Content Type: Article

  • Shareholder Activism Update: Delaware Supreme Court Strikes Improper Advance Notice Bylaws in Kellner

    Shareholder Activism Update: Delaware Supreme Court Strikes Improper Advance Notice Bylaws in Kellner

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Shareholder Activism Update: Delaware Supreme Court Strikes Improper Advance Notice Bylaws in Kellner

    August 6, 2024

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Delaware Supreme Court Rules Bylaws Unenforceable, Highlighting Judicial Skepticism Toward Overbroad and Unreasonable Advance Notice Provisions

    On July 11, 2024, the Delaware Supreme Court in Ted D. Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc., et al., No. 3, 2024 (Del. Jul. 11, 2024) (“Kellner”) unanimously struck down several controversial advance notice bylaw provisions that had been wielded by AIM ImmunoTech Inc. (“AIM”) to thwart a stockholder’s proxy contest and impede its right to nominate directors, finding that the AIM board of directors breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty in adopting the unreasonable bylaws.  

    The court also took the opportunity to clarify the appropriate standards of review in challenges to advance notice bylaws, distinguishing between two types of challenges:

    1. Facial validity challenges: whether a bylaw is consistent with the law and a corporation’s
      certificate of incorporation, and if it addresses a proper subject matter; and
    2. Enforceability challenges: whether a bylaw is enforceable under the circumstances.

    The decision reinforces — and perhaps broadens — a judicial skepticism we saw previously with Politan Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. Kiani, C.A. No. 2022-0948-NAC (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2022) (“Masimo”), where the Delaware Chancery Court was poised to reject overaggressive and overbroad advance notice provisions designed to preclude stockholders from making legitimate director nominations.

    We believe Kellner serves as a warning to companies who wish to adopt bylaws that are not only unreasonable but are also convoluted and “unintelligible,” and we expect the decision to serve as a basis for new challenges to advance notice bylaws at companies that fail to heed to the lessons of the Delaware Supreme Court.

    Background

    Kellner has a fraught history stretching back to 2022, when AIM rejected an activist’s nomination notice for failing mention any arrangements or understandings amongst a “nameless group [who] was working together” to launch a proxy contest.[1] That nameless group also included Ted Kellner, a “sophisticated investor with a substantial number of AIM shares.”[2] After a lawsuit ensued, Vice Chancellor Will effectively upheld the rejection by the Board in a memorandum opinion.[3]  AIM then amended its bylaws to adopt “sweeping new advance notice provisions,” couching several defensive changes to its 2016 bylaws’ advance notice provisions amongst changes purportedly made in response to the SEC’s adoption of the universal proxy card rules.[4]

    A year later, in early August 2023, Ted Kellner submitted his own nomination notice, which the Board rejected for, among other things, failing to disclose “agreements, arrangements, and understandings” between and among Kellner and others and failing to disclose “known supporters” of Kellner’s nominations. Kellner then sued in the Delaware Court of Chancery, claiming that some of the newly-adopted advance notice bylaws were invalid.[5]

    The Chancery Court’s Review of the Challenged Bylaws

    The Chancery Court’s December 2023 decision largely focused on the validity of six particular bylaws that AIM adopted in 2023:

    1. Daisy-Chain AAU Provisions: The 2023 bylaws required disclosure of all arrangements, agreements or understandings (“AAUs”), “whether written or oral, and including promises,” relating to a board nomination with persons “acting in concert” with a nominating stockholder or with certain “Stockholder Associated Persons.”
    2. Consulting/Nomination Provision: The 2023 bylaws required disclosure of AAUs between or among the nominating stockholder party and/or any Stockholder Associated Person to “consult or advise on any investment or potential investment in a publicly listed company” as well to formally or informally nominate their nominees to any publicly listed company in the past ten years.
    3. Known Supporter Provision: The 2023 bylaws required the names and contact info of other stockholders known to support the nominations or any of the nominating stockholder’s proposals.
    4. Ownership Provision: The 2023 bylaws included a 1,099-word run-on sentence with 13 subsections, requiring convoluted disclosures, including, among other things, disclosure of interests in “any principal competitor” of AIM.
    5. First Contact Provision: The 2023 bylaws required disclosure of the date of first contact between the stockholder (and any Stockholder Associated Person) and its nominees regarding AIM or the nominations.
    6. Questionnaire Provisions: The 2023 bylaws required nominees to complete the Company’s form of director & officer questionnaire.

     

    The Chancery Court found that four of the six challenged bylaws were unenforceable: (1) the Daisy-Chain AAU Provision, which was “more akin to tripwire than an information gathering tool”[6] and which, together with the Stockholder Associated Person definition, resulted in vague and overbroad disclosure requirements ripe for subjective interpretation by the board; (2) the Consulting/Nomination Provision, the Known Supporter Provision, and the Ownership Provision to be either ambiguous, onerous, “indecipherable,”[7] or a combination of the three. The Chancery Court found that the First Contact Provision and the Questionnaire Provisions, unambiguous, reasonable and enforceable. Both Kellner and AIM appealed the decision.

    The Supreme Court’s Decision

    The Delaware Supreme Court reinforced that advance notice bylaws are intended to provide boards of directors with prior notice of, and information about, stockholders’ director nominations in order assist boards with “information-gathering and disclosure functions.”[8] It also articulated stockholders can raise two distinct types of challenges to bylaws: (1) facial validity and (2) enforceability, and proceeded to analyze AIM’s challenged 2023 bylaws under this framework.

    Facial Validity Challenge: Is the bylaw valid and intelligible?

    When a validity challenge is raised, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that bylaws are presumed to be valid so long as they are not contrary to law or the company’s certificate of incorporation and address a proper subject matter. To challenge to the validity of an advance notice bylaw, a stockholder must demonstrate that the bylaw cannot be valid under any circumstances. For this analysis, a court will not consider hypotheticals or speculate whether a bylaw might be invalid under a certain fact pattern. For this reason, the Supreme Court found all of the 2023 bylaw provisions valid except for the convoluted Ownership Provision, which was “excessively long” and contained “vague terms” that imposed “virtually endless requirements on a stockholder seeking to nominate directors.”[9]

    Enforceability Challenge: Is the adoption, amendment or enforcement of a bylaw properly motivated and reasonable under the circumstances?

    The Delaware Supreme Court clarified that a board’s adoption, amendment or enforcement of advance notice bylaws during a proxy contested would be subject to heightened scrutiny if challenged under the two-step test recently described in Coster v. UIP 300 A.3d 656 (Del. Jun. 28, 2023) (“Coster”).

    1. Under the first step, the board must have faced an actual threat to an important corporate interest or the achievement of a significant corporate benefit, and its motivations must be proper and not selfish or disloyal. The fact that a board thinks it knows what is in the best interest of stockholders is not a sufficient justification.
    2. If a board’s actions pass this first step of analysis, then a court will consider whether the advance notice bylaws are “reasonable” (and limited to only what is necessary) in relation to the specific threat posed and not preclusive or coercive to the stockholder franchise.

    The Delaware Supreme Court found that AIM’s 2023 bylaws failed to meet the first step of this test, and therefore all of the new advance notice provisions in the 2023 bylaws were unenforceable. The court found that the bylaws were motivated by an improper purpose — to interfere with Kellner’s nomination notice, reject his nominees, and maintain control. This was an impermissible breach of the board’s duty of loyalty.

    Regardless, the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion upheld the Chancery Court’s rejection of Kellner’s nomination notice, in large part because Kellner submitted “false and misleading responses” to certain information requests.

    Observations and Takeaways

    The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision is not terribly surprising. As the Chancery Court observed in December 2023, Delaware courts accept that activism now takes place in an age of “second generation bylaws” where advance notice provisions contain onerous mandates for complex disclosure for information such as: stockholder derivative positions, the identities and stockholdings of “Stockholder Associated Persons” and persons “acting in concert,” and they often also require nominees to complete lengthy nominee questionnaires with laserlike precision. As new regulations give companies a convenient reason to take a fresh look at their advance notice bylaws and as activism case law develops, we expect to see companies take bolder steps with advance notice bylaws unless checked by the threat of litigation.

    Kellner provides some helpful guidance on the outer bounds of what types of advance notice bylaws are invalid or unenforceable. Given that courts will generally presume bylaws to be valid, we expect future challenges to most focus on “enforceability” challenges. And as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, we expect many companies with bylaw provisions similar to the Daisy-Chain AAU Provisions, Consulting/Nomination Provision and Known Supporter Provision to remove or pare back such bylaws to address some of the concerns raised in Kellner.

    We anticipate that this decision will also serve as the basis for new challenges by activists to other advance notice bylaws, including those that implicate the second step of Coster’s two-step test. As it stands, Delaware judges have yet to fully grapple with  how specific bylaw provisions should be properly tailored to what is necessary to ensure transparency in board elections.

    In the meantime, stockholders should carefully evaluate how to properly comply with increasingly complex advance notice bylaws and how to position best position themselves for legal challenges relating to bylaws and nominations.

    Authored by Ele Klein, Brandon S. Gold and Daniel A. Goldstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See Jorgl v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc., et al,. 2022 WL 16543834 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2022) (“Jorgl”).

    [2] See Ted D. Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc., et al. 307 A.3d 998 (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2023) (“Kellner 2023”).

    [3] See Jorgl.

    [4] See Kellner.

    [5] See Kellner 2023.

    [6] Id.

    [7] Id.

    [8] See Kellner 2023.

    [9] See Kellner.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Ele Klein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Brandon S. Gold

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Daniel A. Goldstein

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Photovoltaic systems on rented commercial properties

    Photovoltaic systems on rented commercial properties

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Photovoltaic systems on rented commercial properties

    August 5, 2024

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In focus: Rooftop PV systems in the commercial sector – Can I install a PV system on the roof even if the building is rented out? What do I need to bear in mind and where are conflicts likely to arise?

    In depth

    1. Definition der Mietsache

    Die Frage, ob die Dachfläche in einer bestimmten Ausgestaltung mitvermietet ist, hängt maßgeblich von der jeweiligen vertraglichen Definition der Mietsache ab.

    Hier gilt deshalb, wie stets – schon mit Blick auf das Schriftformerfordernis bei langfristigen Mietverträgen –, dass eine konkrete Beschreibung der Mietsache unbedingt geboten ist. Regelmäßig enthalten Mietverträge dennoch keine konkrete Angabe zu dem Umgang mit der Dachfläche, so dass der Vertrag im Einzelfall auszulegen ist.

    Der Gedanke liegt nahe, dass bei einer Nutzung von Objekten als Bürogebäude oder als Logistikhalle die Ausgestaltung des Daches regelmäßig keinen Einfluss auf die Tauglichkeit für den „vertragsgemäßen Gebrauch“ haben dürfte. Allein auf den Nutzungszweck der Mietsache abzustellen, ist in diesem Kontext indes zu kurz gegriffen. Den Vertragsparteien steht es frei, Ausstattungsmerkmale der Mietsache zu vereinbaren, die in keinem Zusammenhang mit der Gebrauchstauglichkeit der Mietsache für den Verwendungszweck stehen.

    Aus Vermietersicht sollten deshalb insbesondere nicht unbedacht Details zur Ausgestaltung der Dachfläche, etwa im Rahmen einer Baubeschreibung, Einzug in den Vertrag finden. Haben die Parteien eine bestimmte Ausgestaltung der Dachfläche vereinbart, so kann es dem Vermieter verwehrt sein, die Dachfläche abweichend zu gestalten und dort nachträglich eine Photovoltaik-Anlage anzubringen. Der Teufel steckt im Detail, hier oft in den in Bezug genommenen Anlagen.

    Bei der Geschäftsraummiete ist es im Übrigen eine Frage der an der örtlichen Verkehrssitte orientierten Vertragsauslegung, ob sich der Mietvertrag auch auf Außenflächen des vermieteten Gebäudes erstreckt. Diskutiert wird dies in der Regel im Zusammenhang mit der Nutzung zu Werbezwecken; aber auch das optische Erscheinungsbild des Daches, das durch eine Photovoltaikanlage durchaus beeinträchtigt sein kann, sollte jedenfalls nicht pauschal als unerheblich abgetan werden.

    Sofern das gesamte Grundstück bzw. das gesamte Gebäude vermietet wird, der Vermieter aber Anlagen auf dem Dach betreiben oder gar Dachflächen an Dritte vermieten möchte, ist es ratsam, die Dachoberfläche ausdrücklich von dem Mietgegenstand auszunehmen.

    In jedem Fall gilt es besonderes Augenmerk auf die Regelungen zu vermieterseitigen baulichen Änderungen zu legen. Sofern eine Ausnahme der Dachoberfläche nicht gewollt ist – ggf. auch vor dem Hintergrund einer individualvertraglichen „Dach und Fach“ Regelung zulasten des Mieters – gilt dies umso mehr.

    Schließlich ist es auch in Fällen, in denen die Dachfläche nicht (ausdrücklich) Teil der Mietsache ist, aus Vermietersicht ratsam, den Mieter vorsorglich einzubeziehen. Photovoltaikanlagen in der für gewerbliche Objekte interessanten Größenordnung werden in aller Regel fest mit der Dachsubstanz verbunden und stellen damit eine bauliche Veränderung des Gebäudes dar – im Übrigen stellen auch Veränderungen der Anlagentechnik bauliche Veränderungen des Gebäudes dar. Wenn keine Volleinspeisung in das öffentliche Netz gewünscht ist, sondern (auch) die Versorgung des Mieters in Rede steht, ergibt sich ohnehin Regelungsbedarf.

    Zu berücksichtigen ist auch, dass das Dach mit Klimageräten, Dachantennen oder Telekommunikationsanlagen oft verschiedenste weitere Anlagen beheimatet. Bestandteile, Einrichtungen und Zubehör gelten, so keine abweichenden Vereinbarungen getroffen werden, in der Regel als mitvermietet, so dass Beeinträchtigungen dieser Anlagen auch den Mieter tangieren.

    2. Gesetzliche Duldungspflichten des Mieters

    Die Installation einer Photovoltaikanlage kann als Modernisierungsmaßnahme gesetzliche Duldungspflichten des Mieters auslösen. Auf gewerbliche Mietverhältnisse finden gemäß § 578 Abs. 2 S. 1 BGB die § 555d Abs. 1 – 6 BGB entsprechende Anwendung.

    In der Vergangenheit waren Gerichte bei der Annahme einer Duldungspflicht für den Fall, dass der gewonnene Strom voll in das öffentliche Stromnetz eingespeist wird, zurückhaltend. Die Pflicht zur Duldung von Modernisierungsmaßnahmen gelte nur für Maßnahmen, die einen Bezug zur Mietsache haben, d.h. sofern Mieterinteressen durch die Maßnahme betroffen werden. Eine Duldungspflicht könne sich allenfalls aus § 242 BGB ergeben. Der nach diesen Entscheidungen neu eingeführte § 555b Nr. 2 BGB setzt hingegen gerade keinen unmittelbaren Bezug zur Mietsache mehr voraus, so dass diese Entscheidungen überholt sein dürften.

    Sofern der Vermieter jedenfalls einen Teil des photovoltaisch erzeugten Stroms dem Mieter zur Verfügung stellt, handelt es sich nach ganz überwiegender Ansicht um eine Modernisierungsmaßnahme – umstritten ist lediglich, ob diese unter § 555b Nr. 1 oder Nr. 2 BGB fällt. Diese Unterscheidung wirkt sich nicht auf die Duldungspflicht aus, sondern allenfalls auf eine etwaige Mieterhöhung. Die Mieterhöhung nach Modernisierungsmaßnahmen ist nicht für Maßnahmen nach § 555b Nr. 2 BGB vorgesehen. Im Bereich der Geschäftsraummiete gilt § 559 BGB zu Mieterhöhungen allerdings ohnehin nicht, sofern die Vorschrift nicht ausdrücklich für anwendbar erklärt wird.

    Zu spezifischen Fragen wie dem Umfang der Maßnahme, die im Einzelfall noch von dem Mieter zu dulden ist, oder dem Spannungsverhältnis in Bezug auf vertragliche Abreden zu der Außengestaltung des Objektes oder konkurrierenden Anlagen auf dem Dach, verhält sich die gesetzliche Regelung nicht.

    3. Vertragliche Gestaltung

    Eindeutig vorzugswürdig ist deshalb eine klare vertragliche Regelung, in welcher der Mieter (vorsorglich) der Nutzung des Daches des Gebäudes für die Errichtung und den Betrieb einer oder mehrerer Photovoltaikanlagen – durch den Vermieter selbst oder durch Dritte – zustimmt. Regelmäßig enthalten Mietverträge eine Klausel, welche die Zulässigkeit von baulichen Maßnahmen bzw. baulichen Veränderungen durch den Vermieter regelt und konkretisiert. Vermieterfreundlich gestaltete Verträge enthalten teilweise auch die Regelung, dass bauliche Maßnahmen des Vermieters ohne vorherige Zustimmung des Mieters zulässig sind, welche der Modernisierung des Grundstückes bzw. des Gebäudes dienen.

    Vorsorglich sollte die konkrete Berechtigung des Vermieters aufgenommen werden, die für die Nutzung und den Betrieb, die Unterhaltung, die Änderung und die Erneuerung der Photovoltaikanlage erforderlichen baulichen Veränderungen auf dem Dach, insbesondere die Verlegung von Kabeln, die Errichtung von für den Betrieb der Photovoltaikanlage notwendigen Infrastruktureinrichtungen (Schaltanlagen, Messeinrichtungen, Verkabelungen, Einspeisestation etc.) sowie sonstige Installationen durchzuführen oder durch einen Dritten (als möglichen Betreiber der Photovoltaikanlage) durchführen zu lassen. Aus Sicht des Betreibers der Photovoltaikanlagen ist es zudem ratsam, eine Verpflichtung des Mieters aufzunehmen, alle baulichen Maßnahmen oder Anpflanzungen auf der übrigen Mietsache zu unterlassen, die zu einer Verschattung oder einer sonstigen Beeinträchtigung des Betriebs der Photovoltaikanlagen führen könnten.

    Sofern die Entscheidung über die Errichtung einer solchen Anlage noch nicht getroffen wurde, bietet es sich aus Vermietersicht an, diese Entscheidung ausdrücklich in das freie Ermessen zu stellen, um Diskussionen um eine etwaige Pflicht zur Bereitstellung der Anlage oder zu einer späteren Stromversorgung zu vermeiden.

    Je konkreter die Klausel, desto weniger potenzielle Streitpunkte bestehen im Nachgang. Oft werden maßgebliche Punkte übersehen, die im Laufe der Zeit virulent werden können – nur beispielhaft sei auf folgende Punkte hingewiesen:

    • Das Recht zur Wahl des jeweiligen Stromvermarktungskonzepts sollte beim Vermieter verbleiben. Dabei stehen dem Betreiber der Photovoltaikanlage grundsätzlich verschiedene Optionen zur Auswahl:
      • Belieferung des Mieters im Rahmen der sonstigen Direktvermarktung i.S.v. § 21a EEG und auf der Grundlage eines Stromliefervertrags (in diesen Fällen auch häufig On-Site Power Purchase Agreement („On-Site PPA“) genannt);
      • Volleinspeisung zur Inanspruchnahme einer EEG-Förderung (Einspeisevergütung oder Marktprämie je nach Größe der Anlage);
      • Belieferung der Mieter im Rahmen des Mieterstrommodells, welches künftig auch für Gewerbegebäude gilt (vgl. § 19 Abs. 3 EEG, § 42a EnWG);
      • Belieferung der Mieter im Rahmen der neuen Gemeinschaftlichen Gebäudeversorgung und auf Grundlage eines Gebäudestromnutzungsvertrags (vgl. § 42b EnWG).
    • Die Grundzüge einer etwaigen Strombelieferung durch den Vermieter bzw. einen Dritten und einer etwaigen Stromabnahme durch den Mieter können, sofern sie nicht im freien Ermessen des Vermieters stehen, bereits adressiert werden; ihre konkrete Ausgestaltung ist in aller Regel aber einem separaten Stromliefervertrag zwischen dem Betreiber der Photovoltaikanlagen und dem Mieter vorbehalten (On-Site PPA, Mieterstromvertrag oder Gebäudestromnutzungsvertrag). Die Möglichkeit zur Abnahme des mit der Photovoltaikanlage erzeugten Stromes, der in aller Regel günstiger als Strom aus dem öffentlichen Netz ist, dürfte regelmäßig die Bereitschaft des Mieters erhöhen, der Errichtung der Photovoltaikanlage zuzustimmen.
    • Ist die Strombelieferung einem separaten Stromliefervertrag vorbehalten, sind die vertraglichen Regelungen des Mietvertrags und Stromliefervertrag aufeinander abzustimmen (z.B. klare Abgrenzung des jeweiligen Vertragsgegenstandes, Laufzeiten, ggfs. gleichlaufende Kündigungsrechte, ggfs. aufschiebende Bedingungen zwischen beiden Verträgen) und die kommerziellen Bedingungen, insbesondere das Verhältnis vom Pachtzins zum Preis für Strombelieferung, zu klären.
    • Implementierung von Reporting-Pflichten des Mieters, um dem Vermieter Informationen und Daten zur Verfügung zu stellen, die im Zusammenhang mit einer nachhaltigen Nutzung und/oder Bewirtschaftung des Mietgegenstandes stehen und für ein ESG-Reporting bzw. ein vergleichbares Reporting des Vermieters erforderlich sind.
    • Aufnahme einer Regelung zur Tragung der laufenden Kosten und Reparaturkosten; Vereinbarung der Umlagefähigkeit im Zusammenhang mit der Photovoltaikanlage stehender Kosten.
    • Jederzeitiger Zugang vom Vermieter und Dritten zu den Dachflächen und der Photovoltaik-Anlage für die Installation, den Betrieb, die Wartung, Inspektionen etc.
    • Vereinbarung der Umlage von Nebenkosten unter Berücksichtigung des Wirtschaftlichkeitsgebotes (z.B. Mess- und Zähltechnik, Versicherung).
    • Die Berücksichtigung (gewerbe-)steuerrechtlicher Implikationen verschiedener Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten.

    Der Mieter wird regelmäßig darauf bestehen, dass Störungen seines Geschäftsbetriebes vermieden und insbesondere etwaige sonstige Anlagen auf dem Dach nicht beeinträchtigt werden.

    4. Nachträgliche Installation der Photovoltaikanlage durch den Mieter

    Sofern auch die Dachfläche nach der vertraglichen Vereinbarung einen Teil des Mietobjektes darstellt, richtet sich die Zulässigkeit der Errichtung und des Betriebs einer Photovoltaikanlage durch den Mieter nach den Grenzen vertragsgemäßen Gebrauchs. Sofern der vertragsgemäße Gebrauch überschritten wird, steht dem Vermieter ein Unterlassungsanspruch nach § 541 BGB zu.

    Der vertragsgemäße Gebrauch ergibt sich aus den entsprechenden Bestimmungen des Mietvertrages, insbesondere zum Nutzungszweck. Regelmäßig unterliegt wird die Vornahme baulicher Veränderungen der Mietsache einem Zustimmungsvorbehalt des Vermieters. Bei der Installation einer fest mit der Dachsubstanz verbundenen Photovoltaikanlage dürfte der vertragsgemäße Gebrauch regelmäßig überschritten werden, sofern nicht eine anderweitige Regelung getroffen wurde. In der Regel wird demnach die Zustimmung des Vermieters erforderlich sein.

    Sofern dem Mieter die Möglichkeit zur Errichtung und zum Betrieb einer Photovoltaikanlage vertraglich eingeräumt werden soll, sind wiederum diverse Punkte zu berücksichtigen. Es gilt zu klären, ob es dem Mieter freistehen soll, die Photovoltaikanlage selbst zu nutzen oder (in beliebiger rechtlicher Ausgestaltung?) an Dritte zu vermieten bzw. zu überlassen. Punkte wie die Rückbauverpflichtung und Rückbaukosten, die Übernahme der Verkehrssicherungspflicht, die Übernahme laufender Kosten, die Verantwortung für Genehmigungen und die Einhaltung von Meldepflichten etc. bedürfen einer klaren Regelung. Auch empfiehlt sich die Feststellung des Zustandes des Daches vor der Errichtung der Anlage durch einen Sachverständigen. Ferner ist die genaue Verortung der Photovoltaikanlage auf dem Dach erforderlich, da sich regelmäßig diverse weitere Anlagen – ggf. auch zugunsten anderer Mieter – auf dem Dach befinden. Typischerweise wird der Mieter zudem auf eine Regelung zur Scheinbestandteilseigenschaft der von ihm zu errichtenden Photovoltaikanlage oder auf zusätzliche Regelungen aufgrund einer Fremdfinanzierung der Photovoltaikanlage (z.B. erforderliche Sicherungsübereignung, Verzicht auf Vermieterpfandrecht etc.) bestehen.

    Es gilt zudem den jeweiligen Einzelfall zu beleuchten. Beabsichtigt der Vermieter etwa eine Sanierung des Daches während der geplanten Betriebsdauer der Photovoltaikanlage, so sollten insoweit etwa die Kosten für die Demontage, die Einlagerung und den Wiederaufbau der Photovoltaikanlage bedacht werden.

    Neben den bereits angeklungenen Aspekten stellen sich in der Praxis im Einzelfall diverse weitere Fragen. Gerne unterstützen wir Sie bei jeglichen rechtlichen Fragen rund um die Errichtung von Photovoltaikanlagen, sowie die Strukturierung und die Optimierung Ihrer Planung.

    Kommen Sie bei Fragen gerne auf uns zu! Wir freuen uns auf Ihre Themen.

    Authors

    Dr. Ulrich Flege

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    Dr. Simon Groneberg

    Counsel

    Munich, Düsseldorf

    Carolin Irla

    Associate

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • Estate Planning Alert: Urgent Reminder of CTA Filing Deadline for Family LLCs and Other Entities

    Estate Planning Alert: Urgent Reminder of CTA Filing Deadline for Family LLCs and Other Entities

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Estate Planning Alert: Urgent Reminder of CTA Filing Deadline for Family LLCs and Other Entities

    August 5, 2024

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The recently enacted Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) establishes mandatory federal reporting requirements for any legal entity registered with the secretary of state or any similar office. If you own or have management responsibility over one or more limited liability companies, limited partnerships, corporations or other similar entities or, if any trust of which you are a grantor, trustee or beneficiary owns or has management responsibility over one or more limited liability companies, limited partnerships, corporations or other similar entities, you may be subject to the new filing requirements of the CTA. For any entity created before Jan. 1, 2024, beneficial ownership reports must be filed with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the Department of Treasury, by Dec. 31, 2024. A copy of the Alert we circulated on Jan. 31, 2024, outlining the key features of the CTA, can be found here. There are financial and, in some cases, criminal penalties for failure to file a report. Please reach out to us immediately if you need assistance determining whether you have to file a beneficial ownership report. We need to hear from you no later than Aug. 31, 2024, to be able to provide timely assistance on this matter.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact one of the lawyers listed below.

    William D. Zabel – New York (+1 212.756.2351, william.zabel@srz.com)

    Susan Frunzi – New York (+1 212.756.2348, susan.frunzi@srz.com)

    Catherine Grevers Schmidt – New York (+1 212.756.2329, catherine.schmidt@srz.com)

    Marnie Grossman – New York (+1 212.756.2244, marnie.grossman@srz.com)

    Laura Angel-Lalanne – New York (+1 212.756.2077, laura.angel-lalanne@srz.com)

    Annie L. Mehlman – New York (+1 212.756.2343, annie.mehlman@srz.com)

    Debra R. Anisman – New York (+1 212.756.2356, debra.anisman@srz.com)

    John J. Rector – New York (+1 212.756.2293, john.rector@srz.com)


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Susan C. Frunzi

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Catherine Grevers Schmidt

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Marnie S. Grossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Annie L. Mehlman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    John J. Rector

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • DOJ Unveils Details of Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program

    DOJ Unveils Details of Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    DOJ Unveils Details of Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program

    August 2, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On August 1, 2024, the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, Nicole Argentieri, unveiled the highly anticipated details of DOJ’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.

    In depth

    The program, sponsored by the Criminal Division, was created to fill the gaps in incentive coverage that have been left open by other whistleblower programs, such as the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) foreign corruption program and the Civil Division’s qui tam program for False Claims Act matters involving federal healthcare benefit fraud.

    DOJ’s new whistleblower pilot program encourages tipsters to come forward with useful information concerning corporate misconduct in four core areas: (1) foreign corruption not covered by the SEC’s program or other existing programs, (2) crimes involving financial institutions, (3) corruption in the United States, and (4) healthcare fraud involving private insurers.

    Argentieri also disclosed an amendment to DOJ’s recently established Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program. She advised that if a company comes forward and reports misconduct to DOJ within 120 days, and before DOJ reaches out to the company, the company will be eligible for the greatest benefit the government can grant – prosecution declination – if the company fully cooperates and engages in remediation.

    Argentieri described the below key areas of focus for the whistleblower pilot program and encouraged whistleblowers seeking a share of the resulting forfeiture proceeds to contact DOJ directly with their information:

    Foreign Corruption

    • Foreign corrupt practices and misconduct not covered by the SEC whistleblower program or other existing programs, such as bribery at international commodity trading companies that do not issue securities in the United States
    • Misconduct covered by the recently enacted Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA)

    Crimes Involving Financial Institutions

    • Corporate misconduct concerning abuses of the financial system
    • Obstructing or defrauding federal regulators
    • Fraudulent efforts to access services from United States financial institutions

    Corruption in the United States

    • Companies engaged in bribing government officials in the United States

    Healthcare Fraud

    • Fraud against private healthcare benefit programs (i.e., healthcare fraud that is not covered by the Civil Division’s qui tam policy involving the False Claims Act)

    Key Takeaways

    DOJ continues to advance and optimize policies designed to fill gaps left open by traditional whistleblower incentive programs. Their aim is to expand reporting of corporate crime and strengthen DOJ’s overall enforcement approach.

    With this announcement, companies should enhance risk-monitoring associated with four key areas of corporate misconduct: foreign corruption, crimes against financial institutions, corruption in the United States and fraud against private healthcare benefit programs. DOJ is opening the doors wide for tipsters to come forward in these areas, with the powerful new incentive of monetary awards.

    In amending its Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program, DOJ has clarified the route to a declination of prosecution in exchange for timely corporate disclosure of misconduct, along with cooperation and remediation.

    Companies will be well-served in the current enforcement environment by additional investment in compliance programs and enhancements to internal reporting structures.

    Authors
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  • Cross-Border M&A: What Non-US Investors Should Know

    Cross-Border M&A: What Non-US Investors Should Know

    ARTICLE

    Cross-Border M&A: What Non-US Investors Should Know

    August 2, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In contemplating a potential acquisition in the United States, there are multiple considerations that require significant analysis to achieve the strategic goals of such acquisition.

    It is paramount to consider the applicable US political and regulatory implications before acquiring businesses or assets. Additionally, federal, state and local laws, especially in sensitive industries or in industries with foreign government involvement, need to be considered. We also recommend planning how to navigate securities, antitrust regulations and potential review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) strategy is unique and often different than in the home jurisdiction of non-US acquirors and, therefore, we believe it is important to become familiar with strategies utilized in US M&A transactions. For example, acquirors need to understand deal protections, pricing protections and defensive strategies available to US targets.

    Throughout this guide, we discuss important considerations to consummate a successful acquisition in the US and provide summaries of the more significant subjects to be considered when purchasing businesses or assets in the US.

    In depth
    Authors

    Howard Kleinman

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • On the Stand: Trial Lawyer Q&A Series

    On the Stand: Trial Lawyer Q&A Series

    ARTICLE

    On the Stand: Trial Lawyer Q&A Series

    September 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Step into the mind of a trial lawyer with On the Stand, a Q&A series. McDermott’s cross-practice trial and appellate lawyers reveal what drives their passion for the courtroom, preparation techniques, advice for junior lawyers and other valuable insights garnered from years in front of the bench.

    In depth

    On the Stand With Kevin Meek | September 30, 2024: Kevin Meek litigates patent disputes in federal courts across the country, before the US International Trade Commission, and in post-grant proceedings before the US Patent and Trademark Office. He has led dozens of trials involving a wide variety of advanced technologies, including consumer products, complex software, and semiconductor and telecommunications applications. In this Q&A, Kevin shares how his scientific background influenced his legal career, which trial victory he’s proudest of, and why accepting critiques are key to being a successful trial lawyer.

    On the Stand With Peg Warner | August 6, 2024: Peg Warner has tried over 50 cases spanning jury trials (including one that lasted nearly five months), bench trials and arbitration hearings. She has served as first-chair counsel in state and federal courts in over 30 jurisdictions. In this Q&A, Peg shares how English history influenced her career as a trial lawyer, why going to trial is like running a marathon and which of her many jury verdicts is one of her proudest moments.

    On the Stand With Doug Carsten | May 20, 2024: Doug Carsten is the co-head of the Firm’s life sciences industry practice and focuses on complex patent litigation disputes. His substantial first-chair trial experience includes litigating high-profile and billion-dollar patent cases. In this Q&A, Doug shares what he enjoys most about being a trial lawyer, his go-to advice for junior lawyers and how “My Cousin Vinny” has played a pivotal role in his career.

    On the Stand With Rachel Cowen | April 1, 2024: Rachel Cowen, the global co-head of the Firm’s Employment Practice Group, focuses her practice on various employment discrimination and wrongful termination cases in federal and state courts. She has experience both prosecuting and defending employee mobility and trade secret litigation on an emergency injunctive basis through more than a dozen trials. In this Q&A, Rachel shares the best advice she received as a junior trial lawyer and how it’s influenced her strategy, and the two pro bono cases that had a profound impact on her career.

    On the Stand With Richard Salgado | October 23, 2023: Richard Salgado, head of the Dallas Litigation Practice Group, has first-chaired 13 jury trials and presented oral arguments in more than two dozen appeals. He represents clients in complex, bet-the-company disputes ranging from commercial litigation to tort, intellectual property and regulatory matters with amounts at issue often in the billions of dollars. In this Q&A, Richard shares why being a nice person matters during trial, how he helps clients overcome pretrial jitters and why clients should add him to their trial team at the eleventh hour.

    On the Stand With Sarah Chapin Columbia | August 21, 2023: Sarah Chapin Columbia, a fellow in the prestigious American College of Trial Lawyers, has led 17 patent infringement, trade secrets and invalidity trials in federal courts across the country. She counsels clients on overall IP strategy and positioning in several industries, including pharmaceutical and biotechnology, semiconductor, medical device and manufacturing. In this Q&A, Sarah shares why she became a trial lawyer, what common issue she sees her clients face in patent cases and how she uses her differentiated skill to overcome that issue and win.

    On the Stand With Michael Sheehan | August 7, 2023: Michael (Mike) Sheehan is the global head of the Firm’s Employment Practice Group. He focuses on unfair competition litigation and has tried dozens of cases to verdict involving large-scale raiding, inevitable disclosure of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty and noncompete agreements. In this Q&A, Mike shares what he’s learned from history’s great trial lawyers and golf, how he prevailed through his toughest case and why he always puts his team first.

    On the Stand With Paul Hughes | July 24, 2023: Paul Hughes serves as co-head of the Firm’s practices focusing on Supreme Court & Appellate Litigation as well as Government & Regulatory Litigation. He has argued 10 times at the Supreme Court of the United States and more than 70 times in federal and state appellate and trial courts across the country. In this Q&A, Paul shares his career highlights, advice for junior trial lawyers and preparation tactics.

    Authors

    Margaret H. Warner

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Douglas H. Carsten

    Partner

    San Diego

    Richard Salgado

    Partner

    Dallas, Austin

    Paul W. Hughes

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • CFTC/NFA Update: Recent Changes to the BASIC Database for Exempt Firms

    CFTC/NFA Update: Recent Changes to the BASIC Database for Exempt Firms

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFTC/NFA Update: Recent Changes to the BASIC Database for Exempt Firms

    August 1, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Recently, the National Futures Association (“NFA”) has changed its “BASIC” registration database to omit display of non-member exemption filers such as “exempt” Commodity Pool Operators (“CPOs”) and Commodity Trading Advisors (“CTAs”) relying on registration relief under Part 4 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)’s rules (including Rules 4.13, 4.14 and 4.5) and associated no-action letters. The change has been made without a published news release, but appears contemplated as permanent at this time. The process of making exemption filings, and the information publicly available about NFA member entities, has not changed.

    Workaround for Customary Counterparty Diligence

    Under NFA Bylaw 1101, NFA member managers are required to confirm the CFTC registration, or valid exemptive status, of counterparties that are involved in commodity interest-related activities, such as brokers, third-party subadvisors to a manager’s commodity pools or entity investors in a manager’s commodity pools, both at the consummation of a business relationship and, where the counterparty in question has a registration status that might be subject to lapse (such as having an exemption that must be reaffirmed, like that under Rule 4.13(a)(3)), annually thereafter. Where this status could be checked on the NFA’s electronic systems, the NFA’s expectation has been that NFA member managers would avail themselves of the NFA’s database – traditionally, via BASIC – as part of customary Bylaw 1101 diligence to confirm that a counterparty’s claimed CFTC status is valid. If a counterparty is a CFTC registrant (and thus NFA member), such as a CFTC-registered Introducing Broker, Commodity Trading Advisor or Commodity Pool Operator, this status can continue to be easily double-checked on NFA BASIC. Foreign financial services providers (such as certain futures commission merchants) that rely on special “exempt foreign firm” relief granted under CFTC Part 30 also continue to be listed on BASIC.

    Previously, NFA member firms could also verify whether a counterparty who claimed to be completely exempt from CFTC registration under certain commonly-used exemptions that require NFA notice filings in CFTC Rules 4.13, 4.14, 4.5 or no-action relief letter 12-38 maintained a valid exemption by referring to the NFA’s BASIC database. Exemption notice filings are required, for instance, for all exemptions under Rule 4.13 except the family office exemption in Rule 4.13(a)(6), for relief for registered investment companies under Rule 4.5, and for “fund-of-funds” no-action letter 12-38 relief, and these exemptions would commonly be relied upon by entity investors in commodity pools. Third-party subadvisors often claim Rule 4.14(a)(8) relief, which also requires an NFA notice filing. These exemptions can still be verified using the NFA’s electronic systems, but, due to the recent changes to BASIC, must be verified in a different way. NFA member managers should be able to log into the NFA Annual Questionnaire System and access a link to a spreadsheet of “Exempt CPO/CTAs” to confirm the status of non-member entities that have made registration exemption filings. This list is updated each weekday night.

    Note that the NFA’s changes to BASIC do not affect the display of information about NFA member firms, and this includes NFA members who have filed exemptions under Rules 4.13, 4.14, 4.5 and no-action letter 12-38 (i.e., those exemptions will still be displayed in BASIC if the filer is an NFA member). However, as it is common for investment managers to file Rule 4.13 (and no-action letter 12-38) exemptions under the name of the General Partner of an advised “de minimis” Limited Partnership fund rather than the name of the investment manager itself, many such exemptions associated with NFA members will no longer be displayed in BASIC.

    Considerations for Exempt Managers

    Reciprocally, non-NFA member CPOs and CTAs that have made exemption notice filings with the NFA should anticipate that investors, and potentially other counterparties, performing their own diligence into a manager or commodity pool’s CFTC status may have follow-up questions (and potential confusion) due to now being unable to find the manager or its pools’ exemptions on BASIC. It may be necessary to furnish screenshots of the exemption filer’s index of exemptions, which can be accessed by logging into the NFA Exemption Filing System with the credentials of the applicable filer.

    Authored by Daniel F. Hunter and Joshua B. Wright.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

     

    In depth
    Authors

    Daniel F. Hunter

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • How Three SCOTUS Decisions Could Impact Healthcare Organizations’ FCA and Agency CMP Litigation Strategies

    How Three SCOTUS Decisions Could Impact Healthcare Organizations’ FCA and Agency CMP Litigation Strategies

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    How Three SCOTUS Decisions Could Impact Healthcare Organizations’ FCA and Agency CMP Litigation Strategies

    July 31, 2024

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    At the end of the 2024 term, the executive branch struck out when the US Supreme Court issued three separate decisions along ideological lines that have the potential to materially weaken the enforcement authority of federal administrative agencies.

    • First, the Court overruled the long-standing Chevron doctrine that instructed courts to defer to an agency’s permissible interpretation of ambiguous statutes.
    • Second, the Court held that the ability to bring a claim against an agency for a final agency action under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) does not accrue until the time that the plaintiff was injured by that action, effectively extending the six-year statute of limitations for bringing such claims.
    • And third, the Court held that an agency’s use of an administrative process for assessing civil monetary penalties (CMPs) violated the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.

    These cases will likely strengthen healthcare organizations’ ability to affirmatively sue executive agencies to challenge regulations governing operations and enforcement actions. Stakeholders should also closely evaluate these cases when defending actions brought by the government or whistleblowers under the federal False Claims Act (FCA) or by US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies under HHS’s CMP authorities. The cases may present additional arguments for challenging the validity of the underlying rule alleged to have been violated, thus increasing potential leverage in obtaining a more favorable settlement amount or court dismissal of any alleged wrongdoing. In HHS CMP actions, organizations may have a pathway to challenge the agency’s ability to assess CMPs where there is no clear pathway for the allegations to first be evaluated by a federal court instead of an administrative law judge (ALJ).

    In depth

    Strike 1 – Loper Bright

    At the end of June 2024, the Supreme Court published a much-anticipated opinion overruling the decades-old administrative law doctrine known as Chevron that required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. More specifically, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which also decided the companion case Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, the Court held that in deciding whether an agency has acted within its authority under a statute, courts must exercise independent judgment to determine the “best reading” of the statute.

    Decision Summary

    Under the Chevron doctrine, courts were first to consider whether Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the statute was clear, courts were bound by and required to apply the clear meaning of the statute. However, if the statute was ambiguous or silent, courts were to defer to the administrative agency’s interpretation in notice-and-comment rulemaking, provided that interpretation was “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

    The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, grants reviewing courts the right to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.” In Loper Bright, the Court reasoned that because Chevron required reviewing courts to give binding deference to agency interpretations, the doctrine improperly ceded authority to decide certain questions of statutory interpretation (i.e., those involving unclear or ambiguous statutes) in violation of the APA.

    The Court recognized in Loper Bright that there may be circumstances where Congress expressly delegates authority to give meaning to a statutory term to “fill up the details” of a statutory scheme, or to issue regulations subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase such as “appropriate” or “reasonable” that gives flexibility to an agency. In these circumstances, Loper Bright sets forth a new two-pronged analysis: whether the agency is operating within “the boundaries of the delegated authority,” and whether an agency has engaged in “reasoned decision-making.” While the Supreme Court had chipped away at Chevron deference in recent years, the doctrine has now been replaced by Loper Bright.

    How Is Loper Bright Relevant in Defending FCA Actions?

    The most immediate reaction to Loper Bright has been a focus on the additional opportunities it provides for regulated entities to challenge agency rules and actions. These opportunities will likely be particularly plentiful for healthcare and life sciences organizations, which are subject to extremely complex regulatory regimes that often interpret ambiguous statutes (e.g., Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) regulations implementing the Social Security Act, and US Food and Drug Administration regulations interpreting the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) and were historically afforded Chevron deference. Now, it will be important to develop a robust notice-and-comment record before the agency in situations where the court examines the agency’s reasoned decision-making.

    The import of Loper Bright also extends to defending FCA actions brought by the government or relators. It provides another argument to contest those allegations, either in convincing the government to decline – or exercise its power to affirmatively dismiss – a case, or in litigating a motion to dismiss a complaint based on either invalid regulations or non-enforceable guidance. In the CMS context, Loper Bright supplements the Supreme Court’s decision in Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Allina Health Services, et. al. (139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019)). Notably, several other hospitals and health systems were parties in filing this lawsuit. The decision held that HHS was required under § 1871 of the Social Security Act to issue through notice-and-comment rulemaking “substantive legal standards” that govern the scope of benefits; payment for services; eligibility of individuals to receive benefits; or eligibility of individuals, entities or organizations to furnish services. Organizations should seriously consider these arguments when developing their defense strategy to increase the litigation risk calculus of the government in particular, which will likely have more concern about protecting existing regulations from adverse court decisions than relators.

    Strike 2 – Corner Post

    On the heels of the Loper Bright decision, the Supreme Court decided Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, holding that an APA claim accrues when a plaintiff is injured by a final agency action pursuant to the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), even if the government action is challenged much earlier. The case arose as a challenge to the Federal Reserve Board’s regulations establishing standards for assessing whether the amount of any interchange fee received by a debit card issuer is reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.

    Decision Summary

    The Supreme Court reversed the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and held that the plaintiff’s suit was timely because it was filed within six years of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the regulation. The Court’s analysis centered on three statutory provisions: 5 U.S.C. § 702 and § 704, which are the relevant APA provisions, and 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), the applicable statute of limitations. The Court held that a plaintiff cannot bring an APA claim unless and until it suffers an injury resulting from a final agency action.

    The Court’s main reasoning focused on the interpretation of the language in § 2401(a) of the APA, which states that a civil action must be filed within six years after the right of action “first accrues.” The majority found that a “right accrues when it exists,” meaning when the plaintiff has a valid and current legal claim. Accordingly, the Court found that § 2401(a) operates as a statute of limitations that begins only when the plaintiff suffers injury (unless Congress states otherwise in the legislation at issue), rather than functioning as a statute of repose that allows just a six-year window from issuance.

    What Opportunities Does Corner Post Afford Regulated Entities?

    Corner Post may give regulated entities more runway to make Loper Bright affirmative litigation arguments to proactively challenge policies (e.g., payment rules) that could otherwise give rise to FCA liability, particularly with respect to entities that did not exist at the time the regulation was enacted. For cases concerning Medicare and Medicaid payment rules, Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Allina Health Services, et. al. offers another pathway to challenging an enforcement action’s validity where that action is based on sub-regulatory guidance, without necessarily needing to challenge the guidance that forms the basis of the enforcement action itself.

    Strike 3 – Jarkesy

    In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, the Supreme Court considered an appeal by an investment adviser and his firm of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) imposition of CMPs after finding violations of various antifraud provisions of the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act. The statutes at issue permit the SEC to choose between bringing the action in the Commission’s administrative process, which includes an ALJ hearing and appeal to the Commission, or in federal court. The SEC chose the administrative process.

    Decision Summary

    The Court held that the administrative process violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment for lawsuits “at common law.” In examining this issue, the Court articulated a two-step analysis process: whether the CMP action “replicated” a common law action, and if so, whether the “public rights” exception applies.

    In answering the common law question, the Court discussed the distinction between an “equity” action, or one that solely seeks to return the aggrieved party to the status quo, and a “common law” action, which seeks to punish culpable individuals and/or deter future misconduct by others. The Court stated that claims under a statute that are “legal in nature” are common law claims where the cause of action under the statute resembles common law causes of action and where the remedy is of the sort traditionally obtained in a court of law (with the remedy being “the more important consideration”). Since CMPs are monetary sanctions designed to punish or deter, and not simply to “return unjustly obtained funds” that a court of equity could order, the Court held that CMPs are a common law remedy that entitled the defendant to the right to have a federal court and jury trial adjudicate.

    The Court also held that the “close relationship between the causes of action in this case and common law fraud confirms” its conclusion. Both essentially dealt with the same concepts: misrepresenting or concealing material facts. The Court then found that the “public rights” exception did not save the SEC’s position. While acknowledging that its precedent on this exception was “not always spoken in precise terms,” the Court articulated the following standard: when “a suit is in the nature of an action at common law, then the matter presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudication by [a federal] court is mandatory.” The Court then listed examples of subjects that would qualify for the public rights exception, such as collection of revenue (taxes or custom duties), workplace safety regulations, immigration, patents, foreign commerce, tariffs, public benefits, relations with Native American tribes and administration of public lands. The concurrence by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Alito) also pointed to the lack of Fifth Amendment due process in the administrative process as compared to a federal court as another reason supporting the majority’s decision.

    Can HHS Bring CMP Actions in Light of Jarkesy?

    HHS has a large number of CMP authorities in various statutes, such as § 1128A of the Social Security Act. Some of these CMPs have been delegated to the HHS Office of Inspector General, which has issued regulations dealing with CMPs (42 CFR Part 1003) and the administrative litigation process (42 CFR Part 1005). Other CMPs created in other statutes sit with CMS, the Office of Civil Rights, the Health Resources and Services Administration, and myriad other HHS agencies. Similar to the securities laws examined in Jarkesy, under Social Security Act § 1128A, the Secretary may initiate a proceeding to seek CMPs after providing written notice and a “hearing,” which has been implemented through providing a hearing before an ALJ and then the Departmental Appeals Board. A person subject to an adverse decision concerning § 1128A CMPs may appeal the action to the applicable US court of appeals after exhausting all administrative appeal procedures.

    Organizations facing a CMP action should examine the CMP authority against the Jarkesy test to determine if they have a Seventh Amendment claim opposing the agency’s action to impose the penalty. Many commonly used CMPs, such as those for submitting false claims or false information to federal healthcare programs, seem likely to be considered a common law cause of action that entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Both the penalty and any statutory assessment, or multiplier on the government’s “damages,” serve a punishment and deterrence function and purpose above returning the programs to their “status quo.”

    Other CMP authorities may fall within the public rights exception. The Supreme Court left open the possibility for organizations to challenge CMPs that are arguably outside of an “antifraud” purpose. These assessments would require nuanced analysis by experienced counsel. And, even if the CMP is not considered grounded in common law, the concurrence’s concern with the adequacy of the administrative process under Fifth Amendment due process principles may provide another avenue to challenge the agency’s action (although this argument likely will not gain significant traction).

    Conclusion


    The Court’s decisions in Loper Bright, Corner Post and Jarkesy likely will have significant impact on the enforceability of agency regulations and CMP authorities and will provide regulated organizations with additional tools to challenge government enforcement actions. Accordingly, in formulating a defense strategy against such enforcement actions, healthcare and life sciences organizations should carefully evaluate the facts, the government or whistleblower’s allegations, and the statutory and regulatory basis for such claims.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Paul W. Hughes

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Laura McLane

    Partner

    Boston

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  • Corporate Transparency Act Update: FinCEN Issues Guidance for Reporting Companies That Are Disregarded Entities for US Tax Purposes

    Corporate Transparency Act Update: FinCEN Issues Guidance for Reporting Companies That Are Disregarded Entities for US Tax Purposes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Corporate Transparency Act Update: FinCEN Issues Guidance for Reporting Companies That Are Disregarded Entities for US Tax Purposes

    July 31, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 24, 2024, the US Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued updates to its Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) [1] regarding the beneficial ownership information (“BOI”) reporting requirements of the Corporate Transparency Act (collectively, with its implementing regulations, the “CTA”).[2] These FAQs provide (i) clarity on the type of taxpayer identification number (“TIN”) information required to be reported by an entity that is disregarded as an entity that is separate from its sole tax owner for US federal tax purposes (“DRE”) and (ii) relief to certain types of entities relating to this TIN reporting obligation.

    Background and Overview

    The CTA requires certain legal entities formed or registered to do business in the United States (each, a “Reporting Company”) to file beneficial ownership information reports (“BOI Reports”) with FinCEN. Such BOI Reports must include a TIN for each Reporting Company.

    Earlier in 2024 certain Reporting Companies classified as DREs that attempted to file their BOI Reports were rejected by the FinCEN system because the system requires a unique TIN for each Reporting Company and these DREs either left the TIN blank or included the TIN of another entity. This FinCEN system requirement is inconsistent with the rules of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), which generally do not require an entity without US-based employees to obtain a separate TIN if it is a DRE*.

    *A DRE is an entity that is disregarded as separate from its regarded owner for US federal tax purposes and must use its regarded owner’s TIN for all US federal income tax purposes, including information returns and reporting related to income tax. While a DRE may, or may be required to, obtain its own TIN – for example, if needed for employment or excise tax purposes, to file certain IRS forms and elections, or for banking or state law purposes – a DRE generally is not otherwise required to have a TIN for US federal tax purposes.

    Guidance from FinCEN

    FinCEN’s FAQ explains that a DRE that is a Reporting Company must provide one of the following types of TINs (each, a “US TIN”) on its BOI Report if it has been issued a TIN: (1) an Employer Identification Number (“EIN”); (2) a Social Security Number (“SSN”); or (3) an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (“ITIN”). However, consistent with IRS rules regarding the use of TINs, FinCEN explains that different types of tax identification numbers may be reported for DREs under different circumstances:

    • If the DRE has its own EIN, it may report that EIN as its TIN. If the DRE does not have an EIN, it is not required to obtain one to meet its BOI reporting requirements so long as it can instead provide another type of US TIN or, if a foreign Reporting Company has not been issued a US TIN, a tax identification number issued by a foreign jurisdiction and the name of that jurisdiction.
    • If the DRE is a single-member limited liability company or otherwise has only one owner that is an individual with an SSN or ITIN, the DRE may report that individual’s SSN or ITIN as its TIN.
    • If the DRE is owned by a US entity that has an EIN, the DRE may report that other entity’s EIN as its TIN.
    • If the DRE is owned by another DRE or a chain of DREs, the DRE may report the TIN of the first owner up the chain of DREs that has a TIN as its TIN.

    Timely Obtaining US TINs

    FinCEN also issued updates to an FAQ addressing how a Reporting Company can quickly obtain a US TIN for purposes of timely filing an initial BOI Report.

    FinCEN explains that there are different methods for obtaining a US TIN, including: (a) online application for an EIN (which is usually limited to US vehicles with a responsible individual who has an SSN or ITIN); (b) submission of Form SS-4 by fax (suggesting a response time of 4 business days), or (c) submission of Form SS-4 by mail (suggesting that applicants should receive their EIN in 4-5 weeks, although, in some circumstances, this may take 6-8 weeks). FinCEN notes that, as a result, in some limited circumstances, a Reporting Company with no TIN meeting FinCEN’s requirements may not be able to obtain its EIN by its BOI Report filing deadline.

    In addition to making all reasonable efforts to file its BOI Report in a timely manner (including requesting all necessary information as early as practicable), FinCEN notes, the Reporting Company should file its BOI Report as soon as it receives its EIN. FinCEN highlights that as a best practice, the Reporting Company may consider retaining documentation associated with its efforts to comply with the BOI reporting requirements in a timely manner.

    Guidance Relevant for Newly-Formed Entities and Reporting Companies Existing Prior to Jan. 1, 2024

    The guidance in these FAQs takes on significant importance as a Reporting Company formed or registered to do business in the United States before Jan. 1, 2024 must file its initial BOI Report by Jan. 1, 2025. The responses make clear that FinCEN continues to expect reporting to occur by the applicable deadline, and if reporting is not possible due to the inability to timely obtain a US TIN, then the Reporting Company should at least document its reasonable efforts to comply.

    Authored by Phillip J. Azzollini, Michael S. Didiuk, Melissa G.R. Goldstein, David S. Griffel, Jessica Romano and Bryson Kern.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] FinCEN, Beneficial Ownership Information, Frequently Asked Questions F.13 and G.3 (last updated July 2024), available here.

    [2] For a fuller discussion of the CTA, see our prior Alerts: (1) “Passage of Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 Includes Comprehensive BSA/AML Reform Measures“; (2) “The Corporate Transparency Act: The Private Funds Guide to Compliance With the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule“; (3) “The Corporate Transparency Act: Key Considerations for Compliance With the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule.”


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David S. Griffel

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • 6 wishes for the forthcoming final regulations under MHPAEA

    6 wishes for the forthcoming final regulations under MHPAEA

    ARTICLE

    6 wishes for the forthcoming final regulations under MHPAEA

    July 30, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Overview

    On July 1, 2024, the US Department of Labor (DOL) submitted final regulations to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), implementing the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) as most recently amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA). The CAA added a requirement that plans and issuers perform and document comparative analyses of the design and application of nonquantitative treatment limitations (NQTLs) on mental health and substance use disorder benefits (MH/SUD) and medical and surgical (M/S) benefits. Submission to the CBO is the last step in the process of issuing a binding, final rule. The agency ordinarily acts on these submissions within 90 days, but it is widely anticipated that the final rule will be issued sooner.

    The final regulations implement proposed regulations issued in July 2023, which were widely commented on.

    In depth

    To call the proposed rule contentious is an understatement, and the stakes for group health plan sponsors that provide mental health benefits are significant. Many comments on the proposed regulations asked the regulators to withdraw the proposed rule and to reconsider the issue anew. While the chance of that happening was always remote, it is now clear that this is not going to happen. There will shortly be final regulations. Recognizing this to be the case, here are six items in the proposed regulations that we would like to see changed or clarified.

    1. Application of the Quantitative Testing Requirements to NQTLs

    MHPAEA generally provides that financial requirements and treatment limitations imposed on MH/SUD benefits cannot be more restrictive than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations that apply to substantially all M/S benefits in a classification. The 2013 final regulations established the following classifications for this purpose: inpatient, in-network; inpatient, out-of-network; outpatient, in-network; outpatient, out-of-network; emergency care; and prescription drugs. “Treatment limitations” can be either quantitative treatment limitations (QTLs) (e.g., visit limits) or NQTLs (i.e., concurrent review). The rules for the testing of QTLs set out in the 2013 final regulations include detailed numerical standards, which have spawned a cottage industry for testing services.

    The proposed regulations would impose quantitative testing requirements on NQTLs. This is at least modestly counterintuitive. It would also make an already complex testing rule materially more complicated. It is our hope that the DOL, US Department of Health and Human Services, and the US Department of the Treasury (the Departments) see fit to back away from this requirement.

    2. Mental Health Carve-Out Vendors

    The proposed regulations establish a three-prong test that plans and issuers must pass to impose an NQTL in a classification. To qualify, an NQTL:

    • Must be no more restrictive when applied to MH/SUD benefits as compared to M/S benefits;
    • The plan or issuer must meet specified design and application requirements; and
    • The plan or issuer must collect, evaluate and consider the impact of relevant data on access to MH/SUD benefits (as opposed to M/S benefits) and take reasonable action to address any material differences.

    These requirements, if adopted as proposed, could make it difficult for group health plans to use third-party payers that manage their MH/SUD benefits under so-called “MH/SUD carve-out” vendor arrangements. Also referred to generically as “managed behavioral health organizations,” MH/SUD carve-out vendors are payers that claim specialized expertise with, and focus exclusively on the treatment of, mental health and substance use disorders. Even under current law, demonstrating compliance for a single NQTL involves a number of steps, each of which must be repeated for each additional NQTL. NQTLs designed and adopted by mainstream M/S providers and administrative services and carve-out vendors will differ in their particulars. Layering on new, quantitative “no more restrictive” and “data collection” requirements will add a new level of complexity that may be prohibitively costly for plans that seek to use MH/SUD carve-out vendors.

    We hope that the final rule will be more accommodating toward carve-outs than the proposed regulations.

    3. Fiduciary Certifications

    The proposed regulations include a requirement for health plan fiduciaries to annually certify that the plan complies with the rule. This will result in more compliance burdens, costs and risks for plan sponsors. One suspects that any fiduciary asked to sign the certification would insist on a legal opinion, for example. We are of the view that this certification requirement serves no purpose. The rule has the force of law; it must be complied with. Layering on a certification requirement adds nothing of any value.

    4. Network Adequacy

    Owing to the relative paucity of mental health providers when compared to M/S providers, a strict parity requirement would present an impossibly high bar. Severe shortages of behavioral health providers are currently the norm, and these shortages will persist without further action. Employers need time to adapt to the requirement. An extended, good-faith compliance period would be welcome.

    5. Meaningful Benefits

    According to the proposed regulations, a plan does not provide benefits for MH/SUD benefits in every classification in which M/S benefits are provided unless the plan provides meaningful benefits for treatment for the condition or disorder in each such classification “as determined in comparison to the benefits provided for medical/surgical conditions in the classification.” The term “meaningful benefits” is not defined. The preamble to the rule nevertheless observes that meaningful benefits are related to “scope of services.” “Scope of services” in turn generally refers to the types of treatments and treatment settings that are covered by a group health plan or health insurance issuers. Under the proposal, the meaningful benefits requirement is separate from, and in addition to, the newly prescribed NQTL testing standards.

    It has been suggested that the final regulations add “scope of services” to the non-exhaustive list of NQTLs. This would mean that a plan’s scope of services would be subject to comprehensive NQTL testing. We would hope that the Departments do not adopt this suggestion. The better view is that a plan’s scope of services is a high-level plan design feature and not an NQTL.

    6. Bonus Recommendation

    A comment submitted by the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (NABIP) focused on a critical and commonplace compliance hurdle. Noting “the reliance virtually all employer group plan sponsors have on their service providers to give them the information necessary to complete their NQTL analyses,” and the lack of cooperation exhibited by many common health plan service providers, NABIP asked that any final regulation “include both enforcement relief and clear compliance standards for plan sponsors who are generally making a good faith effort to comply with their comparative analyses obligations.” NABIP also asked the regulators to explicitly specify “what group plan sponsors need to do to meet their compliance obligations when they are unable to obtain all or part of the information they need from service providers, including what documentation is required.” In the context of a final regulation, these strike us as big “asks.” Under the circumstances, however, they strike us as more than reasonable.

    There are of course many other issues that have surfaced in the thousands of comments submitted in response to the proposed regulations. The only criteria for inclusion in this post is that an issue caught our particular attention. There are many other issues and questions that are of grave concern to employers and plans. Compliance with the mental health parity rules is complicated and expensive, and if the final regulations look anything like the proposed regulations, compliance will only get more complicated and more expensive. The rules need to be simplified, and we hope that the final regulations recognize and accommodate this view.

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