Content Type: Article

  • DOL Reacts to Fifth Circuit Ruling Vacating Expansion of Fiduciary Rule

    ARTICLE

    DOL Reacts to Fifth Circuit Ruling Vacating Expansion of Fiduciary Rule

    June 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Chris Nemeth, Brian Tiemann and Samantha Souza wrote this bylined article about the Department of Labor’s guidance following the Fifth Circuit ruling to strike down the New Fiduciary Rule and the possibility of the SEC developing its own regulations. “Plan sponsors should continue to follow developments related to the enforceability of the New Fiduciary Rule and the SEC’s proposed fiduciary regulations,” they said.

    In depth
    Authors

    J. Christian Nemeth

    Partner

    Chicago, Miami

    Brian J. Tiemann

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Three Provocative Business Bankruptcy Decisions of 2018

    Three Provocative Business Bankruptcy Decisions of 2018

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Three Provocative Business Bankruptcy Decisions of 2018

    June 25, 2018

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The appellate courts are usually the last stop for parties in business bankruptcy cases. The courts issued at least three provocative, if not questionable, decisions in the past six months. Their decisions have not only created uncertainty, but will also generate further litigation over reorganization plan manipulation, arbitration of routine bankruptcy disputes and the treatment of trademark licenses in reorganization cases. Each decision apparently disposes of routine issues in business cases. A closer look at each case, though, reveals the sad truth: they are anything but routine.

    Insiders

    The U.S. Supreme Court tops the list with In re The Village at Lakeridge LLC, 138 S.Ct. 960 (March 5, 2018). On its surface, the Court merely held that “a clear-error standard should apply” to the narrow question of whether a “non-statutory insider” finding by a bankruptcy court is subject to de novo or clear error review on appeal. Id. at 963. But four justices stressed in two concurrences that the Court’s opinion was limited to “whether the [Ninth Circuit] applied the correct standard of review,” not whether “the test for non-statutory insider status as formulated [by] the Ninth Circuit is sufficient” Id. at 969 (Kennedy, J). Justice Sotomayor, joined by three Justices, wrote “separately . . . because [she was] concerned that our holding eludes the more fundamental question whether the Ninth Circuit’s underlying test [for insider status] is correct.” Id., at 970. As the four Justices agreed, the “Court’s discussion of the standard of review . . . begs the question of what the appropriate test for determining non-statutory insider status is,” noting that “the Court expressly declined to grant certiorari on it.” Id.

    The Court’s disappointing limited review in Lakeridge warrants a review of the record below. See In re The Village at Lakeridge LLC, 814 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2016) (2-1) (“a creditor does not become an insider simply by receiving a claim from a statutory insider”). According to the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel, “insiders are either statutory [per se] [e.g., officers; directors] or non-statutory [de facto].” For a person to be a de facto insider, said the Ninth Circuit, “the creditor must have a close relationship with the debtor and negotiate the relevant transaction at less than arm’s length.” The creditor in question here, R, did “not qualify as either a statutory or non-statutory insider” for voting on the debtor’s Chapter 11 cramdown plan. Id.

    The debtor in Lakeridge proposed a Chapter 11 plan to deal with the claims of its two creditors, one of which was secured (a bank) and the other an insider. Because the bank rejected the plan, the debtor intended to cram down the bank’s secured claim. Shortly after filing its plan and disclosure statement, the debtor’s insider sold its unsecured claim to R, a close business and personal friend, for $5,000, enabling the debtor to classify R’s claim as a “general unsecured claim.” Because R was found not to be a de facto insider, he “could vote to accept the [debtor’s plan] under [Code] § 1129(a)(10) [as] an impaired creditor who was not an insider.” Id. at 998. Affirming the lower courts, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual such as R did not become an insider solely by acquiring the claim from a statutory insider. In its view, insider status was a factual inquiry that had to be conducted on a case-by-case basis — “a question of fact.” Id. at 998-1000. The Ninth Circuit rejected the bank’s argument that its holding would allow debtors to assign their claims to third parties in return for votes in favor of plan confirmation.

