Content Type: Article

  • The Department of Labor Releases Guidance on Mental Health Protections Under the Family Medical Leave Act

    The Department of Labor Releases Guidance on Mental Health Protections Under the Family Medical Leave Act

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Department of Labor Releases Guidance on Mental Health Protections Under the Family Medical Leave Act

    July 7, 2022

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division (“DOL”) recently released guidance on the mental health protections available under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

    FMLA entitles eligible employees to take unpaid, job-protected leave to address certain serious health issues, including those due to mental health conditions.[1] The new guidance does not establish additional obligations for employers, but rather provides examples for employers to better understand how to comply with the law, including a fact sheet and frequently asked questions on the applicability of the FMLA to mental health.

    Under FMLA, eligible employees may take up to 12 weeks of leave:

    • For their own serious mental health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the essential functions of their job, or;
    • To provide care for a spouse, child or parent who is unable to work or perform other regular daily activities because of a serious mental health condition.

    Mental health conditions are considered serious health conditions under the FMLA if they require (1) inpatient care or (2) continuing treatment by a health care provider. A serious mental health condition that requires inpatient care includes an overnight stay in a hospital or other medical care facility. A serious mental health condition that requires continuing treatment by a health care provider includes: (1) conditions that incapacitate an individual for more than three consecutive days and require ongoing medical treatment, either multiple appointments with a health care provider, including a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist or clinical social worker, or a single appointment and follow-up care (e.g., prescription medication, outpatient rehabilitation counseling or behavioral therapy); or (2) chronic conditions (e.g., anxiety, depression or dissociative disorders) that cause occasional periods when an individual is incapacitated and requires treatment by a health care provider at least twice a year and recurs over an extended period of time.

    Common mental health conditions that may be covered under the FMLA include, but are not limited to, severe anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder.

    The DOL noted that an employee who is eligible for FMLA leave may use such leave to care for a child if the child is incapable of self-care because of a disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), or has a serious health condition and needs care. The DOL explained that a “disability” is a mental or physical condition that substantially limits one or more major life activities, and is different than a “serious health condition” under the FMLA.[2]

    Employers should understand their legal obligations in addressing mental health issues under the FMLA.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Max Garfield, Scott A. Gold, Donna K. Lazarus and Ayumi Berstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Employees are eligible if they work for a covered employer for at least 12 months, have at least 1,250 hours of service for the employer during the 12 months before the leave and work at a location where the employer has at least 50 employees within 75 miles.

    [2] The Connecticut Department of Labor recently issued a new notice in regards to employee’s rights to request leave for serious mental health conditions under the Connecticut Family and Medical Leave Act (“CTFMLA”). Several changes to the CTFMLA went into effect on Jan. 1, 2022, including eligibility requirements, covered family members for “care” leave and the duration of the leave.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Max Garfield

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Global Legal Insights: Merger Control 2022 | Belgium

    ARTICLE

    Global Legal Insights: Merger Control 2022 | Belgium

    July 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The GLI Cartels 2022 covers key topics including law & enforcement, investigative powers, cartel enforcement activity, decision making procedures, leniency / amnesty, settlement of cases, third party complaints, sanctions and cross-border issues.

    Hendrik Viaene, Karolien Van der Putten and Hannelore Wiame have contributed an extensive chapter relating to the law in Belgium.

    To read the Belgium chapter, please click here.

    To access the full Guide, please click here.

    In depth
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  • Shields Up: DoD Reminds Contracting Officers that DFARS Cyber Clauses Have Consequences

    Shields Up: DoD Reminds Contracting Officers that DFARS Cyber Clauses Have Consequences

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Shields Up: DoD Reminds Contracting Officers that DFARS Cyber Clauses Have Consequences

    June 30, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 16, 2022, the US Department of Defense (DoD) issued a memorandum (DoD Memo) “reminding” contracting officers that noncompliance with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clause 252.204-7012, “Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting,” may constitute a breach of contract, and that such breach may justify the government’s withholding progress payments, foregoing remaining contract options and potentially terminating part of or the entire contract. The DoD Memo reminds contracting officers that even in contracts that do not include the self-assessment requirement imposed by DFARS 252.204-7020—i.e., contracts issued prior to November 30, 2020, that do not include related assessment and access requirements—there are “alternative remedies and tools” contracting officers can and should consider employing in the event of noncompliance. Defense contractors should pay close attention to this clarion call, have a firm handle on their current cybersecurity posture, track what has been represented to DoD, and promptly address any daylight between their current state and any such prior representations.

    In depth

    BACKGROUND AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

    DFARS 252.204-7012—which requires contractors to provide adequate security on covered contractor information systems—has been in effect since October 2016. Additional rules that have since been implemented have put more teeth into those requirements. On November 30, 2020, for example, interim DFARS Rule 2019-D041 took effect.  This rule requires DoD agencies to include in most solicitations, contracts, task and delivery orders on a go-forward basis, a new clause—DFARS 252.204-7020—that requires contractors to post self-assessment scores regarding compliance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-171 in the Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS) and to provide access to contractor facilities, systems and personnel necessary for the government to conduct additional assessments.

