Content Type: Article

  • The Current Climate in the Automotive Industry – Game changer for the suppliers by US Supreme Court?

    The Current Climate in the Automotive Industry – Game changer for the suppliers by US Supreme Court?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Current Climate in the Automotive Industry – Game changer for the suppliers by US Supreme Court?

    July 27, 2023

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Russo-Ukrainian conflict, supply chain disruptions and the lasting impact of the pandemic have shaped our world, leaving no industry untouched. The automotive sector, in particular, has experienced palpable effects and tensions in recent years. One recurring issue is the absence of vital provisions in contracts, leading to disputes over price adjustments, volume commitments, and risk distribution. These gaps have caused uncertainty for suppliers when faced with increased demand from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), resulting in order cancellations and reductions.

    For years, OEMs have been notorious for pressuring suppliers to lower prices. Recent studies show that Tier 1 suppliers now demand a four percent discount on average, surpassing most OEMs’ demands. Furthermore, volume manufacturers exhibit greater aggression compared to premium part manufacturers.

    Buyers employ various strategies, such as seeking cheaper alternatives and demanding full cost breakdown calculations (CBD) to exert pressure on suppliers. Unfortunately, the suppliers’ concerns regarding rising personnel, raw material, and energy costs often fall on deaf ears.

    To overcome this perpetual tug-of-war, all supply chain stakeholders and their respective legal counsel must embrace and understand each other’s perspectives.

    In depth

    A look across the Pond: Supreme Court Showdown

    On 11 July 2023, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an opinion (in the case MSSC, Inc. v. Airboss Flexible Prods. Co.) that gives suppliers a powerful argument against blanket purchase orders and “non-binding volume estimates”.

    Based on the court’s opinion OEMs can now, in our view, no longer claim that the volumes stated in nomination letters etc. cannot be considered a minimum commitment for the OEM on the one hand, while on the other hand the supplier is obliged to be able to deliver within the estimates and as called for by the OEM in “releases” under blanket purchase orders for the lifespan of a vehicle project. In other words: The OEMs cannot continue to have their cake and eat it, too.

    If an OEM wants an enforceable contract (in the US a so-called “requirements contract”), the OEM must say so in its contract by specifying at least some amount of product it is obliged to purchase. In the case at hand, the “blanket” purchase order lacked an essential quantity term and did, accordingly, not form a binding contract. The supplier was allowed to simply discontinue its supplies.

    In practice, the decision will heavily benefit suppliers by balancing the scales of the bargaining power. By requiring a binding quantity commitment, the Michigan Supreme Court has eliminated the old argument that the original terms or the supply relationship with a supplier were binding for the life of the program. Suppliers now have more certainty as to anticipated volumes in a “requirements contract”. Any supplier currently supplying under a blanket purchase order that does not include a binding quantity now has further arguments to request price increases.

    It remains to be seen what impact this opinion will have on the German market. However, the negotiating power seems to be shifting once again a bit towards the suppliers.

    Navigating Contractual Challenges: Empowering Suppliers & the Key to Negotiation Success

    Amidst growing discussions on price and volume demands, the legal literature has been exploring suppliers’ rights from all angles. As, traditional contractual agreements often favor the OEMs, leading legal experts now seem to emphasize alternative approaches that leverage statutory rights for suppliers in order to break free from unproductive negotiation cycles with the OEMs.

    Apart from that, we think that success in negotiations with OEMs / Tier 1 Suppliers depends in our experience, in particular, on the following:

    • A deep understanding of its decision-making structures and budget competencies.
    • Having in-depth knowledge about the various negotiation customs employed by OEMs and comprehensive understanding of the business approach of key decision-makers and their teams.
    • Appreciating the OEMs’ / Tier 1 Suppliers’ respective internal challenges (e.g. risk management vs. procurement), reporting obligations, preferred channels of communication, tactics to prolong negotiations and last but not least “budget sovereignty”.

    This is a significant advantage for our clients, as our experience allows us to not only anticipate (and thereby dismantling the OEMs / Tier 1 Suppliers’ argumentation), but also effectively involve relevant stakeholders higher up the chain of command at the respective OEM / Tier 1 Supplier, should this be necessary in order to make progress in the negotiations. Our results speak for itself: Sustainable price adoptions, reduction of negotiation duration, limitation of liability claim risks.

    With our in-depth knowledge of this industry, understanding of the commercial drives for the suppliers and our understanding of the global legal landscape, we are convinced to really add value for our clients. Reach out to us to brainstorm ideas and to identity solutions which work from a commercial and legal perspective.

    Authors

    Florian Lechner

    Partner

    Frankfurt

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  • Private Trust Companies

    Private Trust Companies

    ARTICLE

    Private Trust Companies

    July, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jonathan W Motto, Elise J McGee,  Nicholas Holland and Joseph J Viviano authored the following chapters featured in Private Trust Companies, A Handbook for Advisers, Second Edition:

    • Helping Hands: Utilising Service Providers (page 89), Jonathan W Motto
    • Internal Controls (page 109), Elise J McGee
    • Disputes Involving Private Trust Companies (page 171), Nicholas Holland and Joseph J Viviano

     

    In depth
    Authors

    Jonathan W. Motto

    Partner

    Chicago

    Elise J. McGee

    Partner

    Chicago

    Joseph J. Viviano

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Investing in Distressed Debt in Europe, Second Edition

    Investing in Distressed Debt in Europe, Second Edition

    ARTICLE

    Investing in Distressed Debt in Europe, Second Edition

    July, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mark Fine and Bhavesh Madia co-authored the chapter “Direct Lending – Market Trends” (pages 95 to 108) in Investing in Distressed Debt in Europe, Second Edition.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark Fine

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • The Proposed 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines: A Primer for Private Equity

    The Proposed 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines: A Primer for Private Equity

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Proposed 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines: A Primer for Private Equity

    July 27, 2023

    Read time: 16 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    What happened?

    On July 19, 2023, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) jointly released for public comment the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines (“Draft Guidelines”), which would replace the current merger guidelines for both horizontal and vertical mergers. The Draft Guidelines shift away from the longstanding consumer welfare-focused approach to merger enforcement and substantially expand the circumstances under which the agencies may challenge a transaction.

    The proposal is part of President Joe Biden’s economic-reform agenda and is in response to the executive order he signed in 2021 to improve competition across the economy. That order directed the DOJ and the FTC to rewrite their guidance for companies on how the agencies seek to enforce antitrust laws for mergers.

    The comment period will close on Sept. 18, 2023, after which the agencies will review the comments received and finalize the new Merger Guidelines.

    Although the Draft Guidelines are touted by the agencies as “business-model agnostic,” they could be of particular concern to the private equity industry.

    What are merger guidelines?

    Merger guidelines describe and guide the agencies’ review of mergers and acquisitions to determine compliance with federal antitrust laws. They are issued by the antitrust agencies to explain how they approach merger enforcement.

