Content Type: Article

  • Supreme Court Limits Scope of Anti-Bribery Statute for State Officials

    Supreme Court Limits Scope of Anti-Bribery Statute for State Officials

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Limits Scope of Anti-Bribery Statute for State Officials

    July 3, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it is not a federal crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 666. In so doing, the Court overturned the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and resolved a split among the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits.

    The majority opinion in Snyder, penned by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, used text-based principles of statutory interpretation, legislative history and notions of fairness to conclude that Congress only intended for 18 U.S.C. § 666 to criminalize the acceptance of bribes, not gratuities. According to the Court, bribes are payments to public officials made with the purpose of influencing that official before they act. Gratuities, on the other hand, are payments made to a public official after they act as a form of reward or token of appreciation.

    The Court’s holding in Snyder is relatively narrow. The majority opinion does not affect 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) or (c), which prohibit federal officials from accepting bribes or gratuities. The opinion also does not affect any state or local laws that may independently prohibit state and local officials from accepting gratuities.

    In depth

    Background

    The Court based its holding in part on the statute prohibiting bribes and gratuities involving federal officials. In 1962, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) and (c), which respectively contain comprehensive prohibitions on the ability of federal officials to accept bribes and gratuities. Importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) establishes a 15-year maximum prison sentence for bribery, while 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) only establishes a two-year maximum prison sentence for the acceptance of gratuities.

    In the 1980s, Congress extended the federal prohibition on bribery and gratuities to state and local officials by passing 18 U.S.C. § 666. However, just two years after the initial law was passed, Congress amended the statute. Under the current text, 18 U.S.C. § 666 makes it a crime for state and local officials to “corruptly” solicit, accept or agree to accept “anything of value” “intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with” any official business or transaction worth $5,000 or more. That crime currently carries a 10-year maximum prison sentence.

    The Court’s decision overturned the conviction of James Snyder, who served as the mayor of Portage, Indiana, during the early 2010s. In 2013, while Snyder was mayor, the city of Portage awarded two contracts to a local trucking company which were collectively valued at approximately $1.1 million. In 2014, the trucking company cut a $13,000 check to Snyder. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and federal prosecutors charged Snyder, under 18 U.S.C. § 666, with illegally accepting a gratuity in connection with the city’s trucking contract. Snyder was ultimately convicted by a federal jury and sentenced to 21 months in prison. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of whether 18 U.S.C. § 666 makes it a federal crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities for their past official acts.

    Opinion of the Supreme Court

    The Supreme Court reversed Snyder’s conviction in a 6-3 decision, with Justice Kavanaugh delivering the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Roberts, Thomas and Barrett joined in full. Justice Gorsuch additionally wrote his own concurrence in the case, while Justices Jackson, Sotomayor and Kagan wrote in dissent.

    The majority held that 18 U.S.C. § 666 does not make it a federal crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities. Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion listed a number of rationales for the majority’s conclusion but focused on the text of the statute and legislative history. Specifically, the majority’s reasoning focused on comparing and contrasting the language of 18 U.S.C. § 666 with the language of the federal bribery and gratuities statutes (18 U.S.C. § 201(b) and (c), respectively). Of note, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) authorizes a maximum sentence of two years in prison for a federal official who accepts a gratuity; under the government’s reading of 18 U.S.C. § 666, a local official guilty of the same conduct would face a maximum sentence of 10 years. Ultimately, the court concluded that the similarities between 18 U.S.C. § 666 and 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) meant that Congress only intended the statute to prohibit state and local officials from accepting bribes, not gratuities. Any contrary outcome would deny “fair notice” of prohibited conduct and “create traps for unwary state and local officials.”

    Takeaways

    • Snyder held that it is not a federal crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities. However, it remains a federal crime for state and local officials to accept bribes and it is still a federal crime for federal officials to accept both forms of compensation.
    • Section 666 applies to private citizens as well as public officials, so while the underlying case addressed a public official accepting a gratuity, it applies equally to a private individual paying a gratuity to a state or local official.
    • The Snyder decision continues a trend in which the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted federal anti-corruption statutes, chipping away at the tools used by federal prosecutors in public corruption cases.
    • States and local governments may have their own laws that make it illegal for state and local officials to accept gratuities.
    • Given this continuing exposure, it remains important for public companies and other entities to design and execute robust compliance polices to avoid the risks that come with government investigations and securities litigation.
    • Those risks are heightened by recent US Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission pronouncements focusing on the importance of compliance regimes.

    Hallie Fox, a summer associate, contributed to the development of this On the Subject.

    Authors

    James Durkin

    Partner

    Chicago

    Paul M.G. Helms

    Partner

    Chicago, Washington, DC

    Matthew Madden

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • California Legislatively Overturns Recent Office of Tax Appeals Taxpayer Win

    California Legislatively Overturns Recent Office of Tax Appeals Taxpayer Win

    ARTICLE

    California Legislatively Overturns Recent Office of Tax Appeals Taxpayer Win

    Jul 3, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The California State Legislature overturned Microsoft’s recent win at the Office of Tax Appeals, which held that the gross amount of dividends received from foreign affiliates outside its water’s-edge group should be included in its sales factor denominator, regardless of the application of a dividends-received deduction excluding 75% of such dividends from its taxable base.

    The legislation declares that FTB Legal Ruling 2006-1 “shall apply with respect to apportionment factors attributable to income exempt from income tax under the Corporation Tax Law,” and it claims that the declaration “does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing law.” Consistent with the FTB’s position in the Microsoft case, Legal Ruling 2006-1 would limit the sales factor denominator to the net dividends included in the tax base.

    Authors

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Hilkin

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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    Endnotes

  • HHS Issues Provider Information Blocking Disincentives Final Rule

    HHS Issues Provider Information Blocking Disincentives Final Rule

    CLIENT ALERT / INFORMATION BLOCKING

    HHS Issues Provider Information Blocking Disincentives Final Rule

    July 3, 2024

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 1, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) published a final rule in the Federal Register to implement a 21st Century Cures Act provision establishing penalties (called “appropriate disincentives”) for certain health care providers determined by the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to have committed information blocking. Health care providers have been subject to the information blocking regulations since April 5, 2021, but there has been no enforcement mechanism under the Cures Act to date. The disincentives for certain Medicare-participating hospitals and clinicians become effective July 31, 2024, while disincentives associated with the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) become effective January 1, 2025.

    Key Takeaways

    • While the final rule moves the industry towards full enforcement of the information blocking regulations against health care providers, it applies penalties only to health care providers that participate in certain Medicare programs and not to all health care providers that are covered actors under the information blocking regulations.
    • HHS has not proposed any disincentives for health care providers that do not participate in the Medicare Promoting Interoperability Program or MSSP, or that serve a limited number of Medicare beneficiaries.
    • In a press release accompanying the final rule publication, HHS emphasized that the final rule complements OIG’s July 2023 final rule establishing penalties for information blocking actors other than health care providers. OIG’s information blocking civil monetary penalty (CMP) authority does not extend to health care providers except to the extent that they meet the definitions of a health IT developer of certified health IT (certified health IT developer) or health information network and health information exchange (HIN/HIE).

    For more information about ONC’s recent final rule expanding information blocking regulatory exceptions, see our On the Subject. For a discussion of OIG’s final information blocking enforcement rule concerning the penalties for information blocking by certified health IT developers and HIN/HIEs, plus OIG’s investigation and enforcement procedures, see our Special Report.

