Content Type: Article

  • Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2019

    Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2019

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2019

    February 19, 2019

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”), requires parties to acquisitions of voting securities, assets or non-corporate interests meeting certain thresholds to make a premerger notification to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and to observe a waiting period prior to consummating such acquisitions. On Feb. 15, 2019, the FTC announced its annual adjustments to the current HSR Act thresholds. Any transaction that will be consummated on or after the March 2019 effective date of such adjustments may be reportable under the HSR Act if, as a result of such transaction, the acquiring person will hold voting securities, assets and/or non-corporate interests of the acquired person valued above $90 million (the current adjusted minimum threshold is $84.4 million). The new adjusted thresholds reflect changes in the gross national product for the preceding fiscal year. The size-of-person threshold looks at the total sales or assets of each party to a transaction, including its ultimate parent and certain affiliates, and is also being increased.

    The updated size-of-transaction and size-of-person thresholds under the HSR Act are set forth below:

    Threshold

    HSR Act Original

    2019 Adjusted

    Size-of-transaction when
    size-of-person test applies

    $50 million

    $90 million

    Size-of-person (if applicable)

    $10 million and $100 million

    $18 million and $180 million

    Size-of-transaction above which size-of-person test does not apply

    $200 million

    $359.9 million

     

    The filing fees applicable to premerger notifications filed under the HSR Act have not changed in over a decade and will continue as follows:

    Size-of-Transaction (as adjusted)

    Filing Fee

    Valued at greater than $90 million but less than $180 million

    $45,000

    Valued at $180 million or greater but less than $899.8 million

    $125,000

    Valued at $899.8 million or greater

    $280,000

     

    When a premerger notification has been filed under the HSR Act, and the applicable waiting period has expired or been terminated, any additional acquisitions by the same acquiring person of the same issuer’s voting securities will be exempt from notification, so long as:

    • The acquiring person’s holdings crossed the notification threshold with respect to which the premerger notification was made, within one year of the expiration or early termination of the HSR Act waiting period; and
    • The subsequent acquisition is consummated within five years following the expiration or early termination of the HSR Act waiting period;

    unless a higher notification level is met or exceeded. The various notification levels are set forth below:

    HSR Act Original

    2019 Adjusted

    $50 million

    $90 million

    $100 million

    $180 million

    $500 million

    $899.8 million

    25 percent if value of voting securities to be held
    is greater than $1 billion

    25 percent if value of voting securities to be held is greater than $1,799.5 million

    50 percent if value of voting securities to be held
    is greater than $50 million

    50 percent if value of voting securities to be held is greater than $90 million

     

    Any subsequent acquisition would be subject to the adjusted thresholds in effect when such subsequent acquisition is consummated.

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz and Gregory L. Kinzelman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

     

     

    In depth
    Authors

    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Patent Licensing

    ARTICLE

    Patent Licensing

    February 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stefan Meisner and Lisa Peterson co-authored this bylined article about a California federal district court decision requiring an SEP holder to license its intellectual property for cellular communication standards to all willing applicants.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lisa P. Rumin

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Fourth Circuit Reverses Disallowance of Lender’s Post-Bankruptcy Legal Fees

    Fourth Circuit Reverses Disallowance of Lender’s Post-Bankruptcy Legal Fees

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fourth Circuit Reverses Disallowance of Lender’s Post-Bankruptcy Legal Fees

    February 15, 2019

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) permits “a creditor [to] assert an unsecured claim for post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees based on a pre-[bankruptcy] promissory note,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2019. SummitBridge Nat’l Investments III, LLC v. Faison, 2019 WL 490573, *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019). In a sensible opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower courts’ disallowance of an undersecured lender’s claim for legal fees. The court thus “join[ed] other federal courts of appeals” with its holding. Id.

    Relevance

    “Bankruptcy and district courts long have wrestled with this question, disagreeing as to whether creditors may assert unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees based on pre-petition contracts.” Id., citing In re Augé, 559 B.R. 223, 229 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016). The lower courts here either ignored or misread the Supreme Court’s opinion in Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas. & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 452-54 (2007) (“[C]laims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.”). At least two other circuits, though, properly followed Travelers. In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2009) (“attorneys’ fees arising out of a pre-[bankruptcy] contract but incurred post-petition fall within the … Code’s broad definition of claim” and are enforceable under applicable contract and state law); Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). Accord, In re Tribune Media Co., 2018 WL 6167504 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2018) (reversing bankruptcy court, the “courts of appeals … have unanimously … allowed unsecured claims for contractual attorneys’ fees that accrued” after bankruptcy; Third Circuit had not ruled on issue). As we predicted in our Dec. 5, 2017 Alert, “the blinkered analysis of the lower courts in SummitBridge should be reversed on appeal.”[1]

    Facts

    The individual Chapter 11 debtor owed the lender’s predecessor $1.627 million, secured by real estate. Each of the debtor’s notes to the lender provided for “reasonable attorneys’ fees” should the “notes be placed with an attorney for collection.” 2019 WL 490573, at *1. The debtor was not in default when it filed its Chapter 11 petition, but the lender’s counsel was required to perform post-bankruptcy services.