    The first merger guidelines were released in 1968 and have been revised multiple times over the course of different administrations. The agencies last updated the Horizontal Merger Guidelines for mergers between direct competitors in 2010. The Vertical Merger Guidelines for deals between companies in the same supply chain were last revised in 2020 (although the FTC withdrew its approval of those Trump-era changes in 2021).

    Are merger guidelines enforceable?

    The agencies’ merger guidelines are not binding on courts, but they can influence how judges evaluate challenges to mergers and acquisitions and often are cited in decisions.

    The Draft Guidelines are unique in that they include citations to cases, providing courts with a blueprint to understand and bolster the agencies’ now more progressive views on antitrust enforcement. Both Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) Jonathan Kanter and Chair Lina Khan, the top officials at the DOJ and the FTC, respectively, emphasized the agencies’ efforts to ensure the Draft Guidelines are “legally rigorous” and not “an ideological document.”

    What do the Draft Guidelines say?

    The Draft Guidelines give an overview of thirteen guidelines that the agencies may use when determining whether a merger is unlawfully anticompetitive under the antitrust laws and would apply to both horizontal and vertical deals. The Draft Guidelines also describe the frameworks and tools that may be used when analyzing a merger with respect to each guideline.

    The 13 guidelines:

    1. Mergers should not significantly increase concentration in highly concentrated markets. 
    2. Mergers should not eliminate substantial competition between firms. 
    3. Mergers should not increase the risk of coordination. 
    4. Mergers should not eliminate a potential entrant in a concentrated market.
    5. Mergers should not substantially lessen competition by creating a firm that controls products or services that its rivals may use to compete.
    6. Vertical mergers should not create market structures that foreclose competition. 
    7. Mergers should not entrench or extend a dominant position.
    8. Mergers should not further a trend toward concentration.
    9. When a merger is part of a series of multiple acquisitions, the agencies may examine the whole series.
    10. When a merger involves a multi-sided platform, the agencies examine competition between platforms, on a platform or to displace a platform.
    11. When a merger involves competing buyers, the agencies examine whether it may substantially lessen competition for workers or other sellers.
    12. When an acquisition involves partial ownership or minority interests, the agencies examine its impact on competition.
    13. Mergers should not otherwise substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.

    Major revisions include a shift away from the consumer welfare standard (focusing on how mergers and conduct impact prices and output) in favor of more protection for workers and suppliers of the merger firms, and a lowering of the threshold for a firm’s post-merger market share that would lead to enforcers potentially challenging a deal.

    The Draft Guidelines also, for the first time, explicitly reference issues that can arise from deals involving private equity firms.

    How has the perspective on private equity transactions changed?

    Under previous administrations, private equity transactions were considered unlikely to raise significant antitrust concerns. This has changed under the Biden administration. Both the DOJ and the FTC have been vocal about the need to scrutinize private equity firms’ transactions and board appointments, particularly in the healthcare sector.

    Key areas of concern that the FTC and the DOJ repeatedly have raised include:

    Roll-up strategies. Antitrust enforcers frequently have spoken of a need to scrutinize and combat roll-up strategies, particularly by private equity firms, where a large portion of a market is acquired one relatively small transaction at a time. AAG Kanter vowed early in his tenure to take a tough stance on buyout groups aiming to “hollow out or roll up an industry and essentially cash out,” stating that such firms would face consequences for pursuing a strategy that is “very much at odds” with competition. Chair Khan has noted that there are “instances when a firm will undertake a series of acquisitions, no single one of which may raise legal concerns, but in the aggregate there can be significant consolidation of a market.” She recently warned that the FTC was “putting folks on notice that those types of instances can warrant legal scrutiny and legal concern.”

    Chilling competition. Regulators are focused on “whether certain private equity investments may chill fierce competition on the merits.” They are concerned that private equity firms are more interested in consolidating competitors than promoting competition. Specifically, the DOJ has noted its concern that certain private equity investments may “blunt the incentive of the target company to function as a maverick or a disruptor in health markets” or “cause the target company to focus solely on short-term financial gains and not on advancing innovation or quality.” The enforcers’ concerns are fueled by the “buy, strip and flip” practice employed by some firms, where undervalued companies are acquired, restructured and sold off shortly thereafter, as well as the perceived negative effects of private equity in the healthcare space. For example, Chair Khan highlighted an FTC study showing a jump in mortality after nursing homes were acquired by buyout groups.

    Divestiture buying. Both the DOJ and the FTC have sounded the alarm on buyout groups acquiring assets that companies have been ordered to divest to complete another merger. AAG Kanter has stated that private equity’s involvement often exacerbates antitrust issues, which is an abrupt turnabout from the Trump administration’s DOJ that asserted private equity divestiture buyers “may be preferred” over strategic buyers. While expressing concern that “divestitures may not fully preserve competition across all its dimensions in dynamic markets,” AAG Kanter specifically noted that “too often partial divestitures ship assets to buyers like private equity firms who are incapable or uninterested in using them to their full potential.” In a different interview, he stated that settlement divestitures often involve private equity firms that often are “motivated by either reducing costs at a company, which will make it less competitive, or squeezing out value by concentrating [the] industry in a roll-up.” Given the current administration’s skepticism of divestitures as merger remedies in general, as well as for private equity specifically, private equity firms can expect increased scrutiny as proposed divestiture buyers.

    Interlocking directorates. Subject to certain safe harbors, Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits the same person (or the same firm through its representatives) from serving as an officer or director of two or more competing companies. The DOJ has stepped up its enforcement against such interlocking directorates. This past March, AAG Kanter noted that more than a dozen board members have stepped down (three of the last four interlocks unwound by the DOJ involved private equity firms), and that the DOJ has “nearly 20 open investigations” into possible illegal interlocks. He further stated that there are “many additional opportunities” to “deconcentrate the economy” through Section 8 enforcement. (Note that private equity firms should periodically evaluate their portfolio companies for potential interlocks as their businesses evolve. Companies that do not initially compete may become competitors as product and service lines change.)

    HSR filing deficiencies. The DOJ previously stated its concern regarding “filing deficiencies in the private equity space” and that private equity firms “may not be taking seriously enough their obligations under the HSR Act.” Although the DOJ did not elaborate on what these filing deficiencies were, the recently proposed revamp of the notification form required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act likely addresses its concerns with the significantly expanded disclosure requirements for investment funds. The proposed HSR changes also would provide the agencies with information regarding interlocking directorates and previous non-reportable acquisitions of companies within the same industry. (Note that the proposed HSR changes could require weeks, or possibly months, to prepare if a private equity deal involves complex fund and transaction structures and significant overlaps between the parties.)

    What portions of the draft guidelines are most relevant to private equity?