    The DoD Memo reminds contracting officers that even where such assessments are not required—i.e., in contracts that do not include DFARS 252.204-7020—contractors are still required to implement all NIST SP 800-171 requirements or to have a plan of action and milestones for each requirement not yet implemented. The DoD Memo also reminds contracting officers of their own obligation to verify that, for any new award, including new orders or extensions, the contractor has posted the summary level score of a current NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment for the relevant system(s) in SPRS. As the DoD Memo emphasizes, a contractor’s failure to have or make progress on a plan to implement the NIST SP 800-171 requirements may be considered a material breach of contract requirements, for which the remedies include (i) withholding progress payments, (ii) foregoing remaining contract options, and (iii) potentially terminating part or the entire contract.

    WHAT THIS MEANS FOR CONTRACTORS

    Though the DoD Memo does not alter the requirements around self-assessments or compliance with NIST, it does make clear that the government takes these requirements seriously and intends to enforce them. To that end, contractors should review their contractual obligations and take the following additional steps:

    1. Identify and understand whether DFARS 252.204-7020 applies. For contracts prior to November 30, 2020, though DFARS 252.204-7020 may not have been included in the original contract, that clause may have been added by bilateral modification in the intervening years. New awards or extensions will also be subject to assessment requirements, even where the initial contract did not include them.
    2. Independent of whether required to conduct and report a self-assessment, monitor and ensure compliance with NIST SP 800-171. As the DoD Memo makes clear, contractors are on the hook for compliance even if not required to self-assess, and the government intends to pursue remedies for noncompliance. It is thus critical that contractors continue to work toward NIST SP 800-171 compliance for all systems and contracts.
    3. For contracts that do include the DFARS 252.204-7020 clause, make sure self-assessments are accurate. Inaccurate scores can constitute a non-compliance, not to mention a potential violation of the False Claims Act. Scores are good for a maximum of three years, so it is important to stay on top of these requirements not just to ensure current compliance but also to prepare for the next assessment. Review DoD’s guidance on self-assessments and consult with a professional if you are unsure about the meaning of the requirements or the assessment methodology.
    4. Monitor any plans of action and milestones to ensure there are no slips in the schedule communicated to the government regarding the achievement of full compliance with NIST SP 800-171. If there are any threats to that schedule, make sure to consult with counsel to discuss next steps.
    5. Review representations and certifications to other parties (g., insurers, vendors and customers) regarding cybersecurity capabilities and vulnerabilities to evaluate how they compare with what has been represented to DoD.

    McDermott’s Government Contracts and Global Privacy and Cybersecurity teams continue to monitor developments in this area and will provide updates as they develop. Please contact the lawyers listed here if you have any questions about these or related areas.

    Authors

    Daniel P. Graham

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Tara L. Ward

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Jessica McGahie Sawyer

    Counsel

    Los Angeles

    Robert Duffy

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Elizabeth Hummel

    Associate

    Chicago

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  • International M&A Due Diligence, Second Edition

    International M&A Due Diligence, Second Edition

    ARTICLE

    International M&A Due Diligence, Second Edition

    May 27, 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Diego Gómez-Cornejo served as Editor-in-Chief of the Second Edition of International M&A Due Diligence published by the American Bar Association. A member of the ABA wrote, “It is absolutely fabulous. I particularly love the checklists by country…having your book will aid me to have a greater understanding beyond my small silo and allow me to have more context. And, I am quite sure that many lawyers both those who are steeped in M&A and those like me will truly benefit from your time and wisdom as compiled in the book.”

    In depth
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  • CFPB Signals Cuts to Credit Card Late Fees

    CFPB Signals Cuts to Credit Card Late Fees

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Signals Cuts to Credit Card Late Fees

    June 29, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB” or the “Bureau”) continues to aggressively examine the fees associated with consumer financial products and services. The Bureau is pressing for providers under its purview to state total prices up front, rather than rely on “back end” fees which consumers may not take into account when they sign up, or which deceive consumers about what a product or service will really cost. One important focus has been credit card late fees. Before taking action, however, the CFPB has invited public comment through a recently-issued Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPR”), including from credit card issuers.