    The bankruptcy court later confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan that provided for the allowance of the lender’s claim in the amount of $1.715 million, including principal, pre-bankruptcy interest, post-bankruptcy interest, plus fees, late fees and attorneys’ fees. To satisfy the lender’s secured claim in full, the debtor transferred the real estate collateral to it, without prejudice to the lender’s right to assert an unsecured claim for legal fees and the debtor’s right to object. The lender then filed an unsecured claim for post-bankruptcy legal fees in the amount of $302,596, equal to 15 percent of the outstanding indebtedness.

    The bankruptcy court disallowed the lender’s claim as a matter of law. It reasoned that Code “§§ 506(b) and 502(a) – (b) do not permit the recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees sought as unsecured claims.” Affirming, the district court reasoned that the “Code expressly awards post-[bankruptcy] fees under several circumstances, none of which include an award of [fees] to an unsecured creditor.” It also found the “equities [to] weigh in favor of the protection of assets for distribution to all creditors.” According to the district court, allowance of the lender’s claim would “reduce the pool of assets available” to other unsecured creditors.

    The Fourth Circuit

    Travelers. According to the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court, when reviewing a claim for post-bankruptcy legal fees in Travelers, “applied a presumption of broader significance: ‘[W]e generally presume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.’” 2019 WL 490573, at *2, quoting Travelers, 549 U.S. at 452. The “Supreme Court’s ‘analysis and rationale’ in Travelers is ‘equally applicable to post-petition costs arising out pre-petition contracts more generally,’” said the court. Id., quoting the Second Circuit’s Ogle decision. Indeed, “both the Second and Ninth Circuits have concluded that there is no basis in the Code for barring unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees arising out of pre-petition contracts.” Id., citing SNTL, 571 F.3d at 839-45 and Ogle, 586 F.3d at 146-49. Even before Travelers, the Eleventh Circuit held that over-secured creditors can assert unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees, assuming that unsecured and undersecured creditors could also do so. In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

    The Code Allows Post-Bankruptcy Legal Fees. Code § 502(b) governs the “allowance of claims or interests” in bankruptcy cases, explained the Fourth Circuit. Id., at *3. Unless one of nine enumerated exceptions applies, the court must “determine the amount of such claim … as of the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount.” In this case, so long as the lender “had a ‘claim’ for [post-bankruptcy] fees as of the petition date” and so long as that “claim [did] not fall within one or more of the nine enumerated exceptions” in § 502(b), that claim had to be allowed. Id. Although the right to legal fees under the debtor’s notes was “contingent on a future, post-petition event — namely, the notes being placed with an attorney for collection,” the “Code defines ‘claim’ broadly so as to include … contingent right[s] to payment.” Id. Most important, the lender here had “the right to those fees” prior to bankruptcy, when the debtor “signed the promissory notes in question.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit held, this was enough “to make the fees ‘pre[-] petition in nature, constituting a contingent pre[-]petition obligation that bec[omes] fixed post[-] petition when the fees [are] incurred. ’” Id., citing SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 844.

    The court rejected the debtor’s argument that the lender had incurred no legal fees on the date of bankruptcy. Under the Second Circuit’s Ogle decision and Travelers, it found that § 502(b) “does not bar recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees.” Id. at *4, quoting Ogle, 586 F.3d at 147. Moreover, if a claim with no value on the date of bankruptcy could not be allowed under § 502(b), “there would be no need for §502(b)(2), an enumerated exception to §502(b) that specifically disallows claims for ‘unmatured interest.’” Id. Finally, because § 502(c) provides for a bankruptcy court’s estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims in order to avoid delay in the administration of a bankruptcy estate, “there would be no need for such estimates” if that claim had to be liquidated on the date of bankruptcy. “In sum,” said the court, “like our sister circuits, we can find nothing in §502(b) that expressly disallows unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees.” Id.

    Nor does § 506(b) bar the lender’s unsecured claim for post-petition legal fees. It merely provides that “creditors with over-secured claims — that is, creditors with collateral that exceeds the amount of their claims — may add to their secured claims both interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Id. According to the Fourth Circuit, Travelers “made clear that claims enforceable under state law are presumed allowable, and … this presumption may be overcome only by an express disallowance.” Id. at *5, citing 549 U.S. at 452. “And § 506(b) never mentions, let alone expressly disallows, unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees.” Id., citing Ogle, 586 F.3d at 148. Indeed, “in specifying that over-secured creditors may treat as secured their claims for reasonable attorneys’ fees, §506(b) gives those claims priority over other creditors’ unsecured claims.” Id., citing Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1318.

    When Congress wanted to disallow a claim for legal fees, it did so in “§502, not §506 … . And as the Supreme Court explained in Travelers, the ‘absence of an analogous provision excluding’ claims for a different category of fees — in this case, unsecured claims for post-petition fees — is strong evidence that Code does not expressly disallow those claims.” Id. at *6, quoting Travelers, 549 U.S. at 453.