    Roll-up acquisitions. Reflecting the agencies’ concern regarding roll-up strategies, the Draft Guidelines allow the agencies to consider the cumulative competitive effect of an entire series of acquisitions, rather than just an individual deal. According to the proposal, “[a] firm that engages in an anti-competitive pattern or strategy of multiple small acquisitions” in the same business line may violate antitrust laws, even if no single deal would harm competition or tend to create a monopoly. The agencies also may examine a pattern or strategy of growth by assessing the acquirer’s “history and current or future strategic incentives,” including by examining the parties’ consummated and unconsummated acquisitions, as well as their current or future plans as described in ordinary course business documents.

    Partial control or common ownership. The Draft Guidelines allow the agencies to consider the competitive effect of the acquisition of non-controlling “partial control or common ownership” (e.g., when investors hold minority shareholdings in a number of companies that compete with each other). The Draft Guidelines identify three ways a partial acquisition may affect competition. First, a partial acquisition may give the partial owner the ability to influence the competitive conduct of the target (e.g., through governance or board appointment rights). Second, a partial acquisition may reduce the incentive of the acquiring firm to compete (e.g., a partial owner may not develop a new product feature to win market share from a firm in which it has acquired an interest). Third, a partial acquisition may give the acquiring firm access to competitively sensitive information from the target that can result in lessened competition (e.g., by enhancing the ability of the target and partial owner to coordinate their behavior).

    Lowering of market share and concentration thresholds. The Draft Guidelines substantially lower the market share and concentration thresholds for when a transaction is presumed to substantially lessen competition. Under the Draft Guidelines, a merger would be presumptively unlawful if it has a post-merger market concentration — measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (“HHI”) — of 1,800 HHI and an increase in 100 HHI from pre-merger levels. Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the concentration level for presumptive harm is an increase in 200 HHI to a post-merger concentration of 2,500 HHI.

    To illustrate, assume a hypothetical market of six competitors, each with a 15 percent share, and a smattering of smaller competitors totaling the remaining 10 percent. A merger of two of the six competitors would increase the HHI by 450 to a post-merger HHI of 1810. Under the Draft Guidelines, this hypothetical merger would be presumed to substantially lessen competition, whereas the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines would deem this a merger resulting in a “moderately concentrated” market that may warrant scrutiny. Indeed, a merger could be presumed anticompetitive under the Draft Guidelines even where one of the parties has a small share. For example, in a market where seven players have shares of 30 percent, 25 percent, 20 percent, 10 percent, 5 percent, 5 percent and 5 percent, a merger between the 10-percent player and a 5-percent player would be presumed problematic.

    The Draft Guidelines also add a presumption of unlawfulness for any horizontal merger resulting in an increase of 100 HHI and a market share over 30 percent, as well as a presumption of vertical foreclosure concerns if the merged firm would have a market share above 50 percent for an input that a rival might want to access (a departure from the longstanding rule that antitrust law protects “competition, not competitors”). The current merger guidelines do not state any market share presumptions. Notably, the 2010 guidelines recognize that market shares and concentration are tools to be used in assessing the competitive effect of a proposed merger, whereas the Draft Guidelines are clear that transactions tripping the thresholds are presumptively problematic.

    Potential competition. Noting that “[t]he antitrust laws reflect a preference for internal growth over acquisition,” the Draft Guidelines expand on the circumstances in which a merger may be illegal due to potential competition. Under the proposal, a merger may be illegal where it eliminates an “actual” potential competitor (e.g., where the possibility of entry or expansion by one or both parties to the merger would have resulted in new or increased competition in the market in the future) or a “perceived” potential competitor (e.g., where there is “current competitive pressure exerted on other market participants by the mere perception that one of the firms might enter”). Even when assessing the threat to “actual” potential competition, the Draft Guidelines require the agencies to show only that one of the merging firms had a “reasonable probability” of entering the relevant market absent the merger.

    Competition for workers. Rather than just focusing on customers, the Draft Guidelines, for the first time, would allow the agencies to examine how deals will affect workers (e.g., a combined firm’s power over a labor market may lead to “lower wages or slow wage growth, worsen benefits or working conditions, or result in other degradations of workplace quality”). Both the DOJ and the FTC emphasized that enforcement against anticompetitive conduct in labor markets remains a high priority. Many deal proponents point to “efficiencies” or “synergies” that often in large part consist of the elimination of worker redundancy in the merged firm. These arguments about the benefits of lowering costs likely will carry little weight when they conflict with a policy of protecting workers.

    Higher bar for efficiencies arguments. Reflecting the current administration’s skepticism of efficiencies as a procompetitive benefit (note that the FTC withdrew its approval of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines largely because those guidelines “improperly contravened the Clayton Act’s language with its approach to efficiencies, which are not recognized by the statute as a defense to an unlawful merger”), the Draft Guidelines significantly raise the evidentiary burden for merging parties to demonstrate cognizable efficiencies. For example, noting that “[p]rocompetitive efficiencies often are speculative and difficult to verify and quantify, and efficiencies projected by merging firms often are not realized,” the proposal would require that the “benefits are verifiable, and have been verified, using reliable methodology and evidence not dependent on the subjective predictions of the merging parties or their agents.” This is perhaps an insurmountable bar to meet given that any procompetitive efficiencies offered by the parties necessarily would be based on projections.

    Will the agencies continue to litigate even though they are not succeeding in court?

    The threat of litigation has caused a number of deals to be called off across a range of industries, but the current administration’s enforcers largely have come up short in litigated cases where judges have rejected nearly every merger challenge, including every challenge to a vertical deal. The DOJ has won one merger case that went to trial, convincing a D.C. district judge that Penguin Random House’s proposed acquisition of Simon & Schuster risked giving the combined entity too much bargaining leverage over authors of anticipated bestsellers when negotiating publishing rights.

    Some have speculated that the agencies are making gains even while losing in court by developing case law that will strengthen their cases down the line. For example, even though the DOJ has yet to secure a guilty verdict involving no-poach or wage-fixing agreements, courts in at least four circuits now have ruled that such agreements can be prosecuted criminally under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. And, even though the FTC failed to block Meta’s acquisition of Within Unlimited, a developer of virtual reality fitness apps, the FTC succeeded in obtaining a ruling that, in an actual potential competition case, it is enough for the government to show that an acquirer had the ability and incentive to enter a target’s market even if there is no evidence that the acquirer had made actual plans or intended to do so before agreeing to buy the target.

    The Draft Guidelines indicate that the regulators are not changing their aggressive approach despite their litigation track record.

    What happens now?

    It remains to be seen what form the final Guidelines will take once the agencies have considered public comments. Although the Draft Guidelines cite to case law, the agencies would have to persuade courts to agree with their interpretation of precedent (and reject over four decades of jurisprudence based on the consumer welfare standard to do so). Convincing lower court judges to back novel legal theories will only be made more difficult given the conservative majority on the Supreme Court.