    Credit Card Late Fees Add Up

    Over 175 million Americans hold at least one credit card.[1] The Bureau estimates that “credit card company penalty policies” cost consumers $12 billion per year.[2] This amounts to 10 percent of the cost consumers bear to hold credit cards.[3]

    Congress passed the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 (the “CARD Act”) to curb practices that promote excessive fees in the credit card industry.[4] As relevant here, the CARD Act requires credit card penalties to be “reasonable and proportional” to the event that triggered the fee.[5] When the Federal Reserve held rulemaking authority for the CARD Act, it issued a rule that capped late fees at the amount the late payment cost the issuer. However, the rule also created a safe harbor—which the Bureau is now calling an “immunity provision”—that deemed any fee below a specified level acceptable.[6] That limit adjusts over time and is now set at $30 for the first late payment, and $41 for each subsequent late payment within six billing cycles. In a recent study, the Bureau found that “18 of the top 20 issuers” set late fees “at or near” the maximum.[7]

    With this provision in mind, the ANPR seeks to learn more about how to gauge what makes fees “reasonable and proportional,” and gain context on “card issuers’ revenue and expenses, the potential deterrent effect of late fees, and the role late fees play in credit card companies’ profitability.”[8] The Bureau believes that seeking this information now is “particularly timely since current rules might give companies the incentive to impose big hikes based on inflation.”[9]

    The CFPB Taking Aim at “Junk Fees”

    The ANPR follows a statement earlier this year targeting what the Bureau called “junk fees”—back end fees that obscure the true cost of a product or service.[10] There, the Bureau highlighted credit card late fees as well as overdraft and insufficient funds fees for bank accounts, analogizing them to the “resort fees” and “service fees” that some hotels or concert venues add onto the posted price after the fact.[11] The Bureau is focused on late fees in particular because they constitute 99 percent of the dollar value of all the penalty fees credit card issuers charge.[12]

    In that prior statement, the Bureau asked consumers to share their experiences about fees that had taken them by surprise, including:

    • Fees for things people believed were covered by the baseline price of a product or service;
    • Unexpected fees for a product or service;
    • Fees that seemed too high for the purported service; and
    • Fees where it was unclear why they were charged.[13]

    Notably, the Bureau did not solicit input from credit card issuers or major banks at that time.[14] The Bureau forecasted a continued focus on these issues, promising to “craft rules, issue industry guidance, and focus supervision and enforcement resources” to reduce these fees.[15]

    An Opportunity for the Industry to Provide Guidance

    The Bureau now invites input “from credit card issuers, consumer groups, and the public regarding credit card late fees and late payments, and card issuers’ revenue and expenses.”[16] Any interested person can submit a public comment by July 22, 2022.

    The ANPR itself includes 38 specific questions spanning more than a dozen pages, seeking significant detail from issuers and other providers in this space.[17] Broadly, the Bureau is seeking input on areas including: (1) the factors the industry uses to set late fee amounts; (2) issuers’ costs and losses associated with late payments; (3) the “deterrent effect of late fees”; (4) cardholders’ late-payment behavior; (5) methods issuers use to encourage timely payments; (6) issuers’ use of the CARD Act safe harbor; and (7) issuer revenue and expenses related to consumer credit card operations.[18]

    The CFPB is certain to rely on this information as it updates the safe harbor rule. As the CFPB remains focused on reducing credit card late fees and preventing an inflation rate hike, the Bureau will have to balance the impact its changes may have on consumers’ access to credit. The ANPR indicates some of the potential changes, including encouraging issuers to affirmatively notify cardholders of minimum payment amounts and due dates, and to facilitate cardholders’ adoption of autopay options.[19] Additionally, the Bureau will look to minimize the safe harbor provision as a barrier to its enforcement authority.[20]

    Conclusion

    The ANPR—as well as the Bureau’s information request on junk fees—reflect the Bureau’s increased regulatory and supervisory efforts under the leadership of Director Rohit Chopra. These actions demonstrate that consumer financial products and services will remain under the magnifying glass. However, this public comment window specifically addressed to the providers of consumer financial products and services provides an opportunity for industry to help inform the regulations it must follow.

    Schulte Roth & Zabel’s lawyers are available to assist you in preparing a public comment or addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Schulte Roth & Zabel lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following attorneys:

    Donald J. Mosher – New York (+1 212.756.2187, donald.mosher@srz.com)

    Kara A. Kuchar – New York (+1 212.756.2734, kara.kuchar@srz.com)

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471, melissa.goldstein@srz.com)

    Adam J. Barazani – New York (+1 212.756.2519, adam.barazani@srz.com)

    Jessica Romano – New York (+1 212.756.2205, jessica.romano@srz.com)

    Jessica Sklute – New York (+1 212.756.2180, jessica.sklute@srz.com)

    Noah N. Gillespie – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7483, noah.gillespie@srz.com)

    Hadas A. Jacobi – New York (+1 212.756.2055, hadas.jacobi@srz.com)

    Steven T. Cummings – New York (+1 212.756.2251, steven.cummings@srz.com)

    Rebecca A. Raskind – New York (+1 212.756.2396, rebecca.raskind@srz.com)


    [1] Press Release, CFPB Initiates Review of Credit Card Company Penalty Policies Costing Consumers $12 Billion Each Year (June 22, 2022) [hereinafter “Press Release”], available here.

