that “[i]t is critical that financial institutions (including CVC exchanges) identify and immediately report any suspicious transactions associated with ransomware attacks.”[7] FinCEN instructs financial institutions to provide “as much of the relevant details around the activity as available at that time,” and reminds them that amended Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) should be filed to reflect any additional information later discovered relating to the same underlying activity.[8] When filing SARs related to cyber events and associated transactions, financial institutions are also instructed to “include any relevant technical cyber indicators within the available structured cyber event indicator fields (42-44) on the SAR.” Examples of relevant technical cyber indicators include “chat logs, suspicious IP addresses, suspicious email addresses, suspicious filenames, malware hashes, CVC addresses, command and control (C2) IP addresses, C2 domains, targeted systems, MAC address or port numbers.”

    Reminder of Relevant BSA Obligations

    The Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert also reminds regulated financial institutions of their obligations under the BSA, including reporting requirements such as filing BSA reports, including SARs and currency transaction reports; conducting due diligence and enhanced due diligence, where necessary; and information sharing.

    • Suspicious Activity Reporting. FinCEN reminds financial institutions of their SAR filing obligations and associated requirements to maintain records related to SARs and cooperate with law enforcement and regulatory inquiries related to SAR filings, noting that voluntary SAR filings are subject to existing safe harbor protections. FinCEN also reminds financial institutions that a blocking report filed with OFAC would not satisfy a SAR filing obligation if a financial institution were to identify facts and circumstances surrounding the event that are independently suspicious.[9] FinCEN further provides specific instructions for filing SARs in connection with the activities highlighted in the Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert, requesting that financial institutions include the key term “FIN-2022-RUSSIASANCTIONS” in SAR field 2 (Filing Institution Note to FinCEN) and the narrative to indicate a connection between the suspicious activity being reported and the Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert. FinCEN also reminds financial institutions of their ability to contact the FinCEN Financial Institutions Toll-Free Hotline.[10]
    • Due Diligence Obligations. The Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert highlights certain due diligence obligations pertinent to concerns arising from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. FinCEN reminds financial institutions of the following:
      • Senior foreign political figures. Financial institutions are required to “establish risk-based controls and procedures,” which include taking reasonable steps to make sure that the financial institutions knows whether a senior foreign political figure who nominally or beneficially owns a private banking account is or is not a foreign PEP and to “conduct scrutiny of assets held by such individuals.”[11]
      • Enhanced due diligence requirements for private banking accounts. Under Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act, certain U.S. financial institutions must implement a due diligence program for private banking accounts held for non-U.S. persons that is designed to detect and report any known or suspected money laundering or other suspicious activity.
      • General obligations for correspondent account due diligence and AML programs: Financial institutions are also required to comply with their general due diligence obligations for correspondent accounts, in addition to their general AML program obligations. MSBs are reminded of their risk-based AML program requirements with respect to foreign agents or foreign counterparties.
    • Information Sharing. Lastly, the Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert strongly encourages the voluntary sharing of relevant information among financial institutions and associations under the safe harbor provision of section 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act.[12]

    Reminder of Relevant OFAC Obligations

    The Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert stresses the legal requirement to report to OFAC “all [blocked] property and interests in property of blocked persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons” and emphasizes that “all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempted.”[13]

    FinCEN Alert on High-Value Oligarch Assets

    On March 16, 2022, FinCEN issued an additional alert underscoring the importance of identifying and reporting suspicious transactions involving real estate, luxury goods and other high-value assets involving Russian elites, oligarchs, and their family members (the “High-Value Assets Alert”).[14]

    Red Flags Relating to the Real Estate Market

    Warning that “Sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies may seek to evade sanctions through the purchase of commercial or high-end residential real estate,” the High-Value Assets Alert highlights a number of red flag indicators of activity designed to evade sanctions:

    • The purchase, sale, donation or transfer of legal ownership of high-value real estate in the name of a foreign legal entity, shell company, or trust, especially if the transaction (1) is either far above or below fair market value; (2) involves all-cash transfers; or (3) is funded by a third party with a known nexus to sanctioned Russian individuals.[15]
    • The use of legal entities or arrangements to hide the ultimate beneficiary, origins or sources of funds that may have a sanctions nexus.
    • Changes to the transaction patterns of a firm located in a country other than the U.S., Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, without an apparent business purpose, where the new transactions involve CVCs and Russian-related investments.
    • A request by a Russian individual or entity for a wire transfer from a non-U.S. bank to pay for an all-cash purchase, particularly if the wired funds come from an account held by an individual or entity other than the requestor.
    • An attempt to shrink the real property holdings of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies by bringing in, or transferring real estate to, an individual not affiliated with the buyer or seller.
    • The maintenance, purchase or termination of real estate insurance by persons with a known nexus to sanctioned Russian individuals or entities.