    Regardless of the final form that the Draft Guidelines will take, private equity firms should expect increased scrutiny of their transactions (even if not HSR-reportable), portfolios and board appointments as part of the broad enforcement push by the antitrust agencies. When considering a potential transaction (whether a merger or acquisition of control or a partial acquisition), firms should engage antitrust counsel early in the process to assess antitrust risk, including analyzing competition and potential competition in horizontal, vertical and related markets, as well as evaluating potential labor market impacts. Antitrust counsel can help educate deal teams on document creation and the risks arising from, for example, overstating market share or improperly describing markets. In addition, given the expanded HSR disclosure requirements recently proposed by the FTC, antitrust counsel can begin compiling the required information earlier in the process to minimize any HSR-related delays.                

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz and Ngoc Pham Hulbig.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2023 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Italian Supreme Court Extends the Participation Exemption Regime to Non-resident Parent Companies

    Italian Supreme Court Extends the Participation Exemption Regime to Non-resident Parent Companies

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Italian Supreme Court Extends the Participation Exemption Regime to Non-resident Parent Companies

    July 26, 2023

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Judgement

    In its judgment no. 21261 issued on 19 July, the Italian Supreme Court stated that non-resident companies without an Italian permanent establishment (PE) are entitled to apply the Italian 95% participation exemption (PEX) regime on the capital gain realized upon sale of a participation held in an Italian resident company, provided that the requirements  for the PEX regime are met. In such a case, the capital gain would be subject to a 1.2% effective tax (resulting from the application of the 24% CIT ordinary rate on a taxable income equal to 5% of the capital gain).

    In the Supreme Court’s view, not applying the PEX regime to non-resident companies without an Italian PE would infringe the fundamental freedoms laid under the Treaty on Functioning of the EU. Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court upheld the position of a French parent company holding a ‘substantial participation’ in an Italian subsidiary, i.e. a participation attributing the right to 25% or more of the profits of the subsidiary. Pursuant to Art. 8, let. b) of the Protocol attached to the Italy-France Double Tax Convention (DTC), Italy is not prevented from taxing such capital gain.

    The Supreme Court confirmed that the French parent company met all the requirements under Italian tax law for the application of the PEX regime. The Supreme Court pointed out that the discrimination against French resident companies was not eliminated by the tax credit granted pursuant to the Italy-France DTC considering that: (i) the DTC provides for a limited (and not full) tax credit, i.e. not exceeding the amount of French tax attributable to the relevant income and (ii) the capital gain is partially exempt from tax in France, thus limiting the attribution of a tax credit to the parent company.

    In depth

    Current Scenario and Next Steps

    • Provided that the requirements of the PEX regime are met, French parent companies can reasonably leverage on the judgment to directly apply such regime on capital gains realized upon the sale of substantial participations in Italian companies2. While the risk of an audit of Italian Tax Authorities cannot be completely ruled out (the 1.2% tax due upon application of the PEX would result from filing an Italian tax return and the current template does not provide for such tax for non-resident taxpayers), the arguments supporting the position are solidly grounded and further strengthened by the well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on discrimination and restrictions. A more prudent approach could be followed whereby the tax is paid and then a refund is requested.
    • We expect that the legislature will react to the judgment soon, adopting a provision that expressly extends the applicability of the PEX regime to capital gains realized by non-resident companies without an Italian PE. Considering the past experience in respect of dividends distributed by Italian subsidiaries to EU resident parent companies3, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature will extend the PEX regime to EU resident parent companies and to parent companies resident in States of the European Economic Area (EEA) that have an adequate exchange of tax information with Italy4.
    • While the Supreme Court’s judgment makes a generic reference to EU fundamental freedoms, the most recent CJEU jurisprudence indicates that a rule designed in a way such as the PEX should be tested against the provisions on the free movement of capital (rather than those on the freedom of establishment)5. Leveraging on this and on the applicability of the free movement of capital to non-EU countries, it could be argued that the PEX regime should also be extended to non-EU parent companies holding a participation in an Italian company and realizing a capital gain taxable in Italy based on the applicable DTC rules. Based on a first analysis, this would be the case with respect to China, South Korea and Israel, irrespective of the activity carried out by the Italian company. It would also be the case for United States companies with participations in an Italian company “whose assets consist wholly or principally of real property situated in Italy” (Art. 12, let. b) of the Protocol attached to the Italy-US DTC; this would therefore trigger taxation in Italy of the capital gain pursuant to Art. 13, para. 1 Italy-US DTC) and using such real property for its business activity, either as trading goods or fixed assets (thus not qualifying as a real estate company for the purpose of the PEX regime). While the extension of the principles stated by the judgment to such cases is affirmed neither directly nor implicitly by the Supreme Court, please note that it can be argued insofar as the applicable DTC includes a clause providing for an adequate exchange of information with Italy.
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  • U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Affirmative Action in College Admissions: Considerations for Independent Schools

    U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Affirmative Action in College Admissions: Considerations for Independent Schools

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Affirmative Action in College Admissions: Considerations for Independent Schools

    July 26, 2023

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 29, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College held that the race-based affirmative action programs at Harvard College (“Harvard”) and the University of North Carolina (“UNC”) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In so doing, the Court struck down the use of race-based affirmative action in college admissions.

    The decision addressed two cases brought by Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (“SFFA”) claiming that Harvard and UNC discriminated against White and/or Asian Americans by considering race as part of their holistic admissions programs. While both schools admitted that they considered race as one of many factors throughout their admissions process, the schools maintained that their policies adhered to U.S. Supreme Court precedent on this issue holding that educational diversity is a compelling interest that justifies taking account of race as one factor among many in college admissions decisions.

    Harvard and UNC asserted several goals as justifications for their affirmative action programs, including, among other things, “producing new knowledge stemming from diverse outlooks,” preparing graduates to “adapt to an increasingly pluralistic society,” and “promoting the robust exchange of ideas.” The Court stated that while these goals are laudable, they were too amorphous to pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard, the standard for reviewing race-based action under the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., the program must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest”).

    In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts clarified that “nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise.” However, Chief Justice Roberts warned that “universities may not simply establish through application essays or other means the regime we hold unlawful today.”

    The decision is grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, both of which do not apply to private pre-K through 12 schools that do not accept federal funding. However, non-public primary and secondary schools could be next to face legal challenge with respect to the use of race in admissions processes; race-based scholarships; recruitment practices; and broader DEI efforts. Plaintiffs may try to sue a private primary or secondary school that does not accept federal funding and ground their argument in other statutes that do apply to private schools such as Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits non-public schools from engaging in race discrimination, and or City and State laws that prohibit discrimination. Additionally, private schools that are tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code are required to have racially non-discriminatory policies as to their students. Further, IRS Procedure 75-50 requires schools to review enabling documents such as bylaws and charters to determine if they have adopted and complied with such policies and to include a statement of racial non-discrimination in all school brochures and catalogues concerning student admissions, programs and scholarships.

    There is also a concern that schools, like all employers, may eventually face scrutiny for their employment race-based recruiting and DEI practices, because the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which applies in the employment context, is similar to the language of Title VI, which was relied on by the Supreme Court.

