Content Type: Article

  • FCC Requires Consent for AI-Generated Cloned Voice Calls

    FCC Requires Consent for AI-Generated Cloned Voice Calls

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FCC Requires Consent for AI-Generated Cloned Voice Calls

    February 13, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On February 8, 2024, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Declaratory Ruling banning robocalls and robotexts using artificial intelligence (AI)-generated cloned voices. Effective immediately, under the FCC’s authority provided by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), AI-generated voices are considered “artificial,” and the use of them in robocalls is illegal unless callers have obtained prior express consent from the party receiving the call. This clarification gives state attorneys general an avenue to pursue bad actors making robocalls and seek damages under the TCPA.

    In depth

    The FCC’s unanimous Declaratory Ruling confirms that the TCPA’s restriction on the use of “artificial or prerecorded voice” encompasses current AI technologies that generate human voices. As a result, the use of such technologies falls under the TCPA and the FCC’s implementing rules and therefore require the prior express consent of the called party to initiate such calls absent an emergency purpose or exemption. Additionally, any artificial or prerecorded voice message must provide identification and disclosure information by the entity making the call.

    If a call is made for advertisement purposes or constitutes as telemarketing, there must be an option for the consumer to opt-out or request their number be removed from the calling list. All requirements included in the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling will apply to any AI technologies that initiate outbound telephone calls using artificial or prerecorded voices. In addition to FCC scrutiny, failure to comply with these requirements is likely to invite scrutiny from the Federal Trade Commission, which enforces false and deceptive advertising and telemarketing requirements.

    The FCC clarifies that voice cloning enabled by AI technologies are within the scope of the TCPA’s prohibition of artificial or prerecorded voice because the technology emulates real or artificially created human voices used for telephone calls to target consumers. The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling asserts that these calls are what the TCPA seeks to protect consumers from because it’s not a real person speaking on the call. The FCC also recognizes the potential to use AI to communicate with consumers using prerecorded voice messages and concluded that a call “using” a “prerecorded” voice falls within the meaning of the TCPA. The FCC believes this finding will deter negative uses of AI and ensure consumers are protected when they receive such calls.

    The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling was released following a series of government actions focused on how to regulate AI, including US President Joe Biden’s recent executive order aimed at managing the risks of AI. Twenty-six state attorneys general wrote to the FCC supporting its approach ahead of the Declaratory Ruling’s release.

    Prior to the current Declaratory Ruling, on November 16, 2023, the FCC launched a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) “to build a record to help combat illegal robocalls where AI might be involved,” according to FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel’s statement. While the NOI asked how AI might be used for robocall scams, it was also interested in using AI to help with pattern recognition in order to detect illegal robocalls before they reach consumers.

    The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling coincides with the growing number of AI robocalls. The FCC cited recent instances, such as one where robocalls interfered with potential primary voters in New Hampshire via calls purportedly from President Biden telling voters to stay home and skip the state’s primary. The FCC is concerned about generative AI’s growing threat and its ability to support voter suppression schemes during the upcoming campaign season. The FCC is also concerned about generative AI’s ability to mimic children and family members, requesting money to get out of trouble or targeting elderly family members through grandparent scams.

    While the FCC confirms the inclusion of AI technologies under the TCPA, its Declaratory Ruling has not provided clarity as to how express consent can be obtained for robocalls, including whether consent can be obtained via AI technologies. Historically, businesses have often been forced to rely on litigation to gain guidance on what constitutes as prior express consent. There is a line of cases for the proposition that “prior express consent is satisfied ‘by the simple act of giving one’s phone number directly to a caller.’” As the FCC noted, “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” Businesses that request consent for robocalls will likely expand that consent to expressly include the use of AI (if they have not already done so).

    Since the TCPA’s effectiveness relies on enforcement actions, we have yet to see how this Declaratory Ruling will achieve its goal of “protecting consumers from AI-enabled voice cloning harms.” One may even argue that the original language in the TCPA already encompasses AI technologies as there is little debate in considering AI-generated voice to be “artificial.” The TCPA allows individuals to seek damages under private rights of action and the callers generally have the burden of proving that the required consent was obtained. This poses a tangible risk of increased class action litigation as we have seen members of the TCPA plaintiffs’ bar frequently file suits based on tenuous or even frivolous claims – and such claims must be addressed and defended. Despite the Declaratory Ruling’s clarification on AI technologies, the lack of guidance as to what constitutes consent continues to pose challenges for businesses that would like to leverage technologies in consumer communications.

    Authors

    Jason D. Krieser

    Partner

    Dallas

    Brian Long

    Associate

    Dallas

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  • HHS Publishes New Rights of Conscience Final Rule

    HHS Publishes New Rights of Conscience Final Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    HHS Publishes New Rights of Conscience Final Rule

    February 8, 2024

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Several federal laws protect the “rights of conscience” of federally funded healthcare entities and healthcare providers and prohibit recipients of federal funds from requiring individuals to participate in actions that they find objectionable on religious or moral grounds. On January 11, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published its new final rule governing federal healthcare conscience protection statutes, titled Safeguarding the Rights of Conscience as Protected by Federal Statutes (2024 final rule), codified at 45 CFR §§ 88.1 – 88.4. While making efforts to balance patients’ rights to access healthcare on the one hand with the religious beliefs and moral convictions of providers and benefits plan sponsors on the other hand, the 2024 final rule repeals the majority of the prior conscience protection regulations (2019 final rule), which three federal courts found to be unlawful, and reverts to the framework created by the Obama administration (2011 final rule). This continues a pattern of pendulum swings between Democratic and Republican presidential administrations that began about 15 years ago at the end of the George W. Bush administration.