    Red Flags Relating to the Art Market

    The High-Value Assets Alert also addresses the heightened risk of money laundering through the art market. FinCEN notes that the certain qualities of the art market make it particularly attractive to sanctioned Russian oligarchs seeking to launder money and “exacerbate [the art market’s] vulnerability to sanctions evasion,” such as the “mobility, concealability, and subjective value” of works of art. Accordingly, FinCEN advises regulated entities to be on the lookout for the following:

    • The use of shell companies, trusts or third-party intermediaries with a nexus to sanctioned Russian entities to purchase, hold or sell art on a client’s behalf.
    • Transactions involving sanctioned Russian individuals and large amounts of cash, especially denominated in currencies not typically used in the art market.
    • Art-related transactions involving persons with suspected ties to sanctioned Russian individuals who may not be concerned with recouping their investment, pay a substantially higher price than the value of the work or conduct transactions that exceed the expected sales value of the work.
    • The maintenance, purchase or termination of insurance policies to protect the market value of the work from loss, theft or destruction.

    Red Flags Relating to Other High-Value Assets

    • FinCEN cautions that sanctioned Russian oligarchs may use precious metals, stones and jewelry (“PMSJs”) to evade sanctions as Russia is a major exporter of many of the materials used to make PMSJs. Regulated entities are advised to pay particular attention to (1) transactions involving PMSJ trading companies and firms with a nexus to sanctioned Russian individuals, and (2) high-value or frequent transactions involving mining operations with “opaque and complex corporate structures, that are or have been owned or controlled” by sanctioned Russian individuals.
    • Finally, FinCEN adds that sanctioned Russian individuals have been known to purchase and sell other high-value assets, such as luxury yachts and vehicles.[16] Accordingly, regulated entities should take note of the following: (1) sudden transfers of ownership interests in high-value goods and assets by sanctioned Russian individuals, including through sales; (2) the involvement of legal entities with a nexus to sanctioned Russian individuals “posing as well-known entities and operating in jurisdictions other than the well-known entity’s jurisdiction”; (3) the involvement of a common set of individuals, financial institutions or addresses to facilitate transactions for luxury goods; (4) the involvement of law firms that have historically specialized in Russian clientele or in transactions associated with sanctioned Russian individuals; and (5) the involvement of transportation services that have been owned by or have a nexus to sanctioned Russian individuals.

    FinCEN Advisory on Kleptocracy and Corruption

    On April 14, 2022, FinCEN issued an advisory to urge financial institutions to focus their efforts on detecting transactions involving the proceeds of kleptocracy and foreign public corruption (the “Kleptocracy Advisory”).[17] The Kleptocracy Advisory provides an overview of typologies associated with kleptocracy and foreign public corruption and potential red flag indicators[18] to help financial institutions identify the proceeds thereof.[19]

    Typologies of Kleptocracy and Foreign Public Corruption

    Foreign public corruption may involve wealth extraction, such as bribery, extortion, embezzlement or misappropriation or embezzlement of public funds and assets, which can occur at every level of government. The Kleptocracy Advisory highlights that Russian President Vladimir Putin “has allowed the resources of the Russian people to be siphoned off by oligarchs and elites, who amassed their fortunes through their personal connections to Putin and the abuse of state-owned entities and assets.”[20] However, FinCEN notes that kleptocratic activities take place globally and often go hand-in-hand with other criminal behavior, such as human rights abuses, and typically employ the same money laundering methods used by other illicit actors such as drug traffickers or transnational organized crime syndicates.[21]

