Content Type: Article

  • Sanctions Update: Iran, Global Magnitsky and Sudan

    Sanctions Update: Iran, Global Magnitsky and Sudan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: Iran, Global Magnitsky and Sudan

    July 24, 2018

    Read time: 15 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In late June 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) took action on a number of fronts including re-implementing stricter sanctions against Iran, issuing detailed sanctions regulations under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (“Global Magnitsky Act”) and easing sanctions against Sudan.[1] Firms that engage in business that touches upon Iran or Sudan should carefully review these changes. Moreover, firms should make sure to incorporate the names of individuals designated under the Global Magnitsky Act into their screening process.

    First, on June 27, 2018, building upon President Trump’s May 8, 2018 decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”),[2] and in an effort to impose the “strongest sanctions in history,”[3] OFAC revoked Iran-related General Licenses H and I, which were issued in connection with the JCPOA. OFAC amended the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (“ITSR”) accordingly to issue new general licenses authorizing the wind down of transactions previously authorized under General Licenses H and I. OFAC also amended the ITSR to eliminate authorization for transactions involving the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, as well as related letters of credit and brokering services (and to also provide for a wind down period).

    Second, on June 28, 2018, OFAC announced the issuance of the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 583, which implement the Global Magnitsky Act and Executive Order 13818 (“Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption”) and took effect on June 29, 2018. The Global Magnitsky Act allows the U.S. government to sanction foreign government officials implicated in human rights abuses anywhere in the world.

    Last, effective June 29, 2018, OFAC removed the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations from the Code of Federal Regulations. This was the result of the revocation of certain provisions of Executive Orders on which the regulations were based. OFAC also amended the Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations to incorporate a general license authorizing certain transactions related to exports of agricultural commodities, medicines and medical devices, which, until June 29, appeared only on OFAC’s website.

    I. Iranian Sanctions Updates: Revocation of JCPOA-Related General Licenses; Amendment of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations; Publication of Updated FAQs

    General License H: Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a U.S. Person

    General License H, issued in January 2016 in connection with the JCPOA,[4] had authorized U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities to engage in transactions involving Iran that would otherwise have been prohibited.[5] In addition, General License H authorized U.S. person employees, outside legal counsel and consultants to provide training, advice and counseling on operating policies and procedures, provided those services did not facilitate illegal transactions. General License H also authorized U.S. persons to make available to U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities certain “Authorized Business Support Systems,” including any automated and globally integrated computer, accounting, email, telecommunications or other business support system, platform, database, application or server broadly available to, and in general use by, the U.S. parent company’s global organization.

    The effect of the revocation of General License H is to reinstate the prohibition in § 560.215 of the ITSR, which bars foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person from engaging in transactions, directly or indirectly, with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of Iran that would be prohibited if engaged in by a U.S. person.[6]

    OFAC added § 560.537 to the ITSR to authorize, through 11:59 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on Nov. 4, 2018, all transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions relating to foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person that were previously authorized under General License H.[7]

    General License I: Contingent Contracts Relating to Commercial Passenger Aviation

    General License I had authorized certain transactions related to the negotiation of, and entry into, contracts for activities eligible for authorization under the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (“SLP”), provided that the performance of such contract was made expressly contingent upon the issuance of a specific license from OFAC authorizing the activity to be performed.[8]

    OFAC also added § 560.536 to authorize, through 11:59 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on Aug. 6, 2018, all transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions related to the negotiation of contingent contracts for activities that were, at the time of the negotiation, eligible for authorization under the JCPOA SLP pursuant to General License I.[9]

    Sections 560.534 and 560.535: Iranian-Origin Foodstuffs, Carpets, and Related Letters of Credit and Brokering Services

    In addition, OFAC amended § 560.534 (authorizing the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs) and § 560.535 (authorizing certain related letters of credit and brokering services) to narrow the scope of the licenses to only authorize, through 11:59 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on Aug. 6, 2018, the wind down of transactions that were previously under those general licenses.[10] Thus, except for such wind down transactions, transactions involving these Iranian-origin foodstuffs and carpets and related letters of credit and brokering services are no longer authorized.

    II. Global Magnitsky: Publication of Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations

    As noted above, OFAC announced the issuance of the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 583 (the “Regulations”), which implement the Global Magnitsky Act[11] and Executive Order 13818.[12] The Regulations, effective June 29, 2018, were published in abbreviated form, and OFAC intends to issue a more comprehensive set of regulations, which may include guidance, general licenses and statements of licensing policy. This is the first time that OFAC focused sanctions specifically on those responsible for human rights abuses and corruption.

    Section 583.201 of the Regulations prohibits all transactions prohibited by E.O. 13818, and incorporates the names of persons listed in or designated pursuant to E.O. 13818, whose property and interests in property are blocked, into OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) with the identifier “GLOMAG.”[13]

    Further, pursuant to § 583.202(a), any transfer after the effective date[14] that is in violation of the Regulations and involving any property or interest in property blocked pursuant to § 583.201 is null and void. Pursuant to § 583.202(b), transfers prior to the effective date shall not be the basis for an assertion or recognition of any right, power or privilege with respect to any property or interest in property blocked pursuant to § 583.201, unless the person who holds or maintains such property had written notice of the transfer prior to that date or by written evidence recognized such transfer.

    However, transfers may be validated before, during or after such transfer by a license or other authorization from OFAC. Transfers that would otherwise be null and void by virtue of the Regulations shall not be deemed to be null and void if the applicant establishes that (1) the transfer did not represent a willful violation of the Regulations by the person with whom the property is or was held or maintained; (2) the person with whom the property is or was maintained did not have reasonable cause to know that such transfer required a license or authorization, or, if a license or authorization did purport to cover the transfer, that license or authorization had been obtained by misrepresentation of a third party or withholding of material facts or was otherwise fraudulently obtained; and (3) the person with whom the property is or was held or maintained filed a report in OFAC setting forth the circumstances relating to the transfer promptly upon discovery that (i) such transfer violated the Regulations, (ii) such transfer was not licensed or authorized by OFAC or (iii) if a license did purport to cover the transfer, such license had been obtained by misrepresentation of a third party or withholding of material facts or was otherwise fraudulently obtained.[15]

    Except as otherwise provided, U.S. persons holding funds subject to § 583.201 shall hold or place such funds in a blocked interest-bearing account located in the United States.[16]