    Given the Supreme Court’s ruling regarding Harvard and UNC’s affirmative action programs, to avoid being the target of future legal challenges, K-12 schools should review their internal admissions policies, applications, and diversity programs and statements to avoid running afoul of this most recent decision.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Donna K. Lazarus, Julia L. Gordon and Michelle M. Orge. 

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2023 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Michelle M. Orge

    Associate

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Illinois Supreme Court Denies Rehearing of BIPA Claim Accrual Ruling

    Illinois Supreme Court Denies Rehearing of BIPA Claim Accrual Ruling

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Illinois Supreme Court Denies Rehearing of BIPA Claim Accrual Ruling

    July 25, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 18, 2023, the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing in Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., 2023 IL 128004. The denial comes five months after the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that claims accrue under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) each time data is collected and disclosed—on a scan-by-scan basis.

    In depth

    According to the dissents, joined by three of the justices (including the chief justice), the Illinois Supreme Court’s latest ruling will have a major impact on future BIPA cases and has negative implications for Illinois employers and other companies that collect biometric information. According to the dissents, Illinois is already seeing the ruling’s effect: “cases alleging violations of the Act reportedly jumped 65% in Illinois circuit courts in the two months since this court’s ruling.”

    While the majority opinion did not go into any detail on its decision to deny White Castle’s petition for rehearing other than to restate its reading of BIPA as announced in February 2023, the majority did further explain what it sees as the discretion of trial court judges overseeing BIPA cases. Specifically, the Cothron Court reiterated that damage awards “would be discretionary” damages under BIPA and should not be imposed to “result in the financial destruction of a business.” Instead, trial courts are now supposed to fashion damage awards by ensuring that they “(1) fairly compensate[] claiming class members; and (2) include[] an amount designed to deter future violations, without destroying defendant’s businesses.” In practice, this could lead to uncertainty for both plaintiffs and defendants alike. It also means that BIPA damages could be tied, at least in part, to the judge overseeing the case. Despite this attempt to downplay the potential impact of Cothron’s per-scan approach, the dissents saw “[t]he implications of the majority’s opinion [as] severe and arguably oppressive, wholly disproportioned to the violates addressed in the Act, and unreasonable.”

    The strongly worded dissents also argued that the majority’s ruling “eviscerates the legislature’s remedial purpose of the Act and impermissibly recasts the Act as penal.” The dissents also emphasized the need for the Court to provide clearer standards for the trial courts in setting damages, cautioning that “statutory damages awards must be no larger than necessary to serve the Act’s remedial purposes and should explain how lower courts should make that determination.” In short, the dissents made a strong case that it is time for the legislature to intervene to address what has become an even more uncertain litigation environment under BIPA. The call to action by the Court may ring hollow, however, given that the Court itself is a great source of the uncertainty surrounding BIPA.

    The Cothron Court’s recent ruling simply serves to reinforce the uncertain future that defendants—and plaintiffs—now face when trying to scope the potential liability of a BIPA claim. Absent action from the legislature, Illinois companies will be forced to navigate the uncertain legal landscape.

    Of course, the best way to avoid BIPA liability is to ensure compliance with the statute in the first instance.

    For assistance in establishing or evaluating existing BIPA policies, contact your regular McDermott lawyer or the authors.

    Gabrielle Siroonian, a summer associate in the Chicago office, was a contributing author to this article. 

    Authors

    David P. Saunders

    Partner

    Chicago

    Daniel Campbell

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • IRS Criminal Investigation Division Is on the Hunt for Malta Pension Plan Participants and Promoters

    IRS Criminal Investigation Division Is on the Hunt for Malta Pension Plan Participants and Promoters

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Criminal Investigation Division Is on the Hunt for Malta Pension Plan Participants and Promoters

    July 25, 2023

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    There has been a growing trend of US taxpayers contributing non-cash assets, such as appreciated property, securities and cryptocurrency, into Maltese pension plans since the US-Malta Tax Treaty went into effect in 2011. These transactions were marketed to many US taxpayers as a way to cash in on their earnings without being subject to US federal taxation. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is now investigating these transactions as possible tax fraud and evasion.

    In depth

    MALTA PENSION PLANS

    One of the Malta pension plan transactions under investigation involved a US taxpayer who contributed highly appreciated assets to a Maltese pension plan and then relied on an interpretation of the US-Malta Tax Treaty to avoid incurring US taxes. Some taxpayers take the position that they can take distributions without imposition of US income tax. When the appreciated assets are then sold by the Maltese pension plan, some US taxpayers also take the position that the gains were not subject to income tax in Malta or the United States.

    Because some participants in these transactions lacked any connection to Malta, the IRS has suggested that the transactions exploited the intentions of the US-Malta Income Tax Treaty. According to the IRS, “[b]y improperly asserting the foreign arrangement as a ‘pension fund’ for U.S. tax treaty purposes, the U.S. taxpayer misconstrues the relevant treaty provisions and improperly claims an exemption from U.S. income tax on gains and earnings in and distributions from the foreign individual retirement arrangement.”

    CIVIL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

    In July 2021, the IRS added the Malta pension plan transaction to its Dirty Dozen list, which identifies certain transactions that the IRS considers abusive. That same year, the United States and Malta entered into a Competent Authority Agreement to close this interpretation of the treaty by narrowing the definition of a pension fund for purposes of the treaty as follows:

    Accordingly, U.S. citizens and residents may not claim benefits under paragraph 1(b) of Article 17 and Article 18 of the Treaty with respect to the type of fund, scheme or arrangement described in the paragraph immediately above, including a personal retirement scheme established in Malta under the Retirement Pensions Act of 2011. ,,, Additionally, these funds, schemes or arrangements may not apply paragraph 2(e) of Article 22 of the Treaty to be treated as a qualified resident and may not claim the benefits of paragraph 3 of Article 10 of the Treaty.

    The IRS and the US Department of the Treasury then took efforts to discourage taxpayers. In June 2023, proposed regulations rendered the practice as a listed transaction. (See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-12.) If the regulations are finalized, advisors or contributors to Malta pension plans will be subject to required recordkeeping, mandated reporting and possible civil tax penalties for failure to disclose these transactions to the IRS.

    IRS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

    Prior to June 2023, Maltese pension plan enforcement was mainly conducted through civil tax examinations. Recently, however, the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division has begun in-person visits to taxpayers and advisors, presenting summonses and conducting criminal investigations into individuals who contributed to or promoted these transactions. Those under investigation include lawyers, accountants, estate planners and other financial advisors.

    Some taxpayers receiving summonses are unsure if they are the target of a criminal investigation or merely a third-party witness in a potential case. Typically, when the IRS investigates whether transactions are tax evasion schemes, it focuses on the people who promoted and facilitated the transactions.

    NEXT STEPS

    In the interim, it is possible that the IRS will use civil tax examinations to address income tax deficiencies on unreported income from these transactions. The IRS will likely assert civil tax penalties (including negligence penalties) against participants in these transactions. Moreover, the IRS may also impose criminal penalties on taxpayers and the promoters of the transactions.

