Content Type: Article

  • Amendments to Procedure Rules Reflect Dynamic Tax Court

    ARTICLE

    Amendments to Procedure Rules Reflect Dynamic Tax Court

    January 16, 2019

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Andrew Roberson and Kevin Spencer authored this bylined article on recent amendments to Tax Court procedure rules that reflect its need to adapt to new laws and technology.

    This article was originally published in Law360 January 16, 2019

    In depth

    The United States Tax Court is one of several specialized judiciaries — e.g., U.S. Bankruptcy Court, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims, etc. — and was created to provide a forum for taxpayers to seek redress for asserted income tax deficiencies by the Internal Revenue Service. Like all courts, the Tax Court has rules that govern the practice of law before the court, the Tax Court rules of practice and procedure. These rules have evolved over the years, and recent amendments reflect continuing modernization of the court’s administration as well as the continued expansion of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

    Tax Court Background

    The Tax Court’s predecessor was the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, established by Congress in the Revenue Act of 1924.[1] Congress established the board as an “independent agency in the executive branch of the government.”[2] In 1942, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1942, renaming the board as the “Tax Court of the United States.”[3] The Tax Court was established by Congress under Article I of the U.S. Constitution.[4]

    Although taxpayers can challenge the government’s ability to assess and collect taxes in several forums, the Tax Court is unique in that, unlike other forums, the taxpayer does not have to pay the tax first and then sue for a refund. Since being established, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction has been expanded to reflect the growing needs of the populace to have a prepayment forum to challenge the government’s taxing power. Presently, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear cases involving:

    • Tax disputes concerning notices of deficiency;
    • Notices of transferee liability;
    • Certain types of declaratory judgment;
    • Readjustment and adjustment of partnership items;
    • Review of the failure to abate interest;
    • Administrative costs;
    • Worker classification;
    • Relief from joint and several liability on a joint return;
    • Review of certain collection actions;
    • Certain whistleblower actions; and
    • Passport revocation actions.
    • Tax Court Amends its Procedure Rules

    On Nov. 30, 2018, Chief Judge Maurice B. Foley announced the adoption of amendments to Tax Court procedure rules. On Dec. 19, 2018, Chief Judge Folely also announced the adoption of interim and proposed amendments to the Tax Court procedure rules relating to the new regime for administrative and judicial review of adjustments to partnership income enacted by Congress in 2015. The amendments reflect the Tax Court slowly embracing the digital age, as well as refinements to the existing procedure rules and the addition of new areas of jurisdiction for the Tax Court. The latest amendments come on the heels of announcements in 2016 relating to the adoption of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings and other changes to the Tax Court procedure rules, and in 2012 relating to privilege and discovery rules.[5] We highlight the 2018 amendments that may have the most significance to taxpayers and practitioners.

    Payments to the Tax Court

    Prior to the amendment, Rule 11 required payments to the Tax Court to be made by cash, check or money order. This is in contrast with payments made to other federal courts, which all permit electronic remittances. The amendment embraces the digital economy, and now taxpayers and their representatives can make payment electronically through Pay.gov.

    Filing

    Historically, to file a document with the Tax Court you would either mail it or serve it personally. In 2010, changes were made to allow most documents to be electronically filed through the court’s eAccess system. The Tax Court has now amended Rule 22 to permit a document to be filed electronically either during or outside of normal business hours, unless the paper relates to an ongoing trial session, in which case it generally must be filed at the session. Like other federal courts, an electronically filed document is timely if filed at or before 11:59 pm, Eastern time, on the last day of the applicable period for filing.

    This amendment is a welcome change and may help ameliorate the mad dash to the courthouse that would sometimes occur to ensure timely filing. Additionally, electronic filing promotes a more reliable record of when a document is filed with the Tax Court, hopefully obviating the need to rely on the “mailbox rule” for determining whether a pleading was filed timely.

    Signature

    Likewise, the Tax Court amended Rule 23 to permit an “electronic signature” based upon the electronic filing guidelines published separately by the court. No longer will the court require an old-fashioned, handwritten ink signature. Additionally, an email address must be provided beneath the electronic signature.