    [2] Id.; see also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Credit card late fees, at 2, 4 (Mar. 2022), available here [hereinafter “Late Fee Study”].

    [3] Press Release, supra note 1; Late Fee Study, supra note 2, at 4. The Bureau asserts that this “revenue comes disproportionately from people living in low-income neighborhoods.” Late Fee Study at 4

    [4] Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act), Pub. L. 111–24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).

    [5] 15 U.S.C. § 1665d(a).

    [6] 15 U.S.C. § 1665d(e); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.52(b)(1)(ii); see also Press Release at 2.

    [7] Press Release, supra note 1; Late Fee Study, supra note 2, at 6, 14-15 (identifying late fees in the $36-40 range). There are other limits on fees. For example, a late fee cannot exceed the amount of the last minimum payment the issuer required. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.52(b)(2)(i)(A) & cmt. 52(b)(2)(i)-1.

    [8] Press Release, supra note 1.

    [9] Id.

    [10] Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Launches Initiative to Save Americans Billions in Junk Fees (Jan. 26, 2022), available here.

    [11] Id.

    [12] Late Fee Study, supra note 2, at 2, 13.

    [13] Id.

    [14] See id.

    [15] Id.

    [16] CFPB, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Credit Card Late Fees and Late Payments, at 1 (June 22, 2022), available here [hereinafter “ANPR”].

    [17] Id. at 6-17.

    [18] Id. at 1.

    [19] See Press Release, supra note 1, at 2 (requesting information and comment on “What methods are card issuers using to encourage timely payments, including autopay and notifications?”).

    [20] See id. at 1 (the “immunity provision … allows credit card companies to escape enforcement scrutiny”).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • New Amendments to ICSID Rules Come into Effect July 1, 2022

    New Amendments to ICSID Rules Come into Effect July 1, 2022

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Amendments to ICSID Rules Come into Effect July 1, 2022

    June 27, 2022

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 1, 2022, the amended Regulations and Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (the 2022 Rules) will come into effect after being approved by the Member States on March 21, 2022. As expressed by David Malpass, Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council, these amendments are aimed at “streamlin[ing] procedures to enable greater access and speed, increas[ing] transparency, and enhanc[ing] disclosures.”

    The amendment of the ICSID Rules is the result of years of work and delicate compromises between the Member States to increase transparency and efficiency in the proceedings. In the coming months, ICSID has foreshadowed that it will publish a user’s guide to assist in the practical application of the new Rules.

    Major changes include provisions in the areas of transparency, efficiency and provisional measures, costs, challenges to arbitrators and access to arbitration.

    In depth

    A. TRANSPARENCY

    Third-Party Funding

    Third-Party Funding (TPF) has long been highly debated in ICSID proceedings and has received substantial scrutiny. The Rules now directly address disclosure obligations regarding TPF in ICSID proceedings through a measured and nuanced approach.[1] Overall, the new Rules mandate greater disclosure of the involvement of TPF.

    Under new Rule 14, the party having recourse to a third-party funder is required to file a written notice disclosing the name and address of any funders. Further, if the funder is a juridical person, the notice shall “include the names of the persons and entities that own and control that juridical person.” This notice is to be filed with the Secretary-General “upon registration of the Request for arbitration, or immediately upon concluding a third-party funding arrangement after registration.”

    While the new rules do not go as far as the rules of some other arbitral institutions in requiring providing access to the content of the funding agreement, they do interpret TPF broadly. Funders are defined under Rule 14 as “any non-party from which the party, directly or indirectly, has received funds for the pursuit or defense of the proceeding through a donation or grant, or in return for remuneration dependent on the outcome of the proceeding.” This definition then covers agreements that are not-for-profit, such as the one between Uruguay and the Bloomberg Foundation in Philip Morris.[2]  Arguably, success fee arrangements with the law firm representing a party might qualify under this definition. Tribunals are also empowered to require further disclosure on the TPF agreement if they deem it necessary.

    Publication, Access to Proceedings and Non-Disputing Party Submissions

    A completely new chapter in the amended Rules covers “Publication, Access to Proceedings and Non-Disputing Party Submissions,” responding to what some have termed the legitimacy crisis of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) with enhanced transparency.

    Under new Rule 62(3), the consent to publish the award is deemed to have been given when no party objects in writing to the publication within 60 days of the award being rendered.

    Under new Rule 65, open hearings are favored as the Tribunal “shall allow persons in addition to the parties, their representatives, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and persons assisting the Tribunal, to observe hearings, unless either party objects.” However, it is the responsibility of the tribunal to “establish procedures to prevent the disclosure of confidential or protected information.” Some of the mechanisms ICSID has used in past years where access was granted to protect confidentiality is, for example, setting up a separate viewing room to which only those individuals of the public who had preregistered are admitted, sometimes without being permitted to bring in electronic devices such as phones, computers and the like.