    Practice Point: If you have participated in a Malta pension plan or a similar transaction, we recommend having a discussion with an experienced tax lawyer to understand any potential implications of these transactions and consider efficient ways to restructure before the IRS contacts you. Knowing your rights can ameliorate any civil and criminal tax penalties. With respect to potential criminal penalties, it is important to understand your rights, including your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, before you speak and interact with the IRS. Moreover, taxpayers should consider ways to unwind these arrangements and avoid these risks going forward.

    Olivia Sica, a summer associate in the Miami office, also contributed to this case note.

    Authors

    Daniel J. Bell

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Evan Walters

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Proposed Merger Guidelines Outline Fundamental Change of Approach to Merger Investigation and Enforcement

    Proposed Merger Guidelines Outline Fundamental Change of Approach to Merger Investigation and Enforcement

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Proposed Merger Guidelines Outline Fundamental Change of Approach to Merger Investigation and Enforcement

    July 24, 2023

    Read time: 25 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mergers and acquisitions will continue to face strong headwinds at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) under new proposed Merger Guidelines released on July 19, 2023.

    The Proposed Guidelines detail how the agencies will evaluate horizontal (transactions with competitors), vertical (transactions integrating firms up/down a supply chain) and other transactions. The public has 60 days to comment on these Proposed Guidelines, but it is unlikely that there will be significant substantive changes given the Biden administration’s aggressive antitrust enforcement stance. When finalized, the Proposed Guidelines will replace the current 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the short-lived 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines which the FTC withdrew in September 2021.

    The Proposed Guidelines embody the antitrust agencies’ aggressive posture towards merger enforcement under the Biden administration. They reflect the agencies’ view that they have expansive statutory authority to challenge mergers under new and untested legal theories. Courts, however, have specifically rejected several of the theories in these Proposed Guidelines in recent merger enforcement losses suffered by the FTC and DOJ.

    This On the Subject highlights the most significant changes in the Proposed Guidelines and what steps companies contemplating mergers and other transactions should take in the face of these changes.

    In depth

    THE LACK OF A “UNIFYING THEME” IS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE

    Although many of the theories in the Proposed Guidelines are not new, the Proposed Guidelines represent a fundamental change to the agencies’ approach and standards it will use when evaluating mergers.

    The current 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state at the outset that their “unifying theme” is to prevent mergers that enable companies to “raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers.”[1] The rest of those guidelines outline a systematic approach to evaluating mergers consistent with this theme: (i) identifying the relevant market; (ii) identifying market participants and levels of concentration; and (iii) evaluating the merger’s likely unilateral or coordinated competitive effects (i.e., the likelihood that the merger will increase price, reduce output or diminish innovation).

    The Proposed Guidelines do away with this unifying theme. To challenge a merger, it appears the FTC and DOJ no longer need to explain how a merger will lead to anticompetitive effects. Instead, to challenge a merger, the antitrust agencies merely need to satisfy one of several independent bases under which a merger is presumed to be anticompetitive:

    • Guideline 1: A “significant” increase in concentration in a “highly concentrated market”
    • Guideline 2: A combination of “substantial” competitors
    • Guideline 3: A “meaningful” increase in the risk of coordination (presumed if Guideline 1 is met, and the agencies express skepticism such presumption could ever be rebutted)
    • Guideline 4: Elimination of a potential entrant in a “concentrated” market (where a firm that has capabilities that would reasonably enable it to enter is presumed to be an entrant, regardless of its intentions)
    • Guideline 5: Control of products/services rivals may use to compete if the acquisition might make it “harder” for the competitor to compete
    • Guideline 6: Control of 50% share in an upstream market
    • Guideline 7: Entrenchment or extension of a “dominant” position
    • Guideline 8: Furthering a “trend toward concentration”

    Guidelines 9 through 12 apply this framework to specific settings such as patterns of smaller mergers (i.e., “roll-up” transactions), mergers involving multisided platforms, mergers affecting labor markets and acquisitions of partial ownership or minority interests. Guideline 13 provides a catch-all for the FTC and DOJ to challenge other mergers that do not fall into one of the aforementioned buckets.

    Notably, the scenarios in these Proposed Guidelines are all defined broadly. It is likely that many mergers will meet one or more of these bases. Thus, the Proposed Guidelines provide antitrust enforcement agencies with multiple independent avenues to challenge a merger. The burden is then shifted to the merging parties to demonstrate on rebuttal why their merger will not harm competition—and, at the same time, the Proposed Guidelines narrow the scope of merger defenses such as entry, efficiencies and failing firms.

    REVIEW OF SELECTED CHANGES THAT REFLECT AGGRESSIVE MERGER ENFORCEMENT

    Substantial Reduction in Threshold for Presuming Competitive Harm in Horizontal Mergers

    Under the Proposed Guidelines, the agencies will presume that mergers with a post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) index of more than 1,800 or a combined market share of 30% or more and that involve an HHI increase of more than 100 will substantially lessen competition. Notably, the Proposed Guidelines create a new alternative presumption of harm based on market share—a concept not previously tested by courts. This effectively means that a 6-to-5 merger in a market of six equally sized competitors would be presumed unlawful (and that the same may be true of some mergers in markets starting with even more competitors). This is a significant change from the current 2010 Guidelines which apply a presumption only to mergers resulting in a 2,500 post-merger HHI, and an HHI increase of 200, which presumes that a merger of two firms in a market of five equally sized participants is unlawful (i.e., a 5-to-4). This change will significantly increase the number of mergers that the antitrust agencies would presume to lead to competitive harms and thus could challenge. Under this new standard, it will be important for merging parties to try to include all competitors they face in the relevant “market” to lower the combined shares. Considerable document review and data analysis may be necessary to credibly define the market.

    New Structural Presumption for Vertical Mergers

    The Proposed Guidelines announce a new structural presumption applicable to vertical mergers. If a merger leads to a company controlling 50% or more market share in the related upstream input product (the “foreclosure share”), the agencies will presume that the merger will harm competition in the downstream market that uses that input. Below the foreclosure share, the new guidelines would allow the FTC and DOJ to assert a structural presumption when considering a trend toward vertical integration, the nature and purpose of the merger, whether the relevant market is already concentrated, whether the merged firm already has a dominant position or if the merger increases barriers to entry.

    For vertical mergers that do not meet this structural presumption, the Proposed Guidelines look at whether the merger increases the incentive and ability of the combined firm to make it difficult for rivals to compete. The Proposed Guidelines state that the agencies will give little weight to speculative claims about potential reputational harms that parties often suggest will prevent them from harming rivals through increased price or decreased quality or preventing rivals’ access to the related product. Unlike the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines make no mention of the potential procompetitive effects of vertical integration, such as the elimination of double marginalization. This change is unsurprising given the skepticism current FTC and DOJ leadership have expressed towards efficiencies.

