Content Type: Article

  • The Electronic Signature in Tenancy Law Contract Practice

    The Electronic Signature in Tenancy Law Contract Practice

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Electronic Signature in Tenancy Law Contract Practice

    February 5, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Concluding rental agreements quickly, easily and legally compliant electronically? So far, a rather rare exception. We present the options provided for by law – both for the conclusion of rental agreements and for legal declarations such as the termination of a rental agreement.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Jens Ortmanns

    Partner

    Düsseldorf, Cologne

    More insights

  • Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (01/2024)

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (01/2024)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (01/2024)

    February 5, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    1. German Federal Court of Justice rules on reimbursement of disputed workshop invoices by insurance companies 

    On 16 January 2024, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”) decided five cases, all of which concerned the allocation of the so-called “workshop risk” (Werkstattrisiko). The term describes the risk that the party responsible for the damage to a vehicle (or, in practice, that party’s insurance company) will argue that the workshop invoice for the repair of the damaged vehicle is inflated.

    This risk is generally borne by the liable party. The BGH has now clarified that this is not only the case when an invoice is inflated due to inappropriate use of materials or time. It also applies to cases in which the workshop invoices repairs that were not actually carried out, without the party suffering the damage being aware of this. As long as the liable party bears the “workshop risk”, it cannot argue that the invoiced costs were not objectively necessary for the repair of the damaged vehicle. However, the party suffering the damage bears the burden of proof that the damage to the respective vehicle exists and was caused by the liable party.

    If the party suffering the damage has not yet paid the workshop invoice, the workshop risk is allocated as described only if the party suffering the damage sues the liable party (or the insurance company) for payment directly to the workshop and not to himself. In addition, the party suffering the damage must assign to the liable party all claims against the workshop relating to the workshop risk. The option of the party suffering the damage to invoke the workshop risk allocation may not be assigned to third parties.

    Relevant for: Mobility providers, insurance providers, workshops.

    Further details here (available only in German)

    2. EU Parliament and Council agree on new CO2 emission levels for heavy-duty vehicles

    On 18 January 2024, the EU Parliament and Council announced that they had reached an agreement on future CO2 emission standards for new heavy-duty vehicles entering the EU market from 2030.

    Under the current agreement, stricter CO2 emission standards will be introduced in 2030, 2035 and 2040 that are 45% (2030-2034), 65% (2035-2039) and 90% stricter than the previous 2019 levels.

    In particular, all new urban buses must be zero-emission by 2035. The new emission levels also cover almost all trucks, long-distance buses and trailers. Small trucks are not yet covered, although the Commission will review this exemption by 2027.

    The European Parliament and Council must now formally approve the terms of their agreement. The new legislation will then enter into force following publication in the Official Journal of the Union.

    Relevant for: Manufacturers.

    Further details here

    3. EU Court of Justice rules on car manufacturer trademark case

    A German car manufacturer has successfully defended its trademark in a case decided by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”, case C-334/22).

    In the case, a trader offered non-original radiator grilles adapted for older models of the manufacturer’s cars. These grilles contain a component that is designed to hold the manufacturer’s emblem and is therefore similar or identical in shape to the manufacturer’s trademark as the emblem is to be mounted on it.

    The ECJ held that such use of the manufacturer’s trademark by the product distributed by the trader is liable to infringe the functions of the trademark which are, in particular, guaranteeing the origin or quality of the goods.

    Relevant for: Manufacturers, trading companies.

    Further details here

    4. German Higher Regional Court finds T&Cs imposing no-fault liability on intermediary invalid

    In a court case that highlights the impact of the German T&C control regime on B2B contracts, the Higher Regional Court Hamm (Oberlandesgericht Hamm) found a clause that was used by a company which intended to impose a no-fault liability on an intermediary seller invalid.

    In the case at hand, the plaintiff had purchased dried fruit from an intermediary which in turn had obtained the goods from a Turkish seller and had them shipped directly to the plaintiff. The dried fruit were contaminated and therefore unfit for sale and consumption.

    The plaintiff sued the intermediary for damages, relying on a provision in its terms and conditions which stated that the seller guaranteed (zusichern) certain requirements specified by the plaintiff, including the absence of pests.

    However, the court held that the provision was invalid because it deviated, without sufficient justification, from the fundamental legal principle under German law that liability for damages generally arises only from culpable conduct.

    While parties can generally deviate from such principle, the court considered it an unreasonable disadvantage for the affected party to do so in general terms and conditions. The court referred to a general principle, upheld by the BGH, according to which deviations can only be justified in exceptional cases if the interests of the user of the terms and conditions outweigh those of the other party or if the deviation is compensated by granting other legal advantages. According to the court, these principles are applicable to B2B contracts without restrictions.

    As the court found that the intermediary had not culpably breached its obligations under the purchase agreement, the claim was dismissed.

    Non-German market participants are often surprised by the extent to which terms and conditions are regulated under German law even in B2B business relationships. The court’s decision shows the importance of a thorough review of T&Cs and the careful drafting of the relevant provisions in contractual relationships.

    Relevant for: All (mobility) companies.

    Further details here (available only in German)

    5. Plaintiff cannot escape German law in judgment of German Federal Court of Justice

    The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”) recently decided a case in which the parties had agreed that a rental agreement for an apartment located in Germany would be governed by the law of another jurisdiction. When the landlord sought to evict the tenant, the tenant argued that under the Rome I Regulation, apart from the selected governing law, mandatory German law also applied to their contractual relationship.

    The BGH sided with the lessee and held that, despite the deviating governing law clause included in the rental agreement and the fact that the rental agreement was drafted in a language other than German, mandatory German law still applied to the rental agreement under Article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation.

    According to the court, mandatory local law is applied unless the connection of the agreement in question to the selected jurisdiction is objectively significant, for instance because the criteria of Article 4 Rome I Regulation are met.

    In the present case, the court found only connections to Germany in the agreement. Therefore, the parties could not exclude mandatory German law from applying to their contract.

    As these general principles apply to all contractual relationships, not only residential leases, parties should always be mindful of the possible application of mandatory local law provisions. In the future, it will be particularly interesting to see how more nuanced cases will be decided.

    Relevant for: All companies.

    Further details here (available only in German)

    6. European New Batteries Regulation becomes mandatory in all EU member states

    As of 18 February 2024, the European New Batteries Regulation will become mandatory in all EU member states. Under the new regulation, all batteries must contain a certain percentage of recycled metals.

    Starting in 2025, recycling and collection requirements for used batteries will be implemented and become progressively stricter. By 2027, consumers are to be enabled to change the batteries in their own devices such as mobile phones themselves. Each battery will also contain a QR code with a link to detailed information about the battery’s life cycle, capacity, durability and contents.

    Relevant for: Manufacturers.

    Further details here

    In depth
    Authors
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  • Vermont Considers Imposing Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting

    Vermont Considers Imposing Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting

    ARTICLE

    Vermont Considers Imposing Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting

    Feb 2, 2024

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Vermont House Committee on Ways and Means is actively exploring a proposal to become the first state to enact mandatory worldwide combined reporting for corporate income tax purposes. While legislation has not been formally proposed, the Committee has examined a working draft that could be embedded into a broader tax legislation package.

    In Committee testimony supporting the adoption of mandatory worldwide combined reporting, Don Griswold, a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, argued that multinational corporations “pay huge fees to sophisticated advisers to develop an endless variety of complex schemes that shift their profits offshore.” According to him, mandatory worldwide combined reporting would be “the complete solution” to stopping what he perceives as a “loophole for massive tax avoidance.” He also intimated that several companies are among those he believes are currently engaging in “tax avoidance,” even though he freely acknowledged that he worked in a “Big 4 accounting firm’s 600-person ‘state tax minimization’ group” for most of his career.