    The Regulations exempt certain transactions, including: (a) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic or other personal communication that does not involve the transfer of anything of value; (b) the importation and exportation of any information or informational materials (as defined in § 583.306), subject to certain qualifications outlined in § 583.205(b)(2)-(3); and (c) transactions ordinarily incident to travel, including importation or exportation of baggage for personal use, maintenance including payment of living expenses and acquisition of goods or services for personal use, and arrangement or facilitation of such travel.[17]

    In addition, U.S. financial institutions are authorized to debit for payment or reimbursement normal service charges from any blocked account held at the financial institution.[18] The provision of certain specified legal services – including but not limited to the provision of legal advice regarding compliance with U.S. law (so long as the advice is not provided to facilitate transactions in violation of the Regulations) – is also authorized, provided that receipt of payment for legal fees must be authorized pursuant to § 583.507 or via specific license.[19] In addition to the specific types of legal services permitted in § 583.506(a), persons whose property and interests are blocked pursuant to § 583.201 may also seek the issuance of a specific license to cover any other legal services.[20] Notably, entry into a settlement agreement or the enforcement of any order through any judicial process purporting to affect property or interests in property blocked pursuant to § 583.201 is prohibited unless licensed pursuant to the Regulations.[21]

    Entities are blocked if, individually or in the aggregate, they are owned by 50 percent or greater by one or more persons whose property or interest in property is blocked pursuant to § 583.20.[22]

    III. Sudan: Removal of the Sudan Sanctions Regulations; Amendment of the Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations

    Removal of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations

    On Oct. 11, 2017, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, published notice in the Federal Register that the Government of Sudan had taken positive actions, including a reduction in offensive military activity, cessation of hostilities in conflict areas, improvement of humanitarian access, and cooperation with the United States on addressing regional conflicts and the threat of terrorism.[23] For those reasons, effective Oct. 12, 2017, sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order 13067, “Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan” were revoked, and Executive Order 13412, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Government of Sudan” was revoked in its entirety. On June 29, 2018, consistent with the revocation of the provisions upon which the regulations were based, OFAC took the final step of removing the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 21 C.F.R. Part 538 (“SSR”) from the Code of Federal Regulations.[24]

    We note that while the sanctions set forth in the SSR have been lifted, other sanctions on Sudan remain in effect, including E.O.s 13067 and 13400, which are the basis for the Darfur Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 546 (“DSR”), and continue to block the property and interests in property of persons previously designated under the SSR.

    Amendment of the Terrorism List Government Sanctions

    Section 906 of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7205 (“TSRA”) requires a license for certain exports and re-exports to Sudan of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices as a result of Sudan’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Effective Oct. 12, 2017, General License A authorized exports and re-exports of these items to Sudan. Until June 29, this license was only available on OFAC’s website; on June 29, OFAC incorporated the license into the Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 596 as new § 596.506. OFAC does not require a specific license for financing these exports and re-exports.

    However, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) may require licenses to export or re-export to Sudan certain items including commodities, software, and technology that are on the Commerce Control List (“CCL”) and, in limited circumstances, items that are not specifically listed on the CCL but are otherwise subject to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) if such transactions implicate certain end-use or end-user concerns.[25]

    Authored by Seetha Ramachandran, Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Jennifer M. Opheim and Mari S. Dopp.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See OFAC Recent Actions, U.S. Department of Treasury, Revocation of JCPOA-Related General Licenses; Amendment of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations; Publication of Updated FAQs (June 27, 2018); OFAC Recent Actions, U.S. Department of Treasury, Publication of Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations (June 28, 2018); and OFAC Recent Actions, U.S. Department of Treasury, Removal of the Sudan Regulations and Amendment of the Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations (June 28, 2018).

    [2] The President’s May 8, 2018 decision to end the United States’ participation in the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program is outlined in National Security Presidential Memorandum-11 of May 8, 2018.

    [3] See Press Release, U.S. Department of State, After the Iran Deal: A New Iran Strategy (May 21, 2018), available here.

    [4] For a fuller explanation of U.S. sanctions lifted in connection with the JCPOA, see “‘Implementation Day’ Marks Rollback of Significant Nuclear-Related Sanctions on Iran,” SRZ Alert, Jan. 20, 2016, available here.

    [5] General License No. H, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Relating to Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person” (Revoked on June 27, 2018).

    [6] 31 C.F.R. § 560.215.

    [7] 31 C.F.R. § 560.537. See also OFAC FAQ No. 4.4 from Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018 NSPM Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (hereafter referred to as the “JCPOA Wind Down FAQs”) (Updated June 27, 2018).

    [8] General License No. I, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Negotiation of, and Entry into, Contingent Contracts for Activities Eligible for Authorization Under the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services” (Revoked on June 27, 2018).

    [9] 31 C.F.R. § 560.536. See also JCPOA Wind Down FAQ No. 4.3, available here.

    [10] 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.534 and 560.535. See also JCPOA Wind Down FAQ No. 4.5, available here.

    [11] The Global Magnitsky Act authorized the President, among other things, to impose sanctions with respect to any person that “is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” or “is a government official, or a senior associate of such an official, that is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling or otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption,” or has provided material assistance for such corruption. 22 U.S.C. § 2656 note.

    [12] E.O. 13818, invoking authority provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), imposed financial sanctions and visa restrictions on persons determined to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, certain human rights abuses or corrupt acts anywhere in the world. See Executive Order 13818, “Executive Order Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption” (Dec. 21, 2017), available here; OFAC’s Global Magnitsky FAQs (Dec. 21, 2017), available here.

    [13] 31 C.F.R. § 583.201.

    [14] The term “effective date” means “the effective date of the applicable prohibitions and directives contained in this part as follows: (1) With respect to a person listed in the Annex to Executive Order 13818 of Dec. 20, 2017, 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on Dec. 21, 2017 and (2) With respect to a person whose property and interests in property are otherwise blocked pursuant to § 583.201, the earlier of the date of actual or constructive notice that such person’s property and interests in property are blocked.” 31 C.F.R. § 583.302(a).

    [15] 31 C.F.R. §§ 583.202(c)-(d).

    [16] 31 C.F.R. § 583.203(a).

    [17] 31 C.F.R. § 583.205.

    [18] 31 C.F.R. § 583.505(a).

    [19] 31 C.F.R. § 583.506(a). Furthermore, payments for legal services from funds originating outside the United States are generally authorized, provided the funds do not originate from a source within the United States, any source within the possession or control of a U.S. person, or any person other than the person on whose behalf the legal services authorized pursuant to § 583.506(a) are to be provided, whose property and interests in property are blocked. 31 C.F.R. § 583.507(a). In addition, persons who receive payments pursuant to § 583.507(a) must submit annual reports to OFAC as specified in § 583.507(b).