    Electronic Filing of Petitions

    Unlike other federal courts, you cannot file electronically a petition in the Tax Court. Presently, the only way to start your Tax Court case is to mail or personally file the petition. The Tax Court has struggled with how to allow electronic filing of the petition. Not only are there technologically issues, but also many of the documents filed with the court have personal information — e.g., social security numbers — which must be redacted before filing. The amendments to Rule 34 pave the way to allow the electronic filing of a petition to commence a case. Additional information will be furnished to taxpayers on the Tax Court’s website in its electronic filings guidelines.

    This is another welcome development. There has been substantial litigation in the past involving whether a petition was timely mailed, or even mailed at all. Given that the failure to timely file a petition is jurisdictional, this amendment may reduce the amount of litigation on this issue and provides certainty for the court and the parties regarding when the petition was filed.

    Evidence

    Prior to its amendment, Rule 143 dictated that the Tax Court followed the rules of evidence “applicable in trials without a jury in the United State Court of the District of Columbia.” This rule was premised upon Internal Revenue Code Section 7453. In 2015, IRC Section 7453 was amended to direct the court to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court amended Rule 143 to reflect the change in the statute.

    Passport Actions

    In 2015, Congress enacted IRC Section 7345, which permits the U.S. Department of State to deny issuance, revoke or limit a passport if the IRS certifies to the State Department that a taxpayer has “seriously delinquent tax debt.” IRC Section 7345(e) permits a taxpayer to bring a Tax Court action to determine whether the IRS erroneously issued the certification described in IRC Section 7345, or failed to reverse such certification where reversal is required by law. Rule 350 makes the Tax Court rules applicable to these actions.

    Interest Abatement

    In 2015, Congress amended IRC Section 6404(h) to provide that a taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for an abatement of interest if the taxpayer files a claim for interest abatement with the IRS and the IRS fails to issue a final determination on the claim within 180 days after the claim was filed. The Tax Court amended Rule 281 to reflect changes to IRC Section 6404(h).

    Partnership Actions

    In 2015, Congress enacted a new regime for judicial and administrative review of adjustments to partnership income in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.[6] The Tax Court has adopted interim and proposed amendments in Tax Court procedure rules 255.1 through 255.7 to reflect this regime. The Court is allowing further opportunity for public comment on these rules.

    Conclusion

    Since being established, the Tax Court has continually evolved. Congress has regularly expanded its jurisdiction to meet the needs of taxpayers to have a fair and impartial forum to challenge the government’s tax determinations. As the laws change and technology develops, the Tax Court must adapt. The recent amendments to the Tax Court procedure rules show how the Tax Court is endeavoring to keep up with those changes. It is essential for practitioners who regularly practice before the court to review the Tax Court procedure rules each and every time they have a matter before the court.

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  • Fifth Circuit Blocks Fraudulent Transferee’s Good Faith Defense

    Fifth Circuit Blocks Fraudulent Transferee’s Good Faith Defense

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Blocks Fraudulent Transferee’s Good Faith Defense

    January 16, 2019

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “A … transferee [who] received fraudulent transfers with actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud or insolvency” loses any “good faith” defense available under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 9, 2019. Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 2019 WL 141107, *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (emphasis added). Although the “TUFTA good faith affirmative defense is an exception to the rule that fraudulent transfers must be returned,” the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “no court has considered extending TUFTA good faith to a transferee on inquiry notice who later shows an investigation would have been futile.” Id. at *4, *5. Significantly, in reversing the district court’s dismissal of an SEC receiver’s fraudulent transfer complaint in a Ponzi scheme case, the court “declined to rely on [Bankruptcy Code] §548(c) [case law] to interpret TUFTA good faith.” Id., citing G.E. Capital Commercial Inc. v. Worthington Nat’l Bank, 754 F.3d 297, 312 n.21 (5th Cir. 2014) (Code “§ 548(c) is not necessarily substantively congruent with state-law counterparts, despite a common ancestry.”).