    • Wealth Extraction
      • Bribery and Extortion. Bribery and extortion schemes often involve payments to foreign government officials by persons or entities to obtain or retain business or “influence political outcomes, secure beneficial contracts with governments or state-owned enterprises, gain access to natural resources, or obtain fraudulent documents such as passports or visas, among other purposes.”[22] Payments made in furtherance of bribery and extortion can be made through third-party facilitators or legal entities controlled by the ultimate beneficiary’s family members and close associates, and are often laundered through shell companies, offshore financial centers or professional service providers. The accounts into which the proceeds are deposited may be located outside the relevant public official’s country of residence in order to evade detection and AML/CFT controls.
      • Misappropriation or Embezzlement of Public Assets. Such schemes involve the “theft, diversion, or misuse of public funds or resources for personal benefit or enrichment.”[23] Implicated assets may include government funds, services or contracts or publicly owned natural resources. Public officials or their associates may exploit or deceive corporations and financial institutions interested in doing business with the government into redirecting government resources for their own profit. FinCEN notes that the defense and health sectors and large infrastructure or development projects “appear to pose a particularly high risk of being associated with corruption-related money laundering.”
    • Laundering Illicit Proceeds
      • Shell Companies and Offshore Financial Accounts. Corrupt actors frequently rely on shell companies to obscure the ownership and origin of illicit funds, sometimes leveraging family members and close associates to create shell companies and open financial accounts on their behalf. Such shell companies can then be used to facilitate the payment of bribes or move funds gained through corrupt activities such as the misuse of state assets or government contracts. FinCEN notes that shell companies and offshore accounts are often “established in foreign jurisdictions whose corporate formation regimes and financial sector offer limited transparency to law enforcement, regulators, or financial institutions.”[24]
      • Purchase of Real Estate, Luxury Goods and Other High-Value Assets. Similarly, corrupt actors often purchase high-value U.S. assets such as “luxury real estate and hotels, private jets, artwork, and motion picture companies” to launder illicit proceeds.[25] FinCEN further notes that the purchase of real estate to facilitate such conduct may also implicate complicit real estate professionals as well as involve “the use of legal entities and nominees to avoid detection.”[26]

    Financial Red Flag Indicators of Kleptocracy and Foreign Public Corruption

    FinCEN provides the following financial red flag indicators to help financial institutions detect, prevent and report suspicious activity that may be associated with kleptocracy and foreign public corruption[27]:

    • Transactions involving long-term government contracts consistently awarded, through an opaque selection process, to the same legal entity or entities that share similar beneficial ownership structures.
    • Transactions involving services provided to state-owned companies or public institutions by companies registered in high-risk jurisdictions.
    • Transactions involving official embassy or foreign government business conducted through personal accounts.
    • Transactions involving public officials related to high-value assets, such as real estate or other luxury goods, that are not commensurate with the reported source of wealth for the public official or that fall outside that individual’s normal pattern of activity or lifestyle.
    • Transactions involving public officials and funds moving to and from countries with which the public officials do not appear to have ties.
    • Use of third parties to shield the identity of foreign public officials seeking to hide the origin or ownership of funds, for example, to hide the purchase or sale of real estate.
    • Documents corroborating transactions involving government contracts (g., invoices) that include charges at substantially higher prices than market rates or that include overly simple documentation or lack traditional details (e.g., valuations for good and services).
    • Transactions involving payments that do not match the total amounts set out in the underlying documentation, or that involve vague payment details or the use of old or fraudulent documentation to justify transfer of funds.
    • Transactions involving fictitious email addresses and false invoices to justify payments, particularly for international transactions.
    • Assets held in the name of intermediate legal entities whose beneficial owner or owners are tied to a kleptocrat or his or her family member.

    NYDFS Guidance Relating to Recent Sanctions

    On February 25, 2022, the NYDFS released an Industry Letter (the “Industry Letter”)[28] to emphasize that entities and individuals subject to NYDFS regulations (“Regulated Entities”) should fully comply with U.S. sanctions on Russia, as well as New York State and federal laws and regulations. The Industry Letter clarifies the NYDFS’s expectations regarding Regulated Entities’ approach to, and the significance of, compliance with cybersecurity, virtual currency and sanctions regulatory requirements.

    Cybersecurity

    The Industry Letter outlines steps Regulated Entities should take to mitigate cybersecurity risk. These steps include reviewing Regulated Entities’ cybersecurity programs and paying particular attention to core cybersecurity hygiene measures, evaluating their incident response and business continuity planning, implementing the NYDFS’s June 2021 Ransomware Guidance,[29] conducting a full test of Regulated Entities’ ability to restore backups and providing additional cybersecurity guidance to their employees. The Industry Letter cautions that Regulated Entities need to closely track guidance and alerts (as well as follow past issuances) from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). Additionally, the NYDFS expects that regulated entities that do business in Russia or Ukraine will take increased measures to inspect traffic from the region and isolate networks from any Russian or Ukrainian offices from the entity’s global network. Finally, the Industry Letter reminds regulated entities that any cybersecurity event that meets the criteria of 23 NYCRR § 500.17(a)[30] must be reported to the NYDFS’s Portal[31] within 72 hours of the event, as well as reporting the event to CISA.