    Aggressive Theories on Potential Competition

    The Proposed Guidelines significantly lower the threshold for concluding that acquisitions of a potential competitor will lead to competitive harm. At the outset, the Proposed Guidelines state that any merger that eliminates a potential entrant in a “concentrated” market—defined as a market with an HHI of just 1,000 (or the equivalent of 10 equally sized competitors)—can substantially lessen competition.

    The Proposed Guidelines also make it significantly easier to label a merging party as a “potential competitor.” The mere fact that a merging company has the capability or the resources to enter a particular market or is perceived by industry participants as a potential entrant is enough to label it a potential competitor—regardless of any evidence of actual intent to enter or concrete actions taken towards entry. This expansive definition of potential competition would likely allow the agencies to assert that certain companies are potential entrants in a broad range of markets. The Proposed Guidelines also state that subjective evidence that a company considered entry (e.g., evidence of a build-buy analysis) can prove that entry is likely absent the transaction.

    Mergers Involving Already “Dominant” Companies Will Face Heightened Scrutiny

    In a new theory that is not reflected in the 2010 Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines take aim at mergers that entrench or extend a company’s dominant position. Companies with as little as 30% market share are labeled as “dominant”—a threshold that is inconsistent with modern US antitrust case law. This theory is designed to capture mergers that are not strictly horizontal or vertical but involve a firm with significant share combining with a firm with complementary products or services that may allow the “dominant” company to bundle products or rebates and increase switching costs for customers. The Proposed Guidelines also state that a “dominant” firm’s acquisition of a nascent competitor will face significant scrutiny—even when the nascent threat is uncertain or may take several years to develop.

    Serial Transactions and Roll-Up Strategies Specifically Targeted

    The Proposed Guidelines state that “a firm that engages in an anticompetitive pattern or strategy of multiple small acquisitions in the same or related business lines may violate [the antitrust laws], even if no single acquisition on its own would risk substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly.” The agencies will look closely at companies’ “roll-up” strategies in which a single buyer acquires many different companies in the same market. The Proposed Guidelines also state that the agencies will challenge transactions in markets before they become “highly concentrated” if the industry is “trending towards concentration.” This guideline is likely to especially impact transactions involving private equity, large healthcare companies, Big Tech, and aerospace and defense contractors.

    STEPS COMPANIES SHOULD TAKE TO GET DEALS DONE UNDER THESE NEW GUIDELINES

    While the Proposed Guidelines reflect a fundamental shift from the 2010 Guidelines, they are not a paradigm shift from the current antitrust enforcement environment; rather, they codify the more aggressive approach towards mergers under the Biden administration, providing the FTC and DOJ with an expanded toolbox to investigate and challenge potentially problematic mergers. But simply because a merger falls within one or more of the Proposed Guidelines’ categories does not mean a transaction is dead on arrival. In many cases, it may still be possible to obtain clearance. The FTC and DOJ lack the resources to fully investigate and challenge all the many mergers that fall under these new theories and will need to exercise discretion based on their enforcement priorities. The FTC and DOJ only conduct in-depth investigations for less than 2% of all notified transactions.[2] The transactions that the antitrust agencies are challenging today will likely be similar to the transactions that the antitrust regulators challenge when the Proposed Guidelines are finalized.

    Nevertheless, under the Proposed Guidelines, and also under the proposed changes to the premerger filings under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, it will be critical for merging parties to conduct more thorough antitrust risk assessments earlier in the deal process and evaluate applicability to each of these categories. Under the proposed changes to the HSR reporting process, the antitrust enforcement agencies will receive significantly more information upfront to evaluate the applicability of these guideline categories to the reported transactions. Thus, it is important to engage antitrust counsel and economic experts earlier in the deal process, even for acquisitions of a small competitor or transactions that do not appear problematic on their face. Sellers considering multiple bidders will need to carefully weigh each bidder’s level of antitrust risk against these various theories of harm—and strategic bidders will need to respond by demonstrating a viable plan to secure regulatory approval. Under the Proposed Guidelines, even bidders who are not in the same market as the target assets, but who have large market shares in complementary or adjacent markets or have the resources to potentially enter the market, will face increased scrutiny from the FTC and DOJ.

    Companies will need to pay careful attention to internal business document creation to mitigate the risk that the information in the documents will lead to greater scrutiny under these new guideline categories. For example, it is standard practice for many companies considering an acquisition to conduct “Build vs. Buy” analyses to determine whether to enter a market through organic growth or an acquisition. But, if such an analysis was included in the “Item 4 documents” that accompany an HSR filing, under the Proposed Guidelines, the mere consideration of a Build/Buy may lead to agency focus on potential competition theories. Firms should also limit the extent to which past acquisitions or contemplated future acquisitions are discussed within a single document because such discussions may alert agencies to a roll-up strategy which merits more intense scrutiny beyond the instant transaction. Ordinary course business documents should identify all competitors and potential entrants and detail their capabilities and resources. Merger efficiencies should be considered and documented early in the deal process before an agency investigation commences. It is important for the parties to articulate in these documents the ways in which the stated efficiencies can only happen because of the merger, are quantifiable and will achieve benefits that will be passed on to customers and/or employees. Regular document creation trainings and legal audits of business documents—including ordinary course documents created outside the deal process—are crucial for companies that actively buy and sell businesses.

    THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES ARE UNLIKELY TO BE WELL RECEIVED BY COURTS

    It is important to recognize that the Proposed Guidelines are not the law. The Proposed Guidelines cite cases from 30 to 40 years ago that are not consistent with how courts today evaluate mergers. Courts may very well reject some of the aggressive theories in these Proposed Guidelines, as they have been doing in recent cases. For example:

    • The judge in Meta/Within[3] rejected the FTC’s theories on potential competition, dismissing the FTC’s actual potential competition theory that Meta’s internal discussions about potentially converting its musical rhythm VR app to a fitness VR app were sufficient evidence that Meta would enter but for the acquisition of Within and its perceived potential competition theory that other VR competitors considered Meta to be a potential entrant.
    • The judge in United Healthcare/Change Healthcare[4] repudiated the DOJ’s speculative theories that, post-merger, United would have the incentive to disadvantage rivals who relied on Change’s electronic data clearinghouse. The judge noted that the DOJ’s argument “rests on speculation rather than real-world evidence that events are likely to unfold as the government predicts.” The judge also credited firewalls and other customer contractual commitments as sufficient to prevent anticompetitive harm to rivals. In contrast to this opinion, the Proposed Guidelines state that any transaction involving access to rivals’ competitively sensitive information may substantially lessen competition and assert that the FTC and DOJ are unlikely to credit commitments of the merging firms to protect rivals.
    • The judge in Microsoft/Activision[5] acknowledged potential irreparable reputational harm as a reason why Microsoft lacked the incentive to foreclose rivals’ access to Activision’s Call of Duty videogame, in contrast to the Proposed Guidelines’ approach, which would label such harms as speculative and deserving of little weight.
    • The judge in Booz Allen Hamilton/EverWatch[6] rejected the DOJ’s proposed antitrust market, which was limited to one government procurement for one customer. This decision would be inconsistent with the Proposed Guidelines’ emphasis on narrow product markets, including markets limited to a single customer even where “competitive constraints from significant substitutes are outside the group.” In denying a preliminary injunction to enjoin the transaction, the judge also stressed that there was no evidence that the proposed acquisition would likely lead to substantial anticompetitive effects.

