Content Type: Article

  • Supreme Court Rules Against Taxpayers in IRC Section 965 Case

    Supreme Court Rules Against Taxpayers in IRC Section 965 Case

    ARTICLE

    Supreme Court Rules Against Taxpayers in IRC Section 965 Case

    Jun 21, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    On June 20, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a 7-2 opinion in Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. __ (2024), ruling in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

    Moore concerned whether US Congress and the IRS could tax US shareholders of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) on those corporations’ earnings even though the earnings were not distributed to the shareholders. The case specifically focused on the so-called “mandatory repatriation tax” under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 965, a one-time tax on certain undistributed income of a CFC that is payable not by the CFC but by its US shareholders. Some viewed the case as hinging upon whether Congress has the power to tax economic gains that have not been “realized.” (i.e., In the case of a house whose value has appreciated from $500,000 to $600,000, the increased value is “realized” only when the house is sold and the additional $100,000 reaches the taxpayer’s coffers.)

    However, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, rejected that position on the ground that the mandatory repatriation tax “does tax realized income,” albeit income realized by a CFC. On this basis, they reasoned that the question at issue was whether Congress has the power to attribute realized income of a CFC to (and tax) US shareholders on their respective shares of the undistributed income. This group of justices ultimately decided Congress does have the power.

    The majority went out of its way to avoid expressing any opinion as to whether Congress can tax unrealized appreciation, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s concurrence and Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent asserting that it cannot. Perhaps the Court was signaling a distaste for the Billionaire Minimum Income Tax proposed by US President Joe Biden, which would impose a minimum 20% tax on the total income of the wealthiest American households, including both realized and unrealized amounts, among other Democratic proposals.

    Practice Point:

    We previously noted that certain taxpayers should consider filing protective refund claims contingent on the possibility that Moore would be decided in favor of the taxpayers. In light of the case’s outcome, however, those protective claims are now moot.

    In depth
    Authors

    Evan Walters

    Partner

    Chicago

    Samuel J. Preston

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Supreme Court Finds Insurer Has Standing Despite ‘Insurance Neutrality’

    Supreme Court Finds Insurer Has Standing Despite ‘Insurance Neutrality’

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    Supreme Court Finds Insurer Has Standing Despite ‘Insurance Neutrality’

    June 21, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Introduction

    On June 6, 2024, the Supreme Court – in a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Sotomayor – addressed the issue of whether an insurer holding financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim qualifies as a party in interest under Bankruptcy Code § 1109(b). Reversing the Fourth Circuit decision below, the Court concluded that insurer Truck Insurance Exchange is sufficiently concerned with the proceedings so as to qualify as a party in interest because § 1109(b) is “capacious” and “asks whether the reorganization proceedings might directly affect a prospective party, not how a particular reorganization plan actually affects that party.” Truck Ins. Exch. V. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., No. 22-1079, 2024 WL 2853106 (US June 6, 2024) (emphasis added).

    Background

    Debtors Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. and its parent company, Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., produced and sold products containing asbestos, and consequently faced tens of thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits. To resolve these liabilities, Debtors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, under the proposed reorganization plan, created a § 524(g) Asbestos Personal Injury Trust. Section 524(g) “allows a Chapter 11 debtor with substantial asbestos-related liability to establish and fund a trust that assumes the debtor’s liability for ‘damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products.’” Here, the trust contains all present and future claims related to liability springing from asbestos use. In addition to the § 524(g) trust, the Plan also set out to transfer all of Debtors’ rights under their insurance contracts to the trust.

    Truck Insurance served as Debtors’ primary insurer. Under the terms of Truck Insurance’s contract, transferred under the Plan, Truck Insurance is obligated to indemnify Debtors up to $500,000 per claim while Debtors must pay a $5,000 deductible per claim and assist in defending against the claims. At issue was the Plan’s provision treating insured and uninsured claims differently. While insured claims are to be filed in the tort system for the benefit of insurance coverage, uninsured claims are to be submitted directly to the trust for resolution. Most importantly, insured claims, unlike uninsured claims, lack disclosure requirements necessitating claimants to identify any related claims in order to reduce fraudulent and duplicative claims.

    With the above discrepancy in mind, Truck Insurance filed an objection to the otherwise consensual Plan. Truck Insurance objected, asserting that the trust does not comply with § 524(g) and “the Plan would provide ‘anti-fraud’ protections to the trust in resolving uninsured claims but not to Truck Insurance in resolving insured claims,” subjecting Truck Insurance to potentially millions of dollars in fraudulent tort claims. In re Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., 60 F.4th 73, 80 (4th Cir. 2023). Truck Insurance had previously insisted to Debtors that the anti-fraud measures be applied to insured claims but Debtors declined, leading to Truck Insurance’s other contention that the Plan “appear[ed] to be collusive and in violation of [the Debtors’] duty to cooperate and assist,” and in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.

    In September 2020, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina ruled against Truck Insurance and recommended that the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina confirm the Plan. In its recommendation, the Bankruptcy Court adopted Debtors’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and set out that Truck Insurance was not a party in interest and lacked standing to object to the Plan. More specifically, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that Truck Insurance could not object because the Plan is “insurance neutral” and returns Truck Insurance to the tort system exactly as it was prepetition. The Bankruptcy Court also stated that Truck Insurance lacked standing despite being a creditor in the case. Later in July 2021, the District Court adopted the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and confirmed the Plan. Truck Insurance subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

    The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit held: “[i]n determining whether a particular reorganization plan sufficiently affects an insurer’s legal rights to render that insurer a party in interest, courts typically look to see whether the plan is ‘insurance neutral.’” In re Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., 60 F.4th at 83. Put differently, “[i]f a plan is insurance neutral, the objecting insurer ordinarily is not a party in interest under § 1109(b) and thus lacks standing to challenge the substance of the Plan.” Id.

    According to the Fourth Circuit, a plan is deemed insurance neutral “if it doesn’t increase the insurer’s pre-petition obligations or impair the insurer’s pre-petition policy rights.” Id. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that “the Plan was insurance neutral because it expressly preserved Truck [Insurance]’s coverage defenses and the Debtors’ assistance-and-cooperation obligations under the policies, thereby placing Truck [Insurance] in the same position as it was pre-bankruptcy.” Id. at 83-84.

    Truck Insurance appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court granted certiorari.

    The Supreme Court Reverses the Fourth Circuit’s Decision

    The Court began its analysis by looking at the language, context and history of § 1109(b). This provision of the Bankruptcy Code sets out that “[a] party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.”

    The Court held that a common thread among the parties listed in § 1109(b)’s definition of a party in interest “is that each may be directly affected by a reorganization plan either because they have a financial interest in the estate’s assets…or because they represent parties that do.”

    As to context and history, the Court found the following. First, Congress uses the term “‘party in interest’ in bankruptcy provisions when it intends the provision to apply broadly,” and the “general theory behind [§ 1109(b)] is that anyone holding a direct financial stake in the outcome of the case should have an opportunity…to participate in the adjudication of any issue that may ultimately shape the disposition of his or her interest.” Second, “Congress consistently has acted to promote greater participation in reorganization proceedings.” Finally, drafters of the Bankruptcy Code hoped that with an expansive definition of party in interest, a broad range of individual/minority interests would be allowed to intervene in Chapter 11 cases and prevent dominant interests from controlling the restructuring process.

    The Court next held that insurers with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims are parties in interest given that reorganization proceedings can affect insurers’ rights in a variety of ways. For example, “a plan may be collusive, in violation of the debtor’s duty to cooperate and assist, and impair the insurer’s financial interests by inviting fraudulent claims.”

    In the case at hand, the Plan, lacking disclosure requirements for insured claims, risks exposing Truck Insurance to millions of dollars in fraudulent claims and thus gives Truck Insurance an interest in the bankruptcy proceedings and the proposed Plan. Additionally, since the Plan eliminates the Debtors’ ongoing liability and claimants have no incentive to propose barriers to their recovery, Truck Insurance may be the only entity with the incentive to identify any issues with the Plan. Citing to In re Global Indus. Technologies, Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 204 (CA3 2011), the Court held that “[w]here a proposed plan ‘allows a party to put its hands into other people’s pockets, the ones with the pockets are entitled to be fully heard and to have their legitimate objections addressed.”

    Lastly, in reversing the decision below, the Court also addressed the “insurance neutral” doctrine. According to the Court, “[t]his doctrine is conceptually wrong and makes little practical sense” because it “conflates the merits of an objection with the threshold party in interest inquiry.” More simply put, § 1109(b) evaluates whether a plan might affect a party, not how a plan actually affects a party. Thus, “[w]hether and how the particular proposed Plan… affects Truck [Insurance]’s prepetition and postpetition obligations and exposure is not the question.”

    Analysis and Takeaways

    • On the micro-level, this case broadens the ability of insurance companies to challenge proposed reorganization plans.
    • More generally, by reversing the Fourth Circuit’s decision and holding that Truck Insurance is a “party in interest,” the Court has established that future § 1109(b) inquiries are to look not at the merits of an objection, but rather whether a prospective party may be affected by a proposed plan.
    • The “insurance neutral” doctrine seemingly reached merits on the substance of a claim – before even considering the issue of standing. The Court roundly and unanimously rejected that approach.

    Authored by Douglas S. Mintz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Pending California Law Undermines Growth of Digital Health Companies and Patient Access to Virtual Care

    Pending California Law Undermines Growth of Digital Health Companies and Patient Access to Virtual Care

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Pending California Law Undermines Growth of Digital Health Companies and Patient Access to Virtual Care

    June 20, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In California, pending Assembly Bill 3129 (the Act) could severely limit the ability of digital health companies to grow and operate in the state by prohibiting arrangements between physician, psychiatric, and dental practices and any entity that furnishes business or management services to providers that accept investments from private equity groups and hedge funds. The legislation’s current definition of private equity is arguably broad enough to capture venture capital funds, angel investors, family offices and even the innovation or investment arms of academic and nonprofit medical centers. The Act is part of the recent wave of scrutiny from state and federal regulators and lawmakers toward private equity’s involvement in the healthcare space.

    This pending legislation continues to evolve, but as currently drafted its effect could undermine the ability of digital health companies seeking venture capital or other investments to fund growth from operating in or expanding to California. As a result, California’s physician, psychiatry and dental practice community could be transformed back into a “cottage industry” without the ability to leverage modern management, administrative and financial practices. Additionally, Californians could lose the opportunity to use the services of most virtual care platforms or other digital health offerings.

    In depth

    The Act contains several restrictions on healthcare transactions involving private equity and hedge fund backers, including (1) prior attorney general approval for private equity or hedge fund acquisition of healthcare facilities and provider groups and (2) a range of restrictions on arrangements and agreements (e.g., management services agreements) between provider practices and entities owned directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by private equity groups and hedge funds. Funding sources for management services organizations are diverse, including hospitals, venture capital, angel investors and nonprofit entities, and the broad definition of private equity use in the Act could potentially capture arrangements funded by these groups.

