ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
The Gloves Come Off: CFTC Takes Swing at Largest Bitcoin Fraud Scheme
July 13, 2022
Read time: 8 min
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has filed a civil enforcement action in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas charging Cornelius Johannes Steynberg and Mirror Trading International Proprietary Limited (MTI) (collectively, the defendants) with fraud and registration violations.[1] The action alleges that from May 2018 through March of 2021, the defendants orchestrated a multilevel marketing scheme to solicit bitcoin transfers from individuals into a centralized asset pool (the pool) under the guise of offering investment opportunities.[2] The defendants made these offerings without any CFTC registrations of any kind.[3] The CFTC alleges that MTI should have been registered as a commodity pool operator (CPO) while Steynberg should have been registered as an associated person (AP) of MTI.[4] This case is significant not only because of the magnitude of the alleged fraud, but also for the CFTC’s assertion of enforcement authority over the cryptocurrency industry at large.
MTI was publicly marketed as an opportunity for individuals to invest bitcoin into the defendants’ pool and earn profits from off-exchange leveraged trades.[5] The CFTC has alleged that the defendants’ scheme purportedly amassed ill-gotten gains of at least 29,421 Bitcoin at an estimated value of over $1.7 billion.[6] The CFTC further alleges that the defendants misappropriated all of the pool funds, which makes this enforcement “the largest to date charged by the CFTC involving [b]itcoin.”[7]
The CFTC’s enforcement authority over bitcoin was initially asserted in 2015 via In the Matter of: Coinflip, Inc., d/b/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan when the agency first deemed bitcoin a commodity under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).[8] In 2017, then-CFTC Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo publicly branded bitcoin as “a commodity unlike any the Commission has dealt with in the past.”[9] In June 2022, US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Gary Gensler placed added responsibility on the CFTC when he stated that bitcoin is the clearest instance of a cryptocurrency meeting the criteria of a commodity.[10]
Although the CFTC’s authority over bitcoin and cryptocurrency at large has principally been accepted, this enforcement action presents an opportunity for the CFTC to formally augment their authority over bitcoin and the larger cryptocurrency space.
BACKGROUND
MTI was founded in 2019 under the laws of the Republic of South Africa.[11] Steynberg, however, globally marketed MTI’s commodity pool and allegedly engaged with individuals who were not eligible contract participants (ECPs).[12] The CFTC claims “at least 23,000 [MTI] participants from the United States and throughout the world” were conned into contributing to the pool.[13] Steynberg orchestrated this widespread deception by leveraging social media platforms, as well as other direct-to-consumer marketing strategies, to broadcast MTI as an on-ramp into foreign exchange (forex) trading opportunities where MTI participants could earn passive income via MTI’s collective trading of their assets for retail currency on a leveraged, margined or financed basis.[14] MTI’s lenient eligibility thresholds allowed anyone over the age of 18 and with a minimum commitment of $100 in bitcoin to qualify as an MTI participant.[15] MTI participants were led to believe that their bitcoin would be deposited into the pool and that trades facilitated by a “bot” would net up to 10% in profits per month.[16]
Even though MTI participants were assured that they could withdraw any deposited funds within 48 hours of a request, it was later discovered that no such trading “bot” existed—nor were any of the purported trades actually profitable—and that all bitcoin transactions occurred at the sole discretion of the defendants.[17] The CFTC alleges that the defendants sought to further their deception through the falsification of account statements and by effectively running a Ponzi scheme where principal deposits of later MTI participants were redistributed to earlier MTI participants to provide the illusion of “returns.”[18] The defendants further attempted to grow the pool by establishing an “affiliate” program through which MTI participants were influenced to recruit friends and family members to register with MTI in return for bonuses on the platform.[19] In reality, these new MTI participants were also depositing bitcoin into MTI accounts centrally controlled by Steynberg and devoid of any actual trading activity to generate organic profits.
BEGINNING OF THE END
By July 2020, the defendants were issued a cease-and-desist order by the Texas State Securities Board (TSSB) after the TSSB found that Steynberg had made materially misleading solicitations and that MTI’s operations were fraudulent.[20] Subsequently, in August 2020, the defendants lost access to their account at FXChoice, the primary broker meant to enable MTI’s forex trades. FXChoice had frozen the defendants’ account because of suspicions of fraud.[21] At this time, just 1,280 bitcoin (valued at $56 million) existed in the defendants’ FXChoice account, even though the defendants had amassed 29,421 Bitcoin over the duration of the scheme.[22] FXChoice ultimately transferred the frozen balance to South African bankruptcy liquidators in April 2021 pursuant to an order from the South African Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA).[23] After FXChoice froze the defendants’ assets and refused to do any further business with the defendants, “Steynberg, individually and as an agent of MTI, represented to [MTI] participants that MTI would transfer all of the [p]ool’s trading accounts from FXChoice to a purported online broker identified as Trade300.”[24] Trade300 did not and does not exist.[25] Although Steynberg had attempted to evade South African law enforcement as a fugitive, he was recently arrested by INTERPOL in Brazil.[26]
CFTC ENFORCEMENT ACTION
The CFTC has alleged four counts against the defendants under the CEA. First, the CFTC has alleged that the defendants had participated in a fraudulent scheme involving unregistered forex trading.[27] The first count includes the unlawful trading of commodity futures, use of mail or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in connection with retail forex transactions, illegal off-exchange leveraged or margined forex transactions with non-ECPs, and that Steynberg himself exercised direct and indirect control over MTI either in bad faith or knowingly causing MTI to violate the CEA.[28]
The second count alleges that Steynberg acted as an unregistered AP of MTI, which itself was operating as an unregistered CPO by soliciting, accepting or receiving funds or property from the public while engaged in a business of forex-based investment transactions.[29] Under this second count, each act of fraudulent solicitation, misappropriation and false statement is a separate and distinct violation.[30]
The third count alleges a failure to operate a commodity pool as a separate legal entity, failure to receive funds in the pool’s name and a commingling of pool funds.[31]
The fourth and final count alleges that the defendants failed to register as a CPO or as an AP despite their continued operations qualifying them as such.[32]
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE EVOLVING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The compulsory adaptation of regulatory schemes to the public’s adoption of emerging technologies is a reoccurring theme in American jurisprudence. The regulation of cryptocurrency is no different. The timing of this enforcement action dovetails with CFTC Chairman Rostin Benham’s public push to seek additional resources for the CFTC and marks a prime opportunity to show the capacity of the agency as it concerns the regulation of cryptocurrency markets.[33] This enforcement action also coincides with the recently proposed Financial Innovation Act (FTA). The FTA is a bipartisan effort from the duo of Senator Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) who aim to pass a federal bill that will establish guardrails around the cryptocurrency industry.[34] The FTA suggests a categorization of cryptocurrencies as commodities, bringing cryptocurrency further into the realm of the CFTC’s authority.[35] Weeks before Steynberg’s enforcement action, at the Chainalaysis Links conference, CFTC Chairman Benham publicly reiterated the need for the CFTC to have additional authority to regulate cryptocurrencies.[36]
Enforcement actions such as this present a tangible test as to the CFTC’s ability to discipline and mature the cryptocurrency industry. At a time when cryptocurrency scams are seemingly everywhere, with more than 46,000 individuals collectively losing over $1 billion in 2021 alone, the CFTC has positioned itself to be the policing authority over this once-touted “wild west” of an industry.[37] The outcome of this most recent CFTC enforcement action will not only influence the agency’s credibility among consumers, but it could also chart the course as to how much power policymakers bestow in the CFTC moving forward.