    Judges today rarely cite even the more broadly accepted and bipartisan 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The Proposed Guidelines, which were voted on by only Democratic FTC commissioners, will likely be viewed as a political advocacy document rather than a persuasive articulation of antitrust law—especially since the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines released under the Trump administration were withdrawn less than two years after their release. Therefore, merging parties must be prepared to defend their deal and, in some cases, litigate the fix (proposed remedies) in court—where merger case law governs, not these Proposed Guidelines. Merging parties should signal this intention to defend their deal in court to the enforcement agencies through the language in deal agreements (e.g., long end dates, antitrust efforts provisions) and in interactions with agency staff and front office management (e.g., formal presentations, responses to Second Requests).

    ***

    On Wednesday, July 26, 2023, at 12:30 pm EDT, partners from McDermott’s antitrust mergers and acquisitions team will further discuss the Proposed Guidelines and their implications for companies’ M&A strategies. Learn more and find registration details for the webinar, “What You Need to Know About the Revised Merger Guidelines.”

    Authors

    Jon B. Dubrow

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Noah Feldman Greene

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Gregory E. Heltzer

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Joel R. Grosberg

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Raymond A. Jacobsen , Jr.

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lisa P. Rumin

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Ryan C. Tisch

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Reforms to the Florida Patient Self-Referral Act: A Closer Look at the Impact of SB 768

    Reforms to the Florida Patient Self-Referral Act: A Closer Look at the Impact of SB 768

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reforms to the Florida Patient Self-Referral Act: A Closer Look at the Impact of SB 768

    July 24, 2023

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Florida Senate Bill 768 (SB 768) amends the Florida Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992 (PSRA), which regulates referrals from healthcare providers, including physicians, to entities in which they have ownership and other investment interests. This amendment, which became effective July 1, 2023, has important implications for Florida physicians subject to the PSRA by making the physician supervision requirements less onerous. Although this change offers potential benefits, Florida physicians, including those who do not currently participate in the Medicare program but are subject to the PSRA, must ensure they understand and implement the revised supervision requirements, which are identical to Medicare’s supervision requirements.

    In depth

    Background: The Florida PSRA and Its Interplay with the Federal Stark Law

    The PSRA restricts certain health care providers, including physicians, from referring patients to an entity in which they hold a financial interest for the provision of designated health services (DHS) or any other healthcare item or service unless an exception applies.

    Specifically, the PSRA sets forth a number of scenarios that are excluded from the definition of a “referral” and thus are not implicated by the PSRA. In relevant part, the PSRA excludes from the definition of a “referral” an order, recommendation, or plan of care by a member of a group practice (as defined by the PSRA) for DHS or other health care items or services that are prescribed or provided solely for patients of the group practice and, prior to the passage of SB 768, are provided or performed “by or under the direct supervision” of the referring health care provider or a member of the referring health care provider’s group practice (the “Florida In-Office Ancillary Services Exception” or the “FL IOASE”). The PSRA defined “direct supervision” in this context as “supervision by a physician who is present in the office suite and immediately available to provide assistance and direction throughout the time services are being performed.”

    Physicians who have ownership in or compensation arrangements with their group practices and refer patients within the group for the provision of DHS billable to Medicare are also required to comply with the PSRA’s federal counterpart: the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, known commonly as the Stark Law. The Stark Law’s definition of “DHS” varies from the PSRA’s definition of “DHS,” as it encompasses additional categories of services. However, in addition to “DHS,” the PSRA also applies to “any other health care item or service,” thus encompassing all other categories of services considered to be “DHS” under the Stark Law.

    Similar to the PSRA, the Stark Law contains an exception for DHS referred within the group practice (as “group practice” is defined in the Stark Law), referred to as the In-Office Ancillary Services Exception (“Stark IOASE”). This exception requires that the DHS be furnished by the referring physician, by a member (i.e., physician owner or employee) of the referring physician’s group practice, or under the supervision of the referring physician or another physician in the group practice (i.e., physician owner, employee or independent contractor of the group practice), provided that the supervision complies with “all other applicable Medicare payment and coverage rules.”

    The varying supervision standards between the FL IOASE and the Stark IOASE have created difficulties for Florida physicians who must comply with both laws in order to refer DHS within their group practices in which they have ownership interests. As a result, because the FL IOASE is stricter than the Stark IOASE, it has always been possible that services (such as certain diagnostic tests) that may not require direct supervision under applicable Medicare payment and coverage rules must still be performed under direct physician supervision in order to comply with the FL IOASE.

    SB 768: What the Amendment Changes

    In an effort to align the FL IOASE more closely with the Stark IOASE, SB 768 eliminates Florida’s requirement for direct physician supervision and the need for a physician to be in the same office suite, allowing for remote physician supervision of such services under certain circumstances. Under this amended requirement, Florida health care providers will have greater flexibility with the supervision they provide as long as they comply with applicable Medicare payment and coverage rules for the service being provided, in accordance with the Stark IOASE.

    Implications for Florida Physicians

    SB 768 provides potentially significant benefits for Florida physicians. For example, easing supervision requirements may result in cost savings because the need is reduced for a physician’s constant presence during the provision of services. Eliminating the direct supervision requirement will also afford referring physicians in solo practices and group practices enhanced flexibility in their scheduling.

    Additionally, prior to the amendment, there was a risk of inadvertent noncompliance by physicians who billed for services rendered under supervision they believed was appropriate from a Medicare perspective, without being aware that the PSRA contained stricter standards. To the extent this occurred, any claims for payment would have been prohibited under the PSRA, a strict liability statute, even if otherwise permissible under the Stark Law. Aligning Florida’s supervision requirements with the Stark IOASE mitigates the risk of physicians violating the PSRA as long as they adhere to all applicable Medicare supervision requirements. However, this could be potentially problematic for physicians who do not participate in the Medicare program and are not familiar with its supervision requirements.

    Although SB 768 offers potential benefits to physicians, it also necessitates careful oversight to ensure that the correct level of supervision is provided for each service requiring it. Failure to meet the supervision requirements can result in the submission of a prohibited claim, creating overpayment liability, at a minimum, and potentially False Claims Act liability, if the patient is a federal health care program participant. Additionally, submitting a prohibited claim or making a prohibited referral could result in disciplinary action against the physician’s license. Florida physicians and their practices should carefully review and understand the Medicare coverage and payment rules (which require adherence to state licensure supervision requirements – possibly stricter than Medicare supervision requirements) applicable to the services they provide in order to ensure compliance with SB 768 and its amended supervision requirement.

    Authors

    Jamie B. Gelfman

    Partner

    Miami

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