    Relevance

    GMAG shows the different approaches taken by courts when applying fraudulent transfer law under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) and under the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”). In fact, the Fifth Circuit struggled with differences between the two seemingly identical statutes in 2015 and 2016 after asking for and receiving guidance from the Texas Supreme Court on the meaning of “value” in TUFTA’s good faith defense provision. In Janvey v. Golf Channel Inc., 834 F.3d 570, 572 (5th Cir. 2016), the court reluctantly affirmed the dismissal of the SEC receiver’s fraudulent transfer suit against an advertising firm for $5.9 million it had received in good faith from a Ponzi scheme debtor. In response to the Fifth Circuit’s certified question, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s “media­ advertising services had objective value and utility from a reasonable creditor’s perspective at the time of the transaction, regardless of [the debtor’s] financial insolvency at the time.” Janvey v. Golf Channel Inc., 487 S.W. 560, 570 (2016). The Fifth Circuit could therefore not apply TUFTA “in a way that would nullify a statutory affirmative defense [good faith receipt of funds in exchange for reasonably equivalent value] whenever [the] debtor was operating a Ponzi scheme.”

    The district court in Golf Channel had dismissed the receiver’s complaint, relying on the defendant’s statutory good faith affirmative defense, reasoning that the defendant “looks more like an innocent trade creditor than a salesman perpetrating and extending the [debtor’s] Ponzi scheme.” In its earlier 2015 decision, the Fifth Circuit had held that the Golf Channel case was “different” because the debtor had been “engaged in a Ponzi scheme,” but reluctantly vacated that ruling when it received a definitive answer from the Texas Supreme Court on the Texas state law issue – the meaning of “value” in TUFTA. According to the Fifth Circuit, the Texas court interpreted “the concept of ‘value’ under TUFTA differently than we have understood ‘value’ under other states’ fraudulent transfer laws and under Section 548(c) of the … Code.” Significantly, the defendant’s good faith in Golf Channel was undisputed, in contrast to the alleged facts in GMAG, where the defendant’s good faith was the key issue.

    Facts

    The defendants in GMAG (collectively, “M”), had invested in the debtor’s Ponzi scheme and had later received $88.2 million in cash from the debtor. After the receiver sued, M returned $8.5 million, representing so-called “fictitious profits” on its original investment.

    M had an investment committee monitor its $79-million investment in the debtor. When it learned that the SEC was investigating the debtor, M’s investment committee resolved to “take back, at minimum, [M’s] accumulated interest … .” 2019 WL 141107, at *1. According to the receiver, M’s later redemptions were “the result of mounting skepticism about” the debtor. Id.

    The receiver sued M to recover the redeemed funds, asserting a fraudulent transfer under TUFTA and unjust enrichment. The district court rejected the receiver’s unjust enrichment claim before trial, only presenting to the jury the issue of whether M received $79 million as a fraudulent transfer in good faith. According to the jury, M had “inquiry notice that [the debtor] was engaged in a Ponzi scheme, but not actual knowledge.” Id. at *2. The court had defined inquiry notice for the jury as “knowledge of facts relating to the transaction at issue that would have excited the suspicions of a reasonable person and led that person to investigate.” The jury further found that “an investigation [by M] would have been futile,” having been told by the district court that futility existed if “a diligent inquiry would not have revealed to a reasonable person that [the debtor] was running a Ponzi scheme.” Id. Rejecting the receiver’s argument that “the jury’s finding of inquiry notice defeated [M’s] TUFTA good faith defense as a matter of law,” the district court held that M had “satisfied [its] good faith defense,” limiting the receiver to the $8.5 million it had already received from M.

    The Fifth Circuit

    TUFTA’s Good Faith Defense. “Recipients of fraudulent transfers can prevent clawback actions by proving they received property ‘in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value’ [but…] bear the burden of proving” that good faith defense. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has not defined “good faith,” but Texas lower courts “have overwhelmingly adopted an objective definition: ‘A transferee who takes property with knowledge of such facts as would excite the suspicions of a person of ordinary prudence and put him on inquiry of the fraudulent nature of an alleged transfer does not take the property in good faith and is not a bonafide purchaser.’” Id. at *3, citing Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W. 3d 517, 527 (Tex. App. -Houston [Pt Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); and GE Capital Commercial Inc. v. Worthington Nat’l Bank, 754 F.3d 297, 313 (5th Cir. 2014).