    Most notably, Section 1190.40(c)(2) of the Act prohibits physician, psychiatric or dental practices from entering into any arrangement or agreement with a private equity group or hedge fund (or an entity controlled directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by a private equity group or hedge fund) “for the furnishing of business or management services” for any fee passed through “directly or indirectly to a payor, purchaser of physician, psychiatric, or dental services, or patient.” The specific arrangements the Act prohibits is not clear since the Act does not define “business or management services.” However, on its face, this restriction could be interpreted to broadly prohibit providers from entering into standard management services agreements with any third party with private equity or hedge fund backing.

    This restriction would also undermine the physician practice management (PPM) structure, which uses management services agreements to create non-clinical and administrative stability across practices and to provide clinicians with the necessary business support to continue to grow their practice. The PPM structure is relied on by thousands of healthcare organizations, including virtual care providers, private practices, hospitals, managed care organizations and others, to take advantage of efficiencies, create more integrated care delivery approaches and, often, simply to operate efficiently. For digital health companies, the Act would limit their ability to grow and operate in California by restricting access to any outside capital from investment groups.

    The Act could hinder the ability of digital health companies to operate in California once they reach a certain size. Virtual care providers and other digital health companies often turn to venture capital or other investment groups to raise funds to launch the next stage of growth and expansion into new markets. Critically, the Act as drafted would seem to treat venture capital funds as a private equity group. For purposes of the Act, a private equity group is “an investor or group of investors who primarily engage in the raising or returning of capital and who invests, develops, or disposes of specified assets.” This broad definition could presumably capture venture capital funds and other sources of investments, including innovation centers of academic medical centers, which often provide capital to startups to fund their expansion or commercialization of a product with the goal of making a return on that investment (typically when the startup is sold or goes public).

    As a result, early-stage digital health companies seeking funding to grow (such as Series A funding) may find themselves captured by the Act and unable to serve California patients. This restriction could even limit expansion or new operations in California for large digital health companies that rely on PPM structures to integrate complex technologies developed by lay entities with quality clinical care.

    McDermott’s Digital Health Group is actively working on solutions should the Act become law and monitoring how the Act continues to develop. We are particularly watching to see if the Act will define what it means to “furnish business or management services” to a physician, psychiatric or dental group and whether any carve outs, such as those for virtual care providers or digital health providers generally, are included in the Act.

    Authors

    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

    Patrick Zanayed

    Partner

    Chicago

    Nathan Gray

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    Travis Jackson

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Joel C. Rush

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of Lanham Act’s Names Clause

    Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of Lanham Act’s Names Clause

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of Lanham Act’s Names Clause

    June 20, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Vidal v. Elster, a unanimous Supreme Court of the United States reversed the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that the Lanham Act’s names clause does not violate the First Amendment or trigger heightened scrutiny for judicial review. Although the Court was a 5-3-1 split on the reasoning, all the justices concurred in the holding.

    The majority opinion, penned by Justice Clarence Thomas, used historical analogues to find that the names clause is constitutional. Under 15 U.S.C. §1052(c), the names clause prohibits the registration of a trademark that “consists of or comprises a name … identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.” The Court noted that this decision was narrow, holding only that history and tradition establish that the names clause does not violate the First Amendment and making no claims about the constitutionality of other content-based, viewpoint-neutral trademark restrictions.

    Trademark applicants, therefore, must still obtain consent from any living individual whose name is featured in their application. The Court’s narrow holding does not extend to any other content-based, viewpoint-neutral trademark restrictions, which if challenged, will require further analysis from the courts.

    In depth

    Background

    Steve Elster filed a US trademark application in 2018 for the mark “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on shirts. The phrase was a reference to words used in a 2016 Republican presidential primary debate between then-candidates Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL). The US Patent & Trademark Office examining attorney, and subsequently the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, refused registration of the mark on grounds that it clearly referred to former President Trump, and that Elster did not have written consent to use former President Trump’s name in violation of the names clause.

    The Federal Circuit disagreed with the Board and concluded on appeal that the names clause is a viewpoint-neutral, content-based restriction on speech subject to at least intermediate scrutiny. With that standard of review, the Federal Circuit held that the government could not satisfy either intermediate or heightened scrutiny because the names clause does not advance any substantial governmental interest. After significant criticism of the Federal Circuit’s 2022 holding, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of whether the names clause violates the First Amendment.

    Opinion of the Supreme Court

    Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch joined in full. Justices John Roberts and Brett Kavanaugh joined all but Part III of the opinion, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined Parts I, II-A and II-B. Justices Kavanaugh, Barrett and Sonia Sotomayor each filed opinions concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with some or all of the majority’s reasoning.

    Content Based but Viewpoint Neutral

    The Court has previously distinguished between content-based and viewpoint-neutral regulations of speech, finding that content-based regulation is presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, the Court ruled twice that content-based trademark restrictions that discriminate on viewpoint (in those cases, the viewpoint that the trademark at issue gives offense) violate the First Amendment. In Elster’s case, however, the Court confirmed that the names clause is content-based but viewpoint-neutral because it is not grounded on the specific motivating ideology, perspective or opinion of the speaker. This caused the Court, for the first time, to decide whether heightened scrutiny extends to a content-based but viewpoint-neutral restriction on federal trademark registration.

    Referencing Historical Analogues

    The Court admitted its decision “is narrow” and does not set forth a definitive framework for assessing the constitutionality of other content-based but viewpoint-neutral trademark restrictions. Instead, Justice Thomas cited history and tradition to explain why the names clause does not require heightened scrutiny. The Court chose a selection of early trademark laws and cases to show that trademark law has always restricted registration based on the mark’s content, remarking that:

    [T]his history, reflected in the Lanham Act still today, demonstrates that restrictions on trademarks have always turned on a mark’s content. But, despite its content-based nature, trademark law has existed alongside the First Amendment from the beginning. That longstanding, harmonious relationship suggests that heightened scrutiny need not always apply in this unique context.

    The Court summarized that the names clause has long-standing roots in American trademark law and that the names clause restriction serves established common law principles that continue to be relevant today – namely, that a person has ownership over their own name and may not be excluded from using their name because of another party’s trademark rights, and that a person cannot obtain a trademark of another living person’s name without their consent so as to protect the living person’s reputation and goodwill. The Court, therefore, opined that it need not look any further than this history and tradition to conclude that the names clause is compatible with the First Amendment.

    Concurrences

    Although all nine justices agreed that the names clause is constitutional, there were several concurrences taking different approaches to the question, each largely in disagreement with the majority’s basis of the holding in “historical pedigree,” as stated in Justice Kavanaugh’s brief concurrence.

    Justice Barrett’s concurrence, joined in part by Justices Elena Kagan, Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, opined that the Court’s evidence, “consisting of loosely related cases from the late-19th and early-20th centuries, does not establish a historical analogue for the names clause” and questioned why searching for historical analogues was the chosen method to answer the constitutional question. Citing her own historical account alongside the principles of trademark law, Justice Barrett’s concurrence suggested a bright-line rule that “content-based criteria for trademark registration do not abridge the right to free speech so long as they reasonably relate to the preservation of the mark owner’s goodwill and the prevention of consumer confusion.” The opinion stated that because the names clause exists to identify and not confuse consumers about the source of the goods, it is commensurate with the trademark system’s essential purpose.

    Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, also submitted a concurrence rejecting the historical analogue approach and endorsing an approach based on First Amendment precedent. Based on these precedents, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence proffers its own two-step rule:

    First ask whether the challenged provision targets particular views taken by speakers on a given subject. If the trademark registration bar is viewpoint based, it is presumptively unconstitutional and heightened scrutiny applies; if it is viewpoint neutral, however, the trademark registration bar need only be reasonable in light of the purpose of the trademark system. Specifically, the trademark registration bar must reasonably serve its purpose of identifying and distinguishing goods for the public. If the challenged provision is both viewpoint neutral and reasonable, then it does not violate the Free Speech Clause.

    Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also highlights that refusing federal registration of a mark does not “impose a penalty” but merely “withholds a benefit.” Citing “various strands of precedent,” Justice Sotomayor posits that the Free Speech Clause permits governmental bodies to impose a “reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation” on a “state-bestowed entitlement.” In other words, Elster can continue to produce apparel with the TRUMP TOO SMALL phrase on it; he just will not receive the governmental benefit of a federally registered trademark.

    Practice Note: The Court’s admittedly narrow opinion confirms that the names clause does not violate the First Amendment, but the Court does not provide a framework for assessing whether all content-based, viewpoint-neutral trademark restrictions are unconstitutional or when and how heightened scrutiny should be applied.

    In light of this decision, trademark applicants should be careful of applying for federally registered marks containing the name of another living person without their express consent. McDermott’s intellectual property team will continue to report on related Supreme Court decisions and their implications. If you have questions, contact Sarah Bro or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Lisette Donewald, a summer associate in the Boston office, also contributed to this article.

    Authors

    Sarah Bro

    Partner

    Orange County, Los Angeles

    More insights

  • Government Actions Affecting Food, Drug and Medical Device Industries

    Government Actions Affecting Food, Drug and Medical Device Industries

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Government Actions Affecting Food, Drug and Medical Device Industries

    June 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    The food, drug and medical device industries comprise some of the most closely regulated sectors in the United States. The US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) actively exercises authority by constantly changing legislation and policies to keep pace with transformative technologies and emerging public health concerns. Issues such as artificial intelligence (AI), compounding, cannabis and national security are at the forefront of broadcast media and trade press, but they represent only a subset of regulatory focus areas potentially impacted this year.

    In this report we describe several actions, taking shape in 2024 by the federal government, that are expected to have broad impact within the food, drug and medical device industries. The summary is intended to focus on those actions that are most highly anticipated and is not meant to provide an exhaustive overview of all federal regulations or guidance affecting these industries. Readers should keep in mind that individual states also promulgate regulations and guidance that could impact the sectors.

    In depth
    Tabs

    James R. Ravitz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Paul S. Gadiock

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Michael W. Ryan

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Jeff Weinstein

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Marissa Hill Daley

    Law Clerk

    Washington, DC

    Jae Hyun Lee

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Group medical captives, level funding, and US healthcare policy

    Group medical captives, level funding, and US healthcare policy

    ARTICLE

    Group medical captives, level funding, and US healthcare policy

    June 18, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    In a recent article in Managed Healthcare Executive, Peter Wehrwein examines the trend of self-funding of group health benefits by smaller employers who used to depend mainly or entirely on fully insured programs.