    Sanctions

    To ensure that they continue to refrain from transacting with SDNs, the Industry Letter urges Regulated Entities to sign up on the Treasury Department’s website[32] for email updates. The NYDFS reiterates that Regulated Entities are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with persons on the SDN List, unless OFAC has authorized otherwise, through general licenses listed on the OFAC website or by obtaining a separate specific license for a certain transaction. The Industry Letter further outlines particular steps for Regulated Entities to take to ensure their compliance with applicable sanctions laws and regulations:

    • Monitor all communications from the NYDFS, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC and other federal agencies in real-time to ensure that they are compliant;
    • Review Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Programs to ensure the implementation of all modifications necessary for the system to remain compliant with current sanctions prohibitions, as well as Part 504 of the Superintendent’s Regulations;[33]
    • Monitor all transactions, particularly trade finance transactions and funds transfers, to identify and block transactions subject to OFAC sanctions and follow any OFAC instructions regarding blocked funds;
    • Continually update the Regulated Entity’s OFAC compliance policies and procedures.

    Virtual Currency

    The Industry Letter also warns that virtual currency transfers may be used to circumvent sanctions prohibitions and that, accordingly, all Regulated Entities engaging in virtual currency business activity must have in place policies and procedures to protect against risks specific to virtual currency, including through the implementation of OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency Industry[34] and the NYDFS “BitLicense” regulation’s AML program requirement.[35] The Industry Letter also states that in order to identify potentially sanctioned transactions, Regulated Entities should use virtual currency-specific control measures such as geolocation tools, IP address identification and blockchain analytics to identify information associated with sanctioned individuals and entities.

    Additionally, on March 2, 2022, New York Governor Kathy Hochul announced that the state was taking “actions to strengthen the [NYDFS’s] enforcement of sanctions against Russia, including the expedited procurement of additional blockchain analytics technology,” in order to “bolster the [NYDFS’s] ability to detect exposure among [NY]DFS-licensed virtual currency businesses to Russian individuals, banks and other entities that the Biden Administration has sanctioned.”[36] Quoting NYDFS Superintendent Adrienne A. Harris, Governor Hochul’s announcement states:

    We know that bad actors will try to evade sanctions through the transmission of virtual currency, which is why it is imperative that we have the ability to monitor transactions and exposure in real-time. We continue to coordinate closely with federal and other state regulators and communicate with our regulated entities to ensure the full weight of our regulatory regime is brought to bear in the fight to protect Ukraine.

    Conclusion

    Financial institutions should monitor for and be mindful of any guidance by state and federal regulators to ensure compliance with any sanctions-related rules. For more information about the sanctions issued in connection with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, please see Schulte Roth & Zabel’s prior Alerts referenced above and on the SRZ website.

    Schulte Roth & Zabel’s lawyers are available to assist you or address any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Schulte Roth & Zabel lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following attorneys:

    Betty Santangelo – New York (+1 212.756.2587, betty.santangelo@srz.com)

    Gary Stein 

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471, melissa.goldstein@srz.com)

    Donald J. Mosher – New York (+1 212.756.2187, donald.mosher@srz.com)

    Kara A. Kuchar – New York (+1 212.756.2734, kara.kuchar@srz.com)

    Hadas A. Jacobi – New York (+1 212.756.2055, hadas.jacobi@srz.com)

    Hannah M. Thibideau – New York (+1 212.756.2382, hannah.thibideau@srz.com)

    Angela Garcia – New York (+1 212.756.2359, angela.garcia@srz.com)

    Steven T. Cummings – New York (+1 212.756.2251, steven.cummings@srz.com)


     [1] See Schulte Roth & Zabel’s prior Alerts, Sanctions Update: U.S. Imposes Sweeping Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus (Feb. 28, 2022), available at /insights/sanctions-update-u-s-imposes-sweeping-sanctions-against-russia/; and Sanctions Update: US Begins to Roll Out Sanctions Against Russia (Feb. 22, 2022), available at /insights/sanctions-update-u-s-begins-to-roll-out-sanctions-against-russia/.

    [2] See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Russians Bankrolling Putin and Russia-Backed Influence Actors (Mar. 3, 2022), available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0628; and Press Release, U.S. Treasury Guidance on President Biden’s Executive Order (Mar. 8, 2022), available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0641.

    [3] See FinCEN, Advisory on Kleptocracy and Foreign Public Corruption, FIN-2022-A001 (Apr. 14, 2022) at 2 (“Kleptocracy Advisory”), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2022-04-14/FinCEN%20Advisory%20Corruption%20FINAL%20508.pdf.