    No Futility Exception for TUFTA Good Faith Defense. In fraudulent transfer cases based on the Code’s good faith provision, §548(c) (transferee “that takes for value and in good faith … may retain any interest transferred … to the extent that such transferee … gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer”), a transferee may “rebut” proof of inquiry notice by showing that it “conducted a ‘diligent investigation’ into [its] suspicions.” Id., citing Templeton v. O’Cheskey, 785 F.3d 143, 164 (5th Cir. 2015). Further, courts in Code cases also permit a “transferee on inquiry notice to rebut inquiry notice by proving that the fraudulent scheme’s complexity would have rendered any investigation futile.” Id., citing Christian Bros. High Sch. Endowment v. Bayou No Leverage Fund LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 317 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2010).

    The district court in GMAG applied this “futility exception,” reasoning that the Texas Supreme Court “would adopt the diligent investigation requirement” because the Code “may be used to interpret [TUFTA]” Id., citing Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm’n Inc., 712 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2013). It found no binding precedent “requiring the conclusion that a transferee on inquiry notice who fails to investigate lacks good faith.” Id. The district court still “held that a transferee with inquiry notice must conduct a diligent investigation into the facts that put [it] on inquiry notice to retain TUFTA good faith.” Id. In addition, reasoned the lower court, the transferee could “satisfy TUFTA good faith by proving that such an investigation would have been futile.” Id. M had retained good faith, said the district court, because the jury found “that an investigation into the [Ponzi] scheme would have been futile despite M’s inquiry notice.” Id. at *4.

    Texas Law: Transferees With Inquiry Notice Have No Good Faith Defense. Both “Texas lower courts and federal district courts considering TUFTA good faith rely on Hahn to hold that transferees [with] actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud cannot claim TUFTA’s good faith defense.” Id. at *4. No court, though, “has … extend[ed] TUFTA good faith to a transferee on inquiry notice who later shows an investigation would have been futile.” Id. In the Fifth Circuit’s view, the district court in GMAG mistakenly supplemented applicable Texas law’s “good faith analysis with interpretations of … Code good faith” cases under Code §548(c). Id. The Fifth Circuit may have “relied on §548 to interpret various TUFTA provisions because TUFTA is based on UFTA, which itself is based on §548,” but the court has “previously declined to rely on §548(c) to interpret TUFTA good faith.” Id.

    First, “neither §548(c) text nor its legislative history defines good faith.” Id. at *5, citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Hayes, 310 F.3d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts have disagreed “as to what conditions … allow a transferee this defense.” Id. Courts have also disagreed on whether a transferee on inquiry notice “must satisfy a ‘diligent investigation’ requirement”; and “the case law is not clear” as to the nature of the investigation requirement and “whether §548(c) permits a futility exception.” Id., citing Bayou, 439 B.R. at 312 (recognizing futility exception) and Zayed v. Buysse, 2012 W.L. 12893882, at *22-23 (D. Minn. Sep. 27, 2012) (rejecting futility exception). Because of this “lack of conformity,” the Fifth Circuit declined to rely on Code “interpretations to construe TUFTA good faith.” Id. Instead, the court held that “failing to inquire when on inquiry notice does not indicate good faith.” Id.

    “No prior court considering TUFTA good faith has applied a futility exception” in the good faith context. Id. For that reason, the Fifth Circuit declined “to hold that the [Texas] Supreme Court … would do so.” At most, a transferee might “offer up evidence of undertaken investigations to prove a reasonable person’s suspicions would not have been aroused when the transfer was received.” Id. But the complexity of the scheme “does not excuse a finding of inquiry notice and does not warrant the application of TUFTA good faith.” Id.