    B. EFFICIENCY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES

    Time and efficiency are of the essence in arbitration proceedings, and the new Rules introduce new procedures to this end. While most of those procedures were already adopted by Tribunals before the amendment, they are now codified. Overall, various strict timelines have been introduced at all stages of the proceedings. However, contrary to what was originally proposed, the final new Rules require Tribunals only to use their “best efforts” to meet these timelines. Additional new provisions relating to efficiency and provisional measures include:

    • Bifurcation: Under the new Rules, Tribunals can bifurcate proceedings on their own initiative. In doing so, Tribunals should consider whether: “(a) bifurcation would materially reduce the time and cost of the proceeding; (b) determination of the questions to be bifurcated would dispose of all or a substantial portion of the dispute; and (c) the questions to be addressed in separate phases of the proceeding are so intertwined as to make bifurcation impractical.
    • Consolidation and Coordination: As is now typical under most arbitration rules, parties in ICSID arbitrations may “agree to consolidate or coordinate” arbitrations where they are both parties. Under new Rule 46(1), this ability is subject to the parties’ consent.
    • Expedited Arbitration: Under new Rule 75(1), parties may agree to expedited arbitration and subject the proceedings to shorter timelines. Expedited arbitrations also limit the length of submissions.
    • Provisional Measures: The new Rules also clarify the ability of Tribunals to grant provisional measures. Particularly, new Rule 47(1) empowers tribunals to grant provisional measures to “prevent action that is likely to cause current or imminent harm to that party or prejudice to the arbitral process,” “maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute” and “preserve evidence that may be relevant to the resolution of the dispute.”

    C. COSTS

    The new Rules contain a chapter on costs, which notably provides under new Rule 52(4) that “all decisions on costs [be] reasoned and form part of the Award.” Two modifications are particularly noteworthy.

    First, Tribunals have the authority to order security for costs and should consider the following in doing so: the party’s (a) ability and (b) willingness to comply with an adverse decision on costs; (c) the effect that providing security for costs may have on that party’s ability to pursue its claim or counterclaim; and (d) the conduct of the parties. Contrary to the position of some scholars and arbitrators, the fact that a party had recourse to TPF is not a determinative factor.

    Second, the new Rules establish a list of factors that a Tribunal may consider at the cost-allocation stage. While Tribunals’ authority on cost decisions is particularly broad, they are to consider “all relevant circumstances.” The new Rules further state that they should consider in particular: (a) the outcome of the proceeding or any part of it; (b) the conduct of the parties during the proceeding, including the extent to which they acted in an expeditious and cost-effective manner and complied with these Rules, orders and decisions of the Tribunal; (c) the complexity of the issues; and (d) the reasonableness of the costs claimed.

    Finally, under new Rule 52(2), the Tribunal is not bound by the “cost-follow-the-event” principle, as it can “determine [] that there are special circumstances justifying a different allocation of costs.”

    D. ARBITRATORS

    Challenges to arbitrators have been streamlined under the new Rules. Under new Rules 22 and 23, parties wishing to challenge an arbitrator must be vigilant about respecting the new time limits imposed, under the 2006 ICSID Rules the parties could propose the disqualification of an arbitrator at any time before the proceeding was declared closed (Rule 9). Parties must file their proposal for disqualification of an arbitrator after the constitution of the Tribunal and within 21 days after the later of the following: the constitution of the Tribunal or the date on which the party proposing the disqualification first knew or first should have known of the facts on which the proposal is based. The other party should subsequently file its response and supporting documents within 21 days after the receipt of the proposal for disqualification. Under Rule 23(3), the rest of the tribunal shall use its “best efforts” to decide on the proposals within 30 days after the receipt of the final written submissions from the parties.

    E. ACCESS TO ARBITRATION 

    The new Rules notably relax the jurisdictional requirements of the Additional Facility (AF) Rules. Under new AF Rule 2(1)(a), the rules now also apply to disputes between States and nationals of another State even where both of those States are not Members of the ICSID Convention. Under new AF Rule 2(1)(c), regional economic integration organizations, such as the European Union, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, can also access ICSID jurisdiction under the AF Rules.

    Authors

    Lisa M. Richman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Maria Cristina Rosales del Prado

    Special Legal Consultant

    Washington, DC

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  • Intellectual Property & Health | News To Know – June 2022

    Intellectual Property & Health | News To Know – June 2022

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Intellectual Property & Health | News To Know – June 2022

    June 2022

    Read time: 3 min

    Overview

    Patent and trademark issues affecting pharmaceutical laboratories, biotechs, food supplements and dietary products professionals, cosmetics companies and medical devices manufacturers is continually evolving across France and the EU. We are regularly monitoring key cases and news, to provide insights as to how this impacts business within your sector.