    The powerfully persuasive dissent in the Ninth Circuit agreed with the majority’s legal analysis as to the elements of insider status, but, “on the facts of this case,” deemed R a de facto insider. In its view, “[w]ithout the sale of [the insider’s] claim to [R] and his anticipated vote to approve the [debtor’s cramdown] plan, that plan [was] dead in the water.” Id. at 1004. According to the dissent, the “savvy debtor” here formulated “a reorganization plan . . . that would provide a payout on [an] insider claim” and then sold “the claim to a friendly third party for a price lower than the payout . . . ensuring [an acceptance] and thereby allowing the debtor to effectively avoid the requirement under [Bankruptcy Code] § 1129(a)(10) that at least one non-insider approve the plan.” Id., at 1007. The critical issue, therefore, was whether R, the sole unsecured creditor was an insider, for his acceptance of the debtor’s reorganization plan was essential to confirmation. Because there was no other accepting impaired creditor class, confirmation of the plan turned on R’s not being an insider.

    The dissent rejected the majority’s application of the law to the facts of the case, stressing the following undisputed facts:

    • R paid $5,000 for a nominal claim of $2.76 million held by the insider;
    • The selling insider creditor did not offer the claim to any other party;
    • R did not solicit the claim;
    • The insider proposed to R that he buy the claim;
    • Neither the insider nor R negotiated over the price for the claim;
    • R knew nothing or little about the debtor before buying the claim;
    • R made no investigation regarding the value of the claim before or after his purchase;
    • R knew nothing regarding the debtor apart from its proposed treatment of the claim under its plan prior to his later deposition by the bank;
    • After learning of a $30,000 distribution on the claim during his deposition, R still rejected the bank’s offer to purchase the claim for $60,000;
    • The insider needed R’s acceptance of the plan, which could not “be approved unless there was a class of creditors willing to vote to approve it.” at 1004;
    • The debtor’s insiders were “primarily motivated to place the unsecured claim in the hands of a friendly creditor who could be counted on to vote in favor of the reorganization plan, opening the door to . . . approval of the proposed plan . . . .” Id; and
    • R had a close business and personal relationship with the selling insider, the person who proposed the sale of the claim to him.

    Id., at 1002-05.

    The dissent’s characterization of R as a de facto insider turned on the premise that the sale of the claim was not negotiated at arm’s length. Although the bankruptcy court found that R and the insider were “separate financial entities,” it did not and could not find that the transaction “was conducted as if they were strangers.” Id. at 1005. According to the dissent, “even if the clear error standard [of appellate review] applies, the finding that [R] was not a [de facto] insider cannot survive scrutiny.” Id. at 1006. In its view, no reviewing court “could reasonably conclude that this transaction was conducted as if [R] and [the insider] were strangers.”

    The Ninth Circuit’s holding, now affirmed by the Supreme Court, may have a long-term negative effect on the formulation of reorganization plans in other cases. It will, at least in the Ninth Circuit, facilitate creative plan manipulation by “savvy” debtors.

    The Sixth Circuit, in contrast to Lakeridge, held that a Chapter 11 plan’s contrived impairment of two unsecured claims held by the debtor’s former lawyer and accountant “was transparently an artifice to circumvent the purposes of” the Bankruptcy Code. In re Village Green I GP, 811 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2016). Affirming the reversal of the bankruptcy court’s finding that the debtor had “proposed its plan in good faith” under § 1129(a)(3), the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtor’s “assertion that it could not safely pay off the [two] minor [friendly] claims (total value: less than $2,400) up front rather than in over 60 days.” Had the bank in Lakeridge raised the debtor’s lack of good faith in proposing its plan, as evidenced by the apparently collusive sale of the insider claim to R, the result might have been different. See In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 255 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Claim purchasers are entities who knowingly and voluntarily enter the bankruptcy process . . . . [A] purchaser should know that it is taking on the risks . . . attendant to the bankruptcy process . . . . [A] claim purchaser’s opportunity to profit is partly created by the risks inherent in bankruptcy. Disallowance of a claim . . . is among these risks”; transferred claim disallowed because transferor had received preference); In re Metiom Inc., 301 B.R. 634, 642 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (because Code “disallows the claim . . . [t]he claim and defense to the claim . . . cannot be altered by the claimant’s subsequent assignment of the claim to another entity . . .”).