    Comment

    GMAG is another example of the Fifth Circuit’s construing two virtually identical statutes differently, depending on the applicability of federal or state law. Had the GMAG claims been asserted under the Code, M would have been able to assert a futility defense. Until the Texas Supreme Court rules differently from Texas lower courts, no futility exception is available to a fraudulent transferee on inquiry notice of the debtor’s fraud when TUFTA applies in the Fifth Circuit. But see In re Polaroid Corp., 472 B.R. 22, 43, 52 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012), aff’d, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015) (“In the Eighth Circuit, corollary provisions in the federal and state law that address intentionally fraudulent transfers receive the same construction and application … Harmonizing the construction of cognate legislation is as appropriate for the defense as it is for the main remedy.”); In re IFS Financial Corp., 417 B.R. 419, 446 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (TUFTA fraudulent transfer suit; defendant “received … transfers in good faith”; “… had no reason to question the legitimacy … of the investments prior to receipt of the disputed transfers”; defendant “inquired about the [transferor’s] operations [and] found … explanation very persuasive.”), aff’d, 669 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2012); In re World Vision Entertainment, Inc. 275 B.R. 641, 660 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“The defendants did not perform the minimal due diligence steps needed to demonstrate that they acted in good faith”; claims brought under UFTA and Code). As noted by the leading bankruptcy treatise, “[t]he UFTA [was] … drafted after [Code] section 548 … by the same individuals.” 5 Collier, Bankruptcy § 548.09 [5] (16th ed. 2018).

     Authored by Michael L. Cook. 

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • DOJ Reaches Settlement with Six Broadcast Television Companies

    ARTICLE

    DOJ Reaches Settlement with Six Broadcast Television Companies

    January 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stefan Meisner and Ashley McMahon authored this bylined article summarizing the Department of Justice’s settlement with six broadcast television companies after the DOJ claimed that the companies shared competitively sensitive information.

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  • DOJ Announces Settlement with Carolinas Health System (Atrium Health) After Two Years of Litigation

    ARTICLE

    DOJ Announces Settlement with Carolinas Health System (Atrium Health) After Two Years of Litigation

    January 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stephen Wu, Ashley Fischer, Michelle S. Lowery, Jeffrey Brennan, and Ashley McMahon authored this bylined article summarizing the settlement relating to provisions in contracts between the health system and commercial insurers that allegedly restrict payors from “steering” their enrollees to lower-cost hospitals.

    In depth
    Authors

    Michelle Lowery

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Chicago

    Ashley M. Fischer

    Partner

    Chicago

    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Proposed Regulations to Benefit Opportunity Zone Investing

    ARTICLE

    Proposed Regulations to Benefit Opportunity Zone Investing

    January 15, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jeffrey Steiner and Dino Fazlibegu authored this bylined article on the potential tax benefits of acquisitions of real property in qualified opportunity zones.

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  • Subpart F: Sale of a Lower-Tier CFC

    ARTICLE

    Subpart F: Sale of a Lower-Tier CFC

    January 11, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder authored this bylined article discussing the treatment of the sale of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) by a CFC under new Tax Reform regulations. He describes the application of the Subpart F income rules, the GILTI rules and the dividends received deduction.

    In depth
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    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • IRS Issues Guidance on Nonprofit Executive Compensation, but Challenges Remain for Tax-Exempt Health Care Systems

    IRS Issues Guidance on Nonprofit Executive Compensation, but Challenges Remain for Tax-Exempt Health Care Systems

    ARTICLE

    IRS Issues Guidance on Nonprofit Executive Compensation, but Challenges Remain for Tax-Exempt Health Care Systems

    January 11, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Erika Mayshar and Ralph DeJong authored this bylined article on the Internal Revenue Service’s guidance on the excise tax on certain nonprofit executive compensation.

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  • New York Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Will Extend to Private Schools

    New York Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Will Extend to Private Schools

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Will Extend to Private Schools

    January 11, 2019

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Governor Cuomo recently signed a law which will require all private schools to report allegations of sexual and physical abuse of students in their schools to law enforcement, and to notify parents and the New York Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”). The new law adds private schools to the existing structure that most public schools in New York State use for reporting, set out in Article 23-B of New York’s Education Law, Child Abuse in an Educational Setting.

    The law requires school administrators, other employees and bus drivers who receive an allegation of abuse of a student in an educational setting by a school employee or volunteer, to report the abuse to a school administrator. Administrators must notify the student’s parent, prepare a written report, notify law enforcement authorities and notify the Commissioner. Additionally, all required reporters must complete two hours of child abuse training or coursework.

    Reporting Requirements

    Who Must Report?

    Those required to report allegations of child abuse are the school’s teachers, nurses, guidance counselors, psychologists, social workers, administrators (including principals/heads of school), board members, licensed and registered physical therapists, licensed and registered occupational therapists, licensed and registered speech pathologists, teacher aides, resource officers, bus drivers or other school personnel that are required to hold a teaching or administrative license or certificate. Reporters also include employees of companies contracting with the school, including school bus drivers.