    The shift to self-funding, the article explains, is grounded in the Employee Retirement Income Security (ERISA), which exempts self-funded plans from state health insurance mandates, and in the Affordable Care Act, which strictly regulates small group and individual health insurance policies. Wehrwein presents the issues from the perspective of state and federal policymakers and regulators, which the article characterizes as “worrisome.” But what of the perspective of small employers?

    Healthcare costs are rising at rates that are well in excess of the growth of real gross domestic product. This appears unsustainable, but these costs nevertheless keep climbing inexorably. For employers, the pressure to do something is compelling.

    The article claims that self-funding is more expensive than fully insured coverage. But compared to what fully insured coverage, exactly? By definition, many small employers can only purchase coverage in the small-group market. This is, however, the very market these same employers are fleeing, and they are doing so precisely because it is too expensive. Indeed, the prohibitive cost of small-group market coverage is why individual coverage Health Reimbursement Arrangements have failed to gain widespread acceptance, particularly in large urban environments.

    Wehrwein correctly identifies two options for self-funding: group medical captives and level funding, both of which he views as problematic. Small employers appear to disagree, however, based on their actions. In their view, these options instead represent viable options in their quest to provide competitive group health coverage to their employees. The two options for self-funding identified in the article are fundamentally different solutions that are appropriate for different cohorts of small employers.

    Group Medical Captives (50 – 200 Covered Lives)

    The term “captive” insurer traditionally referred to a “single parent” captive, which is a subsidiary of an operating company/parent that insures the risks of the operating company/parent and in some instances its affiliates. Historically, single-parent captives insured property and casualty risks and workers’ compensation, but they have more recently been pressed into service to cover employee welfare plan risks.

    A group captive allows a group of unrelated employers to form a collective insurance company to manage some portions of their risks. Where, as is the case here, the risk is most often medical stop-loss coverage, the arrangement is referred to colloquially as a “medical stop-loss group captive.” For an extended discussion of medical stop-loss group captive funding arrangements and their accompanying legal and regulatory issues, please see our Special Report.

    There is some debate over what size employer might most benefit from participation in a medical stop-loss group captive. While the conventional wisdom is that 200 covered lives is the sweet spot, credible estimates go as low as 50 covered lives. Whatever the appropriate number, medical stop-loss captives can in the right circumstances offer substantial savings when compared to fully insured coverage. To be fair, they are also a bit more complicated, and they usually require the assistance of a captive program manager. (Program managers are typically benefits consultants, managing general underwriters, or other sponsors, organizers, or promoters. They generally provide, bundle or otherwise facilitate access to the various products and services required for captive-program maintenance and operation.)

    The principal objection part of state policymakers and regulators is that medical stop-loss group captives tend to attract groups with better risk experience. Complaints of “cherry-picking” abound. The vast majority of the groups that are a good fit for medical stop-loss group captive coverage are not in a state’s group market, however. This means that their costs are a function of their individual, employer-level claims experience. These groups are generally unable to obtain claims data from their carriers, which means, among other things, that they may not get credit for their good claims experience and can by unduly punished for their bad claims experience. Captive funding is attractive to these group because it offers transparency.

    Level-Funded Products (2 – 10 Employees)

    Level-funded plans are sometimes described as a hybrid between a fully insured health plan and a fully self-funded health plan. What distinguishes a level-funded plan from a traditional stop-loss program is that the employer pays a fixed annual sum paid monthly in an amount that covers claims, fixed costs, stop-loss premiums and administrative expenses. The Managed Healthcare Executive article cites the following KFF data: “In 2018, just 6% of workers for small employers (less than 200 employees) were covered by level-funded plans. In 2023, 38% were.”

    Level-funded plans are usually marketed to employers with 2 to 50 employees. These are employers whose only other option is the state small-group market. The predictability of monthly premiums is part of the reason that level funding is attractive to this cohort. Because a portion of a level-funded plan’s costs are paid with employee contributions, which are always plan assets, any rebate paid to the plan sponsor as a result of favorable claims experience must be shared with covered employees.

    The article reports that the cost of stop-loss insurance in level-funded plans “can be as much as 20% to 30% of your total healthcare costs.” This is likely correct, and it may even be low. Even at these percentages, level-funded plans can still offer a compelling bargain when compared to their small-group counterparts. That this is the case is, in our view, not so much an indictment of level funding as it is an unvarnished assessment of the state of small-group coverage. No one should be surprised that employers are increasingly opting for level-funded arrangements. They are, after all, purchasing coverage in an insurance market. These employers are merely reacting to market forces.

    The challenge with level funding, in our view, has nothing to do with product design. It is rather that level-funded plans are at bottom self-funded plans. This means that they are subject to all the compliance obligations – e.g., the ERISA fiduciary standards and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act privacy and security rules – with which all self-funded plans must comply.

    The insurance markets should be able to provide the robust, affordable health coverage that employers need, but that is not currently the case – which is why these employers are looking to self-funding.

    More insights

  • The StaRUG and its significance for the restructuring of real estate companies – the most important questions and answers

    The StaRUG and its significance for the restructuring of real estate companies – the most important questions and answers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The StaRUG and its significance for the restructuring of real estate companies – the most important questions and answers

    June 18, 2024

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The new year 2024 brings with it some important legislative changes for the real estate industry across Germany. In our Real Estate Update, we take a look at selected legislative changes that have already come into force or are likely to do so.

    Read the full alert in German.

    In depth

    1. Was verbirgt sich hinter der Abkürzung „StaRUG“?

    Hinter der Abkürzung StaRUG verbirgt sich das Gesetz über den Stabilisierungs- und Restrukturierungsrahmen für Unternehmen (Unternehmensstabilisierungs- und -restrukturierungsgesetz). Das StaRUG ist am 1. Januar 2021 in Kraft getreten. Es bietet damit um ein verhältnismäßig neues Instrument, das im Immobiliensektor erst vereinzelt zur Anwendung gekommen ist.

    Das StaRUG zielt darauf ab, Unternehmen frühzeitig und vor Eintreten einer Insolvenz zu sanieren, indem es neue Restrukturierungsinstrumente und -verfahren einführt. Selbst in Zeiten eines schwachen Immobilienmarkts, stark gestiegener Baukosten und erschwerter (Re-)Finanzierungsbedingungen muss eine Unternehmenskrise nicht zwangsläufig in die Insolvenz führen. Vielmehr bieten frühzeitige Sanierungsmaßnahmen, insbesondere die rechtzeitige Aufnahme entsprechender Verhandlungen mit den Finanzierungspartnern, häufig gute Aussichten auf eine erfolgreiche außergerichtliche Sanierung. Solche Maßnahmen stoßen allerdings dort an ihre Grenzen, wo einzelne Stakeholder, auf deren Sanierungsbeitrag das Unternehmen zwingend angewiesen ist, sich einer konsensualen Lösung verschließen. In der Vergangenheit blieb in einem solchen Fall bei sich verstärkender Krise oft nur die Einleitung eines Insolvenzverfahrens. Obwohl auch ein solches einen großen Instrumentenkasten für erfolgreiche Sanierungen bereithält, bestand das Bedürfnis nach einem weniger einschneidenden Sanierungsverfahren, das in einem früheren Krisenstadium die Möglichkeit zu Mehrheitsentscheidungen gegen den Willen einzelner Gläubiger bietet. Daher wurde das StaRUG eingeführt. Das StaRUG ist ein freiwilliges Verfahren. Eine Pflicht zur Durchführung besteht nicht.

    Das Herzstück des StaRUG bildet der Restrukturierungsplan, welcher es ermöglicht, bestimmte Gläubiger- und Anteilseignerrechte zu gestalten, beispielsweise Gläubigerforderungen zu reduzieren oder auch ganz auszuschließen. Ein weiteres Instrument des StaRUG ist die gerichtliche Anordnung zur Einschränkung von Zwangsvollstreckungsmaßnahmen (sog. Stabilisierungsanordnung). Diese verschafft dem Schuldner regelmäßig erst den nötigen zeitlichen Spielraum, um den Restrukturierungsplan ohne drohende Zwangsvollstreckung ausarbeiten und mit den Planbetroffenen, also den Gläubigern und Anteilseignern, auf deren Forderungen und Rechte sich der Restrukturierungsplan auswirkt, abstimmen zu können.

    2. Kann das StaRUG auf Immobiliengesellschaften (sog. PropCos) angewendet werden? Welche Anforderungen müssen Immobiliengesellschaften hierfür erfüllen?

    Die Durchführung eines StaRUG-Verfahrens ist grundsätzlich auch bei Immobiliengesellschaften möglich, sofern diese die gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen erfüllen. Insbesondere muss Zahlungsunfähigkeit drohen, d.h. dass die Immobiliengesellschaft zwar aktuell noch zahlungsfähig ist, planerisch aber nicht in der Lage sein wird, die in den nächsten zwei Jahren voraussichtlich fällig werden Zahlungspflichten im Zeitpunkt ihrer Fälligkeit zu erfüllen.

    Sofern eine insolvenzrechtliche Überschuldung oder Zahlungsunfähigkeit bereits eingetreten ist und somit die Pflicht zur Stellung eines Insolvenzantrags bereits besteht, findet das StaRUG keine Anwendung mehr.

    3. Welche Auswirkungen kann ein StaRUG-Verfahren auf Rechte oder Forderungen der Gläubiger haben? Welche Forderungen/laufende Verträge können in das StaRUG-Verfahren einbezogen werden und welche grundsätzlich nicht? Welche Rolle spielen insbesondere Mietverträge und Finanzierungsgläubiger bei der Restrukturierung von Immobilienunternehmen gemäß dem StaRUG?

    Der Restrukturierungsplan im Rahmen eines StaRUG-Verfahrens kann grundsätzlich die Kürzung (bis auf Null) oder Stundung von Forderungen gegen den Schuldner sowie das vollständige oder teilweise Erlöschen bestimmter Sicherungsrechte an Gegenständen des schuldnerischen Vermögens, wie Grundschulden und Hypotheken, vorsehen. Nicht erforderlich ist hierbei die Einbeziehung sämtlicher Forderungen und Sicherungsrechte. Vielmehr ermöglicht das StaRUG dem Schuldner, bestimmte Gläubigergruppen, die von den Maßnahmen betroffen sein sollen, nach sachgerechten Kriterien auszuwählen. Betroffen von den Regelungen des Restrukturierungsplans sind hierbei nicht nur Forderungen und Rechte der zustimmenden Gläubiger, sondern auch der in den Restrukturierungsplan einbezogenen, diesen aber ablehnenden Gläubiger, sofern eine hinreichende Gläubigermehrheit besteht und eine gerichtliche Bestätigung erfolgt (siehe hierzu auch Frage 5). Im Ergebnis ist eine vorinsolvenzliche Restrukturierung somit auch gegen den Willen einzelner planbetroffener Gläubiger möglich.