    In depth

    Summary of Appropriate Disincentives

    The final rule establishes the following disincentives for health care providers that participate in certain Medicare programs that OIG determines committed information blocking and refers to CMS. As discussed below, the ultimate financial impact of disincentives (if any) will vary in some instances based on Medicare reimbursement otherwise owed to the provider rather than on the severity of a health care provider’s alleged information blocking conduct or other factors related to interference with access, exchange or use of electronic health information. The final rule does not include disincentives for health care providers that are not enrolled in Medicare at all or that do not participate in certain Medicare programs.

    Hospitals and Critical Access Hospitals

    HHS uses the existing Medicare Promoting Interoperability Program for the meaningful use of certified electronic health record (EHR) technology to impose disincentives on certain acute care hospitals (eligible hospitals) reimbursed under the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and on critical access hospitals (CAHs), which are reimbursed based on their reasonable costs. Under the final rule, an eligible hospital or CAH will not be a meaningful EHR user in an EHR reporting period if OIG refers, during the calendar year of the reporting period, its determination that the eligible hospital or CAH committed information blocking. As a result, an eligible hospital would be unable to earn the three-quarters of the annual market basket increase under the IPPS, and a CAH would have its Medicare reimbursement reduced to 100% of reasonable costs, down from 101%. The disincentives under the Medicare Promoting Interoperability Program will be effective July 31, 2024.

    In the proposed rule, HHS estimated that this change could result in a median disincentive amount of $394,353 and a 95% range of $30,406 to $2,430,766. Of note, the Promoting Interoperability Program does not apply to many long-term care hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, laboratories and other facilities.

    Physicians and Other Clinicians Reimbursed Under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule

    With some exceptions, clinicians reimbursed under the Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) must either participate in a Medicare Advanced Alternative Payment Model or achieve a threshold Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) performance score to avoid a downward adjustment to their PFS reimbursement. CMS currently calculates the MIPS performance score based on four performance categories: Quality (30%), Improvement Activities (15%), Promoting Interoperability (25%) and Cost (30%). Measures within the four performance categories are scored and combined to make up a clinician’s MIPS score. Those who score higher than a performance threshold set by CMS for a reporting year (75 points for 2024) can earn a positive adjustment of up to 9% of reimbursement under the PFS in the payment year. Likewise, those below the performance threshold face penalties of up to -9% of reimbursement under the PFS. CMS applies a payment adjustment to the payment year two years after the calendar year of the clinician’s MIPS reporting period. Not all MIPS participants are required to report the Promoting Interoperability category. For example, there are exceptions for facility-based and hospital-based clinicians (e.g., emergency room physicians and providers in ambulatory surgical centers) as well as some small practices.

    Under the final rule, a clinician who participates in MIPS and is required to report on the Promoting Interoperability performance category will receive a zero score for the category if OIG refers, during the calendar year of the clinician’s reporting period, a determination that the clinician committed information blocking. Because the Promoting Interoperability performance category is currently 25% of the total MIPS score, 75 would be the highest score that the clinician could earn and would likely result in a penalty based on the current MIPS performance threshold for 2024. Those who do not report the MIPS Promoting Interoperability category would not be subject to any disincentives under the final rule. The disincentives for MIPS participants will be effective July 31, 2024.

    In the proposed rule, HHS estimated that the median individual disincentive amount could be a loss of $686 for a clinician, while an estimated median group of six clinicians could see a loss of $4,116, with a range of $1,372 to $165,326 for group sizes ranging from two to 241 clinicians.

    Medicare Shared Savings Program

    Clinicians can avoid having to participate in MIPS by participating in the MSSP. Under the final rule, if OIG determines that a health care provider that is an accountable care organization (ACO) or part of an ACO has committed information blocking, CMS can apply a range of appropriate disincentives under the MSSP based on the relevant facts and circumstances. The disincentives may include:

    • Denying the addition of an ACO participant such as a physician group to an ACO participant list (or denying addition of an ACO provider or supplier such as a physician to the ACO provider/supplier list);
    • Informing an ACO that remedial action should be taken against the ACO participant, provider or supplier;
    • Denying an ACO’s application to participate in the MSSP if the remedial action is not taken; or
    • Terminating an ACO’s participation agreement with CMS.

    CMS stated that the relevant facts and circumstances to determine the appropriate disincentives to be applied under the MSSP include:

    • The nature of the provider’s information blocking practice;
    • The provider’s diligence in identifying and correcting the problem;
    • The time elapsed since the information blocking occurred, including whether the issue had long since been remediated; and
    • Whether the provider was previously subject to a disincentive in another program.

    The disincentives under the MSSP will be effective January 1, 2025.

    Scope of Health Care Providers Impacted by Final Rule Disincentives

    The information blocking regulations apply to a broad range of health care providers, including facilities such as nursing facilities, long-term care facilities, dialysis facilities, blood centers, ambulatory surgical centers, laboratories and pharmacies, and individual providers such as therapists and pharmacists. However, because only a subset of health care providers is subject to the requirements that are the basis for disincentives under the final rule (e.g., the Promoting Interoperability Program requirements), many health care providers will be excluded from the disincentives framework, even though they are covered actors under the Cures Act and the information blocking regulations.

    OIG Investigative Authorities, “Referrals” and Intersection With OIG CMP Information Blocking Enforcement Rule

    The application of disincentives to health care providers covered by the final rule turns on a determination by OIG that the health care provider committed information blocking, so to understand the potential impact of HHS’s final rule, it is important to understand OIG’s role in the information blocking ecosystem.

    The Cures Act granted OIG the authority to investigate information blocking claims against each type of covered actor: health care providers, certified health IT developers and HIN/HIEs. The Cures Act also granted OIG the authority to impose CMPs against certified health IT developers and HIN/HIEs that violate the information blocking prohibition. OIG published its final rule implementing its CMP authority in the Federal Register in July 2023. That penalty authority, however, does not extend to the health care provider category of covered actors. Instead, the Cures Act requires OIG to refer health care providers that OIG determines have violated the information blocking prohibition to “the appropriate agency to be subject to appropriate disincentives.”

    From a procedural perspective, the final rule notes that OIG will coordinate with the “appropriate agency” to which OIG plans to make a “referral” during the pendency of OIG’s investigation and before actually making the referral, in an effort to ensure that the agency is aware that OIG might make the referral. When OIG actually makes the referral, OIG will provide information about its determination of information blocking, including how the health care provider’s practice met the “intent element” of the prohibition, among other data related to the alleged misconduct.

    In the final rule, HHS acknowledged that OIG’s anticipated information blocking enforcement priorities for health care providers are identical to those OIG identified for certified health IT developers and HIN/HIEs, except that OIG omitted actual knowledge from its enforcement priorities list for health care providers. This omission reflects the different knowledge standard in the statutory definition of information blocking for health care providers, which must know that their alleged information blocking practice is likely to interfere with access, exchange or use of electronic health information to implicate the prohibition. In contrast, health IT developers and HIN/HIEs must know or should know that their alleged information blocking practice is likely to interfere to implicate the prohibition.

    Health care providers should note that in some situations, they may be considered certified health IT developers or HIN/HIEs, subject to the lower knowledge threshold. However, the HTI-1 final rule released on December 13, 2023, clarifies the definition of certified health IT developer as it may apply to health care providers who “offer” health IT, and, as a result, limits the scope of scenarios in which health care providers would be considered certified health IT developers.

    OIG has provided guidance describing its planned investigative process for entities subject to information blocking CMPs. Although the final rule discusses OIG’s enforcement priorities for health care providers, it largely omits discussion of the underlying investigative process, including whether OIG’s process will similarly include an opportunity for health care providers to discuss an OIG investigation and explain why their conduct did not implicate the information blocking prohibition, met an exception or was otherwise lawful. This is notable given the absence in the final rule of any appeal mechanism by which health care providers could challenge OIG’s information blocking determination. Although there may be some limited opportunities to appeal a disincentive, HHS specifically makes clear that ACO appeals under the MSSP regulations, at least, do not extend to OIG’s underlying information blocking determination.

