Content Type: Article

  • Making Sense of a Rare Robinson-Patman Act Plaintiffs’ Verdict

    Making Sense of a Rare Robinson-Patman Act Plaintiffs’ Verdict

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Making Sense of a Rare Robinson-Patman Act Plaintiffs’ Verdict

    June 11, 2024

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    What Happened?

    On May 20, 2024, US District Court Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald rejected a popular over-the-counter eyedrop seller’s bid for a new trial and granted a pricing injunction impacting two large wholesale membership clubs following one of very few Robinson-Patman Act (RPA) plaintiff-side jury verdicts in recent years.

    The case, L.A. International Corporation v. Prestige Brands Holdings, Inc., centered around popular eye drops called Clear Eyes® (Clear Eyes) sold by Medtech Products Inc. (Medtech) to wholesalers. The plaintiffs – a group of regional wholesalers (Plaintiffs) who purchased Clear Eyes for resale to retailers – sued Medtech and its parent company, Prestige Consumer Healthcare Inc. (together, Medtech or Defendants), in the US District Court for the Central District of California in August 2018.

    The Plaintiffs alleged the Defendants violated Sections 2(a) and 2(d) of the RPA by offering the two large wholesale membership clubs better prices and exclusive manufacturer rebates on Clear Eyes. Contending that they paid 17.5 – 38% more for Clear Eyes than the two large wholesale membership clubs as a result of illegal price discrimination, the Plaintiffs claimed that they “lost hundreds of thousands of dollars … in sales that they otherwise would have had in the absence of the discrimination.” (Redacted First Amended Complaint at 13-14, L.A. International Corporation v. Prestige Brands Holdings, Inc. et al., No.  2:18-cv-06809 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2018)).

    The Plaintiffs further alleged that Medtech violated the RPA by participating in a large wholesale membership club’s delivery, operations and web services (DOW) program under which Medtech made quarterly payments to the large wholesale membership club for advertising and promotional services. Medtech did not offer the Plaintiffs any comparable payments which, the Plaintiffs argued, amounted to an RPA violation.

    Medtech’s conduct, the Plaintiffs alleged, also violated sections of California’s Unfair Practices Act (UPA), the California Business & Professions Code and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) that, like the RPA, arguably preclude certain discriminatory pricing.

    In depth

    The Jury Verdict

    In December 2023, following a nearly two-week long trial, the jury returned a verdict in the wholesale Plaintiffs’ favor. The jury awarded $350,000 in damages to the Plaintiffs for Medtech’s violation of Section 2(a) of the RPA stemming from (1) the favorable prices and rebates offered to membership club stores and (2) Medtech’s participation in a wholesale membership club’s DOW program. The jury also awarded the Plaintiffs $330,000 for Medtech’s violation of California’s UPA.

    What Is the Robinson-Patman Act?

    The RPA in Brief

    The RPA is a federal law that was enacted in 1936 to protect smaller retailers from larger rivals that commanded better prices from upstream sellers by leveraging superior purchasing abilities. The lawmakers who introduced the legislation that became the RPA viewed larger companies’ ability to obtain better deals as an impermissible competitive advantage that threatened small businesses. Enacted to blunt that competitive advantage, the RPA precludes sellers from offering one purchaser a better price than another purchaser for goods of “like grade and quality” sold in the same market when the effect of favoring one purchaser “may be substantially to lessen competition” between the purchasers.

    In RPA parlance, favoring one purchaser over another – by, for example, offering lower prices or exclusive, favorable rebates – is known as “price discrimination.”

    Unlike other antitrust laws, the RPA does not require plaintiffs to show an adverse effect on competition generally. Instead, RPA plaintiffs merely need to show harm to competition between them (the disfavored purchaser) and a competitor (the favored purchaser) that received better prices as a result of price discrimination.

    Section 2(a) of the RPA precludes sellers from charging different prices to two competing buyers for “commodities of like grade and quality” where it is likely to create an adverse effect on competition. Section 2(d) “makes it unlawful for a manufacturer to discriminate in favor of one purchaser by making ‘payment[s]’ to that purchaser ‘in connection with the … sale, or offering for sale of any products … unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products.” U.S. Wholesale Outlet & Distribution, Inc. v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, 74 F.4th 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(d)).

    The RPA does not forbid all pricing differences. Among other statutory defenses, it allows some price discrimination when a lower price is needed to “meet competition” from another seller or when lower pricing is made available to other purchasers (but those purchasers do not do what is necessary to access it).

    Motion for a New Trial

    In February 2024, following the jury verdict discussed above, Medtech filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. In its motion, Medtech argued that the court erred by (1) “omitting the word ‘substantial’ from jury instructions on the requirement that a price discrimination harm competition; (2) excluding Defendants’ proposed instruction on de minimis lost sales or lost customers; (3) erroneously instructing the jury on the functional discount defense; and (4) finding that Volvo Trucks N. Am, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006), did not apply[.]”

    1. “Substantial” Harm

    The Defendants argued that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate substantial harm to competition to prevail. Section 2(a) of the RPA provides that:

    “It shall be unlawful for any person … to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities … where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).

    The court acknowledged that “although the word ‘substantially’ appears in the text of the statute, it was not clear whether Congress intended the word ‘substantially’ also to modify the phrase ‘to injure, destroy, or prevent competition,’ which was added after amendment to the Sherman Act.” After discussing cases interpreting the RPA, the court held that “controlling authority suggests that Section 2(a) does not require a showing of substantial harm to competition in secondary-line cases” and rejected the Defendants’ argument on this point. Specifically, the court noted that the word “substantial” was absent from the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s (Ninth Circuit) decision in U.S. Wholesale Outlet & Dist., Inc. v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, 89 F.4th 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2023), which required plaintiffs to demonstrate that “the effect of such discrimination may be to injure, destroy, or prevent competition to the advantage of a favored purchaser” to prove a Section 2(a) violation.

    2. De Minimis Loss in Sales or Customers

    The court similarly rejected the Defendants’ argument that it erred by declining to instruct the jury that de minimis lost sales or lost customers does not result in RPA liability. In 2015, the Defendants noted, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed an RPA case because the “plaintiffs could not generate evidence tending to show that they lost more than a de minimis number of customers to the favored purchasers, indicating that competition was not substantially harmed or threatened by the price difference in question.” Cash & Henderson Drugs, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 799 F.3d 202, 210 (2d Cir. 2015). Here, however, the court noted that “the Ninth Circuit has previously determined … that even a de minimis impact on competition is sufficient” to violate the RPA. For example, in Chroma Lighting v. GTE Products Corp., 111 F.3d 137, 1997 WL 175062, at *2 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that “15 specific examples of lost sales and profits, in conjunction with testimony from several customers stating that they switched to [the Favored Purchasers] because of the price difference” was sufficient to prove competitive injury.

    3. Functional Discounts Defense

    The Defendants further argued that the court erred in instructing the jury on the so-called “functional discount” defense. The US Supreme Court has held that a seller may provide a functional discount to a purchaser without violating Section (a). A functional discount is a “reasonable reimbursement” made to a purchaser to compensate that purchaser for performing a service for the seller. The service may include, for example, marketing services provided by the purchaser for the seller. The functional discount defense requires only a “reasonable,” not an “exact,” relationship between the services performed and discount provided, and it is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that alleged price discrimination was not the result of a functional discount.

    While a successful invocation of the functional discount defense does not require mathematical certainty, the US Supreme Court has noted that the functional discount defense does not “countenance a functional discount completely untethered to either the supplier’s savings or the wholesaler’s costs.” Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 563 (1990).

    The Defendants here argued that the “[jury] instructions failed to convey that functional discounts served as a complete defense to the Section 2(a) claim” because, in part, of “the Court’s characterization of functional discounts as a ‘concept’ … rather than a defense.”

    The court rejected this argument, holding that “no reasonable reading of the [jury] instructions, taken as a whole, would permit the jury to come to an erroneous understanding of the functional discount defense.” One instruction provided that “‘[i]f you find that the differences in prices here were functional discounts, then any discriminatory pricing did not have a reasonable possibility of harming competition’ and another provided that ‘[i]f you find that the evidence is insufficient to prove any one or more of these elements, then you must find for the Defendants and against the Plaintiff on that Plaintiff’s claim under the Robinson-Patman Act.’” “Taken together, [the instructions] made clear that Plaintiffs’ failure to prove that the price differences were not justified as a functional discount foreclosed Defendants’ liability for the Section 2(a) claim,” the court held.

    The Defendants’ similar arguments regarding the court’s treatment of the functional discount defense in its response to a jury note and the verdict form provided to the jury were also rejected in light of the unambiguous jury instructions.

    4. Application of Volvo

    Finally, the Defendants argued that the court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the applicability of the last US Supreme Court case addressing the RPA, Volvo Trucks N. Am, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006), in which the court held that the RPA was not violated because the allegedly favored and disfavored purchasers were not “in competition” with one another. Because, in the court’s view, Volvo was not factually similar to the Clear Eyes price discrimination at issue, any jury instruction on Volvo would have been inappropriate.