    Neben Forderungen, die vor dem Stichtag der Restrukturierung entstanden sind, können auch bedingte oder noch nicht fällige Forderungen einbezogen werden. Das betrifft beispielsweise Forderungen aus Senior- und Mezzanine-Darlehen, z.B. Zins- und Tilgungsleistungen und andere finanzielle Verpflichtungen. Nicht einbezogen werden können hingegen bestimmte gesetzlich geschützte Forderungen, insbesondere Löhne und Gehälter.

    Gleichzeitig können Regelungen zur Aufnahme neuer Finanzierungen – z.B. zur Deckung des Liquiditätsbedarfs im Restrukturierungszeitraum – und deren Absicherung getroffen werden.

    Mietverträge können im StaRUG-Verfahren ebenso wie andere laufende Verträge nicht unmittelbar gekündigt oder beendet werden. Im Rahmen des Mietverhältnisses entstandene Verbindlichkeiten hingegen können Teil des Restrukturierungsplans sein und darunter gestaltet, z.B. gekürzt oder gestundet werden.  Dies betrifft beispielsweise die Forderung eines Mieters gegen die PropCo auf Auszahlung eines Baukostenzuschusses oder auch, sofern das StaRuG- Verfahren bei einer Mietergesellschaft durchgeführt wird, die Einbeziehung entstandener Verbindlichkeiten einer Mietergesellschaft aus Mietverhältnissen, z.B. auf Zahlung der Miete. Im Übrigen ist es erforderlich, Lösungen einvernehmlich mit den Vermietern/Mietern auszuhandeln. Sonderkündigungsrechte in der Insolvenz des Mieters bestehen dagegen nur in dessen Insolvenzverfahren, so dass ein solches aus Mietersicht Vorteile bietet, wenn die Beendigung von Mietverträgen zur Sanierung erforderlich ist.

    4. Wie läuft ein Restrukturierungsverfahren nach dem StaRUG ab?

    Das StaRUG-Verfahren verläuft in mehreren Schritten und besteht regelmäßig im Wesentlichen aus der Planaufstellung, -abstimmung, und -bestätigung sowie der Inanspruchnahme planflankierender Instrumente durch den Schuldner.

    Zunächst erfolgt die Ausarbeitung eines Restrukturierungsplans auf Basis eines Sanierungskonzepts. Der Restrukturierungsplan besteht aus einem darstellenden (Beschreibung Krisenursachen, Situation des Schuldners ohne Restrukturierung und einer Vergleichsrechnung zum nächstbesten Alternativszenario) und einem gestaltenden Teil (Restrukturierungsmaßnahmen sowie Anlagen mit Aussagen zur Bestandsfähigkeit des Schuldners, einer Vermögensübersicht und einer Erfolgs- und Ertragsplanung sowie Angaben zur Veränderung der Rechtsstellung der Planbetroffenen). Es erfolgt eine Einteilung der ausgewählten Gläubiger in Gläubigergruppen.

    Nach Ausarbeitung des Restrukturierungsplans steht es dem Schuldner frei, diesen Plan entweder in einem gerichtlichen oder einem außergerichtlichen Verfahren zur Diskussion und zur Abstimmung durch die planbetroffenen Gläubiger zu stellen. Ist die erforderliche Zustimmung zum Restrukturierungsplan erreicht worden (siehe hierzu Frage 6), kann dieser auf Antrag des Schuldners gerichtlich bestätigt werden. Das Gericht prüft den Restrukturierungsplan und bestätigt ihn, sofern er den gesetzlichen Anforderungen entspricht und die Interessen der planbetroffenen Gläubiger angemessen berücksichtigt werden.

    Mit der gerichtlichen Bestätigung des Restrukturierungsplans treten die im gestaltenden Teil festgelegten Wirkungen ein. Dies gilt auch im Verhältnis zu ordnungsgemäß am Abstimmungsverfahren beteiligte planbetroffenen Gläubiger, die gegen den Plan gestimmt haben oder die an der Abstimmung nicht teilgenommen haben.

    5. Was hat es mit der Bildung der planbetroffenen Gläubigergruppen auf sich und nach welchen Kriterien werden diese gebildet?

    Um zu gewährleisten, dass im Wesentlichen ähnliche Rechte gleichbehandelt werden und dass Restrukturierungspläne angenommen werden können, ohne die Rechte betroffener Parteien in unangemessener Weise zu beeinträchtigen, verlangt das StaRUG eine Gruppenbildung, soweit Planbetroffene mit unterschiedlicher Rechtsstellung betroffen sind. Innerhalb einer jeden Gruppe sind aus diesem Grund grundsätzlich allen Planbetroffenen auch gleiche Rechte anzubieten.

    Die Aufteilung in Gläubigergruppen muss nach sachlichen Kriterien erfolgen, wobei qualifiziert nachrangige Forderungen – wie z.B. Gesellschafterforderungen – zwingend eine eigene Gruppe bilden und besicherte und unbesicherte Gläubiger ebenfalls getrennt eingruppiert werden müssen. Eine weitere Unterteilung kann nach Maßgabe wirtschaftlicher Interessen erfolgen, sofern diese Gruppen sachgerecht voneinander abgegrenzt werden können. In Betracht kommt hier eine weitere Unterteilung in (Unter-)gruppen wie z.B. Banken, Mieter oder Gesellschafter, eine Unterteilung nach Art der Leistung (z.B. Sachleistungen oder Dienstleistungen) sowie nach Zeitpunkt der Fälligkeit einer Leistung (z.B. kurzfristig oder langfristig) oder Art der Forderung (besichert oder unbesichert). Die Kriterien für die Abgrenzung sind im Restrukturierungsplan anzugeben. Der Einteilung in Gruppen kommt mit Blick auf die notwendigen Mehrheiten (siehe hierzu Frage 6.) entscheidende Bedeutung zu und sollte daher sorgfältig abgewogen werden.

    6. Müssen alle Gläubiger dem Restrukturierungsplan zustimmen? Welche Abwehrmöglichkeiten gibt es?

    Grundsätzlich stimmen nur die vom Restrukturierungsplan betroffenen Gläubiger über diesen ab, da auch nur diese den Planwirkungen unterliegen. Zur Annahme des Restrukturierungsplans ist dabei grundsätzlich erforderlich, dass in jeder Gruppe eine Mehrheit von mindestens drei Viertel für den Restrukturierungsplan stimmt. Die Stimmrechte der planbetroffenen Gläubiger bemessen sich dabei grundsätzlich nach dem Betrag ihrer einbezogenen Forderungen und nicht nach Köpfen.

    Wird in einer Gruppe die Dreiviertelmehrheit verfehlt und stimmt diese gegen den Plan, gilt die Zustimmung dieser Gruppe gleichwohl als erteilt, wenn die Gruppenmitglieder nicht schlechter stehen als sie ohne den Plan stünden, sie angemessen an dem wirtschaftlichen Wert beteiligt werden, der auf der Grundlage des Plans den Planbetroffenen zufließen soll (sog. Planwert) und die Mehrheit der abstimmenden Gruppen dem Plan mit den erforderlichen Mehrheiten zugestimmt hat (sog. gruppenübergreifende Mehrheitsentscheidung bzw. Cross-class Cram-down).

    Planbetroffene Gläubiger, die gegen den Restrukturierungsplan gestimmt haben, können gegen die gerichtliche Planbestätigung im Wege eines Minderheitenschutzantrags gerichtlich vorgehen, wenn sie geltend machen können, dass sie durch den Plan voraussichtlich schlechter gestellt werden, als sie ohne Plan stünden. Demgegenüber steht dem Schuldner die sofortige Beschwerde zu, wenn die Bestätigung des Restrukturierungsplans abgelehnt wurde.

    7. Wie lange dauert ein Restrukturierungsverfahren nach dem StaRUG? 

    Die Dauer einer Restrukturierungssache nach dem StaRUG kann je nach Komplexität und Umfang des Restrukturierungsplans sowie nach Größe des Unternehmens variieren. Gemäß den Bestimmungen des Gesetzes ist vorgesehen, dass üblicherweise zwischen der Anzeige der Restrukturierungssache und der Rechtskraft der gerichtlichen Planbestätigung nicht mehr als sechs Monate vergehen sollen. Unter bestimmten Ausnahmen hat der Schuldner jedoch die Möglichkeit, die Wirkung der Anzeige einmalig um weitere sechs Monate zu verlängern.

    8. Wie unterscheidet sich die Restrukturierung von Immobiliengesellschaften unter dem StaRUG von einem Insolvenzverfahren?

    Ebenso wie ein StaRUG-Verfahren kann ein Insolvenzverfahren zur Sanierung der Immobiliengesellschaft genutzt werden. Ein Eigenverwaltungs- oder Schutzschirmverfahren kann – sofern die Voraussetzungen hierfür vorliegen – genutzt werden, um eine Sanierung in Eigenregie unter Aufsicht eines gerichtlich bestellten Sachwalters im Wege des Insolvenzplanverfahrens durchzuführen. Insolvenzplanverfahren und StaRUG-Verfahren unterscheiden sich insbesondere in der Intensität der Eingriffe und der Reichweite der Auswirkungen.

    Ein Insolvenzverfahren betrifft stets sämtliche Gläubiger der Gesellschaft. Es ist gerade nicht möglich, einen Restrukturierungsplan nur hinsichtlich bestimmter Gläubigergruppen zu erstellen. Das Insolvenzverfahren bietet sehr weitreichende Eingriffsmöglichkeiten in die Rechte der Gläubiger. So können – anders als im StaRUG-Verfahren – etwa nicht nur in Rechte von Arbeitnehmern eingegriffen werden, sondern auch weitreichend Vertragsverhältnisse beendet werden. Die von der Insolvenzordnung vorgesehenen Möglichkeiten zur Beendigung von Verträgen der Gesellschaft bietet nicht nur die Möglichkeit, sich von unvorteilhaften Vertragsverhältnissen zu trennen, sondern solche auch durch den Verhandlungshebel der Kündigungsmöglichkeit neu zu verhandeln. Derart intensive Eingriffsmöglichkeiten sind dem StaRUG fremd.

    Dagegen schafft das StaRUG-Verfahren sehr frühzeitig in der Unternehmenskrise die Möglichkeit, insbesondere Finanzierungsstrukturen neu zu gestalten. Für PropCos kann dies vor dem Hintergrund massiv gesunkener Marktwerte und in der Konsequenz übermäßiger Verschuldung eine solvente Neuordnung der Kapitalstruktur außerhalb der Insolvenz und damit Refinanzierbarkeit oder – im Fall von Projektentwicklungen – den Eintritt in die Baufinanzierungsphase erst ermöglichen. Sofern die erforderliche Zustimmung der relevanten Gläubiger mit Dreiviertelmehrheit erzielt werden kann, können sanierungsunwillige Gläubiger überstimmt werden (siehe hierzu Frage 6). So könnte etwa eine bestehende Finanzierung auch gegen den Willen z.B. eines Finanzierungsgläubigers umstrukturiert werden. Wenn Gesellschafter dabei ihre Gesellschafterstellung halten wollen, setzt dies setzt allerdings regelmäßig voraus, dass die Gesellschafter ihrerseits einen Sanierungsbeitrag z.B. durch weiteren Kapitaleinschuss leisten.

