Content Type: Article

  • Landmark UK Supreme Court Ruling Strikes a Blow to Litigation Funding

    Landmark UK Supreme Court Ruling Strikes a Blow to Litigation Funding

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Landmark UK Supreme Court Ruling Strikes a Blow to Litigation Funding

    August 3, 2023

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On 26 July 2023, the UK Supreme Court gave judgment in R (on the application of PACCAR Inc and others) v Competition Appeal Tribunal and others1.

    By a majority of four to one, the Supreme Court held that litigation funding agreements (LFAs) (which entitle funders to be paid a proportion of any damages recovered) are “damages-based agreements” (DBAs), within the meaning of section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (the 1990 Act). As a result, LFAs are unenforceable unless they comply with the relevant regulatory regime for DBAs and cannot be used at all to fund opt-out collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the CAT).

    This ruling will have significant ramifications for litigation funders in the United Kingdom as well as claimants and claimant law firms that rely heavily on third-party funding. This impact was acknowledged by the Supreme Court, with Lord Sales noting (in the leading judgment) that the Court had been informed that “most third-party litigation funding agreements would…be unenforceable as the law currently stands”2. Lady Rose (in her dissenting judgment) observed that the conclusion reached by the majority of the Court was likely to mean that (i) most (if not all) litigation funding agreements that have been agreed since litigation funding began would be unenforceable; (ii) no collective proceedings order (CPO) could ever be pursued in the CAT; and (iii) a radical review of the entire litigation funding sector in the United Kingdom would be required3.

    In depth

    THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

    This issue arose in the context of the well-known “Trucks” litigation before the CAT.

    In 2016, the European Commission found that five truck manufacturing groups had engaged in anti-competitive behaviour by delaying the introduction of low-emission technologies and passing on the costs for the emissions technologies to customers. After that decision, two applications were made to the CAT under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 to bring follow-on collective proceedings. However, to obtain a CPO, the applicants needed to show that they had adequate funding arrangements in place to meet their own costs and any adverse costs orders that may be made against them should they lose. This condition is a prerequisite for any claim to be certified as collective proceedings in the CAT. Both applicants relied on LFAs to meet those requirements, with their claims being funded by arrangements under which the funders would receive a share of any damages recovered.

    The truck manufacturers objected to the CAT making a CPO on the ground that the funding arrangements were DBAs, which did not comply with the Damages Based-Agreements Regulations 2010 and were therefore unenforceable.

    Sub-sections 58AA(1) and (2) of the 1990 Act4 provide that a DBA will be unenforceable unless certain conditions are complied with. Shortly after the insertion of section 58AA, the Damages Based Regulations 2013 (the 2013 Regulations) came into force. The 2013 Regulations set out further requirements which must be satisfied if a DBA is to be enforceable. It was accepted that the LFAs entered into by the applicants would not satisfy those conditions; therefore, the question as to whether they constituted DBAs was critical for the purposes of their enforceability.

    The key issue concerned the definition of a DBA under section 58AA(3) of the 1990 Act and, specifically, whether the LFAs involved the provision of “claims management services”. Under section 58AA(7), this phrase is defined by reference to earlier legislation, namely the Compensation Act 2006 (the 2006 Act) until 1 April 2019 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) thereafter. Under section 4 of the 2006 Act, such services were defined as “advice or other services in relation to the making of a claim” and “other services” includes a reference to “the provision of financial services or assistance”5.

    The CAT and the Divisional Court both ruled against the truck manufacturers and held that the LFAs in question did not involve the provision of “claims management services”. Accordingly, they were found not to be DBAs, and the fact that they did not satisfy the conditions set out in the 2013 Regulations did not render them unenforceable.

    On a leap-frog appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court allowed the truck manufacturers’ appeal by a majority of four to one. Lord Sales provided the leading judgment, and the key points include the following:

    a. The definition of a DBA for the purposes of section 58AA(3) of the 1990 Act must be determined by reference to the 2006 Act and the words “claims management services”, when read according to their natural meaning, were capable of covering the relevant LFAs that had been entered into6.

    b. In relation to the statutory purpose, the Court held that Part 2 of the 2006 Act was intended to provide a broad power to allow the Secretary of State to decide what targeted regulatory response might be required from time to time as information emerged about what was then a new and developing field of services seeking to encourage or facilitate litigation, where the business structures were opaque and poorly understood at the time of enactment. The wide language used in section 4 of the 2006 Act, and the degree of Parliamentary control for the future exercise of the section 4 power, which is a feature of the scheme of Part 2, were “strong indications of this”7. “Viewed in this light”, the Court held that there was “good reason to think that Parliament used wide language in section 4 deliberately and with the intention that the words of the definition of “claims management services” should be given their natural meaning”8.

    c. The 2013 Regulations are not a permissible aid to interpreting “claims management services” as defined in the 2006 Act. They were not introduced broadly contemporaneously with the 2006 Act “as part of a single coherent scheme”, nor were they “subject to review by the same Parliament which had enacted the 2006 Act”9. By contrast, the Compensation (Regulated Claims Management Services) Order 2006, together with its accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, were broadly contemporaneous and formed part of the same legislative scheme, and so are a legitimate aid to the interpretation of the 2006 Act. These support the interpretation of the definition of DBA which the Supreme Court found in favour of10.

    d. While there might be nothing objectionable in principle about litigation funding on what has become the conventional model, it does not follow that Parliament must have intended to leave such arrangements outside the scope of the definition because “evidence might emerge of third party funders extracting more than a reasonable share of the recovery, in which case regulation would plainly be fairly and squarely within the purpose of the power in section 4 of the 2006 Act, to protect consumers of such services. Moreover, there might be an element of bundling financial services together with other services as part of an overall package offered to a potential litigant, or the funding provided might be used to pay the fees of other services providers, or the person providing the financial assistance might pay a referral fee to a person promoting the litigation, any of which might require the regulatory power under section 4 to be exercised”11.

    e. None of the above was affected by the fact that many agreements have been concluded on the basis that they did not fall within the statutory definition of a DBA, but, as Lord Sales put it, “this would not justify the court in changing or distorting the meaning of “claims management services” as it is defined in the 2006 Act and in section 419A of FSMA”12.

    THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

    As the CAT does not permit DBAs in opt-out cases13, the immediate impact of this decision will be extremely unwelcome to litigation funders. Many of the funding agreements that have been put in place to pursue such cases are currently rendered unenforceable.

    More widely, whilst this decision is unlikely to be a fatal blow, with litigation funding crucial to the ever-increasing number of group actions in areas including data privacy, ESG and consumer protection, litigation funders and claimant law firms that depend on litigation funders will need to reassess their existing funding agreements for different types of claims to determine if they are enforceable. Where necessary (particularly for opt-out cases currently at the CPO stage), funders will need to renegotiate their existing funding agreements for their claims to proceed. Funders will be hopeful that claimants will be willing to do so, as it may not be financially viable for claims to proceed without the funding in place, as costs in opt-out cases in the CAT typically run into the millions and take years to resolve. But claimants could refuse to renegotiate their LFAs, which would potentially leave funders unable to recuperate their returns.

    Going forward, funders will inevitably seek to lobby Parliament to clarify the situation to ensure that group actions can still be properly funded in the CAT. Other funders may choose to focus more on opt-in claims, law firm financing, and enforcement and monetisation of awards. At a time when LFAs and their regulation are also under scrutiny in Europe, we may start to see litigation funders showing greater enthusiasm for the regulation of litigation funding activities to provide clarity around the types of arrangements that are (and are not) permissible.

    Authors

    Jack Thorne

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Harry Denlegh-Maxwell

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    More insights

  • REAL ESTATE UPDATE: THE NEW MF-GIF 2023

    REAL ESTATE UPDATE: THE NEW MF-GIF 2023

    REAL ESTATE UPDATE (GERMANY) / REPORT

    REAL ESTATE UPDATE: THE NEW MF-GIF 2023

    August 3, 2023

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In February 2023, the Gesellschaft für Immobilienwirtschaftliche Forschung e. V. (“gif”) published the new Guideline for the Calculation of Leasable Floor Area for Buildings  (“MF-GIF” 2023). In the following, we provide a brief overview of the background to the amendment, the main changes and notes on (rental) contractual inclusion.

    In depth

    1. Hintergrund der Novellierung
    Für die Bestimmung von Flächengrößen in Mietverträgen gibt es grundsätzlich keinen einheitlichen rechtlichen Standard. Vielmehr können mietvertraglich unterschiedliche Berechnungsmethoden vereinbart werden. Hierzu zählen in Deutschland derzeit etwa die Verordnung zur Berechnung der Wohnfläche („Wohnflächenverordnung“), die DIN 277 (Grundflächen und Rauminhalte im Hochbau) in der Fassung von August 2021 („DIN 277“) sowie die MF-GIF und ihre Vorgänger-Richtlinien, wie z.B. die MFG 2017 und die MF/G 2012. Die Wohnflächenverordnung stellt eine gesetzliche Regelung für die Berechnung von Wohnfläche nach dem Wohnraumförderungsgesetz dar. Bei der DIN 277 handelt es sich um eine Norm des Deutschen Instituts für Normung e. V., welche die einheitliche Beurteilung und Berechnung von Grundflächen und Rauminhalten ermöglicht. Hinzu kommen internationale Standards, wie beispielsweise der europäische „Code of Measurement“, der „International Property Measurement Standard“ („IPMS“) oder der amerikanische „BOMA-Standard“.

    Die unterschiedlichen Berechnungsmethoden können in der Praxis zu erheblichen Abweichungen bei den Flächengrößen eines Mietvertrages führen. Die Vertragsparteien sollten daher im Rahmen des Mietvertrages festlegen, auf welcher Basis die Mietflächen berechnet werden sollen, da dies offenkundig Auswirkungen auf die Miethöhe, die Nebenkosten etc. hat. Die neue MF-GIF versucht, die unterschiedlichen Berechnungssysteme zu harmonisieren und eine weitergehende Vereinheitlichung der Mietflächenberechnung zu erzielen. Hierfür wird die Berechnung der Flächengröße an den IPMS-Standard angeglichen, wodurch Differenzen bei der Berechnung von Mietflächen im internationalen Markt beseitigt werden sollen.

    2. Systematik der MF-GIF
    Die MF-GIF teilt die Mietflächen nicht nach Grundflächenarten ein, sondern unterscheidet, ob die Mietfläche vom Mieter exklusiv (MF-GIF-1) oder gemeinschaftlich (MF-GIF-2) genutzt wird. Exklusiv genutzte Mietflächen werden entweder einem bestimmtem Mieter (MF-GIF-1.1) oder einer Mietergruppe zugeordnet (MF-GIF-1.2). Für die Unterscheidung von gemeinschaftlich genutzten Flächen und exklusiven Mieterflächen, die einer Mietergruppe zugeordnet sind, gilt folgender Grundsatz: Gemeinschaftlich genutzte Flächen werden grundsätzlich von allen Mietern genutzt, zum Beispiel gemeinsame Treppenhäuser. Hingegen werden Mietflächen nach MF-GIF-1.2, die einer Mietergruppe zugeordnet sind, nur von bestimmten oder ausgewählten Mietern benutzt, wie es beispielsweise bei einem Vorflur zu zwei Mietbereichen der Fall ist.