    In depth

    Highlights in this Issue

    RUSSIA RESPONDS TO WESTERN SANCTIONS WITH PATENT RETALIATION
    On March 6, 2022, the Russian government retaliated against the West’s imposition of sanctions by issuing a decree permitting patented innovations to be used without authorization or payment of consideration if the patent holder is from a “non-allied” country that ordered sanctions. READ MORE

    SUPPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CERTIFICATE (SPC) – SUBSTANCE IDENTIFIED AS AN EXCIPIENT
    CA Paris, January 18, 2022, Société Halozyme Inc. v. INPI (docket no. 20/17731)
    The Paris Court of Appeal upheld a French Intellectual Property Institute (INPI) decision via which INPI denied a request for a supplementary protection certificate because the claimed combination of substances cannot be deemed to produce, within the meaning of the European regulation, one of the substances that was clearly identified as an excipient rather than an active ingredient. READ MORE

    ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION – DATE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS TO RUN – PRACTICAL APPROACH
    The Paris Court of Appeal overruled the finding in a trial preparation judge’s order that some of the requests for payment of additional compensation for inventions developed by a former company employee were not time barred, holding that the judge should have taken into consideration the positions she held, tasks she performed, and payments she received in consideration for her inventions. READ MORE.

    REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS – NO GENUINE USE – NO PROPER REASONS FOR NON-USE
    General Court of the EU, January 12, 2022, case no. T-160/21
    The General Court of the European Union required proof of genuine use of the trademark for each product targeted by an application for revocation because the targeted products “form sufficiently autonomous categories.” It also held that the mere existence of a regulation is not a proper reason for non-use. READ MORE

    OPPOSITION PROCEEDINGS — SIMILARITY OF THE GOODS AND SERVICE – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – NO EVIDENCE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
    General Court of the EU, March 2, 2022, case no. T149/21

    TRADEMARK VALIDITY – BAD FAITH FILING – REPEAT APPLICATION
    EUIPO, Fourth Board of Appeal, March 28, 2022, case no. R 1766/2021-4

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    Endnotes

  • The Overturning of Roe v. Wade

    The Overturning of Roe v. Wade

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    The Overturning of Roe v. Wade

    June 24, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Overview

    June 24, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (Dobbs), overturning Roe v. Wade (Roe) and upending 50 years of precedent protecting a woman’s right to privacy in choosing to abort a pregnancy prior to the point of viability. In Dobbs, the Court held that “[t]he Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and [Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Casey)] [] are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.”

    Consistent with the draft majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito that was leaked to Politico in early May, the Court overruled Roe and Casey and held that there is no federal constitutional right to obtain an abortion and that abortion restrictions are subject to rational basis review. This decision leaves individual states free to prohibit and criminalize abortion altogether. Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

    The state statute at issue in Dobbs, Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act, provides that “[e]xcept in a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall not intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion of an unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn human being has been determined to be greater than fifteen (15) weeks.” Jackson Women’s Health Organization and one of its physicians (the Respondents) challenged the Mississippi law in the US District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging that it violated precedents establishing a constitutional right to abortion, including Roe and Casey. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents and permanently enjoined enforcement of the law, reasoning that Mississippi’s 15-week restriction on abortion violated Roe and Casey, which forbid states to ban abortion pre-viability. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, after which the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. In a 6-3 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Mississippi statute at issue is constitutional, Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that the law is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis review.

    What’s next

    As noted in our recent article, “Preparing for the demise of Roe v. Wade and the criminalization of abortion in some US States: Practical considerations for a post-Roe world,” the effect of this decision on US companies cannot be understated. Any organization whose operations touch family planning services in any way (e.g., providers, those that facilitate provider activities, investors, payors, employers that provide family planning benefits and health plan service providers) should immediately examine their precise services, geographic footprint, corporate structure and organizational priorities. This includes not only those providers who furnish pregnancy termination services, but also those that provide advice, operational support or other assistance to providers. Employers, insurers and other health plan service providers that cover or provide access to abortion services or benefits should also immediately evaluate their operations and the potential risks of offering such coverage or access in certain states.

    There is a wide variety of state “trigger” and “zombie” laws that arguably took effect today. For those states that require state attorney general or other administrative action, abortion bans will likely be in place within the next two weeks.

    Companies that have not already put in place a plan to address post-Roe restrictions on abortions in states where abortion is now banned or significantly restricted should consult with counsel immediately to determine if it is necessary for them to adjust any reproductive health-related services that may result in an abortion or the destruction of an embryo until the full effect of state restrictions on abortions can be carefully evaluated. This strategy should take into account laws that have now taken effect that prohibit and criminalize abortion services. The obvious exception to this advice is with respect to abortions furnished to save the life or otherwise prevent significant harm to a patient.