    In Volvo, certain dealers – the beneficiaries of Volvo’s alleged price discrimination – “received discounts from Volvo only after they were invited to bid on projects by their retail customers.” The “bidding process [in Volvo] did not fall under the typical ‘chainstore paradigm’ where the favored purchaser is a chainstore or large department store.” The court rejected the Defendants’ arguments that a wholesale retail club offering its own discount program or “[the wholesale membership club] act[ing] like a broker for Defendants by assisting with high-volume sales of Clear Eyes” removed the case from the traditional “chainstore paradigm” and placed it in a factual scenario similar to Volvo.

    The court held that, unlike the dealers in Volvo, the Plaintiffs were in competition with the favored wholesale price clubs for customers within the meaning of the RPA. In support of its conclusion, the court cited a test recently articulated by the Ninth Circuit. “[T]o establish that ‘two customers are in general competition,’ it is ‘sufficient’ to prove that: (1) one customer has outlets in ‘geographical proximity’ to those of the other; (2) the two customers ‘purchased goods of the same grade and quality from the seller within approximately the same period of time’; and (3) the two customers are operating ‘on a particular functional level such as wholesaling or retailing.’” U.S. Wholesale Outlet & Distribution, Inc. v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, 74 F.4th 960, 973 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Tri-Valley Packing Ass’n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 708 (9th Cir. 1964)).

    Relying on U.S. Wholesale Outlet & Distribution, Inc., the court concluded, any “potential operational differences” between the Plaintiffs and the favored wholesale price clubs did not remove this case from the traditional chain store paradigm and place the Defendants beyond the reach of the RPA.

    Permanent Injunction Motion

    The Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. Acknowledging the “burdensome” impact on the Defendants, the court granted the majority of provisions requested by the Plaintiffs, including requiring that the Defendants:

    • Allow the Plaintiffs to carry and purchase Clear Eyes “on the same price and terms and conditions” on which the Defendants sell Clear Eyes to respective competing large wholesale membership clubs, “including the availability of any discounts, billback, rebates … or other terms that impact the net price” paid by competing clubs;
    • Allow the Plaintiffs to “participate, on proportionally equal terms” in all promotional programs and payments . . . in connection with the handling, sale, or offering for sale of Clear Eyes” that the Defendants make available to other large wholesale membership clubs; and
    • Submit a semiannual report for five years to the Plaintiffs’ counsel stating the list price the Defendants are then charging to competing large wholesale membership clubs, and the effective date of any increase or decrease in price, “along with an itemization and summary of any discounts, rebates, promotional terms, or other payments” that the Defendants make to respective competing large wholesale member clubs.

    With this said, the court did deny one of the Plaintiffs’ requests relating to “most favored nation” guarantees during supply chain shortages, finding the request “goes far beyond curing the effects of the illegal conduct at issue in this action[.]” That denial was consistent with other case law finding that the RPA does not dictate how manufacturers allocate products when supplies are tight.

    Injunctive relief is highly uncommon in RPA cases but not novel. For example, more than 20 years ago, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) entered into a consent order, including injunctive remedies, with a major spice manufacturer found to be in violation of the RPA. That order required the seller to document all information on which it based its “meeting competition” defense under Section 2(b) of the Act for a period of 10 years. In other cases, courts have regarded monetary damages as adequate in RPA cases because losing defendants tend to alter their pricing practices to protect against future liability and avoid serial lawsuits.

    Implications

    Though this rare RPA plaintiffs’ verdict came in a private lawsuit, it may embolden the FTC to double down on its attempts to revive the RPA, including seeking injunctions. All members of the supply chain for goods should be aware of both the potential for similar, private civil actions and the possibility of expanded FTC investigations and litigation.

    The outcome of L.A. International is likely most instructive for companies that sell things resold to small businesses via club stores. However, the FTC’s stated interest in bringing RPA cases in a variety of industries suggests that any business serving multiple retail channels via heterogeneous pricing and trade strategies may learn from the decision.

    In 2022, the FTC released a policy statement stating that the RPA was one of multiple tools in its arsenal to challenge allegedly anticompetitive rebate and fee agreements offered by prescription drug manufacturers. Then, in January 2023, the FTC opened a confidential investigation into two of the nation’s largest soft drink manufacturers, focused on alleged price discrimination in the United States’ soft drink market. In the summer of 2023, the FTC expanded its efforts once again through a Civil Investigative Demand issued to a major wine and spirits distributor.

    Moreover, the Plaintiffs’ win in this case comes just a month after FTC Commissioner Alvaro Bedoya’s remarks at the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section’s annual meeting about agency interest in filing cases under this long-dormant statute and bringing the RPA “car out of the garage.” With recent precedent on the books, the FTC may finally be poised to hit the gas.

    McDermott’s Antitrust & Competition Group advises businesses on how to prepare for, respond to, and avoid investigations and private litigation.

    Summer Associates Phoebe Flint and Dillon Johnson contributed to the development of this On the Subject.

    Authors

    Ryan C. Tisch

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule Requiring Customer Identification Programs for Investment Advisers

    FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule Requiring Customer Identification Programs for Investment Advisers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule Requiring Customer Identification Programs for Investment Advisers

    June 11, 2024

    Read time: 15 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 13, 2024, the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) jointly issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (“CIP Proposed Rule”) that would apply customer identification program (“CIP”) obligations to investment advisers registered with the SEC (“RIAs”) and exempt reporting advisers (“ERAs”) (collectively, “Covered Advisers”).[1] The CIP Proposed Rule would require Covered Advisers, among other things, to implement a risk-based CIP that includes procedures for verifying the identity of each customer to the extent reasonable and practicable, and maintaining records of the information used to verify a customer’s identity, including name, address and other identifying information. The CIP Proposed Rule would require Covered Advisers to establish CIPs comparable to those required for other financial institutions, such as banks and broker-dealers.

    The public comment period for the CIP Proposed Rule will remain open until July 22, 2024.

    Relationship to AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule

    The CIP Proposed Rule is the latest action taken by FinCEN to apply AML/CFT regulations to Covered Advisers. It comes only a few months after FinCEN issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that, if finalized, would require Covered Advisers to develop and implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (“AML/CFT”) compliance programs and monitor for and report suspicious activity to FinCEN (“AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule”).[2] The AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule, if finalized, would also require FinCEN to “prescribe rules that establish minimum standards for covered investment advisers regarding the identities of customers when they open an account”; those are the standards set forth in the CIP Proposed Rule.[3]

    The obligations of the CIP Proposed Rule and the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule apply to the same set of Covered Advisers, which includes both primary and sub-advisers, and are meant to work together in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing.

    Separately from the CIP Proposed Rule, Covered Advisers may be required to comply with other AML/CFT requirements with regard to their clients. For example, Covered Advisers may need to look through an account in connection with the customer due diligence procedures described in the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule, once such rule is ultimately proposed and is finalized.[4]

    Requirements of the CIP Proposed Rule

    Under the CIP Proposed Rule, each Covered Adviser would be required to establish, document and maintain a written risk-based CIP appropriate for the size and nature of its business that incorporates the below requirements:[5]

    1. Implementing risk-based procedures for identifying and verifying the identity of each customer to the extent reasonable and practicable that enable the Covered Adviser to form a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of each customer, including:
    • Collecting certain minimum identifying information of customers prior to opening an account for customers;
    • For a legal entity customer, this would include: name, address, date of formation and identification number, such as an EIN;
    • For a natural person customer, this would include: name, residential address, date of birth and government issued identification number, such as a social security number;[6]
    • Verifying the identity of each customer, using the aforementioned information, through documentary or non-documentary means, within a reasonable time before or after opening the customer’s account;
    • Addressing situations where the Covered Adviser will obtain information about natural persons with authority or control over a legal entity customer’s account when a legal entity customer’s identity cannot be verified using the methods described above; and
    • Responding to situations where the Covered Adviser cannot “form a reasonable belief” that it knows a customer’s true identity. These procedures should include a description of when the Covered Adviser should not open an account for such a customer, the terms under which the Covered Adviser could provide advisory services to such a customer while such customer’s identity is verified, when the Covered Adviser should close such customer’s account if the Covered Adviser cannot verify such customer’s identity, and when the Covered Adviser should file a suspicious activity report related to the interaction with such customer.
    1. Making and maintaining a record of information collected and the verification performed under the CIP, for at least five years in a bifurcated process (for the record of information collected, five years after the account is closed, and for the verification performed, five years after the record is made).
    2. Determining whether a customer appears on any list of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations issued by any federal government agency and designated as such by the Department of the Treasury in consultation with federal functional regulators and doing so within a reasonable period of time after the account is opened (or earlier if required by law or guidance). While no such lists have been designated as of yet by the Department of the Treasury, the preamble to the CIP Proposed Rule (“Preamble”) notes that some investment advisers already screen their customers against the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List; and
    3. Providing customers with adequate notice of the CIP requirements in a manner designed to ensure that a prospective customer is able to view the notice, or is otherwise given notice, before opening an account. To implement this requirement, financial institutions would typically include this notice provision on account opening documents or on their website.[7]

    Upon the opening of each account, the verification requirements of the CIP Proposed Rule would apply. However, if a customer whose identity has been previously verified opens a new account, the Covered Adviser would generally not need to verify the customer’s identity again, provided the investment adviser previously verified the customer’s identity in accordance with procedures consistent with the CIP Proposed Rule and continues to have a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of the customer based on the previous verification. Accordingly, in certain circumstances, Covered Advisers may not be required to verify the identity of a customer whose customer relationship predated the final rule when that existing customer opens a new account. FinCEN requests comment on whether Covered Advisers should be required to re-verify a customer’s identity after a specified period of time, such as annually or every two or five years.