    Sowohl Insolvenzverfahren als auch StaRUG-Verfahren sind also geeignet, Immobiliengesellschaften in der Unternehmenskrise zu sanieren. Es hängt vom Krisenstadium und den für die Sanierung erforderlichen Maßnahmen ab, welches Verfahren das passende ist. Durch die Einführung des StaRUG-Verfahrens bietet sich insbesondere die Gelegenheit, komplexe Finanzierungsstrukturen bereits frühzeitig zu restrukturieren. Immobiliengesellschaften sollten bei Anzeichen einer Krise rechtzeitig handeln, um alle Handlungsoptionen abwägen und die richtigen Sanierungsmaßnahmen identifizieren zu können. Je früher die Optionen bewertet werden, desto größer ist die Entscheidungsfreiheit hinsichtlich der Wahl einer außergerichtlichen Verhandlungslösung, eines StaRUG-Verfahrens oder eines gesteuerten Insolvenzverfahrens zur Sanierung der Gesellschaft.

    Authors

    Tina Happ

    Associate

    Frankfurt

    Christoph Coenen

    Partner

    Frankfurt

    More insights

  • Cellect Your Weapon: Navigating Potential Arguments in the Aftermath of In re Cellect

    Cellect Your Weapon: Navigating Potential Arguments in the Aftermath of In re Cellect

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Cellect Your Weapon: Navigating Potential Arguments in the Aftermath of In re Cellect

    June 17, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In In re Cellect, 81 F.4th 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2023), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a later-expiring patent can be invalid for obviousness-type double patenting (ODP) in view of an earlier-expiring, commonly owned patent, even if the later expiration date is solely due to patent term adjustment (PTA).[1] The Federal Circuit denied a petition for en banc review of Cellect in January 2024 and, in May 2024, Cellect LLC filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.

    The Cellect decision expanded the scope of potentially invalidating prior art and created new pitfalls for patent prosecutors. Patent owners and potential defendants should remain alert for potential Cellect issues while the Supreme Court considers whether to take up Cellect LLC’s petition.

    In depth

    Procedural History and Impact

    The Patent Trial & Appeal Board found several related Cellect patents invalid for ODP in view of each other. Although the Cellect patents all claimed priority to the same original application, their expiration dates varied based on different PTA grants. Because the asserted claims of several Cellect patents were obvious in view of earlier-expired Cellect patents, the Board found those claims invalid for ODP.

    On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Cellect argued that PTA should not be considered in the ODP analysis. Rather, the relevant expiration date for purposes of ODP should be the original expiration date before PTA was granted. The Federal Circuit previously found in Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018), that a similar rule applies to patents subject to patent term extension (PTE). In Cellect, the Federal Circuit rejected extending that rule to a PTA context, noting explicit differences between the statutory language governing (and purpose behind) PTA and PTE. the Federal Circuit specifically noted that, unlike the PTE statute, the PTA statute explicitly referred to terminal disclaimers, which are the common solution to and “inextricably intertwined with” ODP.[2] The Federal Circuit also rejected Cellect’s argument that there was insufficient evidence supporting the “equitable concerns underlying ODP,” such as the “improper timewise extension of a patent term and potential harassment by multiple assignees.” As to the latter consideration, the Federal Circuit noted that the patents at issue had expired recently and that a risk of separate ownership existed. The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the Board’s finding of invalidity.

    Under Cellect, PTA is a double-edged sword. Once beloved by patent owners for extending the term of their monopoly, PTA is now a potential invalidity minefield in their portfolios, especially where continuations or continuations-in-part are present. Where PTA once served only to increase defendants’ potential damages exposure, it now serves (for the time being) as a new arrow in their invalidity quiver.

    The Arguments on Certiorari

    In its petition for certiorari, Cellect advanced two primary arguments. First, it argued the Federal Circuit wrongly supplanted a statutory PTA mandate with the judge made ODP doctrine. Specifically, Cellect notes that 35 U.S.C. § 154, which governs PTA, includes “shall” language nearly identical to that in the relevant PTE provision (Section 156) and that various Patent Act provisions reference one or the other of these sections in a way that indicates US Congress intended the two provisions be treated similarly. Thus, according to Cellect, Novartis applies equally to PTE and PTA. Second, Cellect argued that the Federal Circuit erred by applying ODP as a hardline rule lacking “traditional equitable considerations,” such as gamesmanship or evidence of a risk that the patents at issue might be split between multiple assignees.

    Finally, Cellect addressed “two perceived differences” cited by the Federal Circuit to distinguish Sections 154 and 156, arguing that Section 154’s reference to terminal disclaimers only meant to imply that “PTA cannot extend a patent’s term when circumstances already required the applicant to disclaim patent term” and that PTE addresses delays in product approval while PTA addresses delays in processing the patent is “a distinction without a difference.” The terminal disclaimer issue is one of the Federal Circuit’s strongest points, and Cellect’s response is thin. For instance, Cellect does not explain what other “circumstances” besides ODP would require a terminal disclaimer. Its interpretation would seemingly allow ODP to be corrected only if discovered during prosecution (at which point the examiner may require a terminal disclaimer before allowing the claims and, thus, before a determination would be made regarding PTA) but not if discovered in subsequent litigation.

    Unless and until the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit’s ruling, potential patent litigants should be on the lookout for potential Cellect issues and keep the following tips in mind.

    Practice Tips for Patent Prosecutors

    Force a Restriction Requirement During Prosecution

    A restriction requirement allows patentees to file divisional applications where multiple distinct inventions may have been claimed in the same patent application. The benefit of filing a divisional application is that it brings the claims in the subsequent divisional patent under the safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. 121, which states, “A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other application” (emphasis added). Thus, the claims of a divisional patent cannot be used against an earlier-filed but later-expiring parent patent.

    Provoke ODP Rejection During Prosecution

    Patentees can also provoke an ODP rejection during prosecution and address the patent examiner’s concerns regarding any ODP issues. The benefit of raising, addressing and disposing an ODP argument during prosecution is that it reduces the chances (even if slightly) that a subsequent district court would rule that the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) got the ODP decision wrong. This strategy would allow patentees to lean on previous PTO findings on ODP issues and ask Article III courts to give deference to an examiner’s findings on the very same issue that is before the district court (e.g., ODP rejection over another patent from the same family).

    Review Soon-to-Expire Families for Potential Remedies

    As to already-issued patents, owners should implement routine procedures at regular intervals to assess which patent families are expiring soon and determine whether any involve asymmetric expiration due to PTA. For any such families, owners should compare the claims across patents and consider proactively filing terminal disclaimers on any later-expiring patents with claims that may be found obvious in view of claims in earlier-expiring patents. While the terminal disclaimer will certainly shorten the life of at least one patent in the family, it is preferable to losing the validity of the patent entirely due to ODP.

    Seek PTE in Lieu of PTA, if Available

    Owners of pharmaceutical patents should strongly consider pursuing PTE. PTE is available for patent applications directed to certain human drugs, food or color additives, medical devices, animal drugs and veterinary biological products to restore to the terms of those patents some of the time lost while awaiting premarket government approval from a regulatory agency. (See 35 U.S.C. § 156 and MPEP 2750.) As noted above, in Novartis, the Federal Circuit held that extension under PTE is not considered in the ODP analysis.

    If PTA is awarded, consideration should be given to filing a terminal disclaimer preemptively.[3] Some patent owners may prefer the certainty of eliminating Cellect risk over the additional patent term. However, because it’s unclear whether and how the Supreme Court will address Cellect, this option is (for the time being) most applicable for patents issuing from long-pending prosecutions with extensive family trees, where it’s more likely that an earlier-expiring patent from the family will come up for expiration (and potentially create an irreversible Cellect problem) in the near term.

    Practices Tips for Patent Infringement Plaintiffs

    Plaintiffs should check for Cellect issues before filing suit.

    If there is a potential ODP issue over a patent that has not yet expired, consider whether the ODP arguments are strong enough to warrant proactively filing a terminal disclaimer. If the earlier-expiring patent still has substantial life remaining, it may make sense to delay filing a terminal disclaimer until invalidity contentions or claim construction clarify the ODP risk. However, it is prudent to docket a reminder to file a terminal disclaimer (if necessary) before it is too late.

    If there is a potential ODP issue over an expired patent, ODP cannot be avoided by filing a terminal disclaimer. In such cases, plaintiffs should consider focusing on the expired patent and/or only patentably distinct claims from the later-expiring patent.

    Practice Tip for Patent Infringement Defendants

    Defendants should look for Cellect issues as part of their initial case triage. Because some plaintiffs may be unaware of this still-nascent issue, it could have effective “shock value” in settlement negotiations but keep timing in mind. If the underlying reference patent has not yet expired but soon will, playing the Cellect card too early could give plaintiffs an opportunity to moot this potential defense via a terminal disclaimer.

    Authors

    Syed K. Fareed

    Partner

    Austin

    More insights

  • SEC Adopts Information Security and Notification Amendments to Regulation S-P

    SEC Adopts Information Security and Notification Amendments to Regulation S-P

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Adopts Information Security and Notification Amendments to Regulation S-P

    June 12, 2024

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 16, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced that it had adopted amendments (“Amendments”)[1] to Regulation S-P (“Reg S-P”)[2]. The SEC explained that the Amendments represent an effort to “modernize and enhance” rules designed to protect consumers’ nonpublic information and privacy. The rules create new requirements for “covered institutions,” which include brokers or dealers (“broker-dealers”) and registered investment advisers (“RIAs”).[3]

    The Amendments will require, among other things, broker-dealers and RIAs (1) to develop, implement and maintain written policies and procedures for an incident response plan, (2) to develop written policies and procedures reasonably designed to require service provider oversight and (3) to provide notice to customers within 30 days in the event that “sensitive customer information” is compromised. The Amendments also broaden the scope of information covered by Reg S-P, implement additional recordkeeping obligations for covered institutions, and provide an exception to the annual privacy notice delivery requirement.

    The Amendments were published in the Federal Register on June 3, 2024. Any RIA with $1.5 billion or more in assets under management and any broker-dealer that is not a small entity under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”), for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act will have to comply within 18 months of the date of publication in the Federal Register. RIAs with less than $1.5 billion in assets under management and other broker-dealers will have 24 months to comply.