    Außerdem bestimmt die MF-GIF auch solche Flächen, die grundsätzlich keine Mietflächen sind (MF-GIF-0). Hierunter fallen beispielsweise Dachflächen ohne Nutzung, Abstellflächen und Zugangswege für technische Anlagen, Ladenstraßen oder außerhalb des Bauwerks befindliche Baukonstruktionen, die an das Bauwerk anschließen. Als eigene Kategorie für Flächen und Räume, die keine Mietflächen sind, führt die MF-GIF zudem die sog. Sondermietobjekte ein. Hierbei handelt es sich beispielsweise um nicht unterbaute Terrassen- oder Kraftfahrzeugabstellflächen.

    3. Wesentliche Änderungen gegenüber der Vorgänger-Richtline
    Zunächst nimmt die MF-GIF keinen Bezug mehr auf die DIN 277, insbesondere auf die in der DIN 277 definierten Grundflächenarten, wie z.B. die Brutto-Grundfläche (BGF), die Verkehrsfläche (VK) und die Technikfläche (TK). Die MF-GIF kann nun vielmehr als eigenständiges Regelwerk verwendet werden. Alle Berechnungsvorgaben und Flächeneinteilungen ergeben sich aus der Richtlinie selbst.

    Ferner gilt die MF-GIF für alle Nutzungsformen (Wohnen und Gewerbe), so dass nicht mehr unterschiedliche Richtlinien für unterschiedliche Nutzungsarten verwendet werden müssen. Eine unterschiedliche Berechnung der Flächen ist damit nicht mehr erforderlich, was beispielsweise die Flächenbestimmung in gemischt genutzten Objekten vereinfachen soll.

    Neu ist ferner, dass alle Flächen bis zur Außenkante des Gebäudes, die unterbaut sind, ebenfalls zu 100 % als Mietfläche (MF-GIF-1) angesetzt werden. Alle nicht unterbauten Freiflächen, wie beispielsweise Kraftfahrzeugabstellflächen oder sonstige Freiflächen haben einen eigenen Anwendungsbereich erhalten und gelten zukünftig als Sondermietobjekte, die keine Mietflächen sind (MF-GIF-0). Hintergrund der Einbeziehung von unterbauten Flächen in die Mietflächenberechnung ist die Bestimmung und internationale Vergleichbarkeit des carbon footprints des Gebäudes. Bei der Nachhaltigkeitszertifizierung von Gebäuden, wie der DGNB-Zertifizierung oder der LEED-Zertifizierung, wird die gesamte Fläche des Gebäudes zu den Umwelt- und Effizienzmerkmalen ins Verhältnis gesetzt, die das Gebäude erfüllt. Auch hier ist die internationale Vergleichbarkeit von Gebäuden aus der Anlehnung an den IPMS entstanden. Zusätzlich kann sich dies bei der Begrünung von unterbauten Außenflächen positiv auf die Zertifizierung auswirken.

    Hilfestellungen zur genauen Berechnung sowie zur Auslegung der Richtlinie geben als Hinweise gekennzeichnete Erläuterungen in der Richtlinie selbst.

    4. Einbeziehung in den Mietvertrag

    a) Vereinbarung der Parteien erforderlich
    Bei der Erstellung von Mietvertragsentwürfen ist zu beachten, dass die MF-GIF durch ihre Einführung nicht automatisch Grundlage für die Flächenberechnung in Mietverträgen wird. Bei der MF-GIF handelt es sich nicht um eine gesetzlich verpflichtende Norm, sondern um das Regelwerk eines privatrechtlichen Vereins. Die Vertragsparteien können sich im Rahmen ihrer Vertragsfreiheit entscheiden, ob und welche Berechnungsmethode für die Bestimmung der Flächen im Mietvertrag Anwendung finden soll. Es kann in Mietverträgen beispielsweise weiterhin festgelegt werden, eine Flächenberechnung anhand der Vorgänger-Richtlinien der MF-GIF, der DIN 277 oder der Wohnflächenverordnung vorzunehmen. Die anzuwendende Berechnungsmethode sollte zwingend im Mietvertrag vereinbart werden, um Unklarheiten zu vermeiden. Bei Wohnraummietverträgen werden Mietflächen bei einer fehlenden mietvertraglichen Vereinbarung im Zweifel nach der Wohnflächenverordnung berechnet. Ein entsprechendes gesetzliches Pendant bei Gewerberaummietverträgen existiert nicht, so dass im Zweifel unklar bleibt, welche Berechnungsmethode die Vertragsparteien bei Mietvertragsabschluss zugrunde legen wollten.

    b) Widersprüche vermeiden
    Bei der Vereinbarung einer Berechnungsmethode im Mietvertrag sind Widersprüche zu vermeiden. Die MF-GIF muss zwar nicht zwingend als Anlage zum Mietvertrag genommen werden, jedoch sollte auf die betreffende Richtlinie im Vertragstext zumindest zweifelsfrei verwiesen werden. Ferner sollte bei Vereinbarung der MF-GIF im Rahmen der Miete und der Nebenkosten, aber auch der Instandhaltungs- und Instandsetzungsregelungen stringent unterschieden werden zwischen der exklusiv genutzten Mietfläche (MF-GIF-1) und den Gemeinschaftsflächen (MF-GIF-2). Ebenfalls sollten alle Mietflächen über entsprechende Plananlagen klar ausgewiesen werden, da bei Zweifeln über die Größe und Lage des Mietgegenstandes unter Umständen ein Verstoß gegen das gesetzliche Schriftformgebot bei langfristigen Mietverträgen drohen kann.

    Bei einer Vermietung vom Reißbrett ist es zudem empfehlenswert, die tatsächliche Größe der Mietflächen nach Errichtung mittels eines planimetrischen oder örtlichen Aufmaßes nach der MF-GIF bestimmen zu lassen und das Ergebnis in einem schriftformkonformen Nachtrag zum Mietvertag zu dokumentieren.

    Die MF-GIF sollte immer als Ganzes vereinbart werden. Eine teilweise Anwendung, beispielsweise für Teilflächen, ist nicht zu empfehlen. Zudem sollten keine unterschiedlichen Flächenmaßstäbe für die Berechnung der Nebenkosten festgelegt werden. Der Umlageschlüssel muss für den Mieter verständlich und bestimmt und für alle Mieter einheitlich gestaltet sein.

    Authors

    Thomas A. Beisken, LL.M.

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    Dr. Johannes Honzen

    Partner

    Frankfurt

    More insights

  • Sanctions Update: OFAC Encourages Voluntary Self-Disclosure for Sanctions Violations

    Sanctions Update: OFAC Encourages Voluntary Self-Disclosure for Sanctions Violations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: OFAC Encourages Voluntary Self-Disclosure for Sanctions Violations

    August 2, 2023

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 26, 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and U.S. Department of Commerce (collectively, the “Agencies”) published a Tri-Seal Compliance Note, in which they encouraged private sector firms to self-disclose potential violations of sanctions, export controls and other national security laws and highlighted certain benefits available to firms that do so.[1] The Compliance Note by the Agencies emphasizes a trend in the federal government of encouraging private sector cooperation and voluntary disclosure of misconduct.[2]

    Below is a brief summary of those aspects of the Compliance Note that focus on OFAC’s voluntary self-disclosure (“VSD”) policy, as well as some key takeaways to consider.

    OFAC’s VSD Policy

    OFAC, which administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions, has long encouraged VSDs for any potential violations of sanctions laws and has implemented a framework that describes the disclosure process and the potential associated penalty reduction for apparent violations brought to the attention of OFAC through VSDs.[3]

    The Compliance Note reminds the private sector of the self-reporting procedures contained in OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines, which allow for offering leniency to firms that engage in a VSD of apparent violations of sanctions laws. Although OFAC actually considers many circumstances when determining whether to offer leniency, in light of OFAC’s emphasis on the role of a VSD in that determination, it is important to consider the potential for mitigation credit when making the decision to self-report.

    OFAC considers VSDs a mitigating factor for determining the level of appropriate enforcement action for any potential violation, which can range from a “no action” determination or issuance of a cautionary letter, to imposition of a civil monetary penalty or referral of the matter for criminal prosecution.[4] If OFAC determines that a civil monetary penalty is warranted, a VSD that qualifies under the program can result in a 50 percent reduction in the base amount of a proposed civil monetary penalty in non-egregious cases.[5]

    To be treated as a mitigating factor, OFAC has certain requirements for VSDs:

    • VSDs must be submitted “prior to, or simultaneous with, the discovery by OFAC or another government agency of the apparent violation”; and
    • VSDs should also contain a report that sufficiently details the circumstances of the potential violation, or one should be provided promptly following the initial disclosure.[6]

    Certain other factors will disqualify a disclosure from being treated as a VSD by OFAC:

    • If a third party was required to and did notify OFAC of the same or a substantially similar apparent violation, such as through a disclosure of a blocked or rejected transaction;
    • The VSD contains false or misleading information;
    • The VSD was prompted by a “suggestion or order of a federal or state agency or official” and was not, therefore, self-initiated, such as a disclosure made in response to a subpoena or through the filing of a license application”;
    • For entities, the disclosure was made on behalf of the entity by an individual acting without authorization of the entity’s senior management; or
    • The VSD is materially incomplete.[7]

    Like with all of its enforcement investigations, OFAC will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the potential violation, including the adequacy of the reporting company’s sanctions compliance program and any corrective actions taken by the reporting company, in determining the proper response.[8] Notably, firms that do not receive VSD credit from OFAC may still be eligible for mitigation based on other factors, such as substantial cooperation with an investigation.[9] Aggravating factors that might weigh against OFAC granting leniency include, among others: whether the violation was willful or deliberate, whether there was an attempt to conceal the violation, whether the firm’s management was involved, the extent of economic benefit conferred on a sanctioned person or country, or if the violation harmed U.S. policy objectives.[10]

    Takeaways

    A decision to self-disclose should not be taken lightly and should involve counsel familiar with the OFAC process and VSD program requirements. Below are some considerations to evaluate when determining whether a firm should self-report:

    • Firms needs to appreciate the difference between civil and criminal sanctions violations. With respect to potential criminal sanctions violations, firms should also assess whether to submit a VSD to the DOJ’s National Security Division, which has its own self-disclosure program and does not give credit for disclosures made to other agencies.[11]
    • Firms should analyze their compliance programs and the work performed by service providers, such as administrators, to ensure that their customers/investors are properly screened. Not only will this prevent and potentially uncover violations of sanctions laws, but OFAC evaluates the effectiveness of an entity’s compliance program when reviewing the conduct disclosed in a VSD.
    • FinCEN, a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, employs a whistleblower program that, similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission, compensates whistleblowers for reporting violations of U.S. trade and economic sanctions, in addition to violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.[12] “Individuals who provide information to FinCEN or the DOJ may be eligible for awards totaling between 10 to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected in an enforcement action, if the information they provide ultimately leads to a successful enforcement action.”[13] Firms should consider the fact that a whistleblower might report potential sanctions violations to the government before a firm has an opportunity to self-report, which may instigate a regulatory or other investigation and also prevent the firm from receiving any benefit associated with a VSD.
    • Firms should consider that counterparties to a transaction might take advantage of OFAC’s VSD program, and file a VSD before the firm has identified and reported apparent violations of sanctions laws, which would limit the firm’s ability to obtain leniency on its own behalf from OFAC based on its own self-reporting.

    Schulte Roth & Zabel’s lawyers are available to assist you or address any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Schulte Roth & Zabel lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following attorneys:

    Betty Santangelo – New York (+1 212.756.2587)

    John P. Nowak  – New York (+1 212.756.2382)

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471)

    Hannah M. Thibideau – New York (+1 212.756.2382)

    Gregoire P. Devaney – New York (+1 212.756.2152)


    [1] U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tri-Seal Compliance Note: Voluntary Self-Disclosure of Potential Violations (Jul. 26, 2023), available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932036/download?inline (“Compliance Note”).

    [2] For example, DOJ’s Criminal Division recently updated its Corporate Enforcement Policy regarding VSDs of corporate criminal matters, including FCPA violations. For more information, see Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, Client Alert: DOJ Highlights Self-Disclosure and Cooperation by Corporate Entities (Jan. 24, 2023), available at /insights/doj-highlights-self-disclosure-and-cooperation-by-corporate/#_ftn3. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has also noted that it considers VSDs a mitigating factor in enforcement actions. FinCEN, Statement on Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act (Aug. 18, 2020), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN%20Enforcement%20Statement_FINAL%20508.pdf.

    [3] OFAC FAQ 13 (Dec. 4, 2020), available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/13.

    [4] Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Part 501 II.

    [5] Compliance Note, at 5.

    [6] Id.

    [7] Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Part 501 I; see also Compliance Note, at 5.

    [8] Compliance Note, at 5.

    [9] Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Part 501 I

    [10] Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Part 501 III.

    [11] Compliance Note, at 2-3.

    [12] Id. at 6.

    [13] Id.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2023 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    John P. Nowak

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Gregoire P. Devaney

    Associate

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q2 2023

    Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q2 2023

    ARTICLE

    Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q2 2023

    July 31, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    McDermott Will & Emery’s global competition practice can assist clients with antitrust M&A issues in various jurisdictions around the world. Feel free to contact one or more of our partners in our various offices. The individuals below can assist or can refer you to one of our many other lawyers in our competition team who can help with a specific question.

    United States: Jon Dubrow, Joel Grosberg, Ray Jacobsen and Stephen Wu

    Europe: Jacques Buhart, Christian Krohs, Hendrik Viaene, Frédéric Pradelles and Stéphane Dionnet

    In depth
    Authors

    Graham J. Hyman

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Jon B. Dubrow

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Joel R. Grosberg

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Stéphane Dionnet

    Partner

    Brussels

    Max Küttner

    Associate

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • Healthcare Regulatory Check-up Newsletter | June 2023 Recap

    Healthcare Regulatory Check-up Newsletter | June 2023 Recap

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Healthcare Regulatory Check-up Newsletter | June 2023 Recap

    July 31, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    This issue of McDermott’s Healthcare Regulatory Check-Up highlights significant regulatory activity for June 2023. We discuss several civil enforcement actions involving false claims, the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and patient health information allegations. We also discuss notable developments around Transitional Coverage for Emerging Technologies (TCET) and other healthcare regulatory updates.

    In depth
    Tabs

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Steven J. Schnelle

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Monica Wallace

    Partner

    Chicago

    Max Lubin

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: What’s the Impact?

    The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: What’s the Impact?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: What’s the Impact?

    July 31, 2023

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The EU Artificial Intelligence Act (or “AI Act”) is the world’s first legislation to regulate the use of AI. It leaves room for “technical soft law”; but, inevitably (being the first and being broad in scope), it will set principles and standards for AI development and governance. The UK is concentrating more on soft law, working towards a decentralized principle-based approach. The US and China are working on their own AI regulations, with the US focusing more on soft law, privacy, and ethics and China on explainable AI algorithms, aiming for companies to be transparent about their purpose. The AI Act marks a crucial step in regulating AI in Europe, and a global code of conduct on AI could harmonize practices worldwide, ensuring safe and ethical AI use. This article gives an overview of the EU Act, its main aspects as well as an overview of other AI legislative initiatives in the European Union and how these are influencing other jurisdictions, such us the UK, the US and China.

    In depth

    The AI Act: The First AI Legislation. Other Jurisdictions Are Catching Up.

    On June 14, 2023, the European Parliament achieved a significant milestone by approving the Artificial Intelligence Act (or “AI Act”), making it the world’s first piece of legislation to regulate the use of artificial intelligence. This approval has initiated negotiations with the Council of the European Union which will determine the final wording of the Act. The final version of the AI Act is expected to be published by the end of 2023. Following this, the Regulation is expected to be fully effective in 2026. A two-year grace period similar to the one contemplated by the GDPR is currently being considered. This grace period would enable companies to adapt gradually and prepare for the changes until the rules come into force.

    As the pioneers in regulating AI, the European institutions are actively engaged in discussions that are likely to establish both de facto (essential for the expansion and growth of AI businesses, just like any other industries) and de jure (creating healthy competition among jurisdictions) standards worldwide. These discussions aim to shape the development and governance of artificial intelligence, setting an influential precedent for the global AI community.

    Both the United States and China are making efforts to catch up. In October 2022, the US government unveiled its “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights,” centered around privacy standards and rigorous testing before AI systems become publicly available. In April 2022, China followed a similar path by presenting a draft of rules mandating chatbot-makers to comply with state censorship laws.

    The UK government, has unveiled an AI white paper to provide guidance on utilizing artificial intelligence in the UK. The objective is to encourage responsible innovation while upholding public confidence in this transformative technology.

    While the passage of the Artificial Intelligence Act by the European Parliament represents an important step forward in regulating AI in Europe (and indirectly beyond, given the extraterritorial reach), the implementation of a global code of conduct on AI is also under development by the United Nations and is intended to play a crucial role in harmonizing global business practices concerning AI systems, ensuring their safe, ethical, and transparent use.

    A Risk-Based Regulation

    The European regulatory approach is based on assessing the risks associated with each use of artificial intelligence.

    Complete bans are contemplated for intrusive and discriminatory uses that pose unacceptable risk to citizens’ fundamental rights, their health, safety, or other matters of public interest. Examples of artificial intelligence applications considered to carry unacceptable risks include cognitive behavioral manipulation targeting specific categories of vulnerable people or groups, such as talking toys for children, and social scoring, which involves ranking of people based on their behavior or characteristics. The approved draft regulation significantly expands the list of prohibitions on intrusive and discriminatory uses of AI. These prohibitions now include:

    • biometric categorization systems that use sensitive characteristics like gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship status, religion, political orientation, commonly known as social scoring;
    • “real-time” and “a posteriori” remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces, with an exception for law enforcement using ex post biometric identification for the prosecution of serious crimes, subject to judicial authorization. However, a complete ban on biometric identification, might encounter challenges in negotiations with the European Council, as certain Member State police forces advocate for its usage for law enforcement activities, where strictly necessary;
    • predictive policing systems based on profiling, location or past criminal behavior;
    • emotion recognition systems used in the areas of law enforcement, border management, workplaces and educational institutions;
    • untargeted extraction of biometric data from the Internet or CCTV footage to create facial recognition databases.

    In contrast, those uses that need to be “regulated” (as opposed to simply banned) through data governance, risk management assessment, technical documentation, and criteria for transparency, are:

    • high-risk AI systems, such as those used in critical infrastructure (e.g., power grids, hospitals, etc.), those that help make decisions regarding people’s lives (e.g., employment or credit rating), or those that have a significant impact on the environment; and
    • foundation models, under the form of Generative AI systems (such as, for example, the highly celebrated ChatGPT) and Basic AI models.

    High-Risk AI systems are artificial intelligence systems that may adversely affect security or fundamental rights. They are divided into two categories:

    • Artificial intelligence systems used in products subject to the EU General Product Safety Directive. These include toys, automobiles, medical devices and elevators.
    • Artificial intelligence systems that fall into eight specific areas, which will have to be registered in an EU database:

      (i) biometric identification and categorization of natural persons;
      (ii) management and operation of critical infrastructure;
      (iii) education and vocational training;
      (iv) employment, worker management and access to self-employment;
      (v) access to and use of essential private and public services and benefits;
      (vi) law enforcement;
      (vii) migration management, asylum, and border control;
      (viii) assistance in legal interpretation and enforcement of the law.

    All high-risk artificial intelligence systems will be evaluated before being put on the market and throughout their life cycle.

    The Generative and Basic AI systems/models can both be considered general-purpose AI because they are capable of performing different tasks and are not limited to a single task. The distinction between the two lies in the final output.

    Generative AI, like the now-popular ChatGPT, uses neural networks to generate new text, images, videos or sounds that have never been seen or heard before, much as a human can. For this reason, the European Parliament has introduced higher transparency requirements:

    • companies developing generative AI will have to make sure that it is made explicit in the end result that the content was generated by the AI. This will, for example, make it possible to distinguish deep fakes from real images;
    • companies will have to ensure safeguards against the generation of illegal content; and
    • companies will have to make public detailed summaries of the copyrighted data used to train the algorithm.

    Basic AI models, in contrast, do not ‘create,’ but learn from large amounts of data, use it to perform a wide range of tasks, and have application in a variety of domains. Providers of these models will need to assess and mitigate the possible risks associated with them (to health, safety, fundamental rights, the environment, democracy, and the rule of law) and register their models in the EU database before they are released to the market.

    Next are the minimal or low risk AI applications, such as those used to date for translation, image recognition, or weather forecasting. Limited-risk artificial intelligence systems should meet minimum transparency requirements that enable users to make informed decisions. After interacting with applications, users can decide whether they wish to continue using them. Users should be informed when interacting with AI. This includes artificial intelligence systems that generate or manipulate image, audio, or video content (e.g., deepfakes).

    Finally, exemptions are provided for research activities and AI components provided under open-source licenses.

    The European Union and the United States Aiming to Bridge the AI Legislative Gap

    The United States is expected to closely follow Europe in developing its own legislation. In recent times, there has been a shift in focus from a “light touch” approach to AI regulation, towards emphasizing ethics and accountability in AI systems. This change is accompanied by increased investment in research and development to ensure the safe and ethical usage of AI technology. The Algorithm Accountability Act, which aims to enhance transparency and accountability of providers, is still in the proposal stage.

    During the recent US-EU ministerial meeting of the Trade and Technology Council, the participants expressed a mutual intention to bridge the potential legislative gap on AI between Europe and the United States. These objectives gain significance given the final passage of the European AI Act. To achieve this goal, a voluntary code of conduct on AI is under development, and once completed, it will be presented as a joint transatlantic proposal to G7 leaders, encouraging companies to adopt it.

    The United Kingdom’s ‘Pro-Innovation’ Approach in Regulating AI

    On March 29, 2023, the UK government released a white paper outlining its approach to regulating artificial intelligence. The proposal aims to strike a balance between fostering a “pro-innovation” business environment and ensuring the development of trustworthy AI that addresses risks to individuals and society.

    The regulatory framework is based on five core principles:

    • Safety, security, and robustness: AI systems should function securely and safely throughout their lifecycle, with continuous identification, assessment, and management of risks.
    • Appropriate transparency and explainability: AI systems should be transparent and explainable to enable understanding and interpretation of their outputs.
    • Fairness: AI systems should not undermine legal rights, discriminate, or create unfair market outcomes.
    • Accountability and governance: Effective oversight and clear lines of accountability should be established across the AI lifecycle.
    • Contestability and redress: Users and affected parties should have the ability to contest harmful AI decisions or outcomes.

    These principles are initially intended to be non-statutory, meaning no new legislation will be introduced in the United Kingdom for now. Instead, existing sector-specific regulators like the ICO, FCA, CMA, and MHRA will be required to create their own guidelines for implementing these principles within their domains.

    The principles and sector-specific guidance will be supplemented by voluntary “AI assurance” standards and toolkits to aid in the responsible adoption of AI.

    Contrasting with the EU AI Act, the UK’s approach is more flexible and perhaps ‘more proportionate’, relying on regulators in specific sectors to develop compliance approaches with central high-level objectives that can evolve as technology and risks change.

    The UK government intends to adopt this framework quickly across relevant sectors and domains. UK sector specific regulators have already received feedback on implementing the principles during a public consultation that ran until June 2023, and we anticipate further updates from each of them in the coming months.

    The Difficult Balance between Regulation and Innovation

    The ultimate goal of these legislative efforts is to find a delicate balance between the necessity to regulate the rapid development of technology, particularly regarding its impact on citizens’ lives, and the imperative not to stifle innovation, or burden smaller companies with overly strict laws.

    Anticipating the level of success is challenging, if not impossible. Nevertheless, the scope for “soft law” such as setting up an ad hoc committee at a European level shows promise. “Ultratechnical” matters subject to rapid evolution require clear principles that stem from the value choices made by legislators. Moreover, such matters demand technical competence to understand what is being regulated at any given moment.

    Organizations using AI across multiple jurisdictions will additionally face challenges in developing a consistent and sustainable global approach to AI governance and compliance due to the diverging regulatory standards. For instance, the UK approach may be seen as a baseline level of regulatory obligation with global relevance, while the EU approach may require higher compliance standards.

    As exemplified by the recent Italian shutdown of ChatGPT (see ChatGPT: A GDPR-Ready Path Forward? we have witnessed firsthand the complexities involved. The Italian data protection authority assumed a prominent role and instead of contesting the suspension of the technology in court, the business chose to cooperate. As a result, the site was reopened to Italian users within approximately one month.

    In line with Italy, various other data protection authorities are actively looking into ways to influence the development and design of AI systems. For instance the Spanish AEPD has implemented audit guidance for data processing involving AI systems, more detail here, while or the French CNIL has created a department dedicated to AI with open self-evaluation resources for AI businesses, more detail here. Additionally, the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has developed an AI toolkit (available here) designed to provide practical support to organizations.

    From Safety to Liability: The AI Act is Prodromic to an AI Specific Liability Regime

    The EU AI Act is part of a three-pillar package proposed by the EU Commission to support AI in Europe. The other pillars include an amendment to the EU Product Liability Directive (PLD) and a new AI liability directive (AILD). While the AI Act focuses on safety and ex ante protection/ prevention re fundamental rights, the PLD and AILD address damages caused by AI systems. Non-compliance with the AI Act’s requirements could also trigger, based on the AI Act risk level of the AI system at issue, different forms and degrees of alleviation of the burden of proof under both the amended PLD, for the no-fault based product liability claims, the AILD, for any other (fault based) claim. The amended PLD and the AILD are less imminent than the AI Act: they have not yet been approved by the EU Parliament and, as directives, will require implementation at the national level. Yet the fact that they are coming is of immediate importance and use, as it gives businesses even more reason to follow and possibly cooperate and partake in the standard setting process currently in full swing.

    Conclusion

    Businesses using AI must navigate evolving regulatory frameworks and strike a balance between compliance and innovation. They should assess the potential impact of the regulatory framework on their operations and consider whether existing governance measures address the proposed principles. Prompt action is necessary, as regulators worldwide have already started publishing extensive guidance on AI regulation.

    Monitoring these developments and assessing the use of AI is key for compliance and risk management. This approach is crucial not only for regulatory compliance but also to mitigate litigation risks with contractual parties and complaints from individuals. Collaboration with regulators, transparent communication, and global harmonization are vital for successful AI governance. Proactive adaptation is essential as regulations continue to develop.

    Authors

    Fabio Cozzi

    Partner

    Milan

    Stefano Mechelli

    Senior Counsel

    Milan, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Pilar Arzuaga

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    More insights

  • SEC Imposes New Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements

    SEC Imposes New Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Imposes New Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements

    July 28, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    At an Open Meeting on July 26, 2023, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted final rules and amendments that impose new cybersecurity-related disclosure requirements for public companies subject to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934’s reporting requirements. The new rules require domestic registrants to disclose material cybersecurity incidents within four business days of determining that an incident is material and to periodically disclose information regarding the company’s cybersecurity risk management, strategy and governance. The SEC also adopted rules requiring foreign private issuers to make comparable disclosures.

    The rules reflect the SEC’s growing concern over an increase in cybersecurity threats and existing inconsistent disclosure requirements and are intended to enhance and standardize disclosures regarding cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incidents. In a statement announcing the rules’ adoption, SEC Chair Gary Gensler emphasized the importance of cybersecurity disclosure to investors being “more consistent, comparable, and decision-useful.”

    In depth

    DISCLOSING MATERIAL CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS ON NEW ITEM 1.05 ON FORM 8-K

    The new rules will require registrants to disclose any cybersecurity incident they determine to be material on Form 8-K’s new Item 1.05. They will also need to describe the material aspects of the incident’s nature, scope, and timing and its material impact or reasonably likely material impact on the registrant, including its financial condition and results of operations. Registrants must determine the materiality of an incident without unreasonable delay following discovery and, if the incident is determined material, file an Item 1.05 Form 8-K generally within four business days after such determination. The disclosure may be delayed if the United States Attorney General determines that immediate disclosure would pose a substantial risk to national security or public safety and notifies the SEC of such determination in writing. The rules require comparable disclosures by foreign private issuers on Form 6-K.

    DISCLOSING CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY AND GOVERNANCE IN ANNUAL REPORTS

    The new rules also add Regulation S-K Item 106, which will require registrants to describe:

    • Their processes (if any) for assessing, identifying and managing material risks from cybersecurity threats.
    • The material effects or reasonably likely material effects of risks from cybersecurity threats and previous cybersecurity incidents.
    • The Board of Directors’ oversight of risks from cybersecurity threats and management’s role and expertise in assessing and managing material risks from cybersecurity threats.

    These disclosures will be required in a registrant’s annual report on Form 10-K. The rules require comparable disclosures by foreign private issuers on Form 20-F.

    IMPLEMENTATION 

    The final rules will take effect 30 days following publication of the adopting release in the Federal Register. All registrants must tag the disclosures in Inline Extensible Business Reporting Language (Inline XBRL) beginning one year after initial compliance with the related disclosure requirement. Form 10-K and Form 20-F disclosures will be due beginning with annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2023. Form 8-K and Form 6-K disclosures will be due beginning 90 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register or December 18, 2023, whichever is later. Smaller reporting companies will have an additional 180 days and must begin complying with Form 8-K Item 1.05 on the later of 270 days from the effective date of the rules or by June 15, 2024.

    ***

    Staying on top of the ever-evolving legal landscape can be challenging. Creating an effective, comprehensive program for your organization requires a thorough understanding of relevant legal obligations, especially those subject to new SEC regulations that impact your cybersecurity programs. Our Global Privacy & Cybersecurity and Corporate & Transactional teams can help you navigate the various compliance requirements affecting your business, ensuring you remain secure and compliant.

    If you have questions or need assistance, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Heidi Hutchins and Morgan King, summer associates in the Washington, DC, office, also contributed to this article.

    Authors

    Diana Douglas

    Partner

    Silicon Valley

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Eric Orsic

    Partner

    Chicago

    Elliot R. Golding

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • State Mini-TCPA Laws Create Patchwork Quilt of Regulations for Automated Calls and Texts

    State Mini-TCPA Laws Create Patchwork Quilt of Regulations for Automated Calls and Texts

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    State Mini-TCPA Laws Create Patchwork Quilt of Regulations for Automated Calls and Texts

    July 27, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    State legislators are adopting broad laws requiring consent for sales phone calls, texts and voicemails following the Supreme Court’s 2021 ruling on what dialing technologies are covered by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Learn which states have passed “mini-TCPA” laws and what businesses that send automated calls and texts need to know in this varied regulatory landscape.

    Amrita Krishnan and Alan LeBlang, summer associates in the Chicago office, also contributed to this article.

    In depth
    Tabs

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

    Matthew L. Knowles

    Partner

    Boston

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • If You Can’t Say a Secret under an NDA, Don’t Say It at All

    If You Can’t Say a Secret under an NDA, Don’t Say It at All

    ARTICLE

    If You Can’t Say a Secret under an NDA, Don’t Say It at All

    Jul 27, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Considering a trade secret misappropriation claim involving a business pitch that was not subject to a non-disclosure agreement (NDA), the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment grant for the accused party, finding that it had not acquired the information through a confidential relationship. Novus Grp., LLC v. Prudential Fin., Inc., Case No. 22-3736 (6th Cir. July 17, 2023) (Sutton, Boggs, Readler, JJ.)

    Eric Seyboldt and Mark McCanney founded Novus Group to launch their financial product called the Transitions Beneficiary Income Rider. The pair developed the Rider to address the diminishing availability of retirement income vehicles—such as pension plans or 401k profit-sharing plans—for modern workers. In operation, the Rider guaranteed that, following a policyholder’s death, an insurance company would pay pension-style death-benefit proceeds to non-spouse beneficiaries throughout their lifetimes.

    Novus partnered with financial product developers Genesis and Annexus to ensure that the Rider was feasible and to assist with a pitch to Novus’s target customer, Nationwide. These relationships were governed by two contracts with confidentiality provisions: the Genesis-Novus and Annexus-Novus contracts. Before Novus was formed, Genesis and Annexus had also created a joint organization, AnnGen, which had its own confidentiality agreement with Nationwide concerning AnnGen’s New Heights product (AnnGen-Nationwide contract). Prior to Novus’s pitch, Nationwide refused to sign an NDA and warned that Novus should “not disclose any confidential information.” Despite the lack of an NDA, Novus and Annexus pitched the Rider concept to Nationwide, which elected not to pursue the product.

    After the unsuccessful pitch, two Nationwide employees who allegedly had access to information concerning Novus’s Rider product left Nationwide for Prudential. Shortly thereafter, Prudential launched Legacy Protection Plus, a death-benefit rider that was similar to Novus’s Rider product. Novus believed Prudential stole its Rider concept and sued Prudential for trade secret misappropriation. Prudential moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. Novus appealed.

    On appeal, the Sixth Circuit assumed the existence of a trade secret and its unauthorized use, focusing solely on whether Prudential had acquired Novus’s trade secret as a result of a confidential relationship or through improper means. The Court noted that Novus had not raised a theory of “improper means” in district court and thus had waived that argument.

    The Sixth Circuit also found that the two Nationwide employees did not have a duty to Novus to maintain its information in the utmost secrecy. Novus argued on appeal that such a duty arose from the web of agreements among Annexus, Genesis, Novus, AnnGen and Nationwide. However, Nationwide was not a party to the Annexus-Novus and Genesis-Novus contracts and was not bound by them. Further, Novus was not a signatory to or third-party beneficiary of the AnnGen-Nationwide contract, which narrowly covered the New Heights product developed by AnnGen, rather than Novus’s Rider. Instead of creating a duty of confidentiality, these contracts demonstrated that Novus knew how to create a confidential relationship, yet declined to form one with Nationwide, which had explicitly refused to sign an NDA. The Court thus found that Prudential had not acquired the information through a confidential relationship and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

    Authors
    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Bulletin Concurrence VIII

    Bulletin Concurrence VIII

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Bulletin Concurrence VIII

    July 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    We are delighted to share the eighth Bulletin Concurrence which aims to keep you up to date with the key developments in competition law over the second quarter of 2023.

    Read the full Bulletin (in French) here.

    In depth
    Tabs
    More insights
    Endnotes