    In depth

    2024 Final Rule Overview

    The 2024 final rule sets out that any healthcare entity or individual may file a complaint with HHS’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) alleging a potential violation of the conscience protection statutes. Notably, the complaint filer does not have to be the entity whose rights under the conscience protection statutes are allegedly being violated. OCR’s website encourages all complaints to be filed via OCR’s online portal. Any relevant complaints filed with HHS will be routed to OCR if they are not initially filed directly with OCR.

    OCR’s delegated authority to facilitate and coordinate enforcement of the conscience protection statutes across HHS includes stated empowerment to take the following actions:

    • Receiving and handling complaints
    • Conducting investigations
    • Consulting with other HHS agencies on compliance matters
    • Seeking voluntary resolutions of complaints among involved parties
    • Consulting and coordinating with the relevant HHS fund managers and using existing enforcement regulations, such as those that apply to grants, contracts, or other programs and services
    • Initiating compliance reviews when complaints are lodged
    • Coordinating remedial action as HHS deems necessary and appropriate and as allowed by law and regulation
    • Coordinating with relevant HHS agencies to make enforcement referrals to the US Department of Justice (DOJ)

    The final three items on the above list did not appear in the 2023 proposed rule, so their legality may be in dispute. That is additionally true because at least some of the conscience protection statutes did not include delegations of investigative and enforcement authority to HHS at all (in contrast to, for example, the explicit delegations of investigative powers that Congress included in HIPAA). But HHS noted in the 2024 final rule preamble that these activities are necessary to empower OCR’s ability to meet OCR’s obligations to handle and investigate complaints and to initiate compliance reviews. To that end, the 2024 final rule addresses (1) the conscience protection statutes that the Secretary of HHS authorizes OCR to enforce; (2) how OCR will receive, handle and investigate complaints regarding noncompliance with the conscience protection statutes; and (3) OCR’s strong encouragement, rather than requirement, to post a notice to patients that is consistent with the conscience protection statutes.

    Conscience Protection Statutes

    The 2024 final rule states that OCR has the authority to provide for the enforcement of the conscience protection statutes, which include the Church Amendments, the Coats-Snowe Amendment, the Weldon Amendment, certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act, certain provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid statutes, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, among other federal laws.

    These laws generally prohibit the government from discriminating against institutional and individual healthcare entities by compelling the performance of certain healthcare services or conditioning some or all federal HHS funds (potentially including, depending on the specific statute at issue, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement and Public Health Service grants) on whether the entity performs certain healthcare services, if doing so would be contrary to an individual’s religious or moral convictions.

    Complaint Handling and Investigating

    When OCR receives a complaint alleging that the conscience protection statutes have been violated, the 2024 final rule requires it to promptly investigate. Per the rule, OCR’s investigations may include a review of the investigated party’s practices, policies, communications, documents, compliance history, circumstances under which the possible noncompliance occurred and other factors relevant to determining whether there is noncompliance. The rule purports to authorize OCR to use any number of fact-finding methods, including, without limitation, site visits. OCR may also seek the assistance of any state agency. (As previously noted, depending on the specific statute at issue, these purported delegations of investigative authority may be subject to challenge as never having been granted by Congress to HHS in the first place.)

    The 2024 final rule states that OCR may adopt a negative inference if, absent good cause, an entity that is purportedly subject to the conscience protection statutes fails to respond to a request for information or to a data or document request within a reasonable timeframe.

    If the investigation reveals a failure to comply with the conscience protection statutes in OCR’s judgment, the rule states that OCR will work with the involved parties to resolve the complaint through informal means whenever possible. “Informal means” is not defined in the 2024 final rule or clarified in the preamble, as the various conscience protection statutes address compliance enforcement through different mechanisms, making a single articulable standard impracticable. Rather, OCR states that it will investigate complaints based on the applicable statute at issue. HHS may also adopt formal enforcement processes described in the underlying regulations, such as working with sister agencies to withhold funds and referring matters to DOJ.

    If an investigation reveals that no disciplinary action is warranted, then OCR will notify applicable parties that an investigation occurred without findings.

    In practice, complaint handling and investigations have looked very different under different presidential administrations, given widely differing policy priorities in this area. We expect that trend to continue under the 2024 final rule.

    Notice of Conscience Protection Statutes

    Entities are encouraged to post a public notice of rights on their website, in personnel manuals or handbooks, in applications for employment or for benefits, in student handbooks or orientation materials, or in other prominent locations where similar public notifications are customarily posted. The public notice should provide education to providers, patients and other individuals of their rights under the conscience protection statutes. The 2019 final rule had noted that posting this notice would constitute “non-dispositive evidence of compliance.” The 2024 final rule takes a more modest approach to avoid implying that entities can substantively comply with the underlying conscience protection statutes by merely posting a notice. Instead, the 2024 final rule states that posting a notice is a best practice towards achieving compliance. HHS provides sample language that it encourages entities to tailor to their circumstances and to the conscience protection statutes applicable to their operations:

    [Name of entity] complies with applicable Federal health care conscience protection statutes, including the Church Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 300a–7; the Coats-Snowe Amendment, section 245 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 238n; the Weldon Amendment, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Public Law 117–328, div. H, title V General Provisions, section 507(d)(1) (Dec. 29, 2022); Sections 1303(b)(1)(A), (b)(4), and (c)(2)(A), and 1411(b)(5)(A), and 1553 of the ACA, 42 U.S.C. 18023(b)(1)(A), (b)(4), and (c)(2)(A), 18081(b)(5)(A), and 18113; certain Medicare and Medicaid provisions, 42 U.S.C. 1320a–1(h), 1320c–11, 1395i–5, 1395w–22(j)(3)(B), 1395x(e), 1395x(y)(1), 1395cc(f), 1396a(a), 1396a(w)(3), 1396u–2(b)(3)(B), 1397j–1(b), and 14406; the Helms, Biden, 1978, and 1985 Amendments, 22 U.S.C. 2151b(f), accord, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Public Law 117–328, div. K, title VII, section 7018 (Dec. 29, 2022); 22 U.S.C. 7631(d); 42 U.S.C. 280g–1(d), 290bb–36(f), 1396f, 1396s(c)(2)(B)(ii); 5106i(a)); and 29 U.S.C. 669(a)(5). More information to help entities determine which statutes are applicable to them is available at hhs.gov/conscience/conscience-protections. You may have rights as a provider, patient, or other individual under these Federal statutes, which prohibit coercion or other discrimination on the basis of conscience, whether based on religious beliefs or moral convictions, in certain circumstances. If you believe that [Name of entity] has violated any of these provisions, you may file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, electronically through the Office for Civil Rights Complaint Portal, available at hhs.gov/ocr/complaints or by mail or phone at: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 200 Independence Avenue SW, Room 509F, HHH Building, Washington, DC 20201, 1-800-368-1019, 800-537-7697 (TDD) or by email at ocrmail@hhs.gov. Complaint forms and more information about Federal conscience protection laws are available at hhs.gov/conscience.

    Material Changes From the 2019 Final Rule

    Perhaps the biggest change between the 2024 final rule and the 2019 final rule is the removal of all definitions. The 2019 final rule stated that its purpose was to “protect the rights of individuals, entities, and health care entities to refuse to perform, assist in the performance of, or undergo certain health care services or research activities to which they may object for religious, moral, ethical, or other reasons.” “Health care providers” was defined to include physicians; pharmacists; healthcare personnel; health professions students; health professions applicants; medical laboratories; biomedical and behavioral researchers; health maintenance organizations; health insurers, plans, plan sponsors and third-party administrators; and any other healthcare provider or healthcare facility. “Assist in the performance” further broadened the individuals who could claim conscience objections to providing healthcare services by including any individual who “has a specific, reasonable, and articulable connection to furthering a procedure or a part of a healthcare service program or research activity . . . includ[ing] counseling, referral, training, or otherwise making arrangements for the procedure.”

    The 2019 final rule received critical comments that “assist in the performance” would allow individuals with no direct patient care responsibilities to impede patients’ abilities to otherwise receive care to which they are entitled. Multiple federal courts in 2019 and 2020 concluded that the 2019 final rule exceeded HHS’s rulemaking authority or was arbitrary and capricious in various respects, including with regard to such broad definitions. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 414 F. Supp. 3d 475, 512-15, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Washington v. Azar, 426 F. Supp. 3d 704, 719-20 (E.D. Wash. 2019). The 2024 final rule’s removal of all definitions may cause a different challenge in that it will be less clear how healthcare entities should address employees’ claims of conscience objection. For example, the 2024 final rule does not address whether a hospital scheduler could decline to make an appointment for an individual seeking a visit with an endocrinologist for gender confirmation-related hormone replacement therapy or whether an ambulance driver should be permitted to decline to transport a patient seeking a medically necessary, pre-scheduled abortion. OCR’s case-by-case approach to evaluating complaints and conducting investigations is not likely to afford covered entities much predictability, especially across presidential administrations.

    Compliance Planning

    Covered entities will need to monitor internal complaints regarding moral or religious objections and take care to document burdens and other explanatory circumstances where there is any arguable lack of full accommodation of workforce or patient moral or religious objections. Under the 2024 final rule, the applicable legal standard remains aligned with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, requiring reasonable accommodation of workforce member religious and moral beliefs and practices, but not to the point of imposing an undue hardship on the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). However, as we have seen over the years, the enforcement of the conscience protection statutes varies widely from one administration to the next, and the 2024 final rule compounds this variability by giving OCR significant discretion and providing covered entities with few clear obligations.

    When preparing compliance workplans in advance of the 2024 final rule effective date of March 11, 2024, entities should create flexibilities that will limit disruption to other unrelated compliance efforts. Entities also should consider the pros and cons of posting the notice of rights recommended in the 2024 final rule and whether this notice aligns with internal nondiscrimination policies and procedures.

    As in many contexts, communicating proactively and transparently with workforce members on these issues, and making sure they have opportunities to have any concerns heard and questions answered, usually goes a long way in reducing the risk that any difficult situation or conflict will grow into a formal OCR complaint and investigation under the 2024 final rule.

    For more information or for assistance with compliance under the 2024 final rule, please contact one of the authors.

    Authors

    Sumaya Noush

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Bulletin Concurrence X

    Bulletin Concurrence X

    ARTICLE

    Bulletin Concurrence X

    February 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    We are delighted to share the tenth Bulletin Concurrence which aims to keep you up to date with the key developments in competition law over the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Read the full Bulletin (in French) here.

    In depth
    Authors
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  • Shaping the Digital Future: The Newly Adopted EU Data Act and Its Impact

    Shaping the Digital Future: The Newly Adopted EU Data Act and Its Impact

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Shaping the Digital Future: The Newly Adopted EU Data Act and Its Impact

    February 8, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In the rapidly evolving digital landscape, the European Union’s Data Act (Data Act), adopted on November 27, 2023 marks a significant shift in data, privacy, and intellectual property regulation.