    What Must Be Reported?

    Required reporters who receive oral or written allegations of child abuse in an educational setting by a school employee or volunteer must cause a report to be made. Note that the school where the alleged abuser works or volunteers is not important. All that is needed to trigger the reporting requirement is that an employee or volunteer of any school is alleged to have abused a student in an educational setting.

    “Child Abuse” includes acts that create a substantial risk of physical injury to a student; acts that inflict physical injury to a student; acts that qualify as child sexual abuse prohibited by the New York Penal Laws, including sexual touching, sexual assault and sexual intercourse with a student under the age of 17; and sending or showing, or attempting to send or show, a student “indecent materials” as defined by the New York Penal Law, including materials that depict human genitals and sexual conduct.

    “Educational Setting” includes school grounds, school buses or other vehicles that transport students to or from school, all extracurricular activity sites, all co-curricular sites, including field trip sites, as well as any other location where a school employee or volunteer had direct contact with a student. Note that this definition includes any other location where direct contact is made between an employee or volunteer and a student. Therefore, any location where a school employee or volunteer is alleged to have abused a student will qualify as an educational setting.

    “Employee” means any person who receives compensation from the school, or any person who has duties that involve direct student contact and either (a) receives compensation from any contractor that transports the school’s students (e.g., bus drivers) or (b) is employed by a contractor and placed within the school as part of a public assistance employment program. “Volunteer” is any person, other than an employee, who has direct contact with students and provides services to the school, or provides services to any contractor that transports the school’s students.

    How Is a Report Made?

    After receiving an allegation of child abuse, required reporters (except school bus drivers) must:

    • Promptly complete a written report in a form provided by the Commissioner’s office. This report must include the full name of the allegedly abused child, the name of the child’s parent, the identity of the person making the allegation and their relationship to the alleged victim, the name of the alleged abuser, and a list of the specific allegations of abuse; and
    • Personally deliver a copy of the written report to the school administrator (principal or the equivalent, e.g., head of school, director, etc.) of the school where the child abuse occurred. If the alleged abuser is the school administrator, then the report of abuse must be delivered to another school administrator designated by the school.

    School bus drivers and other employees of a person or entity which contracts with a school to provide transportation, who receive an oral or written allegation that a child has been subjected to child abuse by an employee or volunteer in an educational setting, shall promptly report or cause a report to be made to his or her supervisor employed by such contracting person or entity. The supervisor must then promptly complete a written report in a form provided by the Commissioner’s office (including the details set forth above). The supervisor must personally deliver the report to the school administrator of the school where the child abuse occurred.

    If the alleged abuser is an employee or volunteer of a school other than the school of the student victim’s attendance, the written report of the allegations must be promptly forwarded, in addition to the school administrator of the school where the child abuse occurred, to the school administrator of the alleged abuser’s school.

    What Must the School Administrator Do When They Receive a Report?

    After the school administrator receives the written report of child abuse and there is reasonable suspicion to believe that an act of child abuse occurred, the school administrator must do the following:

    1. If the victim child has made the allegation: (a) promptly notify the parent of the victim of the allegation of abuse and provide the parent of the victim with a written statement prepared pursuant to the Commissioner’s regulations setting forth parental rights, responsibilities and procedures; (b) promptly provide a copy of the report to his or her supervisor, if applicable; and (c) promptly forward such report to appropriate law enforcement authorities.
    2. If a parent of a victim child has made the allegation: (a) promptly provide the parent with a written statement prepared pursuant to the Commissioner’s regulations setting forth parental rights, responsibilities and procedures; (b) promptly provide a copy of the report to his or her supervisor, if applicable; and (c) promptly forward such report to appropriate law enforcement authorities.
    3. When someone other than the victim child or the parent of the child has made the allegation: (a) promptly notify the parent of the victim of the allegation of abuse and provide the parent with a written statement prepared pursuant to the Commissioner’s regulations setting forth parental rights, responsibilities and procedures under this law; (b) ascertain from the person making such report the source and basis for such allegation; (c) promptly provide a copy of the report to his or her supervisor, if applicable; and (d) promptly forward such report to appropriate law enforcement authorities.

    When the school administrator forwards the written report of child abuse to the law enforcement authorities, he or she must also refer the report to the Commissioner where the alleged abuser holds a certification or license issued by the department.

    If a written report of child abuse does not, after investigation, result in a criminal conviction of the alleged abuser, then the report must be expunged from any record kept by the school within five years from the date the report was made.

    What Happens After Law Enforcement Notification?

    Where a criminal investigation of an allegation of child abuse by an employee or volunteer is undertaken in response to a report forwarded by a school administrator to law enforcement authorities, and where law enforcement authorities have provided such report to the district attorney, it shall be the responsibility of the district attorney, as soon as practicable, to notify the school administrator of the school where the acts of child abuse allegedly occurred and of the school where the child is attending, if different, of an indictment or the filing of an accusatory instrument against the employee or volunteer. The district attorney shall also notify the school administrator of the disposition of the criminal case or the suspension or termination of the criminal investigation of such employee or volunteer.

    Unreported Resignation Against Public Policy

    The new law prohibits school administrators from making any agreement to withhold from law enforcement authorities, the superintendent or the Commissioner, where appropriate, the fact that an allegation of child abuse in an educational setting on the part of any employee or volunteer as required by this law, in return for the resignation or voluntary suspension from his or her position, against whom the allegation is made.

    Immunity and Penalties

    Any required reporter, including any employee, volunteer or supervisor who is employed by a person or entity that contracts with a school to provide transportation, who reasonably and in good faith makes a report of child abuse in accordance with this law, will have immunity from any civil liability which might otherwise result because of his or her actions, such as immunity from a defamation lawsuit. A school administrator who reasonably and in good faith makes a report of child abuse or reasonably and in good faith transmits such a report to a person or agency in accordance with this law will have immunity from any civil liability which might otherwise result because of his or her actions, such as immunity from a defamation lawsuit. Any school administrator who reasonably and in good faith reports to law enforcement officials information regarding allegations of child abuse or a resignation as required by this law shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, which might otherwise result by reason of such action.

    Willful failure of an employee to prepare and submit a written report of an allegation of child abuse as required by this law shall be a Class A misdemeanor. The willful failure of a school administrator to submit a written report of child abuse to an appropriate law enforcement authority, as required by this law, shall be a Class A misdemeanor. Additionally, any failure to submit a written report of child abuse to an appropriate law enforcement authority as required by this law shall be punishable by a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 upon an administrative determination by the Commissioner.

    All reports of abuse and other materials submitted with the report, such as photographs, are confidential and may only be disclosed to law enforcement authorities involved in an investigation of the abuse or as expressly authorized by law or a court-ordered subpoena. Willful disclosure of such records to an unauthorized person or entity is a Class A misdemeanor.

    A violation of the unreported resignation prohibition shall constitute a Class E felony and will also be punishable by a civil penalty not to exceed $20,000.

    Training Requirements

    The new law requires the Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations for training regarding mandatory reporting of child abuse and maltreatment under the New York Social Services Law, including, at a minimum, information regarding the physical and behavioral indicators of child abuse and maltreatment, as well as the statutory reporting requirements set out in the law, including when and how a report must be made, the legal protections afforded to reporters and the consequences for failing to report. All employees employed on or after July 1, 2019 as, or in equivalent title to teachers or administrators, and any school bus driver employed by a contractor to transport students are required to complete two hours of coursework or training regarding the identification and reporting of child abuse and maltreatment. The coursework or training must be obtained from an institution or provider that has been approved by the New York Department of Education to provide such coursework or training. Each such employee must provide the school administrator of the school with documentation showing that he or she completed the required training. Each school bus driver must provide his or her contractor with documentation showing that he or she completed the required training. The Department of Education may request your training records on a periodic basis and it may publish a list of any persons or schools who are not in compliance with the training requirements on its website.

    Recommended Actions

    The new law will take effect in June 2019. All independent schools in New York State should review and revise their policies on reporting abuse to comply with the new reporting structure. Additionally, schools should prepare to require the mandated trainings.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert or would like assistance complying with the new requirements, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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