    Under the CIP Proposed Rule, Covered Advisers that are dually registered — for example, as an RIA and broker-dealer — or affiliated with a bank or broker-dealer would not be required to establish a separate CIP for their advisory activities, provided that such entity is subject to an AML/CFT program and CIP requirement, which covers all of the entity’s legal and regulatory obligations. However, the Proposed Rule provides that a Covered Adviser may deem the CIP requirements satisfied for any mutual fund that it advises that has developed and implemented a CIP compliant with CIP requirements applicable to mutual funds. Those specific requirements need not be satisfied for a mutual fund to be exempt from CIP under the CIP rules applicable to other financial institutions, such as broker-dealers.

    Reliance on Other Financial Institutions

    Under the CIP Proposed Rule, Covered Advisers may rely on another financial institution, including an affiliated financial institution, to perform any of the procedures of the Covered Adviser’s CIP if:

    1. The reliance is reasonable under the circumstances;
    2. The financial institution being relied upon is subject to a rule implementing 31 U.S.C. 5318(h) and regulated by a federal functional regulator; and
    3. The financial institution being relied upon enters into a contract with the Covered Adviser requiring the financial institution to certify annually to the Covered Adviser that it has implemented its AML/CFT program, and that it will perform (or its agent will perform) specified requirements of the Covered Adviser’s CIP. The contract requirement can be satisfied by a reliance letter or other similar documentation.

    If these three conditions are met, the Covered Adviser would not be held responsible for the failure of the other financial institution to fulfill the CIP requirements. If, on the other hand, the Covered Adviser cannot establish that its reliance was reasonable and that it obtained the requisite contracts and certifications, then the Covered Adviser would remain solely responsible for the failure to perform CIP.[8] FinCEN requests comment on whether the requirement to enter into a contract is feasible and whether the requirement should be modified.

    Covered Advisers that outsource AML procedures to administrators that are not Bank Secrecy Act-regulated financial institutions can continue to do so, but would not be permitted to use this reliance provision to avoid liability for the failures of an administrator to perform proper CIP.[9]

    Definition of Customer and Account

    Under the CIP Proposed Rule, Covered Advisers’ CIP obligations would be triggered by a “customer” opening an “account.”

    Definition of Customer

    The CIP Proposed Rule defines “customer” as a natural person or legal entity that opens a new account with a Covered Adviser. The customer is the person identified as the accountholder[10], “except in the case of an individual who lacks legal capacity, such as a minor, and non-legal entities, in which case the customer would be the individual who opens the new account for a minor or non-legal entity.”[11]

    Under the CIP Proposed Rule, the definition of a “customer” excludes (i) financial institutions regulated by a federal functional regulator and banks regulated by a state bank regulator; (ii) certain entities that are publicly listed on US securities exchanges; and (iii) persons that have an existing account with the Covered Adviser, provided the Covered Adviser has a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of the person.[12]

    FinCEN requests comment on the scope of the definition of customer and whether any other examples of customers should be added to the final rule.

    Definition of Account

    The CIP Proposed Rule defines an “account” as “any contractual or other business relationship between a person and an investment adviser under which the investment adviser provides investment advisory services.”[13] An “account” does not include any “account that the investment adviser acquires through any acquisition, merger, purchase of assets, or assumption of liabilities.”[14]

    FinCEN requests comment on several questions related to the definition of “account,” including whether other examples of accounts should be included in the final rule, whether any types of accounts should be exempted from the CIP requirements and whether there are any circumstances in which Covered Advisers should be required to apply their CIP to transferred accounts.

    Application to Investors in Private Funds

    The definition of account requires a contractual or other business relationship to provide advisory services, which would likely cause CIP to be applicable to the private funds that Covered Advisers form as well as separately managed account relationships. However, it would not include investors in private funds that Covered Advisers form and the CIP Proposed Rule does not contemplate that a Covered Adviser would have to verify the identity of investors in its private funds.[15] In fact, in the Preamble discussing the Paperwork Reduction Act, FinCEN explains that the term customer “does not include the investors in a private fund.”[16] Rather, a Covered Adviser’s identity verification obligations would be applicable to its private funds.

    FinCEN requests comment on whether the definitions of “customer” and “account” are appropriate and whether Covered Advisers should apply the CIP obligations to private fund investors. If Covered Advisers are required to apply the CIP obligations to private fund investors, it is not clear how Covered Advisers would do so for investors in private funds investing on behalf of other parties, for example through a nominee arrangement.[17]

    Further, unlike the CIP rules applicable to broker-dealers, mutual funds and other financial institutions, the Proposed Rule does not exclude ERISA accounts from the definition of “account.” The reason for that, as explained in the Preamble, is “to harmonize the applicability of this proposed rule with the [AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule], which would require RIAs and ERAs to apply AML/CFT program and SAR reporting requirements to all of their accounts, including accounts opened for the purpose of participating in an employee benefit plan established pursuant to ERISA.”[18] FinCEN requests comment on whether ERISA accounts should be excluded from the definition of account.

    Effective Date

    Under the CIP Proposed Rule, Covered Advisers must develop and implement the required CIP six months from the effective date of the final rule, but no earlier than the required compliance date of the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule. The compliance date of the AML/CFT Proposed Rule is 12 months from the effective date of the final AML/CFT program rule.

    Takeaways

    If the CIP Proposed Rule and AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule are finalized as proposed, they may add significant compliance obligations for Covered Advisers. Covered Advisers that use administrators should also take into consideration that the CIP Proposed Rule may impact the way customer identification and verification can be delegated and outsourced. Covered Advisers should consider commenting on the definitions of “account” and “customer,” the categories of entities that should be exempt from a Covered Adviser’s CIP, and the feasibility of requiring other financial institutions to generally enter into contracts with Covered Advisers for proper reliance.

    Authored by Melissa G.R. Goldstein, Betty Santangelo, Kyle B. Hendrix and Jesse Weissman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] CIP Proposed Rule, Customer Identification Programs for Registered Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers, 89 Fed. Reg. 44571 (May 21, 2024).

    [2] AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule, Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and Suspicious Activity Report Filing Requirements for Registered Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers, 89 Fed. Reg. 12108 (Feb. 15, 2024); for more information on the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule, please see our prior Alert “FinCEN Once Again Proposes Anti-Money Laundering Program Requirements for Investment Advisers.”

    [3] CIP Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 44581.

    [4] Covered Advisers should also monitor future rulemakings as any additional beneficial ownership information due diligence obligations may require identify verification and due diligence on investors in private funds.

    [5] The CIP should be incorporated into a Covered Adviser’s overall AML/CFT program. While the CIP Proposed Rule does not include a requirement to separately have the CIP approved, the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule requires each Covered Adviser’s AML/CFT program be approved in writing by its board of directors or trustees. AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 12125-26.

    [6] For non-US persons, one or more of the following is required: taxpayer identification number; passport number and country of issuance; alien identification card number; or number and country of issuance of any other government-issued document evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard. For a non-US person that is not an individual and that does not have an identification number, the Covered Adviser must request alternative government-issued documentation certifying the existence of the person.

    [7] The CIP Proposed Rule includes sample language that Covered Advisers can use to provide notice to customers. CIP Proposed Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 1032.100(a)(5)(iii).

    [8] Pursuant to a Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association no-action letter, the SEC staff stated they would not recommend enforcement action if a broker-dealer relies on an RIA to perform some or all aspects of the broker-dealer’s CIP obligations or customer due diligence requirements regarding beneficial owners of legal entity customers, provided that certain conditions are met, including that the RIA implements its own AML/CFT program. The no-action letter was originally issued in 2004 and has been periodically reissued since. The CIP Proposed Rule confirms that the no-action letter remains effective.

    [9] The CIP Proposed Rule does not include further discussion of third-party service providers or administrators. However, the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule permits delegating the implementation and operation of aspects of a Covered Advisers AML/CFT program to an agent or service provider, but the Covered Adviser would remain responsible and legally liable for the program’s compliance with regulations, as well as responding to requests from regulators like FinCEN and the SEC. AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 12125.

    [10] Customers would not include individuals with authority or control over accounts or persons who fill out the account opening paperwork or provide information necessary to set up an account unless any such person is the accountholder. However, the CIP Proposed Rule would require a Covered Adviser’s CIP to address situations where, based on the Covered Adviser’s risk assessment of a new account opened by a customer that is not an individual, the Covered Adviser will need to obtain information about individuals with authority or control over the account in order to verify the customer’s identity.

    [11] CIP Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 44574.

    [12] The Preamble notes that these exemptions are “consistent with CIP requirements for other financial institutions.” CIP Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 44574.

    [13] CIP Proposed Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 1032.100(a)(1).

    [14] CIP Proposed Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 1032.100(a)(2)(i).

    [15] See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that an earlier SEC rule that would have required private fund managers to consider the investors of the private fund its clients, thereby requiring the manager to register with the SEC, was arbitrary and in conflict with the purpose of the underlying statute in which the new rule was included).

    [16] CIP Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 44591.