    [4] FinCEN, FinCEN Advises Increased Vigilance for Potential Russian Sanctions Evasion Attempts (Mar. 7, 2022) (“Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert”), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/FinCEN%20Alert%20Russian%20Sanctions%20Evasion%20FINAL%20508.pdf.

    [5] See 31 CFR § 501.603.

    [6] On March 12, 2022, the following seven Russian banks and their subsidiaries were disconnected from the SWIFT network and other financial messaging operators in compliance with EU Council Regulation 2022/345: Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Bank Rossiya, Sovcombank, Vnesheconombank, and VTB Bank.

    [7] Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert at 6 (noting that, for purposes of meeting a financial institution’s SAR obligations, FinCEN and law enforcement consider suspicious transactions involving ransomware attacks to constitute “situations involving violations that require immediate attention.” See, e.g., 31 CFR § 1020.320(b)(3) (Banks), 31 CFR. § 1022.320(b)(3) (MSBs), and 31 CFR § 1025.320(b)(3) (Insurance Companies)).

    [8] Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert at 6-7. FinCEN also notes that “completely new activity should be filed in a new ‘initial’ SAR filing.” Id.

    [9] See Russian Sanctions Evasion Alert at 6, citing FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review, Issue 8, Section 5, Revised Guidance on Filing Suspicious Activity Reports Relating to the Office of Foreign Assets Control List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (April 2005) at 38-40 (“[t]his guidance also does not affect a financial institution’s obligation to file a [SAR] even if it has filed a blocking report with [OFAC], to the extent that the facts and circumstances surrounding the [OFAC] match are independently suspicious and are otherwise required to be reported under the existing FinCEN regulations. In those cases, the [OFAC] blocking report would not satisfy a financial institution’s [SAR] filing obligation . . . [w]hen a financial institution files a reject report on a transaction, the financial institution is obligated to file a [SAR] to the extent that the facts and circumstances surrounding the rejected funds transfer are suspicious”).

    [10] FinCEN directs financial institutions wanting to expedite their report to call the FinCEN Financial Institutions Toll-Free Hotline at (866) 556-3974. Any imminent threat, however, should be reported immediately to local-area law enforcement officials. Id.

    [11] See Id. at 8 (citing 31 CFR § 1010.620(c) (“In the case of a private banking account for which a senior foreign political figure is a nominal or beneficial owner, the due diligence program required . . . shall include enhanced scrutiny of such account that is reasonably designed to detect and report transactions that may involve the proceeds of foreign corruption)”).

    [12] Id. at 9.

    [13] Id.

    [14] FinCEN, Alert on Real Estate, Luxury Goods, and Other High Value Assets Involving Russian Elites, Oligarchs, and their Family Members (March 16, 2022) (“High-Value Assets Alert”), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/FinCEN%20Alert%20Russian%20Elites%20High%20Value%20Assets_508%20FINAL.pdf.

    [15] For additional information, see SRZ Client Alert, FinCEN Commences Rulemaking Process to Implement AML Reporting Requirements for Real Estate Sector (Feb. 11, 2022), available at /insights/fincen-commences-rulemaking-process-to-implement-aml-reporting/.

    [16] High-Value Assets Alert, supra.

    [17] President Biden established the fight against corruption as a core national security interest in 2021. See White House, Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National Security Interest (June 3, 2021), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/06/03/memorandum-on-establishing-the-fight-against-corruption-as-a-core-united-states-national-security-interest/. On June 30, 2021, FinCEN issued the first AML/CFT priorities, which identified corruption as one of the most significant AML/CFT threats currently facing the United States. See FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism National Priorities (June 30, 2021) at 3, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/AML_CFT%20Priorities%20(June%2030%2C%202021).pdf.

    [18] The typologies and potential red flag indicators provided in the Kleptocracy Advisory are derived from FinCEN’s “analysis of [BSA] data, open-source reporting, and information from law enforcement partners.” Id. at 3.

    [19] The Kleptocracy Advisory also provides various examples of enforcement actions. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (former president of Maryland transportation company found guilty of crimes including violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for participating in a scheme to bribe a Russian official in order to secure contracts with JSC Techsnabexport (TENEX), a subsidiary of Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation).

    [20] Id. at 3-4.

    [21] Id. at 6.

    [22] Id. at 4.

    [23] Id. at 5.

    [24] Id. at 6-7.

    [25] Id. at 7.