Aristotle Mannan, a summer associate in the Boston office, also contributed to this article.

EEOC Guidance on Artificial Intelligence in Hiring and Disability Discrimination
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
EEOC Guidance on Artificial Intelligence in Hiring and Disability Discrimination
July 13, 2022
Read time: 6 min
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) recently issued a technical assistance document regarding the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) tools in employment decisions with a focus on disability discrimination claims that may arise as a result.[1] AI in the employment context typically means that the employer (including the software vendor) “relies partly on the computer’s own analysis of data to determine which criteria to use when making employment decisions.” The technical assistance document provides examples of AI tools, including “resume scanners that prioritize applications using certain keywords; employee monitoring software that rates employees on the basis of their keystrokes or other factors; ‘virtual assistants’ or ‘chatbots’ that ask job candidates about their qualifications and reject those who do not meet pre-defined requirements; video interviewing software that evaluates candidates based on their facial expressions and speech patterns; and testing software that provides ‘job fit’ scores for applicants or employees regarding their personalities, aptitudes, cognitive skills, or perceived ‘cultural fit’ based on their performance on a game or on a more traditional test.”
The EEOC identified three common ways an employer’s use of AI could violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”): (i) by not providing reasonable accommodations, (ii) relying on AI tools that improperly “screen out” individuals with disabilities and (iii) adopting AI tools that pose disability-related inquiries or seek information that qualify as a medical exam. The EEOC noted that an employer is responsible for its use of AI tools, including AI tools designed and administered by another entity, such as a software vendor.[2]
If an applicant or employee communicates that a medical condition may make it difficult for them to take a test or may cause an assessment result that is less acceptable to the employer, the employer must respond promptly and provide an alternative testing format unless doing so would create an undue hardship for the employer. Employers must keep medical information obtained in connection with a reasonable accommodation request confidential and separate from the applicant’s or employee’s personnel file.
An AI tool may unlawfully screen out applicants with disabilities if the disability causes the applicant to receive a lower score or an assessment result that is less acceptable to the employer, and the applicant loses a job opportunity as a result despite being able to perform the job with reasonable accommodations. For example, an AI tool that analyzes an applicant’s speech patterns may improperly screen out applicants with speech impediments. Even an AI tool that has been “validated” to predict whether applicants can perform a job under typical working conditions may unlawfully screen out applicants with disabilities who could also perform the job with reasonable accommodations. An AI tool is validated when there is evidence that it meets certain professional standards showing that the tool accurately measures or predicts a trait or characteristic that is important for a specific job.
The EEOC cautioned that employers should not rely on claims that AI tools are “bias-free” if those tools have been designed to reduce Title VII discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, color and religion, and are not tailored to address the unique nature of disabilities. Employers can reduce the chances of improper “screen outs” by (i) inquiring if and how a tool was developed with applicants with disabilities in mind, and (ii) in implementing the AI tool, clearly indicating to applicants that alternative test formats are available, and providing clear instructions on requesting reasonable accommodations and information about the AI tool, including the traits or characteristics the tool is designed to measure.
An employer may violate the ADA if it uses an AI tool that poses disability-related inquiries or seeks information that qualifies as a medical exam before giving an applicant a conditional offer of employment, regardless of whether the applicant has a disability. Disability-related inquiries are ones that are likely to elicit information about a disability or that directly ask if an applicant has disabilities. An assessment qualifies as a medical exam if it seeks information about the individual’s physical or mental impairments or health.[3]
New York City employers should be aware of a new law going into effect Jan. 1, 2023, previously discussed here, that prohibits New York City employers from using automated employment decision tools to promote or screen job candidates, unless certain criteria have been met.
Conclusion
Employers should be cognizant of how their usage of AI in hiring may be interpreted as disability discrimination and respond promptly to any discrimination related issues or claims.
Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Max Garfield, Scott A. Gold, Donna K. Lazarus and Ayumi Berstein.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) simultaneously released guidance on this issue as well, which is applicable to government employers. The guidance provides an overview of how algorithms and AI can lead to disability discrimination in hiring.
[2] An employer may be responsible for the actions of the software vendor that designed or administered its AI tool, even if an applicant with disabilities had communicated an issue to the vendor and not the employer.