    The Fourth Circuit also rejected the debtor’s reliance on Code § 506(b) to “deny under[-] secured creditors post[-] petition interest on their claims.” Id. “[C]laims [for] unmatured interest (unlike attorneys’ fees) are expressly disallowed under §502(b)(2) … . [B]ecause §502(b) does ‘not contain a similar prohibition against [allowance of] attorneys’ fees, the comparison between the current issue and that presented in United Savings Ass’n. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd, 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988) is not persuasive.” Id., citing SNTL, 571 F.3d at 844 and In re Dow Corning Corp., 456 F.3d 668, 682 (6th Cir. 2006).

    Policy Considerations Rejected. Rejecting the debtor’s policy argument (fairness to other unsecured creditors), the Fourth Circuit found it had “no basis in the text of the relevant Code provisions … . ” Id., at *7. “If otherwise secured creditors recover on unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees, those payments may come at the expense of unsecured creditors’ ability to recover fully on their claims to principal [,] … [b]ut a basic tenet of bankruptcy law is that secured creditors are privileged over unsecured creditors.” Id. at *7.

    Finally, as the Supreme Court held in Travelers, “state law governs the substance of claims … . Congress … generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.” Id. at *7, quoting 549 U.S. at 450-51. Here, the lender “bargained specifically for attorneys’ fees under state law to enforce those rights in bankruptcy … even if it reduces the pool of assets otherwise available … .” Id. Only Congress, “not the courts,” can adjust any asserted “tension between this policy of vindicating contract rights enforceable under state law and other bankruptcy principles.” Id.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook. 

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] See “District Court Affirms Disallowance of Lender’s Legal Fee Claim,” SRZ Alert, Dec. 5, 2017, available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • ONC Proposes to Define Conduct That Is Not Information Blocking under the Cures Act

    ONC Proposes to Define Conduct That Is Not Information Blocking under the Cures Act

    CLIENT ALERT / INFORMATION BLOCKING

    ONC Proposes to Define Conduct That Is Not Information Blocking under the Cures Act

    February 14, 2019

    Read time: 19 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The ONC finally released its long-awaited proposed rule to implement the “information blocking” prohibition of the 21st Century Cures Act by identifying conduct that is not information blocking. If finalized, ONC’s proposed rule would have a significant impact on data sharing arrangements and other relationships among health care providers, health IT developers and other stakeholders. In this On the Subject, our experienced team analyzes ONC’s information blocking proposals and suggests practical next steps for the regulated industry.

    This On the Subject was co-authored by Rachel Stauffer at McDermott+Consulting

    In depth

    Summary

    On February 11, 2019, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) released its long-awaited proposed rule (Proposed Rule) that, among other things, proposes to implement the “information blocking” prohibition of the 21st Century Cures Act (the Cures Act) by identifying conduct that is not information blocking. On the same day, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released a proposed rule on related interoperability issues. We cover the CMS proposed rule in a separate On the Subject. If finalized, ONC’s proposed policies would have a significant impact on data sharing arrangements and other relationships among health care providers, health IT developers and other stakeholders.

    More broadly, these two rules emphasize the administration’s focus on ensuring patient access to data and data exchange. As CMS Administrator Seema Verma recently explained, “[t]he days of holding patient data hostage are over…Our proposed rule includes a policy to publicly identify doctors, hospitals, and other healthcare providers who engage in information blocking. Simply put, we’re going to expose the bad actors who are purposely trying to keep patients from their own information. Patient data doesn’t belong to the doctor, hospital, or electronic health record. It belongs to the patient.” ONC’s Proposed Rule reflects a similar sentiment.

    The public will have 60 days to submit comments following official publication of the Proposed Rule in the Federal Register, which we expect to occur in the near future.

    The following sections of this On the Subject address:

    • The events leading up to the adoption of the Cures Act and the Proposed Rule;
    • Discussion and analysis of the information blocking provisions of the Proposed Rule, including its exceptions describing permissible conduct under the Proposed Rule; and
    • Practical impact and next steps for health care industry stakeholders.

    A. Background

    Since passage of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act in 2009, the federal government has invested billions of dollars to encourage the adoption of interoperable technologies in the hope that it will lead to better care and a more efficient health care system. Congress, regulators and health care industry stakeholders, have grown concerned that, despite increased adoption of technology, like electronic health record (EHR) systems, certain economic and market conditions create an incentive for some to inappropriately limit or restrict the flow of electronic health information in ways that undermine the significant investment; this conduct is commonly referred to as “information blocking.”

    See more

    Authors

    James A. Cannatti III

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

    Karen S. Sealander

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • 3 Aspects of Executive Agreements That Need an Upgrade

    ARTICLE

    3 Aspects of Executive Agreements That Need an Upgrade

    February 14, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Zak Franklin authored this bylined article discussing what areas of executive employment agreements need to be updated to provide more clarity.

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  • New York Adopts Child Victims Act Extending and Reviving Statute of Limitations for Abuse Claims

    New York Adopts Child Victims Act Extending and Reviving Statute of Limitations for Abuse Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Adopts Child Victims Act Extending and Reviving Statute of Limitations for Abuse Claims

    February 14, 2019

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Feb. 14, 2019, Governor Cuomo signed the Child Victims Act into law, extending the statute of limitations in both criminal and civil actions alleging child sexual abuse.[1] The legislation passed the New York Senate and Assembly in January with overwhelming support.[2]

    Importantly, the new law does not only apply to future acts of child sexual abuse. The law has the effect of reviving, in certain instances, civil claims for past abuse that were otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. Under the legislation, such civil claims may now be brought against both abusers and others whose intentional or negligent acts render them responsible for the victim’s injuries.