    [26] The U.S. government is working with allies and partners to block President Putin and certain Russian elites’ assets in the United States and elsewhere, including their real estate, private jets and mega yachts. Id. at 8 (citing White House, FACT SHEET: The United States Continues to Target Russian Oligarchs Enabling Putin’s War of Choice (March 3, 2022), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/03/fact-sheet-the-united-states-continues-to-target-russian-oligarchs-enabling-putins-war-of-choice/).

    [27] Id. at 8.

    [28] NYDFS, Industry Letter, Re: Escalating Situation in Ukraine and Impact to Financial Sector (Feb. 25, 2022) (the “Industry Letter”), available at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/industry_letters/il20220225_ukraine_escalation_impact_financial.

    [29] NYDFS, Industry Letter, Re: Ransomware Guidance (Jun. 30, 2022), available at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/industry_letters/il20210630_ransomware_guidance.

    [30] 23 NYCRR § 500.17(a) (requiring each Regulated Entity to notify NYDFS no later than 72 hours from a determination that a cybersecurity event has occurred, subject to certain conditions and required each Regulated Entity to annually submit certification of compliance to the NYDFS).

    [31] The NYDFS Portal can be accessed at https://myportal.dfs.ny.gov/.

    [32] See https://service.govdelivery.com/accounts/USTREAS/subscriber/new.

    [33] 3 NYCRR Part 504 (clarifying the required attributes of a Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program and requiring that the board of directors or senior officer(s) of each Regulated Entity annually submit to the NYDFS a board resolution or compliance finding confirming the steps taken to ascertain such Regulated Entity’s compliance with Part 504).

    [34] OFAC, Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency Industry (Oct. 2021), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/virtual_currency_guidance_brochure.pdf.

    [35] 23 NYCRR § 200.15.

    [36] NYDFS, Press Release: Governor Hochul Announces Actions to Strengthen Department of Financial Services Enforcement of Sanctions Against Russia (Mar. 2, 2022), available at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr20220302.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Views and Lessons from the Trenches of the First Criminal No-Poach Trial

    Views and Lessons from the Trenches of the First Criminal No-Poach Trial

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Views and Lessons from the Trenches of the First Criminal No-Poach Trial

    April 21, 2022

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    AUTHORED BY THE AMERICAN LAWYER’S LITIGATORS OF THE WEEK TRIAL TEAM THAT REPRESENTED A FORMER SENIOR EXECUTIVE FROM THE OUTSET OF THE INVESTIGATION THROUGH THE TRIAL VERDICT

    In a landmark case of first impression, the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division (Division) indicted and brought to trial a federal criminal prosecution alleging agreements between DaVita, Inc., a former senior executive and other companies not to solicit each other’s employees. The case was the first criminal trial of its kind in the Division’s recent efforts to expand Sherman Act liability under Section 1 to include so-called no-poach and non-solicit agreements. Following an eight-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, a Denver jury acquitted a former senior executive and DaVita on all counts of the unprecedented “no-poach” conspiracy. As the district judge himself succinctly put it to the jury: this case was “a unique case in the field of antitrust law.”

    This criminal prosecution in the labor markets reflects a novel and aggressive stance on expanding Sherman Act criminal liability. In pursuit of this policy shift, the Division is trying to jam a square peg into a round hole by characterizing non-solicit and no-poach agreements as per se market allocation agreements. The per se rule creates a judicial shortcut of sorts that makes it easier for the government to prosecute classic cartel conduct such as price-fixing and bid rigging. This case, and related cases, are the first time the per se shortcut has been used in a so-called labor market allocation case. This unprecedented litigation created a watershed moment for the Division’s views that non-solicit and no-poach agreements are per se illegal. The complete acquittal of both defendants and the rulings of the district judge before trial cast doubt on whether the per se standard is appropriate for “no-poach” agreements and whether such agreements should be prosecuted criminally at all.

    In depth

    WHERE DID THIS COME FROM?

    Historically, the Division pursued enforcement of alleged anticompetitive labor market practices in the civil context, meaning fines for companies and individuals. In fact, that was the approach the Division took with no-poach and no cold call agreements entered into by major technology and railway companies. The Division engaged in a volte-face and declared it would criminally prosecute such labor market agreements for the first time in October 2016. Without an intervening act of Congress, executive order or ruling by any court, the Division warned that going forward it intended to proceed criminally against “naked wage-fixing or no-poach agreements” between horizontal competitors in the labor market. The Division declared that investigating alleged “naked wage-fixing or no-poach agreements” was a top priority. Ignoring concerns related to the separation of powers, the Division unilaterally cited its discretion and put the full weight of the government into labor market no-poach agreements. That momentum accelerated in December 2020 and continued throughout 2021, with the Division bringing 12 criminal cases against nine individuals and three companies. In short, aggressive and expansive antitrust enforcement from the DOJ is now the new normal.