    On the other hand, at least one representative from the Vermont Department of Taxes has suggested that worldwide mandatory combined reporting is not the panacea that Griswold claims it would be. In Committee testimony, Will Baker, assistant attorney general and general counsel at the Department of Taxes, pointed out that a corporation’s Vermont taxable income could increase or decrease under worldwide combined reporting depending on the profitability of the corporation’s domestic and overseas subsidiaries and the locations of the corporate unitary group’s sales throughout the world. Baker also suggested that the Department of Taxes would face practical challenges calculating the income of subsidiaries that are not part of a corporate filing at the US federal level. Finally, he added that “small states” should generally “have the same rules that other states have” to make it easier for taxpayers to comply with Vermont law.

    The McDermott state & local tax team will be closely monitoring this legislative proposal to see whether the Vermont General Assembly takes heed of the advice of its own officials at the Department of Taxes.

    Authors

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Hilkin

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • SEC Adopts Final Rules on SPAC IPOs and De-SPACs to More Closely Align With Traditional IPO Requirements

    SEC Adopts Final Rules on SPAC IPOs and De-SPACs to More Closely Align With Traditional IPO Requirements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Adopts Final Rules on SPAC IPOs and De-SPACs to More Closely Align With Traditional IPO Requirements

    February 2, 2024

    Read time: 15 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The adopting release also provides guidance on potential underwriter liability in De-SPACs and the applicability to SPACs of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

    On Jan. 24, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted long-awaited rule changes (“Final Rules”) applicable to special purpose acquisition companies (“SPACs”) and provided related guidance in its adopting release (“Adopting Release”).[1] The Final Rules largely codify the substance of the rules proposed by the SEC on March 30, 2022 (“Proposed Rules”), which were intended to enhance investor protections in SPAC initial public offerings (“IPOs”) and initial business combinations (“De-SPACs”).[2] We previously summarized the Proposed Rules, available here.[3] While the SEC largely adopted the Proposed Rules in substance, this Alert highlights the key modifications and changes from the Proposed Rules, as well as the potential impact of guidance the SEC provided on underwriter liability and the application of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (“ICA”) to SPACs instead of adopting those controversial portions of the Proposed Rules.

    New Specialized SPAC Disclosure Requirements:

    1. Sponsors: The Final Rules largely codify the additional disclosures proposed regarding: (i) the experience and material roles played by, as well as a description of any material agreements between, each party to a De-SPAC, including the sponsor; (ii) the identity of the control persons of the sponsor; and (iii) information regarding compensation paid to the sponsor and promoters of a De-SPAC. In addition, the Final Rules require disclosure of transfers of SPAC securities by SPAC sponsors, their affiliates and promoters. However, the SEC declined to adopt the proposal requiring disclosure of an organizational chart showing the relationship between the SPAC and its sponsors.[4]
    2. Dilution: The Final Rules largely adopt the proposal relating to additional disclosure of potential dilution, with the exception of the proposed tabular sensitivity analysis.[5]
    3. Fairness of the Business Combination Transaction, Procedural Requirements and Related Disclosure

    The Final Rules largely adopt the Proposed Rules’ disclosure requirements relating to the fairness of a De-SPAC to the SPAC’s unaffiliated security holders, with the following modifications:

    • The Final Rules require disclosure of any fairness determination of a De-SPAC only if such determination is required by the law of the jurisdiction of the SPAC’s organization, (i.e., such as Delaware law requires for a merger transaction).[6] In addition, the Final Rules clarify that this disclosure need only include factors which were considered in connection with any fairness determination, including, if applicable, any related financing transaction. [7]
    • Further, if the SPAC or its sponsor has received any report, opinion (other than an opinion of counsel) or appraisal from a third party, the Final Rules require disclosure of the substance of such report in connection with a De-SPAC.[8]

    Aligning De-SPACs More Closely With IPOs

    With the adoption of the Final Rules, the SEC aims to better align traditional IPO and De-SPAC disclosure requirements, including: (i) non-financial statement disclosure requirements; (ii) minimum dissemination time periods; and (iii) requiring that a target company be a co-registrant on certain filings. The SEC made a few minor changes to the Proposed Rules, including:

    • Extending the time period for re-determining smaller reporting company status from within four business days following the consummation of a De-SPAC to within 45 days following the consummation of a De-SPAC.[9]
    • The SEC declined to adopt the proposed rule codifying that named underwriters who participate in a SPAC IPO or in financings related to a De-SPAC are deemed underwriters.[10] Instead, the SEC issued guidance in the Adopting Release regarding statutory underwriter status in De-SPACs, which we discuss below.[11]

    Enhanced Projections Disclosure

    The SEC generally adopted the Proposed Rules regarding the disclosure of projections, with certain clarifying revisions, such as changing the requirement that a registrant in a De-SPAC provide a statement regarding whether or not any projections put forth still accurately reflects the views of the board and management “as of the date of filing.”[12] Instead, the Final Rules require a registrant to provide such statement “as of the most recent practicable date prior to the date of the disclosure document required to be disseminated to security holders”.[13]

    The Final Rules exclude forward-looking statements made in SPAC IPO and De-SPAC filings from the safe harbor provided by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”). The change is intended to more closely align the disclosure regime with a traditional IPO, because a De-SPAC serves a similar role for the private target company as a traditional IPO, and there is similar information asymmetry between issuers and public investors.[14] This change may raise particular issues in De-SPACs that include fairness disclosure, as discussed above, because often one basis for any such fairness determination is based on projections, which have generally been disclosed in De-SPACs with the benefit of the PSLRA safe harbor. However, it is unclear whether the unavailability of the PSLRA safe harbor will materially change market practice, as projections are already commonly included in many sectors of the traditional IPO market, such as master limited partnerships, yieldcos and REITs. Courts have often reviewed such forward-looking information under the “bespeaks caution” standard of review, requiring sufficient cautionary language to accompany forward looking statements, a path that may provide a similar framework for review and inclusion in the SPAC context.

    Underwriter Liability Guidance

    A focus of the SEC’s SPAC rulemaking has been to clarify the gatekeeper role provided by investment banks involved in bringing a target company public by De-SPAC as compared to the role of investment banks acting as underwriters in a traditional IPO and the related liabilities attached to each role. Instead of codifying the Proposed Rules related to statutory underwriters in a De-SPAC, the SEC instead provided guidance in the Adopting Release reaffirming its view that statutory terms such as “distribution” and “underwriter” apply broadly and flexibly, according to the facts and circumstances of the applicable transaction.[15] The statutory definition of “underwriter” is not limited to traditional underwriters in firm commitment IPOs, and encompasses anyone who is selling on behalf of the issuer or participating in the distribution of securities in the combined company to the SPAC’s investors and broader public.[16] In the context of a De-SPAC, the guidance states that a distribution occurs when the SPAC’s investors receive an interest in the combined operating company.[17] Thus, depending on the facts and circumstances of the transaction, a participating investment bank might be deemed a “statutory underwriter” even if the entity is not named as an underwriter in any offering or may not be engaged in any activities that are typical of a named underwriter in a traditional capital raising.[18] In these cases, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933[19] would apply as it would to anyone acting as an underwriter with respect to a De-SPAC, and any such person would be liable for any material misstatement or omission in the registration statement.[20]