    One would expect that OIG would need to engage with the health care provider to perform a reasonable investigation. But the final rule’s omission of meaningful discussion about such interactions leaves open the question of what, if any, reasonable opportunities health care providers will have to make their case before being subjected to disincentives.

    In addition, unlike appeals for CMPs, HHS has not implemented new administrative appeals for appropriate disincentives. In the limited circumstances in which the underlying program that forms the basis for the disincentive has an appeal right, such as the right for an ACO to appeal certain actions under the MSSP, then an actor could appeal the disincentive itself through that process.

    “Wall of Shame” for Information Blocking

    The final rule creates a framework for public posts on ONC’s website about actors that OIG determines have committed information blocking. For health care providers subject to disincentives, the website will feature:

    • The health care provider’s name;
    • The provider’s business address (to ensure accurate provider identification);
    • The practice found to have been information blocking;
    • The disincentive(s) applied; and
    • Where to find additional information, if publicly available, about the determination of information blocking.

    HHS will post similar information on ONC’s website about HIN/HIEs and certified health IT developers that OIG determines have committed information blocking (regardless of whether they resolved their CMP liability with OIG or were subject to a CMP). This portion of the final rule is intended to provide transparency as to how information blocking impacts the nationwide health information technology infrastructure.

    The transparency is also an extension of the ONC’s existing website, Information Blocking Claims: By the Numbers, where it publishes statistics on the information blocking claims received through its Report Information Blocking Portal since April 5, 2021 (the information blocking compliance date). As of the end of May 2024, ONC and OIG had received almost 1,000 claims of possible information blocking (including 813 claims against health care providers).

    Next Steps

    Health care providers should evaluate their current information blocking policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the information blocking prohibition and mitigate the risk of disincentives. If you would like to evaluate your compliance capabilities, contact any of the authors of this On the Subject or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

    James A. Cannatti III

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Reuben Bank

    Associate

    Los Angeles

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  • Loper Bright Could Shift Outlook for FDA Legal Challenges

    Loper Bright Could Shift Outlook for FDA Legal Challenges

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Loper Bright Could Shift Outlook for FDA Legal Challenges

    July 3, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Supreme Court has overruled the longstanding Chevron doctrine, an administrative law doctrine that required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, decided on June 28, 2024, held that in deciding whether an agency has acted within its authority under a statute, courts must exercise their independent judgment to determine the best reading of the statute. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (U.S. June 28, 2024). The Court’s opinion in Loper Bright also decided the companion case Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219.

    Loper Bright will have a far-reaching impact throughout the administrative state, as it confirms that federal courts have ultimate authority to interpret federal statute – and not the agencies tasked with implementing those statutes. This decision has important implications for the operation of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the prospects of legal challenges to FDA actions, as we discuss below.

    Key Takeaways

    • The Supreme Court overruled the Chevron doctrine, which directed courts to defer to agency interpretations resolving statutory ambiguities provided the interpretations were reasonable. Following Loper Bright, courts must now exercise their independent judgment to determine the best reading of the statutes that agencies administer.
    • While courts may give respectful attention to agency reasoning where this reflects the agency’s expertise and experience, courts must never abdicate their responsibility to independently resolve statutory ambiguities.
    • In circumstances where an agency acts pursuant to a claimed delegation of authority, courts must carefully scrutinize whether Congress in fact authorized the agency action at issue and, if so, whether the agency acted with reasoned decision-making.
    • Going forward, FDA’s assertions of authority to regulate will likely face more frequent legal challenges. When considering such challenges, courts must independently evaluate FDA’s interpretations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), even in areas where the agency has traditionally enjoyed extraordinary deference, such as in drug and device approval decisions.
    In depth

    Courts’ Deferential Approach to FDA Interpretations Under Chevron

    Federal courts have historically granted considerable leeway to FDA in its interpretations of the FDCA, giving respectful attention to FDA’s views as a repository of scientific expertise and champion of public health. This deferential approach was reinforced by the two-step framework established under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to guide judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers. At the first step, a reviewing court asked whether Congress had “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” such that the “intent of Congress is clear.” If so, the court was obliged to “give effect to the unambiguously expressed” congressional intent. But if the statute was “silent or ambiguous,” the court would proceed to a second step, where it asked whether the agency’s interpretation was “reasonable.” If so, the agency’s interpretation was “permissible” and the court deferred to the agency’s view even if it would have independently favored a different interpretation.

    When the Chevron framework governed, courts were likely to uphold FDA’s interpretations of the FDCA, both in legal challenges to FDA regulations, and in reviewing FDA enforcement actions against regulated entities. A 2023 Food and Drug Law Journal study surveying decisions by the federal courts of appeals since 2000 concerning challenges to FDA action found that where the statute was determined to be ambiguous at Chevron step one, the courts almost always upheld FDA’s interpretation as reasonable at step two.

    Loper Bright’s “Best Reading” Standard

    In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court jettisoned Chevron’s two-step framework as inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Court observed that the APA provides that “courts, not agencies, will decide ‘all relevant questions of law’ arising on review of agency action” – including legal questions “involving ambiguous laws” – and “prescribes no deferential standard for courts to employ in answering those legal questions” (emphasis added). The APA thus requires that courts “exercise their independent judgment” in construing statutes administered by agencies.

    To discharge this duty to exercise independent judgment, when confronted with an ambiguous statute, courts must “use every tool at their disposal” – the “traditional tools of statutory construction” – to determine “the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity.” The interpretive inquiry, the Court underlined, is focused on a singular result: instead of asking whether the agency’s assertion of authority is can be sustained under a “permissible” reading of the statute it administers, a reviewing court must instead ask whether the agency’s asserted authority is sustained under the “best” reading. “In the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.”

    To be sure, Loper Bright acknowledged that courts may appropriately give “careful attention” to agency reasoning in determining the “best” reading of a statute. But while a reviewing court may search for a statute’s best reading “informed by” the “subject matter expertise” of the agency tasked with administering it, the agency’s interpretation “cannot bind” the court. Loper Bright, slip op. at 25 (quoting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98, n.8 (1983)). An agency’s expertise and experience, while having the “power to persuade,” lacks the “power to control” the distinctive responsibility of the judiciary to interpret the law. Id. at 10 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).

    The Court also recognized that some statutes “delegate[] discretionary authority to an agency.” This could take the form of an express delegation of authority to “give meaning to a statutory term” or to “prescribe rules to ‘fill up the details’ of a statutory scheme.” Id. at 17 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825)). Congress might also delegate authority to an agency “to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase,” such as “appropriate” or “reasonable,” that gives some flexibility to an agency. In these circumstances, Loper Bright directs courts to “respect the delegation” while remaining vigilant to “ensur[e] that the agency acts within” its delegated authority.

    To ensure that an agency operates within “the boundaries of the delegated authority,” courts must heed the major questions doctrine, denying the agency authority to regulate issues outside the traditional scope of its authority. Courts must also carefully test whether the agency has engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking.” This will turn on application of “hard look” review as articulated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), and its extensive progeny, under which courts prevent agencies from taking actions that fail the hallmarks of reasoned and rational action.

    The Court cautioned that its abandonment of Chevron was not a call to revisit prior cases decided pursuant to the Chevron framework. For reasons of statutory stare decisis, Loper Bright does not “call into question” prior cases simply because the court may have deferred to an agency’s “reasonable” interpretation to decide the case. Supreme Court precedent will continue to bind, and in-circuit authority may likewise continue to have precedential effect.