    New Statute of Limitations for Criminal Charges

    Generally under New York law, a felony prosecution must be commenced within five years of the criminal act and misdemeanor prosecutions must be commenced within two years.[3] Prior to the Child Victims Act, these criminal statutes of limitation were tolled in child sexual abuse cases until the victim reached the age of 18 or the offense was reported to law enforcement or the statewide child abuse registry, whichever occurred earlier.[4] Thus (assuming that the offense was not reported), a felony prosecution would be timely if it was brought before the victim turned 23 and a misdemeanor prosecution would be timely if brought before the victim’s 20th birthday.

    Under the new legislation, the criminal statutes of limitation are tolled until the victim reaches the age of 23 (or the offense is reported). A prosecution may now be brought prior to the victim’s 28th birthday (in the case of a felony charge) or the victim’s 25th birthday (in the case of a misdemeanor charge).[5]

    New Statute of Limitations for Civil Causes of Action

    Previously under New York law, victims of child sexual abuse had, in comparison to the laws of other states, a relatively short window of time to file a civil lawsuit. The statute of limitations was tolled until the victim turned 18, the age of majority, but depending on the nature of the abuse, the victim was required to bring his or her claim within one year, three years or at most five years after he or she attained the age of majority.[6]

    Under the Child Victims Act, a child abuse victim can now sue at any time before he or she turns 55 years old, provided that he or she was younger than 18 when the conduct took place and that the conduct constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article 130 of the New York Penal Law (which covers a variety of forms of sexual abuse and misconduct), incest as defined in the Penal Law, or the use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in the Penal Law.[7] According to the Act’s legislative history, it takes most victims many years to come to terms with their abuse and it has been estimated that the average age for a victim to report such abuse is 52.[8]

    The new statute of limitations allows civil claims to be brought “by any person for physical, psychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person” as a result of a covered act of child sexual abuse “against any party whose intentional or negligent acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in the commission of said conduct.”[9] Thus, the limitations period has been extended not only with respect to claims against the alleged abuser, but also with respect to claims against third parties whose intentional or negligent conduct allegedly resulted in the abuse.

    The law also provides that such claims may be brought irrespective of any provision of law that would otherwise require the filing of a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim as a condition precedent to suit, as is the case for claims against public entities.[10]

    Revival of Otherwise Lapsed Civil Causes of Action

    In addition to extending the civil statute of limitations, the new legislation creates a special “one-year window”— starting six months from the effective date of the bill — in which victims will be allowed to commence a lawsuit asserting an otherwise time-barred claim for child sexual abuse. Such causes of action are “hereby revived,” according to the statute, notwithstanding that they were previously barred because the statute of limitations had expired. Indeed, under the statute, even an action that had previously been brought and dismissed on statute of limitations grounds may be resurrected during the one-year window.[11]

    The scope of the revival provision mirrors that of the new statute of limitations for civil claims — it revives claims against “any party” alleging “intentional or negligent acts or omissions” for “physical, psychological or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct” that would constitute a sexual offense under Article 130 of the Penal Law or incest or the use of a child in a sexual performance under the Penal Law. An action asserting such a claim may be commenced no earlier than six months after the law’s effective date — i.e., Aug. 14, 2019 — and no later than one year and six months after the effective date — i.e., Aug. 14, 2020.

    Constitutional Implications

    Constitutional principles may limit the retroactive application of the Child Victims Act. In criminal cases, the Supreme Court has held that a law extending the statute of limitations violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution if it is applied to revive an otherwise time-barred prosecution.[12] Accordingly, the longer limitations period for criminal cases set forth in the Child Victims Act will not have retroactive application to past acts of child sexual abuse that occurred prior to the limitations period under prior law.

    Constitutional challenges have also been brought to the retroactive application of new statutes of limitations in civil cases. In general, legislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil claims has been held not to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause or other federal constitutional guarantees, unless the legislation can be deemed punitive in nature. However, state courts have reached different results as to whether such legislation runs afoul of state constitutional requirements.[13] An analysis of New York’s jurisprudence in this area, as applied to the Child Victims Act, is beyond the scope of this Alert.

    A separate constitutional issue is raised by the provision of the Child Victims Act that revives claims that were previously brought and dismissed. At least one court has held, in a state where retroactive application of a new statute of limitations to civil claims for child sexual abuse was held to be permissible, that the law nonetheless could not constitutionally be applied to revive a claim that had previously been dismissed as time-barred. The court reasoned that the legislature’s enactment of a law to undo a final judgment entered by a court violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers.[14]

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Gary Stein, Donna Lazarus and Brooke Y. Oki.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The text of the Child Victims Act may be found here.

    [2] Vivian Wang, “They Were Sexually Abused Long Ago as Children. Now They Can Sue in N.Y.,” The New York Times, Jan. 28, 2019, available here.