    Status of SPACs under the Investment Company Act of 1940

    In August 2021, two law professors, one a former SEC commissioner, filed a series of lawsuits claiming that SPACs were subject to the ICA, despite market practice to the contrary. Within days, most major private law firms active in the market joined together to issue a joint statement rebutting the claim, including Schulte.[21] Perhaps in response to this controversy, the Proposed Rules included a safe harbor from the ICA, largely based on executing documentation with respect to a De-SPAC within 18 months of the IPO and completing the De-SPAC within 24 months of the IPO. However, the SEC declined to adopt the safe harbor in the Final Rules because of the “fact-based, individualized nature” of whether a SPAC meets the definition of an “investment company” under the ICA. Noting that “a SPAC could be an investment company at any stage of its operation,” the SEC concluded that a specific duration limitation safe harbor would not be appropriate.[22]

    Instead, the SEC provided guidance to assist SPACs in analyzing their potential status as an “investment company” under Sections 3(a)(1)(A)[23] and 3(a)(1)(C)[24] of the ICA (“ICA Guidance”). Specifically, the ICA Guidance, the SEC noted, will assist SPACs in applying the five-factor test that the SEC and its Staff has historically used in determining whether an issuer is an investment company under Section 3(a)(1)(A), which are known as the Tonopah factors. [25] Typically, a SPAC is organized for the purpose of completing a De-SPAC with one or more operating companies, providing its shareholders with the opportunity to invest in a public entity that will be, or will control, an operating company. Nevertheless, the SEC highlighted certain activities a SPAC could engage in that raise “serious questions” about its status as an investment company under the ICA.

    1. Nature of Assets and Income – In general, a SPAC would likely not be considered an investment company if it limits its holdings prior to a De-SPAC to cash and the types of securities held by SPACs today, such as US government securities and money market funds and if its primary business is to complete a traditional initial business combination as a De-SPAC.[26]In contrast, a SPAC that invests in corporate bonds or proposes or forms an intent to acquire a minority interest in a target company as a passive investor would affect the SPAC’s status under the ICA. Specifically, absent an exclusion, a SPAC that “owns or proposes to acquire 40% or more of its total assets in investment securities” might trigger ICA registration.[27]
    2. Management Activities – The SEC also guided SPACs to evaluate the actions of its “officers, directors and employees.” For example, if the management team of a SPAC was spending a considerable amount of time actively managing the SPAC’s portfolio of securities (for these purposes including US government securities or money market funds) or was otherwise not actively seeking a De-SPAC transaction, this would weigh more heavily in favor of the SPAC’s primary purpose being the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities. Relatedly, triggering ICA registration, could cause SPAC sponsors to come within the definition of ‘investment adviser’ …in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
    3. Duration – The SEC’s guidance also focused on the duration of the SPAC, noting that “a SPAC’s activities may become more difficult to distinguish from those of an investment company the longer the SPAC takes to achieve its stated business purpose.” In evaluating a SPAC’s duration within the framework of the ICA, the SEC pointed to the 12-month duration permitted for so-called “transient investment companies” under the ICA[28] and the 18-month duration permitted for blank check companies[29]. Specifically, the SEC noted that “a SPAC should reassess its status and analyze whether it has become an investment company if it has . . . failed to enter into an agreement with a target company beyond such timelines.” This durational requirement has the potential to significantly shorten the potential life of a SPAC, which had generally been three to three-and-a-half years under the listing rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ, subject to providing public shareholders with earlier redemption opportunities agreed during the IPO process. The combination of the durational guidance and the guidance related to assets held in trust may cause SPACs to err on the side of holding amounts in cash or demand deposit accounts, particularly the longer the SPAC takes to complete a De-SPAC.
    4. Holding Out – In response to concerns that SPACs had, in some instances, been viewed primarily as fixed-income investment opportunities (i.e., means to gain exposure to a portfolio of securities), the SEC cautioned SPACs from holding themselves out as such an investment alternative. In other words, the SPAC’s investment in securities, if any, should be merely a vehicle to hold the amounts in trust while the SPAC seeks out a suitable De-SPAC opportunity, not the focus of the SPAC.[30]
    5. Merging with an Investment Company – Lastly, a SPAC that engages in, or proposes to engage in, a De-SPAC with an investment company would itself likely be considered an investment company requiring registration even prior to completion of the De-SPAC. This is because once it settles on an investment company as a potential target, the SPAC’s primary purpose likely shifts to the business of being an investment company (as compared to a “typical” SPAC that is engaged in the business of merging with an operating company).

    In summary, although the Final Rules do not codify a safe harbor or contradict the existing ICA regime that applies to SPACs, it does provide a framework for SPACs to analyze their status under the ICA. Depending upon the facts and circumstances, a SPAC may meet the definition of investment company under the ICA at any time in the lifecycle of a SPAC. Issuers that meet the definition of investment company but fail to comply with the ICA could, among other things, be subject to enforcement action by the SEC or to private litigation. To the extent that a SPAC’s activities may cause it to fall within one or more of these definitions, a SPAC should consider options that would bring it into compliance with the ICA such as moving its assets to demand deposits, changing its operations, winding down its operations or registering as an investment company under the ICA.

    What This Might Mean

    Because the Final Rules largely adopt the Proposed Rules or the Adopting Release provides guidance consistent with the substance of the Proposed Rules, market practice has largely adjusted to these rules. While this may be a significant deviation from the historical practices related to SPACs the Final Rules are unlikely to have a significant effect on a market that has cooled significantly since the initial proposal in 2022.

    Implementation Timeline

    The Final Rules will become effective 125 days after publication in the Federal Register, with the additional requirement to comply with structured data requirements a year later.[31]

    Authored by Charles J. Clark, David A. Curtiss, Michael S. Didiuk and Ele Klein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rules, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, Release No. 33-11265 (Jan. 24, 2024), available here (“Final Rules”).

    [2] See Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rules, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, Release No. 33-11048 (March 30, 2022), available  here.

    [3] Charles J. Clark, Eleazer Klein, Gayle R. Klein, Shaina L. Maldonado and David M. Rothenberg, SEC Proposes Rules to Increase SPAC Disclosure Requirements to More Closely Align with Traditional IPO Requirements, Schulte, Roth & Zabel LLP (May 18, 2022), /insights/sec-proposes-rules-to-increase-spac-disclosure-requirements-to/?bcrFallback=bcrFallback%23_ftnref17.

    [4] Final Rules, supra note 1,. at 53.

    [5] See id. at 95.

    [6] See id. at 137.

    [7] See id. at 143-4.

    [8] See id. at 149.

    [9] See id. at 223.

    [10] See id. at 282.

    [11] See id. at 283.

    [12] See id. at 356.

    [13] See id. at 356-7.

    [14] See id. at 374 and 462.

    [15] See id. at 283.

    [16] See id. at 287.

    [17] See id. at 285.

    [18] See id. at 287-8.

    [19] Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides investors with a way to hold issuers, officers, underwriters and others liable for damages caused by untrue statements of fact or material omissions of fact within registration statements at the time they become effective.

    [20] See id. at 288.

    [21] 

    [22] The SEC stated that “ depending on the facts and circumstances, a SPAC may meet the definition of investment company under Sections 3(a)(1)(A) or 3(a)(1)(C) or both” and should be evaluated by the SPAC “both at its inception and throughout its existence.”

    [23] Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the ICA defines an “investment company” as any issuer that is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to be engaged primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.

    [24] Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the ICA defines an “investment company” as any issuer that is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and that owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40% of the value of the company’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis. Section 3(a)(2) of the ICA generally defines “investment securities” to include all securities except Government securities, securities issued by employees’ securities companies, and securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries of the owner which are not investment companies or certain private investment companies.

