Content Type: Article

  • Ninth Circuit Rejects Disqualification of Secured Lender’s Vote on Plan

    Ninth Circuit Rejects Disqualification of Secured Lender’s Vote on Plan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ninth Circuit Rejects Disqualification of Secured Lender’s Vote on Plan

    June 11, 2018

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “ . . . [A] bankruptcy court may not designate claims for bad faith simply because (1) a creditor offers to purchase only a subset of available claims in order to block a [reorganization] plan . . . and/or

    (2) blocking the plan will adversely [affect] the remaining creditors,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on June 4, 2018. In re Fagerdala USA-LOMPOC Inc., 2018 WL 2472874, *1 (9th Cir. June 4, 2018). According to the Ninth Circuit, the lower courts “erred by considering only the effect of [the lender’s] actions, without respect for its motivation.” Id. at *1, *3. “[T]he mere failure to make purchase offers to all outstanding creditors does not support a bad faith finding . . . [i]n the absence of some ulterior motive.” Id., at *10.

    Relevance

    Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 1126(e) provides that when a party moves to designate (i.e., disqualify) a creditor’s vote on a reorganization plan, “the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of [the Code].” In re Figter Ltd., 118 F. 3d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In this context, ‘designate’ means disqualify from voting.”). “Bad faith” — i.e., the absence of the requisite good faith — may be found when a creditor acts to further an ulterior motive unrelated to its claim or interests as a creditor. In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F. 2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1945) (“The mere fact that a purchase of creditors’ interests is for the purpose of securing the approval or rejection of a plan does not of itself amount to ‘bad faith.’ When that purchase is in aid of an interest other than an interest of a creditor, such purchases may amount [to] ‘bad faith’. . . ”; held, purchaser of claims barred from voting); In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 B.R. 839, 845 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (when “creditor voted without regard to the treatment of its claim, but instead, to achieve some benefit or goal inconsistent with interests of the estate and its creditors, the Court must inquire into those motives in order to preserve the integrity of the Chapter 11 process”). Similarly, bad faith applies “to claimants who oppose the plan for a time until they were ‘bought off,’” as well as “those who refuse to vote in favor of plan unless . . . given some particular preferential advantage.” Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 211 n. 10 (1945).

    The Second Circuit’s 2011 decision in DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD North America Inc., 634 F. 3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (bankruptcy court properly designated vote of claim buyer who sought to defeat debtor’s plan so that it might acquire debtor or its assets) makes the Fagerdala case critically important. As one commentator stressed, the designation holding in DBSD was “likely to chill the market for bankruptcy claims, particularly in cases where the claims are acquired with a view towards the acquisition of the debtor.” C.W. Frost, 31 Bankr. L. Letter, No. 5, at 1 (May 2011).

    Facts

    The lender (“Lender”) in Fagerdala held a senior secured claim of about $3.95 million on the debtor’s real property worth approximately $6 million. After the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition in 2014, it proposed a reorganization plan with a secured creditor class and a general unsecured creditor class, both of which were to be impaired. To “cram down” the plan on the Lender, the debtor “needed the approval of at least one impaired class” under Code § 1129(a)(10). Id., at *1.

    “To block [the debtor’s] proposed plan, [Lender] purchased a number of the general unsecured claims,” admittedly to gain “a blocking position in the unsecured class,” with the goal of maximizing its economic interest. Lender had insufficient funds to purchase all of the general unsecured claims, but was ultimately able to purchase “more than half of the claims by number, but only approximately ten percent by value . . . . (hereinafter ‘Purchased Claims’).” Id. *2.

    The Lender thus had “at least ‘one-half’ in number’ of the general unsecured class,” enabling it “to block the [debtor’s] plan” under Code § 1126(c). Id. The debtor moved to designate the votes of the Purchased Claims, “arguing that [Lender] had not purchased the claims in good faith.” Id. During argument in the bankruptcy court, Lender’s counsel stated that he “did not attempt to buy ‘every claim’ for good business reasons.” Id.

    The Lower Courts

    The bankruptcy court stated, “as a matter of law,” it was not “going to consider [Lender’s] motivation or rationale for offering to purchase only a subset of claims.” Id. Granting the debtor’s designation motion, it found the following:

    • Unsecured creditors would be paid in full under the debtor’s plan with interest within sixty days of the plan’s confirmation;
    • Unsecured creditors would not be paid in a liquidation if the reorganization failed and the Lender foreclosed;
    • Lender would have “an unfair advantage over the unsecured creditors who did not receive a purchase offer and who hold the largest percentage of claims with regards . . . in terms of amount”;
    • Lender’s “conduct in further of its own interest should not result in an unfair disadvantage to other creditors”; and
    • Unsecured creditors should not be prejudiced by Lender’s obtaining a blocking positon by “purchasing such a small percentage of the unsecured debt.”

    Id. Having removed Lender’s Purchased Claims from voting, the debtor had enough creditors in the general unsecured creditor class to accept the plan, enabling the bankruptcy court to confirm it. The district court affirmed confirmation of the plan and designation of Lender’s claims. Id. *3

    The Court of Appeals

    The Ninth Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court’s reliance only on Lender’s limiting its offer to unsecured creditors and the purported prejudice to unsecured creditors. In its view, “under [Code] § 1126(e), neither of these considerations — alone or together — are by themselves sufficient to support a finding of bad faith.” Id.

    Relying on its earlier 1997 Figter decision, the court stressed that the “definition of ‘good faith’ is not provided in [the Code] and was ‘left to the courts’ by Congress.” Because good faith is a “fluid” concept, “no single factor can be said to inexorably demand an ultimate result, nor must a single set of factors be considered.” A creditor may protect its own interests, but may not attempt “to obtain some benefit to which [it was] not entitled.” “An entity acts in bad faith when it ‘seeks to secure some untoward advantage over other creditors for some ulterior purpose.’” Id. at *3 – 4 quoting Figter, *118 F.3d at 638-639.

    A creditor may act in its self-interest, reasoned the Ninth Circuit. Merely buying claims “for the purpose of protecting [its] own existing claim does not demonstrate bad faith or an ulterior motive.” Id. at *4, quoting Figter, 118 F.3d at 639. In short, buying claims “for the very purpose of blocking confirmation of . . . [a] proposed plan . . . is not to be condemned.” Id.

    Failure To Offer To Buy All Claims in a Class Okay

    “ . . . [F]ailing to make an offer to all members of a class is (by itself) [not] sufficient evidence of bad faith.” Id. Nor is offering to buy all the claims a “dispositive factor.” Id. “. . . [O]ffering to purchase all claims is certainly an indicator of good faith, [but] failing to do so cannot be evidence of bad faith.” Id. (emphasis in original). See also In re 225 Park Plaza Assocs. Ltd., 100 F.3d 1214, 1219 (6th Cir. 1996) (“If bad faith could be found any time a claim is purchased to block approval of a plan, there would be no incentive to purchase claims.”); DBSD, 34 F.3d at 102 (“Merely purchasing certain claims in bankruptcy ‘for the purpose of securing the approval or rejection of a plan does not of itself amount to bad faith.’”). When a creditor acts in in its own self-interest, its frustrating the debtor’s “desires” is hardly bad faith. Id. “Doing something allowed by the Bankruptcy Code and case law, without evidence of ulterior motive, cannot be bad faith. Not offering to purchase all the claims in a class (to later use those claims to block a plan) is not — alone — sufficient to evidence the bad faith necessary to designate votes under § 1126(e). ” Id.

    No “Unfair Advantage” Test

    The Ninth Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court’s “unfair advantage” analysis because it “incorrectly examined only the negative effect of the action, not the motivation of the creditor, and failed to establish whether [Lender] had acted to ‘secure some untoward advantage over other creditors for some ulterior motive.’” Id. at 5, quoting Figter, 118 F.3d at 639 (emphasis in original). The court focused instead “on whether the creditor has an ‘ulterior motive,’ and is seeking ‘to secure some untoward advantage.’” Id. Creditors need not vote on a reorganization plan “with a high degree of altruism and with a desire to help the debtor and their fellow creditors. Far from it.” Id., quoting Figter, 118 F.3d at 639 (emphasis added). “‘[I]f [the creditor] acted out of enlightened self-interest, it is not to be condemned simply because it frustrated [the debtor’s] desires.’” Id.

    Bad faith, instead, turns on whether the creditor tried to “obtain some benefit to which [it] [w]as not entitled.” Id. According to the Second Circuit in DBSD, a court may find bad faith when “[t]he purchasing party . . . was less interested in maximizing the return on its claim than in diverting the progress of the proceedings to achieve an outside benefit.” DBSD, 634 F.3d at 104 (emphasis added). Other examples of bad faith include “a non-preexisting creditor ‘purchasing a claim for the purpose of blocking an action against it,’ competitors purchasing claims to ‘destroy the debtor’s business in order to further their own,’ or a debtor arranging to have an insider purchase claims.” 2018 WL 2472874, at *5. In short, simply “protecting a claim to its fullest extent cannot be evidence of bad faith.” Id. The “bankruptcy court in Fagerdala erred both by considering the effect on other creditors, without additional evidence of bad faith, and not making actual findings on [Lender’s] motivations.”

    Comment

    Fagerdala reached a sensible result, ensuring creditors can act in their own economic self-interest. In contrast to the Second Circuit’s DBSD decision, the Ninth Circuit did not condemn an “acquisitive motive alone, without specific findings of bad behavior . . .” Frost, supra, at 7. It also rejected another bankruptcy court decision relying on a creditor’s obtaining a purported “unfair disadvantage.” 2018 WL 2472874, at *5, rejecting In re Pleasant Hill Partners L.P., 163 B.R. 388, 395 (Bankr. N.D.Ga 1994) (a creditor’s self-interested “conduct should not result in an unfair disadvantage to other creditors or the debtor”).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Can Managers Be Held Liable for Antitrust Fines

    ARTICLE

    Can Managers Be Held Liable for Antitrust Fines

    June, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Daniel von Brevern explains the risks on the basis of a legal dispute which currently pending in Dortmund.

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  • Recent Developments in Tax Law: BVerfG of 10 April 2018 on § 7 Sentence 2 GewStG and the Justification of Trade Tax

    ARTICLE

    Recent Developments in Tax Law: BVerfG of 10 April 2018 on § 7 Sentence 2 GewStG and the Justification of Trade Tax

    June 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Gero Burwitz authored the article “Recent Developments in Tax Law: BVerfG of 10 April 2018 on § 7 Sentence 2 GewStG and the Justification of Trade Tax”, featured in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), p. 729-731 in June 2018.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Gero Burwitz

    Partner

    Munich

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  • Commodities Roundup

    Commodities Roundup

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Commodities Roundup

    June 7, 2018

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This Alert contains a summary of recent Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and futures exchanges developments.

    I. CFTC Opens Access to Indian Futures Market for U.S. Customers

    On May 17, 2018, the CFTC issued an order[1] to the National Stock Exchange of India (“NSE”), deeming it to have a regulatory regime for its futures brokers that is “comparable” to CFTC requirements. Under this order, NSE members (i.e., clearing members of that exchange) are permitted to accept U.S. customers without having to register as a futures commission merchant with the CFTC. This is a continuation of a CFTC program that has previously provided comparable relief to 12 other jurisdictions.

    This action may provide direct access to the Indian futures markets for U.S.-person fund managers and other advisers. NSE members looking to take advantage of this order need to make a filing with the National Futures Association (“NFA”), so U.S. fund managers and advisers looking to enter into relationships with Indian futures brokers should document their confirmation of the NSE member’s status on the NFA’s website.

    This order, however, does not extend to swaps. U.S.-based fund managers and advisers entering into swaps with Indian counterparties still need to ensure that the swap is compliant with various CFTC requirements (such as certain obligations to report, clear and trade via a CFTC-registered swap execution facility).

    II. Position Limits and Aggregation

    The CFTC sets position limits for nine “legacy” futures contracts and requires that the futures exchanges it regulates set limits on other futures contracts. For purposes of calculating position limits, the CFTC also requires the aggregation of “positions in accounts for which any person by power of attorney or otherwise directly or indirectly holds positions or controls trading,” unless the CFTC provides an exemption, such as for indirect holdings where there is no “control.”

    Two recent developments have provided some insight into CFTC aggregation requirements:

    • A recent CFTC settlement providing certain insight into what constitutes “control” for aggregation; and
    • New CFTC interpretive guidance on the effectiveness of certain aggregation exemptions.

    Glencore CFTC Settlement

    On April 30, 2018, the CFTC reached a $2-million settlement with Glencore plc for position limit violations concerning two affiliates, Glencore Grain B.V. and Glencore Ltd.[2] Both entities engaged in cotton trading (derivatives and physical trading) as part of Glencore’s overall global cotton business.

    Glencore was presumably considering each unit separately for purposes of calculating position limits; however, the CFTC determined that since one individual “oversaw and communicated overarching cotton strategies and policies across Glencore entities” (including the use of futures for hedging purposes), the two entities should have been aggregated. On an aggregated basis, Glencore exceeded the cotton position limit, one of the nine legacy contracts, by 5,000 contracts.

    To further exacerbate matters, because Glencore entered into several exchange for physical (“EFP”) transactions between the two Glencore parties, the CFTC also took the position that there was a violation of CFTC Rule 1.38(a), which prohibits noncompetitive trades. While Rule 1.38(a) provides an exception that permits noncompetitive trades when executed in accordance with the written rules of an exchange, ICE Futures U.S. (the exchange where the cotton futures were traded), only permits EFPs between “independently controlled accounts,” which the CFTC asserts was not the case here (given the one individual’s control over the trading of both entities).

    While Glencore differs from traditional fund managers in that its entities act as producers and distributors in physical markets (such as cotton), there are still several lessons for managers. Fund managers and other traders that deem different trading units or funds to be disaggregated should consider the CFTC’s Glencore factors and consider whether additional separation measures are needed. In particular, they should determine whether they have structures that:

    • Centralize management of trading;
    • Have unified supervision of traders in different trading units;
    • Employ and enforce common trading strategies and policies across different trading units;
    • Have information sharing or consolidation for activities and positions across trading units; and
    • Permit or facilitate trade-level discussions.

    Interpretive Guidance Aggregation

    The CFTC also recently provided interpretive guidance concerning the reliance on aggregation exemptions by fund investors.[3]

    As a general rule, an investor that owns 10 percent or more of a fund is required to aggregate the positions of the fund with its own positions. The CFTC, however, provides an aggregation exemption for fund investors, under CFTC Rule 150.4(b)(1), that is available unless (i) the CPO of the fund is exempt from registration pursuant to CFTC Rule 4.13 and (ii) the investor holds a 25 percent or greater interest in the fund.[4]

    The rule is silent as to whether an investor relying on Rule 150.4(b)(1)’s exemption from aggregation of positions held directly by the fund is nonetheless required to aggregate positions indirectly held by the fund (i.e., positions held by portfolio companies owned by the fund, which the investor may indirectly own 10 percent or more of, on the basis of the investor’s percentage ownership of the fund). In its recent guidance, however, the CFTC staff stated that, in a Rule 150.4(b)(1) situation, the investor is not required to look through its investment in the fund to aggregate the positions of the portfolio company.[5]

    This guidance may be helpful for fund managers and large investors in negotiating provisions that would assist the investor with its position limits aggregation requirements.

    III. Changing Nature of Exchange Disciplinary Sanctions

    In several recent actions brought by the U.S. futures exchange operators, orders resulting from violations of trading rules have resulted in some form of suspension from trading for the trader involved (in addition to fines).

    Having a key trading employee prohibited, even temporarily, from trading on behalf of clients could result in significant damage to a manager’s investment program and to its clients’ portfolios. Fund managers should ensure that traders are well-educated in exchange rules, particularly with respect to rules concerning activities that could be perceived as manipulative trading.

    IV. CFTC Swap Margin Rule Amendment Proposal

    On May 23, 2018, the CFTC issued a proposed rule (“Proposal”)[6] to amend certain margin requirements for uncleared swaps (“Margin Rules”).[7] The Proposal is consistent with a rule proposal issued earlier this year by the Prudential Regulators[8] (“QFC Rules”)[9] and is simply intended to modify the Margin Rules so that swap amendments that are made solely to comply with QFC Rules will not have an adverse impact on the swap counterparties.

    Under the Margin Rules, a swap dealer is permitted to calculate margin on an aggregated net basis across uncleared swaps that are executed under the same eligible master netting agreement (“EMNA”). However, a master netting agreement that is amended so as to comply with new QFC Rules requirements concerning cross-default rights would not meet the current definition of EMNA, meaning an amendment to comply with QFC Rules could result in the swap dealer being required to measure its exposure on a gross basis, rather than on an aggregated net basis. The CFTC is proposing to modify the definition of EMNA to cover such amendments. In addition, since an amendment to a “legacy” swap that is exempt from the Margin Rules could cause the swap to lose its legacy status (and lose its exemption from the Margin Rules requirements) the CFTC is proposing a rule that would permit swaps to keep their legacy status, so long as the amendment was solely entered into in order to comply with the QFC Rules.

    Fund managers and other traders that have an EMNA in place with their swap counterparties will also benefit from the Proposal (assuming it is finalized); absent these changes, QFC Rule amendments to swap agreements could have resulted in higher margin requirements for all swap counterparties.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly and Jacob Preiserowicz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the authors.


    [1] See here.

    [2] In re Glencore Agriculture B.V. and Glencore Ltd., Commodity Futures Trading Commission Docket No. 18-12 (April 30, 2018).

    [3] CFTC Letter 18-12, available here.

    [4] While such 25 percent+ investors are required to aggregate the positions of the fund, another exemption, known as the “independent account controller” exemption, is available in such situations. (The independent account controller exemption still requires aggregation of physically settled contracts during the spot month).

    [5] While it seems reasonable to conclude that the same rationale is applicable to a 25 percent+ fund investor relying on the independent account controller exemption (i.e., that a 25 percent+ investor relying on the independent account controller exemption concerning its investment in a CFTC Rule 4.13 fund would also not need to aggregate the positions of a portfolio company held by the fund, other than perhaps physically settled contracts during the spot month), the letter did not directly address this situation.

    [6] Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 83 FR 23842 (May 23, 2018).

    [7] Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 FR 636 (Jan. 6, 2016).

    [8] “Prudential Regulators” includes the Federal Reserve Board , the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm Credit Administration and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Margin rules issued by the Prudential Regulators are applicable to their registrants, while CFTC margin rules are applicable to CFTC registrants that are not registered with a Prudential Regulator.

    [9] See 82 FR 42882 (Sep. 12, 2017) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Rule). See also 82 FR 50228 (Oct. 30, 2017) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Rule). See also 82 FR 56630 (Nov. 29, 2017) (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Rule).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Sanctions Update: Venezuela and Ukraine/Russia

    Sanctions Update: Venezuela and Ukraine/Russia

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: Venezuela and Ukraine/Russia

    June 6, 2018

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 21, 2018, in response to recent activities of the Maduro regime, President Trump issued a new Executive Order, “Prohibiting Certain Additional Transactions with Respect to Venezuela.”[1] Previous sanctions under Executive Order 13808, issued Aug. 24, 2017, had prohibited transactions related to, provisions of financing for, or other dealings in, among other things, “new debt” of certain maturities and new equity of the Government of Venezuela, bonds issued by the Government of Venezuela, dividend payments or other distributions of profits to the Government of Venezuela from any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Venezuela, as well as the purchase of securities from the Government of Venezuela.[2] As explained below, the new sanctions prohibit, among other things, transactions involving the purchase of any debt owed to the Government of Venezuela, as well as transactions involving any debt owed to the Government of Venezuela that is pledged as collateral. The new sanctions also prohibit transactions related to, financing for or other dealings relating to the sale, transfer, assignment or pledging as collateral by the Government of Venezuela of any equity interests involving entities in which the Government of Venezuela has a 50 percent or greater ownership interest. By targeting debt owed to the Government of Venezuela, the new sanctions limit the Government of Venezuela’s ability to liquidate assets into usable capital.

    Separately, on May 22, 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued two Ukraine/Russia-related general licenses in its continued effort to allow U.S. persons to divest from relationships that violate recent sanctions. General License 15 authorizes certain activities necessary to the maintenance or wind down of operations or existing contracts with GAZ Group and its subsidiaries until Oct. 23, 2018. General License 12C (replacing General License 12B) authorizes U.S. financial institutions to process certain funds transfers for the benefit of twelve specifically identified blocked persons and clarifies that firms can release such funds for authorized maintenance and wind-down purposes. On the same day, OFAC also published six new Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”), and revised three existing FAQs concerning these general licenses. OFAC also published two additional related FAQs on May 25, 2018. In addition, on May 31, 2018, OFAC issued General License 13B (replacing and superseding General License 13A in its entirety) authorizing certain transactions necessary to divest or transfer debt, equity or other holdings in EN+ Group PLC, GAZ Group and United Company RUSAL PLC (“RUSAL”) and extending the expiration date of the general license to Aug. 5, 2018. Finally, on June 4, 2018, OFAC issued General License 16, authorizing U.S. persons to engage in certain transactions related to the wind down or maintenance of business involving EN+ Group PLC, JSC EuroSibEnergo or their subsidiaries.

    I. Venezuelan Sanctions

    The Executive Order applies to U.S. persons and to transactions within the United States. Subsection 1(a) of the Order prohibits “[a]ll transactions related to, provision of financing for, and other dealings” in “(i) the purchase of any debt owed to the Government of Venezuela,[3] including accounts receivable; (ii) any debt owed to the Government of Venezuela that is pledged as collateral after the effective date of th[e] order, including accounts receivable; and (iii) the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as collateral by the Government of Venezuela of any equity interest in which the Government of Venezuela has a 50 percent or greater ownership interest.”

    These new sanctions, according to the Executive Order, were issued “particularly in light of the recent activities of the Maduro regime, including endemic economic mismanagement and public corruption at the expense of the Venezuelan people and their prosperity, and ongoing repression of the political opposition; attempts to undermine democratic order by holding snap elections that are neither free nor fair; and the regime’s responsibility for the deepening humanitarian and public health crisis in Venezuela.”[4] Fundamentally, the new sanctions, like prior sanctions, are a further attempt to prevent U.S. persons from contributing to the Government of Venezuela’s financial scheme.[5]

    Unlike prior sanctions, which, among other things, prohibited transactions involving certain new debt of specific maturities and bonds issued by the Government of Venezuela, the new sanctions prohibit, among other things, transactions involving debt owed to the Government of Venezuela. This includes debt instruments traded in the secondary market. The prohibition is phrased broadly and extends to accounts receivable and any other type of debt owed to the Venezuelan Government. The new sanctions do not, however, further restrict trading in debt issued by the Venezuelan Government beyond the significant limitations imposed in August 2017.[6]

    Subsection 1(b) provides that the prohibitions in subsection (a) apply “notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date” of the Executive Order. Since the Executive Order overrides any previously issued licenses or permits, firms engaging in the performance of certain categories of transactions previously authorized by a general license, and even firms that have received a specific license authorizing a particular transaction, must cease transactions prohibited by the Executive Order by its effective date of May 21, 2018, unless and to the extent they obtain a new license.

    Subsection 2(a) prohibits “[a]ny transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in” the Executive Order. In addition, Subsection 2(b) prohibits a conspiracy to violate the Executive Order.

    The sanctions were not accompanied by any new or revised general or specific licenses, nor to date has OFAC issued any new or revised FAQs concerning the scope of the sanctions.

    As the political situation in Venezuela continues to deteriorate, firms should monitor for further sanctions-related actions targeting the Government of Venezuela, and carefully scrutinize customers and transactions that may be connected to the Government of Venezuela.

    II. Ukraine/Russia-Related General Licenses; Publication of FAQs

    In an effort to allow GAZ Group and its subsidiaries to continue maintenance or wind-down activities, General License 15 authorizes otherwise prohibited transactions (through 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Oct. 23, 2018) that are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of operations, contracts or, other agreements, including the importation of foods, services, or technology into the United States” involving GAZ Group, or entities in which it owns 50 percent or more.[7] As clarified in accompanying FAQs, accounts of GAZ Group and its subsidiaries remain blocked, except for use in maintenance and wind-down activities.[8] In addition, U.S. and foreign persons may engage in activities authorized by General License 15 that occur on or after May 22, 2018, except for activities involving blocked persons other than GAZ Group or its subsidiaries, without making associated payments into a blocked account.[9]

    The new FAQs issued on May 22, 2018 clarify that U.S. persons may export goods to GAZ Group from the United States pursuant to General License 15, provided that the activity is for maintenance or wind down and consistent with the requirements of other federal agencies.[10] General License 15 does not, however, authorize any divestiture or transfer of debt, equity or other holdings to or for the benefit of the blocked entities it identifies.

    The new FAQs issued on May 22, 2018 also confirm that foreign persons will not be subject to sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”) for engaging in activity with GAZ Group or its subsidiaries that is allowed by General License 15. Specifically, the FAQs clarify that because U.S. persons would not require a specific license to engage in activity authorized by General License 15, the activity would not be considered “significant” of the purpose of a sanctions determination under the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act (“SSIDES”) or CAATSA.[11] OFAC also clarified in a FAQ issued on May 25, 2018 that paying dividends into a blocked account or in a manner that does not provide economic benefit, directly or indirectly, to the blocked person, such as an escrow account, will not be considered “significant” for the purposes of a sanctions determination under SSIDES or CAATSA.[12]

    General License 12C replaces and supersedes General License 12B of May 1, 2018, to provide for the new General License 15, discussed above. General License 12C, like General License 12B, authorizes otherwise prohibited transactions and activities (until 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, June 5, 2018) that are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements, including the importation of foods, services, or technology into the United States” with the following blocked persons: AgroHolding Kuban, Basic Element Limited, B-Finance Ltd., EN+ Group PLC, JSC EuroSibEnergo, GAZ Group, Gazprom Burenie OOO, Ladoga Menedzhment OOO, NPV Engineering Open Joint Stock Company, Renova Group, Russian Machines, RUSAL or any other entity in which these persons own a 50 percent or greater interest.[13]

    OFAC’s FAQs clarify that under General License 12C, General License 14 and General License 15, U.S. persons may receive regularly scheduled payments — and even accelerated payments or voluntary prepayments — of principal and interest from a blocked person listed in the respective general license, so long as the loan or bond was in existence prior to April 6, 2018, and the payments are in accordance with the terms of the preexisting loan or bond contract.[14]

    General License 12C contains the same prohibition as General License 12B with respect to any divestiture or transfer of debt, equity or other holdings to or for the benefit of the blocked entities it identifies, or the exportation of goods from the United States. Further, any payment for the benefit of a blocked person must be made into a blocked, interest-bearing account located in the United States.

    OFAC’s FAQs also address what further sanctions relief OFAC can give to GAZ Group[15] and RUSAL,[16] or entities in which they own a majority interest. OFAC advised that “parties may be removed by demonstrating a change in the circumstances that led to their designation,” and in the case of GAZ Group and RUSAL, that is through divestment and relinquishment of control of the entities by any Specially Designated Nationals, including Oleg Deripaska. In that regard, recent press suggests that Mr. Deripaska is taking steps to divest his ownership in and control over RUSAL.[17]

    Replacing and superseding General License 13A (issued May 1, 2018), General License 13B authorizes otherwise prohibited transactions (through 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Aug. 5, 2018) that are ordinarily incident and necessary (1) to divest or transfer debt, equity or other holdings in EN+ Group PLC, GAZ Group or RUSAL to a non-U.S. person or (2) to facilitate the transfer of debt, equity or other holdings in EN+ Group PLC, GAZ Group or RUSAL by a non-U.S. person to another non-U.S. person. In addition, General License 13B authorizes all otherwise prohibited transactions and activities (through 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Aug. 5, 2018) that are ordinarily incident and necessary (1) to divest or transfer debt, equity or other holdings in EN+ Group PLC, GAZ Group or RUSAL (or its subsidiaries) that were issued by Irkutskenergo, GAZ Auto Plant or Rusal Capital Designated Activity Company (also referred to as “Other Issuer Holdings”) to a non-U.S. person or (2) to facilitate the transfer of Other Issuer Holdings by a non-U.S. person to another non-U.S. person.[18] Such “transactions and activities” include facilitating, clearing and settling transactions to divest to a non-U.S. person debt, equity or other holdings in EN+ Group PLC, GAZ Group, or RUSAL, or Other Issuer Holdings on behalf of U.S. persons.

    Most recently, on June 4, 2018, OFAC issued General License 16, authorizing otherwise prohibited transactions (through 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Oct. 23, 2018) that are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of operations, contracts or, other agreements, including the importation of goods, services, or technology into the United States” involving EN+ Group PLC, JSC EuroSibEnergo or any other entity in which these entities own a 50 percent or greater interest.[19] Except as authorized by General License 14 (authorizing certain activities necessary to maintenance or wind down of operations or existing contracts with RUSAL or entities in which RUSAL owns a 50 percent or greater interest),[20] any payment for the benefit of a blocked person must be made into a blocked, interest-bearing account located in the United States. General License 16 does not authorize, among other things, any divestiture or transfer of debt, equity or other holdings in, to or for the benefit of the blocked entities it identifies.

    U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by the general licenses are required to file with OFAC a comprehensive, detailed report of each transaction — including the names and addresses of the parties involved, the type and scope of activities conducted, and the dates on which the activities occurred — within 10 business days of the expiration of the license.

    Authored by Seetha Ramachandran, Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Jennifer M. Opheim, Mari S. Dopp and Nicole Geoglis.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] An electronic copy of the Executive Order “Prohibiting Certain Additional Transactions with Respect to Venezuela” is available here.

    [2] See Executive Order 13808, Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to the Situation in Venezuela, (Aug. 24, 2017). See also “Sanctions Update: U.S. Imposes Immediate Restrictions Relating to Venezuelan Securities,” SRZ Alert, Aug. 28, 2017, available here.

    [3] The term “Government of Venezuela” is defined to mean “the Government of Venezuela, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Venezuela and Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Venezuela.” See Subsection 3(d) of the Executive Order.

    [4] Executive Order “Prohibiting Certain Additional Transactions with Respect to Venezuela,” (May 21, 2018).

    [5] Concurrent with the issuance of previous sanctions in July 2017, Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin stated: “Yesterday’s illegitimate elections confirm that Maduro is a dictator who disregards the will of the Venezuelan people. By sanctioning Maduro, the United States makes clear our opposition to the policies of his regime and our support for the people of Venezuela who seek to return their country to a full and prosperous democracy.” See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions the President of Venezuela (July 31, 2017), available here.

    [6] For a fuller explanation of the prior Venezuela sanctions, see “Sanctions Update: Russia, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela,” SRZ Alert, Aug. 2, 2017, available here, “Sanctions Update: U.S. Imposes Immediate Restrictions Relating to Venezuelan Securities,” SRZ Alert, Aug. 28, 2017, available here and “Sanctions and AML Update: North Korea and Venezuela,” SRZ Alert, Sept. 27, 2017, available here.

    [7] General License No. 15, “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind Down of Operations or Existing Contracts with GAZ Group“ (May 22, 2018).

    [8] See OFAC FAQs at Nos. 586 and 588 (May 22, 2018).

    [9] See OFAC FAQs at Nos.586 and 590 (May 22, 2018).

    [10] See OFAC FAQs at No. 591 (May 22, 2018).

    [11] See OFAC FAQs at No. 589 (May 22, 2018).

    [12] See OFAC FAQs at No. 593 (May 25, 2018).

    [13] General License No. 12C, “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind Down of Operations or Existing Contracts“ (May 22, 2018).

    [14] See OFAC FAQs at No. 592 (May 25, 2018).

    [15] See OFAC FAQs at No. 587 (May 22, 2018).

    [16] See OFAC FAQs at No. 576 (May 22, 2018).

    [17] See, e.g., Scott Patterson and Ian Talley, “Sanctioned Russian Oligarch Deripaska Distances Himself From Rusal,” The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2018, available here.

    [18] General License No. 13B, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Divest or Transfer Debt, Equity, or other Holdings in Certain Blocked Persons“ (May 31, 2018).

    [19] General License No. 16, “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind Down of Operations or Existing Contracts with EN+ Group PLC or JSC EuroSibEnergo“ (June 4, 2018).

    [20] General License No. 14, “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind Down of. Operations or Existing Contracts with United Company RUSAL PLC“ (April 23, 2018).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • A Look at Treasury’s Recent Efforts to Reform Regulation

    ARTICLE

    A Look at Treasury’s Recent Efforts to Reform Regulation

    June 5, 2018

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Andrew Roberson and Justin Crouse authored this bylined article on the US Department of the Treasury’s response to Executive Order 13789. “In light of tax reform, Treasury’s push for reducing regulatory burdens and OMB review of tax regulatory actions, Taxpayers should monitor for any future regulatory action taken by Treasury,” the authors wrote.

    In depth

    Originally published in Law360

    Just 10 days after his inauguration, President Trump signed Executive Order 13771, establishing the tenet of deregulation to be adopted by the Trump administration. Executive Order 13771 outlined the Trump administration’s vision for reducing regulation and controlling regulatory costs, and established a principle that for every one new regulation issued at least two prior regulations be identified for elimination — the “one in, two out” principle.

    President Trump’s Call for Reducing Tax Regulatory Burdens

    President Trump signed another executive order on April 21, 2017 — Executive Order 13789 — which called on the U.S. Department of the Treasury to identify and reduce tax regulatory burdens that impose undue financial burdens on U.S. taxpayers or otherwise add undue complexity to federal tax laws.

    Treasury’s Response

    In response, Treasury released an interim report on regulations identified for burden restriction and requested comments on whether such regulations should be rescinded or modified.[2] Treasury subsequently submitted a report to the president on Oct. 2, 2017, which was largely consistent with Treasury’s interim report but set forth in greater detail the specific actions recommended by Treasury.

    The Oct. 2017 report recommended the withdrawal, revocation or revision of eight Treasury regulations in order to eliminate or otherwise mitigate the “burdens imposed on taxpayers,” and also stated that Treasury is considering possible reforms of several recent regulations not identified in its interim report — such as regulations under Internal Revenue Code Section 871(m) — relating to payments treated as U.S. source dividends — and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.

    The Oct. 2017 report also stated that Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service have initiated a comprehensive review of all regulations — regardless of when they were issued — that will be coordinated by the Treasury Regulatory Reform Task Force and will be in furtherance of executive orders adopting a PAYGO approach to regulations.

    Retrospective Review: Reducing Tax Regulatory Burdens

    Following its promise to comprehensively review all regulations, Treasury released an April 2018 report in which it outlined Treasury’s efforts to support President Trump’s regulatory reform agenda and to implement the one-in-two-out principle. Consistent with the Oct. 2017 report, the April 2018 report noted that Treasury has undertaken a retrospective review of significant recent tax regulations pursuant to Executive Order 13789 and identified eight regulations for rescission or modification. Treasury indicated that these actions will “advance the President’s policy of regulatory efficiency in support of lower individual and corporate compliance burdens.” The April 2018 report also provided that Treasury has:

    • reduced its regulatory agenda by approximately 100 regulations from its Fall 2017 agenda
    • issued a notice to eliminate almost 300 “deadwood” tax regulations that are duplicative or obsolete
    • withdrawn two regulations deemed “significant” in the Oct. 2017 report
    • issued a series of reports providing specific recommendations to make the U.S. financial regulatory system more efficient

    Lastly, the April 2018 report provided that, since the issuance of Executive Order 13771, no new “tax regulatory actions” have been undertaken by Treasury but rather, actions from Treasury’s fall 2017 agenda have either been identified as “deregulatory” or have not yet been classified.

    Prospective Review: A New Approach to Regulatory Efforts

    In addition to Treasury’s regulatory review efforts, future tax regulatory action will now be subject to oversight and control of the Office of Management and Budget. Historically, Treasury’s regulatory powers had largely been exempted from OMB authority. However, Executive Order 13789 directed Treasury and the OMB to “review and, if appropriate, reconsider the scope and implementation of the existing exemption for certain tax regulations from the review process set forth in Executive Order 12866 and any successor order.”[2]

    In response, Treasury and OMB released a memorandum of agreement, or MOA, on April 12, 2018, which outlined a framework for review of tax regulatory actions, which, according to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, will “increase scrutiny of regulations most likely to impose new costs, while preserving Treasury’s ability to ensure taxpayers receive timely, clear rules and guidance on how to comply with our tax code.”

    Pursuant to the MOA, Treasury must submit a quarterly notice to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the OMB outlining planned tax regulatory actions that: (a) describes each regulatory action, (b) identifies any significant policy changes and (c) articulates the basis for determining whether such tax regulatory action is likely to (i) create a serious inconsistency, (ii) raise novel legal or policy issues or (iii) have an annual non-revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or more. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs will conclude its review within 45 days after Treasury’s submission — although certain actions under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act may be expedited. To the extent there are any unresolved issues, a principals meeting between Treasury and OMB may occur.

    Also pursuant to the MOA, Treasury generally will not be permitted to publish any tax regulatory action in the Federal Register or otherwise publicly release any tax regulatory action unless OMB notifies Treasury that it has either waived or concluded its review.

    What’s Next

    The push to reduce tax regulatory burdens, along with OMB oversight, means that Treasury and the IRS must operate under a new paradigm.

    On the heels of historic U.S. tax reform in which the need for taxpayer guidance is great, IRS and Treasury officials have been unusually quiet about the issuance of any new tax regulatory actions. This was particularly evident at a recent tax conference hosted by the American Bar Association, where IRS and Treasury officials continued to respond to questions and comments with the oft-repeated response that they “understand the issue and are working on regulations.” While government officials have historically been tight-lipped regarding future regulatory guidance, this approach may be influenced by a general directive of the administration in light of the new oversight and control powers granted to OMB.

    Taxpayer Reactions to Guidance

    Taxpayers generally welcome guidance from the IRS and Treasury as it allows them to plan their transactions in conformity with the law. However, disputes often arise as to whether an agency has exceeded its authority when guidance is issued, particularly regulations and other published guidance such as revenue rulings, revenue procedures, notices and announcements.

    For regulations, a starting point is whether the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act have been followed. Litigation on this topic has increased in recent years and it is generally recognized that tax law is not exempt from the APA. Some common challenges involve whether notice and opportunity for comment is provided prior to the promulgation of temporary and final regulations and, if such comments are received, whether they have been adequately considered and sufficient explanations have been provided.

    Another pertinent inquiry for regulations is whether the regulations pass muster under the Chevron test.[3] Under Chevron, if the agency has been delegated authority to issue regulations on a particular subject, a two-pronged test is applied. The first prong looks at whether the statutory language is clear or ambiguous. If Congress’s intent is clear, then the regulations are not entitled to any deference. However, if Congress’s intent is unclear — i.e., the statute is ambiguous — the court will move to the second prong to determine whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, not arbitrary and capricious. Regulations that pass both tests will be entitled to deference.

    For other published guidance, the prevailing standard of deference is the Skidmore test.[4] This test focuses on the “power to persuade” and is a lesser standard of deference than that provided by Chevron.

    It should be noted that the IRS is generally precluded from arguing contrary to its own regulations, as well as its other published guidance. Thus, taxpayers may rely on these types of guidance in planning their transactions. In the case of non-regulatory published guidance, however, taxpayers must take care to ensure that such guidance addresses substantially the same issue and involves many of the pivotal facts.

    Final Thoughts

    In light of tax reform, Treasury’s push for reducing regulatory burdens and OMB review of tax regulatory actions, Taxpayers should monitor for any future regulatory action taken by Treasury. Taxpayers should also carefully review such guidance to ensure that the IRS and Treasury have not exceeded their regulatory authority and have followed all necessary requirements in enacting guidance.

    [1] See Notice 2017-38, 2017-30 IRB 147 (July 7, 2017).

    [2] Executive Order 12866 was signed on Oct. 3, 1993, by President Clinton and in general required that significant regulatory actions be submitted for review to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the OMB.

    [3] See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

    [4] See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).Discussion of the effect that elimination of regulations and new regs are having.

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  • Germany: Restructuring & Insolvency

    ARTICLE

    Germany: Restructuring & Insolvency

    June 4, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Partner Uwe Goetker has contributed to a country-specific Q&A for the The Legal 500: 2nd Edition R&I Comparative Guide, which provides an overview of the legal framework and key issues surrounding restructuring and insolvency in Germany.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Uwe Goetker

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • US Regulators Use Carrots and Sticks to Encourage Good Conduct in ICOs and Cryptocurrency Investment Products

    US Regulators Use Carrots and Sticks to Encourage Good Conduct in ICOs and Cryptocurrency Investment Products

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Regulators Use Carrots and Sticks to Encourage Good Conduct in ICOs and Cryptocurrency Investment Products

    June 4, 2018

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    US state and federal regulators recently offered carrots to guide market actors toward better behavior and are using the stick of enforcement actions to discourage fraud in ICOs and other cryptocurrency-related offerings.

    In depth

    US state and federal regulators recently offered carrots to guide market actors toward better behavior and are using the stick of enforcement actions to discourage fraud in initial coin offerings (ICOs) and other cryptocurrency-related offerings.

    CFTC Guidance. The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) recently issued guidance for the listing of virtual currency derivative products to registered exchanges and clearinghouses in Staff Advisory No. 18-14, “Advisory with respect to Virtual Currency Derivative Product Listings” (Staff Advisory). In an effort to provide regulatory clarity while helping market participants keep pace with innovation, the Staff Advisory is designed to help market participants design management programs that address virtual currency products. The Staff Advisory clarifies the CFTC staff’s priorities and expectations in its review of new digital currency derivatives to be listed on a designated contract market (DCM) or swap execution facility (SEF), or to be cleared by a derivatives clearing organization (DCO).

    The Staff Advisory provides expectations and guidance in five areas: (1) enhanced market surveillance, (2) coordination with CFTC staff, (3) large trader reporting, (4) outreach to stakeholders and (5) DCO risk management. Highlights of the Staff Advisory include a focus on continuously monitoring relevant data deeds to identify manipulation and a recommendation that exchanges set the large trader reporting threshold at five bitcoin, or the equivalent for other virtual currencies, in order to facilitate surveillance of the futures and options market.

    NASAA’s Operation Cryptosweep. The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) announced coordinated enforcement actions by US state and Canadian provincial securities regulators cracking-down on fraudulent initial coin offerings (ICOs), cryptocurrency investment products and their promoters. Operation Cryptosweep involves NASAA members from more than 40 jurisdictions in the United States and Canada and has resulted in 70 inquiries and investigations and 35 pending or completed enforcement actions in only 3 weeks. Additional enforcement actions are expected. Several NASAA members are also conducting public outreach to warn investors of risks associated with ICOs and cryptocurrencies.

    The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Jay Clayton applauded the efforts, stating that while “there are improvements that can be made to our regulatory system” he supported the effort to crack-down on fraud in the ICO markets. He also noted that “regulators are coordinating on an international level to take strong actions to deter and stop fraud.”

    SEC’s HoweyCoins.com. NASAA members’ efforts to educate investors about ICOs were echoed by the SEC’s tongue-in-cheek HoweyCoins.com website. The SEC recently announced the investor education site and related materials to provide guidance by way of example of what the SEC believes are the hallmarks of a scam token offering. The site “mimics a bogus coin offering to educate investors about what to look for before they invest in a scam.” Anyone considering conducting an ICO should also take note of these “classic warning signs of fraud.”

    The site includes a countdown clock, promise of guaranteed returns, celebrity endorsements, a statement that the tokens will trade on an “SEC compliant” exchange, the ability to pay with credit cards, and statements to the effect that this is a pump and dump scheme. The site also includes stock photography of beautiful tropical locations and pictures of SEC staff posing as pseudonymous advisors to the project.

    The SEC has provided a white paper for the project, complete with enthusiastic but vague descriptions of the business opportunities in the travel industry and a purported description of the world’s monetary system. It promises alliances with various travel partners, including airlines, hotels and resort brands. As on the token sale website, the white paper promises immediate returns and a call that this is a “can’t miss investment opportunity.”

    HoweyCoins.com and the accompanying white paper and guidance provide useful information not only to potential investors, but also to anyone contemplating an ICO.

    In conclusion, the CFTC’s and SEC’s regulatory guidance and education efforts and the NASAA’s coordinated enforcement actions demonstrate the broad range of tools available to regulators. These recent actions demonstrate that US regulators are providing guidance to allow for technological and market innovation while bringing enforcement actions to curb fear, uncertainty and doubt in our financial markets.

    Authors

    David L. Taub

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Operating in a Foreign Branch After Tax Reform

    ARTICLE

    Operating in a Foreign Branch After Tax Reform

    May-June 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder wrote this bylined article on how income earned in a foreign branch is treated following the 2017 Tax Act. “Under the 2017 Tax Act, however, income earned in a foreign branch is treated less favorably than if earned in a foreign subsidiary or directly in the United States, and new rules make it more costly to incorporate a foreign branch,” he said.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • A New Era of Data Protection

    ARTICLE

    A New Era of Data Protection

    May/June 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Ziva Robertson authored this bylined article about the EU General Data Protection Regulation. “For data controllers, time is now of the essence to design and implement robust data-processing systems to ensure compliance and avoid the GDPR’s pitfalls and heavy fines,” she wrote.

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