    [3] N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 30.10(2)(b) – (c) (McKinney).

    [4] See id. § 30.10(3)(f).

    [5] N.Y. S.B. 2440, § 1(f), 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).

    [6] N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 208, 213-c, 215(3) (McKinney).

    [7] N.Y. S.B. 2440 § 2(b), 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).

    [8] N.Y. Committee Report, S.B. 2440, 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); see Child USA, Child Sex Abuse Statutes of Limitation, available here.

    [9] N.Y. S.B. 2440 § 2(b), 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).

    [10] N.Y. S.B. 2440 § 2(b), 214-g, 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).

    [11] See N.Y. S.B. 2440 § 214(g), 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (victims will also be able to file claims even if they failed to file a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim); see also Senate Majority Stands Up For Survivors, Passes Child Victims Act, (Jan. 28, 2019).

    [12] Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (1990).

    [13] See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 119 A.3d 462 (2015) (discussing case law).

    [14] Perez v. Roe I, 146 Cal. App. 4th 171, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Big Change For Witness Privilege In House Investigations

    ARTICLE

    Big Change For Witness Privilege In House Investigations

    February 12, 2019

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sam Dewey and Llewelyn Engel authored this bylined article on a recent rule change for congressional investigations, which will impact Executive Branch witnesses and private sector executives giving depositions.

    In depth

    On Jan. 25, 2019, U.S. House of Representatives Rules Committee Chairman James P. McGovern, D-Mass., issued regulations governing staff deposition authority in the 116th Congress, pursuant to his authority under H. Res. 6. In passing H. Res. 6, the newly empowered House Democratic majority drastically increased House committees’ investigative power by allowing committee staff to conduct depositions without members present — a stark departure from precedent.This change was a dramatic first step in the House Democratic majority’s efforts to ramp up oversight of both the executive branch and the private sector.

    The newly issued regulations redouble this effort by making it considerably easier for committees to overrule privilege objections during depositions. As a result, deponents asserting privilege are more likely to be confronted with the choice of either answering the committees’ questions or standing in contempt.The import of this move is clear. With oversight now in hyperdrive, the House intends to aggressively assert its long claimed prerogative to both overrule executive branch claims of privilege and to refuse to honor private parties’ assertions of the attorney-client privilege and other common law privileges.

    When the 114th Congress first expanded staff deposition authority, the regulations governing the taking of depositions contained an unwieldy procedure that prevented a committee chairman from contemporaneously ruling on objections and ordering and directing a witness to answer.

    Specifically: all objections were held in abeyance until the deposition recessed; a chairman could only rule on an objection during the recess and only in writing; and the deposition had to remain in recess for an additional three days following the chairman providing the ruling to the witness and the committee, and only then could the deposition reconvene and the witness be ordered and directed to answer the committee’s questions. Additionally, the witness had the right to appeal the chairman’s ruling to the committee and force the committee to take a roll-call vote on the objection prior to initiating the mark-up of a contempt citation. This procedure stood in sharp contrast to the rules governing the few Senate committees in the 114th Congress that possessed staff deposition authority.

    Under the Senate committees’ rules, a chairman could rule on objections and order and direct a witness to answer contemporaneously. A witness’s failure to then answer could be met with an immediate committee citation for contempt. The Senate regulations remained in substantially the same form during the 115th Congress.

    As a practical matter, the former House deposition regulations imposed serious logistical costs on overruling privilege objections (particularly when combined with the then extant member presence requirement). First, as a scheduling matter, it is decidedly inconvenient to recess a deposition, process a written ruling, and then reconvene a deposition. Second, a recalcitrant witness could force the committee to repeatedly go through this time-consuming procedure by narrowly asserting privilege to one set of questions at a time, causing a delay between each question. By this mechanism, objections could be stacked on objections, allowing the witness to essentially filibuster the committee. These restraints on the process were intentional — the prior rules were designed make overruling an objection an exceedingly rare event.

    Because the regulation’s rules now grant the chairman the power to contemporaneously overrule objections and order and direct witnesses to answer — be it by telephone, written order or personal presence — there is no delay and no ability to game the system. A witness who stands by an objection that is overruled may be immediately held in contempt and forced to face the legal consequences. Additionally, only a member is now permitted to appeal a chairman’s ruling.

    This change will have its greatest impact on executive branch witnesses seeking to assert privileges unique to the executive branch. Undoubtedly, the House Democratic majority enacted the change to facilitate aggressive oversight of the administration. The change could place executive branch witnesses in the incredibly uncomfortable position of facing personal criminal liability for following directions from the administration to assert privilege. Historically, this position is often an unsustainable state of affairs and has often resulted in the administration providing the requested information.

    While the greatest impact of the change will undoubtedly be on executive branch witnesses, it would be a mistake to view this change as agnostic to the private sector. Congress has long taken the position that it need not honor common law privileges, and Democratic chairmen in the past have repeatedly overruled claims of attorney-client privilege by private sector actors.

    As the House probes a variety of issue targeting the private sector, we fully expect to see House committees demand information that would normally be protected by the attorney-client privilege in judicial settings. The rule change now makes it significantly easier for the Democratic chairman to overrule privilege claims made by senior executives and compel them to reveal information that would undoubtedly be protected by a common law privilege in a judicial forum. The change may even lead to private corporate counsel being forced to testify in detail regarding advice they gave their client.

    The rule change foretells the more aggressive oversight role the new House Democratic majority will take this Congress. Private sector executives and executive branch officials can no longer rely on common law privilege to protect confidential information and must prepare for faster moving and more combative oversight proceedings.

    Authors

    Llewelyn M. Engel

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • The New Trademark Law Modernization Act – Strengthening the Rights of Trademark Owners

    ARTICLE

    The New Trademark Law Modernization Act – Strengthening the Rights of Trademark Owners

    February 11, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Boris Uphoff and Richard Gräbener authored this bylined article explaining the possibilities offered by the reformed German Trademark Law Modernization Act for companies and individual applicants.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Boris Uphoff

    Partner

    Munich, Düsseldorf

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  • Fresenius vs. Akorn – The MAC Clause as Contractual Case of Frustration of Contract (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Sec. 313 German Civil Code)

    Fresenius vs. Akorn – The MAC Clause as Contractual Case of Frustration of Contract (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Sec. 313 German Civil Code)

    ARTICLE

    Fresenius vs. Akorn – The MAC Clause as Contractual Case of Frustration of Contract (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Sec. 313 German Civil Code)

    February 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The article focuses on the MAC Clause as contractual case of the German institute of frustration of contract (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Sec. 313 German Civil Code) and its usage in German M&A practice.

    In depth

    The article focuses on the MAC Clause as contractual case of the German institute of frustration of contract (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Sec. 313 German Civil Code) and its usage in German M&A practice.

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  • Sanctions Update: OFAC Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company

    Sanctions Update: OFAC Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: OFAC Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company

    February 8, 2019

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 28, 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (“PdVSA”), the state-owned oil company, as a specially designated national (“SDN”). OFAC also simultaneously issued eight new general licenses and amended one already-existing general license.[1] In addition, on Jan. 31, 2019 and Feb. 1, 2019, OFAC issued new and amended Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”), as well as amendments to two of the previously issued general licenses.[2]

    As a result of OFAC’s action, U.S. persons are now generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with PdVSA and generally must block property interests of PdVSA in their possession or control. However, there are a number of exceptions to these restrictions, as reflected in the new and amended general licenses issued by OFAC in connection with the designation of PdVSA. Careful attention to the new sanctions and general licenses is advised for U.S. persons who have ties to or deal in PdVSA or its securities.

    I. OFAC Designation of PdVSA as SDN

    On Jan. 25, 2019, President Trump signed Executive Order (“E.O.”) 13857 titled “Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to Venezuela.” The new E.O. broadens the reach of previously issued E.O.s (13692, 13808, 13827, 13835 and 13850), by amending the definition of the term “Government of Venezuela” to include any person that has acted, or purported to act, on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including as a member of the Maduro regime. The new E.O. also specifically identifies PdVSA as included in the definition of “Government of Venezuela.”[3]

    Three days later, following a determination by Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin in consultation with Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that persons operating in Venezuela’s oil sector are subject to sanctions pursuant to E.O.13850,[4] OFAC added PdVSA to its List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”).

    Under E.O. 13850, the designation of PdVSA as an SDN means that — subject to the exceptions in the general licenses discussed below — all of its property and property interests that are in, or subsequently come within, the U.S., or that are within, or subsequently come within, the possession or control of a U.S. person, constitute blocked property. U.S. persons — again, subject to the exceptions in the general licenses — may not transfer or otherwise deal in property interests of PdVSA, or contribute or provide any funds, goods or services to or for the benefit of PdVSA, or receive any funds, goods or services from PdVSA.[5]

    Concurrent with this action, Secretary Mnuchin released a statement that the “… designation of PdVSA will help prevent further diverting of Venezuela’s assets by [Nicolas] Maduro and preserve these assets for the people of Venezuela. The path to sanctions relief for PdVSA is through the expeditious transfer of control to the Interim President or a subsequent, democratically elected government.”[6]

    OFAC’s new FAQs further elucidate the purpose of these sanctions: “Treasury will continue to use its economic tools to support Interim President Guaidó, the National Assembly, and the Venezuelan people’s efforts to restore their democracy.”[7]

    II. New General Licenses and Related FAQs

    In connection with designating PdVSA as an SDN, OFAC amended General License 3 and also issued a number of new general licenses. The amendments to General License 3 and the new General License 9 (and immediate amendment thereto) relate to dealings in certain bonds and securities and are summarized below.

    The remaining General Licenses, many of which are explained in FAQs issued by OFAC on Jan. 31, 2019, relate to (i) authorizing certain activities involving PDV Holdings Inc. (“PDVH”), CITGO Holding Inc. (“CITGO”) and Nynas AB (“Nynas”) (General Licenses 7 and 13); (ii) authorizing transactions involving PdVSA for certain entities operating in Venezuela (General License 8); (iii) authorizing the purchase in Venezuela of gasoline from PdVSA (General License 10); (iv) authorizing certain activities necessary to the maintenance or wind down of operations or existing contracts with PdVSA (General Licenses 11 and 12) and (v) authorizing transactions for the conduct of official business of the United States government by employees, grantees or contractors (General License 14).