    [25] To assess an issuer’s primary engagement under Section 3(a)(1)(A), and in other contexts under the ICA, the SEC, its Staff and the courts historically have looked at (1) the company’s historical development; (2) its public representations of policy; (3) the activities of its officers and directors; (4) the nature of its present assets; and (5) the sources of its present income (known as the “Tonopah factors”). See In the Matter of Tonopah Mining Co., 26 S.E.C. 426 (July 21, 1947).

    [26] The SEC highlights that “[w]hile U.S. Government securities and money market funds are securities for purposes of Section 3(a)(1)(A), asset composition is only one of the factors that should be considered in analyzing a SPAC’s status under the [ICA]. For example, an issuer that holds these assets, but whose primary business is to achieve investment returns on such assets would still be an investment company under Section 3(a)(1)(A).”

    [27] The SEC notes that “such activities would also weigh in favor of a SPAC being considered to be primarily engaged in the business of investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities under Section 3(a)(1)(A).”

    [28] Rule 3a-2 of the ICA provides a one-year safe harbor to so-called “transient investment companies” which are issuers that, as a result of an unusual business occurrence may be considered an investment company under the statutory definitions but intend to be engaged in a non-investment company business.

    [29] Rule 419 of the ICA.

    [30] For example, the SEC highlighted, “if a SPAC were to market itself primarily as a fixed-income investment, as an alternative to an investment in a mutual fund, or as an opportunity to invest in Treasury securities or money market funds, it would likely be holding itself out as being primarily engaged in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities…[and] would likely be an investment company under Section 3(a)(1)(A).”

    [31] Final Rules, supra note 1, at 2.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    David A. Curtiss

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ele Klein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • FTC and DOJ: Preserve Your Chats!

    FTC and DOJ: Preserve Your Chats!

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FTC and DOJ: Preserve Your Chats!

    February 1, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    • The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) are updating their standard preservation notices and instructions for responding to all manner of discovery (e.g., second requests, voluntary access letters, compulsory process, etc.). The update will alert parties to the steps that must be taken to preserve communication from popular business collaboration tools and “ephemeral messaging platforms” like Slack, Microsoft Teams and Signal.
    • These platforms are typically set to delete communication data automatically and may lack appropriate capabilities for preserving and extracting data even when a preservation notice is issued. While these tools have become central features in the modern business landscape, the Agencies’ announcement is designed to clearly set out the expectation that companies and individuals will adhere to preservation requirements. Parties could be subject to criminal obstruction of justice charges if they fail to comply.
    • Highlighting the very serious concern these tools raise in the DOJ’s view, Manish Kumar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, asserted that ephemeral messaging platforms are “designed to hide evidence.”
    In depth

    What Happened

    • On January 26, 2024, the DOJ and FTC (the Agencies) announced an update to their preservation notices and instructions for responding to all manner of discovery to “address the increased use of collaboration tools and ephemeral messaging platforms in the modern workplace” and “reinforce longstanding obligations requiring companies to preserve materials during the pendency of government investigations and litigation.”
    • The Agencies recognize that ephemeral chat messaging is becoming an increasingly important feature of the modern business landscape, and they have sought to collect ephemeral messaging data in the past. However, because these platforms are typically set to delete messages automatically and may lack clear solutions for preserving data, the Agencies have run into dead ends trying to collect such data in prior cases. Indeed, Manish Kumar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Antitrust Division stated that “these updates to our legal process will ensure that neither opposing counsel nor their clients can feign ignorance when their clients or companies choose to conduct business through ephemeral messages.”
    • This new preservation language will be included in all DOJ and FTC preservation letters, second request specifications, voluntary access letters, compulsory legal process and grand jury subpoenas going forward.
    • While the new language changes are a continuation of the Agencies’ existing preservation policies, they will highlight parties’ obligations with respect to ephemeral messaging data specifically, potentially making it easier for the Agencies to seek sanctions and other recourse against companies who fail to preserve such data.
    • Indeed, the Agencies’ announcement cites a prior case where civil spoliation sanctions resulted from a target’s failure to properly preserve ephemeral messaging data. Likewise, the FTC has also signaled its willingness to refer cases to the DOJ Antitrust Division’s Criminal Liaison Unit for criminal obstruction charges in certain cases.

    What This Means

    • The Agencies have recognized in recent cases that relevant business communications that used to happen over email are now flowing through more informal channels like ephemeral messaging platforms and employee text messages. Ephemeral and text messages thus potentially represent a key source of information because the same types of communications may not be contained in email or other channels of communication.
    • Companies traditionally have precise means of preserving, collecting and producing employee email data. However, managing data from other channels can present significant challenges. For example, certain ephemeral messaging apps and collaboration tools need to be manually programmed to preserve data from automatic deletion, if it is possible at all. Other platforms lack the ability to extract data in a format that isn’t cumbersome to collate and produce.
    • Likewise, investigation compliance has become even more complicated because many employees now use text messages and messaging apps on personal devices to communicate for business purposes. Business and personal data are now intermingled and cannot be easily segregated. This can be especially problematic in industries where employees regularly travel and communicate mainly with mobile devices.

    What You Should Be Doing

    • Given the Agencies’ emphasis on the need to preserve ephemeral messaging data, and the potentially significant penalties for compliance failures, general counsel should work with their IT departments to formulate technology policies and strategies for responding to investigations.
    • For instance, companies should consider implementing policies that prevent employees from using unapproved apps or personal accounts to communicate for business purposes.
    • IT personnel should be trained to ensure that any platform used by a covered employee is set to retain all data as soon as a litigation or investigation hold is issued. Any autodelete features should be disabled immediately.
    • In addition, companies that use platforms with legal hold functions should enable such features for messaging data. For certain platforms, enabling these features will allow companies to preserve channels or custodians’ chat data centrally.
    • To that end, companies should, where possible, only approve platforms that give IT personnel admin-level control over data retention settings. Conversely, companies should avoid applications and platforms that allow employees to control their own data-retention settings.
    Authors

    Zachary Sproull

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Gregory E. Heltzer

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lisa P. Rumin

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • CMS Approves New York 1115 Medicaid Redesign Waiver

    CMS Approves New York 1115 Medicaid Redesign Waiver

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Approves New York 1115 Medicaid Redesign Waiver

    February 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On January 9, 2024, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved the New York State (NY) 1115 Medicaid waiver “Medicaid Redesign Team” (MRT). The MRT is a long-standing waiver in NY that has continuously evolved to improve the administration, structure and financing of the NY Medicaid program; enhance Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to services; and improve health outcomes across the state. The recently approved waiver represents the next step in Medicaid redesign in NY and builds on the previous Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (DSRIP) program.

    This article reviews the major initiatives included in the MRT, components of the MRT that were excluded from the approval, implications for stakeholders and more.

    In depth
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  • Georgia Bills Target AI in Healthcare

    Georgia Bills Target AI in Healthcare

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Georgia Bills Target AI in Healthcare

    February 1, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Within the last year, many states have presented or passed bills regulating artificial intelligence (AI), and Georgia is no exception.

    Georgia has drafted two pieces of legislation focused on the intersection of healthcare and AI. Most recently, proposed House Bill 887 (HB 887) introduces restrictions on the use of AI in the delivery of healthcare. It follows the recently enacted HB 203, a first-of-its-kind state law expressly permitting the use of AI tools in clinical settings. In contrast to HB 203, HB 887 cuts across care settings to address the general use of AI in a variety of healthcare settings in Georgia. If HB 887 becomes law, it has potential broad implications for any healthcare provider in Georgia. HB 887 also proposes similar restrictions on the use of AI in automated decision-making tools in public assistance and insurance coverage.