    DOJ SEEKS TO CREATE A NEW CATEGORY OF PER SE LIABILITY AND USES DAVITA AND FORMER SENIOR EXECUTIVE AS A TEST CASE

    The Division returned a superseding indictment against DaVita, Inc. and its former senior executive on November 4, 2021. The three-count indictment alleged that the defendants entered into non-solicitation agreements with three separate companies to suppress competition for senior executives (Count I) and all employees (Counts II and III). The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that there was no precedent supporting this case of first impression as a per se violation and that a court should not find—for the first time—that employee non-solicit agreements are so pernicious that they should be categorically prohibited as per se illegal. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-97 (2007). The defendants also argued that such a rule could not be announced for the first time in a criminal case, particularly where the Division had not shown that such agreements “would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,” “have manifestly anticompetitive effects” and “lack any redeeming virtue.” Leegin at 886. Finally, the defendants argued the following: that the alleged non-solicitation agreements have significant plausible procompetitive benefits, that there is no body of cases finding such agreements manifestly anticompetitive or unlawful even under the rule of reason standard, and that declaring the alleged agreements per se illegal would violate the Due Process Clause by depriving defendants of fair warning of the offense with which they have been charged.

    A core tenet of the defendants’ argument on the motion to dismiss is that labor is different. It is different because courts allow restrictions on labor in individual employment contracts with non-solicitation clauses and because certain employees have access to highly confidential information that creates a competitive advantage when those employees leave the company. Labor market restrictions are permissible because there are procompetitive reasons to restrict labor. The fact that labor is different is an independent reason that labor market agreements do not fit a predetermined category of per se unlawfulness such as price-fixing, bid rigging or market allocation.

    In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged that “[t]here are no cases finding that non-solicitation agreements are so pernicious, in and of themselves, that they should be classified as per se unreasonable.” The court also held that only those “naked” no-hire and non-solicitation agreements that “allocate the market” are per se unreasonable. (“What I conclude is that if naked non-solicitation agreements or no-hire agreements allocate the market, they are per se unreasonable.”). In contrast, “[w]here they have been found not to allocate the market…courts have not found no-hire [and non-solicitation] agreements to be inherently anticompetitive.” “It does not follow that every non-solicitation agreement or even every no-hire agreement would allocate the market and be subject to per se treatment.” Accordingly, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss only because it determined that “the government has sufficiently alleged,” on the face of the indictment, “that defendants allocated the market with their non-solicitation agreement.”

    The court itself acknowledged the significance of imposing the per se standard during the oral argument on the motion to dismiss when it commented, “So if I decide that it’s a per se violation, in effect, I’m deciding that these people are guilty,” and explained to the Division lawyers that “[w]ell, your prosecutorial discretion is if I have an easy win by having the judge call it per se we go home and celebrate, and if we have to do the hard work of proving unreasonable restraint of trade, we’re not going to do it. We’ll let someone else worry about it.” Recognizing the draconian nature of the per se standard in a case of first impression, the court ruled that the Division would “not merely need to show that the defendants entered the non-solicitation agreement and what the terms of the agreement were. It will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants entered into an agreement with the purpose of allocating the market” and that the defendants “intended to allocate the market as charged in the indictment.” Lawyers defending future labor market allocation cases should cite and rely on this language that charging a mere non-solicitation agreement, absent more, is insufficient to state a per se offense. Moreover, the court’s key holding that the government must prove that the purpose of the non-solicitation agreement was to allocate the market for employees is a key defense strategy that should be argued in future cases.

    THE TRIAL

    Although the court found that DOJ had pled a per se case, the defendants argued—and the jury ultimately agreed—that is night and day from actually proving that non-solicitation agreements are per se illegal. Leading up to trial, the court itself questioned whether the per se standard would ultimately be appropriate:

    “…it is still at least our view that the question of whether this ultimately goes to the jury as a per se case depends on the evidence they present, and that the court should, in order for the trial to be fair, allow all of the evidence about the relationships between these alleged co-conspirators that could explain exactly the question Your Honor has teed up, which is what they were trying to accomplish. THE COURT: Okay. I hear you. I might be inclined to agree with you, actually.”