    A. General License 3B

    General License 3B (Authorizing Transactions Related to, Provision of Financing for and Other Dealings in Certain Bonds), issued on Feb. 1, 2019,[8] authorizes U.S. persons to engage in all transactions related to, the provision of financing for, and other dealings in the bonds listed in the Annex to the license that would otherwise be prohibited by Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13808,[9] provided that any divestment or transfer of, or facilitation of divestment or transfer of, any holdings must be to a non-U.S. person.[10] Notably, PdVSA bonds that were previously listed in the Annex to General License 3 are not among those listed in the Annex to General License 3B; instead, they are now listed in the Annex to General License 9A (further discussion below).[11]

    In addition, the license authorizes all transactions and activities (including transactions in securities and security derivatives) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of financial contracts or other agreements involving or linked to the bonds specified in the Annex, through March 3, 2019, provided that such agreements were entered into prior to 4 p.m. EST on Feb. 1, 2019.[12] This allows transactions that involve or are linked to the bonds specified in the Annex that were initiated prior to the issuance of General License 3B to be wound down, including resolving the purchase and sale of securities, securities lending, repurchase agreements, and swaps and derivative contracts in securities.[13]

    Last, the license also authorizes all transactions related to, the provision of financing for, and other dealings in bonds that were issued prior to Aug. 25, 2017 by U.S. entities owned or controlled by the Government of Venezuela, other than Nynas, PDVH, CITGO and any of their subsidiaries.[14]

    FAQ No. 662 makes clear that, although non-U.S. persons may continue to deal in bonds specified in the Annex to General License 3B, to the extent that transactions involving the bonds specified in the Annex to General License 3B involve U.S. persons or the U.S. financial system, such transactions may not involve sales of any interests in such bonds to U.S. persons (other than as described above).[15]

    B. General License 9A

    General License 9A (Authorizing Transactions Related to Dealings in Certain Securities)[16] authorizes transactions and activities otherwise prohibited by Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13808 or E.O. 13850 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to dealings in any debt (including bonds listed on the Annex to General License 9A, promissory notes and other receivables) of, or equity in, PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns (directly or indirectly) a 50 percent or greater interest (together, “PdVSA securities”) issued prior to Aug. 25, 2017, provided that any divestment or transfer of any holdings in PdVSA securities must be to a non-U.S. person.[17] Such transactions and activities include facilitating, clearing and settling of transactions to divest to non-U.S. persons PdVSA-related securities, including on behalf of U.S. persons.[18]

    The license also authorizes, through March 3, 2019, transactions and activities, including transactions in securities and security derivatives, otherwise prohibited by Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13808 or E.O. 13850 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of financial contracts or other agreements that were entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. EST on Jan. 28, 2019, involving, or linked to, PdVSA securities issued prior to Aug. 25, 2017.[19] This provision was intended to allow the wind down of agreements entered into prior to the imposition of sanctions on PdVSA, including resolving the purchase and sale of securities, securities lending, repurchase agreements, and swaps and derivative contracts in securities.[20]

    Finally, the general license authorizes all transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to dealings in any bonds issued prior to Aug. 25, 2017 by PDVH, CITGO and Nynas and their subsidiaries.[21]

    The license expressly does not authorize, among other things, “U.S. persons to sell PdVSA securities to, to purchase or invest in securities of, or to facilitate such transactions with, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13850” including PdVSA and any entities in which PdVSA owns a 50 percent or greater interest, “other than purchases of or investments in PdVSA securities (including settlement of purchases or sales that were pending on January 28, 2019) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer of PdVSA securities” (emphasis added).[22]

    Ultimately, U.S. persons may continue to hold their interests in PdVSA debt and equity issued prior to Aug. 25, 2017, but there are restrictive requirements on the sale of those interests in the secondary market — specifically, U.S. persons may not sell their interests to another U.S. person, to PdVSA itself or its subsidiaries, or to another SDN. Moreover, General License 9A generally does not authorize U.S. persons to purchase or acquire new interests in PdVSA bonds, debt or equity (including the bonds listed in the Annex to General License 9A), except that, to the extent that divesting or transferring PdVSA-related debt or equity from a U.S. person to a non-U.S. person requires engaging in certain securities-related transactions (such as purchasing or settling purchases of PdVSA debt or equity), U.S. persons may engage in such transactions.[23] In sum, while non-U.S. persons may continue to deal in PdVSA debt and equity, involvement by U.S. persons or the U.S. financial system must be in compliance with the terms of General License 9A, which generally prohibits U.S. persons from purchasing such securities.[24]

    FAQ No. 650 addresses the level of due diligence associated with ensuring that transfers or divestment of debt in blocked persons are consistent with General License 9A — namely, that such divestment is actually made to a non-U.S. person. OFAC expects firms to conduct due diligence on their own direct customers and firms otherwise may “rely upon the information ordinarily available to them.”[25] However, consistent with FAQ No. 116, if a firm has “information in its possession leading it to know or have reason to know” that the buyer is a U.S. person, then it may be held responsible if it does not take steps to prevent the trade from being consummated.[26]