    [20] 31 C.F.R. § 583.506(b).

    [21] 31 C.F.R. § 583.506(d).

    [22] 31 C.F.R. § 583.406.

    [23] Notice Regarding Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan, 82 F.R. 47287 (Oct. 11, 2017), available here.

    [24] As background, President Clinton issued E.O. 13067 on Nov. 3, 1997, blocking all property and interests in property of the Government of Sudan that were in, or came into, the U.S., or that came within the possession or control of a U.S. person. E.O. 13067 also greatly restricted business involving Sudan, prohibiting, among other things, U.S. persons from exporting goods, technology or services to Sudan and the performance by any U.S. person of a contract in support of a project in Sudan. OFAC issued the SSR to implement E.O. 13067. E.O. 13067, “Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan,” (Nov. 3, 1997), available here. On Oct. 13, 2006, President Bush issued E.O. 13412, taking additional steps to sanction Sudan and to implement the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006. E.O. 13412, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Government of Sudan,” (Oct. 13, 2006), available here. On Jan. 13, 2017, more than ten years later, and in acknowledgement of progress made by the Government of Sudan, President Obama issued E.O. 13761, which was an initial step towards repealing the sanctions against Sudan. E.O. 13761 states that the situation giving rise to prior E.O.s 13067 and 13412 has improved, and therefore, provided that certain criteria could be met during a review period, sections 1 and 2 of E.O. 13067 would be revoked, and E.O. 13412 would be revoked in its entirety, effective July 12, 2017. See E.O. 13761, “Recognizing Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan and Providing for the Revocation of Certain Sudan-Related Sanctions,” (Jan. 13, 2017), available here. This period was extended on July 11, 2017 until Oct. 12, 2017, pursuant to E.O. 13804. See E.O. 13804, “Allowing Additional Time for Recognizing Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan and Amending Executive Order 13761,” (July 11, 2017), available here.

    [25] See 15 C.F.R. Part 744.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
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    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • OCIE Best Execution Risk Alert: Guidance and Lessons for Private Fund Managers

    OCIE Best Execution Risk Alert: Guidance and Lessons for Private Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    OCIE Best Execution Risk Alert: Guidance and Lessons for Private Fund Managers

    July 24, 2018

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 11, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) issued a Risk Alert[1] focusing on the most common deficiencies relating to best execution found by the SEC staff (“staff”) in recent examinations of investment advisers. The Risk Alert provides a snapshot of OCIE’s expectations regarding a fund manager’s best execution policies and procedures.

    The Obligation of Best Execution

    An investment adviser’s obligation to seek best execution for client securities transactions is based in an investment adviser’s fiduciary duties. The SEC and its staff have long indicated that an investment adviser must satisfy fiduciary standards of care in selecting brokers for clients, negotiating commissions and compensation terms for clients’ securities transactions, and supervising execution quality.

    While the staff’s position that there is a duty of best execution is unambiguous, the factors that an investment adviser may use in evaluating whether its clients are receiving best execution and the relative weights given to the various factors are not fixed or enumerated. In selecting broker-dealers for client accounts and in agreeing to the economic terms of the resulting trading activities, an adviser may take into consideration numerous quantitative and qualitative factors in seeking best execution, including the commission rates, the quality of execution, the research provided to the adviser, the broker-dealer’s financial responsibility and responsiveness to the adviser.[2]

    Managers are also permitted, under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to utilize soft dollars to purchase eligible research and brokerage services from broker-dealers. Section 28(e) allows an adviser to cause a client to pay more than the lowest possible commission rate without violating the adviser’s duty to seek best execution, provided that certain conditions are met, including disclosure of the soft dollar arrangements.

    Recent Examination Deficiencies

    The Risk Alert highlighted several areas of particular best execution-related weakness, including the following:

    • Advisers that did not perform a best execution review or that were unable to substantiate that such a review had been performed;
    • Advisers that did perform a best execution review but “did not consider the full range and quality of a broker-dealer’s services” in that review;
    • Advisers that “did not evaluate qualitative factors relating to a broker-dealer including, among other things, the broker-dealer’s execution capability, financial responsibility and responsiveness to the adviser” as part of their best execution review;
    • Advisers that did not “seek[ ] out or consider[ ] the quality and costs of services available from other broker-dealers,” a weakness that appears to have been exacerbated where the adviser used a single broker for its clients’ trading;
    • Insufficient disclosure of execution practices;
    • Failures to carry out best execution procedures that were disclosed to clients;
    • Insufficient disclosure of soft dollar practices;
    • “Mixed-use” allocations not being made on a reasonable basis or that lack sufficient support for the allocation; and
    • Weak controls, including citations for a lack of policies relating to best execution, insufficient internal controls and monitoring, and the use of “off-the-shelf” policies that do not address the adviser’s business.

    The staff indicated that examinations upon which the Risk Alert was based “resulted in a range of actions[,]” including amended disclosures, revised compliance policies and procedures and changes to best execution or soft dollar arrangements.

    Lessons for Private Fund Managers and Other Investment Advisers

    Many of the points raised by OCIE in the Risk Alert are fairly obvious and repeat or echo OCIE statements and actions in analogous areas in the recent past. These include the following lessons:

    1. Advisers should have tailored policies on best execution and the use of soft dollars.
    2. Offering documents should have accurate disclosures about an adviser’s best execution and soft dollar policies.
    3. Advisers should disclose any conflicts or risks related to their best execution and soft dollar practices.
    4. Advisers should actually adhere to their policies and their related disclosures on best execution and soft dollars.
    5. Documentation of best execution analyses and soft dollar practices should be maintained.

    However, there are some less obvious and more nuanced messages in the Risk Alert that are worth considering:

    Qualitative and Quantitative Factors

    The Risk Alert stresses the need for advisers to review pricing and other quantitative factors                    “to assess . . . [a] broker-dealer’s execution performance.” While this is not a new concept, the language – particularly in the context of broker comparisons (discussed below) — creates the impression that the staff may be expecting more objective support on this aspect than in the past.

    At the same time, the staff indicated that focusing solely on quantitative factors when reviewing a broker-dealer’s services may not be enough to satisfy an adviser’s duty to seek best execution. The Risk Alert notes that “[t]he staff observed advisers that did not consider the full range and quality of a broker-dealer’s services in directing brokerage” and specifically mentioned managers that, “as part of their best execution review, did not evaluate qualitative factors relating to a broker-dealer including, among other things, the broker-dealer’s execution capability, financial responsibility and responsiveness to the adviser.”[3] In other words, the staff seems to be sending the message that qualitative and quantitative analysis both should be part of a best execution review.

    Broader Input

    The Risk Alert also specifically mentions deficiencies where advisers “did not solicit and review input from the adviser’s traders and portfolio managers[.]” For advisers with decentralized trading and investment functions, seeking broader involvement in the best execution process is something to consider.

    Comparisons

    The Risk Alert strongly implies that the staff expects to see advisers considering multiple execution options, especially where all or substantially all of a firm’s trading is directed to a single broker-dealer. It may not be sufficient for a best execution analysis solely to review and examine the services received from a single provider; rather, the implication is that best execution requires that execution rates and quality of service be evaluated on both an absolute (e.g., “is this level of performance meeting our expectations?”) and on a relative (e.g., “how does this level of performance compare to what is offered by others?”) basis.

    The staff stated that both the “quality and costs” of alternative brokers should be considered. While such a statement is consistent with prior guidance on best execution and soft dollars, advisers should be sure (as discussed above) that their comparisons address both qualitative and quantitative elements. Large disparities in execution commissions and costs, for example, should be noted and the compensating differences in services should be explained.

    All of this can present challenges for advisers trading in securities or instruments for which execution is dominated by a small number of brokers, or where there are solid business reasons to utilize a leading broker-dealer in that space. The Risk Alert does not offer specific ways to address these situations, other than providing an underlying impetus that these challenges be addressed in a thorough and thoughtful manner.

    Mixed-Use Allocations

    Unlike the criticisms of soft dollar practices, where the staff only cited failures to disclose the existence of, and potential conflicts or risks in the use of, soft dollar arrangements, the staff’s criticism of mixed-use allocation went beyond disclosure. The Risk Alert stated, “the staff observed advisers that did not appear to make a reasonable allocation of the cost of a mixed-use product or service according to its use[.]” Advisers should be ready for the staff to challenge the reasonableness of any mixed-use allocation and should focus on having a well-supported methodology that would be acceptable to a third party. In some cases, it may be helpful to have a client (e.g., the Board of Directors of a fund) approve the mixed-use allocation methodology.

    Surveillance and Testing

    The staff clearly indicated that they expect the supervision of the process to be rigorous, with tailored approaches and policies. They also indicated that advisers should be monitoring “execution performance” as a separate item. For many advisers, this may mean that a more rigorous transaction cost analysis (or similar execution benchmarking) system and process may be needed.

    Next Steps

    OCIE noted that it “encourages advisers to reflect upon their own practices, policies and procedures in these areas and to promote improvements in adviser compliance programs.” As we expect that reviews of best execution practices will continue to be a part of many OCIE examinations, fund managers should evaluate their best execution policies and procedures in light of the Risk Alert and ensure that those procedures are being followed, including with respect to documentation.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly and Marc E. Elovitz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Risk Alert: Compliance Issues Related to Best Execution by Investment Advisers (July 11, 2018).

    [2] See, e.g., Interpretive Release Concerning the Scope of Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Related Matters, Exchange Act Rel. No. 23170 (April 28, 1986); see also Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Rel. No. 54165 (July 18, 2006). Both of these releases were cited in the Risk Alert.

    [3] Emphasis added.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Emerging, High-Stakes, Cybersecurity Litigation and Investigations Risks are Upending the Legal Landscape

    ARTICLE

    Emerging, High-Stakes, Cybersecurity Litigation and Investigations Risks are Upending the Legal Landscape

    July 24, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    David Quinn Gacioch and Natasha Dobrott authored this bylined article on privacy and cybersecurity litigation and enforcement trends. “In this challenging environment, creators, holders, processors and owners of sensitive data face a myriad of rapidly-changing risks to manage and insure against,” they wrote.

    In depth
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  • Congress Should Sprinkle Some SALT on the Federal Courts

    Congress Should Sprinkle Some SALT on the Federal Courts

    ARTICLE

    Congress Should Sprinkle Some SALT on the Federal Courts

    July 23, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Arthur R. Rosen, partner in the state and local tax practice at McDermott, wrote a bylined article in conjunction with Hayes R. Holderness, assistant professor at the University of Richmond School of Law, for the latest edition of Tax Note’s The Art of SALT.

    In this edition the authors examine whether Congress should establish stronger federal checks on state tax actions by opening the federal courts to interstate taxpayers.

    In depth
    Authors

    Arthur R. Rosen

    Senior Counsel

    Miami, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • AT&T Win May Help Partial Ownership Transactions

    ARTICLE

    AT&T Win May Help Partial Ownership Transactions

    July 17, 2018

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jon Dubrow authored this bylined article on a recent ruling in a vertical merger injunction proceeding. “While Judge Leon took care to make his opinion narrow, the nature of his evaluation of the government’s evidence . . . may reverberate in situations involving competitive theories beyond vertical mergers,” Mr. Dubrow wrote.”

    In depth

    Originally published in Law360

    As the world knows, U.S. District Judge Richard Leon delivered a resounding win for AT&T / Time Warner in June in the first vertical merger injunction proceeding in roughly 40 years. While only one judge’s opinion, and the U.S. Department of Justice is appealing the decision, it is significant because the government brings so few vertical cases. This case made brutally clear how hard it is for the government to win a merger case without a presumption of a substantial lessening of competition under United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank.[1] While Judge Leon took care to make his opinion narrow, the nature of his evaluation of the government’s evidence, to see if it actually supported the economic model the government offered to prove anticompetitive impacts, may reverberate in situations involving competitive theories beyond vertical mergers. One example is the antitrust assessment of acquisitions of a noncontrolling partial interest in a rival. Thus, this narrow opinion may have broader impacts.

    In a horizontal merger, the underlying theory of harm is fairly straightforward. The transaction reduces the number of competing firms by one. If there are not many firms in the market, and if the combination will substantially increase concentration, then the U.S. Supreme Court’s Philadelphia National Bank opinion provides the government a presumption that the transaction will substantially lessen competition. When the government wins the product market fight and obtains this presumption of competitive harm, it makes its prima facie case and invariably wins.

    In AT&T, the government agreed it was not entitled to the Philadelphia National Bank presumption in a vertical merger case. But vertical mergers are not the only nonhorizontal mergers. The government has brought a number of cases, normally through consent settlements, in which the competitive concern arose from a company’s acquisition of a partial, noncontrolling interest in a rival. This theory, which arose several decades ago, was captured in Section 13 of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Under the guidelines, a partial but controlling acquisition is analyzed like a standard horizontal transaction. The guidelines, however, note that a partial, noncontrolling acquisition can still raise concerns. Partial interests can give the acquiring firm the ability to influence the competitive conduct of the acquired firm through board or other representation, and they may also provide access to competitively sensitive information of the acquired firm. Even without those control or information rights, the guidelines state that a partial acquisition can “lessen competition by reducing the incentive of the acquiring firm to compete. Acquiring even a minority position in a rival might significantly blunt the incentive of the acquiring firm to compete aggressively because it shares in the losses thereby inflicted on that rival.”[2] The agencies have brought cases using this partial interest theory.[3] In essence, the guidelines indicate that a firm with an interest in a rival may pull its competitive punches. Under this theory, a firm that raises prices on its own products, thereby losing some sales, may recapture some of those lost sales through its interest in a rival that picks up some of those diverted sales. Some economists have attempted to model this, through what they refer to as a modified HHI, or MHHI, which is effectively an HHI calculation, but discounted to account for the partial interest rather than a full combination of the competing businesses.[4]

    The theory of changed competitive incentives through partial ownership interests is similar to the DOJ’s theory of competitive harm in the AT&T case, as presented by its expert economist. The DOJ’s theory in AT&T boiled down to the following. Time Warner’s Turner Broadcasting business engages in negotiations with distributors such as cable companies. An item of leverage in these negotiations is the potential to not sign an agreement, which would make the distributor lose access to Turner content (CNN, TBS, etc.) until the dispute is resolved. This is referred to as “going dark.” Going dark hurts both parties. The distributor may lose some customers who drop their cable subscription when not provided the content they want, and Turner would immediately lose revenue with fewer subscriptions and lower advertising rates because its content is not being distributed. The DOJ’s case was premised on the notion that because AT&T owns DirecTV, if AT&T also owned Turner then some of the subscribers lost by a distributor who went dark with Turner would be gained by DirecTV. Thus, the DOJ asserted that because some Turner losses would be recaptured on the DirecTV side of the ledger, Turner would negotiate more aggressively and raise prices to distributors. The downside of Turner pushing too hard of a bargain and “going dark” with a distributor would be mitigated by the profits that its post-merger parent, AT&T, would pick up at DirecTV.

    As a matter of economic theory, this change in bargaining leverage makes sense. The DOJ’s bargaining model presumed that a vertically integrated firm would operate its businesses to maximize the profits of the overall enterprise. Judge Leon agreed with the concept but found the evidence contradicted the theory. “The Court accepts … the Government’s … argument that, generally, a ‘firm with multiple divisions will act to maximize profits across them,’ [but that] profit-maximization premise is not inconsistent, however, with the witness testimony that the identity of a programmer’s owner has not affected affiliate negotiations in real-world instances of vertical integration.”[5] In short, the DOJ’s case was built on the premise that a profit-maximizing firm would accept losses Turner would incur by going dark to capture new subscribers, and increased revenue, at Direct TV. The “real-world evidence,” however, undercut that premise. Hence, “to borrow a line from one of my able colleagues, ‘antitrust theory and speculation cannot trump facts.’”[6] Antitrust practitioners know that economics are critically important to cases, but Judge Leon’s opinion provides a refreshing reminder that the economic theory is only as good as the underlying facts.

    The DOJ’s theory of competitive harm is similar to the theory of competitive harm in cases of passive equity interests because both are premised on a business line competing less aggressively, and raising prices to customers, based on the potential to recapture some lost revenue in a second business line. This recapture potentially changes the bargaining or pricing leverage of a party in a way that can harm consumers. In a vertical merger case, the second business line is another operating unit controlled by the same parent company (e.g., AT&T’s DirecTV). In a partial equity interest case, the second business line is an independent company in which the acquiring company holds a minority interest.

    Under this theory of harm, antitrust concerns can arise through partial ownership even where control is not transferred.[7] For example, assume WidgetCorp, a widget supplier, acquires a passive, 20 percent minority interest in rival BigConglomerate, which operates a widget division and several other businesses. There are two other widget competitors of note. Under the passive equity interest economic theory, the government economic modeling may show that WidgetCorp will be inclined to price more aggressively after taking the 20 percent interest in BigConglomerate. For those sales that it makes at the higher price, WidgetCorp makes higher profits. For those sales that are lost, BigConglomerate will pick up some of those sales, and WidgetCorp will obtain some benefit because of its interest in BigConglomerate. Thus, theory says WidgetCorp’s interest in BigConglomerate will decrease WidgetCorp’s competitive incentives, prices will rise and consumers will be harmed. This was the DOJ’s theory in AT&T. But how would a court deal with this partial interest theory? The AT&T opinion provides parties with a solid basis to push back against the economic theory of harm if the “real world facts” leave the theory unmoored from reality in a way that eliminates the theory’s probative value.

    To develop these real-world facts, evidence from documents and testimony from WidgetCorp employees must be gathered, as well as evidence from other sources. This evidence will answer important questions, such as the following:

    • Will the facts support the model assumption that a company will choose to forego own-firm profits? In order for the economic model to work, WidgetCorp has to reduce its own sales and profits from the competitive level and hope to have enough recapture from its BigConglomerate holdings to make the strategy profit maximizing when viewed as a whole. Is that a realistic scenario when WidgetCorp employees likely are compensated based on the sales and profitability of the business they operate? Is a year-end review likely to get a sales manager a good bonus when it says ‘I raised prices and lost three accounts, but BigConglomerate won one of the accounts, so our company made more money because we own a piece of BigConglomerate?’ This seems implausible.[8] In many cases, a client likely will have strong real-world facts to undercut the economic model’s assumptions that the firm will pull its punches. However, in more extreme cases, the government may have a stronger case. For example, if the facts show there are only two competitors and one takes a 49 percent interest in its only rival, it may be more plausible to assume this could alter the firm’s competitive incentives.
    • Will the facts demonstrate that a company can rely on recapturing benefits of diversion? Under the economic theory, WidgetCorp will reduce its own profits in order to inflate the profits of BigConglomerate, and WidgetCorp’s overall position will be improved through that process. This raises a host of real-world questions if, as is likely, WidgetCorp has an interest in BigConglomerate, but does not have a right to the distribution of BigConglomerate’s purportedly increased profits. WidgetCorp may need to hope that the increased profits to BigConglomerate increases the value of the stock WidgetCorp holds in BigConglomerate, and that WidgetCorp can capture that increase whenever it ultimately sells its shares, perhaps years later.[9] Also, the overlapping widget business may only be a part of BigConglomerate’s business, so the share price can be impacted by many factors other than the performance of the overlapping business. Of course, a business’ stock value can be buffeted by many other independent factors such as a recession, a bear market, a trade war impacting the business, or other events.

    Just like in AT&T, the government would need to deal with a host of confounding factors to support an economic model predicting harm to consumers from a passive partial equity interest shareholding. If the evidence contradicts the underlying model assumption that a company will pull its punches based on its ownership interest in a rival, the MHHI economic model may lack a foundation, as Judge Leon found with the DOJ’s economic model in AT&T. In a partial equity interest case, just like in a vertical merger, the government is not entitled to the shortcut of a presumption of anticompetitive harm. Instead, the government will need to bring forth evidence of anticompetitive effects in order to make a prima facie case. AT&T shows just how hard that is. The AT&T case could reasonably embolden parties to put the government to its proof if the government raises a competitive concern based on a company’s passive, partial equity interest in a rival. While Judge Leon was careful to note that his opinion was narrow and focused on the facts of the case, his evaluation of the evidence undercut the government’s theoretical economic model of harm in a way that may have broader application in other circumstances in which the government does not benefit from a presumption of anticompetitive harm.[10] Judge Leon has provided a playbook parties can use in a variety of cases unless the DOJ’s appeal fundamentally reverses his opinion.

    Jon B. Dubrow is a partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP. He thanks associate Matthew Evola for his assistance.

    The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm, its clients, or Portfolio Media Inc., or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

    [1] 374 U.S. 321 (1963)

    [2] Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 13; see also Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, Comment of the Federal Trade Commission, Docket No. RM09-16-000 (March 29, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-federal-energy-regulatory-commission-concerning-rulemaking-competitive-assessments/v090008ferc.pdf (“[L]egal and economic scholarship, judicial decisions, and the work of the federal antitrust agencies consistently teach that partial acquisitions can change the competitive incentives of the acquiring and acquired firms, even when the acquiring firm does not gain control or influence over the acquired firm. Such transactions can also create opportunities and incentives for information sharing that facilitates collusion.”).

    [3] See, e.g., In re T. C. Group L.L.C., No. 061-0197, 2007 WL 293866 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Jan. 24, 2007) (alleging a substantial lessening of competition in the market for gasoline and light petroleum resulting from Carlyle and Riverstone’s proposed investment in Kinder Morgan Inc.); U.S. v. Dairy Farmers of Am. Inc., 423 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing district court decision that acquisition of non-controlling partial ownership generally doesn’t raise antitrust concerns).

    [4] Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 Antitrust L.J. 559 at 595 (2000).

    [5] United States v. AT&T Inc., No. CV 17-2511 (RJL), 2018 WL 2930849, at *46 (D.D.C. June 12, 2018).

    [6] Id. at *45 (citation omitted).

    [7] Note, this article focuses on the competitive implications of passive equity interests. If the interest is not passive, but provides some control rights or enables information flows, a partial interest raises different and more straightforward issues.

    [8] Judge Leon took on this issue in AT&T, noting that, “To start, various industry witnesses testified that the identity of a programmer’s owner does not affect the negotiating dynamic. Indeed, this opinion by Professor Shapiro runs contrary to all of the real-world testimony during the trial from those who have actually negotiated on behalf of vertically integrated companies.” AT&T, 2018 WL 2930849, at *46.

    [9] See Jon B. Dubrow, Challenging the Economic Incentive Analysis of Competitive Effects in Acquisitions of Passive Minority Interests, 69 Antitrust L. J. Vol. 69 (2001).

    [10] This could apply not only in passive, partial equity cases, but also to other theories, such as the current ongoing academic debate regarding the competitive implications of cross ownership. If the court rejected DOJ’s theory of harm in AT&T, is it likely to accept that an investment company holding a one or two percent interest in several competing companies, like the major US airlines, is anticompetitive? See Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, and E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 Antitrust L. J. No. 3 (2017).

    Authors

    Jon B. Dubrow

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Rights of First Refusal and Lender Remedies

    ARTICLE

    Rights of First Refusal and Lender Remedies

    July 17, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jeffrey Steiner and Scott Weinberg authored this bylined article on “the potential of a [right of first refusal] to frustrate a lender’s ability to exercise remedies and certain steps a lender may take to protect itself against such potentiality.”

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    Authors

    Scott A. Weinberg

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • New German Law on the Protection of Trade Secrets

    New German Law on the Protection of Trade Secrets

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New German Law on the Protection of Trade Secrets

    July 16, 2018

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Germany will soon introduce a new act on the protection of trade secrets, which will bring substantial change to the way trade secrets are protected in Germany. Some of these changes are already relevant today, and enterprises doing business in Germany should be aware of the new opportunities, threats and requirements.

    In depth

    Germany will introduce a new act on the protection of trade secrets; the legislator is expected to pass the new law in December 2018. As the term is used in Germany, “trade secrets” relate to both technical know-how (such as construction drawings, manufacturing methods, ingredients and recipes) as well as business information (such as customer data, purchasing prices and market studies).

    Once the act is introduced, there will be substantial changes to the way trade secrets are protected in Germany. Due to the effects of a European Directive, some of the expected changes have already become relevant in June 2018 and enterprises doing business in Germany should be aware of the new opportunities, threats and requirements:

    • Only information that is subject to actual and reasonable measures to maintain it secret will be protected as a trade secret. Such requirement did not exist in the past, and enterprises may have to react to this new requirement by adopting additional contractual, organizational and technical measures to protect their trade secrets. Also, in order to be in a position to enforce trade secret-derived claims against third parties, enterprises should immediately start documenting the measures they adopt to protect trade secrets.
    • Reverse engineering (i.e. deconstructing a third-party product to reveal its design or to extract other information from the product) is permitted, except when otherwise contractually agreed. A general freedom to reverse engineer did not exist in the past, and enterprises may want to include clauses against reverse engineering in agreements with third parties such as their suppliers, customers or R&D partners. However, reverse engineering will still be possible for third parties (i.e., competitors which are under no obligation to refrain from reverse engineering). This poses new threats to the secrecy of information. Hence, enterprises may want to adjust their strategies for the protection of proprietary information, seeking a new balance between protecting secrets and obtaining IP rights such as patents.
    • Under the new law, an enterprise may be liable for an infringement of trade secrets even if its management has not acted culpably. This facilitates enforcement against competitors, but at the same time creates a risk in terms of defending third-party claims. This new risk may influence the employment contracts that enterprises conclude with people that come to them from a competitor and that may bring with them information that is proprietary to their former employer.

    Current Developments and Background

    In Germany, a special act on the protection of trade secrets does not yet exist. And while regulations on trade secrets did exist, they were scattered over several acts and fragmentary in nature.

    The impulse for the law on the protection of trade secrets came from the European Union Directive 2016/943, which is a Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure. The Directive serves to harmonize the protection of trade secrets in Europe; it had to be implemented into national laws by 9 June 2018. Where the Directive has not been implemented yet, such as in Germany, individuals may to a certain extent rely on the Directive itself, arguing that the existing national law must be construed in a way that brings it in line with the Directive. Substantial new rules as discussed above (requirement of reasonable measure to protect secrecy; admissibility of reverse engineering; liability even without a culpable act) result from the Directive itself; hence these new rules are potentially relevant for any business now conducted in Germany since 9 June 2018 was the date when the deadline for implementing the Directive into German law expired.

    In order to formally implement the Directive, Germany will pass a Trade Secrets Act (Gesetz zum Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen). On 19 April 2018 a first draft of such an act was presented (the draft as well as an explanatory memorandum can be seen here are available at. The draft Trade Secrets Act provides companies with claims against infringers who unlawfully acquired, used or disclosed a trade secret. In addition to claims for damages, injunctive relief and information, companies may also have claims for recall and destruction of products that were manufactured and marketed as a consequence of infringement of a trade secret (Sections 5-7 of the German draft Trade Secrets Act). However, a mere pecuniary compensation, in the form of a notional license fee, may be paid to the infringed party (replacing any other liability) if the infringer did not act culpably and if a pecuniary compensation to the infringed party appears reasonably satisfactory (Section 10 of the German draft Trade Secrets Act). Also, claims do not exist as far as they would be excessive considering the specific circumstances of the case, including (1) the value of the trade secret, (2) the measures taken to protect the trade secret, (3) the conduct of the infringer in acquiring, using or disclosing the trade secret and (4) the impact of the unlawful use or disclosure of the trade secret (Section 8 of the German draft Trade Secrets Act). In addition to civil law claims against an infringer, consequences under criminal law will still be possible (Section 22 of the German draft Trade Secrets Act).

    Furthermore, the German Trade Secrets Act will contain special provisions for trade secret litigation. A court will be able to classify a trade secret as confidential, and then the alleged infringer and its attorneys must treat the secret as confidential even after the end of the legal proceedings (Sections 15-17 of the German draft Trade Secrets Act). Also, and as a novelty in German procedural law, the court will be able to limit a party’s access to evidence embodying trade secrets (Section 18 of the German draft Trade Secrets Act).

    It is expected that the German government will decide on the Trade Secrets Act by the beginning of August 2018, and after further legislative procedures the act may enter into force in late 2018.

    Strategies for an Effective Protection of Proprietary Information

    Enterprises doing business in Germany should consider the impact that the European Directive already has now, and they should consider the implications of the upcoming German Trade Secrets Act. And obviously, in the background is the ever-present threat to misappropriation of trade secrets: a study reports that 53 percent of German enterprises have fallen victim to economic espionage, sabotage or data theft in the past two years, resulting in an annual loss of around 55 billion euros.

    All this suggests re-evaluating strategies for protecting proprietary information. Enterprises should double-check their approach to taking—and documenting—contractual and technical measures to protect secrecy. Doing so can help maintaining a good position in competition. But not doing so may put at risk that there is any legal protection for the information in the first place, and it may even make an enterprise’s management responsible for unintentionally losing protection of proprietary information.

    The advisable confidentiality measures will depend on the specific circumstances of the case, such as the value of a given trade secret, its importance to the business and customary confidentiality measures in the relevant business. In any event, the explanatory memorandum on the German draft Trade Secrets Act clarifies that contractual provisions to protect secrecy as well as physical access restrictions may be appropriate. The following should be considered:

    1. Identifying the important proprietary information

    Companies should establish a process for identifying and categorizing proprietary information as well as the people who have access to the information and what the status quo of protection is. The aim of this process will often be to identify the perhaps 20 percent of existing information that is not easily accessible to competitors and that is of key importance for business success. This kind of information (the “crown jewels” of an enterprise) deserves effective protection.

    Also, it is important to make the identification and categorization of proprietary information a continuous or regular process because new information may be generated continuously.

    2. Mixing secrecy and intellectual property rights

    A strategic decision should be made about the extent to which secrecy is best suited to protect proprietary information and where intellectual property rights such as patents should be obtained. Under the specific circumstances, one or the other may be better. For example, secrecy gives no protection against independent developments by competitors (or where one cannot disprove a competitor’s allegation that something has been developed independently). Also, maintaining secrecy of technical information may become increasingly difficult with powerful technical means of reverse engineering becoming available and with reverse engineering becoming basically admissible in Europe. In contrast to potential permissible reverse engineering of a trade secret, patents provide effective protection against a competitor’s later independent developments. Moreover, patents are easier to license and may be easier to use for advertisement and promotional purposes, if those are considerations. However, patents have a limited lifetime, make proprietary information available even in regions where no protection is sought, and involve associated costs such as annual renewal fees. Effectively protected secrecy does not come free of costs either, but an enterprise may be able to spread the costs of secrecy over a broad range of products.

    Still it will often be possible to combine the advantages of intellectual property rights and protection of secrecy. While patents may be obtained for certain generalized aspects of a technology (which may be easily accessible by reverse engineering anyway), other more specific features of the technology can still be kept secret. For example, assume a certain chemical process is patented and if reverse engineered would show that certain catalysts are used. Aspects of such a process can still be kept secret, e.g., how the starting materials are made or at what temperature the chemical process should be run for an optimal result.

    3. Organizational measures

    Clear responsibilities and access rights should be defined for proprietary information. The more important secret information is for the company’s business, the more restrictive should access rights be granted. This applies both to internal access and to providing information to external parties such as customers; access to important and proprietary information may be granted on a need-to-know basis only. For example, even an enterprise’s own senior marketing manager may not need access to detailed technical information about ongoing product developments.

    Since a significant real-life threat to secrecy results from employees’ lacking awareness or from targeted attacks against employees, it is helpful to establish a safety culture through regular training. This may include, for example, raising awareness towards social engineering approaches (that is, a competitor using psychological manipulation of employees into divulging secret information). Often advisable are also clear rules for dealing with private and business IT devices such as storage media, or for data that may be taken (or not) on business trips abroad.

    4. Contract housekeeping

    Enterprises should make use of available contractual means to protect secrecy. First, this concerns contracts with employees: explicit confidentiality clauses may become more important than they used to be. It can also be good to explicitly prohibit employees from using any information that is proprietary to their former employer. In addition, post-contractual non-compete clauses may be considered—but mainly in contracts with selected key employees because the clauses need to be drafted case-specific, and because a post-contractual restraint will incur costs for the employer.

    Also, trade secrets need to be protected in contracts with third parties such as customers, suppliers, licensees or R&D partners. Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) will often include contractual penalties because it can be difficult to establish any specific amount of damages that are suffered due to the unlawful disclosure of a trade secret, and because the penalty may have an extra deterring effect. In view of the new rules on reverse engineering it may also be chosen to include an explicit prohibition of reverse engineering in commercial agreements.

    5. Technical measures

    In addition to the above, it has been customary before and has become even more important now to establish IT measures to protect secret information, such as firewalls, encryption, monitoring access to information and rules on the use of private storage media.

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  • Determining the Amount of GILTI

    ARTICLE

    Determining the Amount of GILTI

    July 13, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Partner Lowell D. Yoder authored this bylined article on the rules in section 951A for determining the amount of the GILTI Subpart F inclusion. The 2017 tax act added a new inclusion rule to Subpart F.2 A US shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) must include in gross income the CFC’s global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI). This article discusses issues requiring guidance from the Treasury and IRS and suggests interpretations in the interim.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Expected Legislation Amending CFIUS Will Affect a Broad Range of Foreign Investments in US Businesses

    Expected Legislation Amending CFIUS Will Affect a Broad Range of Foreign Investments in US Businesses

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Expected Legislation Amending CFIUS Will Affect a Broad Range of Foreign Investments in US Businesses

    July 11, 2018

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In response to increasing concerns about foreign investment and access to sensitive US technology, particularly by Chinese investors, the US Senate and House of Representatives recently passed slightly different versions of a bill, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA).

    This legislation will update and expand the role of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in reviewing possible US national security implications of acquisitions and investments in US businesses by foreign parties. House and Senate conferees will now meet to form a single bill, which is expected to pass into law with firm support from the Trump administration.

    Parties to transactions involving foreign investment in US business are well advised to consider the impact of FIRRMA’s amendments to the CFIUS process.

    In depth

    A bipartisan group from the US Senate and the House of Representatives introduced legislation in 2017 to update and expand the role of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in reviewing possible US national security implications of acquisitions and investments in US businesses by foreign parties. Congress has continued to debate and refine the legislation, known as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). Riding a wave of increased scrutiny surrounding foreign investment and access to sensitive technology in US businesses, particularly by Chinese investors, a version of FIRRMA passed the Senate on June 18, 2018. A slightly different FIRRMA bill passed the House of Representatives on June 26, 2018, with significant bipartisan support. House and Senate conferees will now meet to form a single bill, which is expected to pass into law with firm support from the Trump administration. FIRRMA will impact a wide range of new foreign acquisitions and investments in the United States.

    Parties to transactions involving foreign investment in US business are well advised to consider the impact of FIRRMA’s amendments to the CFIUS process.

    Both versions of FIRRMA would broaden the scope of CFIUS’s jurisdiction to include review of any investment (other than passive investment) by a foreign person in any US critical technology business, including:

    • Emerging or breakthrough technologies;
    • Real estate transactions with access to air, land (i.e. border crossings), or sea ports or with proximity to sensitive US government facilities;
    • Bankruptcy and other default transactions;
    • Existing investments under which a foreign stakeholder has gained rights of control or influence over the US entity; and
    • Any other investments which CFIUS deems designed to evade CFIUS review.

    The House bill would additionally require CFIUS to review transactions allowing a foreign investor to influence or gain access to sensitive personal information of US citizens.

    While the new versions of FIRRMA would significantly expand CFIUS’s authority, certain limitations would be introduced as well. Under the Senate’s version, CFIUS could exempt from review transactions in which all foreign investors involved are from “friendly countries” (i.e., countries that have shared security interests with the US and effective review processes to safeguard them, NATO member countries and major non-NATO allies, and countries that adhere to nonproliferation control means). The Senate bill would also expand the definition of “passive” investments (which are exempt from CFIUS oversight) to include transactions involving investment funds with non-controlling foreign investors.

    Both current versions of FIRRMA removed language included in the original draft of the FIRRMA bill that would have allowed CFIUS to review licensing and joint venture transactions with foreign parties for the transfer of US intellectual property.

    For FIRRMA to become law, the two houses of Congress must agree on an identical version of the bill, and President Trump must sign it. The president has stated that he expects Congress to pass “strong FIRRMA legislation that better protects the crown jewels of American technology and intellectual property from transfers and acquisitions that threaten our national security—and future economic prosperity.” However, if Congress does not pass a bill, or if it passes a bill that does not contain language sufficiently strong in the eyes of the administration, then President Trump may seek to impose additional foreign investment restrictions.

    Specifically, the president has raised the possibility of imposing restrictions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301) on China’s laws, policies, and practices relating to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. Section 301 grants authority to “investigate foreign trade practices and take action to compel another country to eliminate unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory practices that burden US commerce.” On March 22, 2018, President Trump issued a Memorandum directing the Secretary of Treasury to report within 60 days regarding measures “to address concerns about investment in the United States directed or facilitated by China in industries or technologies deemed important to the United States,” including “options for new investment restrictions using ‘any available statutory authority.’” The investment restrictions were expected to target China’s key sectors, including information technology, aerospace, marine engineer, pharmaceuticals, advanced energy vehicles, robotics and other technologies.

    On June 27, 2018, President Trump announced that he would not enforce new investment restrictions against China under Section 301, provided that Congress passes FIRRMA. It remains to be seen whether any final version of FIRRMA will impose restrictions stringent enough to satisfy the president and forestall additional China-specific restrictions pursuant to Section 301.

    Companies planning transactions or investments pursuant to which a foreign (non-US) party would acquire an interest in a US business should carefully consider and take appropriate steps to address whether/how the deal would be treated by CFIUS, as amended by FIRRMA. Such consideration would be particularly important in the case of a Chinese investment.

    Authors

    David J. Levine

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Raymond Paretzky

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • INSIGHT: Supreme Court Prohibits Class-Action ‘Stacking’

    ARTICLE

    INSIGHT: Supreme Court Prohibits Class-Action ‘Stacking’

    July 11, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    David Hanselman, Chelsea Black and Steven Vaughn co-authored this bylined article on the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in China Agritech Inc. v. Resh, which limited plaintiffs’ filings of follow-on lawsuits after the expiration of the statute of limitations in the original action. The decision “places a greater burden on class plaintiffs to find adequate class representatives at the beginning of the case,” the authors wrote.

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