    [17] While the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule identifies nominee arrangement as a potential area of concern, FinCEN does not discuss in the AML/CFT Program Proposed Rule or CIP Proposed Rule how to address the common industry practice for Covered Advisers to rely on the AML/CFT practices of other regulated financial institutions in connection with nominee arrangements.

    [18] CIP Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 44573. The CIP Proposed Rule does not specify who would be considered the “customer” of the Covered Adviser with regard to ERISA accounts. Although ERISA accounts are exempt from the definition of “account” in the bank CIP rule, the customer for an account established by an employer at a bank to maintain and administer assets under a non-ERISA employee retirement, benefit, or deferred compensation plan is the employer, or, as applicable, the trust established by the employer to maintain the assets. Interagency Interpretive Guidance on Customer Identification Program Requirements under Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FAQ 7 (April 28, 2005).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kyle B. Hendrix

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Sanctions Update: Statutory Amendments and an Interim Final Rule Create Significant Implications for OFAC Sanctions Compliance

    Sanctions Update: Statutory Amendments and an Interim Final Rule Create Significant Implications for OFAC Sanctions Compliance

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: Statutory Amendments and an Interim Final Rule Create Significant Implications for OFAC Sanctions Compliance

    June 11, 2024

    Read time: 28 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 24, 2024, President Joe Biden signed into law an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for foreign aid (“Supplemental Act”), which includes several sanctions-related provisions, such as the 21st Century Peace Through Strength Act (“21st Century Act”), which increases the statute of limitations for sanctions violations. Only a few weeks later, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued an interim final rule (“Interim Rule”) to amend certain reporting requirements and procedures for sanctions compliance. Together, these statutory and regulatory amendments could require significant changes to US persons’ sanctions compliance policies and procedures. In this Alert, we highlight the key provisions from the Supplemental Act and the Interim Rule and discuss potential implications for investment managers.

    Statutory Amendments to National Security Programs and New Sanctions

    Folded into the Supplemental Act, which provides funding to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, is the 21st Century Act, containing several sanctions and trade restriction provisions. Potentially the most impactful piece of the 21st Century Act are amendments to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the Trading With the Enemy Act (“TWEA”), which increase the statute of limitations for sanctions violations from five years to ten years. The Supplemental Act and 21st Century Act also contain a number of other important provisions, including, among other things, authorization for the seizure of Russian sovereign assets and authorization for imposing sanctions on persons and entities currently sanctioned by the EU or UK that are not yet sanctioned by the US.

    Statute of Limitations

    The 21st Century Act provides for the immediate extension of the statute of limitations from five years to 10 years for any civil enforcement action or criminal prosecution brought under IEEPA and TWEA. Specifically, the 21st Century Act provides that “[a]n action, suit, or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, under this section shall not be entertained unless commenced within 10 years after the latest date of the violation upon which the civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture is based,” and further clarifies that pre-penalty notices and findings of violations are included within the scope of an “action, suit, or proceeding.”[1] With respect to criminal prosecutions, the 21st Century Act provides that no person shall be “prosecuted, tried, or punished” for any offense under IEEPA or TWEA unless the indictment is filed or the information is brought “within 10 years after the latest date of the violation upon which the indictment or information is based.”[2] As IEEPA and TWEA are the primary authorities for the Executive Orders and regulations that implement OFAC’s sanctions programs, this change significantly increases OFAC’s and the DOJ’s sanctions enforcement authority by enabling them to look further back in time for potential sanctions violations. OFAC is also likely to amend its record retention requirements for transactions that are subject to OFAC’s regulations to align with the new statute of limitations.[3]

    The REPO Act

    The Supplemental Act also contains the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act (“REPO Act”).[4] Based on the rationale that the Russian Federation should be responsible for the reconstruction of Ukraine and repaying other costs related to its illegal invasion, the REPO Act authorizes the President to seize Russian sovereign assets that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States for the benefit of Ukraine. The Congressional findings enumerated in the REPO Act note that between $4 and $5 billion Russian sovereign assets are believed to be subject to US jurisdiction, which is a small fraction of the approximately $300 billion that has been immobilized by countries around the globe.[5] Accordingly, before seizing Russian sovereign assets, the President must certify that he has coordinated with other G7 leaders to take similar actions, that seizure is in the interests of the United States, and that Russia has either engaged in a legitimate international mechanism to discharge its obligations to Ukraine or that Russia has not ceased its hostilities against Ukraine and has not otherwise provided full compensation for the invasion.[6]

    The Russian sovereign assets subject to seizure include funds and other property of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Russian National Wealth Fund, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (collectively, the “Covered Entities”), or any other assets owned by the Government of the Russian Federation and its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities.[7] Notably, while the Covered Entities are not subject to full blocking sanctions by OFAC, Directive 4 of the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions program, issued in 2022 and amended on May 19, 2023 (“Directive 4”), prohibits US persons from transacting with the Covered Entities, which has effectively frozen any Russian sovereign assets in the possession or control of a US person. And as of June 18, 2023, US persons have been required to submit reports to OFAC on any such sovereign assets in their possession or control.[8] The REPO Act also prohibits the release of any Russian sovereign assets that are currently blocked or “effectively immobilized” until the President certifies that Russia has ceased hostilities with Ukraine and made full compensation for harms resulting from the invasion.[9]

    Harmonizing US Sanctions with EU and UK Sanctions

    The US’s sanctions against Russia have been largely coordinated with its allies, including the European Union and the United Kingdom. The 21st Century Act, however, ostensibly seeks to close any gaps that may exist between US sanctions and EU and UK sanctions. Specifically, the 21st Century Act requires the President to submit a report to Congress on persons currently subject to EU and UK sanctions and any such persons that may meet the criteria for sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14024, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (authorities under which many Russian individuals and entities are sanctioned).[10] Based on this report, the President may — but is not required to — impose sanctions on any person that is both sanctioned by the EU or UK and meets the criteria for US sanctions against Russian persons.[11]

    Other Sanctions and Trade Restrictions

    The Supplemental Act also contains several other sanctions, money laundering and trade restriction provisions. A few key highlights include: calling for sanctions on persons involved in trafficking the drugs fentanyl and captagon, authorization for imposing secondary sanctions on foreign persons engaged in oil or military technology-related transactions with Iran, authorization for sanctions against persons involved in cyber-attacks against the US and mandating the President to implement sanctions against persons that have sponsored or aided Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Middle East.

    In addition, the Supplemental Act notably prohibits any entity from distributing, maintaining, updating, or providing internet hosting services for an application controlled by a foreign adversary of the United States.[12] For now, this law specifically targets TikTok and provides a 270-day period before taking effect, with the purpose of allowing TikTok’s Chinese parent company, ByteDance Ltd., to sell TikTok. But other applications (defined as websites, desktop applications, mobile applications or other technology applications[13]) could be designated and banned by the President in the future, with a similar 270-day delay in effectiveness from the date of designation.[14]

    OFAC Interim Final Rule on Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations

    On May 8, 2024, OFAC released an interim final rule that amends its Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations.[15] The Interim Rule makes some notable changes to the reporting requirements for blocked property, allows OFAC to request information from US financial institutions on certain transactions, and clarifies several other procedures. The Interim Rule takes effect on Aug. 8, 2024.

    Use of OFAC’s Reporting System Now Required for Certain Filings — OFAC has, to date, accepted initial blocked property reports, annual reports of blocked property and reports of rejected transactions by mail, email or through its electronic reporting platform, the OFAC Reporting System (“ORS”). The Interim Rule now requires the use of ORS for all such reports, unless the submitter can “provide evidence of unique and extraordinary circumstances that would not permit the electronic filing of reports … subject to a presumption of denial” for requests to file by other means.[16]

    OFAC May Require Reports From Financial Institutions For Transactions Believed to Involve Blocked Property — Pursuant to existing regulations, OFAC may demand from any person “information relative to any act or transaction, regardless of whether such act or transaction is effected pursuant to license or otherwise, subject to the provisions of this chapter or relative to any property in which any foreign country or any national thereof has or had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”[17] The Interim Rule does not change this authority, but clarifies in a note to this provision that if “OFAC has reason to believe an account or transaction … may involve the property or interests in property of a blocked person, OFAC may issue an instruction to one or more financial institutions” requiring information regarding such transactions, and may require further action if OFAC determines that a transaction involves blocked property.[18]

    New Reporting Requirement For Any Blocked Property That is Unblocked or Transferred —OFAC’s existing regulations only require reports on the unblocking of property if “made a condition of a general or specific license.”[19] The Interim Rule makes such reports mandatory, which must be submitted within 10 business days from the date that blocked property is unblocked or transferred, including when performed “pursuant to a valid order issued by a US government agency or US court,” though the Interim Rule notes that this reporting requirement is in addition to the obligation to notify OFAC of any litigation that may affect blocked property.[20] US persons do not need to file unblocking or transfer reports for debits to blocked accounts for permissible service charges.[21] Unblocking reports, unlike blocked property reports, may still be submitted to OFAC by email.[22]

    Scope of Reporting Requirement For Rejected Transactions — The Interim Rule explains that OFAC received a number of public comments in response to a 2019 interim final rule asking for clarification on what types of rejected transactions need to be reported under OFAC regulations, who must file reports, and the scope of information that needs to be included in reports. In response, the Interim Rule clarifies that the term “transaction” means wire transfers, trade finance, transactions related to securities, checks or foreign exchange, and sales or purchases of goods or services.[23] The Interim Rule also provides that submitters of rejected transaction reports need only provide information required under the regulations “to the extent the information is available … at the time the transaction is rejected.”[24] OFAC also notes in the supplementary information section of the Interim Rule that the rejected transaction regulations apply to all US persons, not just US financial institutions.[25]

    Procedures for Unblocking Property Blocked in Error — The Interim Rule amends regulations concerning procedures for unblocking property that is believed to have been blocked in error. The procedures for unblocking such property now extend not just to property blocked due to mistaken identity, but also to property blocked due to “typographical or similar errors.”[26] OFAC is also limiting the availability of these unblocking procedures (a “Compliance Release”) to only persons who originally filed a blocked property report in error.[27] Previously, any person who was a party to a transaction relating to blocked property could request the release of funds blocked in error. Non-reporting parties may still seek release of blocked property by applying to OFAC for a specific license.[28]

    Additional Changes — The Interim Rule includes several other amendments to provisions in the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations, including updates to regulations governing the availability of information under the Freedom of Information Act, and clarification on who may submit petitions for administrative reconsideration for seeking removal of a person or property from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List, as well as technical and conforming edits to the regulations.