    At trial, the government called two of the three counterparty CEOs, three COOs and one head of Human Resources. In each instance, the witnesses had received a form of the non-prosecution agreement. Importantly, the witness and document evidence adduced at trial demonstrated the following:

    • The charged non-solicitation agreements did not constitute market allocation agreements;
    • The charged agreements did not “end meaningful competition” for the employees that were allegedly subject to them;
    • The employees subject to the alleged non-solicitation agreements had hundreds—if not thousands—of other competitors in the market vying for their services;
    • The charged agreements permitted transfers between the alleged co-conspirator companies and employees did move between the companies during the charged conspiracy periods;
    • The charged agreements did not suppress employees’ wages in any meaningful way;
    • Employee turnover was not suppressed;
    • The alleged conspirators lacked the ability through agreements between them meaningfully to affect competition or competitive outcomes for those employees; and
    • The evidence showed procompetitive purposes and effects of the charged agreements, among others.

    Although the court denied the defendants’ motions for a judgment of acquittal and allowed the case to go to the jury on a “per se” standard, ultimately the court—through its jury instructions—did not agree with the Division that a typical per se approach was appropriate. By way of example, evidence and economic expert testimony about strategic business reasons for alleged non-solicitation agreements, the existence of employee movement, the lack of effect and the lack of harm could be considered. The court allowed the jury to consider that “evidence of lack of harm or procompetitive benefits might be relevant to determining whether defendants entered into an agreement with the purpose of allocating the market.” The court also instructed that to find defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must find that the defendants sought to “end meaningful competition” through the non-solicit agreements. At the end of two days of deliberations, the jury—not the government—had the last word, and justice was done.

    TAKEAWAYS

    There are several important takeaways for counsel from this case of first impression. First, there were significant legal victories beyond the jury’s verdict, and these may be a useful precedent for other matters. As described above, the court required the Division to prove more than the mere existence of an agreement and the defendants’ participation in a conspiracy. Importantly, the court required the Division to prove intent—that “defendants entered into an agreement with the purpose of allocating the market.”

    In addition, there were two important jury instructions that may assist other defendants in pending matters. In one, the court instructed that the jury “may not find that a conspiracy to allocate the market for the employees existed unless you find that the alleged agreements and understandings sought to end meaningful competition for the services of the affected employees.” The jury asked about this definition, inquiring about what “meaningful competition” means. The court instructed in its response that ‘meaningful competition’ essentially is another way of saying ‘significant competition’ or ‘competition of consequence.’ In another key jury instruction, the court instructed the jury that “evidence of lack of harm or procompetitive benefits might be relevant to determining whether defendants entered into an agreement with the purpose of allocating the market.” This instruction is a critical instruction to seek in similar cases.

    Second, despite the Division’s insistence—bolstered to a minimal degree by their surviving two motions to dismiss in a criminal matter—that certain alleged “no-poach” agreements should be considered only under the per se standard, once the factual record is developed, counsel should continue to press against the imposition and advocate that the appropriate standard is the rule of reason because of the core tenet that labor is fundamentally different from markets for customers/goods/services. Because agreements to allocate the market, as charged in this case, for labor can and do have inherent procompetitive benefits to both employers and employees, traditional market allocation cases are not sufficiently analogous to condemn labor market allocation agreements as per se illegal. Where Congress has not spoken and where there is no considerable experience with the type of restraint to predict with confidence that the offense would be invalidated in all or almost all instances, the factual record can demonstrate that the evidence is not so thoroughly pernicious to merit per se treatment.

    Finally, while the full acquittal represents a setback for the Division’s aggressive stance on criminalizing certain labor market practices, this result is unlikely to deter the DOJ’s misguided pursuit of these matters. The Division’s novel and aggressive stance on expanding Sherman Act criminal violations to how companies engage with their workers have thus far passed muster at the motion to dismiss stage but has flunked with juries. See generally, US v. DaVita, Inc. and [a former senior executive], 21-cr-00229; US v. Jindal, 20-cr-00358. However, the Division is steadfastly determined to investigate and prosecute alleged “wage-fixing and no-poach” issues. With the Division’s resolute approach to changing the landscape of antitrust labor market cases, companies would be prudent to ensure their compliance programs are updated to include specific and appropriate guidance on these issues.

    When clients consider typical antitrust cartel investigations, the focus has traditionally been on alleged conspiracies relating to pricing, sales and/or bidding of certain products or in certain geographic areas. The Division is shifting the landscape and its criminal focus towards labor market antitrust issues. To address the Division’s assertive approach, executives involved in hiring and compensation-related decisions would be well-served to receive antitrust training addressing issues relating to these issues.

    Authors

    Jeffrey E. Stone

    Partner

    Chicago

    Daniel Campbell

    Partner

    Chicago

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