    In depth

    Background: HB 887

    HB 887, introduced by Representative Mandisha Ann-Marie Thomas, proposes to add a new Section 16 to the Georgia rules applicable to healthcare professionals: Chapter 1, Title 43, Section 34 (applicable to Physicians, Acupuncture, Physician Assistants, Cancer and Glaucoma Treatment, Respiratory Care, Clinical Perfusionists, and Orthotics and Prosthetics Practice). The proposed legislation uses a definition for “artificial intelligence” that is extremely broad and establishes a new definition for the term “automated decision tool.”

    HB 887 defines “artificial intelligence” as a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing a real or virtual environment. It defines an “automated decision tool” as a system or service that uses AI and has been specifically developed and marketed, or specifically modified, to make (or to be a controlling factor in making) consequential decisions.

    Notably, HB 887 prohibits clinicians from enacting healthcare decisions solely on results produced from AI or automated decision tools. In addition, HB 887 requires any healthcare decision-making process that results from the use or application of AI or automated decision tools to be meaningfully reviewed in accordance with the procedures established by the Georgia Composite Medical Board (the Board). HB 887 requires the Board to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations governing and establishing the standards necessary to implement the requirements in this section, including (but not limited to) disciplining any clinician who fails to comply with the restrictions on AI.

    Background: HB 203

    HB 887 is the second piece of Georgia legislation focused on the intersection of healthcare and AI. HB 203, which received overwhelming support from both the Georgia House and Senate, went into effect on July 1, 2023. It permits a prescriber to use an “assessment mechanism,” including AI devices, to conduct an eye assessment or generate a prescription for contact lenses or spectacles under certain circumstances. Similar to the proposed language in HB 887, HB 203 requires the following:

    • The data obtained from the assessment mechanism cannot be the sole basis for issuing the prescription.
    • The assessment mechanism alone cannot be used to generate an initial prescription or the first renewal of the initial prescription.
    • The assessment mechanism can only be used if the patient has had a traditional eye examination in the past two years.

    Key Takeaways

    By requiring the Board to promulgate rules to implement HB 887 and HB 203, the Georgia legislature acknowledges state medical boards’ critical role in implementing legislation involving AI in the healthcare delivery space. Perhaps recognizing that a medical board is better positioned to address the unique dynamics of a care delivery setting, the Georgia legislature does not attempt to craft how care is delivered in either bill (beyond establishing a basic prohibition against clinicians delegating their care responsibilities entirely to technology powered by AI).

    The Board is now tasked with the difficult job of articulating the “meaningful review” standards for HB 887. If put together poorly, these standards could paralyze utilization and further innovation. Accordingly, the Board will need to articulate appropriate standards that are sufficiently nuanced to balance the many concerns that arise with any innovative approach to care delivery.

    HB 887 may be drafted so broadly as to create problems. The proposed legislation creates a new definition for “artificial intelligence,” which – as currently drafted – is extremely broad and effectively restricts the utilization of any AI tool that functions without a human review component. As such, HB 887 appears to ignore existing review processes for artificial intelligence tools, such as those enumerated by the US Food and Drug Administration, that qualify the use of technology in a clinical setting. This potential problem with HB 887 – which could be described as a legislative overreaction – should not be surprising given the complexity of the subject matter and the anxiety that AI seems to be causing. Finding a balance is not always easy.

    Our cross-practice team continues to closely monitor developments in AI. Reach out to one of the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer to discuss the potential legal implications for your business.

    Authors

    Jayda Greco

    Partner

    Chicago

    Reuben Bank

    Associate

    Los Angeles

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  • The MHPAEA proposed rule: Standards of care and medical necessity

    The MHPAEA proposed rule: Standards of care and medical necessity

    ARTICLE

    The MHPAEA proposed rule: Standards of care and medical necessity

    February 1, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Blog

    Comments submitted in response to the proposed regulations under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) reflect a broad range of perspectives.

    A nontrivial subset of the comments single out a particular nonqualified treatment limitation (NQTL) for special treatment or scrutiny. An example of this trend is found in an October 16, 2023, comment letter submitted by the Legal Action Center. The letter asks the US Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury (the Departments) to address the rule’s treatment of medical standards of care and medical necessity.

    Under the 2013 final MHPAEA regulations, a plan or issuer may not impose an NQTL with respect to mental health/substance use disorder (MH/SUD) benefits in any classification unless the processes, strategies, evidentiary standards or other factors used in applying the NQTL in the classification are comparable to, and are applied no more stringently than, the processes, strategies, evidentiary standards or other factors used in applying the limitation with respect to medical/surgical (M/S) benefits. (Classifications for this purpose include inpatient, in-network; inpatient, out-of-network; outpatient, in-network; outpatient, out-of-network; emergency care; and prescription drugs.)

    The proposed regulation defines “strategies” as “practices, methods, or internal metrics that a plan or issuer considers, reviews, or uses to design an NQTL.” Compliance with and deviations from generally accepted standards of care are cited as examples. Strategies for this purpose include “the development of the clinical rationale used in approving or denying benefits,” which is the central purpose of medical necessity determinations.

    Medical necessity criteria are considered NQTLs because the criteria have the capacity to limit a patient’s access to or duration of MH/SUD treatment that are not based on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage or days in a waiting period (the latter are quantitative treatment limitations). The Legal Action Center claims that plans sometimes develop their own criteria for determining medical necessity for MH/SUD treatment or use criteria developed by nonprofit clinical specialty associations or industry entities, despite the law’s admonition that plans must treat the two comparably. Concerned that under the proposed regulation plans retain significant discretion to adopt overly restrictive medical necessity criteria, the Legal Action Center asks the Departments to revise the definition of “strategies” to include a definition of “generally accepted standards of care” that is tied to criteria and guidelines from the nonprofit clinical association for the relevant specialty.

    One way to determine the quality of a medical necessity definition is to look at claims data, which offer a useful test of parity compliance. Current law does not require parity of outcomes, but the proposed regulation does. The proposed rule would require that plans collect and evaluate outcomes data for the express purpose of assessing the impact of the NQTL on access to MH/SUD benefits. Material differences in outcomes are viewed as a strong indicator of noncompliance. (For the network composition NQTL, a material difference in outcomes data is deemed to be noncompliant.)

    It is possible for the Departments to rely on the proposed regulations’ rules governing parity of outcomes to address the Legal Action Center’s worries, although their proposed fix seems far more efficient. Either way, the Center’s concerns seem well founded. What constitutes the relevant standard of care, and what rises to the level of medical necessity, goes to the heart of the claims adjudication process for both M/S and MH/SUD benefits.

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  • The Corporate Transparency Act: Key Considerations in Estate Planning

    The Corporate Transparency Act: Key Considerations in Estate Planning

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Corporate Transparency Act: Key Considerations in Estate Planning

    January 31, 2024

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As part of your estate planning or for other purposes (e.g., for privacy reasons regarding ownership of a residence), you may have created one or more limited liability companies, limited partnerships or other entities that may now be subject to important new federal information reporting requirements imposed by the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”).[1] Below, we provide a brief overview of the first rule implementing the CTA (“BOI Rule”), discuss the types of entities subject to the BOI Rule and the information that must be included on a beneficial ownership information (“BOI”) report filed by those entities. In addition, we highlight certain implications of this law on individuals and entities involved in estate planning.

    I.  Jan. 1, 2024 Implementation of the BOI Rule.

    On Jan. 1, 2024, the BOI Rule went into effect, which requires certain legal entities that are formed or registered to do business in the US by filing a document with the secretary of state or similar office (each, a “Reporting Company”) to file a BOI report with the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).[2] This new reporting obligation is significant and is expected to have a broad impact on clients that have formed or will form legal entities to do business in the US for estate planning, privacy and family investment purposes, as many of these legal entities will not be exempt. In addition, although trusts typically used for estate planning purposes are not Reporting Companies (as such trusts are not formed by filing a document with a secretary of state), a trustee, grantor, and, in some cases, a beneficiary of such trusts, may be included on a Reporting Company’s BOI report if such individual has a certain ownership interest in or control over a Reporting Company.

    II.  Overview of the BOI Rule.

    According to FinCEN, the BOI Rule is intended to help prevent and combat money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption, tax fraud and other illicit activity. The information in the BOI report is not intended to become public, but FinCEN is authorized to share the information with certain government agencies, such as law enforcement agencies and financial regulators, and financial institutions with a Reporting Company’s consent.[3]

    On Jan. 1, 2024, FinCEN began accepting BOI reports, which are required to be filed electronically through FinCEN’s BOI E-Filing System.[4] It is the responsibility of each Reporting Company to submit a completed BOI report to FinCEN on a timely basis. Failure to do so may result in civil or criminal penalties (or both) for the Reporting Company.[5]

    Key Filing Dates:

    • Existing Entities:Reporting Companies formed or registered before Jan. 1, 2024, must file their initial BOI reports by Jan. 1, 2025.
    • New Entities: Reporting Companies formed or registered on or after Jan. 1, 2024, will have 90 days from receiving confirmation of formation or registration to submit a BOI report to FinCEN.
    • Updates/Corrections: Reporting Companies must submit updated/corrected BOI reports within 30 days after (i) any change to the information previously reported in the BOI report regarding the Reporting Company or its beneficial owners; or (ii) becoming aware (or having reason to know) of an inaccuracy regarding the information previously reported in the BOI report.[6]

    III.  Which Legal Entities are Required to File a BOI Report?

    Each Reporting Company is required to file a BOI Report with FinCEN. A “Reporting Company” is any legal entity that is formed or registered to do business in the US by filing a document (such as, in the case of a formation, Articles of Incorporation or a Certificate of Formation), with the secretary of state or similar office. The types of legal entities that are formed for estate planning purposes most commonly include limited liability companies (“LLCs”) and limited partnerships. A trust used for estate planning purposes will not typically be considered to be a Reporting Company because it does not file documents with a secretary of state or similar office.

    The BOI Rule exempts from the definition of Reporting Company twenty-three types of entities, although most of these exemptions are not likely to apply to Reporting Companies formed for estate planning or similar purposes. The exemptions that are potentially most likely to be relevant for estate planning purposes are as follows:

    1. Tax Exempt Entity – Any (a) organization defined in Section 501(c) and exempt from tax under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code; (b) political organization defined in Section 527(e)(1) and exempt from tax under Section 527(a) of the Internal Revenue Code; or (c) trust defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of Section 4947(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
    2. Entity Assisting a Tax Exempt Entity – Any entity that (a) operates exclusively to provide financial assistance to, or hold governance rights over, any tax-exempt entity (described above); (b) is a US person; (c) is beneficially owned or controlled exclusively by one or more US persons that are US citizens or lawfully admitted for permanent residence; and (d) derives at least a majority of its funding or revenue from US persons that are US citizens or lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
    3. Large Operating Company – Any entity that meets all of the following requirements: (i) has more than 20 full-time employees in the US; (ii) has more than $5 million in gross receipts or sales on its prior year’s federal income tax return; and (iii) has an operating presence at a physical location in the US.
    4. Inactive Entity – Any entity that (a) was in existence before Jan. 1, 2020; (b) is not engaged in active business; (c) is not owned by a foreign person whether directly or indirectly, wholly or partially; (d) has not experienced any change in ownership in the preceding 12 months; (e) has not sent or received any funds greater than $1,000, either directly or through any financial account in which the entity or an affiliate had an interest, in the preceding 12 months; and (f) does not hold any assets in the US or abroad, including any ownership interests in any corporation, limited liability company or other similar entity.
    5. Subsidiary of Certain Exempt Entities – Any entity whose ownership interests are controlled or wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any exempt entity, except entities assisting a tax-exempt entity or inactive entities.

    FinCEN did not create an express exemption for statutory or business trusts or family offices, although such trusts and family offices may be able to meet one of the exemptions to the definition of Reporting Company (e.g., charitable trusts that qualify for the tax-exempt status exemption and family offices that qualify for the large operating company exemption)

    IV.  Which Individuals are Required to be Identified on a BOI Report?

    A Reporting Company must disclose its own identifying information and the personally identifying information of each of its Beneficial Owners and, in certain circumstances, its Company Applicants, as defined below.

    Beneficial Owner. A “Beneficial Owner” is any individual who directly or indirectly (1) exercises substantial control over the Reporting Company or (2) owns or controls 25 percent or more of the ownership interests of the Reporting Company. The definitions of “substantial control” and “ownership interest” in the BOI Rule are quite broad, and have the potential to capture many individuals. For example, the senior officers of an LLC, such as the president, chief financial officer, general counsel, chief executive officer and chief operating officer, and any members with the right to appoint or remove a senior officer, will likely be deemed to exercise substantial control over the LLC. Although this example references specific titles, any individual who performs similar functions or has substantial influence over the business, financial or structural decisions of the Reporting Company may be deemed a Beneficial Owner. In addition, there are five ownership interest types that can be used to calculate an individual’s 25 percent ownership interest, such as (i) equity, stock or voting rights, (ii) capital or profit interests, (iii) convertible instruments, (iv) options or (v) any other instruments, contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or mechanism used to establish ownership.

    The BOI Rule contains five exceptions to the definition of Beneficial Owner: (1) a minor child, provided that a parent’s or guardian’s information is reported; (2) an individual acting as nominee, intermediary, custodian or agent on behalf of another individual; (3) an individual acting solely as an employee of a Reporting Company in specified circumstances (provided that the employee is not a senior officer); (4) an individual whose only interest in a Reporting Company is a future interest through a right of inheritance; and (5) a creditor of a Reporting Company.

    Company Applicant. Reporting Companies formed or registered to do business in the US on or after Jan. 1, 2024, must include on their BOI report information regarding the individual who directly files the document (physically or electronically) with a secretary of state or similar office that forms or registers the entity to do business in the US. This may be an employee of a corporate formation service. In addition, if there is another individual that is primarily responsible for directing or controlling the filing of the formation document or first registration document, the identifying information of this individual must also be reported. No more than two individuals may be reported as Company Applicants.

    V.  Are Trusts Beneficial Owners?

    Although trusts used for estate planning purposes are not typically Reporting Companies, as noted above, the BOI Rule requires a Reporting Company to identify any individual that, directly or indirectly, has substantial control over or owns or controls 25 percent or more of the ownership interest in a Reporting Company, which may include trust beneficiaries and other parties who participate in the creation and administration of a trust. Accordingly, the Reporting Company may require identifying information from the trust’s trustee, grantor and, in certain cases, beneficiaries, for purposes of identifying such persons as Beneficial Owners on the Reporting Company’s BOI report. Specifically, where a trust owns or controls a Reporting Company, the individuals listed below must be reported as Beneficial Owners:

    1. Any trustee of the trust or other individual (such as trust protector, distribution trustee or trust committee member) with the authority to dispose of trust assets;
    2. Any beneficiary who is the sole current permissible recipient of trust income and principal from the trust, or who has the right to demand a distribution of or withdraw substantially all of the trust assets[7]; or
    3. Any grantor who has the right to revoke or otherwise withdraw trust assets.