    We will continue to closely monitor the impacts of this decision and provide updates.

    In case you missed it

    Article: Preparing for the demise of Roe v. Wade and the criminalization of abortion in some US states: Practical considerations for a post-Roe world
    Webinar: Preparing for the likely overturning of Roe v. Wade: What providers, employers, investors, and other organizations need to know

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  • Updates to Data Transfer Agreements – 21 September Deadline is Approaching

    Updates to Data Transfer Agreements – 21 September Deadline is Approaching

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Updates to Data Transfer Agreements – 21 September Deadline is Approaching

    June 24, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), and equivalent legislation in effect in the UK, restrict transfers of personal data from the European Union and the United Kingdom.

    Firms with operations in the UK or EU are often required to transfer personal data internationally. For example, such firms may be sharing personal data relating to their employees, clients or investors with a group affiliate in the United States or another non-EU/non-UK jurisdiction. EU and UK businesses may also enter into service provider agreements with vendors based outside their jurisdiction which involve handling or storage of personal data by such service providers (e.g. CRM, cloud storage, employee benefits, payroll, travel services or regulatory technology services). In some cases, firms outside the UK/EU may also be required to enter into data transfer agreements with their clients, investors or portfolio companies established in the UK or EU (e.g. in the context of sharing KYC data or monitoring the operations of an investee company).

    As a result of recent changes to the rules on international transfers of data, businesses currently relying on standard contractual clauses to transfer personal data from the UK and EU will need to update their data transfer agreements in the near term.

    New EEA SCCs

    On June 4, 2021, the EU’s executive branch, the European Commission, adopted two sets of Standard Contractual Clauses [1] – one for use between controllers and processors[2] and the other for the transfer of data between the European Economic Area (the “EEA”) and non-EEA countries (collectively, the “New EEA SCCs”)[3] under the GDPR. The New EEA SCCs reflect the GDPR requirements applicable to the appointment of “data processors”, as well as the Schrems II decision, as it relates to the additional safeguards applicable to cross-border transfers of personal data. The New EEA SCCs, which went into effect on June 27, 2021, replace the Standard Contractual Clauses adopted in 2001, 2004 and 2010 (the “Old SCCs”) and introduce new obligations on data transfers.

    The Old SCCs were common mechanisms for cross-border personal data transfers to countries outside the EEA, that are not considered to provide equivalent data protection as under the GDPR (that is, countries not subject to an “adequacy” decision by the European Commission).

    The New EEA SCCs address the concerns articulated in the Schrems II decision, which found that the Old SCCs were valid, but were not an adequate data transfer mechanism unless they were coupled with transfer impact assessments and certain supplementary measures. To address these concerns, the New EEA SCCs expand obligations for data exporters and importers, strengthen the security measures requirements, impose limitations on disclosing personal data to public authorities, stipulate stronger data subject protection and include impact assessment and audit obligations. The New EEA SCCs retain and expand on the old modular structure applicable to specific transfer scenarios, including controller-to-controller transfers (Module 1), controller-to-processor transfers (Module 2), processor-to-processor transfers (Module 3) and processor-to-controller transfers (Module 4), as well as offering the options to have multiple data exporting parties and add new parties over time.

    Compliance with the New EEA SCCs for any new data exports from the EEA has been required since 27 September 2021. Any Old SCCs entered into before that date must be replaced with the New EEA SCCs by 27 December 2022, or earlier if there is a change in the underlying data processing or transfer practices.

    UK Data Transfer Agreement

    In the UK, new forms of International Data Transfer Agreement (“IDTA”)[4] and IDTA Addendum (“Addendum”) came into effect on 21 March 2022, subject to transitional provisions.

    UK exporters of personal data to third countries (such as the United States) that are not covered by an adequacy decision will be able to choose between the IDTA and the Addendum to transfer personal data outside the UK. The IDTA is designed as a form of agreement for exporting data solely from the UK, whereas the Addendum is intended as an add-on to simplify contract documentation for exporters making data transfer out of both the EEA and UK. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office has also updated its “Guide to UK GDPR” to explain the requirements for restricted transfers of data.

    A transitional period through to 21 March 2024 applies to contracts entered into before 21 September 2022[5].

    UK/EU data exporters should review their data transfer agreements now

    Despite the transitional period, UK firms transferring personal data overseas should consider switching to the new IDTA or Addendum now to manage the risk of non-compliance, especially if the data transfers are likely to continue beyond 21 March 2024. There are several compelling reasons to do so. For example, firms currently relying on the Old SCCs will need to ensure that appropriate supplementary controls are in place to comply with the conditions laid out in Schrems II. UK/EU data exporters relying on the Old SCCs to export data from both UK and EEA will not be able to use these after 27 December 2022, as the New EEA SCCs must be used for exporting EEA data. Separately, if the data processing operations change, the new standards must be applied immediately.