    New Obligations for Broker Dealers and RIAs

    Incident Response Plan. The Amendments will require that broker-dealers and RIAs “develop, implement, and maintain written policies and procedures for an incident response program that is reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover from unauthorized access to or use of customer information.”[4] The Amendments do not prescribe specific steps for response plans, but a response plan must include certain general elements, including procedures “to assess the nature and scope of any incident and to take appropriate steps to contain and control the incident to prevent further unauthorized access.”[5] Covered institutions will be required to maintain written documentation of any detected breach, as well as any related response and recovery, under the Amendments’ recordkeeping obligations described below.

    Further, incident response plans must include procedures to notify individuals whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been accessed or used without authorization (in each instance a “breach” as used in this alert) in accordance with a covered institution’s notification obligations under the Amendments.[6] Incident response plans must also include written policies and procedures to require service provider oversight as further described below.

    Service Provider Oversight. The Amendments require that incident response plans include, “written policies and procedures reasonably designed to require oversight, including through due diligence and monitoring,” of service providers[7] and to ensure that applicable notification requirements are carried out in the event of a breach at the service provider.[8] The Amendments require that broker-dealers and RIAs ensure service providers take measures to “(A) protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer information, and (B) provide notification to the covered institution in the event of a breach resulting in unauthorized access to a customer information system maintained by the service provider,” as soon as possible but no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of a breach, in order to allow covered institutions to carry out their own incident response plans and notice obligations, to the extent they have any.[9] Service provider oversight may include independent certifications and attestations obtained from service providers as part of due diligence and monitoring but ultimately oversight remains a risk-based analysis and should generally be tailored to the facts and circumstances of each service provider relationship.[10]

    Customer Notification Requirements. Broker-dealers and RIAs will be required to provide clear and conspicuous written notice, or ensure that such notice is provided, to affected individuals[11] whose sensitive customer information[12] was, or was reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization. While the requirement in the Amendments is to adopt an incident response plan that addresses unauthorized access to or use of customer information, the notification requirement only applies to sensitive customer information that has been, or is reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience (i.e., the notification requirement is narrower than the plan requirement). Covered institutions must provide notice to customers as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 days “after becoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of customer information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred.”[13] Note, in the event that a covered institution experiences a breach affecting another covered institution’s customers, the covered institution that experienced the breach may meet its notice obligation by “ensur[ing] that such notice is provided” by coordinating with the other covered institution to determine that only one of the covered institutions will provide the notice.[14] Such notice must include, among other things, a description of the incident and the type of information that was accessed or used without authorization, relevant or estimated dates of the incident and contact information to inquire about the incident.[15]

    There is a presumption in the Amendments that notification is required, and notification may only be avoided if covered institutions determine, after a reasonable investigation of the breach, that “sensitive customer information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience.”[16] The determination must be conclusive.[17] Accordingly, after becoming aware of that a breach occurred, or was reasonably likely to have occurred, covered institutions will have 30 days to conduct an investigation, and if determined necessary, provide notice to affected individuals.[18] Note, while the Amendments require notice no later than 30 days after the “becoming aware” trigger, notice may be required earlier if, based on the facts and circumstances of the incident, notice is practicable earlier (e.g., a few days).[19] Certain factors are applicable, including “the time required to assess, contain, and control the incident.”[20]

    Determining whether a harm or inconvenience caused by a breach is “substantial” requires a facts and circumstances analysis. The Amendments do not define “substantial harm or inconvenience;” however, harms or inconveniences provided in the Proposed Amendments like “personal injury, financial loss, expenditure of effort, or loss of time” or “theft, fraud, harassment, physical harm, impersonation, intimidation, damaged reputation, or impaired eligibility for credit”, among others, may be a starting point for a covered institution’s determination.[21] Lastly, for any determination that notice is not required, the deciding broker-dealer or RIA must maintain a record of the investigation and the basis for its determination that notice to customers was not warranted.[22] Such records should support that the investigation was reasonable (i.e., outlining the nature and scope of the breach, including whether the breach was the result of an intentional external intrusion or an inadvertent internal unauthorized employee, the overall duration of the incident, the accounts and information compromised, etc.).[23]

    Customer Notification of Service Provider Breaches. Broker-dealers and RIAs will be required to provide customers with notice, or ensure notice, of a breach of one of its service providers that is not itself a covered institution. The Amendments provide that covered institutions “may enter into a written agreement with [] service provider[s] to notify affected individuals on [a] covered institution’s behalf”.[24] However, the Amendments make clear that the obligation to ensure affected individuals are notified in accordance with the Amendments’ notice requirements remains with the covered institution.[25] Accordingly, broker-dealers and RIAs may need to conduct due diligence to confirm service providers have provided sufficient notice. This may include maintaining or requesting copies of notices provided to customers by service providers, request certifications or attestations regarding notifications from service providers or, among other things, test that service providers have given notice by confirming delivery of notice from customers.[26]

    Scope of Information Covered by Reg S-P. The Amendments expand the scope of information covered by Reg S-P. The new defined term “customer information” applies Reg S-P to personal information regardless of a client relationship – meaning not only is a covered institution’s own customer information in scope, but also the customer information of other financial institutions[27] whose information has been provided to the covered institution.[28] This amendment brings consistency to the information currently protected under Reg S-P’s safeguards and disposal rules.

    Annual Privacy Notice Delivery Exception. The Amendments also include an exception to the requirement to deliver a privacy notice on an annual basis if the covered institution (1) only discloses non-public personal information to non-affiliated third parties in accordance with exceptions to the requirement that consumers must be given certain rights to opt out of such disclosure or notice[29] and (2) it has not changed its policies and practices regarding the disclosure of non-public personal information from its most recently delivered notice.

    Recordkeeping Obligations. The Amendments require certain recordkeeping obligations, including, but not limited, to covered institutions’ written policies and procedures established under the Amendments, written documentation of any detected breach, as well as any related response and recovery, investigation and determination regarding the covered institution’s notice obligation related to a breach. A covered institution’s recordkeeping obligations also extend to policies and procedures established to oversee, monitor and conduct due diligence on service providers and any written documentation of any related service provider agreements.

    Implementation Timeline

    A “Larger Entity” will need to comply with the Amendments by Dec. 3, 2025, 18 months following the Amendments’ publication in the Federal Register on June 3, 2024. Any RIA with $1.5 billion or more in assets under management is considered a larger entity. All broker-dealers that are not small entities under the Exchange Act for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act will be considered a larger entity for purposes of compliance with the Amendments. All other broker-dealers and RIAs will be considered a “Smaller Entity” and will need to comply by June 3, 2026, 24 months following the Amendments’ publication in the Federal Register.

    Next Steps for Broker-Dealers and RIAs

    With compliance dates ranging from 18 to 24 months following publication of the Amendments, broker-dealers and RIAs should begin work to understand their obligations and how their current compliance framework will need to change under the revised rules. Such steps should include:

    • Reviewing and revising incident response plans to meet the policy and procedure and notification requirements under the Amendments. Many broker-dealers and RIAs have already implemented incident response plans that might need to be updated in light of the changes. A review of whether your organization’s incident response plan is reasonably designed to detect, respond and recover from a breach should take place, including whether the plan is easy for employees to understand and carry out when faced with a breach.
    • Assessing existing policies and procedures regarding internal access to customer information, including assessments of the firm’s processes and procedures for approving access to customer information and periodic assessments of existing permissioning.
    • Due to the 30-day notice requirement in the Amendments, covered institutions should identify mechanisms for providing notice to customers and make sure those mechanisms are available and can be used quickly, if needed.
    • Develop and enhance policies and procedures for overseeing service providers through due diligence and monitoring. Covered institutions should review service provider due diligence questionnaires to know whether changes are necessary to ensure appropriate measures are in place for covered institutions to meet their Reg S-P obligations.
    • Revisit current service provider agreements. While the Amendments do not require written agreements with service providers, a written agreement and certain representations or attestations may facilitate covered institutions’ compliance with the Amendments’ oversight and notification obligations.
    • Ensure that there is a process in place for service provider agreements that are due to be renewed are done so in a manner that accounts for the Amendments’ requirements.
    • Work to understand the scope of the “customer information” within your organization. Because the Amendments apply to not only a covered institution’s own customer information, but also the customer information of other financial institutions, covered institutions should review the customer information that either they, or service providers on their behalf, are in possession of or handle or maintain.

    Authored by William J. Barbera, Kelly Koscuiszka, Philip J. Bezanson, Tarik M. Shah and Cody A. Lind.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The amendments were initially proposed in March 2023 (“Proposed Amendments”). See also “Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information and Safeguarding Customer Information,” Exchange Act No. 34-100155 (May 16, 2024) (“Adopting Release”).

    [2] Originally adopted in 2000, Reg S-P generally requires proper safeguards for customer nonpublic information through the adoption of written policies and procedures, proper disposal of consumer information and obligations to provide privacy notice and opt-out provisions to customers.

    [3] In addition to broker-dealers (including funding portals) and RIAs, the Amendments also apply to investment companies and certain registered transfer agents – collectively, “covered institutions” under the Amendments. Although private funds are not “covered institutions” subject to Reg S-P, the Adopting Release explains that private funds may be subject to the Federal Trade Commission’s Safeguards Rule under Regulation P which requires, generally, a comprehensive information security plan that includes an incident response plan as well as requirements related to selecting and retaining service providers. See Adopting Release at 5, footnote 2; 181-82.

    [4] Adopting Release at 13. The Adopting Release makes clear, both any instance of unauthorized access to and unauthorized use of customer information are considered an “incident” and will trigger a covered institution’s incident response program. Adopting Release at 16-7.

    [5] Adopting Release at 13.

    [6] Adopting Release at 17.

    [7] A service provider is defined as “any person or entity that receives, maintains, processes, or otherwise is permitted access to customer information through its provision of services directly to a covered institution.” See final rule 248.30(d)(10). The Adopting Release makes clear this includes affiliates of covered institutions. See Adopting Release at 88.

    [8] See final rule 248.30(a)(5).

    [9] Adopting Release at 71.

    [10] Adopting Release at 76.

    [11] If unable to identify the specific individuals whose sensitive customer information has been accessed or used, covered institutions must provide notice to all individuals whose sensitive customer information resides on the breached customer information system. See Adopting Release at 25.

    [12] Notification requirements under the amendments are limited to breaches involving “sensitive customer information” defined as “any component of customer information alone or in conjunction with any other information, the compromise of which could create a reasonably likely risk of substantial harm or inconvenience to an individual identified with the information.” See final rule 248.30(d)(9). Certain enumerated examples include information uniquely identified with an individual (e.g., social security number, biometric record, routing code, telecommunication identifying information, etc.) and account information in combination with authenticating or access information. See final rule 248.30(d)(9)(ii).

    [13] See final rule 248.30(a)(4)(iii).

    [14] See final rule 248.30(a)(4).

    [15] See final rule 248.30(a)(4)(iv).

    [16] See final rule 248.30(a)(4).

    [17] For example, if a covered institution has information that an external actor has gained unauthorized access to sensitive customer information, but lacks information indicating whether any individual’s sensitive customer information was or was not used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience, the investigation would be inconclusive and would require notice to affected individuals. See Adopting Release at 26-7.

    [18] Adopting Release at 54.

    [19] Adopting Release at 56.

    [20] Adopting Release at 56.

    [21] Adopting Release at 49.

    [22] See final rule 275.204-2(a)(25)(iii).

    [23] Adopting Release at 26.

    [24] See final rule 248.30(a)(5)(ii).

    [25] See final rule 248.30(a)(5)(iii).

    [26] See Adopting Release at 86-7.

    [27] Reg S-P defines “financial institution” generally to mean any institution the business of which is engaging in activities that are financial in nature or incidental to such financial activities as described in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)). 17 CFR 248.3(n). Although the definition of “financial institution” is broad, the Adopting Release includes that private funds “are not subject to Reg S-P”. See Adopting Release at 5, footnote 2.

    [28] “Customer information” includes “any record containing nonpublic personal information as defined in section 248.3(t) about a customer of a financial institution, whether in paper, electronic, or other form, that is in the possession of a covered institution or that is handled or maintained by the covered institution or on its behalf.” See final rule 248.30(d)(5)(i). The Adopting Release explains that defining customer information to include “handled or maintained on behalf of a covered institution” expands the scope to a covered institution’s customer information handled or maintained by a service provider. See Adopting Release at 97.

    [29] Exceptions generally include (1) an exception to opt out requirements for service providers and joint marketing when nonpublic personal information is provided to a nonaffiliated third party to perform services or functions on the covered institution’s behalf, (2) an exception to notice and opt out requirements for processing and servicing transactions where disclosing nonpublic personal information as necessary to effect, administer or enforce a transaction that a consumer requests or authorizes, and (3) other notice and opt out exceptions for specific instances (e.g., with consent, to protect confidentiality, prevent fraud, report to necessary organizations, etc.) as described under 248.15. See 17 CFR 248.13-15.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    William J. Barbera

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Tarik M. Shah

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Securities Lending Update: SEC Extends Review Period for Proposed Securities Lending Rules

    Securities Lending Update: SEC Extends Review Period for Proposed Securities Lending Rules

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Securities Lending Update: SEC Extends Review Period for Proposed Securities Lending Rules

    June 12, 2024

    Read time: 33 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Executive Summary

    On June 10, 2024, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”) published a notice extending the period by which the Commission must take action on the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.’s (“FINRA”) proposed new FINRA Rule 6500 series (“SLATE Rules”)[1] to Aug. 5, 2024. FINRA’s proposed rulemaking is mandated by recently adopted Rule 10c-1a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”) and, if adopted, would implement FINRA’s Securities Lending and Transparency Engine (“SLATE”) for the reporting of securities loans.

    The proposed SLATE Rules would apply to any covered person or reporting agent subject to Exchange Act Rule 10c-1a (“Rule 10c-1a”), a group that includes registered broker-dealers, registered investment advisers, private funds, agent banks and registered clearing agencies, as well as foreign (non-US) persons.[2] Registered investment advisers and private funds are not subject to FINRA jurisdiction, but FINRA anticipates referring potential violations of the SLATE Rules by registered investment advisers and other non-FINRA members to the SEC. Accordingly, to protect against an SEC enforcement investigation, registered investment advisers and private funds will need to comply with the FINRA SLATE Rules.

    While the proposed SLATE Rules generally adhere to the requirements of Rule 10c-1a, certain provisions would mandate the reporting and subsequent public dissemination of data elements not required under Rule 10c-1a. This appears to exceed Rule 10c-1a’s mandate, with requires that FINRA “implement rules regarding the format and manner of its collection of information described in [Rule 10c-1a]…”[3]

    Absent additional extension by the SEC, the SLATE Rules will become effective on Aug. 5, 2024; however, covered persons would not have to report to SLATE until January 2026.[4]

    Relevant Background

    As further discussed in Schulte’s Nov. 7, 2023, Alert,[5] on Oct. 13, 2023, the SEC adopted Rule 10c-1a,[6] which requires that any “covered securities loan”[7] be reported to FINRA[8] the day on which the loan is entered into or modified. Rule 10c-1a separately mandates that FINRA make certain information about covered securities loans publicly available by no later than the morning of the business day after the covered securities loan was reported to FINRA, including information about individual covered securities loans and, separately, aggregate transaction activity and the distribution of loan rates for each reportable security.[9]

    Additionally, Rule 10c-1a mandates that FINRA, as the current sole registered national securities association (“RNSA”), “implement rules regarding the format and manner of its collection of information described in” in the rule.[10] The proposed SLATE Rules and SLATE system represent FINRA’s attempt to comply with this requirement.

    While Rule 10c-1a became effective on Jan. 2, 2024, covered persons and reporting agents (collectively, “Reporting Persons”) will not need to begin reporting information to FINRA until January 2026 (at the earliest).

    Reporting Covered Securities Loans to FINRA

    Rule 10c-1a requires that covered persons report to FINRA, or engage a reporting agent to report to FINRA, a number of data elements relating to each covered securities loan. Rule 10c-1a mandates that such information be reported to FINRA by the end of the day on which a covered securities loan is affected.[11]

    In adopting Rule 10c-1a, the SEC anticipated that the required FINRA rulemaking would further define a number of Rule 10c-1a’s required data elements and related reporting obligations.[12] While the FINRA Proposal helps clarify certain data elements required by Rule 10c-1a, the proposed SLATE Rules include a number of data elements not required by Rule 10c-1a. We discuss the clarified data elements and, separately, the additional data elements below.[13]

    Clarified Data Elements

    Timing Requirements

    While Rule 10c-1a states that covered securities loans must to be reported to FINRA by the end of the day on which a covered securities loan is effected, Rule 10c-1a does not define “end of the day” for purposes of Rule 10c-1a.

    The SLATE Rules would require that initial covered securities loans be reported to FINRA within the time periods outlined in proposed FINRA rule 6530(a)(1). Specifically, for initial covered securities loans that are effected:

    • At or after 12:00:00 a.m. Eastern Time (“ET”) through 7:45:00 p.m. ET on a business day, the required information must be reported before 8:00:00 p.m. ET that same day.[14]
    • After 7:45:00 p.m. ET on a business day, the required information must be reported before 8:00:00 p.m. ET the next business day (T+1);[15] and
    • On a Saturday, a Sunday, a federal or religious holiday or at any time on a day on which SLATE is not open must be reported before 8:00:00 p.m. ET the next business day (T+1).[16]

    While FINRA noted this timing is “generally consistent with the reporting deadline used by commercial vendors to which some Covered Persons currently voluntarily submit securities lending information,” it may nevertheless prove burdensome for certain participants, particularly as certain covered persons may not currently participate in similar reporting regimes and may need to develop systems and processes to deliver the required information on a timely basis.

    Certain Non-Confidential Data Elements

    As noted above, Rule 10c-1a requires that covered persons or their reporting agents report a number of data elements to FINRA by the end of the day on which a covered securities loan is affected. FINRA will, on a loan-by-loan basis, make certain of these data elements publicly available on the following business day (such data elements, the “Non-Confidential Data Elements”).[17] Specifically, Rule 10c-1a requires covered persons or their reporting agents report the following Non-Confidential Data Elements to FINRA by the end of the day on which a covered securities loan is effected:

    1. The legal name of the security issuer, and the Legal Entity Identifier (“LEI”) of the issuer, if the issuer has a non-lapsed LEI;
    2. The ticker symbol, International Securities Identification Number (“ISIN”), Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (“CUSIP”), or Financial Instrument Global Identifier (“FIGI”) of the security, or other security identifier;
    3. The date the covered securities loan was effected;
    4. The time the covered securities loan was effected;
    5. The name of the platform or venue where the covered securities loan was effected;
    6. The amount, such as size, volume, or both, of the reportable securities loaned;
    7. The type of collateral used to secure the covered securities loan;
    8. For a covered securities loan collateralized by cash, the rebate rate or any other fee or charges;
    9. For a covered securities loan not collateralized by cash, the securities lending fee or rate, or any other fee or charges;
    10. The percentage of collateral to value of reportable securities loaned required to secure such covered securities loan;
    11. The termination date of the covered securities loan; and
    12. Whether the borrower is a broker or dealer, a customer (if the person lending securities is a broker or dealer), a clearing agency, a bank, a custodian, or other person.

    The proposed SLATE Rules would further define the following non-confidential data elements: (i) the name of the platform or venue where the covered securities loan was effected, (ii) the amount, such as size, volume, or both, of the reportable securities loaned, (iii) for a covered securities loan collateralized by cash, the rebate rate or any other fee or charges, (iv) for a covered securities loan not collateralized by cash, the securities lending fee or rate, or any other fee or charges, (v) the termination date of the covered securities loan.

    Name Of The Platform Or Venue Where The Covered Securities Loan Was Effected

    Rule 10c-1a(c) requires that covered persons or their reporting agents report the “name of the platform or venue where the covered securities loan was effected” when reporting a covered securities loan to FINRA.

    The FINRA Proposal notes that FINRA would “make available a list of platforms/venues and their associated identifiers for [such] reporting purposes. If a loan occurs on a platform/venue not yet included on the FINRA list, the covered person must enter the name of the platform/venue in the SLATE report.”[18] Notwithstanding this clarification, it remains unclear how, exactly, venues will be identified and whether FINRA has anticipated potential information leakage concerns when identifying the “venue” of an individually negotiated loan or other risks associated with identifying the platforms by name (e.g., the name of a prime broker when a fund or other customer borrows securities from its prime broker).

    The Amount Of The Reportable Securities Loaned

    Rule 10c-1a(c) requires that covered persons or their reporting agents report the “amount, such as size, volume, or both, of the reportable securities loaned” when reporting a covered securities loan to FINRA.

    FINRA’s proposal notes that “for a Covered Securities Loan of a security reportable to CAT, a Covered Person must report the number of shares loaned. For a Covered Securities Loan of a security reportable to TRACE or the MSRB’s RTRS, a Covered Person must report the total par value of the securities loaned.”

    Rebate Rates, Securities Lending Fees and Other Fees and Charges

    Rule 10c-1a(c) requires that covered persons or their reporting agents report “[f]or a covered securities loan collateralized by cash, the rebate rate or any other fee or charges” and, separately, “[f]or a covered securities loan not collateralized by cash, the securities lending fee or rate, or any other fee or charges.”