    The Data Act applies to manufacturers of connected devices (such as IoT and medical devices, but also connected vehicles). Among other entities, it also applies to data processing services, such as cloud services providers and their users, public sector bodies, and others.

    Similarly to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), it equally applies to EU and non-EU businesses, even if they are not established in the European Union. However, unlike the GDPR, it applies to both personal and non-personal data.

    This crucial piece of legislation came into force on January 11, 2024 and will be applicable as of September 12, 2025. Businesses within its scope should not delay implementation efforts, given the broad data access/sharing obligations, compliance with which will impact their current internal business processes. Similar efforts will be needed regarding various transparency and contracting obligations, which may require longer lead times to be fully integrated into companies’ practices.

    In depth

    Background, Purpose and Scope of the EU Data Act

    Following in the footsteps of the 2022 Data Governance Act, the Data Act represents a significant advancement in the EU strategy to effectively manage, regulate and utilize the growing potential of the expanding data economy.

    The Data Act’s primary purpose is to ensure that the wealth of product and related services data generated across the European Union is accessible not just to large corporations, but also to small and medium-sized enterprises, startups, and individual consumers. The European Union sees this democratization as a crucial step towards fostering a more equitable and competitive digital market.

    The scope of the Data Act is broad, encompassing all sectors of the economy. Similarly to the GDPR, it also impacts businesses, which are not established in the European Union. The Data Act applies to:

    • Manufacturers of connected devices and providers of related services placed on the EU market
    • Users of any such connected devices and related services
    • Data holders (e.g., manufacturers of connected devices) making data available to data recipients in the European Union and the data recipients themselves
    • Providers of data processing services (such as cloud services providers)
    • Participants in data spaces and various stakeholders in the area of smart contracts; and
    • Public sector bodies/EU institutions that request data holders to make data available under specific circumstances.

    As to the types of data covered by the Data Act, the scope of the Act includes data produced by connected devices and related services and data processed by data processing services (including cloud services providers). In all such cases the data covered may be personal or non-personal. By including such a wide range of entities and industries, the Data Act aims to establish a universal standard for data access and sharing within the European Union, impacting the digital economy at large.

    Key Provisions of the EU Data Act

    The Data Act is a significant piece of legislation with far-reaching implications across various economic sectors. It introduces several key provisions that redefine how personal and non-personal data is accessed, shared, and protected. Key elements of the new legislation include:

    1. Data Sharing Obligations: One of the fundamental provisions of the Data Act is the mandate for manufacturers of connected products and service providers to share data. This includes making data generated by the use of these products and services accessible to users of these same products and services and, under certain conditions, to third parties. This provision aims to democratize data access, fostering innovation and competition.
    2. Protection of Intellectual Property and Trade Secrets: While promoting data sharing, the Data Act also safeguards intellectual property and trade secrets. It grants manufacturers a veto right in specific scenarios where sharing data could lead to serious and irreparable economic loss or compromise sensitive trade secrets, thus balancing data accessibility with the protection of business interests.
    3. Data Portability and Design Requirements: The Act strengthens user rights to access data generated by their use of products and services by requiring manufacturers to design these products and services to ensure data accessibility. This enhances data portability, enabling users to transfer their data seamlessly between different service providers, thus promoting consumer choice and flexibility. Compliance with these design standards is essential for manufacturers and service providers to align with the new regulatory landscape.
    4. Sector-Specific Rules: Recognizing the unique needs of different industries, the Data Act includes provisions for tailored regulations in sectors like healthcare and the automotive industry. For instance, it addresses the specific challenges and opportunities in sharing data from medical devices and smart vehicles, ensuring sector-specific compliance and innovation.
    5. Data Protection and GDPR Compliance: In line with the robust EU data protection framework, the Data Act stipulates that all data sharing and handling must comply with the GDPR. This ensures that personal data that is accessed, used, and shared by virtue of the Data Act, is also processed in compliance with the GDPR.
    6. Transparency: The new legislation institutes strong transparency obligations, which will impact manufacturer’s production processes, such as the requirement to inform users on product data, which the connected product is capable of generating, before concluding contracts for the purchase, rent or lease of the connected product.
    7. Public Sector Access in Emergencies: The Data Act also outlines conditions under which public sector bodies can access data held by private entities during emergencies. This provision is designed to ensure that critical data can be utilized effectively in situations like public health crises or natural disasters, while maintaining appropriate safeguards.
    8. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement: The Data Act establishes mechanisms for resolving disputes related to data sharing and sets out enforcement provisions. This includes the designation of competent authorities and the establishment of penalties for non-compliance by EU Member States, to ensure that its provisions are effectively upheld.

    Challenges and Considerations

    • Consumer Rights and Privacy: Balancing user access rights with privacy concerns, especially under the GDPR, requires a nuanced approach. This is particularly crucial in health-related data, where personal and sensitive information is at stake. Businesses will also need to navigate complex decisions about which legal basis they can rely on for the access and sharing of personal and non-personal data under the Data Act. While the Data Act is clearer in some instances (e.g., with regards to non-personal data sharing based on a contract), it leaves room for interpretation (and risk assessment) to businesses when it comes to the legal basis they can rely on when sharing personal data (albeit, it hints at consent and contract as the appropriate legal bases).
    • Legal and Technical Complexity: The interplay between data sharing obligations and IP rights, particularly in sectors dealing with sensitive data like healthcare, presents legal challenges. Businesses must navigate these complexities while ensuring compliance and protecting their competitive edge.
    • Adaptation and Implementation: The Act’s broad scope means that businesses across various sectors must adapt their practices, potentially overhauling their data handling and product design strategies.
    • Contractual Protections: The Data Act establishes strong contractual protections for users. It clarifies that any contractual terms to the detriment of the user (in particular if these exclude or derogate from and/or change their rights) would not be binding. Businesses therefore must consider such provisions carefully, in light of potential future enforcement and litigation.