[3] While personality tests would generally not fall into a disability-related inquiry or medical exam, employers should ensure the test does not unlawfully screen out individuals with disabilities.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

OIG Issues Unfavorable Opinion on Laboratory Specimen Collection Payments to Hospitals
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
OIG Issues Unfavorable Opinion on Laboratory Specimen Collection Payments to Hospitals
July 12, 2022
Read time: 9 min
The US Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) has a long history of skepticism when reviewing financial arrangements between laboratories and referral sources, such as physicians and hospitals, under the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). In its latest statement on this subject, OIG published Advisory Opinion (AO) 22-09, which analyzes arrangements between hospitals and clinical laboratories operated by the requestor (Requestor). OIG reached an unfavorable conclusion in this case, finding that the “per-patient encounter” fee structure could induce or reward referrals. This opinion is noteworthy because it raises unanswered questions given the representations made by the Requestor about the arrangement, and because of the Requestor’s decision to move forward with obtaining an unfavorable opinion once it became aware of OIG’s views.
OIG has a long history of scrutinizing laboratory arrangements because of the agency’s view that these arrangements are particularly susceptible to fraud and abuse. Much of OIG’s past guidance focused on laboratory arrangements with physicians. One of the first fraud alerts, published in 1994, dealt with a laboratory providing phlebotomists to a physician’s office to collect samples for the laboratory (see OIG Special Fraud Alert, “Provision of Phlebotomy Services to Physicians” (Dec. 19, 1994) at 9). OIG has subsequently expressed concerns about provision of free specimen collection kits and per-patient payments for blood sample collections by laboratories (see OIG AO 05-08 (June 6, 2005)), laboratory payments of electronic medical record ordering processing fees that relieve ordering physicians of a financial obligation (see OIG AO 14-03 (Apr. 1, 2014)), and payments to physicians for specimen collection and registry arrangements (see OIG Special Fraud Alert, “Laboratory Payments to Referring Physicians” (June 25, 2014)). This past guidance has generally articulated OIG’s concern with arrangements that may provide an improper incentive, such as above fair market value (FMV) payments or provision of free services, for a physician to order tests from a particular laboratory.
In AO 22-09, OIG turns to laboratory relationships with hospitals rather than physicians. The arrangement at issue involved a payment that the requestor-laboratory certified was FMV, but OIG still issued a negative opinion. Read on for a discussion of OIG’s rationale, the potential reasons for OIG’s conclusion, and the implications for the laboratory industry.
THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT IN AO 22-09
The Requestor operates a network of clinical laboratories. Under the proposed arrangement, the Requestor would contract with hospitals (each a Contract Hospital) on a per-patient basis to collect, process, and handle specimens that would then be sent to the Requestor’s clinical laboratories. The services would be performed by a Contract Hospital-employed or Contract Hospital-contracted phlebotomist at the Contract Hospital, and the per-patient payment encounter compensation rate would be consistent with FMV. Contract Hospitals would be compensated only for the services performed (i.e., collection, processing, and handling of specimens) in connection with individuals who presented with orders for testing and who were not currently inpatients or registered outpatients of the Contract Hospital. Services performed under the proposed arrangement would be limited to those that were “reasonable and necessary” to accomplish the “commercially reasonable business purpose.” The Requestor would bill third-party payors for the testing—including federal health care programs. Contract Hospitals would not be permitted to bill any payor for patient services performed under the proposed arrangement. If the patient’s test order did not specify a performing laboratory, the Contract Hospital would be able to choose the laboratory that would conduct the test. Each Contract Hospital would be required to represent and warrant that none of its employed physicians, contracted physicians, or affiliated practices would be required or directed to refer to the Requestor, and that such physicians or practices would not receive any remuneration from the Contract Hospital for any referrals to the Requestor. The Requestor expressly certified all of these facts to OIG under penalty of law as part of the AO process. However, because no Contract Hospital was a party to the AO request, OIG did not have before it a factual certification from a Contract Hospital as to how it would behave under the proposed arrangement.
OIG ANALYSIS
OIG found that the proposed arrangement would implicate the AKS because it would involve a laboratory providing remuneration to a party that was in a position to make referrals to the laboratory or “otherwise arrange for the laboratory to furnish[] items and services that may be paid for in whole or in part by a federal health care program.” For example, under the proposed arrangement, if a patient presented to a Contract Hospital an order for laboratory services that did not specify the laboratory to which the specimen was to be referred, the Contract Hospital would have authority to choose the testing laboratory. OIG specifically took issue with the per-patient payment structure, concluding that it could create an incentive for a Contract Hospital to direct specimens to Requestor’s laboratories.
Next, OIG concluded that the proposed arrangement would not meet the personal services and management contracts and outcomes-based payment arrangements safe harbor because the per-patient-encounter compensation methodology would take into account the volume or value of referrals or business otherwise generated for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal healthcare program.
Finally, OIG conducted a facts and circumstances analysis of the proposed arrangement. OIG came to an unfavorable conclusion because it believed the following:
- The proposed arrangement’s per-patient-encounter fee structure would be a form of a “per-click” fee structure, which generally, by their nature, take into account the volume or value of referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties.
- Laboratory services, in OIG’s experience, are “particularly susceptible” to the risk of “steering” patients to a particular laboratory.
OIG noted that the proposed arrangement would contain three significant safeguards:
- An FMV payment.
- A prohibition against Contracted Hospitals billing payors or patients for the services performed under the proposed arrangement.
- Each Contract Hospital’s representation and warranty that its employed physicians, contracted physicians and affiliated practices would not be required or directed to refer to the Requestor’s laboratories.
However, OIG concluded that “because of the possibility that the per-patient-encounter fee would be used to induce or reward referrals to [the] Requestor and the corresponding risk of inappropriate steering to [the] Requestor,” the proposed arrangement would “pose more than a minimal risk of fraud and abuse under the [f]ederal anti-kickback statute” (emphasis added).