    It is necessary to evaluate whether any individuals have substantial control over, or own or control a 25 percent or more ownership interest in, a Reporting Company through a trust arrangement, as such individuals would be considered Beneficial Owners of the Reporting Company. More than one individual in a trust arrangement (e.g., trustee and beneficiary) may be considered a Beneficial Owner of a Reporting Company. In addition, it is necessary to conduct this analysis while considering the facts of a particular trust arrangement, including whether any minor children or non-vested beneficiaries are involved, as these individuals may be excepted from the definition of Beneficial Owner.

    VI. What Identifying Information Must be Included on a BOI Report?

    Reporting Company. A Reporting Company must report the following information about itself: (1) full legal name; (2) any trade name or “doing business as” name; (3) the street address of its principal place of business or, in the case of a foreign Reporting Company doing business in the US, the primary location in the US where the foreign Reporting Company does business; (4) the jurisdiction of formation; (5) for any foreign Reporting Company doing business in the US, the State where the entity first registers to do business; and (6) taxpayer identification number and name of taxing jurisdiction.

    Beneficial Owners and Company Applicants. The Reporting Company must report the following information about each Beneficial Owner and Company Applicant: (1) full legal name; (2) date of birth; (3) residential street address; (4) unique identifying number and issuing jurisdiction from their government-issued identification document (e.g., US driver’s license or US or foreign passport); and (5) the image of the document that shows the unique identifying number.

    FinCEN Identifier. Beneficial Owners and Company Applicants may register for a unique number (a “FinCEN Identifier”) by submitting an application to FinCEN that includes the identifying information that would otherwise have been included on a BOI report.[8] Once obtained, a FinCEN Identifier can be used on a BOI report instead of providing the required information listed above. This may be preferable to limit the disclosure of personal information that a Beneficial Owner or Company Applicant would have to give to the Reporting Company.

    VII.  Key Takeaways.

    If you have formed one or more LLCs or other entities in connection with your estate planning (or home ownership, or other personal reason), such entities may be Reporting Companies and be required to submit a BOI report to FinCEN in 2024. Each entity will need to be analyzed to determine if it is a Reporting Company and, if so, what information must be included on a BOI report. It may take time to collect the necessary information, so it is important to begin the process of evaluating the reporting obligations of your entities with your financial advisors, accountants and attorneys. If you are planning to create a new legal entity for estate planning purposes in 2024, please be aware that the initial BOI report must be submitted to FinCEN within 90 days after formation.

    Given the complexity of the BOI Rule, and because FinCEN is continuing to issue guidance and, most recently, a Small Business Compliance Guide[9] to aid the public in complying with the BOI Rule, clients should carefully evaluate the appropriate filing requirements. FinCEN has indicated that it is intending to issue guidance specific to trust arrangements, which could differ from or add nuance to the information discussed above. The information provided herein should be considered in conjunction with any applicable guidance that FinCEN may issue.

    Please contact your Schulte attorney if you have any questions about whether the reporting requirements imposed by the BOI Rule will apply to you, or if you wish to discuss other estate planning opportunities as they relate to your specific financial and personal situation.


    [1] In addition to the new federal reporting requirements, on Dec. 22, 2023, the New York LLC Transparency Act was signed into law, which will require New York LLCs to disclose their beneficial owners to the New York Department of State, unless an exemption applies. New York LLCs will be permitted to file a BOI report filed with FinCEN with the New York Department of State. This information will only be accessible to federal, state and local government agencies and law enforcement in New York and is not intended to be publicly available.

    [2]   31 C.F.R. § 1010.380; Final Rule, Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59498 (Sept. 30, 2022). For more information on the BOI reporting obligation please see our prior Alerts: (1) “FinCEN Issues Final Rule Requiring Reporting of Beneficial Ownership Information,” available here; (2) “The Corporate Transparency Act: Key Considerations for Compliance With the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule,” available here and (3) “The Corporate Transparency Act: The Private Funds Guide to Compliance With the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule,” available here.

    [3]   For more information regarding the extent to which BOI information reported to FinCEN will be shared and secured, please see our prior Alert “Final Rule on Access to Beneficial Ownership Information”  

    [4]    For more information regarding how to file a BOI report and FinCEN Identifier application, please see our prior Alert “Corporate Transparency Act Update: Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule Now Effective and FinCEN Is Accepting Reports.”

    [5]   Any individual, Reporting Company or other entity that willfully provides, or attempts to provide, false or fraudulent beneficial ownership information to FinCEN, or willfully fails to report complete or updated beneficial ownership information to FinCEN may be liable for civil or criminal penalties.

    [6]  Reporting Companies are not required to update previously reported information about their Company Applicants, but are required to correct any inaccurate information previously reported about their Company Applicants.

    [7] A Reporting Company will not be required to report current beneficiaries who are sprinkle beneficiaries of a trust as Beneficial Owners, unless a sprinkle beneficiary has substantial control over the Reporting Company.

    [8]   Reporting Companies can also obtain a FinCEN Identifier by checking a box on their BOI report.

    [9]   FinCEN, Small Entity Compliance Guide, Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements (Version 1.1, December 2023), available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • NYDFS Issues Proposed Guidance on AI and External Consumer Data Use

    NYDFS Issues Proposed Guidance on AI and External Consumer Data Use

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    NYDFS Issues Proposed Guidance on AI and External Consumer Data Use

    January 30, 2024

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On January 17, 2024, the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) issued a proposed Circular Letter that provides guidance for authorized insurers using external consumer data and information sources (ECDIS) and artificial intelligence systems (AIS) in underwriting and pricing. NYDFS requests feedback on the draft by March 17, 2024.

    For the past several years, federal and state agencies, along with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (the NAIC), have been evaluating the impact of ECDIS and AIS[1] use on consumers, specifically focusing on potential unlawful discrimination. The Circular Letter, which follows the work of the NAIC on a Model Bulletin addressing insurer use of artificial intelligence (AI) and the Colorado Division of Insurance’s implementation of legislation enacted in 2021, is the most recent example of engagement by state insurance regulators in this area. The Circular Letter also emphasizes AI safety, security and equity and responsible AI governance principles that align with the themes of the Biden administration’s landmark October 2023 executive order on AI.

    Throughout this article, we summarize the Circular Letter and offer our preliminary takeaways and commentary. For further background, please see our prior report, “NYDFS issues proposed guidance on AI and external consumer data use.”

    In depth

    Summary

    First, insurers within the scope of the Circular Letter should carefully consider NYDFS’ guidance when complying with applicable New York statutes and regulations, including those cited in the Circular Letter. However, even if formally issued by NYDFS, the Circular Letter does not have the force of law. Although NYDFS is requesting feedback before presumably formally issuing the Circular Letter, such input is not equivalent to the comprehensive analysis, debate and process required to enact legislation or promulgate a regulation.

    Second, the Circular Letter applies only to authorized insurers using ECDIS and AIS for underwriting or pricing.

    Third, the Circular Letter states that NYDFS will examine an insurer’s use of ECDIS and AIS under Sections 308 and 309 of the New York Insurance Law and the guidance in the Circular Letter.

    Lastly, in addition to addressing authorized insurers’ use of ECDIS and AIS, the Circular Letter also seeks to clarify the disclosure requirements in NYDFS’ 2019 Circular Letter No. 1, which was issued to authorized life insurers using expedited, accelerated or algorithmic underwriting.

    NYDFS Guidance in the Proposed Circular Letter

    The Circular Letter states that insurers should establish governance processes, policies and procedures to ensure ECDIS and AIS use complies with applicable New York law. The Circular Letter reminds insurers that NYDFS “expects that insurers use of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence will be conducted in a manner that complies with all applicable federal and state laws, rules, and regulations.”

    The Circular Letter recognizes the importance of industry innovation, stating, “[t]he use of [ECDIS] and [AIS] can both benefit insurers and consumers alike by simplifying and expediting insurance underwriting and pricing processes, and potentially result in more accurate underwriting and pricing of insurance.” NYDFS states that it expects insurers “who utilize such technologies establish a proper governance and risk management framework to mitigate the potential harm to consumers and comply with all relevant legal obligations” and to address the following:

    • Fairness Principles. “An insurer should not use ECDIS or AIS for underwriting or pricing purposes unless the insurer can establish that the data source or model, as applicable, does not use and is not based in any way on any class protected pursuant to Insurance Law Article 26…” or in a way that such “use would result in or permit any unfair discrimination or otherwise violate [insurance laws] or any regulations.” To show compliance, the insurer should be able to demonstrate:
      • Data validation in accordance with “generally accepted actuarial standards of practice and are based on actual or reasonably anticipated experience, including, but not limited to, statistical studies, predictive modeling, and risk assessments”
      • Proxy assessments that demonstrate that the ECDIS does “not serve as a proxy for any protected classes that may result in unfair or unlawful discrimination”
      • Comprehensive underwriting and pricing assessments that demonstrate that “ECDIS or AIS does not collect or use criteria that would constitute unfair or unlawful discrimination or an unfair trade practice,” including the evaluation of any use of third-party software, data, services or products to ensure they meet the insurer’s compliance obligations, and should address:
        • “[W]hether the use of ECDIS or AIS produces disproportionate adverse effects in underwriting and/or pricing on similarly situated insureds, or insureds of a protected class”
        • “[I]f there is prima facie showing of such a disproportionate adverse effect, further assessing whether there is a legitimate, lawful, and fair explanation or rationale for the differential effect on similarly situated insureds,” or if there is a finding of prima facie evidence, the insurer should alter the way it uses ECDIS or AIS to account for the differential effect
        • “[I]f a legitimate, lawful, and fair explanation or rationale can account for the differential effect, further conducting and appropriately documenting a search and analysis for a less discriminatory alternative variable(s) or methodology that would reasonably meet the insurer’s legitimate business needs.”
      • Document the processes and reasoning behind its testing methodologies and analysis for unfair or unlawful discrimination commensurate with the insurer’s use of ECDIS and AIS and the complexity and materiality of such ECDIS and AIS
      • Test regularly and frequently to confirm the insurer meets such compliance obligations
      • Perform a quantitative assessment that “use[s] multiple statistical metrics in evaluating data and model outputs to ensure a comprehensive understanding” and compliance, including adverse impact ratios, denial odds ratios, marginal effects, standardized mean differences, Z-tests and T-Tests, and drivers of disparity
      • Perform a qualitative assessment of unfair or unlawful discrimination, which includes “[being] able to explain, at all times, how the insurer’s AIS operates and to articulate the intuitive logical relationship between ECDIS and other model variables with an insured or potential insured individual’s risk”
    • Governance and Risk Management. The Circular Letter reminds insurers of their obligations under 11 NYCRR § 90.2 “to have a corporate governance framework that is appropriate for the nature, scale, and complexity of the insurer,” which includes the following:
      • Board and senior management oversight
      • Policies, procedures and documentation including, but not limited to:
        • “[A]n up-to-date inventory of all AIS implemented for use, under development for implementation, or recently retired”
        • “[A] description of how each AIS operates, including any ECDIS or other inputs and their sources”
        • “[A] description of the process for tracking changes of an insurer’s use of ECDIS and AIS over time”
        • “[A] description of testing conducted to periodically assess the output of AIS models”
        • “[A] description of data lifecycle management process”
      • A consumer complaint response and resolution process
      • Risk management and internal controls, including an audit function
      • Third-party vendor due diligence and compliance, ensuring that the insurer’s use of third-party software, data, services and products comply with these requirements and that appropriate contractual terms and monitoring are in place
    • Transparency and Disclosure. The Circular Letter states “[a]s discussed in Circular Letter No. 1 (2019), transparency is an important consideration in the use of ECDIS to underwrite and price insurance,” so the insurer will need to continue to comply with its obligations for the disclosure of the use of certain ECDIS and AIS in the underwriting and pricing process while clarifying what types of data elements or use of data should be disclosed to a consumer as it relates to underwriting and pricing. “The failure to adequately disclose the material elements of an AIS, and the external data sources upon which it relies, to a consumer may constitute an unfair trade practice under Insurance Law Article 24.”

    Further, where an insurer is using ECDIS or AIS and there is a declination, limitation, rate differential or other adverse underwriting decision, “the reason or reasons provided to the insured or potential insured, or a medical professional designee, should include details about all information upon which the insurer based any declination, limitation, rate differential, or other adverse underwriting decision, including the specific source of the information upon which the insurer based its adverse underwriting or pricing decision.” The notice shall specifically disclose “(i) whether the insurer uses AIS in its underwriting or pricing process, (ii) whether the insurer uses data about the person obtained from external vendors, and (iii) that such person has the right to request information about the specific data that resulted in the underwriting or pricing decision, including contact information for making such request.”

    Takeaways/Commentary

    The Circular Letter, as with the NAIC Model Bulletin, is a reminder to insurers of their obligations under existing laws when using AI, including those regulating unlawful/unfair discrimination, corporate governance and risk management frameworks, underwriting and pricing, actuarial, disclosure and related requirements. NYDFS unsurprisingly intends to be at the forefront of the race to establish guardrails around the use of AI in insurance and had previously signaled its intention to issue this guidance.

    The Circular Letter combines a principles-based approach (See NAIC Model Bulletin) with certain aspects of the Colorado legislation when requiring an insurer to conduct detailed testing to prove that its use of ECDIS and AIS does not permit unlawful discrimination.

    The Circular Letter’s emphasis on data set documentation and the actuarial validity of data is consistent with emerging best practices that promote deliberate reflection about how data sets might affect AI systems. Often, harm caused by AI can be traced back to the characteristics of underlying data sets. Additionally, the Circular Letter’s emphasis on risk and impact assessments to determine whether the use of ECDIS or AIS produces adverse or discriminatory effects aligns with guidance in the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s AI Risk Management Framework, a voluntary guidance document intended to guide organizations to increase the trustworthiness of AI systems.

    The documentation, testing and ongoing monitoring expectations in the Circular Letter may prove challenging to operationalize for in-scope insurers that have not yet developed an internal AI governance program. As a practical next step, an insurer could conduct an inventory of current AIS and ECDIS use or development within its organization. Each AIS, for example, may require varying types of quantitative and qualitative testing depending on its context of use and intended outputs.

    It is unclear how NYDFS may enforce the guidance in the Circular Letter once issued. The guidance does not have the force of law but suggests insurers using ECDIS and AIS take comprehensive action subject to NYDFS examination. Licensed insurers that currently use or plan to deploy AIS and ECDIS should carefully review the Circular Letter and are invited to submit comments to NYDFS by March 17, 2024.

    For more insights on what’s ahead for AI in 2024, including general guidance on AI governance and risk management considerations, please see our Special Report, AI and the Next Frontier: Understanding What’s Ahead in 2024.

    If you want to discuss the Circular Letter more in-depth or have any questions, please reach out to the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    H. Michael Byrne

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Amber Adair

    Partner

    Dallas

    Shawn C. Helms

    Partner

    Dallas

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