    Looking Ahead: A Data-Driven Future

    As the Data Act moves towards implementation, it imposes new regulatory challenges and opportunities for businesses, particularly in terms of data sharing and protection. It requires businesses to make significant changes to their operations, requiring them to ensure compliance with stringent data management and privacy standards.

    Policymakers and industry stakeholders will need to collaborate closely to navigate these changes effectively. The Data Act’s successful execution will depend on how its complex legal requirements will be implemented in practice and the ability of businesses to innovate within these constraints, setting a new standard for the digital economy in the European Union.

    We have yet to see if the Data Act will follow in the footsteps of the GDPR and influence global data governance practices for connected products and related services.

    Authors
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  • Year in Review: Criminal Enforcement by the DOJ Antitrust Division in 2023

    Year in Review: Criminal Enforcement by the DOJ Antitrust Division in 2023

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Year in Review: Criminal Enforcement by the DOJ Antitrust Division in 2023

    February 7, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    When it comes to antitrust criminal enforcement, 2023 will be remembered as the year when the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division redefined and tested the outer boundaries of its authority. This report looks back at the key events from the DOJ’s year in criminal antitrust enforcement.

    Here’s a glimpse of what’s inside:

    • Despite four straight losses and a voluntary dismissal in labor market cases, the DOJ remains undeterred in bringing additional criminal wage-fixing and no-poach suits.
    • DOJ’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force secured several guilty pleas and stiff penalties in 2023 and will most likely continue pursuing aggressive investigative and litigation strategies moving forward.
    • The nearly decade-long investigation of the generic drug industry appears to be ending after the DOJ recently resolved and dismissed the remaining cases.
    • Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco highlighted cybersecurity, tech and national security as areas of heightened risk and thus heightened scrutiny, so corporations in these markets should take heed of the DOJ’s emphasis on corporate compliance in 2024.
    In depth
    Tabs

    Lisa P. Rumin

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Paul M. Thompson

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes

  • SEPs, medical devices, e-cigarettes: Biggest UPC battles reveal broad court remit

    SEPs, medical devices, e-cigarettes: Biggest UPC battles reveal broad court remit

    ARTICLE

    SEPs, medical devices, e-cigarettes: Biggest UPC battles reveal broad court remit

    JUVE Patent

    February 7, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    By the end of 2023, the Unified Patent Court had a total of 160 cases filed, with one of the biggest battles being fought by Hon.-Prof. Dr. Henrik Holzapfel for NJOY.

    Find more information in the article “SEPs, medical devices, e-cigarettes: Biggest UPC battles reveal broad court remit” by JUVE Patent, January 23, 2024.

    In depth
    Authors
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  • Remote Retailers Held Responsible for Tax Collection in Washington

    Remote Retailers Held Responsible for Tax Collection in Washington

    ARTICLE

    Remote Retailers Held Responsible for Tax Collection in Washington

    Feb 6, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    If there’s a lesson to be learned from the Washington Court of Appeals’ recent holding in Orthotic Shop Inc. and S&F Corporation v. Department of Revenue, No. 39321-6-III (Jan. 23, 2024), it’s that the use of a marketplace does not eliminate a remote seller’s tax responsibilities, particularly for pre-Wayfair periods.

    The dispute in Orthotic Shop involved a retailing business and occupation tax (B&O tax) and a retailing sales tax assessment against two merchants for sales they made on an online retailer’s website. The audit report asserted that the merchants were “retailers” who maintained a nexus to Washington because they maintained a stock of goods in the online retailer’s warehouses located in the state. As such, the audit report concluded that the merchants were liable for retailing B&O tax and sales tax on sales to Washington customers made via the online retailer’s website.

    The merchants admitted before the Court of Appeals that they sold their goods to consumers and not to the online retailer. However, the merchants challenged the assessment and argued that the online retailer’s provision of fulfillment services necessarily rendered it a “consignee” responsible for remitting retailing B&O tax and sales tax on transactions facilitated through its website in accordance with WAC 458-20-159. The merchants also asserted that the assessment was unfair because they lacked an understanding that they could incur a tax collection liability in Washington through the storage of their merchandise in an in-state warehouse.

    The Court of Appeals determined that the merchants failed to show that the online retailer was a consignee with sole responsibility for tax collection. “A consignee,” the Court of Appeals explained, “makes sales on behalf of the consignor.” By contrast, the merchants’ product pages on the marketplace’s website listed the merchants as the sellers, not the online retailer. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded: “[s]ince the merchants sold to buyers, they are liable for retailing B&O tax on those sales.”

    The merchants’ failure to list the online retailer as the “seller” on their respective sales pages was also fatal to their argument that they were not liable for retailing sales tax on sales made via the online retailer’s website. The Department of Revenue’s administrative rules explain that while a consignee is responsible for collecting and remitting sales tax on sales made in its own name, when the consignee is selling in the name of the consignor, the consignor may instead report and remit the retail sales tax. Here, the Court of Appeals noted that while the online retailer’s agreement with the merchants provided that it would remit the sales tax if the merchants asked it to do so, neither merchant made such a request.