    OFAC is requesting public comments on the Interim Rule, which may be submitted in writing on or before June 10, 2024.

    Takeaways

    Statutory Changes

    The increase in the statute of limitations for sanctions violations is potentially the most significant sanctions development of the last few months. In particular, it may be prudent, if not necessary, to amend record retention policies regarding any transactions subject to OFAC regulations to cover the ten-year statute of limitations period. Relatedly, firms should consider changing the scope of transactional due diligence (particularly for mergers and acquisitions) and amend representations and warranties to account for the increased statute of limitations.

    From an enforcement perspective, the longer statute of limitations may give OFAC and the DOJ more flexibility to investigate sanctions evasion violations that involve complex transaction structures or ownership chains with multiple entities. OFAC and the DOJ may also apply the new statute of limitations to any potential violations for which the old five-year period has not already run.

    The Supplemental Act also includes authorizations and mandates for imposing new sanctions, such as terrorism- and narcotics-related sanctions and imposing sanctions on Russian persons that have already been designated by the EU and UK. Firms should review their exposure to any investments or transactions that fall within the scope of these criteria for sanctions designation and consider whether they might need to comply with any new sanctions obligations as more entities and individuals are added to the SDN List later this year.

    Firms should also review their holdings to determine whether they have any Russian sovereign assets in their possession or control and ensure that they are up to date with respect to their OFAC reporting obligations under Directive 4, since such assets could be subject to further scrutiny if the US government moves forward with plans for seizing these assets. Pursuant to Directive 4, US persons have been prohibited from transacting with Covered Entities, but the REPO Act further prohibits the release or mobilization of Russian sovereign assets, so such assets should remain frozen.

    Interim Final Rule

    OFAC’s amendments to its reporting requirements and other procedures have less far-reaching implications than the increase in the statute of limitations, but US firms should be mindful of whether they need to make any changes to their sanctions compliance policies and procedures in light of the Interim Rule. Firms that need to file an annual report on blocked property this year should take note that the requirement for using ORS to file blocked property reports takes effect Aug. 8, 2024, ahead of the Sept. 30, 2024 due date for annual reports.[29] Firms should also review their sanctions compliance policies to ensure their procedures for reporting rejected transactions conform to the Interim Rule — and include policies for reporting rejected securities transactions and rejected transactions involving goods or services, not just rejected wire transfers. And as always, it is important to continually monitor the SDN List for any changes, but firms will now need to take note of any removals from the SDN List, not just additions, to ensure compliance with their reporting obligations when they unblock property.

    Authored by Melissa G.R. Goldstein, Betty Santangelo and Gregoire P. Devaney.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] 21st Century Peace Through Strength Act, Pub. L. 118-50, Div. E, Title I, Sec. 3111(a)–(d) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1705(d), 4315(d)).

    [2] Id.

    [3] Current record retention regulations require “every person engaging in any transaction subject to the provisions of this chapter [to] keep a full and accurate record of each such transaction engaged in … and such record shall be available for examination for at least 5 years after the date of such transaction.” 31 C.F.R. § 501.601. This provision also requires maintaining records of blocked property until at least 5 years after the property is unblocked. Id.

    [4] Pub. L. 118-50, Div. F.

    [5] Id. at Sec. 101(a)(8).

    [6] Id. at Sec. 104(a)–(c).

    [7] Id. at Sec. 2(6).

    [8] OFAC, Directive 4 (as amended) Under Executive Order 14024 (May 19, 2023).

    [9] REPO Act, Pub. L. 118-50, Div. F., Sec. 103(a). Notwithstanding this provision, the REPO Act sunsets five years after its enactment. Id. at Sec. 104(l)(1).

    [10] Pub. L. 118-50, Div. G, Sec. 1(a).

    [11] Id. at Sec. 1(b).

    [12] Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. 118-50, Div. H, Sec. 2.

    [13] Id. at Sec. 2(g)(3).

    [14] Id. at Sec. 2(a)(2).

    [15] OFAC, Recent Actions, Amendment of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR) (May 8, 2024), available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240508. See also Interim Final Rule, Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations, 89 Fed. Reg. 40372 (May 10, 2024) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part 501).

    [16] Interim Rule, 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.603(d), 501.604(d) (forthcoming).

    [17] 31 C.F.R. § 501.602(a) (current as of Jun. 4, 2024).

    [18] Interim Rule, Note 1 to 31 C.F.R. § 501.602 (forthcoming).

    [19] 31 C.F.R. § 501.603(b)(3)(i) (current as of Jun. 4, 2024).

    [20] Interim Rule, 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.603(b)(3), Note 3 to 501.603(b)(3) (forthcoming).

    [21] Id. at § 501.603(b)(3).

    [22] Id. at § 501.603(d).

    [23] Interim Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 501.604(a)(3) (forthcoming).

    [24] Id. at § 501.604(b).

    [25] Interim Rule, Supplementary Information.

    [26] Interim Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 501.806 (forthcoming).

    [27] Id. at § 501.806(a).

    [28] Interim Rule, Supplementary Information.

    [29] 31 C.F.R. § 501.603(b)(2)(i) (current as of Jun. 4, 2024). Firms that submit their annual reports before Aug. 8, 2024, should still be permitted to submit them to OFAC by email.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Gregoire P. Devaney

    Associate

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Court Denies FTC Bid to Halt Novant-CHS Deal

    Court Denies FTC Bid to Halt Novant-CHS Deal

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Court Denies FTC Bid to Halt Novant-CHS Deal

    June 7, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 5, 2024, the US District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) petition to enjoin Novant Health Inc.’s (Novant) acquisition of Community Health Systems Inc.’s (CHS) Lake Norman Regional Medical Center (LNR) and Davis Regional Psychiatric Hospital (Davis), thereby allowing the acquisition to proceed while the FTC conducts its administrative process to consider the lawfulness of the transaction.

    In depth

    What Happened

    • In February 2023, Novant and CHS entered into an asset purchase agreement whereby Novant would acquire LNR, Davis and related assets from CHS.
    • Following an extended investigation, in January 2024, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against the proposed transaction, alleging it would significantly increase concentration in the market for general acute care inpatient services sold to commercial insurers and their health plan members in the Eastern Lake Norman Area. The FTC also contended the proposed transaction would eliminate head-to-head price and non-price competition between the parties.
    • The FTC sought to enjoin the transaction from closing while it litigated the merits of its antitrust claims in an administrative proceeding scheduled to begin June 26, 2024. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.

    The Decision

    • Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, courts may issue a preliminary injunction “[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in public interest.”
    • The district court recognized the FTC’s defined product markets and geographic markets and acknowledged that share levels exceeded those in the Merger Guidelines necessary to establish a presumption of the proposed transaction’s illegality.
    • However, the court emphasized the public equities and unique facts that led it to conclude that granting a preliminary injunction would not be in the public interest. In particular, the court noted the likely immediate closure by CHS of one of the hospitals following a grant of an injunction. It also focused on the likely continued decline in competitive significance of the other CHS hospital during the pendency of the FTC litigation due to new entry by another competitor and a change in government certificate of need regulations. These developments, the court reasoned, were likely to increase competition for outpatient services and further weaken the target hospital.