    Impact on FDA’s Authority to Regulate

    Loper Bright should result in greater scrutiny of FDA’s authority to regulate particular products. For example, FDA recently issued a final rule asserted authority to regulate laboratory-developed tests as medical “devices” under the FDCA. The laboratory-developed tests rule is currently being challenged in the courts, and the odds of success have improved in light of Loper Bright.

    FDA jurisdiction over dietary supplements is another area where Loper Bright may offer regulated entities new opportunities to resist FDA overreach in asserting regulatory authority. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 explicitly clarified that dietary supplements are food and may not be regulated as drugs. However, over the years, FDA has asserted additional authority to regulate dietary supplements as drugs. For example, FDA has asserted jurisdiction over supplements where they contain certain drug-related ingredients. Courts have upheld FDA’s expanded assertions of authority under the Chevron framework. Loper Bright may encourage challenges to and greater scrutiny of this and other assertions of authority that stretch the meaning of the statutory text.

    FDA’s interpretations of the various market exclusivity provisions of the FDCA and the Hatch-Waxman Act also are consistently subject to challenges in courts, typically focused on the approval process for generic drugs and the Orphan Drug Act. These challenges should intensify following Loper Bright.

    It is well understood that FDA often uses guidance documents rather than promulgating regulations, perhaps with a desire to avoid legal challenge. This FDA practice is already facing heavy scrutiny, and these legal challenges will likely gain yet more traction.

    The McDermott Difference

    In the wake of Loper Bright, it is likely that regulated parties will be reinvigorated to challenge FDA’s interpretations of the FDCA and other statutes FDA administers. McDermott will continue to monitor the impact of Loper Bright in the lower courts. For a deeper dive, join us for a webinar on July 9, 2024, at 3:00 pm EDT that will break down the Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless Inc. v. Department of Commerce decision and what lies ahead for the business community. Register today.

    In the meantime, for more information on Loper Bright and its potential impacts on FDA actions, please contact one of the authors or any other member of McDermott’s Food, Drug & Medical Device Regulatory Practice Group.

    Authors

    James R. Ravitz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Paul S. Gadiock

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Michael W. Ryan

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Paul W. Hughes

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Jeff Weinstein

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Marissa Hill Daley

    Law Clerk

    Washington, DC

    Jae Hyun Lee

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Supreme Court Rules on Purdue Pharma Chapter 11 Plan: No Authorization for Release of Nonconsensual Claims Against Third Parties

    Supreme Court Rules on Purdue Pharma Chapter 11 Plan: No Authorization for Release of Nonconsensual Claims Against Third Parties

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    Supreme Court Rules on Purdue Pharma Chapter 11 Plan: No Authorization for Release of Nonconsensual Claims Against Third Parties

    July 3, 2024

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Introduction

    On June 27, 2024, in a highly anticipated ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the release of claims against non-debtors without the consent of affected claimants in a ruling springing from the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy. In the 5-4 decision, penned by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court rejected confirmation of the Purdue Chapter 11 plan and remanded the matter back to Judge Sean Lane and the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion. This is likely the most significant bankruptcy ruling by the Supreme Court since at least 2011 – one that will impact the negotiation and confirmation of bankruptcy plans – particularly, but not exclusively, in cases involving mass tort claims. Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L. P., No. 23-124, 2024 WL 3187799 (US June 27, 2024)

    Background

    Purdue Pharma, a manufacturer of branded opioid medications, including OxyContin, faced thousands of lawsuits after an affiliate plead guilty to misbranding OxyContin as a less-addictive and less-abusable alternative to other pain medication. To avoid the consequences of the onslaught of litigation, the Sackler family, which owned and controlled Purdue Pharma, withdrew approximately 75 percent of Purdue’s assets over a decade. Left in a significantly weakened financial state, Purdue filed for bankruptcy on Sept. 15, 2019.

    Purdue’s original proposed Chapter 11 plan sought to resolve the opioid litigation by incorporating a settlement framework that included a release of claims, both current and future, against the Sackler family in exchange for a lump-sum settlement payment of $4.325 billion at the time of confirmation. The Plan additionally sought to release negligence claims as well as claims for fraud and willful misconduct, and included releases of the family by both consenting and non-consenting creditors.

    Most voting creditors supported the plan, although there were a number of other creditors that included opioid victims who voted against the Plan. The Bankruptcy Court approved the Plan and entered a confirmation order on Sept. 17, 2021. Certain parties, including the US Trustee appealed the confirmation order. Pending appeal to the Second Circuit, the Sacklers agreed to contribute an additional $1.175 to $1.675 billion to Purdue’s estate if eight states and the District of Columbia withdrew their remaining objections to the plan. Those states and the District eventually consented, increasing potential recovery to $6 billion. The Second Circuit later affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation of the Plan, allowing for it to contain nonconsensual releases of direct claims against the non-debtor Sackler family. After a subsequent appeal by the office of the US Trustee, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    Supreme Court Ruling

    Majority Opinion

    At the outset of its ruling, the Court made it clear that the Sacklers “ha[d] not filed for bankruptcy and ha[d] not placed virtually all their assets on the table for distribution to creditors, yet… [sought] what essentially amount[ed] to a discharge,” something usually reserved for debtors. Thus, the question for the Court boiled down to whether a bankruptcy court may extend the benefits of a Chapter 11 discharge to non-debtors. The majority’s decision approached this question in four ways — by: (1) conducting a textual/statutory interpretation analysis of Bankruptcy Code § 1123(b); (2) looking at related and relevant provisions in the Code to further interpret the meaning of section 1123(b); (3) taking notice of the history of Bankruptcy law; and (4) analyzing the parties’ policy arguments.

    1. The Text of § 1123(b)

    Section 1123(b) sets out, in a list, what a Chapter 11 plan may contain. As the Court observed, that list concludes with § 1123(b)(6) which states that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.” Proponents of the Plan interpret § 1123(b)(6) to allow “a debtor to include in its plan, and a court to order, any term not ‘expressly forbid[den]’ by the bankruptcy code as long as a bankruptcy judge deems it ‘appropriate’ and consistent with the broad ‘purpose[s]’ of bankruptcy.” Thus, Plan proponents believe that § 1123(b)(6) allows the plan to include the nonconsensual release of claims against the Sackler family.

    In its analysis, the Court applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a statutory interpretation method that sets out that a “catchall must be interpreted in light of its surrounding context and read to ‘embrace only objects similar in nature’ to the specific examples preceding it.” More simply, ejusdem generis “seeks to afford a statute the scope a reasonable reader would attribute to it.”

    The Court held that the common thread among the five preceding paragraphs to § 1123(b)(6) is that they all concern the debtor and authorize “a bankruptcy court to adjust claims without consent only to the extent such claims concern the debtor.” The Court thus held that “a bankruptcy court’s powers are not limitless and do not endow it with the power to extinguish without their consent claims held by nondebtors (here, the opioid victims) against other nondebtors (here, the Sacklers).”

    2. Related Provisions

    The Court next looked to various related statutory provisions for guidance.

    First, the Court looked to Bankruptcy Code § 1141 to determine “what is and who can earn a discharge.” The Court noted that the Code “reserves the benefit [of a discharge] ‘to the debtor’”, and the Plan proponents’ interpretation of § 1123(b)(6) would be contrary to the Code by “affording to a nondebtor a discharge usually reserved for the debtor alone.”

    Second, the Court noted §§ 541, 523, and 1141 for the proposition that the Bankruptcy Code constrains both the debtor and the discharge of claims against the debtor. More specifically, the Court noted that (1) “[t]o win a discharge…the code generally requires the debtor to come forward with virtually all its assets,” (2) a discharge “does not reach claims based on ‘fraud’ or those alleging ‘willful and malicious injury,’ and (3) a discharge cannot “‘affect any right to trial by jury’ a creditor may have ‘with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.’” The Court then held that the settlement provision of the Plan transgresses the Code’s limitations.

    Finally, the Court addressed § 524(g) – a “notable exception to the code’s general rules.” Under § 524(g), for asbestos-related bankruptcies (and only for asbestos-related bankruptcies), “courts may issue ‘an injunction…bar[ring] any action directed against a third party’ under certain statutorily specified circumstances.” The Court held that because “the code does authorize courts to enjoin claims against third parties without their consent, but does so in only one context, [it] makes it all the more unlikely that § 1123(b)(6) is best read to afford courts the same authority in every context.”

    According to the Court, Plan proponents argued that the limits imposed on debtors and discharges are inapplicable because the Sacklers sought a release, not a discharge. Nonetheless, after looking to related Code provisions, the Court held that no matter how the Sacklers’ sought relief is classified, “nothing in the bankruptcy code contemplates (much less authorizes) it.”

    3. History

    The third component critical to the Court’s holding was that no party had directed them to a statute (including any prior versions of the Bankruptcy Code) or case “suggesting American courts in the past enjoyed the power in bankruptcy to discharge claims brought by nondebtors against other nondebtors, all without consent of the individuals affected.” According to the Court, “if Congress had meant to reshape traditional practice so profoundly in the present bankruptcy code, extending to courts the capacious new power the plan proponents claim, one might have expected it to say so expressly ‘somewhere in the [c]ode itself.”

    4. Policy

    Lastly, the Court’s opinion entertained both sides’ policy arguments. Proponents of the plan argued that without the releases, there would be no “viable path” for victims to recover. In the Brief for the Petitioner, the US Trustee disputed this, setting out that with the increased legal exposure resulting from potential lawsuits by individual victims, States, and other governmental entities, the Sacklers might be induced to negotiate consensual releases on more favorable terms. Moreover, the US Trustee argued that with the allowance of nonconsensual third-party releases, tortfeasors would be able to obtain immunity from claims that they normally could not discharge in bankruptcy, all the while failing to place “anything approaching all of their assets on the table.” This, according to the US Trustee, “would provide a ‘roadmap for corporations to misuse the bankruptcy system’ in future cases ‘to avoid mass-tort liability.’”

    Despite acknowledging these perspectives, the Court held that it was the wrong audience for the policy arguments, which are for Congress to address. To further emphasize the limited nature of their ruling, the Court also explicitly stated that nothing in their decision should be “construed to call into question consensual third-party releases offered in connection with a bankruptcy reorganization plan,” and the Court was not expressing a view on what qualified as a consensual release. Finally, the Court set out that it would not address whether their reading of the Bankruptcy Code “would justify unwinding reorganization plans that have already become effective and been substantially consummated.”

    Dissent

    Writing for the dissent, Justice Kavanaugh emphasized that the Court’s decision essentially rewrote the text of the Bankruptcy Code and restricted “the long-established authority of bankruptcy courts to fashion fair and equitable relief for mass-tort victims.” Justice Kavanaugh also explained that because of a 2004 indemnification agreement where Purdue agreed to pay for the legal fees and liability expenses of its officers and directors, the non-debtor release provision would have protected the Purdue estate from being depleted by indemnification claims and would have ensured the victims receive compensation.

    Justice Kavanaugh stated:

    “[d]espite the broad term ‘appropriate’ in the statutory text, despite the longstanding precedents approving mass-tort bankruptcy plans with non-debtor releases like these, despite 50 state Attorneys General signing on, and despite the pleas of the opioid victims, today’s decision creates a new atextual restriction on the authority of bankruptcy courts to approve appropriate provisions.”

    According to Justice Kavanaugh, non-debtor releases are “absolutely critical” to achieving the bankruptcy system’s overarching goal of fair and equitable relief for victims and creditors.”

    Takeaways

    There are a few key takeaways and considerations following this landmark decision.

    • While the opinion likely will have a profound impact on bankruptcy cases, including mass tort bankruptcies, the parameters of that impact are yet to be determined. Non-debtor affiliates of debtors will clearly not be able to receive the benefit of a full release from non-consenting parties. However, those non-debtor affiliates can still use the bankruptcy process to negotiate litigation settlements – with whatever benefits or disadvantages a bankruptcy process could bring. Alternatively, those non-debtor entities can file for bankruptcy to take full advantage of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code – including potential discharge or other debt resolution.
    • The justices expressly avoided defining what constitutes a “consensual” release; future courts will have to make determinations on whether things like “opt-out” releases constitute consent.
    • With respect to the Purdue bankruptcy itself, the Debtors have asked the Bankruptcy Court to re-enter mediation. In re Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., 19-23649 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY, June 27, 2024), ECF Doc. 6498. It remains to be seen whether the parties will return to mediation and emerge with a new settlement or otherwise propose a new Chapter 11 plan.

    Authored by Douglas S. Mintz and Reuben E. Dizengoff.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Reuben E. Dizengoff

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Governor Murphy Saddles Taxpayers With the Nation’s Highest Corporate Tax Rate

    Governor Murphy Saddles Taxpayers With the Nation’s Highest Corporate Tax Rate

    ARTICLE

    Governor Murphy Saddles Taxpayers With the Nation’s Highest Corporate Tax Rate

    Jul 2, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy’s proposed flip-flop, which reneges on his promise to allow the state’s 2.5% corporate business tax surtax to expire, has now passed both the New Jersey State Assembly and Senate and been signed by the governor. As a result, New Jersey will once again have the highest corporate income tax rate in the nation at 11.5%. The surtax will now apply to corporate taxpayers with “allocated taxable net income in excess of” $10 million a year, and it applies to tax years beginning in 2024. The legislation would allow the tax to expire after 2028 – but as surtax payers know, any expiration date is subject to extension.

    Authors

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Hilkin

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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    Endnotes

  • No Longer Adrift in the Ocean State: Rhode Island Enacts Consumer Data Privacy Law

    No Longer Adrift in the Ocean State: Rhode Island Enacts Consumer Data Privacy Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    No Longer Adrift in the Ocean State: Rhode Island Enacts Consumer Data Privacy Law

    July 1, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Consult our interactive state privacy law map to learn more about all of the enacted state consumer privacy laws.


    On June 25, 2024, the governor of Rhode Island transmitted without signature a comprehensive privacy bill, the Rhode Island Data Transparency and Privacy Protection Act (DTPPA), back to the state legislature, which is still in session. This means that the DTPPA will take effect January 1, 2026. For many companies, the DTPPA will look familiar, but for smaller companies, there is a twist: The DTPPA has privacy policy requirements that apply to any commercial website conducting business or offering products and services to Rhode Island residents.

    In depth

    Who Does the DTPPA Apply To?

    Unlike other consumer privacy laws, Rhode Island’s DTPPA has a two-tier applicability threshold:

    First, any operator of a commercial website or internet service provider conducting business in Rhode Island or with Rhode Island customers or otherwise subject to Rhode Island jurisdiction is subject to the privacy policy disclosure requirements of the DTPPA. This applies regardless of the size of the company.

    Second, all other requirements of the DTPPA apply to any for-profit entities that conduct business in Rhode Island or provide products or services that are targeted to Rhode Island residents and, during the immediately preceding calendar year, either:

    1. Controlled or processed the personal data of at least 35,000 Rhode Island customers (excluding that personal data controlled or processed solely for the purpose of completing a payment transaction); or
    2. Controlled or processed the personal data of at least 10,000 Rhode Island customers and derive more than 20% of their gross revenue from the sale of personal data.

    Who Is a “Customer”?

    The DTPPA follows the majority of other states and defines a customer to be an individual who is a resident of Rhode Island acting only in the individual context (i.e., excluding employment or commercial actors).

    What Is “Personal Data”?

    The definition of “personal data” should look familiar as well. The term applies to information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable individual but excludes de-identified data or publicly available information. In other words, the DTPPA tracks the majority of state consumer privacy laws.

    Who Can Enforce?

    Rhode Island’s attorney general has exclusive enforcement power. Penalties can be up to $10,000 per violation under Rhode Island’s unfair and deceptive trade practices statute.

    Who Is Exempt?

    The DTPPA includes what has now become a standard list of entity-level exemptions, including for government entities, nonprofit organizations, institutions of higher education, financial institutions subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), national securities associations, and covered entities or business associates under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

    The DTPPA also includes a standard list of data-level exemptions, including exemptions for data subject to HIPAA, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the GLBA, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and the Farm Credit Act, among others.

    What Obligations Are Imposed?

    All companies that are subject to the DTPPA and subject to jurisdiction in Rhode Island (i.e., because they operate a commercial website that offers products and/or services to Rhode Island residents) must provide a website privacy policy in a “conspicuous location on its website or online service platform” that includes (1) all categories of personal information that are collected; (2) all third parties to whom personal information has or may be sold; (3) an active email address or other mechanism for a consumer to contact the company; and (4) if the company engages in targeted advertising, disclosures about that processing. The requirement to disclose “all third parties” to whom information may be sold is a unique aspect of the DTPPA, especially given that it applies to companies of any size that operate a website in Rhode Island (and that are subject to jurisdiction in Rhode Island).

    In addition to these privacy policy requirements, for entities that meet the size threshold of the DTPPA, there is what has become a standard set of additional obligations, including but not limited to:

    1. Limiting the collection of personal data to what is reasonably necessary in relation to the purposes for which the data is processed and disclosed to the customer;
    2. Establishing, implementing and maintaining reasonable administrative, technical and physical data security practices (to protect the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of personal data);
    3. Not processing sensitive data without prior customer consent; and
    4. Not discriminating against customers.

    What Customer Rights Are Created by the DTPPA?

    The DTPPA provides Rhode Island customers with customer rights that should look familiar:

    1. The right to confirm whether or not the controller is processing the customer’s personal data and to access that data, if being processed, unless that would reveal a trade secret;
    2. The right to correct and delete personal data, taking into account the nature of the data and the purposes of the processing of that data;
    3. The right to data portability when data processing is done through automated means, again provided it does not reveal a trade secret;
    4. The right to opt out of the processing of personal information for targeted advertising, the sale of personal data and profiling, where profiling is being performed by automated means that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning a customer; and
    5. The right to appeal rights requests that have not been fulfilled.

    Sensitive Data

    The DTPPA has a list of sensitive data that generally tracks with other state customer privacy laws:

    1. Racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, mental or physical health condition or diagnosis, sex life, sexual orientation, or citizenship or immigration status;
    2. The processing of biometric or genetic information for the purpose of unique identification;
    3. Personal data of a known child (under 13); or
    4. Precise geolocation data (excluding communications generated by or connected to utility metering infrastructure).

    Response to Customer Requests

    Following the same framework as most states, under the DTPPA, controllers must respond to a data subject request within 45 days after receipt, with a 45-day extension available as reasonably necessary. If denied, the controller must provide a method to appeal the denial of a request and make the process conspicuously available. A decision on the appeal must be provided within 60 days of receipt of the customer’s appeal. If an appeal is denied, the customer may submit a complaint to the Rhode Island attorney general.

    Data Protection Assessments

    The DTPPA also requires controllers to conduct a data protection assessment for each of the following activities:

    1. Processing personal data for targeted advertising;
    2. Selling personal data;
    3. Processing sensitive data; and
    4. Processing personal data for purposes of profiling, where the profiling presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of (1) unfair or deceptive treatment; (2) unlawful disparate impact; (3) financial, physical or reputational injury; (4) a physical or other intrusion on the private affairs of a customer where such intrusion would be offensive to a reasonable person; or (5) other substantial injury to a customer.

    A single data protection assessment may address a comparable set of processing operations that include similar activities.

    When Does the DTPPA Take Effect?

    The DTPPA will go into effect on January 1, 2026.

    ***

    The plethora of unique state privacy laws is becoming more challenging as each new version is introduced. In addition to implementing comprehensive privacy programs, organizations need to ensure they are reviewing applicability and updating internal policies and procedures as needed to maintain compliance. If you have questions or need assistance in readiness work for the new state customer laws, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or reach out to one of the authors.

    Authors

    David P. Saunders

    Partner

    Chicago

    James S. Mann

    Associate

    Los Angeles

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  • European Commission Seeks Feedback on NIS2 Draft Cybersecurity Measures

    European Commission Seeks Feedback on NIS2 Draft Cybersecurity Measures

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    European Commission Seeks Feedback on NIS2 Draft Cybersecurity Measures

    July 1, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    WHAT HAPPENED: On June 27, 2024, the European Commission published for feedback a draft implementing act (draft implementing act) under the Network and Information Security 2 Directive (NIS2). It specifies cybersecurity risk-management measures for digital infrastructure providers, digital providers and information communication technology service managers, as well as thresholds for reportable incidents with respect to each type of provider.

    WHY IT MATTERS: The draft implementing act adds considerable details to NIS2’s list of cybersecurity measures and specifies the significant incident reporting thresholds for each type of provider concerned. The draft implementing act will therefore impact providers’ cybersecurity and incident reporting practices directly. Noncompliance with NIS2 may lead to fines of up to EUR 10 million, or 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the undertaking, whichever is higher.

    WHO NEEDS TO KNOW: Providers of cloud computing services, data center services, online marketplaces, search engines, social networking services platforms, content delivery network services, managed services, managed security services, trust services, domain name system services and top-level domain name registries (Relevant Entities).

    IMMEDIATE NEXT STEP: Interested stakeholders can submit feedback to the draft implementing act via this link until July 25, 2024. The European Commission will review input and adopt a final implementing act by October 17, 2024. Once adopted, the implementing act will apply to all Relevant Entities directly, in all EU Member States.

    In depth

    On June 27, 2024, the European Commission published for feedback a draft implementing act (draft implementing act) under the Network and Information Security 2 Directive (NIS2). It specifies cybersecurity risk-management measures for digital infrastructure providers, digital providers and information communication technology (ICT) service managers, as well as thresholds for reportable incidents with respect to each type of provider.

    NIS2 provides a list of 10 cybersecurity risk-management measures that entities from critical sectors must apply (such as business continuity, incident handling or supply chain security). It requires such entities to report incidents that have a significant impact on their services to competent authorities and, in some instances, to service recipients. NIS2 does not provide details about these measures or what constitutes “significant impact” to trigger reporting obligations, but it requires the European Commission to do so. The draft implementing act is the result of advice and cooperation between the European Commission, the NIS Cooperation Group and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA).

    EU Member States are required to transpose NIS2 into their national laws and start enforcing it as of October 18, 2024. However, the requirements stemming from the implementing act that the European Commission will adopt will apply to Relevant Entities directly as of October 18th, without any need for Member States to transpose them into national law, thereby underscoring the importance of this draft implementing act.

    The draft implementing act adds considerable details to NIS2’s list of cybersecurity measures and specifies the significant incident reporting thresholds for each type of provider concerned. The draft implementing act will therefore impact providers’ cybersecurity and incident reporting practices directly. Noncompliance with NIS2 may lead to fines of up to EUR 10 million, or 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the undertaking, whichever is higher.