    The new FAQs specify that mutual funds and exchange traded funds that are U.S. persons may not buy, sell or otherwise engage in transactions related to debt, equity or other holdings in SDNs (such as PdVSA), unless authorized by a general or specific license.[27] A U.S. fund that contains such blocked holdings is generally not considered a blocked entity, U.S. persons may continue to invest in the fund and the fund may continue to operate. The fund may divest itself of blocked holdings only with OFAC authorization.[28]

    In addition, the new FAQs clarify that U.S. (and non-U.S.) persons may continue to constitute, offer and trade in synthetic exchange traded funds which track baskets of debt, equity or other holdings in an SDN to provide a return approximating the returns on such baskets, so long as the “underlying basket being tracked includes less than a predominant share by value of debt, equity, or other holdings in blocked persons.”[29]

    III. Duration of PdVSA Sanctions

    The FAQs indicate that the sanctions imposed on PdVSA are likely to continue until a “bona fide transfer of control” to Interim President Guaidó or a democratically elected government is accomplished. In the interim, “Treasury will continue to use its economic tools to support Interim President Guaidó, the National Assembly and the Venezuelan people’s efforts to restore their democracy.”[30]

    Authored by Seetha Ramachandran, Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Jennifer M. Opheim and Mari S. Dopp.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert or would like assistance complying with the new requirements, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Issuance of a New Venezuela-related Executive Order and General Licenses; Venezuela-related Designation” (Jan. 28, 2019), available here.

    [2] U.S. Department of Treasury, “Issuance of Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)” (Jan. 31, 2019), available here; U.S. Department of Treasury, “Issuance of Amended Venezuela-related General Licenses and Frequently Asked Questions” (Feb. 1, 2019), available here.

    [3] E.O. 13857, “Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to Venezuela” (Jan. 25, 2019) available here. See also OFAC FAQ No. 649 (Jan. 28, 2019).

    [4] E.O. 13850, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela” (Nov. 1, 2018), available here. For a fuller explanation of E.O. 13850, “Sanctions Update: Iran, Venezuela and Russia,” SRZ Alert, Nov. 13, 2018, available here.

    [5] E.O. 13850, §§ 1, 4. U.S. persons are also prohibited from conspiring to violate any of these prohibitions and from engaging in any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate, these prohibitions. Id., § 5.

    [6] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.” (Jan. 28, 2019), available here.

    [7] OFAC FAQ No. 660 (Jan. 31, 2019).

    [8] General License 3B (Feb. 1, 2019), available here. General License 3B replaces and supersedes in its entirety General License 3A. General License 3A was issued on Jan. 28, 2019. It, in turn, replaced and superseded the previously existing General License 3, which was issued on Aug. 25, 2017.

    [9] Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13808 provides: “All transactions related to, provision of financing for, and other dealings in the following by a United States person or within the United States are prohibited: … bonds issued by the Government of Venezuela prior to the effective date of this order”. See E.0. 13808, “Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to the Situation in Venezuela,” (Aug. 24, 2017), available here.

    [10] The license also authorizes all transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing and settling trades of holdings in the bonds specified in the Annex to the license, regardless of whether the sale or transfer was to a non-U.S. person, provided that such trades were placed prior to 4 p.m. EST on Feb. 1, 2019. This authorization allowed trades placed prior to Feb. 1, 2019 to settle in the ordinary course, regardless of whether the sales and transfers were to non-US persons. See OFAC FAQ No. 662 (Feb. 1, 2019).

    [11] OFAC FAQ No. 651 (Jan. 31, 2019).

    [12] General License 3B(c).

    [13] OFAC FAQ No. 662 (Feb. 1, 2019).

    [14] General License 3B(d).

    [15] OFAC FAQ No. 662 (Feb. 1, 2019).

    [16] General License 9A(a) (Feb. 1, 2019), available here. General License 9A was issued on Feb. 1, 2019. It replaces and supersedes General License 9, which was issued on Jan. 28, 2019.

    [17] General License 9A(a).

    [18] General License 9A(b). In addition, the license authorized transactions and activities that were ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of holdings in PdVSA securities described above, provided that such trades had to be placed prior to 4:00 p.m. EST on January 28, 2019. As with General License 3B, this authorization was intended to allow trades that were initiated prior to the imposition of blocking sanctions on PdVSA to settle in the ordinary course to both U.S. and non-U.S. persons. See General License 9A(c) and OFAC FAQ No. 661 (Feb. 1, 2019).

    [19] General License 9A(d).

    [20] OFAC FAQ No. 661 (Feb. 1, 2019).

    [21] General License 9A(e).

    [22] General License 9A(f)(2).

    [23] OFAC FAQ No. 661 (Feb. 1, 2019).

    [24] Id.

    [25] OFAC FAQ No. 650 (Jan. 31, 2019).

    [26] Id.

    [27] OFAC FAQ No. 652 (Jan. 31, 2019).

    [28] Id.

    [29] OFAC FAQ No. 653 (Jan. 31, 2019).

    [30] OFAC FAQ No. 660 (Jan. 31, 2019).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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