TAKEAWAYS
AO 22-09 poses several interesting—and unanswered—questions. First, why did the Requestor proceed with an unfavorable opinion? This is a question one should ask whenever reading an unfavorable opinion. As part of the AO process, a requestor is generally made aware if OIG is heading towards an unfavorable conclusion (i.e., the arrangement is not low enough risk in OIG’s eyes to receive a favorable opinion, which represents a very high bar) and has the opportunity to either withdraw the request or amend the arrangement to address OIG’s concerns in order to obtain a favorable opinion. This means that whenever there is an unfavorable opinion, the requestor generally wanted to receive it. Here, it is not clear what motivated the Requestor to proceed with its request, because it is now effectively restricted in paying hospitals FMV fees for specimen collection services in the manner set out in AO 22-09. One possibility is that the Requestor, knowing that OIG had an unfavorable view, wanted AO 22-09 to function as a deterrent to other laboratories paying hospitals specimen collections fees since it would not be able to do so without some risk having learned OIG’s view of the proposed arrangement. Another possibility is that the Requestor actually preferred not to pay hospital specimen collection fees and wanted the opinion to function as a shield against such requests from hospitals. However, these were not the only options available to the Requestor.
This leads to the second question: why didn’t the requestor add a Contract Hospital to the request? It appears that one of the issues that OIG may have had with this request is the lack of a Contract Hospital as a co-requestor that could certify how it would behave under the arrangement. This gap may have led OIG to conclude that there was a “possibility” that the per-patient-encounter fee could induce referrals, which meant that it could not overcome OIG’s very high standard for issuing a favorable opinion (i.e., that the arrangement “pose no more than minimal risk of fraud and abuse”). Perhaps OIG would have reached a different conclusion if it had a certification from a Contract Hospital to support that the Contract Hospital would behave in a manner consistent with the contractual representations in the agreement—namely, that the Contract Hospital’s employed physicians, contracted physicians, and affiliated practices would not be required or directed to refer to the Requestor and would not receive any remuneration from the Contract Hospital for any referrals to Requestor. OIG could have requested additional certifications from the Contract Hospital to make OIG more comfortable that the proposed arrangement was low-risk. For example, OIG could have requested certifications that the Contract Hospital would not take other actions to encourage physicians to select the Requestor or would otherwise ensure that physicians had several laboratories from which to choose.
The ultimate question remains: what are laboratories supposed to do now? Laboratories often are between a rock and a hard place when it comes to collecting specimens. Most laboratories depend on the provider to collect and process the specimen. However, past OIG guidance, AO 22-09, and recent enforcement actions show that the government has concerns about how payments from a laboratory to a provider can impact the provider’s laboratory selection. As a result, laboratories and providers should carefully consider this guidance and construct arrangements that mitigate risks, for example by ensuring the payment is FMV and that the provider does not act in a way that could jeopardize an otherwise legally permissible and commercially reasonable arrangement.

Genesis Opinion Provides Opportunity for District Court to Determine Definition of “Patient” for 340B Covered Entities
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Genesis Opinion Provides Opportunity for District Court to Determine Definition of “Patient” for 340B Covered Entities
July 11, 2022
Read time: 5 min
A federal district court likely will determine the 340B program definition of “patient” following a decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Genesis Healthcare v. Becerra. The issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing Genesis’s case against the US Department of Health and Human Services before determining whether the definition of “patient” used by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) for purposes of enforcing the 340B drug diversion prohibition was consistent with the 340B statute. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court was wrong to dismiss the case and sent the case back to the district court for further deliberations. This case could have wide-reaching effects on how 340B covered entities determine who is eligible to receive drugs purchased through the 340B program.
STAY CURRENT ON THE 340B LITIGATION THAT MAY IMPACT YOUR BUSINESS
McDermott+Consulting has launched a 340B Litigation Tracking Tool, a real-time resource following the 40+ state and federal 340B program legal challenges. No more searching online or sorting through your newsfeed for important case developments. This tracker, available 24/7 and regularly monitored by our team, delivers concise updates to help you make informed risk analyses on what’s next for your business in the evolving 340B landscape. Learn more here.
Background
Following an audit in which HRSA found that Genesis was dispensing 340B drugs to ineligible individuals, HRSA determined that Genesis was no longer eligible to participate in the 340B program. Genesis sued HRSA. HRSA voided the audit findings, reinstated Genesis in the 340B program and argued that the case was moot. HRSA continued to instruct Genesis that it was required to comply with the 340B program “patient” definition guidance issued in 1996, however. The district court agreed with HRSA and dismissed the case.
On appeal, Genesis argued that HRSA’s continued use of the 1996 patient definition guidance undermined the purposes of the 340B program and would require Genesis to make changes to its operations that would materially affect Genesis. Genesis argued that it was therefore improper for the district court to have dismissed the case as moot. HRSA argued that by voiding the audit findings that led to this lawsuit, it precluded the basis for the lawsuit. Any court interpretation of the definition of “patient” would only satisfy Genesis’ curiosity and advise on what the law would be based upon a hypothetical set of facts, HRSA argued.
Fourth Circuit Opinion
On July 1, 2022, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in the case, reversing the district court’s judgment and remanding the case back to the district court for further proceedings. The Fourth Circuit concluded that there was in fact a “live controversy” between Genesis and HRSA because Genesis continued to be governed by a definition of “patient” that it viewed as illegal and harmful.
The Fourth Circuit explained that the Constitution limits which cases can be heard by federal courts. At all stages of a federal court proceeding, a case must involve a dispute that is “definite and concrete” and “real and substantial,” and it must seek “specific relief” as opposed to an opinion advising what the law would be based upon a hypothetical set of facts. If circumstances arise following the filing of a lawsuit that resolve the dispute at issue, then the case should be dismissed as moot.
The Fourth Circuit found it significant that when HRSA voided its audit findings and reinstated Genesis in the 340B program, it failed to instruct Genesis on how it should continue to conduct itself under the 340B program and failed to address its 1996 “patient” definition guidance, which was the basis of its enforcement against Genesis. Despite this failure, Genesis remained subject to a HRSA audit and would have to continue to comply with HRSA’s 1996 “patient” definition guidance, the Fourth Circuit reasoned. The Fourth Circuit determined that “the real issue thus remains . . . whether the 1996 Guidelines are inconsistent with the statute, as Genesis Healthcare has alleged and with respect to which Genesis Healthcare sought a declaratory judgment.”