    Arbitration

    A bankruptcy court properly denied a bank’s motion to compel arbitration of a debtor’s asserted violation of the court’s discharge injunction, held the Second Circuit on March 7, 2018. In re Anderson, 884 F.3d 382, 392 (2d Cir. 2018). The debtor’s breached credit card agreement with the defendant bank had mandated arbitration of any dispute, including a claim for injunctive relief, and precluded the debtor’s right to participate in a class action. Two years after getting his bankruptcy discharge, the former Chapter 7 debtor asked the creditor bank to change its accurate credit report that showed his default, but the bank refused. The debtor then reopened his bankruptcy case and started a class action, alleging that the bank was seeking to collect on its discharged claim, although the bank had previously sold the claim to a third party.

    Finding a purported “inherent conflict between arbitration of [the debtor’s] claim and the Bankruptcy Code,” the Second Circuit reasoned that the bankruptcy court “properly considered the conflicting policies [of the Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code] in accordance with law.” Id., quoting In re United States Lines Inc., 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999). To reach its extraordinary result, the court strained to distinguish Anderson from its earlier decision in MBNA America Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2006) (held, arbitration of debtor’s “automatic stay claim would not necessarily jeopardize or inherently conflict with the Bankruptcy Code”). The Second Circuit also ignored Supreme Court precedent as well as the text of the Bankruptcy Code, the Judiciary Code and relevant legislative history.

    The Supreme Court, on May 21, 2018, later held in another case that “employees and employers [were] allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration,” and preclude “class or collective actions . . . .” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 2018 WL 2292444, *3 (2018) (5-4). Finding no conflict between the Arbitration Act and the National Labor Relations Act, the Court stressed that it “has heard and rejected efforts to conjure conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other federal statutes. In fact, this Court has rejected every such effort to date (save one temporary exception since overruled), with statutes ranging from the Sherman Clayton Act to the Age Discrimination Employment Act, the Credit Repair Organizations Act, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act.” Id. at *11 (emphasis in original). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the creditor bank in Anderson filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on June 8, 2018.

    The Second Circuit’s Anderson decision is problematic in at least two respects. First, it failed to cite a significant contrary district court decision. Belton v. GE Capital Consumer Lending Bank, 2015 WL 6163083, *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015) (Congress never “intended to preclude arbitration of [ § ] 524 [discharge violation] claims”; Congress gave federal district courts non-exclusive jurisdiction over [such] claims; no “inherent conflict” between arbitrating such claims and underlying purpose of Bankruptcy Code; debtor’s rights could be vindicated in arbitration; discharge injunction a “national form”; nothing suggested that “bankruptcy court . . . more qualified than an arbitrator to adjudicate [discharge violation] claim[s].”). Belton is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit.

    Second, nothing in the text or the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code even suggests that Congress intended bankruptcy courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over discharge violation claims. In its earlier Hill decision, the Second Circuit conceded that when “arbitration would not interfere with or affect the distribution of the estate” or “affect an ongoing reorganization,” a bankruptcy court lacks discretion to deny arbitration. 463 F.3d at 109-110, citing Bigelow v. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp., 2000 WL 33596476, *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2000) (compelled arbitration of discharge violation claim). In Anderson, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was closed and the debtor had already received his discharge. Arbitration, therefore, would have had no effect on a reorganization or on distributions to creditors.

    More important, Congress provided exclusive federal-court jurisdiction over specific bankruptcy-related claims (e.g., § 327), but not § 524 discharge violation claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) & (e). Congress, in fact, gave bankruptcy courts non-exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“ . . . original but not exclusive jurisdiction . . . ”). Resolution of a discharge violation claim hardly requires unique bankruptcy expertise, for the issue is only whether the alleged act sought “to collect” a discharged debt. In Anderson, the arbitrator was required to be either a lawyer or a former judge.

    Rejection of Trademark License

    A Chapter 11 debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark license “left [the non-debtor licensee] with only a pre-petition damages claim in lieu of any obligation by Debtor to further perform under . . . the trademark license,” held the First Circuit on Jan. 12, 2018. In re Temptnology LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 2018) (2-1). Reversing the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) and affirming the bankruptcy court, the First Circuit explained that “we favor the categorical approach of leaving trademark licenses unprotected from [bankruptcy] court approved rejection.” Id. at 404. Thus, the licensee’s “right to use Debtor’s trademarks did not otherwise survive rejection of the” license. Id. at 396.

    The key trademark issue, said the First Circuit “poses for this circuit an issue of first impression concerning which other circuits are split.” Id. at 392. It expressly noted the Seventh Circuit’s contrary view in Sunbeam Products Inc. v. Chicago American Mfg. LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012) (right to use debtor’s trademark continues post-rejection), a view shared by an important judge on the Third Circuit. In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 964-68 (3d Cir. 2002) (Ambro, J., concurring). The First Circuit, though, followed the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enters. Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (effect of rejection was to terminate intellectual property license). The licensee, of course, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on June 12, 2018.

    The First Circuit distinguished between a “statutory breach” and a “common law breach.” 879 F.3d at 396, citing Lubrizol. It then argued that Congress only partially overturned Lubrizol in 1988 when it defined intellectual property in Code § 101(35A) and had specifically excluded trademarks from any new statutory protection from contract rejection. 879 F.3d at 401.

    Disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam decision, the court reasoned that the goal of Code § 365(a) is to release the debtor “from burdensome obligations.” Id. at *402. According to the First Circuit, a debtor should not be forced to choose between performing its obligations under the license agreement or risking the loss of its trademarks under applicable federal law. Any such “restriction on Debtor’s ability to free itself from its executory obligations, even if limited to trademark licenses alone, would depart from the manner in which section 365(a) operates.” Id., at 403. “In sum, . . . Sunbeam entirely ignores the residual enforcement burden it would impose on the debtor just as the Code otherwise allows the debtor to free itself from executory burdens. [It] also rests on a logic that invites further degradation of the debtor’s fresh start options.” Id. at 404.

    The majority opinion in Temptnology relied on the premise that federal bankruptcy law preempts federal trademark law, taking a “categorical approach” that values reorganization over other business concerns. The case is now ripe for U.S. Supreme Court review, given the circuit split.

    The Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam decision is more persuasive. Merely because trademarks are not covered by the protection of § 365(n) means nothing: “an omission is just an omission.” 686 F.3d at 375. “According to the Senate committee report on the bill that included § 365(n), the omission was designed to allow more time for study, not to approve [the Fourth Circuit’s] Lubrizol [decision].” Id. Also, “[o]utside of bankruptcy, a licensor’s breach does not terminate a licensee’s right to use intellectual property . . . . [N]othing about [the rejection] process implies that any rights of the other contracting party have been vaporized . . . . [R]ejection is not the functional equivalent of a rescission, rendering void the contract and requiring that the parties be put back in the positions they occupied before the contract was formed.” Id. 376-77.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author. 


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • New Foreign Tax Credit Rules May Warrant Restructuring Foreign Branches

    New Foreign Tax Credit Rules May Warrant Restructuring Foreign Branches

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Foreign Tax Credit Rules May Warrant Restructuring Foreign Branches

    June 25, 2018

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    The 2017 Tax Act added a separate foreign tax credit limitation category, or basket, for income earned in a foreign branch. As a result, certain US groups may be limited in their ability to use foreign income taxes paid or accrued by a foreign branch as a credit against their US federal income tax liability.

    This new limitation can present a problem for a taxpayer with losses in some foreign branches and income in other foreign branches. Consider, for example, a US consolidated group that has $1,000 of losses from Foreign Branch X and $1,000 of income in Foreign Branch Y on which it pays $200 of foreign income taxes. The group would have zero income in its foreign branch basket, and therefore the $200 of foreign taxes would not be currently usable as a foreign tax credit. The credits can be carried over to other tax years, but they may never be tax benefited if the above circumstances continue.

    In addition, the reduction in the US corporate tax rate results in foreign taxes paid by a foreign branch in excess of 21 percent (vs. 35 percent) not being currently usable. This problem can be exacerbated by the allocation of expenses to the group’s foreign branch income causing the foreign branch credit limitation to be even lower. Such taxes may never be benefited unless the US group has low-taxed foreign branch income.

    Therefore, a taxpayer may consider taking steps to reduce foreign branch income subject to foreign taxation by moving all or a portion of the branch’s business into the United States. The income generally would continue to be subject to US tax at a rate of 21 percent, or may qualify for a tax rate of 13.125 percent to the extent that income is foreign-derived intangible income. Any foreign tax implications of such restructuring will need to be considered.

    Alternatively, a taxpayer may transfer the branch business to a foreign subsidiary (a CFC), or elect to classify a disregarded foreign entity as a corporation. The income earned by the CFC (less 10 percent of depreciable tangible assets) generally would be subject to a 10.5 percent US tax rate under the new Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime and US tax may be reduced by 80 percent of the foreign income taxes paid on the GILTI, but any foreign taxes not used in the current year would be lost. A portion of the CFC’s income may be Subpart F income, which is generally taxed at a 21 percent rate, but if the foreign income tax rate exceeds that rate, an election can be made to exclude the income from current US taxation. Alternatively, the US tax on any Subpart F income may be reduced with foreign tax credits and any excess credits may be used to reduce US tax on other foreign source business income of the US group or carried forward. The transfer of a branch to a CFC would be taxable for US purposes, but the benefits may outweigh the costs (including that any annual deemed royalty income from the transfer of intangible property and goodwill may qualify for the 13.125 percent tax rate and fall within the general basket).

    Authors

    Damon M. Lyon

    Partner

    Chicago

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • SEC Director Makes Groundbreaking Speech about Blockchain Token Sales

    SEC Director Makes Groundbreaking Speech about Blockchain Token Sales

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Director Makes Groundbreaking Speech about Blockchain Token Sales

    June 19, 2018

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance William Hinman gave a speech in which he discussed whether a digital asset originally offered as a security can become something other than a security over time. The speech provided some of the most important considerations to date for analysis of blockchain token transactions under US securities law.

    In depth

    In a speech before the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto, William Hinman (Director Hinman), the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the SEC’s) Director of the Division of Corporation Finance discusses whether a digital asset offered as a security can, over time, become something other than a security. Although preceded by the standard disclaimer that the speech expresses Director Hinman’s personal views and not necessarily those of the SEC, its Commissioners or other members of its staff, the carefully worded speech nonetheless provides some of the most important considerations to date for analysis of blockchain token transactions pursuant to US securities law. Director Hinman explains that he is excited about “the potential for distributed ledger technology to share information, transfer value, and record transactions in a decentralized environment.” The key takeaways of Director Hinman’s speech are:

    1. A token “all by itself is not a security,” rather, the transactions pursuant to which it is distributed may be securities transactions. The securities law analysis of the transactions may change over time.2. Currently the Bitcoin and Ether networks are sufficiently decentralized that the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws seem to add little value. Over time, other networks may be sufficiently decentralized such that the tokens that function on them may not need to be regulated as securities.3. The form of a transaction is less important than the economic reality of the transaction. Where tokens are sold to raise money to fund an enterprise, and where the token purchasers rely on the efforts of someone other than themselves to see a profit, sale of the tokens may be a securities transaction.4. A non-exclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether third-party activity and the features of a token suggest that the transfer of tokens is a securities transaction. He also acknowledged that the application of securities laws to initial sales of a blockchain token will impact secondary market transactions in the token.5. The SEC welcomes dialogue with token promoters and their counsel and is prepared to provide more formal interpretations and no-action guidance.

    A Token “All by Itself Is Not a Security.” Importantly, Director Hinman distinguishes between the actual token on the one hand, and the manner in which it is sold and the reasonable expectations of the purchasers on the other. For some time, lawyers have been emphasizing that just as the orange groves in Howey were not securities, depending on the facts and circumstances, a token itself may not be a security, even if the contract under which it is sold is a security. Director Hinman agrees, stating that of the ICOs he is seeing, “strictly speaking, the token – or coin or whatever the digital information packet is called – all by itself is not a security, just as the orange groves in Howey were not.” In a footnote to the written version of the speech, Director Hinman does not opine on the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT), however, he states that “I believe a token once offered in a security offering can, depending on the circumstances, later be offered in a non-securities transaction. I expect that some, perhaps many, may not.”

    Director Hinman also notes that “[i]f a promoter were to place Bitcoin in a fund or trust and sell interests, it would create a new security. Similarly, investment contracts can be made out of virtually any asset (including virtual assets), provided the investor is reasonably expecting profits from the promoter’s efforts.”

    “Decentralized” Networks. Director Hinman believes that the Bitcoin network is sufficiently decentralized, so that requiring disclosure pursuant to the securities laws to the offer and resale of Bitcoin “would seem to add little value.” Although he declines to take a position on the original fundraising for Ether, he states that based on his understanding of “the present state of Ether, the Ethereum network and its decentralized structure, current offers and sales of Ether are not securities transactions.”

    Director Hinman discusses a key policy underlying the securities laws, noting that “[t]he impetus of the Securities Act [of 1933] is to remove the information asymmetry between promoters and investors.” As Director Hinman explains, the Securities Act of 1933 requires that those who issue securities to the public provide information to investors so they can make an informed investment decision, and imposes liability on the promoters for material misstatements in those offering materials. He finds that the disclosures required under the securities laws “nicely complement the Howey investment contract element about the efforts of others,” and that where investors are relying on the efforts of others to run the enterprise, they need adequate information to make an informed decision about their investment. “These are important safeguards, and they are appropriate for most ICOs.” Where, however a network is “sufficiently decentralized – where purchasers would no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts – the assets may not represent an investment contract.” Therefore, “when the efforts of the third party are no longer a key factor for determining the enterprise’s success, material information asymmetries recede. As a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite disclosures becomes difficult, and less meaningful.”

    Although he includes factors to consider in assessing whether a digital asset is offered as a security, a key challenge for the SEC will be the development of factors that are determinative of decentralization.

    Economic Reality. Director Hinman discusses SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. (Howey), the case in which the Supreme Court interpreted whether the sale of a contract for orange groves was a transaction to which securities laws apply. As articulated in Howey, “‘[f]orm is disregarded for substance and the emphasis is placed upon economic reality.’” Director Hinman explains that in Howey, the interests in the orange groves were sold to hotel guests rather than farmers, and similarly “tokens and coins typically are sold to a wide audience rather than to persons who are likely to use them on the network.” Where tokens are sold to raise money to fund an enterprise, and where the token purchasers rely on the efforts of someone other than themselves to see a profit, Director Hinman finds that the sale of the tokens may be a securities transaction.

    Security Factors; Secondary Market. Director Hinman provides two lists of non-exclusive factors to consider in assessing whether a digital asset is offered as an investment contract and thus a security. A primary consideration is whether a third party “drives the expectation of a return.” (Although not explicitly stated in the speech, a third party likely means a third party in relation to the network.) Director Hinman emphasizes that the lists are illustrative, and the question depends on the particular facts and circumstances and the economic reality of the transaction. The lists are meant to prompt thinking by promoters and their counsel, and start a dialogue with the SEC.

    Director Hinman briefly acknowledges that the application of securities laws to blockchain token distributions could have an impact on how the token or sale is treated, not just in the initial sale, but in secondary transactions. He explains that the SEC’s Divisions of Trading and Markets and Investment Management are focused on such issues as broker-dealer, exchange and fund registration, as well as matters of market manipulation, custody and valuation. “We understand that market participants are working to make their services compliant with the existing regulatory framework, and we are happy to continue our engagement in this process.”

    An Invitation for Dialogue. Director Hinman welcomes discussions with promoters and their counsel to work through the securities law issues of particular tokens, sales, broker-dealer, exchange and fund registration, market manipulation, custody and valuation. Director Hinman encourages anyone who has questions about a particular structure to consult with knowledgeable securities counsel or the SEC.

    Director Hinman’s speech certainly will prompt thinking and discussions by blockchain token projects and their counsel. We continue to consider the implications of Director Hinman’s speech and look forward to working together with market participants on these questions.

    Authors

    David L. Taub

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Backyard Grill Summary Judgment Gets Burnt by Fourth Circuit

    ARTICLE

    Backyard Grill Summary Judgment Gets Burnt by Fourth Circuit

    June 18, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mary Hallerman authored this bylined article summarizing the judgment given by the Fourth Circuit in a trademark infringement dispute.

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  • Transgender Employees and Employment Discrimination

    ARTICLE

    Transgender Employees and Employment Discrimination

    Summer 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Ali Nadel and Natalie Colvin wrote this bylined article about considerations for employers around gender identity and expression under Title VII.

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  • Competition, Regulation and the Public Sector

    ARTICLE

    Competition, Regulation and the Public Sector

    June 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sabine Naugès and Laurant Ayache authored this review, which presents the new regulation for gas storage, and focuses on the dispute over competitive damages (private enforcement), as well as the recent case law concerning the management of advertising in the health sector.

    In depth
    Authors

    Laurent Ayache

    Partner

    Paris

    Sabine Naugès

    Partner

    Paris

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  • State and Local Taxes in Illinois

    ARTICLE

    State and Local Taxes in Illinois

    June 14, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lauren Ferrante and Mary Kay McCalla Martire present a structured guide to state and local tax law in Illinois as part of Lexology Q&A. Read more here.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mary Kay Martire

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Second Circuit Gives Tidy Answer on Attorneys’ Fees in Sloppy Tuna Trademark Row

    ARTICLE

    Second Circuit Gives Tidy Answer on Attorneys’ Fees in Sloppy Tuna Trademark Row

    June 13, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Eleanor B Atkins authored this bylined article summarizing a trademark dispute addressing for the first time whether attorneys’ fees should be included in an award of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d).

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  • IRS Doubles Down on Retention of 2017 Overpayments to Satisfy Future Section 965 Installment Payments

    IRS Doubles Down on Retention of 2017 Overpayments to Satisfy Future Section 965 Installment Payments

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Doubles Down on Retention of 2017 Overpayments to Satisfy Future Section 965 Installment Payments

    June 13, 2018

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    We previously discussed the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) surprising position that for taxpayers making an election under Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 965(h) to pay the transition tax over 8 years through installment payments, any overpayments of 2017 tax liabilities cannot be used as credits for 2018 estimated tax payments or refunded, unless and until the overpayment amount exceeds the full 8 years of installment payments. The IRS’s position has affected many taxpayers, and practitioners have expressed their concerns to the IRS.

    On June 4, 2018, the IRS responded to these concerns. Rather than changing its position, the IRS has doubled down; however, the IRS has taken the small but welcome step of allowing some penalty relief for taxpayers affected by the earlier guidance as set forth in new Questions and Answers 15, 16 and 17.

    Based on discussions with the IRS, it appears that the IRS’s position is based on the view that it has broad authority under Code Section 6402 to apply overpayments against other taxes owed, and that Code Section 6403 requires an overpayment of an installment payment to be applied against unpaid installments. Thus, the IRS maintains that the Code Section 965 tax liability is simply a part of the tax year 2017 liability, and it is, except for Code Section 965(h) and a timely election thereunder, payable and due by the due date of the 2017 tax return. Any future installments for the Code Section 965 liability are, in the IRS’s view, not part of a tax for a future tax year that has yet to have been determined, as the tax has already been self-assessed by the taxpayer for 2017. Accordingly, the IRS views any overpayments as being applied within the same tax period to the outstanding Code Section 965 tax owed by the taxpayer even though taxpayers making a timely Code Section 965(h) election are not legally required to make additional payments until subsequent years.

    We continue to believe that the IRS’s position on this issue is incorrect. There are several arguments, both technical and as a matter of tax policy, as to why the IRS should not be able to keep taxpayers’ money for several years when Congress has expressly permitted payment of a liability over a multi-year period. The statutory scheme enacted by Congress regarding the transition tax is different from the circumstances under which Code Section 6402 and 6403 potentially apply, and a close reading of those sections casts substantial doubt on their application in the present situation. The IRS’s position also ignores the negative impacts on taxpayer cash flow and the fact that some taxpayers may have to borrow or use lines of credit to maintain operations absent the ability to obtain credits or refunds. The purpose of Code Section 965(h) was precisely to avoid these problems. Therefore, to the extent there is any conflict, Code Section 965(h) should trump Code Sections 6402 and 6403.

    We are continuing to explore options for taxpayers affected by the IRS’s position and will provide further updates in the future. In the meantime, please contact one of the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer if you are affected by the IRS’s position and would like to further discuss these issues.

    Authors

    Sandra P. McGill

    Counsel

    Chicago

    David G. Noren

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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