    Data exporters should review any contractual relationships that rely on the Old SCCs and devise the strategy for prioritising the required updates. The description (including personal data categories) and the purpose of the transfer should be reviewed at the same time, as these may have changed since the contract was first executed. In some cases, it may no longer be necessary to continue transferring personal data, and as such, the data transfer arrangements should be terminated. For any new contracts, given the upcoming deadline of 21 September 2022, firms should begin utilising the IDTA now or, for transfers involving both UK and EEA personal data, a combination of New EEA SCCs and the Addendum.

    Authored by Alexander Kim, Kelly Koscuiszka, Anna Maleva-Otto and David Soerensen.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) | European Commission (europa.eu).

    [2] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/915 of 4 June 2021 on SCCs between controllers and processors under Article 28(7) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Article 29(7) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

    [3] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 of 4 June 2021 on SCCs for the transfer of personal data to third countries pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

    [4] International Data Transfer Agreement and Guidance.

    [5] See scc-transitional-provisions.pdf (ico.org.uk).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Supreme Court: An Employee’s Individual PAGA Claim Must Be Adjudicated in Arbitration

    Supreme Court: An Employee’s Individual PAGA Claim Must Be Adjudicated in Arbitration

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court: An Employee’s Individual PAGA Claim Must Be Adjudicated in Arbitration

    June 16, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 15, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States finally issued its long-awaited decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana. The Court partially overturned Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (Iskanian), determining that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts the aspect of Iskanian’s holding that precludes the division of Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. Meaning, if an employee subject to a valid arbitration agreement brings a PAGA claim, then the employee’s individual PAGA claim must be adjudicated in arbitration. (The individual aspect of the PAGA claim refers to violations of the Labor Code actually suffered by the plaintiff, whereas the non-individual “representative” aspect of the PAGA claim refers to the violations the plaintiff has alleged on behalf of other employees.)

    In depth

    BACKGROUND

    PAGA allows “aggrieved employees” to step into the shoes of the state and seek civil penalties on behalf of themselves and other current or former employees for various Labor Code violations. When issuing its decision in Iskanian, the Supreme Court of California previously determined that PAGA claims cannot be forced into arbitration because the state—not the employee—is the real party in interest and not bound by an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee. Iskanain also held that a PAGA claim could not be divided into arbitrable individual claims and non-arbitrable representative claims because a PAGA action is a single claim for civil penalties brought on behalf of all aggrieved employees. Under Iskanian and its progeny, employees who signed otherwise valid arbitration agreements were allowed to bring PAGA claims in court, even when they were forced to arbitrate their individuals claims. Now, that is no longer the case.

    Under Viking River, employees with a valid arbitration agreement are required to arbitrate their claims, including the individual aspects of a PAGA claim. Moreover, the Supreme Court determined that once a plaintiff’s individual claims are severed and sent to arbitration, the remaining “representative” claims (i.e., alleged violations of the Labor Code suffered by other alleged aggrieved employees) must be dismissed because the plaintiff no longer has standing to bring those claims. This is a notable departure from the historical practice of California courts, which has long conferred standing on a plaintiff who has suffered at least one Labor Code violation to pursue PAGA penalties for all Labor Code violations (even those not personally suffered).

    THE KEY TAKEAWAYS

    There are three main takeaways from the Supreme Court’s ruling:

    1. Employees may agree to arbitrate PAGA claims on an individual basis.
    2. In such cases, individual violations of the Labor Code actually endured by the plaintiff must be sent to arbitration.
    3. The remaining “representative” portion of the PAGA claim must be dismissed for lack of statutory standing.

    However, the Court did not overrule Iskanian’s rule that blanket PAGA waivers are unenforceable. Such blanket waivers remain invalid. Notably, the waiver in Viking River had a blanket PAGA waiver and would have been unenforceable but was saved by a “severability clause” that provided, “if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any ‘portion’ of the waiver that remains valid must still be ‘enforced in arbitration.’” Going forward, arbitration agreements should contain similar robust clauses.

    Additionally, Viking River did not foreclose the state from amending the PAGA statute to provide statutory standing even when an employee did not personally suffer violations, and such changes may be brewing in the state legislature. In response to the Viking River decision, California Attorney General Rob Bonta promptly issued a statement that “[they] will continue to stand with workers to fight for their rights everywhere.” Employers should also monitor the Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta ruling (which addressed whether the FAA preempts California’s Assembly Bill 51), as the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit could review that decision/issue again in light of Viking River.

    For now, employers should review their arbitration agreements to ensure it contains:

    1. A provision for arbitration of claims only on an individual basis.
    2. A clear waiver of an employee’s right to bring representative claims.
    3. A clear severability clause.

    If you have any questions regarding the Supreme Court’s decision or how to navigate its implications, please contact your regular McDermott team member.

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