    The Court of Appeals also was unimpressed by the merchants’ assertions that they did not understand that they could establish physical presence nexus and incur a tax liability based on the storage of their goods at a warehouse in the state. The Court of Appeals explained that ignorance of the law, was not an acceptable defense.

    CASE TAKEAWAYS

    Although Orthotic Shop dealt with periods prior to Washington’s implementation of marketplace laws on January 1, 2020, the case contains important considerations that remain relevant today. For example, because Washington’s marketplace laws do not apply to B&O tax, a remote seller remains responsible for its own B&O tax remittance obligations under current law. Additionally, remote retailers selling tangible personal property must not forget to consider whether they have established “inventory nexus” in the state even if their total sales to Washington customers are under the state’s $100,000 economic nexus threshold.

    Authors

    Troy M. Van Dongen

    Partner

    San Francisco

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    Endnotes

  • Prohibiting Gender-Affirming Care for Minors: Update on Texas Senate Bill 14-Related Lawsuits

    Prohibiting Gender-Affirming Care for Minors: Update on Texas Senate Bill 14-Related Lawsuits

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Prohibiting Gender-Affirming Care for Minors: Update on Texas Senate Bill 14-Related Lawsuits

    February 5, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    By way of background, in May 2023, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 14 (SB 14), which prohibits physicians and other licensed medical professionals from providing gender-affirming medical care to minors. Almost immediately thereafter, several Texas families, medical professionals, and organizations filed suit against the state, challenging SB 14’s constitutionality. In August 2023, a Texas state court temporarily enjoined SB 14, finding that the law likely violates the Texas Constitution. Texas appealed, which sent the case to the Texas Supreme Court and put a pause on the injunction. As a result, SB 14 went into effect as planned on September 1, 2023. The case challenging SB 14 remains pending, and oral argument on the appeal of the temporary injunction took place before the Texas Supreme Court on January 30, 2024. (See State of Texas, et al. v. Loe, et al., No. 23-0697 (Tex. Sup. Ct.).)

    In the meantime, the Texas Office of the Attorney General (OAG) has used its investigative and enforcement powers under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) to initiate investigations of a hospital and telehealth clinic based outside of Texas in connection with their provision of gender-affirming care to minors. In November 2023, Texas issued a civil investigative demand and a demand for Sworn Written Statement to Seattle Children’s Hospital (Seattle Children’s) in Washington. The demands were issued pursuant to the DTPA and identified the subject matter of the investigation as “possible violations of DTPA sections 17.46(a) and (b) for issues related to misrepresentations regarding Gender Transitioning and Reassignment Treatments and Procedures.” In response, Seattle Children’s filed suit in Texas state court challenging the legality of the OAG’s demands. (See Seattle Children’s Hospital v. Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas, No. D-1-GN-23-008855 (98th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Dec. 7, 2023).)

    On January 26, 2024, QueerMed, a Georgia-based telehealth clinic that provides gender-affirming care to minors in numerous states (historically including Texas), confirmed that it received a similar request for records from the OAG. QueerMed represented that it stopped providing care to Texas youth upon the passage of SB 14. However, the OAG’s request seeks records dating back to January 1, 2022 – before SB 14 took effect. It remains to be seen how QueerMed will respond to the OAG’s demand.

    In depth

    Texas physicians and other licensed medical professionals are prohibited from providing gender-affirming care to patients younger than 18 years of age pending the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling on the judicial challenge to SB 14. In a press release, the OAG stated that it “will continue to enforce the laws duly enacted by the Texas Legislature and uphold the values of the people of Texas by doing everything in its power to protect children from damaging, unproven ‘gender transition’ interventions.”

    In response to the enactment of SB 14, some families with transgender children have traveled or relocated to states where gender-affirming care for minors is legal, including Washington. This has coincided with aggressive enforcement efforts by the OAG and a general effort to reach out-of-state providers, as signaled by the OAG’s demands to Seattle Children’s and QueerMed.

    Under the guise of a DTPA action, the OAG requested documents and information about Texas residents treated by Seattle Children’s and QueerMed, including information regarding diagnoses, medication, laboratory testing and treatment protocols from January 1, 2022 (before SB 14 took effect) to the present. While the DTPA is broadly designed to protect Texas consumers from “[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” it is generally unclear how the DTPA is applicable to the provision of gender-affirming care. (See Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 71.46(a).)

    In response, Seattle Children’s filed a lawsuit in Texas state court challenging the jurisdiction and investigative authority of the OAG to look into Washington providers. Seattle Children’s argued in its pleading that it does not provide gender-affirming care in Texas (including by telemedicine), has not used public money from the state of Texas in support of gender-affirming care, nor has it received reimbursement from Texas Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program for gender-affirming care to minors. While it does employ a select number of remote employees in Texas, those employees do not perform clinical services or provide support for Seattle Children’s Gender Clinic. Seattle Children’s further argued that it does not engage in advertising or marketing in Texas regarding gender-affirming care. In sum, Seattle Children’s argued that “[a] Texas resident’s unilateral choice to obtain healthcare in Washington is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction on Seattle Children’s.” The crux of Seattle Children’s argument is that the OAG’s demands represent an inappropriate use of the DTPA and an unconstitutional attempt to investigate and reduce potential interstate commerce and travel for Texas residents seeking care in other states.