    What This Means

    • Denial of the injunction allows the parties to proceed to closing their transaction. The temporary restraining order that currently prevents closing will expire five business days after the date of the court’s ruling.
    • The FTC may decide to appeal the decision and may also attempt to move for an emergency injunction pending such appeal.
    • The court’s decision does not stop the FTC from continuing to pursue its administrative challenge of the transaction. In prior cases where the FTC has failed to obtain a preliminary injunction, it has later abandoned its administrative challenge, but it is not yet clear what the FTC will choose to do here.
    • The court’s decision is tied closely to the specific facts of this case and is unlikely to signal a major change in how the FTC handles hospital merger cases in the future. The decision may, however, offer some guidance on how parties may convince a federal court judge that the issuance of a preliminary injunction to block a hospital merger or acquisition is against the public interest.
    • Unlike denials of preliminary injunctions in past hospital merger cases, the court did not question the adequacy of the FTC’s prima facie case, for example by disputing its market definitions. Instead, the court focused on the loss and further erosion of healthcare options that would occur immediately and during the pendency of litigation if the injunction issued.  It also noted the defendants’ commitments not to raise rates and to immediately begin improvements at both target hospitals. Such improvements included restoring previously closed services, recruiting specialists, raising nurse salaries and increasing nurse staffing, and implementing a new electronic medical records system. Given such facts, the court concluded that the injunction posed a greater and more immediate harm to competition than allowing the transaction to proceed.
    • The combination of equitable factors that swayed the court in this case may well be unique, as the court itself suggested. But to the extent that parties in future mergers can show that 1) issuance of a preliminary injunction will trigger immediate harms (e.g., like the closure of a hospital), 2) denial of the injunction will enable the rapid realization of pro-competitive benefits (e.g., the expansion and improvement of services and higher pay for nurses and other workers ) and 3) failure to issue the injunction will not immediately lead to theoretical harms predicted by the FTC (e.g., rate increases), they may be able to benefit from a similar balancing of the equities from future courts and force the FTC to decide whether to pursue a case through its administrative process.
    Authors

    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

    Daniel Powers

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Graham J. Hyman

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights

  • Spotlight on the “Partner Countries” Subsidiaries’ Exemption from Sanctions against Russia

    Spotlight on the “Partner Countries” Subsidiaries’ Exemption from Sanctions against Russia

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Spotlight on the “Partner Countries” Subsidiaries’ Exemption from Sanctions against Russia

    June 7, 2024

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    UPDATE: Following the negotiations of the 14th sanctions package, the “partner countries” subsidiaries’ exemption has been extended until September 30, 2024.

    From June 20, 2024, EU companies with a presence in Russia will no longer be able to rely on the “partner countries” exemption and will be required to obtain, or rely on, a licence to provide business services and/or software to their Russian entities. Competent authorities of the EU Member States responsible for granting licences required pursuant to EU sanctions have taken markedly different approaches in implementing this change. At the same time, UK sanctions against Russia never contained the “partner countries” exemption and UK companies providing business services to their Russian entities were always required to apply for a licence. In this article, we analyse how the German, French, Italian and the UK regimes are addressing this issue.*

    In depth

    Background

    As discussed in our previous Quarterly Sanctions Update, the 12th Sanctions Package introduced significant amendments to Article 5n of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 on restrictive measures against Russia (Regulation 833/2014). Among other things, as of June 20, 2024, EU entities will no longer be allowed to provide certain business services (including accounting, auditing, bookkeeping and tax consulting, business and management consulting services), legal advisory services (together, “Restricted Services”) nor certain software for the management of enterprises and for industrial management and infrastructure (together, “Restricted Software”) intended for the exclusive use of their Russian subsidiaries (currently authorised by the so-called “partner countries” exemption covering entities established in the European Union, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and South Korea, and their subsidiaries). Instead, EU companies will need to obtain, or rely on, a licence issued under Article 5n(10)(h) of Regulation 833/2014 to continue providing the Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software to their Russian subsidiaries.

    On April 2, 2024, the European Commission updated its FAQ on professional services to reflect the 12th Sanctions Package, clarifying that:

    • Competent authorities of EU Member States are responsible for issuing licences under Article 5n(10)(h) of Regulation 833/2014 and they are free to establish their own procedures in this respect (including in relation to processing time, information and documents required to be submitted with the application, the period for which a licence can be obtained, and any conditions attached to the licence).
    • Although competent authorities may issue licences covering a number of Restricted Services to be provided to the same Russian company, they must assess each licence request on a case-by-case basis are not authorised to issue general licences covering entire sectors or activities.
    • EU companies providing Restricted Services to their Russian subsidiaries from several EU Member States will need to request a licence in each of these States.

    Differences exist in relation to the implementation of the above amendment. Whilst the majority of EU Member States will be assessing each licence application on a case-by-case basis, two competent authorities have taken two extreme approaches. On one side, the officials of the Lithuanian competent authority announced that no licence will be granted for the provision of Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software to Russian subsidiaries. On the other side, the German competent authority issued a licence generally allowing all German entities to provide the Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software to their Russian subsidiaries.

    Germany

    German companies intending to provide Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software to their Russian subsidiaries after June 20, 2024 will be able to rely on the General Licence No 42 (German Licence) issued by the German competent authority, Budensamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) on February 20, 2024 (see our previous article, “German Authorities Take Action to Accelerate Export Control Procedures,” on a number of general licences recently issued by BAFA). The German Licence authorises the provision of Restricted Services and Restricted Software for the exclusive use of entities established in Russia owned by, or solely or jointly controlled by, entities established in the European Union, European Economic Area or any of the “partner countries” from June 21, 2024 until May 31, 2025, subject to the following conditions:

    • German companies who intend to rely on the German Licence must register with BAFA using the ELAN-K2 export system or by email, at the latest 30 days after the use of the licence.
    • In addition, German companies must report to BAFA by email the details of (i) Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software provided to Russian subsidiaries in reliance on the German Licence, as well as (ii) the ownership/control of the group, within 30 days of the provision of these Services and/or Software.
    • All documents relating to the reliance on the German Licence should be securely stored and kept for at least 5 years.

    Significantly, no more than a month after the publication of the German Licence, the European Commission amended its FAQ on professional services to expressly state that Regulation 833/2014 does not allow competent authorities of EU Member States to issue general licences covering entire sectors or activities. In the Commission’s view, such a licence would amount to a de facto exemption and would be in contradiction to the amendments introduced by the Council of the European Union, which replaced the existing “partner countries” exemption with a requirement for a prior licence from competent authorities of EU Member States. The Commission specifically referred to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-585/13P, where it held that “the competent authority must make an assessment on a case-by-case basis and […] it is not authorised to give general approval to a certain category of transactions in respect of which the entities concerned would be relieved of the need to request authorisation on a case-by-case basis.”

    To date, BAFA has not changed its position and the German Licence remains applicable. It is not the first time the German authorities’ interpretation of EU sanctions has diverged from the European Commission’s interpretation (see in particular the difference between the European Commission and the German Central Bank, Bundesbank, on the application of asset freeze to non-designated entities owned by designated persons). In this instance, however, the Commission’s position is less clear. Not only does Article 5n(10) of Regulation 833/2014 give competent authorities the power to issue licences “under such conditions as they deem appropriate”; a number of prohibitions in Regulation 833/2014 also instruct the authorities to grant trade licences in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation 2021/821 on dual-use items, which deliberately allow them to issue national general licences. Finally, the non-binding nature of the Commission’s FAQ has been consistently confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, as recently reiterated by Advocate General Medina in Case C-109/23 [Jemerak], who insisted that FAQ are “of no consequence” for the interpretation of Regulation 833/2014.

    France

    French companies intending to provide Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software to their Russian subsidiaries after June 20, 2024 should apply for a licence to the French competent authority, Direction générale du Trésor (DG Tresor), which clarified that:

    • Licence applications should be made through the Téléservice platform. In the case of several Russian subsidiaries, a separate licence will need to be submitted for each of them.
    • As part of the application, French companies would need to submit a document (in the form of a memorandum or an Excel sheet) setting out (i) the list of Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software that would be provided to the Russian subsidiary, (ii) the expected use of Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software, and (iii) the structure chart relating to the ownership/control of the group.
    • Once the licence application is submitted, DG Tresor should respond within 2 months with its decision on whether it will grant the licence.

    Italy

    Italian companies intending to provide Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software to their Russian subsidiaries after June 20, 2024 should apply for a licence to the Italian competent authority, the division for dual-use items of the Unità per le autorizzazioni dei materiali di armamento (UAMA). Similar to the approach taken by French DG Tresor, UAMA will only issue specific individual licences, and will not grant any general licences (contrary to the approach taken by Germany). Although UAMA must decide on whether to grant a licence within 180 days following the submission of the application, licences are generally granted within 30-45 days (noting that the timing may vary in connection with the new prohibitions). In its Explanatory Note dated April 26, 2024, and as updated on May 22, 2024, UAMA provided the following clarifications relating to the application process:

    • The licence application must be submitted via the e-licencing electronic platform pursuant to the procedure set out in Article 10 of Legislative Decree 221/2017, and must be limited to a specific end-user.
    • Licences can only be issued for the provision of Restricted Services and will not extend to financing or financial assistance (which can only be authorised by the Financial Security Committee of the Italian Ministry of Finance, following a separate licence request).
    • The application must contain: (i) the evidence of the ownership structure (i.e. confirmation of registration with the Chamber of Commerce); (ii) an end user statement, containing the list of Italian employees and/or directors who will rely on the licence; (iii) an agreement between the service provider and the end user; and (iv) a declaration outlining the envisaged activity accompanying the Restricted Services, and confirming that the conditions for obtaining a licence under Article 5n(10)(h) of Regulation 833/2014 have been satisfied.

    Finally, in relation to Italian citizens working in companies outside Italy, UAMA clarified that:

    • Italian citizens who are employees, directors or members of other corporate bodies at Russian companies and intend to perform the Restricted Services must apply to UAMA for individual licences. The same applies to Italian citizens working at foreign companies established outside Italy or Russia who intend to provide the Restricted Services to Russian companies (even if they are self-employed).
    • For the sake of efficiency, it is recommended that the licence application is submitted on behalf of employees by an operator holding an account at the e-licencing electronic platform, e.g. a law firm, advisory company or, alternatively, the Italian parent company (although an application submitted by the individual employee concerned would also be considered).