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Genesis that the district court should not have dismissed its case and remanded the case back to the district court for further deliberations. The district court will likely proceed in addressing Genesis’ claim that the 1996 patient definition is inconsistent with the 340B statute.
Analysis
Despite challenges presented by the ongoing litigation regarding the use of contract pharmacies, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Genesis marks the second recent win for covered entities following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in the Medicare payment cut case American Hospital Association, et al. v. Becerra, et al.
The definition of “patient” has long been an area of confusion and frustration for covered entities. The statute itself does not provide much insight into what a “patient” is, and understanding the definition requires a review of subsequent guidance issued by HRSA. HRSA has used varying interpretations of the definition during audits, many of which have not been publicly available. A federal district court will now have the opportunity to determine the 340B program definition of “patient” and, in doing so, would provide much needed clarification.
We will continue to watch the Genesis case in the district court and will provide updated information on developments through our 340B Litigation Tracking Tool.

PBGC Issues Final Rule for Special Financial Assistance Program
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
PBGC Issues Final Rule for Special Financial Assistance Program
July 11, 2022
Read time: 4 min
The American Rescue Plan Act (“ARPA”) created a special financial assistance program (the “SFA Program”) to assist struggling multiemployer pension plans to remain solvent through 2051. In July 2021, following ARPA’s passage, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) issued an interim final rule (the “Interim Rule”) establishing the method for multiemployer plans to determine eligibility and apply for special financial assistance (“SFA”) under the SFA Program.
On July 8, 2022, the PBGC published its final rule implementing changes to the SFA Program (the “Final Rule”). The Final Rule was issued in response to public comments the PBGC received last summer from various stakeholders, including SRZ clients, identifying concerns with the Interim Rule. The Final Rule will take effect on Aug. 8, 2022. The Final Rule’s most significant changes to the Interim Rule are discussed below.[1]
Certain requirements and conditions under the Interim Rule created a misalignment between the projected needs of plans applying to the SFA Program, and the actual investment returns plans would be able to receive from SFA assets. This misalignment was primarily attributable to restrictions imposed under the Interim Rule requiring plans to use one interest rate assumption for both SFA and non-SFA assets, while limiting investments of SFA assets to investment grade, fixed income investments. Consequently, the projections in plan SFA Program applications and the returns that plans would realistically realize from SFA assets were misaligned.
The Final Rule changes the interest rate assumptions that plans are required to use in calculating the amount of SFA such plans are eligible to receive. Under the Final Rule, plans will be permitted to utilize two different interest rate assumptions: one for calculating expected returns on the investment of a plan’s non-SFA assets,[2] and another for calculating expected returns on the investment of a plan’s SFA assets.[3]
The Final Rule also changes the investment restrictions the Interim Rule placed on SFA Program assets. Under the Final Rule, plans will now be able to invest up to 33 percent of their SFA assets in return-seeking investments, including publicly traded common stock and equity funds that invest primarily in public shares.
The Final Rule substituted the plan phasing in SFA assets over the SFA payout period in calculating withdrawal liability, instead of recognizing all of the SFA as plan assets immediately, so as not to encourage withdrawals. The Final Rule includes a request for additional public comments with respect to this change. The phase-in condition is subject to change. The Final Rule maintained the Interim Rule’s provision mandating use of the PBGC’s annuity-based interest rate for calculating withdrawal liability.
Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Scott A. Gold, Andrew B. Lowy and Dorothy Newman.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] Other changes include special provisions (i) to allow possible retroactive benefit improvements in 10 years, (ii) for plans that had reduced benefits and (iii) for plans that merge with plans that do not receive SFA.
[2] The interest rate assumption for non-SFA assets is the interest rate used by the plan in its most recently completed certification of plan status before Jan. 1, 2021.
[3] The new interest rate assumption for SFA assets is the lower of (1) the interest rate used by the plan in its most recently completed certification of plan status before Jan. 1, 2021, and (2) the average of the three segment rates (24-month average) determined under section 430(h)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, plus 67 basis points.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

CPPA Begins Formal Rulemaking Process
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
CPPA Begins Formal Rulemaking Process
July 8, 2022
Read time: 3 min
On July 8, 2022, the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) issued updated draft regulations implementing the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) as well as a notice of proposed rulemaking, which announced public hearings on August 24 and 25, 2022.
The CPPA also released an economic impact statement, which appears to underestimate the compliance costs to companies, indicating that compliance costs will be less than $10 million in the aggregate for all companies that need to comply with CPRA. California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) compliance costs are estimated to be in excess of $55 billion.
The updates to the draft regulations appear to be limited to non-substantive edits to the draft regulations published on May 27, 2022. The public can submit written comments to the draft regulations until August 23, 2022. We expect a significant volume of comments will be submitted.
As we detailed in our June 1, 2022, summary of the initial draft regulations, as written the regulations represent a seismic shift to the plain language of the CPRA. The draft regulations will make some optional aspects of the CPRA mandatory and introduce some entirely new requirements. The initial draft regulations drew widespread criticism, including from the Association of National Advertisers. As a result, if the CPPA does not further amend the draft regulations, litigation challenging the CPPA’s authority might follow the conclusion of the rulemaking process, further muddying the waters for companies trying to understand their obligations before the January 1, 2023, deadline for compliance.
McDermott’s Global Privacy & Cybersecurity team can assist clients with submitting comments to these new proposed rules. In addition, we are helping client across a broad range of industries currently working toward compliance with the CCPA/CPRA, including gap assessments, updates to CCPA program components, and implementation strategies based on unique business risks. If you are interested in submitting comments in response to the proposed regulations, or need assistance with your CPRA compliance please contact Amy Pimentel or David Saunders.
McDermott’s Chambers-rated Global Privacy & Cybersecurity team leads clients through the complex—and often unanticipated—regulatory, compliance and transactional challenges that govern their valuable data assets. Combining deep experience operating within highly regulated environments with a practical business-focused approach to navigating the rapidly evolving data privacy environment, our team of 20+ lawyers help clients develop creative solutions to regulatory obstacles and leverage their valuable data assets to drive change and innovation.

