Content Type: Article

  • Ninth Circuit Rejects TCPA Plaintiffs’ Argument that Text Messages Count As “Voices”

    Ninth Circuit Rejects TCPA Plaintiffs’ Argument that Text Messages Count As “Voices”

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ninth Circuit Rejects TCPA Plaintiffs’ Argument that Text Messages Count As “Voices”

    August 14, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On August 8, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a published opinion holding that conventional text messages do not amount to “artificial or prerecorded voice” calls under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). In Trim v. Reward Zone USA LLC, the court rejected a plaintiff’s unusual argument that “voice” should be considered as “an instrument or medium of expression,” and that such a definition includes text messages. This distinction is vital, because the use of an artificial or pre-recorded voice triggers consent requirements and potential statutory damages under the TCPA. In other words, if a text message amounts to the use of an artificial or pre-recorded voice, the TCPA’s consent rules would apply to every such message.

    In depth

    Among other things, the TCPA prohibits making calls or sending texts to mobile numbers using either (i) an automatic telephone dialing system, (ii) a pre-recorded voice or (iii) an artificial voice, unless the caller has prior express consent (and prior express written consent for calls and texts that are telemarketing under TCPA). As businesses increase their use of automated text messages to communicate with their customers, employees and patients, aggressive plaintiffs have tried to cash in by pursuing TCPA class actions arising from such uses of text messages.

    Recent case law from the Supreme Court has substantially narrowed the categories of technology that count as an automatic telephone dialing system, making it harder for plaintiffs to win TCPA cases. In response, the class-action plaintiffs in Trim v. Reward Zone argued that because a text message is “an instrument or medium of expression,” it constitutes a “prerecorded voice” under the TCPA—and thus the consent requirement applies even without the use of an automatic telephone dialing system.

    Fortunately for callers, the Ninth Circuit rejected this expansive interpretation. The court held that Congress “clearly intended ‘voice’… to encompass only audible sounds,” based on the ordinary definition of the word at the time of the TCPA’s passage in 1991. The court wrote that it could not “embrace an ‘idiosyncratic definition’” of a statutory term without strong proof of congressional intent. The court further explained that the TCPA elsewhere makes a reference to “a voice service or a text message,” a superfluous sentence if Congress intended the definition of “voice” to include text messages.

    The court also rejected the plaintiff’s theory that Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules required a finding that text messages are “voices.” The FCC has determined that a text message counts as a call under the TCPA, and the plaintiffs argued that the FCC’s interpretation of the definition of “call” must also mean that a text message contains a “voice.” Without reaching the question whether this is a fair description of the FCC’s ruling (and we submit that it is not), the court did not reach the issue, holding that it would not defer to the FCC’s interpretation because the statute is unambiguous.

    The Ninth Circuit’s common-sense decision affirms the logic of recent district-court decisions that have similarly held that the “voice” restriction in the TCPA does not extend to text messages.

    While helpful, this ruling does not eliminate TCPA risk for large-scale text messaging campaigns. McDermott’s TCPA team is available to answer your questions about strategies to manage and mitigate TCPA risk.

    Authors

    Matthew L. Knowles

    Partner

    Boston

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Flames, Not Smoke: LTL Management LLC’s Second Chapter 11 Filing Dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey for Lack of Imminent and Immediate Financial Distress

    Flames, Not Smoke: LTL Management LLC’s Second Chapter 11 Filing Dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey for Lack of Imminent and Immediate Financial Distress

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Flames, Not Smoke: LTL Management LLC’s Second Chapter 11 Filing Dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey for Lack of Imminent and Immediate Financial Distress

    August 14, 2023

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 28, 2023, Judge Michael Kaplan of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey issued an opinion granting motions to dismiss LTL Management LLC’s second chapter 11 case, finding that it was filed in bad faith due to a lack of imminent and immediate financial distress. See In re LTL Mgmt., LLC, No. 23-12825 (MBK), 2023 WL 4851759 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 28, 2023). Judge Kaplan’s decision follows the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s dismissal of LTL’s first chapter 11 bankruptcy case in January 2023. Read our Alert on the Third Circuit’s dismissal of LTL’s first chapter 11 bankruptcy case here. In this latest opinion, Judge Kaplan referenced the fact that, though he had failed to dismiss the original bankruptcy, the facts supporting the Third Circuit’s decision to require dismissal – specifically, the Debtor’s lack of “financial distress” remained largely unchanged and thus mandated dismissal under current Third Circuit law. The Court’s decision to dismiss highlights difficulties that corporations with mounting mass tort liabilities face under the Third Circuit’s precedent.  

    A potential circuit split may emerge. In June, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a 2-1 decision upholding a bankruptcy court-issued preliminary injunction prohibiting asbestos-related actions against Georgia-Pacific, a non-debtor predecessor of Bestwall. In re Bestwall LLC, 71 F.4th 168 (4th Cir. 2023), reh’g en banc denied. The Fourth Circuit in Bestwall noted the Third Circuit’s LTL decision, recognizing that the two circuits adopt different approaches with respect to the requirements that debtors must satisfy to avoid dismissal of their bankruptcy case under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The emerging circuit split presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to decide the issue. A Supreme Court ruling could have significant ramifications for those looking to engage in the controversial Texas two-step maneuver – which both of LTL Management and Bestwall engaged in prior to their bankruptcy filings.

    Background

    In our previous Alert, “Third Circuit Dismisses J&J Bankruptcy Case for Lack of Good Faith,” we analyzed the Third Circuit’s dismissal of LTL’s chapter 11 first bankruptcy case. The Third Circuit dismissed the case as a bad faith filing based on a lack of imminent and apparent financial distress. The decision reversed rulings by Judge Kaplan, created uncertainty around whether strategies like the “Texas two-step” will remain a tool for large corporations to cabin off legacy liabilities, and, as we discuss below, contributes to what appears to be an emerging circuit split between the Third and Fourth circuits.

    LTL’s Second Bankruptcy Filing

    Just hours after the Bankruptcy Court officially dismissed LTL’s first bankruptcy case on April 4, 2023, LTL filed for chapter 11 protection once more. LTL announced in a press release that it “filed [its first chapter 11 case] in good faith, and, heeding the Third Circuit’s guidance, [has] filed this new case to effectuate that intent.” LTL entered its second bankruptcy with a funding backstop from parent Johnson & Johnson worth ~$30 billion, roughly half of the $61.5 billion backstop LTL had from its parent when it filed its previous case.

    Various parties, including the Official Committee of Talc Claimants, the U.S. Trustee, the ad hoc committee of states holding consumer protection claims, New Mexico, Mississippi and other talc claimant representatives, filed motions to dismiss LTL’s second case. In their pleadings, they argued that, much like the first case, LTL’s new case was not filed in good faith. The Bankruptcy Court held a four-day trial on the motions to dismiss in June.

    Judge Kaplan’s Opinion in the Second LTL Management Bankruptcy

    On July 28, 2023, Judge Kaplan issued an opinion granting the motions to dismiss, finding that LTL filed its second chapter 11 case in bad faith due to a lack of imminent and immediate financial distress.

    In the Third Circuit, a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition is subject to dismissal for ‘cause’ under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code unless it is filed in good faith. A debtor files a petition in good faith if the bankruptcy (i) serves a valid bankruptcy purpose and (ii) is not filed merely to obtain a tactical litigation advantage. Judge Kaplan made it clear in his opinion that, under the Third Circuit’s guidance from the first LTL Management bankruptcy, a bankruptcy court must start its analysis of whether a bankruptcy petition is filed in good faith with an assessment of “financial distress.”

    Grappling with precedential constraints, Judge Kaplan noted that the Third Circuit has not “set out a specific test to apply rigidly when evaluating financial distress.” However, the Third Circuit has articulated that “[f]inancial distress must not only be apparent, but it must be immediate enough to justify a filing” and that “an attenuated possibility standing alone” regarding a bankruptcy filing is insufficient for purposes of establishing good faith.

    Although LTL (i) faces a mounting wave of future liabilities stemming from legacy talc-related tort claims and (ii) has already incurred billions of dollars in judgments, settlements and litigation costs, Judge Kaplan acknowledged that LTL has significant assets, including a funding backstop with parent Johnson & Johnson. Pursuant to the funding backstop agreement, LTL “was contractually entitled to . . . access the value of HoldCo’s significant cash holdings, anticipated annual dividends, and equity interests having a value approaching $30 billion.” Based on expert valuations presented by LTL and certain parties seeking dismissal of the case, Judge Kaplan found that LTL was solvent – with the assistance of its parent – because its assets exceed “projected near term and aggregate talc liability.”

    Judge Kaplan recognized that the Bankruptcy Court faced nearly the same record as the Third Circuit faced in dismissing the original LTL Management bankruptcy. Thus, under the approach articulated by the Third Circuit earlier this year, “[g]iven LTL’s assets – including the [funding] backstop – the record demonstrates that LTL can satisfy these costs; accordingly, there is no imminent financial distress.”

    Judge Kaplan also held that LTL failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 1112(b)(2), which states that the court shall not dismiss a case if the court finds the presence of “unusual circumstances establishing that . . . dismissing the case is not in the best interests of creditors . . .” Judge Kaplan explained that this exception arises “where ‘cause’ for dismissal is based on ‘technical mistakes’ or other procedural and ministerial failings.” Similarly, Judge Kaplan declined to appoint an examiner or chapter 11 trustee, finding that it would not be in the best interests of creditors.

    Judge Kaplan wrote that “[o]ne can view the Third Circuit’s ruling as being somewhat at odds with a pro-active approach to trouble. When one smells smoke, the wise course of action is to get out of the house and call for help. However, as it stands now, in gauging financial distress, observing smoke may not be enough – one must see flames.”

    Potential Circuit Split Between the Third and Fourth Circuits

    In June, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision in In re Bestwall LLC upholding a bankruptcy court-issued preliminary injunction prohibiting asbestos-related actions against Georgia-Pacific, a non-debtor predecessor of Bestwall.

    The Fourth Circuit cited to the Third Circuit’s LTL opinion. While the Fourth Circuit recognized that the issues presented in the two cases were different – the Fourth Circuit’s Bestwall opinion dealt with jurisdictional questions rather than the requirements of a good faith filing – it also acknowledged that the overall standard applied by each circuit in determining whether a bankruptcy petition lacks good faith differs markedly. The Fourth Circuit employs a “more stringent standard for dismissal of a case for lacking good faith.” Under Fourth Circuit precedent “the complaining party must show both ‘subjective bad faith’ and the ‘objective futility of any possible reorganization.’”

    Comparatively, pursuant to Third Circuit’s approach, it is the debtor, not the movant, that bears the burden of proving that its filing was in good faith – and of showing “financial distress.” These holdings conflict, and reflect an increasingly pertinent circuit split – which could prompt the Supreme Court to weigh in on the issue. The likelihood of the Supreme Court weighing in is bolstered by the fact that, as the dissent in Bestwall articulates, “in recent years, major and fully solvent business corporations have managed to skirt [the] debtor-centric objective [of the Bankruptcy Code] and obtain shelter from sweeping tort litigation without having to file for bankruptcy themselves.” This type of “manipulation of the Bankruptcy Code” is seemingly antithetical to the Supreme Court’s long standing recognition “that Congress’s central purpose in enacting the Bankruptcy Code was to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort.”

    Takeaways

    This ruling could impact bankruptcies in the Third Circuit (and beyond) significantly.

    • Judge Kaplan wrote that the “chief difference” between the Bankruptcy Court’s decision not to dismiss LTL’s first case and the Third Circuit’s subsequent logic in reversing that decision was the perceived lack of “immediacy” of financial stress. Judge Kaplan’s decision to dismiss the second LTL case follows directly from the Third Circuit’s guidance. The requirement of imminent and immediate financial distress poses a challenge for companies who, keenly aware of sure-to-come mass tort liability, seek a proactive approach to the issue.
    • Judge Kaplan expressed doubt that the “procedural mechanisms and notice programs offered in the tort system can protect future claimants’ rights in the same manner as the available tools in the bankruptcy system.” However, he conceded that the “Court’s beliefs as to the benefits and advantages of bankruptcy, or the appropriateness of employing a chapter 11 filing to resolve mass tort liability are of no moment” because, under the Third Circuit’s guidance, the analysis must “‘start, and stay, with good faith’ and the requirement of financial distress.” The focus on financial distress under Third Circuit jurisprudence over the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers to facilitate orderly resolution of mass tort litigation through bankruptcy systems may lead corporations dealing with mounting mass tort liability to reconsider the merits of filing for chapter 11 in the Third Circuit (which includes Delaware). Notably, LTL Management originally filed the first case in the Fourth Circuit (in North Carolina). The judge there transferred venue to New Jersey.
    • Lastly, two-stepping companies must contend with a new dilemma – (1) severely curtail backstop funding arrangements with parent or holdco entities, which could expose the company to fraudulent transfer claims or (2) limit fraudulent transfer exposure through adequate funding, but risk wholesale dismissal of its bankruptcy case.

    Authored by Douglas S. Mintz, Kelly (Bucky) Knight and Robert D. Brown.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2023 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors
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  • No Surprises Act Update: Litigation Developments, Enforcement Trends, Agency Guidelines and Future Rulemakings

    No Surprises Act Update: Litigation Developments, Enforcement Trends, Agency Guidelines and Future Rulemakings

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    No Surprises Act Update: Litigation Developments, Enforcement Trends, Agency Guidelines and Future Rulemakings

    August 11, 2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    The No Surprises Act (NSA) has been in effect since January 2022, and has faced litigation ever since from healthcare providers. States and federal agencies are also examining surprise billing and consumer protection laws related to some provisions of the NSA. Here we review the state of NSA litigation, oversight activities, and rulemaking and guidance as we approach Q4 2023, and share our views on what lies ahead for healthcare providers.

    For more from McDermott on the NSA, visit our Resource Center.

    In depth
    Tabs

    Emily R. Curran

    Associate

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes

  • Five Key Considerations for Study Pre-Screening and Recruitment Initiatives in the Digital Age

    Five Key Considerations for Study Pre-Screening and Recruitment Initiatives in the Digital Age

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Five Key Considerations for Study Pre-Screening and Recruitment Initiatives in the Digital Age

    August 9, 2023

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Key players across the healthcare industry—including sponsors, contract research organizations (CROs), research sites, regulators and patient advocates—are well aware of the challenges associated with the prompt and effective identification and enrollment of study subjects. In this context, stakeholders should consider several important factors when developing and implementing study pre-screening and recruitment activities.

    In depth

    Delays or failures in launching clinical trials can lead to millions of dollars in costs for sponsors and impede access to new or improved therapies and diagnostics for patients. As services and initiatives designed to address these challenges proliferate, it is important to consider key factors that can trigger legal, operational and business risks.

    1. Data Use and Sharing. It is important to consider what data will be collected, used and shared for purposes of identifying potentially eligible study subjects. For example, does the service or initiative involve collecting electronic medical records, genetic testing results or other protected health information (PHI) from HIPAA-regulated covered entities or business associates? Will individually identifiable health information be collected from non-HIPAA-regulated entities, such as providers of direct-to-consumer mobile medical apps or genetic testing services? Will the service or initiative involve disseminating study recruitment materials through digital and other channels, as well as collecting pre-screening information from individuals through a web form?Confirming the data sources is critical for purposes of identifying applicable privacy, human subject protection and other laws and implementing appropriate pathways to collect, use and share data for the pre-screening platform in accordance with such laws. In the event the service or initiative involves collecting PHI subject to HIPAA, note that various pathways may be available under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. However, these pathways may involve regulatory ambiguities and operational complexities. There has been a growing recognition of the need for updated privacy paradigms under HIPAA to support scalable, standing pre-screening and recruitment initiatives, including by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections (SACHRP). Alternatively, if the service or initiative includes collecting non-HIPAA-regulated health and other personal information, it is important to consider what, if any, consents or notices are required under applicable law.Additionally, note that consent or authorization for purposes of complying with privacy laws is distinct from informed consent that may be required under human subject protection laws. Whether informed consent is required for pre-screening activities that are limited to administering surveys or questionnaires should be evaluated based on the specific facts and circumstances and applicable human subject protection laws.
    2. IRB Review. Requirements for institutional review board (IRB) review and approval may stem from applicable laws and regulations, contracts, industry practices or risk mitigation objectives. For example, pre-screening and recruitment platforms for U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-regulated clinical investigations may be subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and FDA human subject protection regulations, which include certain requirements for IRB review. Insofar as the platform supports pre-screening and recruitment for federally funded human subjects research, IRB review requirements under the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (also known as the Common Rule) may apply. Stakeholders should also consider applicable state human subject protection laws or contracts, which may require compliance with standards such as the good clinical practice guidelines laid out by the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use. Under these myriad requirements, any collection, use or disclosure of PHI or personal information and any proposed scripts, questionnaires or recruitment materials may need to undergo IRB review and approval.
    3. Future Use. Consider whether the service or initiative will collect information to pre-screen and recruit individuals for specific studies only or whether there is also a desire to store and use information to pre-screen and recruit individuals for future studies. These considerations will inform the nature of any privacy or ethical consents and IRB review that may be required, as well as the contractual rights that the operator of the service or initiative, data source, sponsor or other stakeholders will need to negotiate. Note that commercial IRBs may have varying policies regarding requests for standing approvals or other determinations that are requested in the context of scalable pre-screening and recruitment initiatives.
    4. Basis for Payment. It is critical to analyze the basis for any payment that may be provided to participating data sources (such as healthcare providers) or to the operator of the service or initiative. For example, compensation arrangements that are based on the number of individuals who are referred to a study site or who are randomized or enrolled into a study should be assessed under applicable human subject protection laws, IRB requirements and potentially relevant federal and state anti-kickback and similar healthcare fraud and abuse laws. Analysis under such fraud and abuse laws, in particular, depends heavily on the facts and circumstances of each financial arrangement, and the manner in which they might apply to any given arrangement can be less obvious than in other settings in the healthcare industry.
    5. Looking Past Eligibility Determinations. Identifying a potentially eligible study subject is only part of the picture. Consider how and where the individual would participate in the study once enrolled. Does the pre-screening and recruitment service or initiative identify only eligible study subjects who are in close proximity to an existing study site, or would they participate through the healthcare provider that disclosed their medical records to the operator of the pre-screening service or initiative? If the latter, does the healthcare provider have the expertise and compliance infrastructure necessary to conduct the research study, and will it contract directly with the applicable sponsor or CRO? What, if any, role will the operator of the pre-screening and recruitment service or initiative play in this phase? These considerations may also inform the kinds of research that the service or initiative will support (e.g., decentralized clinical trials, low-interventional studies or biobanking studies). See also our On The Subject titled, FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Decentralized Clinical Trials for Drugs, Biological Products and Devices.

    With FDA taking additional steps to increase diversity among clinical trial participants and as technology makes it easier to extract insights from data sets and engage with individuals, opportunities are plentiful for pre-screening and recruitment initiatives. In this evolving context, it is critical for stakeholders to anticipate and address the myriad legal requirements and practical challenges associated with finding and enrolling eligible study subjects.

    Authors

    Jiayan Chen

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    James A. Cannatti III

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Hospitals: Check Your Addresses or Face Medicare Claims Returns!

    Hospitals: Check Your Addresses or Face Medicare Claims Returns!

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Hospitals: Check Your Addresses or Face Medicare Claims Returns!

    August 9, 2023

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Following an implementation delay during the COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE), on August 1, 2023, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) initiated Medicare hospital claims edits that will return certain claims when the address where a service was provided does not exactly match an address in the hospital’s Medicare Provider Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System (PECOS) enrollment file or where the reported address requires a “PO” or “PN” modifier and neither modifier is present. Additional details are provided in a CMS Medicare Learning Network (MLN) article. Hospitals that bill Medicare for outpatient services should ensure that their billing systems are reporting the actual address where services were rendered on claims to Medicare. They also should ensure that all addresses where services are rendered are listed in the hospital’s Medicare PECOS enrollment file and that all claims for services at off-campus outpatient locations contain the “PO” or “PN” modifier. Our prior coverage of this claim edit is available here.

    In depth

    Background

    Hospitals commonly furnish services in more than one location. For example, a hospital may have multiple campuses where inpatient services are furnished, and it is very common for a hospital to have off-campus outpatient facilities where hospital services are also furnished. Hospitals have long been required to enroll each provider-based location where hospital services are furnished on the hospital’s Medicare enrollment form (the Form CMS-855A), which is maintained in the hospital’s provider file through PECOS. Medicare outpatient service providers, including hospitals, are also required to report the nine-digit ZIP code of the service facility on the facility claim submitted for payment.

    In recent years, legislative changes have mandated payment changes intended to address a payment difference between off-campus provider-based departments (which are hospital service locations) and physician offices paid exclusively under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS). To implement these payment methodology changes, CMS requires hospital items and services furnished at off-campus outpatient provider-based departments to be reported with the appropriate modifier. Payment for items and services furnished at off-campus provider-based departments established after November 2, 2015, are generally reported with modifier PN, which results in a lower payment rate than the rates applicable to on-campus provider-based locations and certain “excepted off-campus provider-based departments.” In contrast, modifier PO is used for services furnished at “excepted off-campus provider-based departments.” The appropriate modifier is required to be reported with every HCPCS code for all outpatient hospital items and services furnished in all off-campus provider-based department of a hospital. Reporting the appropriate service location on claims for services also permits CMS to utilize the ZIP code included in the service facility information field of submitted claims to determine the appropriate payment methodology or locality.

    As part of ongoing efforts to apply “site neutral” payment policies between hospitals and other locations where similar healthcare services are provided, CMS announced in 2017 that it would be implementing claims edits to reject claims for hospital outpatient services when the location of the service reported on the claim for payment does not precisely match a practice location address listed in the hospital’s Medicare enrollment file in PECOS. In mid-2019, CMS announced that implementation of the edits was imminent, but ultimately did not activate the edits prior to the COVID-19 PHE. CMS then suspended the implementation of the edits during the PHE, which ended May 11, 2023.

    Implementation of Claims Edits for Hospitals

    After a more than three-year delay due to the PHE and after conducting additional claims testing, CMS believes that the claim edits are now functioning correctly. Accordingly, as of August 1, 2023, CMS has instructed the Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) to prepare for permanent implementation of the claims edits.
    Specifically, the “billing provider address” and “service facility address,” if applicable, that are reported by a hospital on a claim for services must appropriately reflect the location where the services are furnished. The “billing provider address” for services furnished on the main campus of the hospital or the “service facility address” for services furnished at a remote campus or off-campus outpatient location, must match a practice location address listed in the hospital’s Medicare enrollment file in PECOS. CMS established a separate claims edit to identify claims for services at off-campus outpatient locations that did not include either the PO (excepted services, paid at the full Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) rate) or PN (non-excepted services, paid at the lower fee schedule rate) modifiers. Implementation of these edits was delayed through several rounds of testing, while CMS worked to ensure that the claims edits functioned correctly. Meanwhile, throughout the testing process, CMS continued to notify hospitals of the forthcoming edit and need for each hospital to ensure that it had systems to properly identify the location of services on claims and that all such locations were included in the hospital’s PECOS record.

    Key Takeaways

    Hospitals should immediately evaluate their current billing systems to ensure that they are reporting, on claims to Medicare, the actual location where hospitals services were rendered. If the actual location address is not being reported—for example, the main hospital address is reported as the service location on all claims—steps should be taken as soon as possible to ensure that the correct location is reported. In addition, hospitals should identify all locations where hospital services are provided and compare them to the list of practice locations on the hospital’s Medicare enrollment record in PECOS. If any locations are missing (or no longer operational) the hospital should immediately submit an update via PECOS to revise the hospital’s Form CMS-855A to correct the practice location information. In addition, hospitals that provide services at off-campus outpatient locations should ensure that the PO or PN modifier is being applied correctly to all services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries at off-campus outpatient locations.

    Although the claim edits will return claims that fail the edits to the hospital to allow for correction and reprocessing within the timely filing deadlines, failure to ensure that the correct information is reported on the claim and is reported in PECOS could result in material adverse consequences, including overpayments, false claims liability and revocation of the hospital’s Medicare provider agreement. Therefore, the implementation of these claim edits may provide an opportunity for hospitals to conduct a review of billing practices and Medicare enrollment records to confirm compliance with Medicare rules, identify any gaps, and take timely corrective action.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Monica Wallace

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • State Regulators Step Up Enforcement of New Privacy Laws

    State Regulators Step Up Enforcement of New Privacy Laws

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    State Regulators Step Up Enforcement of New Privacy Laws

    August 8, 2023

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Regulators in California and Colorado recently announced enforcement sweeps under new and newly updated state privacy laws. Companies in Colorado (including nonprofits) and California should double-check their privacy notices, processes and documentation to comply with these laws, particularly the enforcement priorities identified in the notices.

    Colorado: The Colorado Attorney General announced an enforcement sweep just days after the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) took effect on July 1, 2023. The stated priorities include complying with sensitive data processing requirements and targeted advertising and profiling opt-out requests. Although the Attorney General noted that letters mailed to Colorado organizations were intended to be educational warnings, we are aware of more direct enforcement and inquiries as well. The attorney general’s office also launched a designated CPA resource hub with FAQs, guidance and links to the final regulations.

    California: Alongside Colorado, the California Attorney General recently revealed an enforcement sweep targeting large employers’ processing of personnel-related data, which is now subject to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). This latest CCPA sweep follows prior enforcement initiatives targeting mobile apps and “do not sell” requirements in the retail, travel, and food services sectors and financial incentive requirements, as well as numerous published case examples. The California Privacy Protection Agency is also signaling its commitment to enforcement with a review of connected vehicle manufacturers’ data privacy practices.

    If you have questions or need assistance ensuring compliance with these laws and regulator enforcement priorities, please reach out to Elliot Golding or Allison M. Tassel or contact your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Check out our additional coverage on new state consumer privacy laws: 

    Ruling Delays Enforcement of Latest CCPA Regulations

    Oregon Joins the Consumer Privacy Trend

    Texas Consumer Privacy Law Nears Governor’s Signature

    Florida Adds a New Twist to Consumer Privacy Patchwork

    Tennessee Joins the Fray as Legislature Passes Consumer Privacy Law

    Consumer Privacy Law Comes to Big Sky Country as Montana Passes New Law

    Indiana Passes Consumer Privacy Bill

    Iowa’s New Privacy Law: The Basics

    Colorado Finalizes Sweeping New Privacy Rules; Iowa Joins the Fray

    Preparing for New Consumer Privacy laws in Colorado, Connecticut and Utah

    In depth
    Authors

    Elliot R. Golding

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • U.S. Department of Education Opens Inquiry Into Harvard’s Legacy Admissions Policy

    U.S. Department of Education Opens Inquiry Into Harvard’s Legacy Admissions Policy

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    U.S. Department of Education Opens Inquiry Into Harvard’s Legacy Admissions Policy

    August 8, 2023

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Following the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, the Chica Project, the African Community Economic Development of New England and the Greater Boston Latino Network (“Complainants”) filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) against Harvard College (“Harvard”) (“Complaint”). The Complaint alleges that Harvard’s policy of giving preference to the relatives of alumni and donors in its admissions process violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”) because the policy disproportionately advantages white applicants and systematically disadvantages students of color without any justified educational necessity. According to the Complaint, nearly 70 percent of donor-related and legacy applicants are white. The Complaint also alleges that between 2014 and 2019, the acceptance rate for relatives of donors was about seven times higher than the acceptance rate for applicants with no relation to a donor, and the acceptance rate for legacy applicants was almost six times higher than the acceptance rate for non-legacy applicants. The Complainant’s requested relief includes (1) the opening of an investigation into Harvard’s legacy admissions policy; (2) a declaration that the policy is discriminatory and violates Title VI; (3) a declaration that if Harvard wishes to continue to receive federal funds, it must cease considering an applicant’s relationship to Harvard alumni and/or donors as part of the admissions process; (4) ensuring that applicants have no way to identify a familial relationship in the admissions process, including in the application, essays and interviews; and (5) the granting of any other relief deemed appropriate by the DOE. On July 25, 2023, the DOE launched a civil rights investigation into Harvard’s legacy admissions policy.

    In Students for Fair Admissions, Inc, the Plaintiff submitted a statistical analysis to the Court which found that Harvard could come close to reaching its goal of racial diversity if it eliminated its policies giving preference to relatives of alumni, donors and faculty. In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch commented on Harvard’s legacy admissions policy, stating, “[i]ts preferences for the children of donors, alumni, and faculty are no help to applicants who cannot boast of their parents’ good fortune or trips to the alumni tent all their lives . . . While race-neutral on their face, too, these preferences undoubtedly benefit white and wealthy applicants the most.”

    DOE officials declined to comment on potential outcomes of its inquiry. If the investigation by the DOE concludes that Harvard’s legacy admissions policy violates Title VI, the inquiry could be referred to the Justice Department and a lawsuit could follow. The outcome of the DOE investigation, and any subsequent litigation, is likely to have widespread impact on the issue of legacy admissions in schools for years to come. A number of universities and colleges have already eliminated their policies that give preference to relatives of donors and alumni.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Julia L. Gordon and Michelle M. Orge.


    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2023 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Michelle M. Orge

    Associate

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Mobility@McDermott: Gamechanger for the Supply Industry?

    Mobility@McDermott: Gamechanger for the Supply Industry?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Mobility@McDermott: Gamechanger for the Supply Industry?

    August 7, 2023

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Current Climate in the Automotive Industry

    The Russo-Ukrainian conflict, supply chain disruptions and the lasting impact of the pandemic have shaped our world, leaving no industry untouched. The automotive sector, in particular, has experienced palpable effects and tensions in recent years. One recurring issue is the absence of vital provisions in contracts, leading to disputes over price adjustments, volume commitments, and risk distribution. These gaps have caused uncertainty for suppliers when faced with increased demand from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), resulting in order cancellations and reductions.

    For years, OEMs have been notorious for pressuring suppliers to lower prices. Recent studies show that Tier 1 suppliers now demand a four percent discount on average, surpassing most OEMs’ demands. Furthermore, volume manufacturers exhibit greater aggression compared to premium part manufacturers.

    Buyers employ various strategies, such as seeking cheaper alternatives and demanding full cost breakdown calculations (CBD) to exert pressure on suppliers. Unfortunately, the suppliers’ concerns regarding rising personnel, raw material, and energy costs often fall on deaf ears.

    To overcome this perpetual tug-of-war, all supply chain stakeholders and their respective legal counsel must embrace and understand each other’s perspectives.

    A look across the Pond: Supreme Court Showdown

    On 11 July 2023, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an opinion (in the case MSSC, Inc. v. Airboss Flexible Prods. Co.) that gives suppliers a powerful argument against blanket purchase orders and “non-binding volume estimates”.

    The court’s opinion prevents OEMs, in our view, to have it both ways by claiming that all volumes are noncommitted while still expecting suppliers to deliver within estimates and as called for by the OEM in “releases” under blanket purchase orders for the lifespan of a vehicle project.

    If an OEM wants an enforceable contract (in the US a so-called “requirements contract”), the OEM must say so in its contract by specifying at least some amount of product it is obliged to purchase. In the case at hand, the “blanket” purchase order lacked an essential quantity term and did, accordingly, not form a binding contract. The supplier was allowed to simply discontinue its supplies.

    In practice, the decision will heavily benefit suppliers by balancing the scales of the bargaining power. By requiring a binding quantity commitment, the Michigan Supreme Court has eliminated the old argument that the original terms or the supply relationship with a supplier were binding for the life of the program. Suppliers now have more certainty as to anticipated volumes in a “requirements contract”. Any supplier currently supplying under a blanket purchase order that does not include a binding quantity now has further arguments to request price increases.

    It remains to be seen what impact this opinion will have on the German market. However, the negotiating power seems to be shifting once again a bit towards the suppliers.

    Navigating Contractual Challenges: Empowering Suppliers & the Key to Negotiation Success

    Amidst growing discussions on price and volume demands, the legal literature has been exploring suppliers’ rights from all angles. As traditional contractual agreements often favor the OEMs, leading legal experts now seem to emphasize alternative approaches that leverage statutory rights for suppliers in order to break free from unproductive negotiation cycles with the OEMs.

    Apart from that, we think that success in negotiations with OEMs / Tier 1 Suppliers depends in our experience, in particular, on the following:

    1. A deep understanding of its decision-making structures and budget competencies.

    2. Having in-depth knowledge about the various negotiation customs employed by OEMs and comprehensive understanding of the business approach of key decision-makers and their teams.

    3. Appreciating the OEMs’ / Tier 1 Suppliers’ respective internal challenges (e.g. risk management vs. procurement), reporting obligations, preferred channels of communication, tactics to prolong negotiations and last but not least “budget sovereignty”.

    This is a significant advantage for our clients, as our experience allows us to not only anticipate (and thereby dismantling the OEMs / Tier 1 Suppliers’ argumentation), but also effectively involve relevant stakeholders higher up the chain of command at the respective OEM / Tier 1 Supplier, should this be necessary in order to make progress in the negotiations. Our results speak for themselves: Sustainable price adoptions, reduction of negotiation duration, limitation of liability claim risks.

    With our in-depth knowledge of this industry, understanding of the commercial drives for the suppliers and our understanding of the global legal landscape, we are convinced to really add value for our clients. Reach out to us to brainstorm ideas and to identitfy solutions which work from a commercial and legal perspective.

    In depth

    For years, OEMs have been notorious for pressuring suppliers to lower prices. Recent studies show that Tier 1 suppliers now demand a four percent discount on average, surpassing most OEMs’ demands. Furthermore, volume manufacturers exhibit greater aggression compared to premium part manufacturers.

    Buyers employ various strategies, such as seeking cheaper alternatives and demanding full cost breakdown calculations (CBD) to exert pressure on suppliers. Unfortunately, the suppliers’ concerns regarding rising personnel, raw material, and energy costs often fall on deaf ears.

    To overcome this perpetual tug-of-war, all supply chain stakeholders and their respective legal counsel must embrace and understand each other’s perspectives.

    A look across the Pond: Supreme Court Showdown

    On 11 July 2023, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an opinion (in the case MSSC, Inc. v. Airboss Flexible Prods. Co.) that gives suppliers a powerful argument against blanket purchase orders and “non-binding volume estimates”.

    Based on the court’s opinion OEMs can now, in our view, no longer claim that the noncommitted volumes stated in nomination letters etc. can be considered a minimum commitment for the OEM on the one hand, while on the other hand the supplier is obliged to be able to deliver within the estimates and as called for by the OEM in “releases” under blanket purchase orders for the lifespan of a vehicle project. In other words: The OEMs cannot continue to have their cake and eat it too.
    If an OEM wants an enforceable contract (in the US a so-called “requirements contract”), the OEM must say so in its contract by specifying at least some amount of product it is obliged to purchase. In the case at hand, the “blanket” purchase order lacked an essential quantity term and did, accordingly, not form a binding contract. The supplier was allowed to simply discontinue its supplies.

    In practice, the decision will heavily benefit suppliers by balancing the scales of the bargaining power. By requiring a binding quantity commitment, the Michigan Supreme Court has eliminated the old argument that the original terms or the supply relationship with a supplier were binding for the life of the program. Suppliers now have more certainty as to anticipated volumes in a “requirements contract”. Any supplier currently supplying under a blanket purchase order that does not include a binding quantity now has further arguments to request price increases.
    It remains to be seen what impact this opinion will have on the German market. However, the negotiating power seems to be shifting once again a bit towards the suppliers.

    Navigating Contractual Challenges: Empowering Suppliers & the Key to Negotiation Success

    Amidst growing discussions on price and volume demands, the legal literature has been exploring suppliers’ rights from all angles. As traditional contractual agreements often favor the OEMs, leading legal experts now seem to emphasize alternative approaches that leverage statutory rights for suppliers in order to break free from unproductive negotiation cycles with the OEMs.
    Apart from that, we think that success in negotiations with OEMs / Tier 1 Suppliers depends in our experience, in particular, on the following:

    1. A deep understanding of its decision-making structures and budget competencies.
    2. Having in-depth knowledge about the various negotiation customs employed by OEMs and comprehensive understanding of the business approach of key decision-makers and their teams.
    3. Appreciating the OEMs’ / Tier 1 Suppliers’ respective internal challenges (e.g. risk management vs. procurement), reporting obligations, preferred channels of communication, tactics to prolong negotiations and last but not least “budget sovereignty”.

    This is a significant advantage for our clients, as our experience allows us to not only anticipate (and thereby dismantling the OEMs / Tier 1 Suppliers’ argumentation), but also effectively involve relevant stakeholders higher up the chain of command at the respective OEM / Tier 1 Supplier, should this be necessary in order to make progress in the negotiations. Our results speak for themselves: Sustainable price adoptions, reduction of negotiation duration, limitation of liability claim risks.

    With our in-depth knowledge of this industry, understanding of the commercial drives for the suppliers and our understanding of the global legal landscape, we are convinced to really add value for our clients. Reach out to us to brainstorm ideas and to identitfy solutions which work from a commercial and legal perspective.

    Authors

    Florian Lechner

    Partner

    Frankfurt

    More insights

  • Treasury, DOL and HHS Issue Landmark Mental Health Parity Proposed Rule

    Treasury, DOL and HHS Issue Landmark Mental Health Parity Proposed Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Treasury, DOL and HHS Issue Landmark Mental Health Parity Proposed Rule

    August 3, 2023

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Departments of the Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services (the Departments) recently issued much-anticipated proposed regulations under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) to better ensure that health plans allow access to mental health or substance use disorder (MH/SUD) benefits as easily as medical or surgical (M/S) benefits. The proposed regulations reiterate the Departments’ focus on mental health parity and underscore the importance of compliance for health plan sponsors. They also come after many plans have been subject to audit by the Departments which focused heavily on MHPAEA compliance, leaving plan sponsors frustrated at the lack of guidance and inconsistent application of MHPAEA.

    The proposed regulations:

    • Require health plans to collect and evaluate data to assess the impact of non-quantitative treatment limitations (NQTLs) on access to MH/SUD and M/S benefits, including a special rule regarding network composition;
    • Amend examples and add examples regarding the application of the rules for NQTLs; and
    • Adopt new content requirements for NQTL comparative analyses and specify how plans and issuers must make such a comparative analysis available to the Departments and any applicable state authority, participants and beneficiaries upon request.

     

    In depth

    BACKGROUND

    In 1996, Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, which required parity in aggregate lifetime and annual dollar limits for mental health benefits and medical/surgical benefits. The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) expanded the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 by adding new requirements, including provisions to apply mental health parity to substance use disorder benefits. MHPAEA generally requires that group health plans and group health insurance issuers ensure that the financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to MH/SUD benefits are no more restrictive (e.g., more restrictive lifetime or annual dollar limits, financial requirements or treatment limitations) than those applicable to M/S benefits and that there are no separate financial requirements or treatment limitations applicable only with respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits.

    The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021 expanded MHPAEA by expressly requiring health plans that cover both M/S and MH/SUD benefits and impose NQTLs on MH/SUD benefits to perform and document their comparative analyses of the design and application of NQTLs. While the Departments have issued a steady stream of sub-regulatory guidance on the NQTL comparative analysis requirement, the proposed regulations are the first formal regulatory guidance they have issued since the 2013 final regulations.

    More recently, many Department audits of health plans have focused heavily on MHPAEA compliance. In these audits, the lack of guidance and problems with the application of existing guidance have been apparent, with many plan sponsors complaining of Department requests that are not supported by law, not practical in application and even contradictory. Plan sponsors have also been faced by a dearth of third-party vendors and other qualified experts who are willing and able to assist them in preparing the required comparative analyses, leaving the full burden of compliance on understaffed benefit departments who don’t have access to the analytical tools necessary to meet the Departments’ varied requests.

    NQTL RULES

    The proposed regulations seek to improve access to MH/SUD benefits through the following key provisions:

    • Meaningful Benefits NQTL Standard

    The proposed regulations confirm that the requirement to provide MH/SUD coverage in each classification in which M/S benefits are provided applies on a condition or disorder basis. The proposed regulations provide that if a plan provides any MH/SUD benefits in any classification of benefits, the plan would not be considered to provide benefits for the MH/SUD in every classification in which M/S benefits are provided, unless the plan provides meaningful benefits for treatment for that condition or disorder in each classification, as compared to the M/S benefits. The 2013 final regulations established the following classifications for this purpose: inpatient, in-network, inpatient, out-of-network, outpatient, in-network, outpatient, out-of-network, emergency care and prescription drugs.

    • NQTL Three-Part Test

    The proposed regulations require that health plans meet three requirements to impose NQTLs on MH/SUD services:

    1. The “no more restrictive” requirement: The NQTL is not more restrictive as applied to MH/SUD benefits than to M/S benefits. If adopted, this requirement would greatly increase plans’ MHPAEA-related compliance burdens.
    2. Design and application requirement: A health plan satisfies requirements regarding the design and application of the NQTL.
    3. Relevant data evaluation requirement: The plan collects, evaluates and considers the impact of relevant data on access to MH/SUD benefits relative to M/S benefits. As a result, the plan takes reasonable action to address any significant differences.
    • Other NQTL Updates

    The proposed regulations would also establish a special rule regarding network composition aimed at ensuring that plan networks include an adequate number of each category of provider and facility.

    Finally, the proposed regulations include extensive examples applying NQTL standards to certain NQTLs, including telehealth, prior authorization and concurrent review requirements, peer-to-peer medical necessity reviews and a requirement for primary caregiver participation applied to ABA therapy. These examples explain whether the NQTL and the facts and circumstances of the case comply with any or all of the above-described three-part test.

    NQTL Comparative Analysis

    The proposed regulations elaborate on the content elements that must be included in the NQTL analysis, including:

    • Description of the NQTL;
    • Identification and definition of the factors used to design or apply the NQTL;
    • Description of how factors are used in the design or application of the NQTL;
    • Demonstration of comparability and stringency, as written, and a demonstration of comparability and stringency in operation; and
    • Findings and conclusions that the plan drew from the analysis.

    NEXT STEPS

    The Biden administration will publish the proposed regulations in the Federal Register on August 3, 2023. After publication, the public has 60 days to comment on the proposed regulations before they take effect. It may take some time for publication of the final regulations, depending on the volume of comments that the Departments receive and the extent to which they alter the proposed regulations as a result. If finalized, the proposed regulations would apply on the first day of the first plan year starting on or after January 1, 2025.

    The proposed regulations are part of a larger, coordinated effort by the Biden administration to improve access to mental health care, which includes a Fact Sheet that emphasizes the role and importance of MHPAEA. Concurrent with the proposed regulations, the Departments also issued a Technical Release requesting comments from the public on the type of data and information plans should include in their existing NQTL analysis to the Departments and state regulators to determine whether plan participants have access to an appropriate number of MH/SUD providers in the plans’ or issuers’ network. This guidance sets out principles and seeks public comment. This Technical Release will be the subject of a future On the Subject.

    In the meantime, the proposed regulations highlight that the Departments continue to focus on mental health parity, and employers and plan sponsors must ensure that they are in compliance with these additional NQTL standards. Plan sponsors should continue to take steps to ensure compliance with the MHPAEA requirements as modified by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, including the requirement to prepare a comparative analysis. For most plan sponsors, this will mean finding a suitable third-party vendor and collaborating with their third-party administrator to ensure compliance as soon as possible, including updating any existing analysis.

    For any questions regarding mental health parity or for assistance to submit comments regarding the proposed regulations, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.

    Authors

    Sarah G. Raaii

    Partner

    Chicago

    Jacob M. Mattinson

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • IRS Guidance Declares That Taxpayers Must Include Staking Rewards in Gross Income

    IRS Guidance Declares That Taxpayers Must Include Staking Rewards in Gross Income

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Guidance Declares That Taxpayers Must Include Staking Rewards in Gross Income

    August 3, 2023

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 31, 2023, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released Revenue Ruling 2023-14, which concludes that the fair market value of staking rewards received by a cash-method taxpayer is includible in the taxpayer’s gross income for the tax year in which the taxpayer gains “dominion and control” over the staking rewards.

    In this article, we explore several tax considerations for taxpayers who are engaged in cryptocurrency staking activities.

    In depth

    IRS GUIDANCE ON STAKING REWARDS

    The IRS’s guidance comes on the heels of oral arguments before the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Jarrett v. United States, No. 22-6023 (6th Cir. 2023), a closely followed case where the question before the Court was whether the receipt of staking rewards generates taxable income at the date the rewards are received.

    The Revenue Ruling considered a simple fact pattern in which a specific cryptocurrency (M) is validated by a proof-of-stake consensus mechanism. A cash-method taxpayer (A) owning 300 units of M stakes 200 of the units and validates a new block of transactions on the M blockchain, receiving two units of M as validation rewards. Pursuant to the cryptocurrency protocol, for a brief period, A cannot sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of any interests in the two units of M in any manner until a later date. A did not convert any of its validation rewards into cash or other property. On the basis that the two units of M represent A’s reward for staking units and validating transactions on the M blockchain, the IRS held that because A has accession to wealth as A gains dominion and control through its ability to sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the two units of M, the fair market value of the two units of M is included in A’s gross income for the taxable year that includes when A received dominion and control. The same holding applies if A had staked M through a cryptocurrency exchange and received additional units of M as validation rewards. Such guidance is consistent with Notice 2014-21, where the IRS stated that a taxpayer who “mines” cryptocurrency must include the fair market value of the cryptocurrency received in the taxpayer’s gross income in the tax year the taxpayer obtains dominion and control of the cryptocurrency.

    While the Revenue Ruling seems straightforward in that all staking rewards should be included in gross income when a taxpayer has the ability to either transfer, withdraw or otherwise dispose of such staking rewards, the Revenue Ruling is light on facts that pertain to the specific mechanics of the cryptocurrency and blockchain in question. For example, the Revenue Ruling does not detail whether the staking rewards are newly created tokens or a reallocation of tokens from a preexisting pool of tokens that are transferred to the taxpayer for services performed. Such distinction has been cited as relevant for taxpayers, including Jarrett, who argue staking rewards should not be included in gross income on the basis that the creation of new property is not taxable income. However, for proof-of-stake blockchains that reallocate a preexisting pool of tokens to taxpayers who provide services through validation, recognizing income for services performed has been subject to less scrutiny.

    CHARACTER MISMATCH

    For individual taxpayers who receive tokens as part of staking rewards and include the fair market value of the rewards in gross income (as ordinary income for services performed), there could be a character mismatch to the extent that the taxpayer later disposes of such tokens, resulting in an income tax liability without sufficient cash. For example, if a taxpayer obtained dominion and control over 10 ether tokens (ETH) in May 2021 at a price per token of $3,900 and disposed of all such tokens within that same year for $1,900, the taxpayer will have recognized $39,000 of ordinary income and $20,000 of short-term capital loss in the same year attributable to the same asset. Given that short-term capital loss cannot be used to offset more than $3,000 of ordinary income (or $1,500 in the case of married taxpayers who file separate tax returns), the taxpayer is left with $17,000 of capital losses that cannot be used to offset the ordinary income that resulted from the same property.

    While the same character mismatch exists outside of the world of cryptocurrency, such risk could be more prevalent for taxpayers who are involved in staking activities to the extent the taxpayer loses all of the rewards to “slashing,” a mechanism built into blockchain protocols to discourage validator misbehavior whereby validators can lose or forfeit a predefined percentage of its tokens. Slashing can be triggered by either validator downtime (where the validator is either offline for some time), double signing (the validator is operating on two different servers) or other misbehavior. The Revenue Ruling does not address the tax treatment of slashing. However, depending on what happens to the “slashed” tokens, (i.e., are they redistributed to other validators or are they burned?), there is a chance that the IRS could assert that slashing results in gain or loss treatment to the taxpayer.

    CONCLUSION

    While the Revenue Ruling clarifies how the IRS plans to tax staking rewards, administrative guidance like this is only a display of an official interpretation by the IRS of existing tax law, as applied to a specific set of facts. Such guidance is not binding on the courts and does not have any force of law or the authoritative weight of regulations.

    Since early 2023, the IRS has undertaken several pieces of administrative guidance that each covers a discrete issue in areas in which taxpayers have requested direction. However, given the limited set of facts and analysis with each one, taxpayers are often left with more questions than answers. A comprehensive framework by the legislature is needed to bridge the gap between taxation and digital assets so that taxpayers have guidance they can rely on with certainty.

    If you have questions about the tax implications of staking activities, please do not hesitate to contact the authors of this article or your regular McDermott contact(s).

    Authors

    John T. Lutz

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Andrew M. Granek

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Anthony Teng

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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