    United Kingdom

    The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (UK Russia Regulations) which govern UK sanctions against Russia never provided for the “partner countries” exemption in the context of the professional and business services and legal advisory services prohibitions (broadly encompassing the scope of Restricted Services) set out by Regulations 54C and 54D of the UK Russia Regulations. Instead, the UK Russia Regulations introduced a number of exemptions covering, among other things, the provision of services in discharge of various UK statutory duties. UK companies intending to provide services not falling within any of the exemptions to their Russian subsidiaries were, and are, required to apply for a licence with the UK competent authority, the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU). The UK Russia Regulations do not provide for the equivalent to the European Union’s prohibition on Restricted Software.

    On December 22, 2023, the ECJU issued further guidance clarifying that:

    • All applications for licences should be made through the SPIRE online platform. UK companies should apply for a Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL).
    • As part of the application, UK companies should include (i) a cover letter explaining the services to be provided to Russian subsidiaries and referring to the applicable prohibitions, and (ii) a list of recipients of the services and any other interested parties. An end-user undertaking (EUU) is not however required.
    • The processing time for the licence is likely to take significantly longer than the standard 20 working day target.

    Practical Tips for Businesses

    • EU companies with a presence in Russia should assess whether they provide any Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software to their Russian subsidiaries and apply for a licence in the relevant EU Member State, if necessary. Any new services intended to be provided to these subsidiaries should be carefully evaluated in light of applicable prohibitions and/or required licences.
    • Although the possibility for granting licences exists under Article 5n(10) of Regulation 833/2014, it cannot be excluded that competent authorities of particular EU Member States will not issue such licences. EU companies should prepare in advance for such an eventuality, including by revising their intra-group contractual arrangements accordingly.
    • Groups and professional partnerships providing Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software from a number of EU Member States should consolidate and centralise the licence application process to avoid any differences in the information provided to the authorities and ensure that the scopes of requested licences are aligned. Also, given the different licencing approaches, EU groups may consider simplifying, consolidating or otherwise rationalising intra-group arrangements in order to limit the number of required licences.
    • The supply chain’s compliance with EU sanctions should also be carefully assessed. Firstly, EU companies should ensure that Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software are provided “for the exclusive use” of their Russian subsidiaries (noting that the interpretation of this term and the applicable burden of proof have not been yet clarified by the European Commission). In addition, they must ensure (including by contractual warranties) that Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software are not provided to the Russian subsidiaries through EU companies’ subsidiaries in third countries, as any such structure would likely be considered by the European Commission as indirect provision of Restricted Services and/or Restricted Software and therefore prohibited (noting that additional sanction circumvention considerations may also come into play in this respect).
    • Finally, even though no Restricted Software is provided by EU companies from the territory of the relevant EU Member States, EU companies should assess if any software is provided by US companies, from the US territory or whether it contains US technology. Additional assessment under US sanctions should be conducted in case the US nexus exists.

    *Trainee Angela Gerbino contributed to this article.

    Authors

    Raminta Dereskeviciute

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Fabio Cozzi

    Partner

    Milan

    Sabine Naugès

    Partner

    Paris

    Dr. Alexa Ningelgen

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • The impact of the ACA 1557 final regulations on pregnancy and abortion

    The impact of the ACA 1557 final regulations on pregnancy and abortion

    ARTICLE

    The impact of the ACA 1557 final regulations on pregnancy and abortion

    June 6, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, or any combination thereof, in a health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance. On May 6, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued final regulations under Section 1557. For an overview of these regulations, please see our May 2024 client alert.

    In a recent article, we reported that the final regulations unambiguously prohibit categorical coverage exclusions or limitations for health services related to gender transition or other gender-affirming care. This, we predicted, is likely to result in a showdown involving the two dozen or so state laws that, among other things, limit gender-affirming care access. In this post, we take up the final regulations’ treatment of pregnancy and abortion. While a similar showdown over abortion is possible, it is (for the reasons set out below) less likely.

    Rather than establish protected characteristics, Section 1557 instead cross-references four other civil rights statutes to define what discrimination is prohibited. These include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Notably, three of the cross-references (including Title IX) also contain the abbreviation “et seq.,” which captures the balance of the provisions constituting a given law.

    An ongoing source of friction involving ACA Section 1557 is the cross-reference to the “religious exemption” in Title IX. This exemption permits conduct by a religiously controlled educational institution that might otherwise violate the statute’s requirements when the institution acts for a religious reason and compliance with the statute would conflict with a religious tenet. A subsequent amendment clarified that Title IX must be construed to neither require nor prohibit any person or entity to provide abortion-related benefits or services. This is referred to as “abortion neutrality.” The final regulations do not incorporate Title IX’s religious exemption or its abortion neutrality provision.

    The final regulations define discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include pregnancy or related conditions. How this squares with abortion is addressed at some length in the preamble and the regulation itself:

    • The decision not to import the Title IX religious exception does not compel any individual provider or covered entity with religious- or conscience-based objections to provide abortion or any other care to the extent doing so would conflict with a sincerely held belief.
    • The ACA’s respect for federal laws applies. That law includes robust protections regarding conscience protection, willingness or refusal to provide abortion, and discrimination on the basis of the willingness or refusal “to provide, pay for, cover, or refer for abortion or to provide or participate in training to provide abortion.’’ In addition, “[i]nsofar as the application of any requirement under this part would violate applicable Federal protections for religious freedom and conscience, such application shall not be required.’’
    • An exemption is provided for any portion of the rule that “would violate applicable Federal protections for religious freedom and conscience.” There is also an administrative process for recipients to seek an assurance of exemption in writing from the application of a provision of Section 1557.

    The government has had a generally dismal record in defending challenges based on religious beliefs and conscience. The final regulations take a practical approach to the regulation of covered entities who seek religion- or conscience-based exemptions. The exemption for any portion of the rule that would violate applicable federal protections for religious freedom and conscience strikes us as well advised.

    In the preamble, OCR concludes as a matter of statutory interpretation that Section 1557 does not require “the Department to incorporate the language of title IX’s abortion neutrality provision.” At the same time, it says that a covered provider’s decision not to provide abortions does not itself constitute discrimination in violation of Section 1557. Will the latter (i.e., the concession that a provider’s decision not to provide abortions does not itself constitute discrimination in violation of Section 1557) negate the former (i.e., the claim that there is no need to recognize Title IX’s abortion neutrality provision)?

    Whether the final regulations’ approach will satisfy everyone remains to be seen.

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  • The new European AI regulation – how it affects medical technology

    The new European AI regulation – how it affects medical technology

    ARTICLE

    The new European AI regulation – how it affects medical technology

    June 6, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    AI systems that fall under the provisions of the MDR as software are increasingly being used in medical technology. Additional regulation by the new European AI Regulation is now imminent. Jana Grieb and Dr. Deniz Tschammler explain what this means for manufacturers in a guest article for DeviceMed.

    In depth
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  • The Unified Patent Court – a New International Court based on an Enhanced Cooperation between EU Member States

    The Unified Patent Court – a New International Court based on an Enhanced Cooperation between EU Member States

    ARTICLE

    The Unified Patent Court – a New International Court based on an Enhanced Cooperation between EU Member States

    June 5, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Laura Woll’s latest piece delves into the topic of the Unified Patent Court, a noteworthy advancement in European patent safeguarding. The write-up offers a comprehensive examination of the Unitary Patent, a mechanism that enables patent protection across as many as 17 EU Member States via a solitary application.

    In depth
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  • State Regulators Address Insurers’ Use of AI: 11 States Adopt NAIC Model Bulletin

    State Regulators Address Insurers’ Use of AI: 11 States Adopt NAIC Model Bulletin

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    State Regulators Address Insurers’ Use of AI: 11 States Adopt NAIC Model Bulletin

    June 4, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In December 2023, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) adopted a Model Bulletin on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems by Insurers. The model bulletin reminds insurance carriers that they must comply with all applicable insurance laws and regulations (e.g., prohibitions against unfair trade practices) when making decisions that impact consumers, including when those decisions are made or supported by advanced technologies, such as AI systems. The model bulletin was issued by the NAIC’s Innovation, Cybersecurity, and Technology Committee, which includes insurance regulator representatives from 15 states and is tasked with discussing how technological developments may impact consumer protections and insurance oversight. While not a model law or regulation, the model bulletin is intended to serve as a guiding document for state insurance regulators to promote uniformity in state regulatory frameworks. The NAIC’s model applies only to the extent that a state adopts the bulletin.

    In depth

    Model Bulletin Principles and State Adoption

    To date, almost a dozen states have adopted the model bulletin with minor customization, and many other states likely will adopt similar standards regarding the use of AI in health insurance.

    State Date Adopted
    Alaska February 1, 2024
    Connecticut February 26, 2024
    Illinois March 13, 2024
    Kentucky April 16, 2024
    Maryland April 22, 2024
    Nevada February 23, 2024
    New Hampshire February 20, 2024
    Pennsylvania April 6, 2024
    Rhode Island March 15, 2024
    Vermont March 12, 2024
    Washington April 22, 2024

    The state bulletins are based on the key principles outlined in NAIC’s model, including:

    Insurers should maintain a written program for the use of AI systems.

    The model bulletin establishes that insurers should implement and maintain a written program to ensure that AI systems are used responsibly. This includes mitigating adverse consumer outcomes and using verification and testing methods to identify potential biases in the use of AI systems and other predictive models. The responsibility for oversight of the program should rest with senior management or a committee that is accountable to the insurer’s board.

    The governance framework should be driven by transparency, fairness and accountability.

    Insurers are expected to implement a governance framework overseeing the AI system, including policies and procedures, risk management and internal controls, documentation requirements and similar methods of oversight to be used at each stage of the AI system’s cycle. The governance structure should include committees of appropriate disciplines (e.g., actuarial, data science, underwriting, legal); clearly defined chains of command; monitoring, auditing and reporting protocols; and ongoing training and supervision requirements for personnel.

    Risk management and internal controls should be documented.

    An insurer’s AI system should document the insurer’s risk management and internal control framework, including how AI systems are approved and adopted. This extends to management and oversight of predictive models, including the expectation that insurers maintain descriptions of such models, document their use, and conduct regular audits and assessments of the tools. Insurers should validate, test and retest AI system outputs, as necessary. Insurers are expected to protect nonpublic information (i.e., consumer information) from unauthorized access.

    Insurers are accountable for third-party vendor management.

    The model bulletin requires insurers to develop clear processes for using or acquiring AI-related systems developed by third parties. This includes protocols for assessing the third party’s system to ensure that decisions made or supported by such systems meet the legal standards imposed on the insurer. The model bulletin also encourages insurers to consider including terms in their contracts with third parties that provide audit rights and require third parties to cooperate with the insurer on state regulatory inquiries.

    Regulators may ask about an insurer’s use and development of AI.

    The model bulletin indicates that in the event of a state investigation or market conduct action, an insurer may be asked about its development and use of AI, including the insurer’s governance framework, risk management and internal controls. This could include a request for policies, procedures, training materials and other information relating to the insurer’s implementation, monitoring and oversight of AI systems.

    Other State Activity

    While almost a dozen states have adopted the NAIC’s model bulletin, other states are taking different approaches to regulate the use of AI in insurance. For example:

    • In 2022, California’s insurance commissioner issued a bulletin noting that it is aware of and investigating instances of potential bias and alleged unfair discrimination across lines of insurance resulting from the use of technology and data. The bulletin expressed concern about the irresponsible use of “Big Data” and encouraged insurers to review their practices.
    • Colorado established governance and risk management framework requirements for life insurers regarding the use of external consumer data, algorithms, predictive models and similar systems. The regulation aims to prevent unfair discrimination and includes documentation, management and reporting requirements. Colorado also recently enacted the nation’s first comprehensive framework to govern the development and use of AI, which goes into effect on February 1, 2026. Importantly, the law includes an exemption for insurers, fraternal benefit societies and developers of AI systems used by insurers that are subject to C.R.S. § 10-3-1104.9 and the rules adopted by Colorado Insurance Commissioner Michael Conway.
    • In 2020, Texas issued a bulletin reminding regulated entities – including their agents and representatives – that they are responsible for the accuracy of data used in claims handling, underwriting and rating practices.

    Health Insurers’ Key Takeaway

    As AI systems are increasingly used in all facets of the insurance industry – from product development to sales, pricing, claims management and more – AI regulation in the health insurance sector is likely to grow. Health insurers should be mindful of these developments and the different approaches states may take to overseeing and investigating insurers’ use of AI. While many states have taken up the NAIC’s model, other states are implementing state-specific requirements, which could result in a patchwork of AI standards. Health insurers operating across multiple states should be aware of the different standards implemented and should maintain compliance as these expectations evolve.

    For those affected and interested in these developments, McDermott’s team continues to track AI developments in the healthcare and insurance industries; visit McDermott’s AI in Healthcare Resource Center to learn more. McDermott’s insurance regulatory team is tracking the changing regulatory landscape, including regulators’ increased attention to the use of big data systems, including external consumer data and information sources. We will continue to closely monitor the state of AI in healthcare and insurance to help stakeholders maximize the value of data and AI with an eye toward compliance in this rapidly evolving regulatory landscape.

    Authors

    Gregory R. Mitchell

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Emily R. Curran

    Associate

    Washington, DC

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  • New Developments in French Competition Law Pose Risk of Ex-Post Challenge to Non-Notifiable Transactions

    New Developments in French Competition Law Pose Risk of Ex-Post Challenge to Non-Notifiable Transactions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Developments in French Competition Law Pose Risk of Ex-Post Challenge to Non-Notifiable Transactions

    June 4, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a significant development for French merger control, on May 2, 2024 the French Competition Authority applied the jurisprudence laid down in the recent Towercast case to an alleged anti-competitive agreement matter in the meat-cutting sector.

    In its Towercast ruling (C-449/21), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that a merger which is not notifiable i.e. being below the European and national merger control thresholds, and which has not been subject to a referral under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 of 2004 (EUMR), may be challenged a posteriori by the European Commission or a national competition authority (NCA) if an abuse of dominant position, resulting from the merger but detachable from it, can be established.

    Less than a week after the Towercast ruling, the Belgian Competition Authority applied the principles set out by the CJEU by opening an ex officio investigation into the acquisition of the edpnet group by Proximus, ordering interim measures in June 2023 to ensure the continuity of edpnet’s activities and its operational and commercial independence from Proximus, ultimately leading to the sale of edpnet’s activities post-closing in November 2023. The President of the FCA, Benoît Cœuré, said that this instrument could “now be used, bearing in mind that its conditions of use are restrictive[1]”. This has now been confirmed by the FCA’s decision issued on May 2, on which he immediately commented, stating that it was an “important clarification for merger control”, particularly regarding Article 101 TFEU.*

    In depth

    In the current case in question, France’s three leading groups in the meat-cutting sector had signed several cross-divestitures of business assets in June 2015. As the merger control thresholds set out in Article L.430-1 of the French Commercial Code had not been exceeded, these transactions were not notified to the FCA under the merger control procedure.

    Nonetheless, the FCA’s investigation services initiated proceedings not on the basis of an alleged abuse of dominant position but on Articles 101 TFEU and L. 420-1 of the French Commercial Code, and sent out a statement of objections to these three groups, alleging they had agreed to divide up the market geographically, in particular by organizing meetings and exchanging information beforehand, and then carrying out the divestiture of the businesses in question.

    In its decision no. 24-D-05, the FCA firstly considered that the information provided in the case did not establish the existence of an agreement to implement a global plan for the geographical allocation of the meat-cutting markets in France. According to the FCA, the discussions between the parties involved in the merger were strictly in preparation for the merger.

    Secondly, the FCA confirmed that the signing of the divestiture agreements established the existence of an agreement to carry out the mergers. The FCA examined whether the mergers in question, when considered independently, would likely violate Articles 101 TFEU and L. 420-1 of the French Commercial Code by forming an anti-competitive agreement. This analysis was completed using the Towercast established case law in a novel manner.

    On this issue, the FCA considered that, in view of the content and the economic and legal context surrounding the case, the divestiture agreements did not have an anti-competitive purpose, and that the evidence available was not sufficient to analyze the effects of these transactions on the market concerned.

    Consequently, the FCA dismissed the claims brought by its investigation services.

    The FCA’s decision, which clearly sets a precedent, comes not long after Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou’s noteworthy opinion in the Illumina/Grail case, pending before the CJEU. In this opinion, published at the end of March 2024, the Advocate General considered that “The General Court erred in its interpretation and application of Article 22 EUMR. Under a proper construction, that provision does not empower the Commission to adopt decisions such as those challenged by the appellants in the present proceedings. Those decisions should, thus, be annulled.” If this position were to be followed by the CJEU, the European Commission would no longer be competent to review, on referral from NCAs, mergers that are not notifiable under national law.

    Yet the FCA had shown great support for the use of Article 22, congratulating the European Commission in a press release dated September 15, 2020, on its announcement that it would take on this new competence through a new interpretation of Article 22, previously construed as allowing Member States without merger control law to refer to the European Commission. On March 9, 2021, in the case of Illumina’s proposed acquisition of sole control of Grail, the FCA submitted a request for the examination of the transaction to be referred to the Commission under Article 22. Since then, the FCA has used this EUMR provision in the Autotalks/Qualcomm case in July 2023.

    In this context, if the FCA should not be able to refer a case to the European Commission on the basis of Article 22, supposing the CJEU were to endorse the position recently expressed by its Advocate General, the decision n°24-D-05 it has just issued sends a strong and clear message to companies: the FCA will not hesitate to examine ex post any merger which is not notifiable in France, but which may give rise to an abuse of a dominant position (e.g. Towercast) or even an anticompetitive agreement, and to draw all the legal consequences.

    This message is even more powerful given that the FCA is not the only enforcement agency in France to ensure that the Towercast ruling is applied. Decision no. 24-D-05 was initiated after the French General Directorate for Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) forwarded evidence relating to the meat-cutting sector, basis on which the FCA carried out dawn raids.

    Moreover, decision no. 24-D-05 will unquestionably lead companies to consider, when drafting their corporate documentation (in particular acquisition agreements), how to best organize the completion of their transactions that do not require prior authorization under merger control, and to anticipate this new legal risk of their agreements being challenged a posteriori – a risk that is now tangible, as the FCA’s decision teaches us.

    *Trainee Victoire Sipp contributed to this article

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