Navigating Data Privacy Questions Post-Dobbs
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Navigating Data Privacy Questions Post-Dobbs
July 8, 2022
Read time: 8 min
The US Supreme Court’s recent decision to overturn Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization has raised many questions about potential efforts by law enforcement agencies to obtain data from healthcare and other service providers to detect the performance of a possibly unlawful abortion. For example, data collected by period-tracking apps, patients’ self-reported symptoms, or diagnostic-testing results might be used to establish the timeframe in which an individual became pregnant, and then demonstrate that a pregnancy was terminated, as part of investigative or enforcement efforts against individuals or organizations allegedly involved in such termination.[1]
On June 29, 2022, the office within the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that is responsible for enforcing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), issued guidance addressing how HIPAA limits disclosures by covered entities and business associates to law enforcement agencies in the absence of a court order or other legal mandate. The guidance provides helpful insight on how OCR may use HIPAA enforcement to discourage unauthorized disclosures of protected health information (PHI) to law enforcement officials in the wake of new state laws outlawing abortion. The guidance also implicitly confirms, however, that HIPAA does not provide a complete shield against law enforcement and litigation-driven requests for abortion-related information.
President Biden issued an executive order on July 8, 2022, that in part aims to address privacy concerns related to reproductive healthcare and the limitations to HIPAA’s current protections. The President’s order calls on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to consider steps to protect consumers’ privacy when they seek information about the provision of reproductive healthcare services, and on the Secretary of HHS to consider additional actions, including under HIPAA, to protect sensitive information related to reproductive healthcare.
In this article, we examine the HIPAA protections discussed in the OCR guidance as well as other potential strategies that healthcare providers and application developers may use to protect the data of their patients and other users.
DISCLOSURES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER HIPAA
HIPAA permits covered entities and business associates to disclose PHI to law enforcement if certain conditions are met. Specifically, HIPAA permits disclosures in response to requests from law enforcement that are accompanied by a court order, a subpoena or summons issued by a judicial officer or grand jury, or an administrative agency request made under a similar process authorized under law. OCR emphasizes in its guidance that these are permitted rather than required disclosures under HIPAA. This means that although a covered entity’s or business associate’s failure to comply with a law enforcement request could, depending on the specific circumstances, constitute a violation of state law, it would not constitute a violation of HIPAA.
In the guidance, OCR reinforces that disclosures by covered entity or business associate workforce members to law enforcement regarding an abortion or an individual’s reproductive healthcare absent a court order or other mandate enforceable in a court of law are violations of HIPAA. The guidance elaborates that its position on such disclosures “is true whether the workforce member initiated the disclosure to law enforcement or others or the workforce member disclosed PHI at the request of law enforcement” (emphasis added). OCR appears to be stressing that covered entities and business associates could be cited with a HIPAA violation if they were to disclose PHI to law enforcement absent a qualifying subpoena, warrant or other legal mandate, even if a law enforcement agent had initiated the request.
OCR additionally notes that in the absence of mandatory reporting obligations under state law, covered entities and business associates would be prohibited by HIPAA from proactively reporting abortions or other reproductive healthcare to state law enforcement authorities.
OUT-OF-STATE SUBPOENAS
When a state law enforcement agency seeks information from a person or entity located in another state, the law enforcement agency will typically look to the state of the target person or entity to reissue a court-approved subpoena in accordance with the laws of the target state. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have passed the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (UIDDA), which establishes the necessary processes for reissuing subpoenas in this manner. In anticipation of the Dobbs decision, New York and other states have enacted safe-harbor laws prohibiting courts in the state from issuing subpoenas in response to out-of-state law enforcement agency requests for assistance with abortion-related investigations where the alleged abortion-related conduct at issue would be legal if it occurred in New York. This is aimed at preventing prosecutors in states with abortion bans from seeking to issue and enforce out-of-state subpoenas related to abortions that are legal under the laws of the state being asked to assist in such efforts. We anticipate that other states will follow the lead of New York, Connecticut, California and others in passing similar laws that protect their residents from out-of-state subpoena requests.
Health systems, health plans, hospitals, telehealth providers and digital health application developers will need to carefully examine whether they are in a position to avail themselves of these protective state laws, or if they could be forced to respond to subpoena requests for the information concerning reproductive health care. They should consider the following questions:
- Does the company have any property or other physical presence in a state that has outlawed or will outlaw abortion, such that shield laws passed in other states arguably may not protect it?
- Are employees of the entity located in or licensed to provide care to patients in a state that has outlawed or will outlaw abortion?
- Does the company maintain any data storage facilities, servers or other patient records located in the state?
We expect that law enforcement officials within states that have banned abortion will seek to use any such connection or presence as leverage to issue and obtain compliance with subpoena requests relating to abortion services and associated reproductive health information. States with abortion bans may also look for opportunities to serve persons or entities that reside outside the state, such as when an officer of the company travels to a state with an abortion ban. Companies that wish to avoid responding to such subpoenas will therefore need to consult with their legal counsel to consider if there are any defenses they can raise against effective service or production of their customers’ reproductive health information. For example, companies may consider reviewing the state’s physician-patient privilege statute or regulation, as such laws could provide a good faith and potentially effective basis on which to resist production depending on the strength of the privilege protection in the state.
DATA MINIMIZATION
In response to the perceived threat of subpoena requests, companies that provide healthcare and healthcare-related services to women may also reexamine how they document reproductive health services. Some providers may avoid creating records that indicate a patient was considering an abortion, to the extent not required by law or contract to do so. Application developers may refine the information they collect and store through their applications, as well as their data retention policies, to limit the amount of information they retain that could reveal that a user sought or received reproductive health services, if they were to receive an enforceable subpoena or other law enforcement request. Healthcare providers and application developers should work closely with their legal counsel to examine proposed data minimization practices to ensure the effectiveness of such practices and confirm that they comply with federal or state medical record and document retention laws and sufficiently and accurately document services rendered for billing purposes.
Data minimization responses reflect that, in the age of smartphones and wearable devices, a growing amount of information collected every day could, if obtained by law enforcement officials, potentially reveal that a user obtained an abortion. Recognizing that consumers are concerned with this prospect, OCR issued a second guidance document that outlines strategies and best practices for consumers to protect health data collected via smartphones and wearable devices. For example, OCR suggests that consumers can minimize their “digital footprint” by turning off location services and avoiding giving apps permission to access location data (unless necessary to operate the app). Additionally, the guidance suggests that consumers use communication apps, mobile web browsers and search engines that support increased privacy and employ security measures such as encryption.
Although consumer education and information collection transparency could help users make informed decisions about data-sharing settings on their devices, patients and application users will continue to look to providers and application developers to answer questions and concerns about data protection for reproductive health information. Healthcare providers and application developers should therefore consider updating their online privacy policies or posting information about their reproductive health information privacy practices to address potential patient and user information collection concerns, being careful not to overstate the protections that HIPAA and other state privacy laws provide against disclosure of health information to law enforcement.

New Chicago Ordinance on Sexual Harassment Takes Effect
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
New Chicago Ordinance on Sexual Harassment Takes Effect
July 8, 2022
Read time: 3 min
The new Chicago Ordinance on sexual harassment, effective July 1, 2022, requires that an employer maintaining a business facility within the geographic boundaries of Chicago must have a written policy—including a conspicuously displayed notice poster in English and Spanish—documenting the prohibition of sexual harassment.
The written policy must include the following features:
- A statement that sexual harassment is illegal in Chicago.
- Definition of sexual harassment as defined in section 6-10-020, which adds that sexual harassment includes unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature and sexual misconduct, meaning any behavior of a sexual nature which also involves coercion, abuse of authority or misuse of an individual’s employment position.
- Requirement that all employees participate in sexual harassment prevention training annually (minimum of one hour). Anyone supervising/managing employees must participate in a minimum of two hours of training annually.
- Requirement that all employees participate in one hour of bystander training annually.
- Examples of prohibited conduct that constitutes sexual harassment (the ordinance does not provide examples).
- Details on (1) how an individual can report sexual harassment, including instructions on how to make a confidential report with a form, to a manager, the employer’s headquarters, the Human Resources department or another internal reporting mechanism; and (2) how legal services, including governmental, are available to employees who may be victims of harassment.
- Statement that retaliation for reporting sexual harassment is illegal in Chicago.
This written policy must be retained for five years. The policy must be provided in the employee’s primary language within one week of their start date. When administering the required training, the employer can use the model sexual harassment prevention training program prepared by the State of Illinois required under 775 ILCS 5/2-109 or it may have its own prevention training program that is equal to or exceeds the Illinois law. Evidence of training, including slides and other materials, must be retained for five years.
Chicago recently released its model training slides and model written notices, which can be found here and here.
If McDermott can assist in any way to help you meet these new requirements, please contact your McDermott Employment lawyer or the authors listed below.

Commerce Proposes New Rule to Pause Collection of Antidumping or Countervailing Duties on Pending Circumvention Inquiries Involving CSPVs
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Commerce Proposes New Rule to Pause Collection of Antidumping or Countervailing Duties on Pending Circumvention Inquiries Involving CSPVs
July 7, 2022
Read time: 5 min
On July 1, 2022, the US Department of Commerce (Commerce) published a proposed rule to pause the collection of any antidumping (AD) or countervailing (CVD) duties under its pending circumvention inquiries on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules (CSPVs) from four southeast Asian countries.[1] Commerce’s proposed rule, if enacted, would provide more certainty as to AD/CVD duty liability for importers and purchasers of CSPVs from these countries for the period of time that this “pause” is in effect (likely until June 6, 2024). Comments on this proposed rule are due by August 1, 2022.[2]
SUMMARY OF COMMERCE’S PROPOSED REGULATION
Commerce’s proposed rule implements US President Joe Biden’s Proclamation 10414, issued June 6, 2022,[3] which declared an emergency under Section 318 of the Tariff Act of 1930[4] concerning the electricity generation capabilities of the United States. This Proclamation announced various steps to address the emergency, including authorizing Commerce to allow the importation of CSPVs from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam (target countries) without collecting estimated AD or CVD duties that relate to the pending circumvention proceedings until June 6, 2024, or the date the emergency described in Proclamation 10414 has been terminated—whichever occurs first (Date of Termination). The Proclamation, as implemented by Commerce’s proposed regulations, will provide temporary relief from cash deposits or import duties that could be assessed as a result of the ongoing inquiry as to whether imported CSPVs from the target countries are circumventing AD and CVD orders on CSPVs from the People’s Republic of China.[5]
ANALYSIS
Commerce’s proposed rule, which it intends to codify at 19 C.F.R. § 364, would provide much needed certainty and additional clarity as to the process of importing CSPVs from the target countries during the period which the assessment of duties or cash deposits is suspended. The proposed rule states that Commerce will not direct US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to suspend liquidation or collect cash deposits of estimated duties that could result from an affirmative circumvention determination for any CSPVs entered into the United States before the Date of Termination.[6] Additionally, Commerce will instruct CBP to discontinue the suspension of liquidation and refund any cash deposits for entries of CSPVs for which CBP suspended liquidation and required cash deposits upon Commerce’s initiation of the inquiries.[7] In other words, CSPVs from the target countries, if entered prior to the Date of Termination, will not be assessed any cash deposits or duties regardless of whether Commerce has made affirmative circumvention determinations in the meantime.[8] For entries of CSPVs on or after the Date of Termination, and in the event of affirmative final circumvention determinations, Commerce will instruct CBP to suspend liquidation and collect AD and CVD cash deposits on that merchandise.[9]
The proposal contains three noteworthy caveats:
- Commerce specifically noted that certain CSPVs that have already been found to be “in-scope” of certain AD/CVD orders covering imports of CSPVs from China or Taiwan (independent of the ongoing circumvention inquiries) will not be considered covered by the proposed rule and will not be able to be entered into the United States duty-free.[10]
- Commerce noted that its instructions to CBP to allow the entry of CSPVs from the target countries duty-free will not restrict CBP’s authority to independently make country-of-origin determinations for entered merchandise. Thus, CBP may determine that CSPVs are subject to those Chinese or Taiwanese AD/CVD orders and are not eligible for duty-free treatment.
- The proposed rule explicitly notes that it shall not constrain Commerce’s authority to require certifications of CSPV imports in the event of an affirmative circumvention determination.[11] Commerce has already requested comments from interested parties regarding certifications in the event of an affirmative determination,[12] so importers and purchasers of CSPVs from the target countries need to be conscious that, even if they import CSPVs free of duties, both they and their suppliers may need to comply with any certification regime Commerce may impose. It is not clear what action Commerce would take if the requisite certifications are not provided for entries during the temporary relief period.
This temporary pause on duties is intended to allow for the United States to develop domestic CSPV manufacturing capacity.[13] While Proclamation 10414 and the Date of Termination (as defined in Commerce’s proposed regulations) leave open the possibility that the US electricity generation capacity emergency could be resolved prior to June 6, 2024, it appears unlikely given the significant time required to develop CSPV manufacturing capability. It remains to be seen what other government initiatives, including the president’s proposed use of the Defense Production Act,[14] will be used to buttress demand for, and the production of, US-manufactured cells and modules.

CMS Seeks to Establish Regulations Limiting Critical Access Hospital Location Requirement
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
CMS Seeks to Establish Regulations Limiting Critical Access Hospital Location Requirement
July 7, 2022
Read time: 6 min
Tucked into the recent proposed rule establishing Rural Emergency Hospital Conditions of Participation (CoPs) is a proposal to change the CoPs for critical access hospitals (CAHs). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) proposes to codify in regulation its long-standing definition of “primary road” used to determine whether a facility meets the CAH location requirement, and to conduct routine analyses of the location of all CAHs to determine if they continue to meet requirements related to the distance from other hospitals and CAHs. CMS also proposes to revise CoPs related to medical staff, infection control and quality.
Comments to the proposed rule can be submitted to CMS electronically or by mail no later than August 29, 2022, with reference to file code CMS-3419-P.
CAHs must be located more than a 35-mile drive, or a 15-mile drive in mountainous terrain or in an area with only secondary roads available, from any other hospital or CAH (or must have been designated by their state as a “necessary provider” exempt from the mileage requirement). Prior to this proposed rule, no regulatory language referenced “primary road” (the opposite of “secondary road”) or defined the term. Instead, CMS had set forth the definition in Medicare Manual guidance. In response to a 2013 Office of Inspector General report related to CAH location requirements, CMS now (almost 10 years later) proposes to define “primary road” in regulation. CMS believes that this will provide clarity and consistency regarding distance requirements and will allow it to implement routine data-based monitoring of CAH location compliance.
The proposed definition of “primary road” clarifies that the location distance requirement for a CAH is that the CAH be more than a 35-mile drive on primary roads, or a 15-mile drive on roads in mountainous terrain or in an area with only secondary roads available, from a hospital or CAH. CMS further defined “primary road” to include either of the following:
- A numbered federal highway (including interstates, intrastates, expressways or any other numbered federal highway)
- A numbered state highway with two or more lanes each way.
The proposed regulatory definition removes roads that are shown on a map prepared in accordance with the US Geological Survey’s Federal Geographic Data Committee Digital Cartographic Standard for Geologic Map Symbolization as a “primary highway, divided by median strip.”
CMS specifically solicits comments regarding the description of a numbered federal highway in the proposed definition above and is interested in feedback on whether the definition of primary road should include numbered federal highways with two or more lanes, similar to the description of numbered state highway, and exclude numbered federal highways with only one lane in each direction.
Under the proposed rule, CMS would also review all hospitals and CAHs within a 50-mile radius of a CAH during review for initial eligibility and would re-review each CAH on a continuous three-year cycle. Each three-year review would initially focus on expanded healthcare capacity and access to care within the 35-mile radius of the CAH rather than roadway designations used to make the initial determination. Where there are no new hospitals within a 50-mile radius, the CAH would be immediately recertified. Where there are new hospitals within a 50-mile radius, an additional review would be conducted based on the distance and definitions for primary roads and mountainous terrain. Any CAH that did not meet the regulatory distance and location requirement at the time of any subsequent three-year review would be identified as non-compliant and could be subject to enforcement actions.
Unrelated to the proposed CAH location rule changes, CMS would also revise CAH CoPs related to medical staff, infection control/antibiotic stewardship and quality assessment performance improvement programs (QAPI) of a multi-hospital system. Under these proposed rules, CAHs would be able to operate with a system-level unified and integrated medical staff, and to establish and implement infection control, antibiotic stewardship and QAPI programs at the system level.
Practical Implications
If finalized as proposed, the location rule would generally maintain the status quo regarding how to measure distance between a CAH and another hospital or CAH. CMS estimates that three or four CAHs that do not meet current mileage definitions would retain CAH eligibility. However, if the alternative approach to exclude federal highways with only one lane in each direction is adopted, it could open opportunities for new CAHs.
The routine monitoring and removal of CAHs that do not meet the distance requirements is likely to result in de-designation. CMS does not provide an estimate of the number of potentially impacted CAHs. Although CAHs are required to ensure that they continue to meet distance requirements and report any changes to CMS, CMS has not consistently enforced this requirement and some CAHs may be unaware that they do not meet the criteria because of new hospitals or CAHs established within the distance limits.
The CoP changes for CAHs that operate as part of multi-facility systems would reduce administrative burden and duplication currently required under the CAH CoPs, but not under the hospital CoPs.
CAHs that currently rely on the mileage requirement for CAH eligibility should review their compliance with the current definition of primary road to determine the potential effect of the proposed rule, and should provide feedback to CMS if the rule would benefit or harm the CAH. CAHs that may lose eligibility under the proposed re-review process may need to conduct additional review of current compliance obligations and risks, as well as advocacy beyond preparing comments. CAHs that are part of a multi-facility system would benefit from the proposed rules and should communicate support to CMS, but should also evaluate compliance with the current CoPs in the event that the proposed rule is not finalized.