    Below is an overview of the key aspects of the draft implementing act regarding cybersecurity risk-management measures and significant incident reporting thresholds.

    Cybersecurity Risk-Management Measures

    The draft implementing act specifies detailed cybersecurity risk-management measures based on European and international standards. It will apply to digital infrastructure providers, digital providers and ICT service managers. In terms of high-level requirements, in-scope entities should:

    • Security Policy: Establish a comprehensive security policy aligned with business strategy, security objectives, risk tolerance, roles, responsibilities and documentation requirements.
    • Risk Management: Develop a risk management framework to identify, assess and address risks. Perform regular risk assessments, maintain a risk treatment plan and implement compliance monitoring.
    • Incident Handling: Establish policies and procedures for detecting, analyzing, responding to and reporting incidents. Implement monitoring and logging, and conduct post-incident reviews.
    • Business Continuity and Crisis Management: Develop business continuity and disaster recovery plans, including key contacts, recovery objectives, resources and crisis management processes.
    • Supply Chain Security: Manage supplier and service provider relations to mitigate risks. Set selection criteria, specify cybersecurity requirements and maintain a supplier directory.
    • Security in Systems Acquisition and Maintenance: Manage risks in acquiring ICT services or products. Implement secure development, configuration management, change management, security testing and patch management.
    • Effectiveness Assessment: Establish policies and procedures to assess the implementation and effectiveness of cybersecurity measures, including regular monitoring and evaluation.
    • Cyber Hygiene and Training: Raise employee awareness of cybersecurity risks and provide targeted security training, ensuring effective application of cyber hygiene practices.
    • Cryptography: Use cryptography to protect information confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, following established policies and procedures.
    • Human Resources Security: Ensure employees and third parties understand and commit to security responsibilities. Conduct background checks and manage employment changes securely.
    • Access Control: Implement access control policies, manage access rights and review access controls regularly.
    • Asset Management: Classify and handle information and assets appropriately, maintaining an accurate asset inventory and managing removable media securely.
    • Environmental and Physical Security: Protect systems from physical and environmental threats, implementing perimeter controls and monitoring premises for security breaches.

    Significant Incident Reporting Thresholds

    The following sections explain the criteria the draft implementing act outlines for determining what constitutes a significant incident. First, there are general criteria that apply to all entities. Then, there are specific thresholds tailored to certain types of service providers. The general and specific criteria do not need to apply simultaneously. An incident can be deemed significant if it meets either the general criteria or the specific thresholds relevant to the provider. Providers listed with specific thresholds follow both their specific criteria and the general criteria.

    • General Criteria for Significant Incidents: An incident is deemed significant if it fulfills one or more of the following criteria:
      • Financial Loss: The incident causes, or is capable of causing, financial loss exceeding EUR 100,000, or 5% of the entity’s annual turnover, whichever is lower.
      • Reputational Damage: The incident causes, or is capable of causing, considerable reputational damage, which may include media reports, multiple user complaints, regulatory noncompliance or significant loss of customers.
      • Theft of Trade Secrets: The incident results in the theft of trade secrets.
      • Death: The incident causes, or is capable of causing, the death of a natural person.
      • Health Damage: The incident causes, or is capable of causing, considerable damage to a natural person’s health.
      • Unauthorized Access: The incident involves successful, suspectedly malicious and unauthorized access to network and information systems.
      • Recurring Incidents: Incidents that occur at least twice within six months with the same root cause are considered collectively significant.
      • Specific Criteria: The incident meets one or more of the specific criteria outlined in the “Specific Thresholds” section below.
    • Specific Thresholds: The following list outlines the specific thresholds for significant incidents for various service providers:
      • Cloud Computing Service Providers: Service unavailability for more than 10 minutes, unmet service level agreements (SLAs) for more than 5% or 1 million users, or compromised data integrity due to suspected malicious action.
      • Online Marketplaces: Service unavailability or order delays impacting more than 5% or 1 million users, or compromised data integrity.
      • Online Search Engines: Service unavailability or delayed response times impacting more than 5% or 1 million users, or compromised data integrity.
      • Social Networking Platforms: Service unavailability or delayed response times impacting more than 5% or 1 million users, or compromised data integrity.
      • Content Delivery Network Providers: Network unavailability for more than 10 minutes, unmet performance agreements for more than 5% or 1 million users, or compromised data integrity.

    Specific thresholds also exist for data center service providers, managed and managed security service providers, domain name system (DNS) service providers, top-level domain (TLD) name registries, and trust service providers, but these have been left out for brevity.

    At this stage, the European Commission has not (yet) utilized Article 23(11) of NIS2 to issue a template specifying the type, format and procedure for submitting incident notifications or for communications to recipients of services potentially affected by significant cyber threats.

    What This Means

    Entities subject to NIS2 should consider enhancing both their cybersecurity risk-management measures and incident reporting programs to comply with the proposed requirements. To prepare, they should consider, inter alia:

    • Comprehensive Cybersecurity Policies: Establish detailed policies covering all aspects of cybersecurity risk management, including business continuity planning, incident handling and supply chain security. Regularly review and update these policies to address evolving threats and vulnerabilities.
    • Clear Incident Reporting Procedures: Develop clear procedures for assessing and reporting incidents that meet the significance criteria.
    • Automated Detection and Monitoring: Implement monitoring tools (real-time or periodic) and automated systems to detect cybersecurity incidents. Ensure these systems can identify incidents that meet defined financial, reputational and operational thresholds.
    • Staff Training and Awareness: Regularly train staff on the latest cybersecurity risk-management measures and incident reporting procedures. Ensure all employees understand their roles in maintaining cybersecurity and are prepared to respond to significant incidents.
    • Comprehensive Incident Logging: Maintain detailed logs of all cybersecurity incidents to identify patterns, support regulatory compliance and facilitate continuous improvement.
    • Regular Risk Assessments and Audits: Conduct regular risk assessments and security audits to identify potential vulnerabilities and ensure that cybersecurity measures are effective and up to date.
    • Consultation Process: Consider responding to the European Commission’s consultation on the draft implementing act via this link to provide feedback and influence the final requirements.
    Authors
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  • Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | June 2024

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | June 2024

    ARTICLE

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | June 2024

    June 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Unified Patent Court (UPC) is revolutionizing the way patents are enforced in Europe, and McDermott’s intellectual property team is here to help you navigate this dynamic landscape. Our Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court newsletter is designed to keep patent holders and legal departments well-informed. And with an on-the-ground team in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, we offer a unique cross-border perspective.


    In depth
    Authors

    Diana Pisani

    European Patent Attorney

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Keval Amin

    Associate

    Chicago

    Aashish Kapadia

    Partner

    Austin

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  • California Legislature Reaches Compromise on PAGA

    California Legislature Reaches Compromise on PAGA

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California Legislature Reaches Compromise on PAGA

    June 28, 2024

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a last-minute deal to avoid another controversial ballot initiative, the California legislature finalized and passed a compromise to reform the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), encompassing the most significant changes to PAGA since its inception 20 years ago. On June 27, 2024, Assembly Bill 2288 and Senate Bill 92 were passed in a near-unanimous vote. They are now on the governor’s desk for signature.

    The new PAGA legislation will only apply to civil actions filed on or after June 19, 2024. PAGA cases filed before June 19, 2024, are still governed by the existing statute.

    In depth

    The Upshot: How the New PAGA Legislation Is an Improvement

    The new PAGA legislation will help employers curtail litigation abuse by the plaintiffs’ bar on many levels:

    • Plaintiffs’ lawyers can no longer find an employee with a single potential labor code violation and seek to represent a large class of employees.
    • Plaintiffs’ lawyers will have a much harder time creating broad and costly discovery because courts will now have additional authority to contain PAGA litigation.
    • Employers will be able to mitigate or reduce possible penalties through a more robust cure provision and as a result of the new caps on penalties.
    • Employers’ counsel will be able to utilize the various provisions of the new PAGA legislation from the outset of new litigation to contain or even defeat plaintiffs’ attempts to seek extortionate penalties claims or to represent large representative classes (and seek high plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees).

    Why Now?

    Prior to the compromise, Californians were set to vote on whether to keep PAGA as is, or to repeal and replace it with the California Fair Pay and Employer Accountability Act (FPEAA). A coalition of business groups successfully qualified the ballot measure in 2022, with Californians for Fair Pay and Employer Accountability, a political action committee, registered to support the ballot initiative and raising more than $20 million in campaign funding.

    FPEAA’s proponents argued that although PAGA was meant to protect employees, workers did not benefit from it – instead, plaintiffs’ lawyers used PAGA to generate six- and seven-figure attorneys’ fees – and a better way to resolve claims without long, costly litigation and disproportionate plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees was necessary.

    Opponents of the measure argued that its title was misleading, that FPEAA would limit employees’ ability to litigate against their employers, and that the repeal would leave the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) without adequate funding to investigate labor code violations.

    What Is PAGA?

    PAGA creates a private right of action and allows employees who suffer an alleged labor code violation to file lawsuits on behalf of themselves, other “aggrieved” employees and the LWDA. PAGA plaintiffs can seek penalties for alleged violations of a host of specifically enumerated labor code statutes that the employee individually experienced and penalties for alleged violations that other employees experienced.

    When PAGA was enacted in 2004, its proponents convincingly argued that the LWDA lacked the resources to investigate and prosecute labor code violations. Under the prior PAGA statute, the LWDA received 75% of the monetary penalties, and 25% went to the aggrieved employees. Since PAGA’s enactment, plaintiffs’ lawyers have been incentivized to pursue claims on behalf of “aggrieved” employees because in cases where they are successful, plaintiffs’ lawyers receive a percentage of the total award or settlement (including the portion that goes to the LWDA), sometimes up to 40% of the total PAGA recovery.

    Given the onerous technical requirements in California wage and hour law and recent decisions in employees’ favor, including limitations of arbitration enforcement with respect to PAGA claims, employers are fed up with PAGA litigation.

    How Will the Proposed Legislation Change PAGA?

    Revises the Definition of an “Aggrieved Employee”

    The proposed legislation redefines who qualifies as an “aggrieved employee” and, relatedly, whether the individual has standing to bring a PAGA action.

    Under the original PAGA, an “aggrieved employee” is an employee “against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” This meant that, in certain instances, an exempt employee could bring PAGA claims for meal and rest break and derivative violations, for example, on behalf of nonexempt employees, even though the allegedly aggrieved exempt employee never experienced those violations.

    The new law requires the “aggrieved employee” to have personally experienced each of the violations alleged within the one-year statute of limitations.

    Gives Trial Courts the Inherent Authority to Limit the Scope of PAGA Claims

    As many employers experienced firsthand, plaintiffs’ lawyers were emboldened by the California Supreme Court’s decision in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., (2024) 15 Cal. 5th 582 where the court held that trial courts do not have the inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim on manageability grounds, even though the court also said that trial courts have multiple tools available to them to ensure PAGA claims are effectively managed.

    The proposed legislation goes one step further, explicitly stating that a trial court has the authority to “limit the evidence to be presented at trial or otherwise limit the scope of any claim filed pursuant to this part to ensure that the claim can be effectively tried.” The new legislation also allows trial courts to consolidate or coordinate civil actions with overlapping legal theories or facts alleged against the same employer. This will be critical to reducing the waste of resources that employers have experienced in having to litigate broadly asserted claims (which lead to expansive and unnecessary discovery) and having to litigate similar cases in different venues.

    Provides Employers a More Robust Cure Opportunity

    The proposed legislation also redefines an employer’s right to cure. Under the proposed legislation, an employer can cure alleged violations if, after receiving a PAGA notice, it takes steps to revise policies and practices and make employees whole through payment of:

    • All owed wages due under the specified statutes going back three years from the date of the notice, plus 7% interest;
    • Liquidated damages as provided by any applicable statute; and
    • Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

    Reduces Penalties for Some Violations and Some Employers

    The new legislation reduces civil penalties for violations that do not carry a civil penalty, depending on the circumstances of the violation, such as the duration, severity and employer’s compliance efforts. Changes to the penalty structure include:

    • A 15% cap on penalties where the employer demonstrates it has “taken all reasonable steps to be in compliance” with the labor code prior to receiving a PAGA notice.
    • A 30% cap on penalties where the employer, within 60 days of receiving a PAGA notice, takes “all reasonable steps” to comply with the labor code.
    • Labor Code § 226 penalties are capped at $25 per pay period where the violation did not cause economic harm to the aggrieved employee. And, where the alleged violation is isolated and did not extend beyond the lesser of 30 calendar days or four pay periods, Labor Code § 226 penalties are capped at $50 per pay period.
    • Aggrieved employees cannot collect derivative penalties unless they can show that the employer willfully or intentionally underpaid wages during employment.

    The legislation further defines “all reasonable steps” to include, but not be limited to:

    • An audit of wage and hour violations and actionable steps taken by the employer in response to the results of the audit.
    • Lawful written policies.
    • Training for supervisors on applicable labor code and wage order compliance.
    • Appropriate corrective action with regard to supervisors who violate the labor code.

    Whether the employer’s conduct was reasonable will be evaluated by the totality of the circumstances and will take into consideration the size of and resources available to the employer, and the nature, severity and duration of the alleged violations. The mere fact that a labor code violation exists is not enough to establish that an employer failed to take all reasonable steps, and the trial court will have discretion to determine whether the employer’s actions were reasonable.

    Redistributes Civil Penalties

    Under PAGA, 25% of civil penalties were awarded to the aggrieved employees, with 75% going to the LWDA. The new legislation increases the percentage awarded to aggrieved employees to 35%, with the remaining 65% going to the LWDA.

    Offers Injunctive Relief as a Remedy

    Under the new legislation, aggrieved employees have a new remedy of injunctive relief, which will allow plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief with a trial court to compel the employer to remedy alleged labor code violations. The LWDA will also have the discretion to seek injunctive relief.

    Early Resolution

    The new legislation offers options for early resolution of cases for both small and large employers. Employers that employ fewer than 100 employees during the applicable PAGA period can request a settlement conference through the LWDA. Employers with more than 100 employees during the applicable PAGA period may request a stay of all court deadlines and seek a neutral evaluation of the allegations. The employer can then propose a plan to cure the alleged violations to the plaintiffs, and in the event that plaintiffs do not approve of the proposed plan to cure, the employer may seek court approval by filing a motion.

    ***

    What’s Next?

    On June 27, 2024, which was the deadline to withdraw FPEAA from the ballot, the California legislature voted on and approved Assembly Bill 2288 and Senate Bill 92. The legislation is now on California Governor Gavin Newsom’s desk. Governor Newsom is expected to sign the legislation and has already indicated his support for PAGA reform, commenting: “[w]e accomplished something that was seemingly impossible.”

    If you have any questions regarding compliance with the California Labor Code or reforms related to PAGA, please contact your McDermott lawyers or the authors of this article.

    Sapphire Sandoval contributed to the development of this On the Subject.

    Authors

    Maria C. Rodriguez

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Pankit J. Doshi

    Partner

    San Francisco, Silicon Valley

    Brian Casillas

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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