    The FINRA Proposal notes that “[w]hen reporting a rebate rate or lending fee…, a Covered Person must report the rebate rate or lending fee as a percentage, and separately report the dollar cost of any other fees or charges.”[19] While the exact manner of reporting will be dictated by the SLATE Participant specifications,[20] it appears that loans with floating rates may require daily modifications to reflect the effective rate. As such, it appears that FINRA has elected not to implement commenters’ suggestion that floating rate loans be reported by identifying (i) the reference rate and (ii) the spread thereto, and instead will require daily reporting of the effective rate.

    Termination date of the Covered Securities Loan

    Rule 10c-1a(c) requires that covered persons or their reporting agents report the scheduled “termination date” when reporting covered securities loans to FINRA.

    The FINRA Proposal clarifies that where the parties have agreed to a termination date such date must be provided. Where, instead, the parties have agreed to an “open” term, the termination date field would be left blank.

    Additional Data Elements

    As noted above, the proposed SLATE Rules would require that Reporting Persons transmit a number of data elements to SLATE not required by Rule 10c-1a (as opposed to the above “clarifications” of certain elements required under Rule 10c-1a).

    For instance, the SLATE Rules would require that Reporting Persons report:

    • Whether the covered person is the lender, borrower or intermediary;
    • The unique internal identifier assigned to the covered securities loan by the covered person responsible for reporting the loan to SLATE;
    • If the covered securities loan is an allocation of an omnibus loan effected pursuant to an agency lending agreement, the unique internal identifier for the associated omnibus loan assigned by the covered person responsible for reporting the covered securities loan to SLATE;
    • Whether the loan was pursuant to an exclusive arrangement with the borrower or intermediary;
    • Whether the loan was made to an affiliate of the lender or intermediary;
    • An indicator identifying the amount of any covered securities loan that did not settle by the close of SLATE system hours on the expected settlement date (this would require subsequent reporting by end-of-day on the date the loan actually settled);
    • An indicator noting when a covered securities loan has been terminated, including for covered securities loans that did not and will not settle;[21]
    • An indicator if the reported loan rebate rate or lending fee accounts for: (1) a billing adjustment or correction to amounts previously rebated or charged; or (2) the value of a distribution or other economic benefit associated with the reportable security; and
    • An indicator if a loan rebate rate or lending fee reflects a rate or fee involving a basket of at least 10 unique reportable securities for a single agreed rate or fee for the entire basket.

    The proposed SLATE Rules also expressly state that Reporting Persons will have to report such “modifiers and indicators as required by either the Rule 6500 Series or the SLATE Participant specification.”[22] Accordingly, the proposal indicates that FINRA may require data elements in addition to the above and that certain required elements may not be subject to the FINRA rulemaking process.

    The inclusion of such data elements has the potential to increase the risk of information leakage associated with these reporting requirements.

    Aggregate Loan Transaction Activity & Distribution of Loan Rates

    Rule 10c-1a(g)(5) requires that FINRA, in its capacity as the sole RNSA, “as soon as practicable, and not later than the morning of the business day after covered securities loans are effected or modified, make publicly available, on a daily basis, information pertaining to the aggregate transaction activity and distribution of loan rates for each reportable security…” (Emphasis added).

    Aggregate Loan Transaction Activity

    Under the proposed SLATE Rules, the following categories of aggregated information would be disseminated on a security-by-security basis:

    • The aggregate volume of securities (both in total and broken down by collateral type) subject to an initial covered securities loan or modification to the amount of reportable securities loaned reported on the prior business day;
    • The aggregate volume of securities (both in total and broken down by collateral type) subject to a rebate rate or fee modification reported on the prior business day;
    • The aggregate volume of securities subject to an initial covered securities loan or modification to the amount of reportable securities loaned subject to a term loan (i.e., a loan with a specified term) and subject to an open loan (i.e., a loan without a specified term) reported on the prior business day;
    • The aggregate volume of securities subject to an initial covered securities loan or modification to the amount of reportable securities loaned broken down by borrower type (as specified in the SLATE Rules) on the prior business day; and
    • The aggregate number of initial covered securities loans and terminated covered securities loans (both in total and broken down by collateral type) reported on the prior business day.

    Notably, a number of these aggregated data elements appear to be expansions relative to the plain language Rule 10c-1a.[23] In discussing the purpose of providing such additional information, FINRA notes that such data points may provide useful information to market participants without separately assessing the potential for information leakage. However, in recognition of potential information leakage concerns, FINRA would omit from the daily loan volume statistics information for reportable securities for which there are three or fewer types of initial covered securities loans and loan modifications reported to SLATE on a given day.[24]

    Distribution of Loan Rates

    Under the FINRA Proposal, for each Reportable Security for which an initial covered securities loan or modification thereto has been reported to SLATE, FINRA will disseminate, no later than the next business day, the relevant security identifier (as determined by FINRA) and information pertaining to the distribution of loan rebate rates or lending fees.

    For covered securities loans collateralized by cash, this information would include, as applicable:

    • Highest rebate rate,
    • Lowest rebate rate, and
    • Volume weighted average of the rebate rates reported to SLATE.

    For covered securities loans not collateralized by cash, this information would include, as applicable:

    • Highest lending fee,
    • Lowest lending fee, and
    • Volume weighted average of the lending fees reported to SLATE.

    The FINRA Proposal indicates that FINRA may disseminate additional information regarding the distribution of loan rates in its discretion.[25] This indicates that FINRA may elect to disseminate such additional information absent additional rulemaking.

    Fees

    The FINRA Proposal notes that FINRA anticipates making information regarding covered securities loans available on its website “free of charge for personal, non-commercial purposes only.”[26] FINRA anticipates charging for commercial or “professional” uses and separately indicated that it will assess reporting fees on SLATE Participants.[27] Such fees would be subject to a separate FINRA rule filing.[28]

    Participation in SLATE

    Proposed Rule 6520, if adopted, would establish the requirements applicable to covered persons and reporting agents regarding their participation in SLATE. Under the proposed SLATE Rules, a “SLATE Participant” would be “any person that reports securities loan information to SLATE, directly or indirectly,”[29] and would include both persons who connect to SLATE directly to report covered securities loan information, including reporting agents, as well as any covered person who has engaged a reporting agent or other agent.[30] Accordingly, all covered persons would be Slate Participants (and subject to the relevant SLATE Rules), regardless of whether the covered person engaged a reporting agent, and would be required to comply with all requirements applicable to Slate Participants, including completion of the SLATE onboarding process.

    This may prove exceedingly difficult in practice and would prevent persons from acting as covered persons without first becoming SLATE Participants (absent violation of the SLATE Rules and, potentially, Rule 10c-1a). This may have a negative impact on market participants’ willingness and ability to engage in securities lending activities.

    Member Specific Obligations

    In addition to the reporting requirements described above, the proposed SLATE Rules would impose additional supervisory obligations on FINRA members, including a requirement that FINRA members relying on a reporting agent take reasonable steps to ensure that the reporting agent is complying with SEA Rule 10c-1a and FINRA Rule 6530.[31] FINRA also noted that it would expect FINRA members to review the covered securities loan reporting data made available to it by the reporting agent or through FINRA’s system to evaluate the accuracy and timeliness of the covered securities loan reports submitted on its behalf by the reporting agent.[32]

    Authored by William J. Barbera, Marc E. Elovitz, Kelly Koscuiszka and Kristopher J. Kendall.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change to Adopt the FINRA Rule 6500 Series (Securities Lending and Transparency Engine (SLATE™)), Release No. 34-100046 (89 Fed. Reg. 38203) (May 7, 2024) (“FINRA Proposal”) available here.

    [2] See the definitions of “covered person” and “reporting agent” at, respectively, paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(4) of Rule 10c-1a.

    [3] See Rule 10c-1a(f). (Emphasis added).

    [4] Separately, industry groups have filed a lawsuit in the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seeking to invalidate Rule 10c-1a. This lawsuit is ongoing. The petition for review can be found here.

    [5] Available at /insights/sec-securities-lending-rule-increased-transparency-and-the-risk-of-information-leakage/.

    [6] Reporting of Securities Loans, 88 Fed. Reg. 75644 (Nov. 3, 2023) (“10c-1a Adopting Release”).

    [7] See Rule 10c-1a(j)(2)(i). Subject to certain exceptions, a covered securities loan is defined as “[a] transaction in which any person on behalf of itself or one or more other persons, lends a reportable security to another person.”

    [8] In its capacity as the current sole registered national securities association.

    [9] See Schulte’s previous Alert regarding the substance of Rule 10c-1a, available here.

    [10] See Rule 10c-1a(f).

    [11] See Rule 10c-1a(c).

    [12] See the 10c-1a Adopting Release at 75667.

    [13] As noted above, any requirements beyond those required under Rule 10c-1a appears to go beyond Rule 10c-1a(f)’s mandate.

    [14] See proposed Rule 6530(a)(1)(A)

    [15] See proposed Rule 6530(a)(1)(B)

    [16] See proposed Rule 6530(a)(1)(C).

    [17] Other than the size of a particular covered securities loan, which will be disseminated on the twentieth business day after the covered securities loan is effected, the Non-Confidential Data Elements will be made publicly available by no later than the morning of the business day after the covered securities loan was effected or modified.

    [18] See the FINRA Proposal at n. 28.

    [19] See the FINRA Proposal at n. 30.

    [20] That is, technical specifications that will be available to SLATE Participants for reporting purposes.

    [21] As proposed, Rule 10c-1a would have effectively required a report whenever a settled covered securities loan terminated by requiring a modification to the loan amount, although such modifications would be report on a twenty (20) business day delay, while the reporting of loan termination would be reported on the next business day.

    [22] See the FINRA Proposal at 38207.

    [23] As relevant, Rule 10c-1a(g)(5) requires that FINRA make publicly available “information pertaining to the aggregate transaction activity and distribution of loan rates for each reportable security…” (Emphasis added).

    [24] See the FINRA Proposal at 38216.

    [25] See the FINRA Proposal at n. 79, noting “FINRA may, in its discretion, publish or distribute additional metrics regarding loan rebate rates and lending fees free of charge.” (Emphasis added).

    [26] See the FINRA Proposal at 38212.

    [27] Id.

    [28] Id.

    [29] See proposed Rule 6510(h).

    [30] See the FINRA Proposal at 38210, stating “‘SLATE Participant’ therefore would include both persons who connect to SLATE directly to report Covered Securities Loan information, including Reporting Agents, as well as any Covered Person who has engaged a Reporting Agent or other agent.” (Emphasis added).

    [31] See the FINRA Proposal at 38210.

    [32] Id. (Emphasis added)


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    William J. Barbera

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights