Content Type: Article

  • United States v. Eaton: IRS Summons Power Overrides EU Privacy Laws

    United States v. Eaton: IRS Summons Power Overrides EU Privacy Laws

    ARTICLE

    United States v. Eaton: IRS Summons Power Overrides EU Privacy Laws

    May 31, 2024

    Read time: 3 min

    A US federal district court judge recently endorsed the broad investigative powers of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in United States v. Eaton Corp., No. 1:23-mc-00037, May 16, 2024 (N.D. Ohio). During its audit of Eaton’s transfer pricing of a royalty arrangement with Eaton’s Irish affiliate, the IRS sought performance evaluations of certain employees of the affiliate. Eaton declined to provide the evaluations citing relevancy and legal objections based on EU privacy laws. The IRS subsequently served Eaton with an administrative summons seeking the evaluations.

    In the ensuing summons enforcement action, Eaton initially prevailed before a magistrate judge on both grounds. However, the IRS persuaded the district court judge to reject the magistrate’s recommendation and enforce the summons.

    The district court judge rejected Eaton’s position that a heightened relevancy standard applies when the IRS seeks personal information, such as employee valuations. The judge distinguished between civil discovery disputes where such a standard might apply and summons enforcement disputes, which engage the broad authority of the IRS to seek information that may be relevant to its audit. While the IRS’s case for relevancy could have been stronger, the judge nonetheless found that the IRS had sufficiently supported the connection between potential information in the evaluations and its audit of the royalty arrangement.

    The district court judge also ruled that the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) did not bar the IRS’s legitimate exercise of its audit powers. The judge acknowledged that the GDPR generally prohibits the transfer of personal information, such as employee valuations, outside of the EU. However, the judge also found that exceptions to that prohibition applied where the IRS properly requested the information as part of its audit function and the EU Member State (in this case Ireland) had entered into a treaty with the United States that addressed corporate cross-border relationships and sought generally to combat tax evasion by resident entities. Comity concerns did not prevent enforcement of the summons according to the judge.

    Practice Point:

    Given the effort the IRS expended in this case to obtain marginally relevant information, we clearly see the effects of increased audit resources at work and of the IRS’s mandate to target large corporate taxpayers. While there are certainly instances in every audit where a taxpayer should not expend resources just to fight a battle, the difficulty in cases like this is that absent this decision, Eaton likely felt bound to adhere to the GDPR for the sake of the employees working for its Irish affiliate.

    In depth
    Authors

    Edward L. Froelich

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Susan E. Ryba

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Washington State Further Restricts Noncompetition Agreements

    Washington State Further Restricts Noncompetition Agreements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Washington State Further Restricts Noncompetition Agreements

    May 31, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Effective June 6, 2024, the state of Washington will further restrict the use of noncompetition agreements. This article provides background on the current law governing noncompetition agreements in Washington and walks through the new law’s changes.

    Readers may also be familiar with the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) latest noncompete rule, which goes into effect on September 4, 2024. While that federal regulation is currently being challenged in court, Washington employers should be mindful that the state rule explained here will go into effect in June regardless of the FTC rule’s status.

    In depth

    Background on the Current Law

    In general, Washington’s state code sets out three main rules regarding noncompetition covenants:

    • Under the “layoff rule,” “noncompetition covenant[s]” are void and unenforceable if the employee who signed them is terminated as a result of a layoff.
    • Under the “18-month rule,” noncompetition covenants are presumed unreasonable if they have a duration exceeding 18 months after termination of employment, unless the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the duration is necessary to protect the party’s business or goodwill.
    • Under the “provisions rule,” if a noncompetition covenant requires a Washington-based employee or independent contractor to adjudicate the covenant outside the state of Washington, then the provisions in the covenant are void and unenforceable to the extent they deprive the worker of Washington Revised Code Chapter 49.62’s benefits.

    The new law, outlined in Substitute Senate Bill 5935, affects both the substance of these rules and the procedures for enforcing them. Below, we walk through the three key changes: the substantial revision of the provisions rule, the general expansion of the statute’s prohibitions and the narrowing of the statute’s exceptions.

    The Provisions Rule

    As outlined above, the provisions rule originally only targeted provisions in certain covenants – i.e., covenants with a mandatory non-Washington forum selection clause.

    Under the new rule, a provision in a noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable:

    1. If the covenant requires the employee or independent contractor to adjudicate a noncompetition covenant outside of Washington;
    2. To the extent it deprives the employee or independent contractor of the protections or benefits of Chapter 49.62; or
    3. If it allows or requires the application of choice of law principles or the substantive law of any jurisdiction other than Washington state.

    The two key changes here are the insertion of the word “or” and the new third subsection. Both of these revisions expand the reach of the provisions rule.

    The Expansion of the Statute

    The new law also expands Washington’s rules on noncompetition covenants in several other ways:

    • Previously, one could only bring a cause of action on pre-2020 covenants if the covenant was being enforced. Under the new rules, one can support a cause of action for a pre-2020 covenant if it is being enforced or if it is being “explicitly leveraged.”
    • Previously, the statute did not dictate how courts should interpret it. The new rules, however, instruct courts to apply a “liberal construction.”
    • Previously, the statue did not contain examples of “noncompetition covenants.” Under the new rules, the statute offers one example of a noncompetition covenant: “an agreement that directly or indirectly prohibits the acceptance or transaction of business with a customer.” Thus, a customer nonsolicit clause that prohibits the acceptance or transaction of business with a customer would qualify as a noncompetition covenant under the new rules.

    The new rules also expand the procedural reach of the statute. The statute now clarifies that it preempts not only conflicting tort, restitution and contract laws but also “contract principles relating to discharge by assent or alteration.” And while the statute previously limited its enforcement to just the covenant’s parties, that language has now been removed. Similarly, even though the statute previously only made covenants void “against the employee,” that language has also been removed. This suggests that employers can now file lawsuits under the statute.

    The Narrowing of the Exceptions

    The new law narrows several exemptions and exceptions to the statute.

    As written, the current statute exempts the following from the definition of “noncompetition covenant”:

    • Nonsolicitation agreements;
    • Confidentiality agreements;
    • Covenants prohibiting the use or disclosure of trade secrets or inventions;
    • Covenants entered into by a person purchasing or selling the goodwill of a business or otherwise acquiring or disposing of an ownership interest; and
    • Covenants entered into by a franchisee when the franchise sale complies with Washington Revised Code § 19.100.020(1).

    The new rules narrow two of these exemptions. First, the “goodwill or ownership” exemption is now limited only to where “the person signing the covenant purchases, sells, acquires, or disposes of an interest representing one percent or more of the business.”

    Second, the “nonsolicitation agreement” exemption has been significantly narrowed. Previously, the phrase “nonsolicitation agreement” only applied to agreements that prohibited post-termination solicitations by an employee (A) of any employee   of the employer to leave the employer or (B) of any customer of the employer to cease or reduce the extent to which it is doing business with the employer. The new rules swap the word “customer” with the phrase “current customer” in subsection (B). The import is this: An agreement that prohibits the solicitation of an employer’s former customers is not a nonsolicitation agreement and therefore could potentially qualify as a prohibited noncompetition agreement.

    There is one last change to note. Previously, the statute made noncompetition covenants void and unenforceable unless the employer disclosed the terms of the covenant in writing to the prospective employee no later than the time of acceptance of the offer. The new statute tightens the timeframe: The employer must disclose the terms of the covenant in writing no later than the time of “the initial oral or written acceptance of the offer.”

    The McDermott Difference


    For assistance in drafting and enforcing restrictive covenant agreements – in Washington or elsewhere – please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.

    Authors

    Brian Mead

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • The impact of the ACA 1557 final regulations on gender-affirming care

    The impact of the ACA 1557 final regulations on gender-affirming care

    ARTICLE

    The impact of the ACA 1557 final regulations on gender-affirming care

    May 30, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, or any combination thereof, in a health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance.

    On May 6, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services published final regulations (final regulations) implementing Section 1557 (read our summary and overview of the final regulations). Entities that are subject to Section 1557 (covered entities) include hospitals, health clinics, health insurance issuers, state Medicaid agencies and community health centers. While group health plans are not themselves covered entities unless they receive federal financial assistance (e.g., certain Medicare Part D programs and Employer Group Waiver Plans), carriers that provide administrative services to group health plans may themselves be covered entities if they receive federal financial assistance (e.g., by selling Medicare Advantage products).

    Reversing prior law, the final regulations unambiguously prohibit categorical coverage exclusions or limitations for health services related to gender transition or other gender-affirming care. OCR finds support for this change in the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, which held that Title VII of the Equal Employment Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on the basis of sexual orientation. But prohibiting categorical coverage exclusions is not the same thing as requiring covered entities to provide access to gender-affirming care under all circumstances. There are limits; covered entities must not:

    [D]eny or limit services based on gender identity or sex assigned at birth, adopt any policy of treating individuals differently on the basis of sex, including to the extent it prevents an individual from engaging in a health program or activity consistent with the individual’s gender identity, or deny or limit services sought for gender transition or other gender-affirming care based on sex assigned at birth or gender identity.

    The provision would outlaw blanket bans on both gender-affirming care itself and on specific gender-affirming procedures (like facial feminization surgery). But it would also prohibit plans or carriers that qualify as covered entities from covering breast reconstruction for cancer treatment, or hormones to treat post-menopause symptoms, without also covering these procedures to treat gender dysphoria.

    The final regulations do not interfere with individualized clinical judgment about the appropriate course of care for a patient. (The preamble makes further claims that OCR has a general practice of deferring to a clinician’s judgment about whether a particular service is medically appropriate for an individual, or whether the clinician has the appropriate expertise to provide care.) A provider’s belief that gender transition or other gender-affirming care can never be beneficial, or its compliance with a state or local law that reflects a similar judgment, is not a sufficient basis for a judgment that a health service is never clinically appropriate, however.

    The 2016 final Section 1557 regulations were successfully challenged in Franciscan Alliance v. Burwell (N.D. Tex. 2016), which held that Section 1557’s cross-reference to Title IX incorporates that statute’s religious exemption. While OCR disagrees with the holding, the final regulations provide an exemption for any portion of the rule that “would violate applicable Federal protections for religious freedom and conscience.” There is also an administrative process for recipients to seek an assurance of exemption in writing from the application of a provision of Section 1557 under this exception.

    Less clear is how the final regulation will interact with the two dozen or so state laws that, among other things, limit access to gender-affirming care for children and adolescents. The preamble to the final rule recognizes that “some States may have laws [ ] that are contrary to the final rule’s nondiscrimination protections.” OCR is of the view that these laws are preempted by the ACA. (The ACA states that “nothing in this title shall be construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the application of the provisions of this title,” which means that states can adopt protections that go beyond what the ACA requires but may not prevent a federal law from being implemented.) One or more challenges to the final regulations’ rules governing gender-affirming care are all but certain.

    More insights

  • Mixing Things Up Like a Certain Ice Cream Maker: Vermont Passes Consumer Data Privacy Law

    Mixing Things Up Like a Certain Ice Cream Maker: Vermont Passes Consumer Data Privacy Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Mixing Things Up Like a Certain Ice Cream Maker: Vermont Passes Consumer Data Privacy Law

    May 29, 2024

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Consult our interactive state privacy law map to learn more about all of the enacted state consumer privacy laws.


    Just past midnight on May 11, 2024, the Vermont Legislature passed H.121, the Vermont Data Privacy Act (VDPA). If signed into law, the VDPA would become the most onerous state comprehensive privacy law in the country. Among other things, the bill contains a private right of action (that will only last from 2027 through 2029), which is leading to some suspense as to whether it will become law. The bill awaits the signature of Vermont Governor Phil Scott, who is said to be considering a veto.

    If Governor Scott signs the VDPA, most of its provisions would take effect July 1, 2025, but the private right of action would take effect January 1, 2027.

    In depth

    Who Does the VDPA Apply To?

    The VDPA is a long and complicated bill, and the applicability layers are no exception. There are multiple layers of applicability to VDPA, which we use in this article as follows:

    Controllers: The VDPA generally applies to controllers, which are defined as a person that conducts business in Vermont or a person that produces products or services that are targeted to Vermont residents and that during the preceding calendar year:

    • Controlled or processed the personal data of not fewer than 25,000 consumers (to be lowered to 12,500 consumers on July 1, 2026, and then to 6,250 consumers on July 1, 2027), excluding personal data controlled or processed solely for the purpose of completing a payment transaction; or
    • Controlled or processed the personal data of not fewer than 12,500 consumers (to be lowered to 6,250 consumers on July 1, 2026, and then to 3,125 consumers on July 1, 2027) and derived more than 25% (to be lowered to 20% on July 1, 2026) of the person’s gross revenue from the sale of personal data.

    Covered persons: Certain sections of the VDPA – including the provisions relating to consumer health data; consumer health data controllers; the duties of controllers to minors, data protection assessments for online services, products or features offered to minors; and the confidentiality of consumer health data – apply more generally to covered persons conducting business in Vermont or producing products or services targeted to Vermont residents without any additional limitations.

    Online service providers: The VDPA also contains requirements applicable to controllers that offer any product, service or feature online that is not (1) a telecommunications service subject to the Communications Act of 1934, (2) a broadband internet service or (3) the delivery or use of a physical product. That last exception is unquestionably odd and subject to multiple interpretations.

    Large data holders: A large data holder is a person who, during the preceding calendar year, processed the personal information of 100,000 or more Vermont residents.

    Who Is a “Consumer”?

    A consumer is an individual who is a resident of Vermont. However, a consumer is not an individual acting in a commercial or employment context or as an employee, owner, director, officer or contractor of a company, partnership, sole proprietorship, nonprofit or government agency whose communications or transactions with the controller occur solely within the context of that individual’s role with the company, partnership, sole proprietorship, nonprofit or government agency.

    What Is “Personal Data”?

    Personal data means any information, including derived data and unique identifiers, that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable individual or to a device that identifies, is linked to or is reasonably linkable to one or more identified or identifiable individuals in a household. Personal data does not include de-identified data or publicly available information.

    The wrinkle is that, as drafted, the VDPA appears to require all entities that want to assert that information is de-identified to comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) de-identification standards. It is difficult to believe that the Vermont Legislature meant to impose HIPAA de-identification standards on all entities, but one potential reading of the VDPA is exactly that.

    Who Can Enforce?

    Notably, the VDPA creates a private right of action for a consumer who is harmed by a data broker or large data holder’s:

    • Processing of sensitive data without first obtaining the consumer’s consent;
    • Processing of the sensitive data of a known child in a manner that does not comply with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA);
    • Sale of sensitive data; or
    • Violation of the confidentiality obligations relating to consumer health data.

    The Vermont attorney general has the authority to enforce violations. Prior to initiating an action for a violation, the attorney general may issue a notice extending a 60-day cure period for the alleged violation.

    Who Is Exempt?

    The VDPA has several entity-level exemptions, including for:

    • Federal, state, tribal or local government entities in the ordinary course of their operation;
    • Covered entities that are not hybrid entities, healthcare components of a hybrid entity or business associates;
    • Financial institutions, credit unions, independent trust companies, broker-dealers, investment advisers, or their affiliates or subsidiaries that are exclusively and directly engaged in financial activities; and
    • Nonprofit organizations established to detect and prevent fraudulent acts in connection with insurance.

    The VDPA’s list of data-level exemptions includes data processed in accordance with a variety of federal laws, such as HIPAA, the Common Rule and other research laws and regulations, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, the Farm Credit Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

    There are also what can only be described as special interest exemptions that are unique to the VDPA. For example, publishers and editors, television and radio stations holding Federal Communications Commission licenses, and press and wire services are all exempt.

    What Consumer Rights Are Created by the VDPA?

    The VDPA grants Vermont residents the right to:

    • Confirm whether a controller is processing the consumer’s personal data and to access that data, if processed;
    • Obtain from a controller a list of third parties to which the controller has disclosed the consumer’s personal data or, if the controller does not maintain this information in a format specific to the consumer, a list of third parties to which the controller has disclosed personal data;
    • Correct inaccuracies in the consumer’s personal data, taking into account the nature of the personal data and the purposes of the processing of the consumer’s personal data;
    • Delete personal data provided by, or obtained about, the consumer unless retention of the personal data is required by law;
    • Data portability, if the processing of personal data is done by automatic means; and
    • Opt out of the processing of personal data for purposes of (1) targeted advertising, (2) the sale of personal data or (3) profiling in furtherance of solely automated decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the consumer.

    The VDPA allows consumers to designate an authorized agent for the purposes of exercising only the consumer’s right to delete or opt out of the processing of their personal data.

    Targeted advertising under the VDPA tracks the CCPA model definition in that “targeted advertising” is considered to be the targeting of an advertisement based on activity across distinctly branded websites even if those websites belong to affiliated entities.

    Additionally, the requirement that a controller provide a “list of third parties” to whom personal information has been disclosed is likely to be an incredibly burdensome exercise for most businesses.

    What Obligations Are Imposed?

    Controllers are subject to a number of obligations, including requirements to:

    • Not sell sensitive data (like in Maryland’s privacy law);
    • Not process sensitive data about a consumer without first obtaining the consumer’s consent or, if the controller knows the consumer is a child, without processing the sensitive data in accordance with COPPA;
    • Establish a process by which a consumer may appeal the controller’s refusal to take action on a request;
    • Limit the collection of personal data to what is reasonably necessary and proportionate to provide or maintain a specific product or service requested by the consumer to whom the data pertains;
    • Have reasonable administrative, technical and physical data security practices to protect the personal data;
    • Provide an effective mechanism for a consumer to revoke consent to the controller’s processing of the consumer’s personal data;
    • Not process personal data for a purpose not disclosed in the privacy notice unless the controller obtains the consumer’s consent or the purpose is reasonably necessary to and compatible with a disclosed purpose;
    • Not discriminate or retaliate against consumers for exercising their rights, for refusing to consent to the processing of personal data for a separate product or service, and in certain other circumstances;
    • Provide a privacy notice with certain disclosures (e.g., categories of personal data that the controller possesses; purposes for processing; how to exercise consumer rights; categories of personal data shared; categories of third parties with which the personal data is shared; online contact method that the controller actively monitors; business name and assumed business name of the controller; description of processing engaged for the purposes of targeted advertising, sale of personal data or profiling; opt-out procedures; and methods for submitting a consumer request); and
    • If in possession of de-identified data, take reasonable measures to ensure that the data cannot be used to re-identify an individual or be associated with an individual or device that identifies, is linked or is reasonably linkable to an individual or household; publicly commit to maintaining and using de-identified data without attempting to re-identify the data; and contractually obligate any recipients of the de-identified data to comply with the VDPA.

    Additionally, a covered person who offers any online service, product or feature to a consumer whom the covered person knows or consciously avoids knowing is a minor must:

    • Not process the minor’s personal data for longer than is reasonably necessary to provide the online service, product or feature;
    • If the minor has consented to the processing of precise geolocation data, collect the minor’s precise geolocation data only as reasonably necessary to provide the online service, product or feature; and provide to the minor a conspicuous signal indicating that the covered person is collecting such data and make the signal available for the entire duration of the collection.

    Again, the requirements of the VDPA appear to pose significant implementation burdens on any covered person who collects information about minors.

    The VDPA also requires that, subject to applicable exceptions, no covered person may:

    • Provide an employee or contractor with access to consumer health data unless the employee or contractor is subject to a contractual or statutory duty of confidentiality;
    • Provide any processor with access to consumer health data unless the person and processor comply with the above duties of a processor; or
    • Use a geofence to establish a virtual boundary that is within 1,850 feet of any healthcare facility, including any mental health facility or reproductive or sexual health facility, for the purpose of identifying, tracking, collecting data from or sending any notification to a consumer regarding their health data.

    What Is “Sensitive Data”?

    Sensitive data is personal data that:

    • Reveals a consumer’s government-issued identifier – such as a Social Security, passport, state identification card or driver’s license number – that is not required by law to be publicly displayed;
    • Reveals a consumer’s racial or ethnic origin, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, religious or philosophical beliefs, or union membership;
    • Reveals a consumer’s sexual orientation, sex life, sexuality or status as transgender or nonbinary;
    • Reveals a consumer’s status as a victim of a crime;
    • Is financial information – including a consumer’s tax return and account number, financial account login credentials, financial account, debit card number, or credit card number in combination with any required security or access code, password or other credentials allowing access to an account;
    • Is consumer health data;
    • Is personal data collected and analyzed concerning consumer health data or personal data that describes or reveals a past, present or future mental or physical health condition, treatment, disability or diagnosis, including pregnancy, to the extent the personal data is not used by the controller to identify a specific consumer’s physical or mental health condition or diagnosis;
    • Is biometric or genetic data;
    • Is personal data collected from a known minor; or
    • Is precise geolocation data (within a radius of 1,850 feet).

    Response to Consumer Requests

    The VDPA follows most other states by requiring controllers to respond to consumer requests within 45 days after receipt. The VDPA allows for a 45-day extension when reasonably necessary, provided the controller informs the consumer of the extension within the initial 45-day response period and the reason for the extension. If the controller declines to take action regarding the request, the controller must inform the consumer within 45 days after receipt of the request of the justification for declining to take action and provide instructions for appealing the decision. The appeal must be approved or denied within 45 days after receipt. If the controller denies the appeal, the notice to the consumer must provide or specify information enabling the consumer to contact the Vermont attorney general to submit a complaint.

    Data Protection Assessments

    The VDPA requires controllers to conduct and document a data protection assessment for each processing activity that presents a heightened risk of harm to a consumer, which includes:

    • Processing personal data for targeted advertising;
    • Selling personal data;
    • Processing personal data for profiling, where the profiling presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of unfair or deceptive treatment of, or unlawful disparate impact on, consumers; financial, physical or reputational injury to consumers; a physical or other intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion, or the private affairs or concerns, of consumers, where the intrusion would be offensive to a reasonable person; or other substantial injury to consumers; and
    • Processing sensitive data.

    The assessments must identify and weigh the processing activity’s benefits that may flow to the controller, consumer, other stakeholders and the public against the potential risks to the consumer, as mitigated by safeguards that can be employed by the controller to reduce the risks.

    A covered person who offers an online service, product or feature to a consumer who the covered person knows or consciously avoids knowing is a minor must also include in its assessment for the online service, product or feature a variety of additional analyses, including a mitigation plan under certain circumstances.

    One saving grace is that, like other state privacy laws, the VDPA allows data protection assessments conducted to comply with other existing laws to satisfy its requirements if the assessment is reasonably similar in scope and effect.

    When Does the VDPA Take Effect?

    The bill provides for staggered effective dates. If signed, the sections relating to the Vermont attorney general’s public education, outreach and assistance program; assessment of the VDPA; and policy recommendations will come into effect on July 1, 2024. For controllers and covered persons, most of the VDPA will take effect on July 1, 2025. The private right of action will take effect on January 1, 2027, and sunset on January 1, 2029. The VDPA’s applicability thresholds will lower on July 1, 2026, and then again on July 1, 2027.

    Authors

    David P. Saunders

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • DOJ Proposes to Reschedule Marijuana (Cannabis) to Schedule III

    DOJ Proposes to Reschedule Marijuana (Cannabis) to Schedule III

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    DOJ Proposes to Reschedule Marijuana (Cannabis) to Schedule III

    May 29, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 21, 2024, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) published the highly anticipated notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to reschedule marijuana (cannabis) from a Schedule I controlled substance to Schedule III, taking the first step to easing federal restrictions on cannabis and potentially opening up the door for further cannabis research and development. This regulatory change could have far-reaching implications for the cannabis, pharmaceutical and banking industries if promulgated in a final rule. Stakeholders interested in submitting comments to the DOJ must do so by July 22, 2024.

    In depth

    Legal Background

    Following a comprehensive review by the US Department of Health and Humans Services (HHS) on cannabis’s safety and subsequent recommendation to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the DOJ published an NPRM to reschedule cannabis. Currently, cannabis is classified as a Schedule I drug, which is reserved for substances like heroin and peyote that are considered highly addictive and lacking medical value. The DEA’s decision to reschedule cannabis as a Schedule III drug, indicating a moderate to low risk of dependency, will not legalize marijuana but will mark a significant move towards reducing federal limitations and recognizing the potential for cannabis’s therapeutic and medical benefits.

    The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) divides controlled substances into five levels of control, or “schedules,” based on a drug’s potential for abuse, whether the drug has a currently accepted medical use, and whether there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under medical supervision or the level of psychological or physical dependence that could result from abuse of the drug.

    Under the CSA, when determining that a drug should be controlled (and if so, under which schedule), the secretary of HHS and the attorney general must consider eight factors set forth in 21 U.S.C. Section 811, subsection (c). The eight factors are:

    1. The drug’s actual or relative potential for abuse
    2. Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known
    3. The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance
    4. Its history and current pattern of abuse
    5. The scope, duration and significance of abuse
    6. What, if any, risk there is to the public health
    7. Its psychic or physiological dependence liability
    8. Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled

    The NPRM discusses in detail the assessment conducted by the HHS towards each of these factors, ultimately concluding that marijuana has less potential for abuse than the drugs or other substances in Schedules I (such as heroin and peyote) or II (such as fentanyl and hydrocodone), that marijuana has accepted medical use in treatment, and that the abuse of marijuana may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. The NPRM seeks cannabis stakeholder comment and feedback in connection with the DOJ’s evaluation of the eight aforementioned factors.

    Notably, the proposal to reschedule marijuana applies to substances meeting the statutory definition of “marijuana,” limited to the Cannabis sativa L. plant (other than the mature stalks and seeds) and derivatives of the plant, including marijuana extracts and any part of the plant with a delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of not more than 0.3% on a dry-weight basis (the definition of “hemp”). The proposal does not apply to synthetically derived THC, which is outside of the CSA’s definition of marijuana. Synthetically derived THC will remain in Schedule I. Furthermore, stakeholders should be aware that the manufacture, distribution, dispensing and possession of marijuana would remain subject to the applicable criminal prohibitions under the CSA.

    Implications of Rescheduling Marijuana

    If finalized, the proposed rescheduling of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III could have far-reaching implications for the cannabis, pharmaceutical and banking industries. The evolving regulatory landscape presents opportunities and challenges for businesses operating in the cannabis industry. As federal policies shift towards a more permissive approach, businesses must remain vigilant and proactive in navigating the changing regulatory environment while assessing potential new opportunities provided by the federal government’s new stance.

    Rescheduling marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III would subject marijuana to the same regulatory controls applicable to Schedule III substances. Marijuana would remain subject to the applicable provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In the NPRM, the DOJ notes that a drug containing a substance within the CSA’s definition of marijuana would need FDA approval to be lawfully “introduce[d] or deliver[ed] for introduction into interstate commerce,” unless an investigational new drug (IND) is in effect for that drug. The classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance has inhibited those seeking federal funding for research that could establish cannabis as a generally recognized as safe ingredient (GRAS) by the FDA. As noted in the NPRM, the FDA would require approval of any drug products containing marijuana, ensuring they meet safety and efficacy standards before entering interstate commerce. The rescheduling of marijuana to Schedule III would allow for more extensive clinical research and pharmaceutical companies could submit INDs and new drug applications (NDAs) for marijuana-based products to demonstrate their safety, efficacy and manufacturing quality. In addition, this change could make it easier to access certain funding and grants previously unavailable to parties interested in research and development opportunities related to marijuana.

    In addition to the processes that would apply to marijuana-based products as a part of the drug development and approval process, the regulatory processes that apply once a drug is approved will also apply for marijuana-based products. For example, the DEA requires registration to permit businesses and/or individuals to manufacture, import, export, distribute and dispense controlled substances. Businesses newly engaging in the cannabis industry should be mindful that the DEA registration requirements may apply once the proposed language is finalized.

    Financial Implications for Businesses

    Rescheduling cannabis could alleviate some financial burdens for cannabis businesses. Currently, those in the cannabis business face prohibitive tax burdens due to Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code, which does not allow certain business deductions for businesses trafficking a Schedule I or II drug. As a result, these businesses often encounter higher income tax rates and often encounter higher costs and less favorable terms for loans and insurance due to the risks associated with Schedule I substances. Removing cannabis from Schedule I could significantly reduce these financial and operational challenges for those in the cannabis industry.

    Rescheduling marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III has the potential to impact the banking industry, primarily by reducing the regulatory and legal risks associated with providing financial services to marijuana-related businesses (MRBs). As a Schedule I drug, marijuana is classified as a substance with no accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse, making it illegal under federal law. This creates significant legal risks for banks that provide services to MRBs, as banks could be accused of money laundering or aiding and abetting criminal activity. By rescheduling marijuana to Schedule III, which would bring the substance into alignment with other highly regulated drugs, the risks of such accusations may be minimized. The proposed changes may result in helping cannabis stakeholders gain access to loans and move away from a cash-only business. Furthermore, rescheduling marijuana to Schedule III would likely prompt federal regulatory agencies, such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), to issue updated guidance on banking to MRBs. Updated guidance from FinCEN would provide banks with a clearer framework for legal compliance and risk management.

    Importantly, banks may continue to find it risky to open their doors to MRBs following this news, given the statutory and regulatory ambiguity surrounding the impacts of reclassification. Notably, other legislation, such as the Secure and Fair Enforcement Regulation Banking Act (SAFER Banking Act), provide clearer protections in statute, if codified, and banks may consider waiting to make operational changes until after further protections have been enacted.

    Words of Caution

    Cannabis stakeholders should note that the rescheduling of marijuana does not decriminalize marijuana or legalize recreational use, and the same criminal prohibitions against the manufacture, distribution, dispensing and possession of marijuana would apply, similar to those restrictions applicable to similarly situated Schedule III controlled substances such as ketamine and anabolic steroids.

    Additionally, the federal rescheduling of marijuana does not directly impact the status of cannabis-related state laws, including adult use, medical use or CBD/low THC state cannabis regimes. Stakeholders should consult with legal counsel to assess what impact, if any, the rescheduling of marijuana would have on a state’s specific cannabis laws.

    Next Steps

    The NPRM comment period ends on July 22, 2024. Stakeholders interested in commenting on the proposed rules must submit comments electronically or by mail on or before July 22, 2022.

    As federal cannabis regulations undergo significant changes, stakeholders must stay informed and involved in the rulemaking process, and businesses must continue to adapt to the evolving landscape to remain competitive and compliant. For more information and guidance on navigating cannabis regulation, please contact one of the authors or any other member of McDermott’s Cannabis Regulatory Practice Group and the Food, Drug & Medical Device Regulatory Practice Group. McDermott will continue to monitor cannabis regulation as it develops.

    Authors

    James R. Ravitz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Alva C. Mather

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Paul S. Gadiock

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Deepika Raj

    Associate

    Los Angeles

    Marissa Hill Daley

    Law Clerk

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | May 2024

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | May 2024

    ARTICLE

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | May 2024

    May 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Unified Patent Court (UPC) is revolutionizing the way patents are enforced in Europe, and McDermott’s intellectual property team is here to help you navigate this dynamic landscape. Our Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court newsletter is designed to keep patent holders and legal departments well-informed. And with an on-the-ground team in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, we offer a unique cross-border perspective.


    In depth
    Authors

    Diana Pisani

    European Patent Attorney

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Keval Amin

    Associate

    Chicago

    Aashish Kapadia

    Partner

    Austin

    More insights

  • FTC Amends Health Breach Notification Rule to Regulate Health Apps and Expand Breach Notification Requirements

    FTC Amends Health Breach Notification Rule to Regulate Health Apps and Expand Breach Notification Requirements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FTC Amends Health Breach Notification Rule to Regulate Health Apps and Expand Breach Notification Requirements

    May 28, 2024

    Read time: 18 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 26, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a final rule to amend its Health Breach Notification Rule (HBN Rule). The HBN Rule works as a complement and counterpart to the breach notification requirements established under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) for HIPAA-regulated entities. Specifically, the HBN Rule requires that vendors of personal health records (PHRs) and related entities that are not covered by HIPAA notify individuals, the FTC and, in some cases, media outlets of a breach of unsecured personally identifiable health data.

    The final rule aims to clarify the HBN Rule’s application to certain direct-to-consumer health apps and similar technologies that are not regulated by HIPAA and attempts to modernize the regulation to remain current in the face of evolving business practices and technological developments. The HBN Rule also includes requirements for third-party service providers supporting direct-to-consumer apps, which may include data aggregators, cloud computing service providers and more.

    The FTC initially proposed amendments on May 18, 2023, and published the final HBN Rule in April 2024 after considering public comments to the proposed rule. The final HBN Rule was published in the Federal Register on May 30, 2024, with amendments going into effect on July 29, 2024.

    For more information about the proposed amendment issued under the HBN Rule, see our prior On the Subject.

    In depth

    Background

    The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) directed the FTC to develop a breach notification rule for consumer-facing entities that are not HIPAA “covered entities” or “business associates.” ARRA specifically granted rulemaking authority to the FTC to require vendors of PHRs and “PHR related entities” to notify consumers in the event of an information security breach. In response, the FTC issued its first version of the HBN Rule later in 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 42962), which required PHRs and PHR related entities to notify impacted consumers, the FTC and, in some cases, media of a breach of unsecured personally identifiable health information.

    In 2009, when the HBN Rule was originally published, its reach was limited. At that time, relatively few entities existed in the market that offered a PHR service. However, in promulgating this rule, the FTC recognized that despite relatively few actors, there were wide swaths of health information that were not covered by HIPAA and still susceptible to breaches that could harm consumers.

    In fall 2021, the FTC signaled its intention to interpret its authority more expansively to broaden the reach of the HBN Rule. It approved a policy statement entitled On Breaches by Health Apps and Other Connected Devices to “clarify the scope of” the HBN Rule principally by reinterpreting the definition of a PHR such that the rule applies to health apps and connected devices that are not subject to HIPAA but are capable of drawing information from multiple sources even if the health information only comes from one source. For example, health information that a consumer directly inputs into an app (e.g., blood sugar levels) and non-health data drawn from another source (e.g., dates from a user’s phone calendar). The policy statement effectively reclassified most healthcare apps that were not already regulated by HIPAA to be within the FTC’s jurisdiction. We describe the 2021 HBN Rule policy statement in depth in a prior publication.

    The FTC exercised its enforcement under the HBN Rule, as interpreted by the 2021 guidance, for the first time in settlements last year against GoodRx, a digital health company focusing on prescription purchases, and Easy Healthcare Corporation, the publisher of the fertility tracking app Premom. The FTC has leaned on these settlements and associated allegations and disciplinary approach to resolve any questions about the FTC’s perception of its role in consumer privacy in the healthcare space.

    On May 18, 2023, days after the proposed settlement with Easy Healthcare Corporation was announced, the FTC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend the HBN Rule to “clarify” its applicability to health apps and other similar technologies and expand the information that must be provided to consumers when notifying them of a breach of their health data.

    On April 26, 2024, the FTC issued a final rule that largely adopted the changes it proposed in the NPRM.

    Clarification on Scope and Applicability of the HBN Rule

    Applicability to Health Applications

    The FTC explains that its modifications to the HBN Rule are motivated by a desire to harmonize the applicability of the HBN Rule with innovations in healthcare delivery and evolving privacy considerations. The FTC modifies the HBN Rule definition of “PHR identifiable health information” to clearly apply to developers of health applications and similar technologies and adds two new definitions for “covered health care provider” and “health care services or supplies.”

    In its final rule, the FTC declined to explicitly broaden the categories of data captured in the definition of “PHR identifiable health information,” recognizing that its application is already broad, capturing all information characterized as maintaining “unique, persistent identifiers (such as unique device and mobile advertising identifiers), when combined with health information . . . if the identifiers can be used to identify or re-identify an individual.” For example, the FTC indicates this definition captures information about sexual health and substance use disorders because the information “relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.”

    To highlight the interplay of definitions in the HBN Rule, the FTC provides a few examples of health applications and similar technologies that would and would not be subject to the HBN Rule:

    1. Health apps or websites that are purely informational and do not track or record consumer information are not subject to the HBN Rule. A health advice application or website that is not covered by HIPAA would not be subject to the HBN Rule if its function is purely informational (e.g., provides information regarding various medical conditions), and it does not maintain a mechanism for consumers to track or record their information. In this example, a health advice application or website would not be a PHR because it is not an electronic record of PHR identifiable health information of any consumer.
    2. Health apps or websites that provide medical information and maintain an interface for consumers to track their symptoms where the consumer is the only source of information are not subject to the HBN Rule. A health advice application or website that is not covered by HIPAA would not be subject to the HBN Rule if it does not have the technical capacity to draw information from multiple sources. A health app or website that provides information on medical conditions and a symptom tracker for consumers who log in with a username and password would be considered an electronic record of PHR identifiable health information on an individual because the information (1) is provided by the consumer, (2) is associated with the individual’s account information, (3) relates to their health conditions and (4) is received by a healthcare provider (in this case the health app or website). However, if the health app or website does not have the capability to pull information from multiple sources, it is not a PHR and, thus, not subject to the HBN Rule. Importantly, the classification does not depend on whether the health application is actually pulling from multiple sources rather whether it has the technical capacity, as discussed in more depth below.
    3. Health apps or websites that provide medical information and maintain an interface for consumers to track their symptoms and collect geolocation data or draw information from a data broker are subject to the HBN Rule. In contrast to the previous example, a health app or website that has the capacity to draw information from multiple sources, such as collecting geolocation data through the application programming interface (API) and consumer inputs or from a data broker and consumer inputs, is considered a PHR and subject to the HBN Rule.

    Further, commenters raised concerns with the definitions of “covered health care provider” and “health care services or supplies” using the term “online services,” noting that this definition could impermissibly cause the HBN Rule to cover retailers of general purpose items (e.g., sellers of tennis shoes, shampoos and vitamins). In response, the FTC indicated that a threshold inquiry under ARRA is whether an entity is a “vendor of personal health records” and notes that “to be a vendor of personal health records under the Rule, an app, website, or online service must provide an offering that relates more than tangentially to health.”

    Multiple Source Rule

    The FTC adopts the changes made in the NPRM to clarify what it means for a PHR to draw information from “multiple” sources and defines that a product is a PHR if it has the technical capacity to draw information from multiple sources (e.g., through an API), even if the consumer or entity elects not to connect the product to more than one source. To address stakeholder concern of the breadth of the multiple sources test, the FTC notes that the HBN Rule still requires drawing PHR identifiable health information from at least one source to count as a PHR.

    In the final rule preamble commentary, the FTC indicates that a product feature or integration that exists and has the capability to draw PHR identifiable health information is considered a “source,” even if the feature is in beta testing, is not yet in its final form or is only available to a subset of users. As a reminder of a key limiting principle on HBN Rule liability, the FTC underscores that a website or health app must be “managed, shared, and controlled by or primarily for the individual” to constitute a PHR and that simply drawing information on a consumer in and of itself does not pull the entity under the scope of the HBN Rule.

    Expanded Scope for “Breach of Security”

    The FTC enshrines its position taken in the GoodRx and Premom settlements that a “breach of security” under the HBN Rule includes an unauthorized acquisition of identifiable health information that occurs because of a data security breach or unauthorized disclosure to a third party. In other words, a breach is not limited to third-party hacking or an intrusion into a health app’s systems but occurs when a health app discloses PHR identifiable health information without the user’s authorization. The FTC has taken a strong position that security breaches are not limited to cybersecurity intrusions or nefarious behavior and could also arise when PHR identifiable health information is used in ways that are inconsistent with a company’s disclosures and consumers’ reasonable expectations. The HBN Rule provides examples of events that could trigger notification requirements, including failing to disclose how a company accesses, uses, processes, discloses or retains data. The determination of whether a disclosure is authorized under the HBN Rule will be a fact-specific inquiry that depends on the context of the interactions between the consumer and the company; the nature, recipients, and purposes of those disclosures; the company’s representations to consumers; and other applicable laws.

    The HBN Rule continues to include the rebuttable presumption for unauthorized access to an individual’s data from the 2009 HBN Rule, which permits entities to rebut the presumption of acquisition in instances of unauthorized access by providing “reliable evidence showing that there has not been, or could not reasonably have been, unauthorized acquisition of such information.” In commentary to the original HBN Rule, the FTC noted that no breach of security has occurred if an unauthorized employee inadvertently accesses an individual’s PHR and logs off without reading, using or disclosing anything. “If the unauthorized employee read the data and/or shared it, however, he or she ‘acquired’ the information, thus triggering the notification obligation in the Rule.” Accordingly, the circumstances under which an entity may rebut the presumption of a breach of security under the HBN Rule are narrower than under HIPAA’s “low probability of compromise” assessment.

    In response to commenter concerns, the FTC reiterates that the HBN Rule is only triggered by breaches of unsecured PHR identifiable health information and does not apply to information that is “secured” or protected. This clarification indicates that stakeholders should consider using de-identified data or employ encryption methods when engaging in product testing to protect its consumers’ data and avoid liability under the HBN Rule.

    PHR Related Entity

    The final rule adopts the proposed revised definition of PHR related entities to clarify certain PHR vendors’ notification obligations under the HBN Rule. Specifically, the revised definition contemplates whether vendors providing services for PHRs are considered PHR related entities (and therefore subject to broader obligations under the HBN Rule) or “third party service providers.” The adopted definition of PHR related entities was revised to (1) more clearly include vendors of PHRs that offer products and services solely through online services or mobile applications, (2) limit the definition of PHR related entities to only include those that send or receive identifiable health information, as opposed to any information, and (3) indicate that not all third-party service providers who access PHR identifiable health information are necessarily a PHR related entity. Additionally, the FTC reiterates that under the existing rule, PHR related entities and other PHR vendors are required to alert their vendors of their status as a PHR related entity or vendor of PHRs to put third-party vendors on notice of the potential implications under the HBN Rule.

    In the preamble commentary, the FTC provides examples to aid in the differentiation between a PHR related entity and a third-party service provider. One of these examples compares the use of a search engine by a health tracking website that would qualify as PHR. In this example, the FTC draws a distinction between a search engine whose logo is prominently displayed to the consumer and providing services for its own benefit against a search engine that runs services on the back end. The consumer facing entity would be considered a PHR related entity because it “offers its services through the website, which is a personal health record.” This situation is contrasted to a search engine firm that provides back-end services, stating that since a consumer may not be aware that the search bar is offered through a separate service and receiving a notice from the search engine may cause consumer confusion, this back-end search provider is not a PHR related entity even though it received identifiable information from the PHR.

    Modernize Method of Notice

    Recognizing that mailing notices can incur high costs to an entity and that physical mailing is generally inconsistent with the communication method for users of health apps, the FTC has adopted the use of electronic mail as a notice method in certain circumstances for a PHR to meet its obligations under the HBN Rule. Importantly, the FTC has defined electronic mail to be email in combination with a text message, in-app message or electronic banner. The dual method electronic mail notice requirement was met with substantial stakeholder commentary, however, the FTC denied changing the requirements for electronic mail noting that two methods of communication to an individual will help ensure that the individual receives the notice.

    Under the final rule, electronic mail can be used to satisfy the individual notice requirement only when the individual has designated electronic mail as their preferred method of communication. Additionally, electronic mail notice must be “clear and conspicuous,” which is newly defined to mean that a “notice is reasonably understandable and designed to call attention to the nature and significance of the information.” The FTC points out that this term closely mirrors the existing definition of clear and conspicuous in the FTC’s Financial Privacy Rule to improve consistency across various privacy rules. The FTC did not proscribe details on how the notification is presented to the individual, remaining rather flexible to account for changing technologies. If the methods required under electronic mail notice are not available or the individual has not chosen electronic mail as their preferred contact method, first-class mail can be used to satisfy written notice requirements.

    Expand Content of Notice

    Initially, the FTC proposed several updates to expand the content of individual notices, however, it reigned in these changes in the final rule to address stakeholder commentary. The proposed changes to the content of the notice included adding (1) a brief description of the potential harm to the individual that may result from the breach, (2) the full name, website name, and contact information of third parties that acquired unsecured identifiable information, (3) a description of the types of information involved, (4) a brief description of what the entity experienced, mitigation steps, and credit protection services being offered, and (5) at least two methods of contact information.

    In the final rule, the FTC decided against requiring a brief description of the potential harm to the individual, agreeing with commentary that this could cause confusion to individuals. The final rule also amends its proposed requirement that PHRs provide details about the third party that received access to the data and, instead, only requires the full name or identity of the third party. This also creates an exception to including the identifying information of the third party if it would create a risk for individuals or the entity (e.g., where disclosing the identity of a hacker or hacking group could subject affected individuals or the entity providing notice to further harm). In these cases, the disclosure only needs to include the type of third party (e.g., “hacker”) who acquired individual’s PHR identifiable health information. The remaining proposals to the content of the notice were adopted without modification.

    Additional Considerations

    The final rule incorporated comments on improving readability in part by creating a new section for penalties. This section more clearly indicates that the violations of the HBN Rule are considered violations of Section 18 of the FTC Act, and incur the civil penalties associated with those violations.

    The FTC also requested comments in the NPRM related to the timing requirements related to notice to the FTC, the HBN Rule currently requires notice to the FTC within 10 business days of the discovery of the breach. In response largely to comments that it is difficult to submit a thorough and complete notice to the FTC in such a short time period, the final rule now extends the timeline for notification to the FTC affecting 500 or more individuals to be contemporaneous with individual notification ― i.e., without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 days after discovery. Similar to HIPAA, breaches affecting less than 500 individuals can be submitted annually to the FTC.

    Next Steps

    • Organizations that operate or maintain applications or websites in the wellness or health market and developers that create health related apps or websites, should assess whether they are subject to the HBN Rule based on the expanded definitions adopted in the final rule.
    • Stakeholders should be mindful that the “multiple sources” rule in the HBN Rule does not require that a health application or website actively use or pull multiple sources of user information (i.e., other data besides the data provided by the consumer), but instead, solely requires that the health application or website have the technical capacity to pull such other sources of information.
    • Stakeholders should prioritize use of secured data over unsecured data in product testing to avoid and limit their liability under the HBN Rule. For instance, stakeholders should use de-identified or encrypted data in product testing and avoid using sources of unsecure PHR identifiable health information to the extent possible.
    • The final rule adopts definitions from the NPRM that more clearly provide guidance on what types of entities are considered PHR related entities, subject to certain reporting requirements, and which are third-party service providers. It is important for PHRs and PHR related entities to understand the distinction between these two types of vendors. To help with this categorization, stakeholders should review the examples provided by the FTC. The examples indicate the type of criteria and situations where the FTC would distinguish between a third-party service provider and PHR related entity. From the examples, the FTC would consider, among other things, the consumer perception of the role the vendor has in the PHR functionality, access to identifiable health information, and whether services are provided for the vendor’s purpose or the PHR’s.
    • Organizations working with PHR vendors should confirm that PHR vendors can satisfy reporting obligations under the HBN Rule. PHR related entities and other PHR vendors should assess their methods of notifying vendors of their status as a PHR related entity or PHR vendor to put third-party vendors on notice of the potential implications under the HBN Rule.
    • Stakeholders should consider the new ability to give notice to individuals electronically when planning their information security program. This new flexibility to provide notice can offer financial and logistical savings for the organization. However, before relying on the electronic mail notice option, the organization must give individuals the opportunity to select a preference on method of communication and must take into account that electronic mail notice requires e-mail in addition to another type of notification.

    If you have questions about how the final rule affects your organization, contact your regular McDermott lawyer or any of the authors of this On the Subject.

    Authors

    Jennifer S. Geetter

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Kyle E. Hafkey

    Associate

    Boston

    More insights

  • Consequences under employment law for Kampens “rich kids” – Xenophobia as grounds for dismissal?

    Consequences under employment law for Kampens “rich kids” – Xenophobia as grounds for dismissal?

    ARTICLE

    Consequences under employment law for Kampens “rich kids” – Xenophobia as grounds for dismissal?

    May 28, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The HR News blog provides regular updates on recent developments in German employment law (in German). The latest blog post provides insights on “Consequences under employment law for Kampens “rich kids” – Xenophobia as grounds for dismissal?”.

    Visit the blog and/or register now for regular HR NEWS updates (in German).

    In depth
    Authors

    Volker Teigelkötter

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • SEC Marketing Rule Update: Risk Alert Pinpoints Examination Findings to Date

    SEC Marketing Rule Update: Risk Alert Pinpoints Examination Findings to Date

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Marketing Rule Update: Risk Alert Pinpoints Examination Findings to Date

    May 28, 2024

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The SEC’s Examination Staff continues to focus on investment adviser’s compliance with the Marketing Rule. In a recent Risk Alert, the Examination Staff identified specific deficiencies it has found both as to the content of advertisements and compliance policies and procedures related to marketing activities. This Alert describes key features of the Examination Staff’s findings and highlights useful compliance practices.

    On April 17, 2024, the staff (“Staff”) of the SEC’s Division of Examinations issued a Risk Alert (“Risk Alert”) titled, “Initial Observations Regarding Advisers Act Marketing Rule Compliance”, summarizing the Staff’s “preliminary observations” from its review of registered investment advisers’ (“Advisers”) compliance with Rule 206(4)-1 (“Marketing Rule”) during recent SEC examinations. This Risk Alert, which follows two prior Risk Alerts from June 2023[1] and September 2022[2] related to the Marketing Rule, serves to highlight: (i) the Staff’s ongoing scrutiny of Advisers’ compliance with the Marketing Rule; and (ii) the importance of ensuring not only that the content of an Adviser’s advertisements comply with the requirements of the Marketing Rule, but that the Adviser also complies with its Form ADV disclosure obligations, and its obligations under Rule 206(4)-7 (“Compliance Rule”)[3] and Advisers Act Rule 204-2 (“Books and Records Rule”) under the Advisers Act.[4]

    The Staff’s observations align with what we continue to see the Staff focus on during SEC examinations with regard to Marketing Rule compliance. The Staff, during examinations, routinely requests and reviews:

    • Copies of all “advertisements” used during the relevant examination period;
    • Explanations for the Adviser’s responses to Form ADV Part 1A, Item 5.L;
    • Current marketing policies and procedures;
    • Documentation of placement agent agreements and other “endorsement” arrangements; and
    • Documentation maintained as the substantiation of material statements of fact, performance reporting and third party rankings used in the Adviser’s advertisements.

    Notably, the Risk Alert comes just days after the SEC announced a second set of enforcement cases following an ongoing sweep focused on Marketing Rule compliance.[5] In those cases, the SEC found that the five firms advertised hypothetical performance to the general public on their websites without adopting and implementing policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the hypothetical performance was relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of each advertisement’s intended audience, as required by the Marketing Rule. The SEC alleged that one Adviser violated other requirements of the Marketing Rule by 1) including false and misleading information in its advertisements; 2) being unable to substantiate performance shown in its advertisements; 3) failing to enter into written agreements for compensation for endorsements; and 4) failing to comply with the Adviser’s recordkeeping obligations under the Advisers Act.

    In announcing these enforcement actions, Co-Chief of the Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit Corey Schuster highlighted the Enforcement Division’s focus on Marketing Rule violations through use of “targeted initiatives” to ensure that Advisers fully comply with their obligations under the Rule. This is the second set of cases that the SEC has brought as part of an ongoing targeted sweep concerning Marketing Rule violations after charging nine advisory firms in September 2023.[6]

    Key Deficiencies in the Content of Advertisements

    The Staff’s review of substantive compliance with the Marketing Rule focused on compliance with the Rule’s General Prohibitions.[7] The Staff observed and provided specific details regarding a litany of deficiencies in the following areas:

    • Untrue and unsubstantiated statements of material fact;
    • Omission of material facts and misleading inferences;
    • Unfair and unbalanced treatment of material risks or limitations;
    • References to specific investment advice that were not presented in a fair and balanced manner;
    • Inclusion or exclusion of performance results or time periods in manners that were not fair and balanced; and
    • Advertisements that were otherwise materially misleading as a result of font size, visibility of disclosures, etc., particularly on websites and in videos.

    The Staff’s observations provide the following important reminders:

    Be Truthful, Be Accurate and Be Able to Substantiate – The Staff observed advertisements that included various statements of material fact that appeared to be untrue or that could not be substantiated. These observations provide insight as to what the Staff considers to be material statements of fact related to an Adviser’s business strategy and what types of statements the Staff will expect that an Adviser substantiate if such claims are being used in marketing materials. The Staff noted that certain statements appeared to be untrue on account of omitting material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading and that it observed advertisements that included information that caused untrue or misleading implications or inferences to be drawn regarding material facts relating to the Adviser, highlighting among other examples:

    • Claims that an Adviser is different from other Advisers because they act in the “best interest of clients,” without disclosing that all Advisers have a fiduciary duty to act in their clients’ best interests;
    • Recommendations of certain investments (e.g., on podcasts or websites) without disclosing the conflicts of interest attributed to the compensation paid to, or received by, the Adviser for such recommendations;
    • Statements that the Adviser was “seen on” national media, implying appearances in national news media, without disclosing that the “appearances” were in fact paid advertisements and advertising images of celebrities in marketing materials in a manner that implied the celebrities endorsed the firms when such celebrities did not endorse the firms;
    • Presentation of performance information that did not provide adequate disclosure regarding the share classes included in the performance returns, used lower fees in calculations for net of fees performance returns than were offered to the intended audience, and omitted material information regarding fees and expenses used in calculating returns;
    • Inclusion of third-party ratings that (i) implied that the Adviser was the sole top recipient of certain awards when the awards went to multiple recipients or the Adviser was not the top recipient, (ii) failed to disclose that the Adviser or that Adviser personnel nominated fellow employees for certain awards, and (iii) indicated that the Adviser was highly rated by various organizations without disclosing that the methodologies for such ratings were based primarily or solely on factors that were not related to the quality of investment advice, such as assets under management or the number of clients of the Adviser; and
    • Inclusion of testimonials on the Adviser’s website without any disclosures explaining the context of the testimonials, implying that the testimonials were about the Adviser’s services rather than a third-party product.

    Don’t Omit Material Facts or Make Misleading Inferences—and Keep Context in Mind When Showing Performance – The Staff similarly observed advertisements that appeared to omit material facts necessary to make certain statements made by Advisers, in light of the circumstances, not misleading as well as advertisements that included information that could have reasonably caused untrue or misleading implications or inferences to be drawn concerning material facts relating to the Adviser. The Staff also highlighted advertisements that contained untrue or misleading performance claims, including, among other deficiencies:

    • Performance information that did not provide adequate disclosure regarding the share classes included in the performance returns;
    • Net of fees performance returns calculated using lower fees than were offered to the intended audience; and
    • Omission of material information regarding fees and expenses used in calculating returns.

    With respect to advertisements containing performance, the Staff observed information that was misleading, such as:

    • Benchmark index comparisons that did not define the index or provide sufficient context to enable an understanding of the basis for such comparison;
    • Performance presentations that contained outdated market data information or included lower investment costs than were currently available to clients;
    • Statements about an Adviser’s performance track record that reflected securities not actually bought or sold in client accounts;
    • Claims that the Adviser achieved above average performance results without clarifying that the Adviser did not yet have clients or performance track records; and
    • Statements regarding performance information that did not include disclosures to provide context to the presentations, such as advertising performance during time periods when most investors would have experienced the advertised performance returns due to general market performance.

    These observations provide additional insight into the Staff’s views as to what might constitute material statements of fact related to performance figures and demonstrate that Advisers should pay careful attention when including any reference to performance (hypothetical or actual) in their marketing materials.

    Include Risk and Limitations Disclosures – Including in Social Media Posts – The Staff observed advertisements that included statements about the potential benefits connected with the Advisers’ services or methods of operation that did not appear to provide fair and balanced treatment of any material risks or material limitations associated with the potential benefits. For example, the Staff observed advertisements on social media that highlighted performance information without also disclosing the material risks and limitations associated with the potential benefits. Advisers may find it challenging to include proper disclaimers on websites, blogs and social media posts, however it is nonetheless sometimes required under the Marketing Rule and seeking solutions for how to incorporate this information is a priority.

    Selection of Investments in Marketing Materials Must Be Fair and Balanced – The Staff observed advertisements that included references to specific investment advice that were not presented in a fair and balanced manner — noting in particular that it had observed advertisements that included only the most profitable investments or specifically excluded certain investments without providing sufficient information and context to evaluate the rationale for the exclusion, such as investments that were written off as a loss or were lower performing investments. The Staff also observed advertisements that included or excluded certain performance results or presented performance time periods in a manner that was not fair and balanced. With respect to policies and procedures, the Staff also observed Advisers that had not established criteria in their policies and procedures to ensure references to specific investment advice shown in advertisements were presented in a fair and balanced manner.

    Size Matters – The Staff observed advertisements that appeared to otherwise be materially misleading, due to presenting disclosures in an unreadable font on websites or in videos.

    Compliance Beyond Content

    The remainder of the Staff’s observations in the Risk Alert extend beyond the content of Advisers’ marketing materials and relate to 1) Compliance Rule deficiencies, 2) Books and Records Rule deficiencies and 3) Form ADV deficiencies. These three additional areas of note are seemingly independent of whether or not the content of an Adviser’s advertisements complied with the Marketing Rule.

    Advisers Must Say What They Do and Do What They Say: Compliance Rule Obligations Not Satisfied When Policy Gaps Exist – With respect to an Adviser’s obligation to adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act, including the Marketing Rule, the Staff noted that many Advisers have adopted compliance policies and procedures that include processes to comply with the Marketing Rule. These policies include providing training to relevant personnel and implementing processes to review and approve advertisements before dissemination. The Staff nonetheless observed instances of deficient policies, such as policies that were not sufficiently tailored to address the specific advertising or record retention practices of the Adviser, resulting in gaps in the policies’ ability to prevent violations of the Marketing Rule and/or the Books and Records Rule.

    The Staff also noted instances where policies were updated to reflect the Marketing Rule, but not implemented as written. For example, the Staff noted that it had observed policies that required net performance be included in any performance advertisements, but such Advisers’ advertisements did not include net performance, resulting in not only a violation of the Marketing Rule, but also the Advisers’ own policies. We also have observed deficiency letters that take this “layering approach” to non-compliant advertisements by layering onto a Marketing Rule deficiency for failing to comply with the Marketing Rule, a Compliance Rule deficiency for failing to comply with the Adviser’s own marketing policies. Adviser’s policies should be formally documented, sufficiently detailed and properly tailored to the Adviser’s actual marketing practices, in addition to being frequently updated to reflect the Adviser’s current marketing practices.

    Maintaining Books and Records Obligations – In light of an Adviser’s obligation to keep accurate books and records, an Adviser’s marketing policies should also address the preservation and maintenance of required records. All types of communications that could potentially be required books and records should be evaluated for retention purposes, including social media posts, and Advisers should ensure they maintain all necessary documentation supporting any performance figures included in advertisements, and, to the extent applicable, completed questionnaires and surveys used in the preparation of third party ratings.

    Reminder to Update ADV Disclosures – The Staff also observed that many Advisers had updated their Form ADV, including Part 1A, Item 5.L disclosures related to advertising practices and Part 2A, Item 14 brochure disclosures related to client referrals and other compensation, when applicable. However, the Staff observed Marketing Rule deficiencies on Form ADV, such as Advisers that inaccurately reported whether their advertisements included third-party ratings, performance results or hypothetical performance. The Staff also observed that some Advisers had failed to update their Form ADV Part 2A, Item 14 disclosures which continued to reference provisions of the prior and now superseded “cash solicitation rule”, as well as Advisers that inaccurately disclosed material terms and compensation figures regarding their referral arrangements. Advisers should ensure that their ADV disclosures regarding their marketing practices are accurate.

    Conclusion

    Compliance with the Marketing Rule requires careful attention to the substance of an Adviser’s marketing materials and also includes developing and following specific and tailored policies and procedures to ensure proper compliance with both the Marketing Rule as well as the Compliance Rule, the Books and Records Rule, and all Form ADV requirements.

    Authored by Christopher S. Avellaneda, Allison Scher Bernbach, Michael S. Didiuk, Marc E. Elovitz, Tinika M. Brown and Tarik M. Shah.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See also SEC Marketing Rule Update: Additional Focus Areas in Examinations, Schulte Alert (June 23, 2023) available here.

    [2] See also SEC Marketing Rule Update: What Private Fund Advisers Should Be Thinking About as the November 4 Compliance Date Approaches, Schulte Alert (Sept. 20, 2022) available here.

    [3] 17 CFR § 275.206(4)-7

    [4] 17 CFR § 275.204-2

    [5] See SEC Charges Five Investment Advisers for Marketing Rule Violations, SEC Press Release (April 12, 2024) available here.

    [6] See SEC Sweep into Marketing Rule Violations Results in Charges Against Nine Investment Advisers, SEC Press Release (Sept. 11, 2023) available here.

    [7] The Marketing Rule’s General Prohibitions prohibit advertisements from including: (i) an untrue statement of a material fact or omitting a material fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, not misleading; (ii) including a material statement of fact that the Adviser does not have a reasonable basis for believing it will be able to substantiate upon demand by the Commission; (iii) including information that would reasonably be likely to cause an untrue or misleading implication or inference to be drawn concerning a material fact relating to the Adviser; (iv) discussing any potential benefits to clients or investors connected with or resulting from the Adviser’s services or methods of operation without providing fair and balanced treatment of any associated material risks or limitations; (v) referencing specific investment advice provided by the Adviser in a manner that is not fair and balanced; (vi) including or excluding performance results, or presenting performance time periods, in a manner that is not fair and balanced and (vii) providing information that is otherwise materially misleading.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Christopher S. Avellaneda

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Allison Scher Bernbach

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Tarik M. Shah

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Labor law update: Union certification without winning the employee vote

    Labor law update: Union certification without winning the employee vote

    ARTICLE

    Labor law update: Union certification without winning the employee vote

    May 29, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As reported throughout the trade press, alcohol beverage companies are facing escalating pressure from unions and the National Labor Relations Board (or NLRB, the federal agency that enforces labor laws against both unionized and non-unionized companies). As recently as last month, an NLRB administrative law judge ordered Woodford Reserve Distillery to recognize and bargain with a union even though that union lost the election (45 employees voted against the union and only 14 in favor). This case reflects an aggressive tack at the NLRB that, across numerous fronts, poses increasing risk to operations, maneuverability and brand. But these risks are navigable.

    BACKGROUND

    For context, across all industries, union election petitions are up 35% over last year, and unfair labor practice investigations are up 7%. This follows consecutive years of spikes including a 53% jump in union election petitions in 2022 and a 19% increase in unfair labor practice investigations.

    Behind this data are historic changes in law on how unions form. In an August 2023 decision, the NLRB now offers a path to union certification without unions having to win secret ballot elections. A union with signed majority support from their target “bargaining unit” can demand recognition, and have that imposed if the employer does not file a petition for election in two weeks or if it commits unfair labor practices. Where a union files for an election, or the employer does and it is granted, even then the union can be certified without the union actually winning majority employee support.

    RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

    In a notable example of this development, in an April 2024 NLRB administrative law judge decision against Woodford Reserve, the company was ordered to recognize a union and bargain with it even after employees voted against unionizing. Prior to a November 2022 election, the company announced market-based raises, changed a few work policies for consistency, and provided bottles of whiskey after production targets were reached as it had done in the past on various occasions. The union filed objections to the election result and alleged unfair labor practices. Despite evidence that the company’s actions were for legitimate business purposes and practices and unrelated to the election, the NLRB administrative law judge found that the “timing and circumstances surrounding these actions” were “more than sufficient to infer unlawful motivation.” The employees’ votes and the entire election has been set aside pending potential appeal.

    In another case, over 60% of employees at Creature Comforts Brewing Company voted against joining a union in October 2023. But the union filed objections and alleged unfair labor practices by the employer during the nine-month union organizing campaign. The NLRB is investigating, and if the agency finds violations, it may issue a union recognition and bargaining order.

    DEVELOPING A RESPONSE PLAN

    Despite the NLRB’s trajectory in these cases and in many others, courts that can overrule the NLRB have long recognized the rights of employers to run their businesses, express their views on unionization, and expect due process in investigations and hearing processes. There is increasing regulatory pressure on these rights, but this is navigable with careful attention to technical labor laws and processes, timing and strategy.

    Proactive development of legal response plans can provide sufficient runway to decrease risk on all fronts and help ensure (1) that the company speaks with a consistent, compelling, and legally effective voice and (2) that employees’ rights to decide to join or not join a union are protected.

    KEY ELEMENTS FOR PLANNING

    • Understand current employee pressure points and expedite solutions
    • Stay up to date on local union activity, developments and key players
    • Evaluate policies and protocols for National Labor Relations Act compliance
    • Ensure appropriate access and communications rules
    • Provide manager and executive training and support
    • Communicate management’s perspective on unionization
    • Develop a rapid response game plan, including delegation of responsibilities for responding to union election petitions or demands for recognition

    The McDermott labor team represents alcohol beverage companies and employers across industries in all union-related matters. This includes legal planning and responses to organizing campaigns, resolution of NLRB investigations and labor arbitrations, and navigating union contract negotiations, all with a focus on protecting operations, brand and core company values.

    Authors

    Alexander L. Randolph

    Associate

    Los Angeles

    Alva C. Mather

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes