Content Type: Article

  • IRS Announces 2025 Limits for Health Savings Accounts, High-Deductible Health Plans and Excepted Benefit HRAs

    IRS Announces 2025 Limits for Health Savings Accounts, High-Deductible Health Plans and Excepted Benefit HRAs

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Announces 2025 Limits for Health Savings Accounts, High-Deductible Health Plans and Excepted Benefit HRAs

    May 9, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently announced (see Revenue Procedure 2024-25) cost-of-living adjustments to the applicable dollar limits for health savings accounts (HSAs), high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) and excepted benefit health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) for 2025. All of the dollar limits currently in effect for 2024 will change for 2025, with the exception of one limit. The HSA catch-up contribution for individuals ages 55 and older will not change as it is not subject to cost-of-living adjustments.

    The table below compares the applicable dollar limits for HSAs, HDHPs and excepted benefit HRAs for 2024 and 2025.

    HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN LIMITS 2024 Δ 2025
    HDHP – Maximum annual out-of-pocket limit (excluding premiums)
    Self-only coverage $8,050 ↑ $8,300
    Family coverage $16,100 ↑ $16,600
    HDHP – Minimum annual deductible
    Self-only coverage $1,600 ↑ $1,650
    Family coverage $3,200 ↑ $3,300
    HSA – Annual contribution limit
    Self-only coverage $4,150 ↑ $4,300
    Family coverage $8,300 ↑ $8,550
    Catch-up contributions (ages 55 and older) $1,000 = $1,000
    Excepted Benefit HRA
    Annual contribution limit $2,100 ↑ $2,150

    Next Steps

    Plan sponsors should update payroll and plan administration systems for the 2025 cost-of-living adjustments and incorporate the new limits in relevant participant communications, such as open enrollment and communication materials, plan documents and summary plan descriptions.

    For further information about applying the new HSA, HDHP and excepted benefit HRA plan limits for 2025, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors below.

    In depth
    Authors

    Jacob M. Mattinson

    Partner

    Chicago

    Sarah G. Raaii

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • Ten Takeaways From Long-Awaited Section 1557 Nondiscrimination Protections

    Ten Takeaways From Long-Awaited Section 1557 Nondiscrimination Protections

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ten Takeaways From Long-Awaited Section 1557 Nondiscrimination Protections

    May 8, 2024

    Read time: 22 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 26, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a final rule (press release, fact sheet, FAQs) reinterpreting Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, or any combination thereof, in a health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance. The rule, which has staggered effectivity dates starting on July 5, 2024, largely finalizes the policies as proposed in HHS’s August 2022 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM, or proposed rule), including strengthening the protections against discrimination in healthcare, expanding digital and physical accessibility, and addressing potential biases in health technology.

    Specifically, the rule:

    • Requires HHS’s health programs and activities to comply with the same nondiscrimination standards as recipients of federal financial assistance;
    • Interprets Medicare Part B payments as constituting a form of federal financial assistance for purposes of Section 1557 and other federal civil rights laws;
    • Requires providers, insurers, grantees and others to inform individuals of the availability of language assistance services and accessibility services at no cost;
    • Provides that covered health programs and activities offered via telehealth must be accessible to individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP) and individuals with disabilities;
    • Codifies that Section 1557’s prohibition against discrimination based on sex includes pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics;
    • Reiterates that nondiscrimination in health programs and activities applies to the use of artificial intelligence (AI), clinical algorithms, predictive analytics and other tools;
    • Prohibits certain covered entities, including healthcare providers, from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability in health programs or activities through the use of “patient care decision support tools”; and
    • Clarifies the application of Section 1557 nondiscrimination requirements to health insurance plans, among other things.
    In depth

    Overview of Section 1557 and the Proposed Rule

    Section 1557 of the ACA, codified at 42 U.S.C. 18116, is the nondiscrimination provision of the ACA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability in specified health programs and activities, including those that receive federal financial assistance. Section 1557 has been in effect since 2010 and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has been enforcing and investigating complaints filed since that time. However, the interpretation of the statute and scope of the nondiscrimination protections has been in flux for many years:

    • In May 2016, the Obama administration issued a final rule first implementing the nondiscrimination provision, which included protections against discrimination “on the basis of sex,” including sex stereotyping, gender expression, gender identity and termination of pregnancy. The rule included requirements to provide certain language assistance to LEP individuals and auxiliary aids and services for individuals with disabilities.
    • In June 2020, the Trump administration issued a final rule eliminating many of the 2016 protections, including those related to sex stereotyping, gender expression, gender identity and termination of pregnancy, removing regulatory burdens aimed at notifying individuals with LEP of their rights and scaling back the covered entities to which Section 1557 would apply – in particular, eliminating health insurers and employer-sponsored group health plans.
    • In August 2022, the Biden administration issued an NPRM aimed at restoring and strengthening civil rights protections under federally funded health programs. The NPRM built on the administration’s executive order on advancing racial equity and support for underserved communities, as well as HHS’s Equity Action Plan.

    Comments on the NPRM were due in October 2022. The agency ultimately received more than 85,000 comment submissions on its proposals. This report summarizes our top 10 takeaways.

    1. Section 1557 applies to nearly the entire healthcare industry.

    Except as otherwise provided in regulation, the final rule applies to:

    • Health programs or activities that receive HHS funding (directly or indirectly);
    • Health programs or activities administered by HHS (e.g., Medicare Part D program); and
    • Health insurance state and federally facilitated exchanges.

    The final rule applies to all health insurance issuers that receive federal financial assistance, including Medicare Parts A, C and D payments, as well as state Medicaid agencies, Children’s Health Insurance Programs and Basic Health Programs.

    Federal financial assistance includes any grant, loan, credit, subsidy, contract (other than a procurement contract) or other arrangement by which the federal government provides assistance (e.g., advance payments of premium tax credits, cost-sharing reduction payments or subsidies).

    Depending on a fact-based analysis, the rule may apply to hospitals, health clinics, physicians’ practices, home healthcare agencies and even subcontractors. For example, if an exchange or recipient of federal financial assistance, such as a health issuer, contracts with an agent or broker to perform the responsibilities of the covered entity’s health program and uses federal financial assistance to pay the agent or broker, the agent or broker would be subject to Section 1557. Similarly, if a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) receives federal financial assistance – even indirectly – from HHS, the PBM would be subject to the rule.

    As discussed in more detail in our client alert, “HHS final Section 1557 nondiscrimination regulations: Gender-affirming care and the role of carriers under ASO arrangements,” the final rule states that it does not apply to any employer or other plan sponsor of a group health plan, including a board of trustees or association. However, the final rule applies to most carriers and third-party administrators and therefore applies at least indirectly to most group health plans.”

    2. Medicare Part B is now considered federal financial assistance.

    For nearly 40 years, HHS took the position that Medicare Part B funding did not meet the definition of “federal financial assistance” for purposes of Section 1557, as well as other federal statutes. In the 2022 NPRM, HHS proposed to change its interpretation to provide that Medicare Part B payments constitute federal financial assistance when received by providers and suppliers.

    In the final rule, HHS finalizes this interpretation but amends the applicability date to allow newly covered recipients additional time to comply. HHS describes that some recipients do not currently receive any federal financial assistance other than Part B funds; therefore, these recipients will be newly required to comply with Section 1557 and other federal civil rights laws. While HHS’s revised interpretation is effective upon publication of the final rule, HHS will permit a one-year delayed applicability date. Entities whose federal program participation has been limited to Part B must comply with Section 1557 and other applicable federal laws no later than May 6, 2025.

    Perhaps more importantly, this interpretation of Medicare Part B as federal financial assistance was well-reasoned by OCR and will apply to all civil rights statutes enforced by HHS. Given the wide-sweeping effect of HHS’s declaration in the final rule, this is an area ripe for potential legal challenges.

    3. The final rule expands protections for LGBTQI+ individuals but does not compel covered entities to perform gender-affirming procedures.

    Under the final rule, covered entities are expected to provide equal access to programs and activities without discrimination on the basis of sex. OCR reaffirms its position from the 2022 proposed rule that discrimination on the basis of sex includes sexual orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics, including intersex traits, consistent with the US Supreme Court ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County.

    When evaluating whether a covered entity violated Section 1557 by denying or limiting access to gender-affirming care, OCR will continue to evaluate whether the covered entity provides the same service for other purposes. To that end, OCR clarifies that not all circumstances of sex-separated programs constitute unlawful discrimination. A covered entity is permitted to operate a program or facility differently based on sex as long as no person is subjected to more than de minimis harm based on sex. For example, a covered entity that refuses to admit a transgender person or refuses to place them in a facility inconsistent with their gender identity would violate Section 1557. Conversely, inquiring about a patient’s sex-related medical history, health status or physical traits are likely not discriminatory unless the questions or distinctions are not relevant to the patient’s condition or the patient has answered the questions sufficiently and further probing becomes harassing. And if an insurance plan places restrictions on gender-affirming surgery coverage that are no more stringent than restrictions for any other type of surgical care, those restrictions are unlikely to violate Section 1557.

    In a likely attempt to circumvent state challenges, OCR states that to the extent states have laws prohibiting gender-affirming procedures, Section 1557 is deemed to preempt such laws. However, OCR will consider the specific facts of each case and any other relevant factors to determine whether a recipient has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking actions in conflict with Section 1557, including a good-faith belief that state or local law obligates refraining from taking certain actions. In those circumstances the covered entity should demonstrate a willingness to refer or provide accurate information regarding gender-affirming care or engage in good-faith efforts to ensure medically necessary care is provided to patients.

    4. The final rule reaffirms its protections of pregnant individuals but does not compel performance of abortions.

    The final rule expressly states that discrimination on the basis of sex includes pregnancy or related conditions, including labor and delivery, the post-partum period and one’s pregnancy-related decisions past, present or future. However, throughout the final rule OCR repeats that the ACA should not be construed to have any effect on federal laws regarding (i) conscience protection; (ii) willingness or refusal to provide abortion; and (iii) discrimination on the basis of the willingness or refusal to provide, pay for, cover or refer for abortion or to provide or participate in training to provide abortion.

    OCR observes that Section 1557 should not be read to override any state’s laws prohibiting abortion or to be noncompliant with the US Supreme Court’s determination in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization that there is no constitutional right to abortion. Specifically, under Section 1557, a covered entity’s decision not to provide abortions is not considered to be sex discrimination unless that decision is applied differently based on protected classifications. For example, if a covered entity generally provides abortion services but denies those services to a patient due to their race or disability, that may be considered a violation of Section 1557. But denying abortion services due to religious or conscience objections, professional or business judgments, or any other nondiscriminatory reasons would not be discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or related conditions.

    5. Covered entities must ensure they are communicating with patients and their companions effectively.

    HHS recognizes that effective communication is a key component to ensure that individuals with LEP and individuals with disabilities have meaningful access to covered entities’ programs and activities. Accordingly, the final rule establishes that covered entities are obligated to take reasonable steps to identify those individuals who are eligible to be served or likely to be directly affected by the covered entity’s health programs and activities and to ensure effective communication with individuals with LEP and individuals with disabilities.

    In the context of individuals with LEP and companions with LEP, the final rule establishes that covered entities must provide “meaningful access.” The final rule declines to define “meaningful access” but will consider whether to issue sub-regulatory guidance to supplement the existing HHS LEP Guidance and the Language Access Annual Progress Report. This gives covered entities flexibility to identify the language assistance services that are appropriate for the individual and the specific facts present during the circumstances.

    One mandatory component of “meaningful access” is obligating covered entities to provide language assistance services that are free of charge, accurate and timely, and protective of the privacy of the individual with LEP. To meet this obligation, a covered entity must use qualified interpreters and translators, and language assistance should be provided at a time and place that avoids imposing an undue burden or delay or that results in an effective denial of services. Covered entities may use bilingual/multilingual staff or another adult not accompanying an adult to serve as an interpreter during emergency situations. If an individual with LEP requests that an adult who is accompanying them serve as an interpreter, the covered entity should ensure that the individual with LEP makes the request without the accompanying adult present and with the services of a qualified interpreter, except during urgent and extraordinary situations. OCR recognizes that circumstances may arise in which exigency necessitates the use of machine-translation modalities in order to ensure an individual with LEP can access healthcare services. In such circumstances, OCR requires that the machine translation is subsequently checked by a qualified human translator as soon as practicable or that the patient is warned in advance that the translation may contain errors.

    In the context of individuals with disabilities, the final rule establishes that communication with individuals with disabilities and companions with disabilities must be as effective as communication without disabilities. When appropriate, individuals with disabilities must be provided with auxiliary aids and services at no charge, in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way that protects the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.

    When a covered entity provides health programs and activities through information and communication technology (ICT), mobile applications, telemedicine modalities and web-based modules, OCR observes that Section 1557 still applies. Regardless of whether the covered entity develops the materials and platforms internally or obtains the technology through purchase or contract with a third-party vendor, any health programs and activities must be accessible to individuals with LEP individuals with disabilities. This is addressed in greater detail in the disability nondiscrimination rules promulgated by HHS and the Department of Justice.

    6. Covered entities must protect against discrimination arising from AI and decision support tools.

    In the final rule, OCR establishes a general prohibition on covered entities’ discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability in healthcare programs or activities through the use of patient care decision support tools. OCR defines “patient care decision support tool” to mean any automated or non-automated tool, mechanism, method, technology or combination thereof used by a covered entity to support clinical decision-making in its health programs or activities. The final rule also creates an ongoing duty of covered entities to make reasonable efforts to identify uses of patient care decision support tools that employ input variables or factors that measure race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability. For each qualifying patient care decision support tool that is identified in the above inventory, covered entities must make reasonable efforts to mitigate the risk of discrimination resulting from the tool’s use.

    Recognizing the need to give covered entities a reasonable time period to come into compliance with these new AI governance and risk management requirements, OCR is finalizing its requirements for patient care decision support tools with a delayed applicability date of no later than 300 days after the final rule’s effective date (likely in early March 2025).

    Following the applicability date for the patient care decision support tool requirements, OCR will assess each allegation that a covered entity is violating such requirements on a case-by-case basis. In the final rule, OCR recognizes the challenges that covered entities may face when attempting to identify the discriminatory potential of every use of each patient care decision support tool. When analyzing whether a covered entity is in compliance with the requirement to use reasonable efforts to identify in-scope uses of patient care decision support tools, OCR states it may consider, among other factors:

    • The covered entity’s size and resources (e.g., a large hospital with an IT department and a health equity officer would likely be expected to make greater efforts to identify tools than a smaller provider without such resources);
    • Whether the covered entity used the tool in the manner or under the conditions intended by the developer and approved by regulators, if applicable, or whether the covered entity has adapted or customized the tool;
    • Whether the covered entity received product information from the developer of the tool regarding the potential for discrimination or identified that the tool’s input variables include race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability; and
    • Whether the covered entity has a methodology or process in place for evaluating the patient care decision support tools it adopts or uses, which may include seeking information from the developer, reviewing relevant medical journals and literature, obtaining information from membership in relevant medical associations, or analyzing comments or complaints received about patient care decision support tools.

    The scope of patient care decision support tools as defined by OCR overlaps with the definitions for predictive decision support interventions and evidence-based decision support interventions in the HHS Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology’s (ONC) recently published “Health Data, Technology, and Interoperability: Certification Program Updates, Algorithm Transparency, and Information Sharing” rule. Specifically, the final rule’s definition for “patient care decision support tool” includes non-automated and evidence-based tools that rely on rules, assumptions, constraints or thresholds (evidence-based decision support interventions identified in ONC’s regulations), and health AI tools that support decision-making based on algorithms or models that derive relationships from training data and produce output that results in prediction, classification, recommendation, evaluation or analysis (predictive decision support interventions in ONC’s regulations). While ONC’s regulations apply to and include requirements for health information technology developers, OCR’s final rule applies to and includes requirements for covered entity users of patient care decision support tools. You can read more about the ONC’s health AI regulatory framework in our Special Report.

    The final rule does not apply to tools used to support decision-making unrelated to clinical decision-making affecting patient care or that are outside of a covered entity’s health programs or activities. OCR provides some examples of tools that are likely out of scope, including automated or non-automated tools that covered entities use for:

    • Administrative and billing-related activities;
    • Automated medical coding;
    • Fraud, waste and abuse detection;
    • Patient scheduling;
    • Facilities management;
    • Inventory and materials management;
    • Supply chain management;
    • Financial market investment management; or
    • Employment and staffing-related activities.

    In the final rule, OCR also seeks comment on whether it should engage in additional rulemaking to expand the scope of its prohibition on algorithmic discrimination, including comments on other decision support tools that are being used in health programs and activities that might not directly impact patient care and clinical decision-making but may nevertheless result in unlawful discrimination.

    This component of the final rule creates new obligations for covered entities to inventory their use of patient care decision support tools and mitigate risks of discrimination or bias that might arise from use of these tools in clinical settings. The final rule’s requirements are consistent with the administration’s ongoing focus on preventing bias, unfairness and discrimination in connection with the use of AI and will necessitate a comprehensive approach to AI governance by covered entities.

    7.Covered entities do not need to affirmatively request an exemption based on religious freedom or rights of conscience when denying services.

    As we summarized earlier this year, HHS is taking concerted efforts to balance, on the one hand, patients’ rights to access healthcare with, on the other hand, the religious beliefs and moral convictions of providers, covered entities and benefits plan sponsors. Section 1557’s exemptions are consistent with this effort. Throughout the final rule, OCR repeats that the ACA should not be construed to have any effect on federal laws regarding (i) conscience protection, (ii) willingness or refusal to provide abortion, and (iii) discrimination on the basis of the willingness or refusal to provide, pay for, cover or refer for abortion or to provide or participate in training to provide abortion.

    To further emphasize its intention, the final rule sets forth an exemption process that allows for covered entities to either rely on the protections in religious freedom and conscience laws when denying services to patients based on their beliefs, or covered entities may seek assurance from OCR that they are entitled to an exemption.

    To request an exemption, a covered entity should send notification to OCR that includes (i) the type of care that the covered entity objects to providing and specifying whether the objection is to the overall service or to this particular service, (ii) an explanation of the legal basis supporting its objection and (iii) the factual basis supporting the claim. OCR provides an example of a Catholic hospital objecting to sterilization procedures that are prohibited by their religious tenets claiming a right to objection under religious freedom laws and providing evidence that it never provides sterilizations in violation of that tenet for any patient, irrespective of sex. If a covered entity is seeking an exemption after OCR has initiated an investigation, the covered entity would provide the same information, but the basis for its claim should discuss the specific context of the investigation at hand.

    When OCR considers an exemption request, it will have 30 days to acknowledge receipt of the request, and the covered entity may rely on a temporary exemption that will remain in place while OCR evaluates whether the government has a compelling interest in denying the exemption. The final rule promises that, regardless of whether an exemption is sought, when a covered entity acts based on a good-faith reliance that it is exempt from providing a particular service due to the application of relevant religious freedom and conscience protections, even if it is determined that the legal requirements for an exemption have not been met, OCR will only seek forward-looking relief, which a covered entity may appeal and the temporary exemption would remain effective until the administrative appeal process is completed. Covered entities granted an exemption are encouraged to make the exemption publicly known, but they will not be obligated to do so, and OCR also does not intend to make exemptions public either, except through the FOIA process. By this mechanism, OCR believes that Section 1557 does not impose an undue burden on religious entities.

    8. The notice and tagline requirements are back but significantly scaled back.

    Covered entities must provide a notice of nondiscrimination annually and upon request to participants, beneficiaries, enrollees and applicants of their health programs and activities, and the notice must also be publicly available. The public version must be in a sans serif font, no smaller than 20-point font, and posted in physical location that is accessible to individuals who may have low vision.

    Covered entities must also provide participants, beneficiaries, enrollees, applicants and the public with a notice of availability, translated into the 15 most prevalent non-English languages in the applicable state or states, regarding the availability of free language assistance services and auxiliary aids and services. The standards for the public-facing notice of availability are the same as the notice of nondiscrimination, but the notice of availability must also accompany the following electronic and written communications:

    • Notice of nondiscrimination;
    • Notice of privacy practices required by HIPAA;
    • Application and intake forms;
    • Notices of denial or termination of eligibility, benefits or services, including an Explanation of Benefits, and notices of appeal and grievance rights;
    • Communications related to an individual’s rights, eligibility, benefits or services that require or request a response from a participant, beneficiary, enrollee or applicant;
    • Communication related to a public health emergency;
    • Consent forms and instructions related to medical procedures or operations, medical powers of attorney, or living wills;
    • Discharge papers;
    • Communication related to the cost and payment of care, including medical billing and collections materials and good-faith estimates;
    • Complaint forms; and
    • Patient and member handbooks.

    Covered entities may provide individuals with the option to opt out of the receipt of the notice of availability on an annual basis.

    9. OCR will assist covered entities with the myriad policies and procedures that must be prepared and updated.

    The final rule requires a covered entity to establish or update several policies and procedures pertaining to how it will comply with Section 1557. OCR has made templates available and expects covered entities to tailor these templates to their size, complexity, and the types of health programs or activities that they provide. Policies and procedures must have an effective date printed on them and should be dynamic insofar as a covered entity changes its operations and capabilities or the law evolves. OCR expects that relevant personnel are trained in how to comply with such policies and procedures. Specific policies and procedures include:

    • A nondiscrimination policy consistent with the version required since 2016;
    • A grievance procedure (for covered entities with 15 or more employees), which must be accessible to individuals with LEP and individuals with disabilities and requires records related to grievances filed to be retained for at least three years after the grievance is resolved;
    • A language-access procedure, which will require a covered entity to engage in some form of analysis to identify the language access needs in the service area (this procedure must include instructions on how to access any electronic translated materials and how employees can obtain the services of qualified interpreters, translators and multilingual/bilingual staff);
    • A communication procedure to address effective communication, accessibility, and availability of auxiliary aids and services for individuals with disabilities, including individuals with disabilities who also have LEP; and
    • A reasonable-modification procedure describing how an individual with a disability may request a reasonable modification and how the covered entity will process and respond to such requests to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.

    A covered entity that employs 15 or more persons must also designate at least one employee as a “Section 1557 coordinator” to oversee the covered entity’s compliance with the rule. The responsibilities of the Section 1557 coordinator include, among others, processing grievances, upholding recordkeeping requirements and implementing language-access procedures. This individual does not need to be identified by name, but the designation should include sufficient information, such as phone number, email address and mailing address, that allows an individual to reach the coordinator easily.

    10. Rollout will be both immediate and staggered.

    The final rule will be effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. However, certain provisions will be phased in on longer timeframes, as outlined below.

    Section 1557 Requirement Compliance Date
    § 92.7 Section 1557 Coordinator Within 120 days of effective date
    § 92.8 Policies and Procedures Within one year of effective date
    § 92.9 Training Following a covered entity’s implementation of the § 92.8 Policies and Procedures, and no later than one year of effective date
    § 92.10 Notice of nondiscrimination Within 120 days of effective date
    § 92.11 Notice of availability of language assistance services and auxiliary aids and services Within one year of effective date
    § 92.207(b)(1) through (5) Nondiscrimination in health insurance coverage and other health-related coverage For health insurance coverage or other health-related coverage that was previously subject to Section 1557, by the first day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2025
    § 92.207(b)(6) Nondiscrimination in health insurance coverage and other health-related coverage By the first day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2025
    § 92.210(b), (c) Use of patient care decision support tools Within 300 days of effective date
    Recipients of Medicare Part B funds and no other Federal financial assistance Within one year of effective date

    Source: Final Rule, Summary of Regulatory Changes.

    Authors

    Emily R. Curran

    Associate

    Washington, DC

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  • HHS Final Section 1557 Nondiscrimination Regulations: Gender-Affirming Care and the Role of Carriers Under ASO Arrangements

    HHS Final Section 1557 Nondiscrimination Regulations: Gender-Affirming Care and the Role of Carriers Under ASO Arrangements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    HHS Final Section 1557 Nondiscrimination Regulations: Gender-Affirming Care and the Role of Carriers Under ASO Arrangements

    May 8, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 26, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a final rule (press release, fact sheet, FAQs) (final regulations) reinterpreting Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, or any combination thereof, in a health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance. The rule, which has staggered effectivity dates starting on July 5, 2024, largely finalizes the policies as proposed in HHS’s August 2022 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM, or proposed rule), including clarifying protections for gender-affirming care, as provided by group health plans, carriers and third-party administrators (TPAs) under administrative-services-only (ASO) arrangements.

    This article considers how a self-funded plan’s obligation to provide gender-affirming care is affected by the plan’s choice of a third-party administrator (i.e., under an ASO arrangement) where the ASO provider is also a licensed insurance carrier. In a previous post, we surveyed best practices for group health plans relating to gender-affirming care generally. As discussed in more detail in our related On the Subject, the final rule also includes health program and provider requirements.

    In depth

    Overview of Section 1557 and Past Rulemaking

    Whether and the extent to which group health plans, their carriers and TPAs may be subject to Section 1557 has evolved through years of rulemaking. If Section 1557 applies to carriers and TPAs acting in an ASO capacity for self-funded group health plans, then the vast majority of these plans could be at least indirectly affected. This is the case because the large ASO providers are also licensed carriers that sell products on state marketplaces and also sell Medicare Advantage plans and Medicare supplement policies. But if Section 1557 applies only to carriers in their capacity as health insurance issuers, and not in their capacity as ASO providers, the obligation to provide gender-affirming care would arise only under applicable civil rights laws and not under Section 1557.

    • In May 2016, under the Obama administration’s final rule, group health plans were subject to Section 1557, and carriers and TPAs were treated as covered entities. Thus, if a carrier or TPA also sold policies on a state marketplace or offered a Medicare Part C product, it could be subject to Section 1557. This rule was challenged by a group of religiously affiliated healthcare providers and states, and a federal district court in Texas vacated much of the rule.
    • In June 2020, under the Trump administration’s final rule, the reach of Section 1557 was significantly narrowed to exclude sex stereotyping, gender expression and gender identity. The 2020 final rule also limited covered entities to those that received federal financial assistance and were principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare so that carriers and TPAs that offered coverage in a state’s marketplace would be subject to Section 1557 regarding their metallic-level plans, but the same carrier or TPA providing administrative services to a self-funded group health plan would not be. Similarly, group health plans that did not receive federal financial assistance and were not principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare were not subject to Section 1557. The rule was largely nullified by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County.
    • In August 2022, the NPRM expanded the covered entity to resemble the 2016 final rule. While the final regulations do not expressly include group health plans as covered entities subject to Section 1557, they treat carriers that sell individual or group policies on a state marketplace or that offer Medicare Advantage plans or Medicare supplement policies as covered entities subject to Section 1557 when providing ASO services.

    Section 1557’s Impact on Covered Entities

    Based on a preponderance of case law, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock, it appears that employers must either provide gender-affirming care or risk being compelled to do so in the event of a participant claim or a government enforcement action.

    Remedies for violations of federal civil rights and related laws typically include compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Punitive damages may be available where the discrimination is intentional – which would appear to be the case where the discriminatory feature is rooted in plan design. Section 1557 changes none of this. Rather, it imposes additional substantive and procedural requirements, including establishing a set of robust notice and related requirements aimed at persons with limited English proficiency (LEP) and individuals with disabilities. In addition, aggrieved parties are permitted to challenge facially neutral policies and practices.

    How the Final Rule Applies to Group Health Plans, Carriers, and TPAs

    Under the final regulations, federally funded covered entities that restrict an individual’s ability to receive medically necessary care, including gender-affirming care, from their healthcare provider solely on the basis of their sex assigned at birth or gender identity violate Section 1557. The final regulations also define “health program or activity” to include all the operations of an entity that is principally engaged in providing or administering health services or health insurance coverage.

    The preamble to the proposed regulations makes the following observations and claims relating to the application of Section 1557 to non-covered entity group health plans that are administered by covered-entity TPAs:

    • Most group health plans are not covered entities (exceptions to this rule include Employer Group Waiver Plans and Medicare Part D programs). TPAs that receive federal financial assistance are covered entities.
    • The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) will conduct a case-by-case analysis in instances in which a carrier seeks to evade the application of Section 1557, e.g., by providing TPA services through an affiliate.
    • The OCR does not intend to enforce Section 1557 against a TPA that administers a plan for which it is not responsible for plan design (and therefore does not participate in the violation), but when reviewing complaints, it will conduct a “fact-specific” analysis to determine the source of the violation.
    • A TPA is responsible for ensuring that its actions do not run afoul of Section 1557. Where a plan is compliant on its face, but the asserted violation involves plan administration (e.g., claims), the OCR will target the TPA. (The preamble provides an example of a TPA that applies a faulty clinical standard to deny a claim involving a service that is required to be covered.)

    The OCR’s views result in interpretive challenges (e.g., whether a TPA may administer a non-compliant plan design and at the same time ensure its own compliance with Section 1557).

    Although the final regulations do not apply to most group health plans, they apply to most carriers and TPAs. As a result, Section 1557 will now apply at least indirectly to most group health plans. Plan sponsors and administrators should carefully review their plan designs and operations to ensure compliance by the effective dates.

    Effective Date(s)

    The final rule is generally effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. Covered entities must comply with the nondiscrimination in health insurance coverage and other health-related coverage (non-benefit design) provisions by the first day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2025, for health insurance coverage or other health-related coverage that was not subject to nondiscrimination requirements when the rule was published. In addition, covered entities must comply with the nondiscrimination in health insurance coverage and other health-related coverage (benefit design) provisions by the first day of the first plan year beginning on or after January 1, 2025.

    If you have questions about how the rule impacts your group health plan or organization, please contact the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    Sarah G. Raaii

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • FTC Rule Banning Non-Competes: Pause Before Making Drastic Changes

    FTC Rule Banning Non-Competes: Pause Before Making Drastic Changes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FTC Rule Banning Non-Competes: Pause Before Making Drastic Changes

    May 3, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) passed its long-anticipated final Non-Compete Rule broadly prohibiting the use of worker non-competition restrictions. The Non-Compete Rule is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on May 7, 2024, and become effective 120 days later, on Sept. 4, 2024. To the extent the Non-Compete Rule is more restrictive than a state or local law, the Non-Compete Rule will supersede such other law. However, the validity of the Non-Compete Rule is already being challenged in three separate court cases and its effective date may be delayed.

    Banning Non-Compete Clauses

    The Non-Compete Rule applies to “workers,” which includes any natural person who is an employee, independent contractor, extern, intern, volunteer, apprentice or sole proprietor who provides services. Although the Non-Compete Rule, itself, does not address whether partners are considered workers, the preamble to the Non-Compete Rule (the “Preamble”) implies that it is intended that partners will be treated as workers.

    The Non-Compete Rule prohibits employers and other service recipients from:

    • Entering into a “non-compete clause” with a worker,
    • Enforcing a worker “non-compete clause” (except in the case of existing non-compete clauses applicable to “senior executives”), and
    • Representing that a worker is subject to a “non-compete clause.”

    Only non-compete clauses entered into with “senior executives” prior to the effective date of the Non-Compete Rule will remain enforceable.

    Although the Non-Compete Rule’s reference to a “non-compete clause” implies a written agreement, a non-compete clause is defined to encompass any term or condition of employment that prohibits a worker from, penalizes a worker for, or functions to prevent a worker from:

    • Seeking or accepting new employment or other work in the United States with a different person; or
    • Operating a business in the United States after the conclusion of the employment or other work that imposed the non-compete clause.

    The scope of the Non-Compete Rule is not limited to restricting workers from moving to competitors; rather, it applies to any new employment or other work position.

    Due to the breadth and generality of the rule, it appears that the Non-Compete Rule could extend to certain compensation designs that condition vesting on a worker’s continued services as well as garden leave, non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions. Based on the Preamble, it appears that the determination of whether an arrangement constitutes a non-compete clause will depend on the facts and circumstances and the surrounding market context. For example, the FTC noted in the Preamble that a simple “garden leave” arrangement would not be prohibited as an impermissible post-employment restriction if the worker were to remain employed and continue to receive the same total annual compensation and benefits on a pro rata basis. According to the FTC, “where a worker does not meet a condition to earn a particular aspect of their expected compensation, like a prerequisite for a bonus, the FTC would still consider the arrangement “garden leave” that is not a non-compete clause under this final rule even if the employer did not pay the bonus or other expected compensation.” The Non-Compete Rule, however, omits any guidance regarding how to determine if a particular term or condition imposed on a worker constitutes an impermissible non-compete clause. Accordingly, all compensation arrangements and post-termination obligations imposed on workers should be reviewed closely to determine whether they are permissible under the Non-Compete Rule. To the extent an arrangement or obligation constitutes a non-compete clause, it should be modified to conform to the rule, if possible, or replaced.

    Existing Senior Executive Non-Competes

    Only non-compete clauses covering “senior executives” that are “entered into” prior to the Non-Compete Rule’s effective date will be permitted to be enforced following the rule’s effective date. The category of individuals who qualify as “senior executives” is quite narrow. For purposes of the Non-Compete Rule, a worker is a senior executive only if the worker was in a “policy-making position,” and received:

    1. Total annual compensation of at least $151,164 in the preceding year (or, if the worker was only employed during part of the preceding year, total compensation of at least $151,164 when annualized), or
    2. Total compensation of at least $151,164, when annualized, in the preceding year prior to the worker’s termination if the worker’s services terminated before the preceding year.

    A “policy-making position” is limited to a business entity’s president, chief executive officer or the equivalent, any other officer of a business entity who has policy-making authority, or any other natural person who has policy-making authority for the business entity similar to an officer with policy-making authority. “Policy-making authority” is narrowly defined. It only includes the “final authority to make policy decisions that control significant aspects of a business entity or common enterprise” and excludes “exerting influence” over policy decisions or having the “final authority to make policy decisions for only an affiliate or subsidiary of a common enterprise.”

    Unfortunately, the Non-Compete Rule does not describe what “entered into” means with respect to an already existing employment agreement. Based on this omission, it is unclear if a non-compete clause will continue to be enforceable if either the clause, itself, is amended or modified or, if it is included in another agreement, such as an employment agreement, that is later amended to include a non-compete clause.

    Notice Requirements

    The Non-Compete Rule requires that employers and other service recipients who have workers (other than senior executives) who are subject to non-compete clauses must provide those workers with a “clear and conspicuous” written notice by the Non-Compete Rule’s effective date. The notice must be delivered by hand, mail, email or text, and state that the non-compete clause cannot and will not be enforced against the worker. The Non-Compete Rule provides model language that can be used to satisfy the notice requirement.

    Sale of Business Exception

    In addition to existing non-compete clauses covering senior executives, the Non-Compete Rule includes an exception for non-compete clauses “entered into by a person pursuant to a bona fide sale of a business entity, of the person’s ownership interest in a business entity, or of all or substantially all of a business entity’s operating assets.” Importantly, the Preamble notes that the sale of business exception should apply to a partner who agrees to a non-compete clause in connection with the partner’s sale of interests in a partnership.

    Challenges to the Non-Compete Rule

    Within three days of the FTC’s issuance of the Non-Compete Rule, three separate lawsuits were filed against the FTC challenging its authority to issue the rule. Two were filed in federal court in Texas on April 24, 2024. The other was filed in federal court in Pennsylvania on April 25, 2024. The complaints allege, among other things, that the FTC lacked the requisite authority to pass the Non-Compete Rule on statutory and constitutional grounds. All three lawsuits request orders delaying the effective date of the Non-Compete Rule, and ultimately seek to bar its enforcement. Although the final resolution of such litigations will take time, with litigations potentially reaching the US Supreme Court, a court decision on whether to delay the Non-Compete Rule’s effective date is expected prior to Sept. 4, 2024.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Ian L. Levin, Martin L. Schmelkin, Max Garfield and Adam B. Gartner.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ian L. Levin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Martin L. Schmelkin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Max Garfield

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam B. Gartner

    Special Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule to Implement AML Reporting Requirements for Real Estate Sector

    FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule to Implement AML Reporting Requirements for Real Estate Sector

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule to Implement AML Reporting Requirements for Real Estate Sector

    May 3, 2024

    Read time: 16 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Feb. 16, 2024, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a bureau of the United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”), issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (“Proposed Rule”)[1] continuing the process of implementing regulations to combat illicit finance risks posed by abuse by some in the real estate market. The Proposed Rule would require certain persons involved in residential real estate closings and settlements to submit reports (“Real Estate Reports”) and keep accurate records of certain non-financed transfers of US residential real property. The reasoning behind the Proposed Rule is explained extensively in FinCEN’s December 2021 Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Real Estate Transactions Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which discusses “the opacity of shell companies or other legal entity structures to mask true beneficial ownership of a property and their involvement in real estate transactions.”[2]

    Although FinCEN has statutory authority to extend anti-money laundering (“AML”) requirements to “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements”[3] as such category of persons are included in the statutory definition of financial institution under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), FinCEN has not yet implemented comprehensive regulations applying the BSA to such category of persons.  Rather, FinCEN has addressed money laundering and terrorist financing risks presented through real estate activity through the issuance of a series of geographic targeting orders to the real estate sector that were limited in duration and geographic scope.

    The Proposed Rule would impose new reporting requirements in connection with certain residential real estate transfers where the transferee of the property is a legal entity (“Transferee Entity”) or trust (“Transferee Trust”). Transfers made directly to an individual would not be covered by this rule. The Real Estate Report must include, among other things, information concerning the property being transferred, and identifying information on the Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust and its beneficial owners, the transferor, and the person filing the Real Estate Report (“Reporting Person”).  

    The reporting obligations will take effect one year after the promulgation of final regulations by FinCEN.[4]

    What Transfers are Reportable?

    Under the Proposed Rule, Real Estate Reports are required only where an ownership interest in residential real property is transferred to a Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust.[5]

    Residential real property includes: (1) real property that includes a structure designed principally for occupancy by one to four families; (2) land that is vacant or unimproved, and that is zoned, or for which a permit has been issued, for occupancy by one to four families; or (3) a share in a cooperative housing corporation (“Reportable Property”).[6] Reportable Property only includes property located in the US, including any state, the District of Columbia, Indian lands and territorial possessions of the US.

    An ownership interest is evidenced by rights to the property that are demonstrated through a deed or, for an interest in a cooperative housing corporation, through stock, shares, membership, a certificate or other contractual agreement evidencing ownership. The transfer is reportable even if one or more other transferees receive an ownership interest in the Reportable Property as part of the same transaction.

    Transfers involving an extension of credit to a Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust are exempt from this reporting requirement if: (1) the credit is secured by the Reportable Property and (2) is extended by a financial institution that has an obligation to maintain an AML program and a requirement to file suspicious activity reports (“SARs”). Transfers financed by a private lender or the seller would not fall within this exemption. Also exempt are transfers that are the result of a grant, transfer or revocation of an easement; transfers that occur as a result of the death of an owner of the residential real property; transfers that are the result of divorce or dissolution of marriage; and transfers to a bankruptcy estate. There is no obligation to file a Real Estate Report if the transfer does not involve a Reporting Person. Note that there are no exemptions based on the value of the property or the purchase price.

    Key Terms

    The definitions of Transferee Entity and Transferee Trust broadly include most entities or trusts obtaining an ownership interest in Reportable Property. However, there are exemptions to the definitions of Transferee Entity and Transferee Trust that cover certain highly regulated entities and trusts that are subject to BSA AML program requirement or to other significant regulatory reporting requirements.

    Definition of Transferee Entity.  The Proposed Rule defines Transferee Entity as “any person other than a transferee trust or an individual”[7] that is not otherwise exempt.  Many, although not all, of the entities exempt from reporting under the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”)[8] are also excluded from the definition of Transferee Entity. Those exempt entities include: registered investment companies, securities reporting issuers and certain banks, credit unions, depository institution holding companies, money service businesses, brokers or dealers in securities, securities exchange or clearing agencies, other Exchange Act registered entities, insurance companies, state-licensed insurance producers, Commodity Exchange Act registered entities, public utilities, financial market utilities and US governmental authorities, as well as any legal entity whose ownership interests are controlled or wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any of the above entities.

    Pooled investment vehicles (“PIVs”) that are investment companies and are registered with the SEC would be exempt from the definition of a Transferee Entity. However, PIVs that are not registered with the SEC may be Transferee Entities.[9] FinCEN reasoned that unregistered PIVs are not subject to comprehensive AML regulations and are therefore vulnerable to abuse by illicit actors.

    Notably, large operating companies as defined under the CTA are not exempt from the definition of Transferee Entity unless they fall under other exemption categories. Non-profit organizations are also not exempt from the definition of Transferee Entity.

    Definition of Transferee Trust.  The Proposed Rule defines Transferee Trust as “any legal arrangement created when a person (generally known as a settlor or grantor) places assets under the control of a trustee for the benefit of one or more persons (each generally known as a beneficiary) or for a specified purpose, as well as any legal arrangement similar in structure or function to the above, whether formed under the laws of the United States or a foreign jurisdiction”[10] that is not otherwise exempt. A Transferee Trust includes trust property titled in the name of the trustee in their capacity as trustee for the Transferee Trust. Excluded from Transferee Trusts are trusts that are securities reporting issuers or trusts that have a trustee that is a securities reporting issuer.[11] Statutory trusts are also exempt from the definition of Transferee Trust but could be considered a Transferee Entity, unless subject to another exemption.

    Definition of Beneficial Owner.  Real Estate Reports must include beneficial owners of Transferee Entities and Transferee Trusts, as beneficial owners are defined in the CTA.

    Consistent with the CTA, a beneficial owner of a Transferee Entity is “any individual who, directly or indirectly, either exercises substantial control over the transferee entity or owns or controls at least 25 percent of the ownership interests of the transferee entity.”[12] As the owners or directors of tax-exempt organizations do not hold a direct ownership stake in the organization, the reportable beneficial owners would be limited only to the individuals who exercise substantial control. Only those beneficial owners of the Transferee Entity on the date of closing must be reported.

    A beneficial owner of a Transferee Trust is any individual who, at the time of the real estate transfer to the Transferee Trust: (1) is a trustee; (2) otherwise has authority to dispose of Transferee Trust assets, such as may be the case with a trust protector; (3) is a beneficiary who is the sole permissible recipient of income and principal from the Transferee Trust or who has the right to demand a distribution of, or to withdraw, substantially all of the assets of the Transferee Trust; (4) is a grantor or settlor of a revocable Transferee Trust; or (5) is the beneficial owner of a legal entity or trust that holds one of the positions described in (1)-(4), taking into account the exemptions that apply to Transferee Entities and Transferee Trusts.

    Who is Responsible for Reporting?

    FinCEN proposes a cascade approach to reporting obligations in the Proposed Rule. They identify five levels of persons who are responsible for filing the Real Estate Report as set forth herein and explain that: “a real estate professional would be a reporting person required to file a report and keep records for a given transfer if the person performs a function described in the cascade and no other person performs a function described higher in the cascade.”[13] For example, “if no person is involved in the transfer as described in the first tier of potential Reporting Persons, the reporting obligation would fall to the person involved in the transfer as described in the second tier of potential reporting persons, if any, and so on.”[14] The categories are based on the functions performed in a closing or settlement. That means that a Reporting Person could be a buyer representative, real estate agent, attorney or any other person.

    The cascade order is, as follows:

    • First, Real estate professionals providing certain settlement services in the settlement process. This is the person listed as the closing or settlement agent on a settlement or closing statement. If there is no one listed, the reporting obligation falls on the person that prepared the closing or settlement statement.
    • Next, the person that underwrites an owner’s title insurance policy for the transferee.
    • Third, the person that disburses the greatest amount of funds in connection with the real estate transfer. Disbursement may be in any form, including from an escrow account, trust account or lawyer’s trust account. This includes persons disbursing funds through third-party accounts and excludes direct transfers from transferees as well as disbursements coming directly from banks.
    • Fourth, the person that prepares an evaluation of the title status. This takes the form of a title check that is usually performed by the title insurance company.
    • Finally, the person who prepares the deed.

    There is no obligation of persons in the cascade to verify that any other potential Reporting Person has filed a Real Estate Report. Although the cascade is the default way to determine the Reporting Person, those in the cascade can enter into a written agreement to designate another person in the cascade as the Reporting Person.

    Where the Reporting Person is an employee, agent or partner acting within the scope of such individual’s employment, agency or partnership, then the individual’s employer, principal or partnership is deemed to be the Reporting Person. Accordingly, the employer, principal or partnership would have the responsibility to file a Real Estate Report with FinCEN.

    Certification

    The Reporting Person may collect the information required for a Real Estate Report from a Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust or a representative of the Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust, so long as that person certifies that the information is correct to the best of his or her knowledge. The Reporting Person may rely upon that information, unless the Reporting Person knows, suspects or has reason to suspect the information is inaccurate or incomplete.

    Record Keeping

    All Reporting Persons must keep a copy of any Real Estate Report filed with FinCEN with respect to the transaction and any certification for five years from the date of filing. Each party to an agreement designating a Reporting Person (not just the Reporting Person) must retain a copy of the agreement for five years from the date of signing.

    What Information Must be Reported?

    The following information must be included on a Real Estate Report for each Transferee Entity:

    • Transferee Entity: (1) name; (2) trade name or “doing business as” name; (3) street address of principal place of business, and, if not in the US, the street address of the primary location in the US where the Transferee Entity conducts business; and (4) unique identifying number, such as a TIN.
    • Beneficial owners of each Transferee Entity: (1) name; (2) date of birth; (3) residential street address; (4) citizenship; and (5) unique identifying number, such as a TIN.
    • Signing individual(s)[15] of each Transferee Entity: (1) name; (2) date of birth; (3) residential street address; (4) unique identifying number, such as a TIN; (5) description of the capacity in which the individual is authorized to act as the signing individual; and (6) if the signing individual is acting in that capacity as an employee, agent, or partner, the name of the individual’s employer, principal, or partnership.

    The following information must be included on a Real Estate Report for each Transferee Trust:

    • Transferee Trust: (1) name; (2) date the trust instrument was executed; (3) street address that is the trust’s place of administration; (4) unique identifying number, such as a TIN; and (5) whether the trust is revocable.
    • Each trustee that is a legal entity: (1) name; (2) trade name or “doing business as” name; (3) street address of principal place of business, and, if not in the US, the street address of the primary location in the US where the transferee trustee conducts business; (4) name and business address of the trust officer assigned to the trust; and (5) unique identifying number, such as a TIN.[16]
    • Beneficial owners of each Transferee Trust: same as beneficial owners for Transferee Entities.
    • Signing individual(s) of each Transferee Entity: same as signing individuals for Transferee Entities.

    The following information must be included on a Real Estate Report for each Reporting Person: (1) name; (2) principal place of business; and (3) category of Reporting Person in the cascade.

    The following information must be included on a Real Estate Report for each transferor:

    • Individual transferor: (1) name; (2) date of birth; (3) residential street address; and (4) unique identifying number, such as a TIN
    • Transferor entity: (1) name; (2) trade name or “doing business as” name; (3) street address of principal place of business, and, if not in the US, the street address of the primary location in the US where the transferor entity conducts business; and (4) unique identifying number, such as a TIN.
    • Transferor trust: (1) name; (2) date the trust instrument was executed; (3) unique identifying number, such as a TIN; (4) for each individual that is a trustee, name, address and unique identifying number, such as a TIN; and (5) for each legal entity trustee: name, trade name or “doing business as” name, street address of principal place of business, and, if not in the US, the street address of the primary location in the US where the transferor trustee conducts business and unique identifying number, such as a TIN.

    The following information must be included on a Real Estate Report for each Reportable Property: street address and, if applicable, the legal description, such as the section, lot and block.

    The following information must be included on a Real Estate Report concerning payments made in connection with a Reportable Property: (1) total amount paid by all transferees for the property; (2) total amount paid by the Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust; (3) method of each payment made by the Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust; (4) accounts and financial institutions used for each such payment; and (5) if the payor is anyone other than the Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust, the name of the payor. Payments made from escrow or trust accounts held by the Reporting Person are exempt.

    The Real Estate Report must also include whether the real estate transfer involved a credit extension by a person that is not a financial institution with an obligation to maintain an AML program and an obligation to file SARs.

    Report Timing

    A Reporting Person must file a Real Estate Report with FinCEN no later than 30 days after the day on which the Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust receives the ownership interest in the Reportable Property. The Real Estate Reports are essentially simplified versions of SARs.[17] Unlike reports required under the CTA, the Proposed Rule would not require Reporting Persons to report changes to beneficial ownership of a Transferee Entity or Transferee Trust.

    Confidentiality

    Real Estate Reports, like SARs, will be held in a secure FinCEN database and will not be publicly accessible. Unlike SARs, the Proposed Rule proposes to exempt Reporting Persons and Federal, State, local or Tribal government authorities from the confidentiality provision in 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) that prohibit disclosing the transaction has been reported to any person involved in the transaction. The Reports are not considered confidential from the other parties to the transaction.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Melissa G.R. Goldstein, Julian M. Wise and Kyle B. Hendrix.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Residential Real Estate Transfers, 89 Fed. Reg. 12,424 (Feb. 16, 2024), (hereinafter, “Proposed Rule”).

    [2] Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Real Estate Transactions, 86 Fed. Reg. 69,589, 69,591 (Dec. 8, 2021), (hereinafter, “ANPRM”). For more information on the ANPRM, please see our prior Alert “FinCEN Commences Rulemaking Process to Implement AML Reporting Requirements for Real Estate Sector.”

    [3] 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(U).

    [4] Questions and comments on the Proposed Rule were due April 16, 2024

    [5] The transfer is reportable even if one or more other transferees receive an ownership interest in the same property as part of the same transaction.

    [6] Properties with a commercial element may be Reportable Property if they meet any of three prongs in the definition of Reportable Property, such as a single-family residence that is located above a commercial enterprise.

    [7] Proposed Rule at § 1031.320(j)(10).

    [8] The CTA was enacted in January 2021 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (“NDAA”) (CTA §§ 6401–03).

    [9] See Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 12,433 (“The difference between registered and unregistered PIVs turns in part on whether the PIV is or is not excluded from registration requirements as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. PIVs that meet these exclusion requirements and are therefore not registered with the SEC, do not have disclosure and reporting requirements that govern similar but public PIVs, such as mutual funds or exchange-traded funds.”).

    [10] Proposed Rule at § 1031.320(j)(11).

    [11] Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 12,434

    [12] 31 CFR § 1010.380(d). For more information on the beneficial owners under the CTA and beneficial ownership information reporting obligation please see our prior Alerts: (1) “FinCEN Issues Final Rule Requiring Reporting of Beneficial Ownership Information”; (2) “The Corporate Transparency Act: Key Considerations for Compliance With the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule,” and (3) “The Corporate Transparency Act: The Private Funds Guide to Compliance With the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule.”

    [13] Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 12,437.

    [14] Id.

    [15] Signing individuals do not include any individual who signed documents as part of their employment with a financial institution that has an obligation to maintain an AML program and an obligation to file SARs.

    [16] Each trustee that is an individual is considered a beneficial owner.

    [17] While the Proposed Rule does not include a proposed form for filing Real Estate Reports, the Proposed Rule requests comments on such a form. See e.g., Proposed Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 12,443, 12,464.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Julian M. Wise

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kyle B. Hendrix

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Back in the USA: Seventh Circuit Lifts Sanctions, Anti-Suit Injunction Contempt

    Back in the USA: Seventh Circuit Lifts Sanctions, Anti-Suit Injunction Contempt

    ARTICLE

    Back in the USA: Seventh Circuit Lifts Sanctions, Anti-Suit Injunction Contempt

    May 2, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stayed a district court’s contempt sanctions relating to an anti-suit injunction violation, finding that the adjudicated infringer had done all it could to withdraw from the other proceeding in China. Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera Communications Ltd., Case No. 24-1531 (7th Cir. Apr. 16, 2024) (Hamilton, Brennan, St. Eve., JJ.) (per curiam).

    Motorola Solutions previously obtained a $500 million judgment against Hytera for trade secret misappropriation and infringement of copyrighted code used in Motorola’s two-way radio systems. Motorola subsequently brought contempt proceedings after Hytera launched a new line of two-way radio systems, asserting that the new radio systems also used the copyrighted code. As part of the contempt proceeding, the district court imposed an anti-suit injunction ordering Hytera to “refrain from further pursuing or enforcing in any way” a lawsuit that Hytera had filed in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in China seeking a declaratory judgment that the new line of radios did not infringe Motorola’s intellectual property.

    After evidence emerged that Hytera continued to participate in the Chinese proceeding, the district court issued an order directing Hytera to withdraw from the Chinese proceeding. Just a few days later the district court issued an order finding that Hytera had violated the anti-suit injunction by continuing to participate in the Chinese proceeding and imposed contempt sanctions, including a worldwide suspension of Hytera’s sales of two-way radio products; a fine of $1 million per day; and worldwide notice of the sanctions and prohibitions to customers, distributors and others. A few days after the order issued, Hytera filed an appeal.

    At the same time, Hytera filed a petition with the Chinese court seeking to withdraw the declaratory judgment action and seeking the return of all evidence from that court. Less than a week later, Motorola appeared before the Chinese court. Because of the anti-suit injunction, Hytera did not appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the Chinese court denied Hytera’s motion to withdraw. Later that same afternoon, the Chinese court summoned Hytera and thereafter issued a short order granting the motion to withdraw.

    Despite the Chinese court’s decision to grant Hytera’s motion to withdraw, the district court did not lift the sanctions. The district court expressed concern about a scenario in which a written order “technically withdraws the action” but comes with “a whole series of other consequences that generates duplicative litigation . . . and thereby undermines the whole purpose of the anti-suit injunction and the subsequent contempt proceedings.” The district court also noted that Hytera had not yet produced a promised log of ex parte communications between it and the Chinese court, and thus the district court could not be sure that Hytera was not using the Chinese court’s ex parte procedure to push for a favorable written order behind closed doors. Under the pressure of the continued contempt sanctions, Hytera repeatedly asked the Chinese court to clarify the status and effect of the order granting its withdrawal.

    On appeal before the Seventh Circuit, Hytera argued that the contempt sanctions should be stayed because it had fulfilled the district court’s original anti-suit injunction by withdrawing from the Chinese action, and that it was unable to comply with the district court’s latest requirements to secure additional clarification or a final written order from the Chinese court.

    The Seventh Circuit began by noting that it understood the district court’s skepticism that Hytera had complied with the district court’s order given Hytera’s long history of trade secret theft, spoliation of evidence and other litigation misconduct, and its initial delay in response to the anti-suit injunction. Nevertheless, the Court found the situation different here because Hytera lacked the ability to comply, and continued imposition of sanctions would be punitive. The Court explained that the Chinese court permitted Hytera to withdraw and Hytera could not be blamed for the Chinese court not providing any additional response, particularly when Hytera was precluded from having further communications with the Chinese court. The Seventh Circuit also explained that it appreciated the district court’s concern about ex parte communications with the Chinese court, but that even if the Chinese court reopened the action, Hytera would be prevented from participating without violating the anti-suit injunction. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit stayed the contempt sanctions.

    The Seventh Circuit commended the district court’s close attention to the case, noting that if Hytera should seek to take advantage of a future written order from the Chinese proceeding, the district court could take appropriate action to enforce its injunctions.

    Authors

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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    Endnotes

  • Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (04/2024)

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (04/2024)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (04/2024)

    May 2, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    1. “No re-export to Russia” clauses become mandatory for certain contracts within the EU

    As of March 20, 2024, so-called “no re-export to Russia” clauses have become mandatory for certain types of contracts concluded by EU companies. The EU has amended EU Directive 833/2014 so that companies must now require their contractual partners not to re-export certain goods or technologies to Russia.

    The purpose of the amendment is to prevent non-EU companies from circumventing EU bans of exports to Russia by re-exporting goods to Russia. The no re-export requirement applies to non-EU countries with the exception of companies from certain “partner countries” including the US, Japan, CANZUK, Norway and Switzerland. While companies are free to draft the language of the required clauses, they must include adequate remedies that can be activated in the event of a breach, such as monetary penalties.

    The requirement applies only to certain products, such as jet fuel and aircraft parts, firearms but also electronic integrated circuits and other sensitive goods. It does not apply only to future contracts: As of March 20, 2024, any contract concluded on December 19, 2023 or later must contain a “no re-export to Russia” provision. For contracts entered prior to that date, such a provision must be included if performance under such contracts is rendered under such con-tracts after December 19, 2024.

    Relevant for: All companies.

    Further details here

    2. German Federal Court of Justice rules on warranty claim for classic car

    Is a car seller liable for a faulty air conditioner in a 40-year-old car? In a decision dated April 10, 2024, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”) confirmed that this is indeed possible.

    In this case, a consumer had sold a classic Mercedes 380 SL first registered in 1981 to another consumer and had excluded any warranty (Gewährleistung) for defects, as is generally possible under German civil law for consumers selling used goods. In the advertisement, the seller also stated that the air conditioning worked “without any problems”. Two months after receiving the vehicle, the purchaser realized that the air conditioner was not working and demanded that the seller pay the repair costs.

    Previously, a regional court had ruled that the purchaser had no claim because the seller had validly excluded any warranty for defects in the purchase agreement. While the agreement of a certain condition – for example, the air conditioning system will work – usually results in the exclusion of the warranty for such a condition, the regional court argued that this was different in the present case because the purchaser had to expect that maintenance and repairs would be necessary on a 40-year-old car.

    The Federal Court of Justice disagreed, stating that, even in the case of classic cars, its long-standing rule applies that a warranty exclusion does not apply to aspects for which the parties have agreed a condition. Otherwise, the exclusion would be meaningless.

    Relevant for: Sellers and purchasers of vehicles.

    Further details here (available only in German)

    3. Car infotainment systems to fall under German media regulation

    In a decision that it called “groundbreaking”, the German Commission on Licensing and Supervision (”ZAK”) classified in-car infotainment systems used in Audi, BMW/Mini and Tesla vehicles as so-called “user interfaces”.

    As a result, the OEMs must now ensure free and not arbitrarily restricted access to media offerings on their infotainment systems. In practice, that means that public broadcasting services and private broadcasters that provide regional information must be easily accessible through the infotainment interfaces.

    In case of Tesla, the Tesla media player that also allows for the integration of third-party apps, was considered a media platform by ZAK. As a consequence, one third of the player’s capacity must be reserved for traditional broadcasting services including public and television programs. Tesla will also be required to disclose to providers and regulators how the requirements will be implemented.

    Relevant for: OEMs.

    Further details here (available in German only)

    4. Car subscription provider loses court case for not allowing direct debits from Lithuanian bank account

    A car subscription provider that only accepted direct debit mandates for German bank accounts lost in court to a consumer protection agency. A customer had asked the company to use a Lithuanian bank account to debit his monthly car subscription payments, but the car subscription provider refused.

    In a decision dated March 8, 2024 which could still be appealed, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf found that such a practice violated article 9 para. 2 of the EU SEPA Regulation. According to this provision, payment recipients are not allowed to specify the member state in which the payment account is located.

    In court, the car subscription argued unsuccessfully that its refusal to accept the Lithuanian bank account was not legally binding, as stated in the footer of the email sent to the customer. The court ruled that it did not matter whether the refusal was legally binding. It was sufficient that the customer understood the email to mean that the payment recipient would only accept bank accounts which were located in certain countries for direct debit.

    Relevant for: All companies.

    Further details here (available only in German)

    5. German Federal Court of Justice applies workshop risk principles to “expert assessment risk”

    In our January 2024 Mobility Update, we presented the German Federal Court of Justice’s rulings in five cases on the allocation of “workshop risk”.

    In a ruling dated March 12, 2024, the BGH has now applied the same standards to the “expert assessment risk”, i.e. the risk that an expert assessing damage to a vehicle after an accident may overcharge without the claimant being responsible for this, is generally not borne by the claimant. The claimant is therefore entitled to reimbursement from the liable party even if the expert’s invoice is inflated. The liable party, on the other hand, can then demand the assignment of any claims the claimant may have against the expert.

    Further details here (available only in German)

    Relevant for: Insurance companies, vehicle owners.

    6. No right of withdrawal after loan agreement has been completely fulfilled

    The German Federal Court of Justice ruled on January 23, 2024 that consumers no longer have a right of withdrawal under a loan agreement once the agreement has been fully performed.

    The BGH’s ruling follows a landmark decision by the European Court of Justice in December 2023 in which the Court ruled that consumers no longer have a right of withdrawal after the parties to a contract have fully performed their obligations, regardless of having received withdrawal information or of compliance with other statutory requirements by the lender.

    The ruling illustrates that this legal issue, which had previously been controversial, has now been resolved in favour of creditors not only at the EU level, but also at the national level.

    Relevant for: Banks, finance providers.

    Further details here (available only in German)

    7. German Federal Court of Justice to rule on withdrawal right applicability 

    On May 15, 2024, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) will hear a case on the applicability of German law withdrawal rights on a contract between a consumer residing in Germany and a Swiss company.

    The consumer entered into two contracts in 2010 and 2013 which were titled “purchase and service agreement” regarding 1400 teak trees with a duration of 17 and 14 years, respectively, and paid a total of EUR 77,200 to the Swiss company. Under the contract, the Swiss company was responsible for growing and maintaining the trees and eventually cutting and selling them. The contract stated that it was governed by Swiss law and provided that Swiss courts would have jurisdiction in the event of disputes. The consumer did not receive any information about their right of withdrawal. Under Swiss law, there was no right of withdrawal.

    In August 2020, the consumer declared their withdrawal from the two agreements, arguing that they were governed by German law under the Rome I Regulation and that German courts were competent under the Lugano Convention, an international treaty between, among others, the EU member states and Switzerland.

    Most importantly, the consumer argued that the two contracts in question were financial services so that the right of withdrawal was – unlike the right of withdrawal for distance purchase agreements – not subject to a time limit. As they had not been informed of their right of withdrawal, they argued that the withdrawal period had never started.

    It will be interesting to see whether the German Federal Court of Justice will take the opportunity to further define the term of “financial services” which is highly relevant in practice. The lower courts had largely sided with the consumer.

    Relevant for: All companies.

    Further details here (available only in German)

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  • Court Rejects Debtors’ Attempt to Lock Up Votes for Future Plan in GOL Linhas Bankruptcy

    Court Rejects Debtors’ Attempt to Lock Up Votes for Future Plan in GOL Linhas Bankruptcy

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Court Rejects Debtors’ Attempt to Lock Up Votes for Future Plan in GOL Linhas Bankruptcy

    May 2, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Executive Summary

    In an opinion issued on April 22, 2024, Judge Martin Glenn of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the debtors’ efforts to “lock up” plan votes in the chapter 11 cases of GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes S.A. and certain of its affiliates. The debtors sought to approve lock-up provisions that would have bound counterparties to vote in favor of the debtors’ plan without detailing the specific terms of the plan itself or providing any conditions to terminate the lock-up agreement. While courts widely approve of lock-up provisions commonly seen in the form of restructuring support agreements, Judge Glenn declared the lock-up provisions at issue, “an impermissible lockup, not a common RSA.” See In re GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes S.A., No. 24-10118 (MG) (Bankr. SDNY Apr. 22, 2024).

    Background

    GOL, a Brazilian aerospace company, and certain of its affiliates filed chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions on Jan. 25th, 2024. Thereafter, the debtors filed four motions seeking approval of settlements with certain of their prepetition aircraft lessors. Within each of the settlement agreements, the debtors included a provision requiring the settling creditor to vote in favor of the debtors’ plan so long as (i) the terms of said plan were not inconsistent with the terms of the settlement agreement, (ii) the plan provided exculpation for the settling creditors and (iii) the debtors would meet a minimum liquidity and leverage ratio on the effective date of the plan. The lock-up did not require that the plan comply with any other provisions, leaving the debtors free to formulate a plan with the benefit of knowing that the settling creditors would be obligated to vote in favor of it. Each of the settlement agreements provided that the lock-up provision would not be enforceable if the Court determined that it violated applicable law. This gave the Court the option to approve the settlements without also approving the lock-ups.

    The US Trustee and the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee objected to the approval of the lock-up provisions within the settlements (but did not object to the approval of the settlements, which resolved disputes regarding unpaid lease payments and provided for the assumption of the leases subject to certain agreed modifications). The objections alleged that the lock-up provisions were improper vote solicitations in violation of Section 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states:

    An acceptance or rejection of a plan may not be solicited after the commencement of the case…from a holder of a claim… unless, at the time of or before such solicitation, there is transmitted to such holder the plan or a summary of the plan, and a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a hearing, by the court as containing adequate information.

    The US Trustee argued that a lock-up of votes prior to the formulation of a plan would allow the debtors to build “creeping support” for any plan of their choosing and further, that the lock-ups could act as a “poison pill” to thwart any plan opposed by the debtors. Similarly, the Creditors’ Committee argued that approval of the lock-ups could open the floodgates for the debtors to gather support for an unknown plan, which would have the effect of disenfranchising creditors.

    The debtors defended the lock-ups by arguing that they would allow the debtors the certainty needed to move the cases forward and that the lock-ups were permissible under existing case law. However, none of the cases cited (In re Grupo Aeroméxico, S.A.B. de C.V., No. 20-11563 (SCC) (Bankr. SDNY 2022); In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463 (SHL) (Bankr. SDNY 2018); and In re Avianca Holdings S.A., No. 20-11133 (MG) (Bankr. SDNY 2023)) resulted in written opinions.

    Decision

    In a bench ruling, Judge Glenn approved the settlements with the aircraft lessors, but refused to approve the lock-up provisions. Subsequently, Judge Glenn issued a written opinion to discuss the rejection of the lock-ups and to differentiate them from restructuring support agreements, which are commonly approved by bankruptcy courts.

    Judge Glenn made clear that his decision takes no issue with existing precedents that except restructuring support agreements from Section 1125’s prohibition of solicitation of votes on a plan prior to approval of a disclosure statement. Those precedents provide that an RSA can be approved if it provides (1) the agreeing creditors with meaningful information about the plan they are agreeing to support and (2) the ability to rescind the agreement if the plan does not materially comply with the agreed terms. RSAs create a “‘base camp’ for parties when there is no obvious path to an easily confirmable plan,” by outlining the basic elements of a plan or a timetable of events. Op., at 13. This accomplishes two policy objectives: First, it provides creditors with adequate and accurate information, and second, it encourages productive negotiations. Op., at 13-14.

    In contrast, the opinion notes that the lock-ups at issue in the GOL settlement agreements complied with neither of those requirements, because the lock-ups were not tied to “any adequate information about plan terms,” and there was no meaningful ability for the settling creditors to rescind the lock-up agreement because the purported conditions to the lock-up were illusory, “requiring their vote without regard for any legitimate concerns they may have with the plan.” Op., at 23, 24. As a result, the settling creditors had effectively agreed to lock-up their vote without adequate information regarding the terms of a plan or meaningful choice as to how to vote on a plan, “essentially disenfranchising their votes at a nascent stage in these cases.” Op., at 22. This was an improper solicitation under Section 1125(b).

    Takeaways

    • RSAs are critical to the bankruptcy process and used regularly by debtors to drive consensus prior to the confirmation process. Their success, however, depends on the level of information shared between the parties and the ability of the creditor counterparty to make a meaningful choice when a plan is proposed.
    • While this opinion does not threaten or impair a debtor’s ability to negotiate a proper RSA with creditors, it does rebuke an attempt by the debtors to indefinitely lock-up votes on a plan without meaningful disclosure of the contents of the plan and the inclusion of conditions under which the locked-up creditors may terminate the agreement. Debtors, at least in the SDNY, must take heed of these requirements in seeking approval of an RSA or other lock-up agreement.

    Authored by Douglas S. Mintz, Abbey Walsh and Christiana G. Johnson.


    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute
    legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark
    of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • FDA Establishes CDER Center for Clinical Trial Innovation (C3TI)

    FDA Establishes CDER Center for Clinical Trial Innovation (C3TI)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FDA Establishes CDER Center for Clinical Trial Innovation (C3TI)

    May 1, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 15, 2024, the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) announced the establishment of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) Center for Clinical Trial Innovation (C3TI). C3TI will serve as the central support hub for innovative approaches to clinical trials designed to improve the quality and efficiency of drug development and regulatory decision-making.

    In depth

    Background

    As the division of FDA responsible for regulating drugs and certain biologics, CDER’s authority includes overseeing the development and testing of such products. As technology advancements and challenges and opportunities in drug development evolve, CDER is seeking to cultivate drug development and innovation through novel clinical trial designs, trial execution strategies and drug development tools and by leading or co-leading several efforts to foster improvements across the study design landscape. One such effort included a public solicitation of comments on the barriers of clinical trial designs on October 17, 2023. After discussion of the comments, FDA determined that the establishment of C3TI would enhance CDER’s ability to address those barriers and foster innovation.

    C3TI

    C3TI is governed by various offices of CDER, including the Office of the Center Director, the Office of Communications, the Office of Compliance, the Office of Medical Policy, the Office of New Drugs and the Office of Translational Sciences. C3TI’s mission is to “promote existing and future CDER clinical trial innovation through enhanced communication and collaboration.” C3TI aims to improve clinical trial efficiency, effectiveness, data quality, innovation and coordination in the hope that such efforts will increase the participation of diverse populations in clinical trials and accelerate the development of safe and effective drugs.

    C3TI will:

    1. Facilitate the sharing of lessons learned across CDER’s existing clinical trial innovation programs
    2. Communicate and collaborate with external parties regarding innovative clinical trials
    3. Manage a C3TI Demonstration Program to expand opportunities for sponsors to interact with CDER staff

    The C3TI Demonstration Program will initially consist of three project areas under a pre-investigational new drug application (pre-IND) or IND: (1) point-of-care or pragmatic trials, (2) Bayesian analyses and (3) trials using selective safety data collection. Sponsors may submit program proposals via email to CDERclinicaltrialinnovation@fda.hhs.gov. The program will accept up to nine proposals on a rolling basis within a 12-month period. Sponsors selected for the program will engage with CDER staff to serve as case examples and generate lessons for the broader community.

    C3TI is under development and will eventually serve as the conduit for internal and external parties to access resources and obtain information regarding clinical trial designs and innovation efforts. Stakeholders including sponsors, contract research organizations and other service providers in the research industry, and entities conducting industry-sponsored research should monitor C3TI’s development and implementation. The learnings that emerge from C3TI’s activities may meaningfully shape clinical trial strategy and related business offerings in the research industry.

    For more information on C3TI, visit the C3TI webpage or contact one of the authors or any other member of McDermott’s Food, Drug & Medical Device Regulatory Practice Group. McDermott will continue to monitor C3TI’s activities as FDA continues to develop the repository.

    Authors

    James R. Ravitz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Paul S. Gadiock

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Jiayan Chen

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Marissa Hill Daley

    Law Clerk

    Washington, DC

    Nathan Gray

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    Jae Hyun Lee

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • FDA Issues Final Rule Regulating Many Laboratory-Developed Tests as Medical Devices

    FDA Issues Final Rule Regulating Many Laboratory-Developed Tests as Medical Devices

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FDA Issues Final Rule Regulating Many Laboratory-Developed Tests as Medical Devices

    April 30, 2024

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 29, 2024, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued the long-awaited final rule around the regulation of laboratory developed tests (LDTs), which are in vitro diagnostic products (IVDs) that FDA describes as intended for clinical use and are designed, manufactured and used within a single clinical laboratory that meets certain regulatory requirements. The final rule amends FDA’s regulations to make explicit that IVDs are devices under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), including when the manufacturer of the IVD is a laboratory. Along with this amendment, FDA finalized its policy to phase out, over the course of four years, its general enforcement discretion approach for many LDTs. The agency also issued targeted enforcement discretion policies for certain categories of IVDs manufactured by laboratories.

    In depth

    It has long been FDA’s position that the FDCA gives it authority to regulate LDTs as medical devices. Historically, FDA has exercised enforcement discretion with respect to most LDTs and has not required the laboratories offering such tests to comply with FDA regulatory requirements for medical devices. However, on September 29, 2023, FDA published its to modify its regulations to explicitly state that IVDs are devices, including when the manufacturer of the IVD is a clinical laboratory.

    The final rule is consistent with the proposed rule in many respects. As in the proposed rule, the final rule states that LDTs generally will be subject to FDA’s existing regulatory framework for medical devices by making explicit that IVDs are devices under the FDCA, including when the manufacturer of the IVD is a laboratory. However, FDA substantially expanded its list of tests that will be eligible for some form of “grandfathering” (i.e., continued enforcement discretion), including LDTs currently on the market, LDTs that obtain New York State approval, and certain LDTs offered by integrated health systems for patients with unmet needs, with certain important limitations discussed below.

    Scope of Exemption Types of Tests
    Exempt from all medical device requirements
    • Pre-1976-Type LDTs.
    • Certain human leukocyte antigen tests performed in a single laboratory.
    • Tests intended solely for forensic purposes.
    • Tests for public health surveillance (where results are not reported back to patients or providers).
    • Tests performed and manufactured within the US Department of Defense or the US Departments of Veterans Affairs.
    Exempt from premarket review requirements only

    (All other device requirements apply – e.g., registration/listing, adverse event reporting, labeling, investigational use, quality systems, inspections)

    • LDTs approved by New York State.
      • Tests that are approved, conditionally approved, or within an approved exemption from full technical documentation.
    Exempt from premarket review requirements and quality systems (QS) requirements (except for record-keeping requirements)

    (All other device requirements apply – e.g., registration/listing, adverse event reporting, labeling, investigational use)

    • LDTs “first marketed prior to [May 6, 2024] that are not modified, or that are modified in certain limited ways.”
      • FDA will expect compliance with premarket review and QS requirements when a lab’s modifications (individually or in aggregate):
        • Change the indications for use;
        • Alter the test’s operating principle;
        • Include significantly different technology (e.g., addition of artificial intelligence, or switch from targeted sequencing to whole genome sequencing; or
        • Adversely change the performance or safety species for the test.
      • FDA also intends to “request” that laboratories offering such LDTs submit labeling to FDA, which FDA intends to review to see whether claims of “superior performance. . .are adequately substantiated.
    • LDTs “manufactured and performed by a laboratory integrated within a healthcare system to meet an unmet need of patients receiving care within the same healthcare system.”
      • For purposes of this exemption, an LDT is for an “unmet need” if there is no available FDA-authorized IVD that meets the patient’s needs.
      • Enforcement discretion for these tests would end when FDA authorizes a test that meets the patients’ needs.
      • FDA will provide additional guidance on the parameters of this exemption.
    • LDTs for rare red blood cell antigens when performed in blood establishments.

    FDA notes that it “retains discretion to pursue enforcement action for violations of the FDCA at any time and intends to do so when appropriate.” FDA explains that it “may update any of these [enforcement discretion] policies as circumstances warrant or if the circumstances that inform these policies change, consistent with FDA’s good guidance practices.”

    Nearly identical to the timelines set forth in the proposed rule, the final rule describes the phase-out of enforcement discretion to occur in five stages over the next four years. Key dates are indicated below:

    • Phase 1 (effective May 6, 2025 – one year post-publication of final rule):
      • End enforcement discretion with respect to medical device (adverse event) reporting, correction/removal reporting requirements and maintenance of complaint files under the FDA QS requirements (21 CFR 820.198).
    • Phase 2 (effective May 6, 2026 – two years post-publication):
      • End enforcement discretion with respect to all other device requirements not listed elsewhere (e.g., registration/listing, labeling, investigational use).
    • Phase 3 (effective May 6, 2027 – three years post-publication):
      • End enforcement discretion for QS requirements (other than complaint files, which are addressed in Phase 1).
    • Phase 4 (effective around November 6, 2027 – three and a half years post-publication):
      • End enforcement discretion for premarket review requirements for high-risk tests (i.e., tests subject to premarket approval requirements).
      • FDA will continue to exercise enforcement discretion for these tests while its review is pending.
    • Phase 5 (effective May 6, 2028 – four years post-publication):
      • End enforcement discretion for premarket review requirements for moderate- and low-risk tests (i.e., tests subject to de novo or 510(k) requirement).
      • FDA will continue to exercise enforcement for these tests while its review is pending.

    Analysis

    Although the final rule runs more than 500 pages, a substantial number of questions remain unanswered. For example:

    • Does FDA have legal authority to regulate LDTs? Consistent with FDA’s longstanding position, the agency argues – at length – that the FDCA gives it authority to regulate LDTs as medical devices. Nevertheless, it appears likely that laboratory stakeholders will challenge the agency’s position in court. To date, the courts have not conclusively addressed this issue.
    • How meaningful is FDA’s expansion of “grandfathering”? On its face, the final rule gives laboratories offering certain LDTs a pathway to remain on the market without complying with some of FDA’s most onerous requirements (e.g., premarket review and, depending on the test, most QS requirements). However, FDA makes clear that it retains the ability to take enforcement action against any “violative” LDT at any time. In furtherance of its ability to make such assessments, FDA intends to “request” labeling from laboratories for such LDTs (including information on test performance and a summary of validation data). The agency “anticipates” that laboratory manufacturers will alert FDA regarding potential problems with their competitors’ tests once performance information is made publicly available. Either of these pieces of information could potentially lead to agency enforcement action, depending on the agency’s assessment of the relevant facts and circumstances. And finally, many of the grandfathering provisions only apply insofar as the test is not modified in a manner that would trigger the requirement for a new submission – effectively locking many LDTs in their current form unless labs wish to comply with the broader list of FDA requirements.
    • Will the final rule change industry’s – or Congress’s – position on the VALID Act? While the final rule includes certain potentially meaningful concessions from FDA (on grandfathering), it remains constrained by the parameters of the FDCA’s medical device framework. As a result, some stakeholders may reasonably conclude that VALID is the more favorable of the two options. The US House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee held a hearing on March 31, 2024, regarding FDA’s regulation of diagnostics, in which VALID was specifically discussed. Committee leaders and the sponsors of VALID were quick to express interest in moving the legislation forward after the final rule was released. Stakeholders anticipate that the Energy and Commerce Committee will continue to prioritize this issue, but action in the US Senate is less clear.
    • What tests will FDA down-classify? In January 2024, FDA announced its intent to down-classify certain types of assays. The final rule mentions this announcement in several places but does not provide any additional details on the types of tests that may be eligible for down-classification (beyond the companion diagnostic and infectious disease tests noted in the original announcement).

    Final Guidances

    In addition to the final rule, FDA issued two draft guidance documents. The first provides the agency’s thinking about an enforcement discretion policy for certain laboratories offering certain unauthorized IVDs for immediate response to an emergent situation, such as an outbreak of an infectious disease, in the absence of a public health emergency declaration applicable to IVDs. The second provides insight into the factors the agency intends to consider when developing a policy regarding enforcement discretion for certain IVDs during a public health emergency. These guidances are open for public comment through July 5, 2024.

    European Considerations

    FDA’s final rule is similar to regulatory changes in Europe introduced in 2017 through the In Vitro Diagnostics Regulation (IVDR). Before the IVDR, LDTs (or in-house tests, as they are more commonly called in Europe) fell outside of the in vitro diagnostic regulatory regime, although some countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom, had already issued guidance that tests transferred outside of a healthcare institution must be certified or otherwise regulated to some extent. Under the IVDR, LDTs must comply with new conditions. In particular, tests must be used in-house in an EU health institution only. LDTs must be produced in accordance with a quality management system, and the manufacturing healthcare institution must ensure quality assurance, issue a declaration of conformity and keep records. The most onerous and controversial requirement is that health institutions must justify that the needs of a patient group cannot be met by a certified test on the market (the “no-comparator” test).

    The IVDR implementation in Europe has been costly, with many manufacturers indicating that they may withdraw tests from the market. This has led to several suspensions to the deadlines for compliance. While some LDT requirements must be met by May 2024, in January 2024, the European parliament proposed to extend the deadline for the “no-comparator” test to December 2030. In the United Kingdom, the government has proposed introducing rules similar to the IVDR for the Great Britain market that are aligned to current guidance. This legislation has likewise been delayed.

    For more information on FDA’s final rule, contact the authors of this article, any other member of McDermott’s Food, Drug & Medical Device Regulatory Group or a member of McDermott+Consulting.

    Authors

    Michael W. Ryan

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    James R. Ravitz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Sharon Lamb

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Paul S. Gadiock

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Paul W. Radensky , MD

    Counsel

    Washington, DC, Miami

    Marissa Hill Daley

    Law Clerk

    Washington, DC

    Bella North

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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