    Seattle Children’s filed an amended petition on January 5, 2024, in which it asserted that it is prohibited from responding to the OAG’s demands by federal and state privacy laws, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and a Washington State court order. The Washington State court order, entered on December 22, 2023, bars Seattle Children’s from releasing records regarding the provision of gender-affirming treatment or related mental health treatment to the OAG in the absence of individual, informed patient consent. Seattle Children’s further contends that the Washington State court order binds the Texas state court under the US Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.

    The OAG has signaled aggressive enforcement of SB 14 by initiating previous investigations into Texas-based providers, including Dell Children’s Medical Center in Austin and Texas Children’s Hospital in Houston. However, the demands to Seattle Children’s and QueerMed represent a clear attempt by the OAG to step up its enforcement efforts by attempting to target out-of-state providers.

    Key Takeaways and Practical Implications

    1. The challenge to SB 14 currently before the Texas Supreme Court is expected to be lengthy. Until the Texas Supreme Court issues a decision regarding SB 14’s validity, the law remains in effect, and Texas providers should continue to expect aggressive enforcement by the OAG.
    2. The OAG is likely to issue additional investigative demands to out-of-state providers of gender-affirming care to minors, including telehealth providers. Given this, out-of-state providers will need to consider the cost of litigation in deciding whether to provide care to residents of states that have similar bans in effect.
    3. In response to the wave of legislation in Republican-controlled states outlawing gender-affirming care to minors, several states, including California, Colorado, Oregon and Washington, have enacted or proposed laws that seek to protect patients who travel out of state to receive such care by preventing authorities from complying with subpoenas, arrest warrants and other requests from states that have banned such treatments.
    4. Providers should continue to follow the litigation initiated by Seattle Children’s, including subsequent appeals, as it will likely inform the viability and scope of future requests by the OAG to out-of-state providers.
    5. Any provider or facility that receives an investigative demand or other related correspondence from the OAG should immediately engage legal counsel and carefully consider its response.
    Authors

    Amanda Jester

    Partner

    Austin

    Rosalyn R. Broad

    Partner

    Austin

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  • Court Finds Red Cross Has Antitrust Immunity, Rejecting Broad Interpretation of the Sherman Act

    Court Finds Red Cross Has Antitrust Immunity, Rejecting Broad Interpretation of the Sherman Act

    ARTICLE

    Court Finds Red Cross Has Antitrust Immunity, Rejecting Broad Interpretation of the Sherman Act

    Feb 5, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    WHAT HAPPENED

    Recently, in a rarely considered question, the US District Court of Massachusetts held that the American Red Cross (ARC), a federally chartered corporation, is not subject to liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) because it is not an antitrust “person.” The court narrowly construed the Sherman Act to exclude a quasi-public entity like ARC, resulting in a broad interpretation of immunity for quasi-public entities under the antitrust laws.

    ARC is the largest supplier of blood platelets in the United States and, until recently, sold “untreated” platelets to hospitals which then employed various services to mitigate the risk of platelets becoming infected. Verax Biomedical Inc. (Verax) manufactures one such mitigation service. After ARC announced its plan to begin using Cerus Corporation’s INTERCEPT Blood System on its platelet supply prior to sale – a system that is incompatible with Verax’s service – Verax sued ARC for allegedly leveraging its power in the market for platelets to monopolize the market for mitigation services.

    The court found that, although Congress had clearly waived ARC’s sovereign immunity, it did not constitute a “person” under the Sherman Act in form or function because its public attributes outweighed its private ones.

    BACKGROUND

    • ARC is a federally chartered nonprofit corporation responsible for “provid[ing] volunteer aid in time of war to the sick and wounded of the Armed Forces.” 36 U.S.C. § 300102(1). It is also the largest supplier of blood platelets in the United States.
    • Verax produces and sells US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-cleared tests for detecting bacterial growth in platelets.
    • In the past, ARC sold both “untreated” and “treated” platelets to hospitals. Untreated platelets require further treatment to ensure bacterial growth is controlled. Hospitals could choose which mitigation services to use, including Verax’s.
    • In 2020, ARC announced its intention to stop selling untreated platelets and to begin treating all platelets with Cerus Corporation’s INTERCEPT Blood System prior to sale. Verax’s service cannot be used on platelets that have been treated with the INTERCEPT system, as the FDA has not endorsed the pairing of the two technologies.
    • Verax filed suit against ARC, bringing three counts under the Sherman Act: tying, exclusive dealing and attempted monopolization.
    • ARC moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing, in part, that ARC cannot be sued under the Sherman Act. Shortly after, the federal government filed a statement of interest arguing that ARC can be sued under the Sherman Act.
    • The court concluded that, although it was a close question, ARC was not a “person” under the Sherman Act in either form or function and therefore dismissed the antitrust claims.

    HOW THE DECISION WAS REACHED

    • To determine whether the Sherman Act extends to ARC, the court applied the two-step analysis laid down by the US Supreme Court in FDIC v. Meyer and asked (1) whether there was a waiver of sovereign immunity for actions against ARC and (2) whether the substantive prohibitions of the Sherman Act apply to ARC.
    • The answer to the first question, the court found, was a clear yes. Since 1950, ARC’s statutory charter has stated that it may “sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, state or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States.” 36 U.S.C. § 3001015(a); see 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1905).
    • As to the second question, the court noted that the Sherman Act imposes liability on any person, which includes corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of the United States. However, because the United States is not an antitrust “person,” the question was whether ARC is a person separate from the United States for the purposes of the antitrust laws. ARC argued it is a federal instrumentality, while both Verax and the United States argued it was not.
    • The court looked to ARC’s form and function to settle the question. It considered a prior determination by the US Supreme Court that the US Postal Service is not an antitrust “person” because its statutory designation and goals and obligations suggested Congress did not intend it to be treated as a separate entity from the United States.
    • When considering ARC’s form, the court found that ARC’s enabling statute demonstrates a congressional intent to treat it as an instrumentality of the federal government and that one of the “rights” of an instrumentality of the United States is immunity from antitrust suit. It rejected the government’s assertion that ARC is a separate antitrust person because the “United States does not own, control or supervise the ARC,” finding this was not dispositive.
    • When considering ARC’s function, the court found it significant that ARC’s charter requires it to fulfill a variety of public functions, including effectuating treaty obligations and coordinating domestic and international aid both during peacetime and during war or emergency. It acknowledged that ARC’s enabling statute does not provide it with powers more characteristic of government, such as eminent domain, but found that on balance ARC’s public attributes outweighed its private ones. Moreover, ARC is different from private enterprises because it does not seek profits. It rejected the government’s argument that ARC is a separate antitrust person because federal courts have repeatedly concluded it is a corporate “person” separate from the United States, noting that these decisions predate a 2007 amendment to ARC’s statutory charger and discuss ARC’s government status under distinct legal regimes and mandates.

    WHAT THIS DECISION MEANS

    • The court narrowly construed the definition of “person” under the Sherman Act, which includes “corporations” and “associations.” As a result, quasi-public entities like ARC, which have more public attributes than private attributes, are immune from liability under federal antitrust laws.
    • Had the court adopted the government’s argument that ARC is a “person” subject to antitrust liability, it could have exposed a variety of other entities that perform governmental functions to liability. Instead, the court rejected the government’s attempt to expand antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.
    Authors

    Lisa P. Rumin

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes

  • Don’t assume nonalcoholic beverage ingredients are OK for alcoholic beverages

    Don’t assume nonalcoholic beverage ingredients are OK for alcoholic beverages

    ARTICLE

    Don’t assume nonalcoholic beverage ingredients are OK for alcoholic beverages

    Feb 5, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As we enter 2024, more and more brands are joining the nonalcoholic beverage space. An increasing variety of nonalcoholic, single-serve, ready-to-drink beverages are marketing the innovative use of indigenous botanicals, herbs or novelty ingredients found in other foods. This innovation has led to product development teams exploring the use of those ingredients for their alcoholic beverage products, but in many instances those ingredients have not been used in or approved for alcoholic beverages in the United States by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), leading to challenges with obtaining formula approvals.

    BACKGROUND

    As a reminder, the TTB requires that all ingredients added to an alcoholic product be determined generally recognized as safe (GRAS) for use in alcohol. If the TTB finds that a product’s ingredient is not GRAS, it can cause significant delays for your product’s market launch. Currently, the TTB’s GRAS determination relies directly on the advice and approval of the ingredient’s use in alcoholic beverages by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

    In line with the historic Memorandum of Understanding (MOA) between the two agencies, the FDA (not the TTB) is responsible for determining which ingredients are prohibited from use in food and/or beverage products under the US Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. These include food additives, such as substances added intentionally to food, and color additives. The TTB is authorized by law to utilize the services of a government department or agency to carry out its powers and duties under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. Pursuant to its MOA with the FDA, the TTB regularly consults with the FDA regarding the approval of ingredients in alcoholic beverages and the requirements of label disclosure for certain substances. The TTB’s Beverage Alcohol Laboratory also analyzes alcoholic beverage products for limited and prohibited compounds and enforces these restrictions for alcoholic beverages as per FDA guidance.

    OUR GUIDANCE

    In light of these challenges, we recommend that before submitting your formula, double-check to make sure all the ingredients and substances added are GRAS and allowable for use in alcoholic beverages specifically. This will help streamline the approval process and avoid potential delays. Below are some tips you should consider:

    • Check with the ingredient supplier or manufacturer for the regulatory status of the ingredient and ask for a Technical Data Sheet or Product Specification Sheet that likely contains the relevant information.
    • Refer to the TTB’s Limited Ingredients page, which contains both the “Flavoring Substances and Adjuvants Subject to Limitation or Restriction” and “Flavoring Substances and Adjuvants that are Used Only in Certain Situations.” These list many ingredients that may be used in alcoholic beverages only. It is not an exhaustive list of all substances that have limitations in foods or beverages but useful in determining whether a limit is exceeded in an alcoholic beverage product.
    • Search your ingredient on the FDA’s The Substances Added to Food inventory (formerly called Everything Added to Foods in the United States) to determine if its approved as GRAS by the FDA. Make sure to use the scientific name of the substance in the search field.
    • Check the FDA’s GRAS database for a published GRAS Notice for the ingredient. Substances may not have FDA approval but are recognized as GRAS for their intended use in the notice.
    • If you cannot find evidence of general recognition of safety for the ingredients in the United States, you may want to seek support from a third-party scientific consultant firm experienced with FDA GRAS assessments.

    We also recommend using ingredient suppliers who are familiar with restrictions on alcohol additives. Although the ingredient may be a staple in some foods, it might not be meant for the alcohol space.

    If you need further assistance determining the regulatory status of your ingredients, reviewing your formula for potential problematic substances or navigating through a GRAS assessment process, please contact Alva Mather, Alice Chung or McDermott’s alcohol team.

    Authors

    Alva C. Mather

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes