Content Type: Article

  • Eleventh Circuit Bars Noteholders’ Fraudulent Transfer Suit Because of Indenture’s “No-Action Clause”

    Eleventh Circuit Bars Noteholders’ Fraudulent Transfer Suit Because of Indenture’s “No-Action Clause”

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eleventh Circuit Bars Noteholders’ Fraudulent Transfer Suit Because of Indenture’s “No-Action Clause”

    May 4, 2012

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held on April 25, 2012, that “the language of [a] no-action clause [in an indenture] controls, [barred individual] noteholders from bringing” fraudulent transfer claims against the issuer of the notes, its directors and officers. Akanthos Capital Management, LLC v. Compucredit Holdings Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 1414247, *1 (11th Cir. April 25, 2012). Reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals essentially agreed with the defendants that only the indenture trustee could sue.

    The plaintiffs were “hedge funds that hold [allegedly the majority of the outstanding] notes,” asserting creditor status under Georgia’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Id. Their notes were issued under a trust indenture with a “standard ‘no-action clause’,” barring noteholders from pursuing “any remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities,” subject to only two exceptions (the usual “trustee demand” and the “right to payment” exceptions).

    Issue

    New York law governed the terms of the indenture, and the parties agreed that neither of the exceptions to the “no-action clause” applied. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that (a) the plaintiff noteholders “constituted a majority” and thus satisfied “the purpose of the [no-action] clause to prevent suits not in the majority’s best interest”; (b) the issuer had stated “its intent to pay a dividend” to insiders; and that (c) the plaintiffs’ claims “were extra-contractual,” outside “the terms of the [no-action] clause” which “contemplated a contractually-defined Default predicating a suit.” Id., at *2. When the unsuccessful defendants sought interlocutory review by the Eleventh Circuit, the district court certified the following legal question for disposition by the appellate court: “Under New York law, may noteholders sue under Georgia’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act where the noteholders have not complied with the conditions precedent to filing suit specified in the ‘no-action clause’ in the trust indentures governing the notes?” Id.

    Defendants’ Non-Party Status Irrelevant

    The Court of Appeals first rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant insiders who were not parties to the indentures could rely on the no-action clause in the indenture. Relying on cases around the country applying New York law, the court held that “Directors and Officers may assert that the no-action clause prevents Plaintiffs from bringing this suit.” Id., at *5. In the words of the Delaware Chancery Court when applying New York law, plaintiffs who buy bonds “consent . . . to no-action clauses” and thus “waive their rights to bring claims that are common to all bondholders, and that waiver applies equally to claims against non-issuer defendants as to claims against issuers.” Id., quoting Feldbaum v. McCrory Corp., 1992 WL 119095, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 2, 1992). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the no-action clause “bars the pursuit of ‘any remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities.’” Id. (emphasis in original text).

    No-Action Clause Covers Extra-Contractual Claims

    New York law also does not exempt “extra-contractual fraudulent transfer claims . . . from the operation of the no-action clause.” Id., at *6. The Delaware Chancery Court in Feldbaum held that fraudulent transfer claims “could only be properly brought by the trustee.” Id., citing Feldbaum, at *8. Because these claims arise from transactions by issuers of bonds that “assert injuries arising from the bondholder status of plaintiffs . . . [,] [plaintiffs] are hurt derivatively . . . . and thus should share any remedy they receive on a pari passu basis with other bondholders.” Id., at *6, quoting Feldbaum, at *8. Accord, Lange v. Citibank, N.A., 2002 WL 2005728, Del. Ch. (August 13, 2002) (applying New York Law) (nature of claim asserted by noteholders not determinative as to whether no-action clause applied; “what is determinative is whether the claim is one with respect to the Indenture or the Debentures themselves.”), Id., at *7; Ernst v. Film Production Corp., 148 Misc. 62, 264 N.Y.S. 227, 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933) (no-action clause barred fraudulent transfer claims because plaintiffs purported “to speak for all the bondholders and not for themselves alone”).

    No Indenture Trustee Conflict

    When an indenture trustee has a conflict of interest or an “unjustifiable unwillingness” to pursue the fraudulent transfer remedy, however, courts have created an exception under New York law allowing noteholders to sue. 2012 WL 1414247, at *7. Because of the “absence of” any such “allegations of trustee misconduct” here, the Eleventh Circuit found “no persuasive reason to deviate from” established authority holding that “no-action clauses bar fraudulent [transfer] claims.” Id., at *8.

    Majority Ownership of Notes Immaterial

    The court also rejected the lower court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s “majority ownership of the notes” as a ground for disregarding the no-action clause. No-action clauses undoubtedly serve to “protect against the exercise of poor judgment by a single bondholder or a small group of bondholders, who might otherwise bring the suit against the issuer that most bondholders would consider not to be in their collective economic interest.” Id., quoting Feldbaum, 1992 WL 119095, at *5-6. Here, however, the indenture was “complete, clear and unambiguous on its face” and had to be “enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.” Id., quoting Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y. 2d 562, 750 N.Y.S. 2d 565, 780 N.E.2d 155, 170 (2002). The no-action clause here is “absolute: noteholders ‘may not pursue any remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities’ unless they complete the conditions precedent allowing them to fall within one of the two stated exceptions.” 2012 WL 1414247, at *8. Because, among other things, the plaintiffs admitted that there was no default under the indenture, Id., at *11 n.3., the court found no exception to the applicability of the no-action clause.

    The Eleventh Circuit stressed that parties include no-action clauses in indentures “to deter suits brought by the minority,” to prevent unnecessary litigation, and to protect “the issuer from a multiplicity of lawsuits.” Id., at *9. Because “[m]ajority ownership offers no guarantee that those purposes are fulfilled,” it constitutes no “reason to allow noteholders to bring suit when they do not fall within a stated exception” to a no-action clause. Id.

    No Issuer Misconduct

    The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the so-called “prevention doctrine.” The plaintiffs argued that the issuer had “made it impossible” for them “to comply with one of the conditions of the trustee demand exception” — namely, the requirement that they “wait sixty days after making a demand on the [indenture] trustee . . . .” The issuer had “announced its intent to pay a dividend less than sixty days in advance . . . . “ Id., at *2.

    First, the plaintiffs assumed “the risk that fulfillment of the condition precedent could be prevented” when they bought the notes. Id., at *10. Moreover, the issuer “escaped no duty by failing to give sixty-days notice.” Id. The “prevention doctrine” requires some “wrongful” conduct, but the issuer here gave the requisite notice (20 days) before issuing a dividend, complying with the terms of the indenture. Id.

    Uniform Interpretation Important

    Finally, the no-action clause here “is a standard provision present in many trust indentures” that had, according to the court, to be given a “consistent, uniform interpretation.” Id., at *11, quoting Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982). By uniformly interpreting standard contract language, the court intended to ensure the “effective functioning of our financial markets” and “stability.” Id. Because the plaintiffs could find “no persuasive, legally grounded reason to depart from the established law that no-action clauses are generally applicable,” the court reversed the district court, ordering dismissal of the complaint. Id.

    Comments

    1.  The plaintiffs here raised every conceivable argument, convincing the district court of their merit. But, as the Eleventh Circuit stressed, courts applying New York law strongly favor no-action clauses in indentures.

    2.  Indeed, some courts have stretched in the past few years to bar suits and other acts by individual noteholders despite the seemingly flexible language of the indenture. See, e.g., Beal Savings Bank v. Sommer, 8 N.Y.3d 318, 321, 333-34 (2007)( (4-1) (affirmed dismissal of suit by one lender in syndicated loan because other “required lenders” had settled; they had right to sue through their agent; lenders “intended to act collectively”; but dissent argued majority misread documents to deprive minority lender of right to sue; nothing in documents gave agent exclusive right to sue or showed a “surrender of individual lenders’ right to sue”; to the contrary, documents recited that “each lender severally agrees to make loans,” and that no “right or remedy” given the “Agent . . . is intended to be exclusive of any other right or remedy . . . in . . . other Loan Documents or at law and equity.”); In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (agent given authority to release collateral in event of default; overruled single lender’s objection to agent’s credit bid for collateral); In re GWLS Holdings, Inc., 2009 WL 453110 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (same; unanimous voting requirement for release of collateral, amendments, waivers not applicable).

    3.  The plaintiff noteholders in Akanthos still have a remedy. Their claims “may be asserted by the Indenture Trustee.” Lange v. Citibank, N.A., 2002 WL 2005728, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2002).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 90

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 90

    May, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Patents

    Court of Appeal of England and Wales Allows Damages Under a Cross-Undertaking in Respect of an Interim Injunction
    In Les Laboratories Servier and another v Apotex Inc. and others [2012] EWCA Civ 593, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has allowed an appeal against a High Court decision that an importer of pharmaceutical products made in Canada could not recover damages under a cross-undertaking in respect of an interim injunction after the UK patent was invalidated, because the Canadian patent had been held valid and infringed.

    Advocate General Recommends Dismissal of AstraZeneca Appeal
    On 15 May 2012, Advocate General Mazak gave an opinion on the appeal by AstraZeneca against a judgment by the General Court that upheld the European Commission’s decision to fine AstraZeneca for abusive patent misuse.

    Advocate General Opinion on The Interpretation of “First Marketing Authorisation” for Supplementary Protection Certificates
    Advocate General Trstenjak (the AG) has rendered an opinion in a preliminary reference relating to Neurim Pharmaceuticals Ltd [1991] C-130/11 that it should be possible to grant a Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) for a second medicinal product that comprises the same active ingredient as a medicinal product covered by a prior marketing authorisation (MA), if the scope of the basic patent protecting the second medicinal product does not extend to the earlier medicinal product.

    Commercial

    Court of Justice of the European Union Considers Whether Unfair Terms and Practices Invalidate Agreements
    In Jana Perenicova and another v SOS financ spol. s.r.o. (C-453/10), the Court of Justice of the European Union has considered whether a contract is invalidated if it contains unfair terms or was obtained by unfair commercial practices.

    Data Protection

    90,000 Reasons To Consider Ongoing Data Protection Training as Critical
    The United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has issued a £90,000 penalty notice to Central London Community Healthcare NHS Trust for sending faxes containing patient information to an unauthorised fax number. The ICO found the Trust’s lack of ongoing data protection constituted a failure to take appropriate organisational and technical measures to prevent unauthorised processing of personal data.

    Copyright

    Protection of Computer Programs Revisited by the Court of Justice of the European Union
    The Court of Justice of the European Union has again examined the question of which elements of a computer program are protectable by copyright. In line with its previous decisions, it has confirmed that the functionality, language and data format of a program are not protectable as they are part of the ideas or principles underlying the program.

    General Intellectual Property

    OHIM Tasked with IP Infringement Monitoring Role
    By way of a Regulation 386/2012, which was published on 16 May 2012, the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) has been entrusted with certain tasks relating to tackling the infringement of intellectual property rights.

    Trade Marks

    Counterclaims for The Invalidity of a Community Trade Mark Are a Shield, Not a Sword
    The High Court of England and Wales has confirmed that counterclaims for the invalidity of a Community trade mark can only be brought by a defendant where the counterclaim would result in a defence to the claimant’s claim for infringement. Counterclaims that would not impact the main claim should be struck out.

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  • New Proposed Tax Regulations on FATCA Withholding and Reporting

    New Proposed Tax Regulations on FATCA Withholding and Reporting

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Proposed Tax Regulations on FATCA Withholding and Reporting

    April 25, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) released proposed regulations for sections 1471 through 1474 (“FATCA”) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”). These proposed regulations affect both onshore (i.e., U.S.) and offshore (i.e., non-U.S.) investment funds. While additional guidance is expected in the coming months, investment managers should already begin the FATCA compliance process by identifying their investors and counterparties.

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  • Final Rule on Summary of Benefits and Coverage

    Final Rule on Summary of Benefits and Coverage

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Final Rule on Summary of Benefits and Coverage

    April 11, 2012

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Earlier this year, the Departments of Treasury, Labor and Health and Human Services (“HHS”) (collectively, the “Departments”) issued a final rule regarding the implementation and content requirements of the Summary of Benefits and Coverage (“SBC”), a standardized document that group health plans and health insurance issuers must provide under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) to summarize the benefits and terms of coverage for plan participants and beneficiaries. A separate SBC (and summary plan description) must be prepared for each benefit package offered by the plan or issuer.

    Effective Date

    For participants and beneficiaries who enroll or re-enroll in coverage through open enrollment, the plan administrator of a self-insured group health plan (or the health insurance issuer for a fully-insured group health plan) must provide the SBC on the first day of the open enrollment period that begins on or after Sept. 23, 2012. For participants and beneficiaries who do not enroll in coverage through open-enrollment (i.e., individuals who enroll during HIPAA special enrollment periods), the SBC must be provided on the first day of the first plan year beginning after Sept. 23, 2012 (Jan. 1, 2013 for calendar year plans).

    Background

    As a response to the Departments’ growing concern that health plan participants and beneficiaries do not understand the terms or value of their health coverage and are unable to compare their coverage options, PPACA requires group health plans and health insurance issuers to provide plan participants and beneficiaries with an easy-to-understand summary of the benefits and coverage offered under their plan, free of charge and in a uniform format. The SBC must be distributed in a timely fashion so that participants and beneficiaries are aware of their coverage options before making a year-long health care commitment.

    Form and Content of the SBC

    The final rule clarifies exactly what information must be included in the SBC, and in what form. Concurrent with issuing the final rule, the Departments issued materials, including an SBC template complete with instructions and examples and a uniform glossary that defines standard medical and insurance terms, that group health plans and health insurance issuers must use for coverage beginning before Jan. 1, 2014. Because of market reforms that take effect in 2014 and beyond (e.g., the requirement to provide minimum essential coverage and the prohibition of any annual limit), the Departments expect to issue updated materials that take these provisions into consideration in the coming years. If a plan’s terms cannot be described in a manner consistent with the template, the plan or issuer must use its best efforts to describe the terms in a manner as consistent as possible with the template’s instructions. The SBC cannot exceed four double-sided pages and must be written in at least 12-point font.

    For coverage in the individual market, the final rule retains the proposed regulations’ requirement that the SBC must be provided as a stand-alone document, though it can be included in a mailing with other plan documents. However, for group health plan coverage, the final rule states that the SBC can be provided as a stand-alone document or along with other summary materials (for example, a summary plan description) if the SBC is positioned at the beginning of the materials (i.e., right after the SPD’s table of contents).

    Generally, the SBC must include:

    • Uniform definitions of standard insurance and medical terms so that participants and beneficiaries can better understand and compare their health care options. The Departments have prepared a uniform glossary of the relevant terms for this purpose, which includes common terms such as “co-insurance,” “deductible,” “preferred provider,” “hospital outpatient care,” “physician services” and “prescription drug coverage.” Group health plans and health insurance issuers must provide the uniform glossary within seven (7) business days of a participant’s or beneficiary’s request, distributed in either paper or electronic form pursuant to the same requirements for distributing the SBC itself.
    • A description of the coverage offered under the plan, including any exceptions, reductions or limitations on coverage. This description must also include certain cost-sharing requirements, including deductibles, co-payments and co-insurance. In an answer to a set of Frequently Asked Questions posted on the DOL website, the Departments clarified that group health plans and health insurance issuers are not required to provide a separate SBC for each tier of coverage. Instead, information for different tiers of coverage can be consolidated into one SBC as long as the SBC’s appearance is understandable. If the SBC includes information on multiple tiers of coverage, the SBC’s coverage examples should be completed using only the cost-sharing information for employee-only coverage, and the SBC should note this assumption.
    • A description of the terms governing renewal and continuation of coverage.
    • Examples of common benefits scenarios. Pursuant to the template, one example must illustrate normal childbirth and one must illustrate how to manage type II diabetes. Both examples must include the expected cost-sharing for both scenarios.
    • An Internet address or other contact information where participants can obtain a list of network providers and/or more information about the plan’s or issuer’s prescription drug coverage must be provided if the plan or issuer maintains one or more networks of providers and/or a prescription drug formulary.

    These content requirements differ slightly from the content requirements of the proposed regulations. For example, the proposed regulations required the SBC to include premium or cost-of-coverage information. After receiving several comments opposing this requirement, the Departments decided that it would be administratively infeasible to require this kind of information when premiums and costs-of-coverage differ based on many factors, including family size and, for multiemployer plans, employer contributions. In addition, the proposed regulations required the SBC to include three coverage examples, but the final rule requires only the two examples described above. Additional information, including other examples, may be required in future SBCs.

    Form and Timing of Distribution

    Generally, the SBC must be provided upon:

    • An Application for Coverage (and Before Initial Enrollment):A health insurance issuer must provide an SBC to a group health plan (or individual in the individual market) as soon as practicable following the health insurance issuer’s receipt of the group health plan’s (or individual’s) application for coverage, but in no event later than seven (7) business days after receipt of the application. Similarly, the SBC must be provided along with any written open enrollment materials. If no materials are distributed for open enrollment, the SBC must be provided no later than the first date on which the participant or beneficiary is eligible to enroll in coverage. If a change occurs in the information required to be included in the SBC between the time the SBC was first provided and the first day of coverage, the health insurance issuer must provide a revised SBC no later than the first day of coverage.
    • A Participant’s, Beneficiary’s or Employer’s Request:A health insurance issuer or group health plan must provide an SBC to a participant, beneficiary or employer as soon as practicable, but in no event later than seven (7) business days, after receiving the participant’s, beneficiary’s or employer’s request for the document.
    • Renewal or Reissuance:A health insurance issuer or group health plan must provide a group health plan or individual with an SBC upon renewal or reissuance of the policy or coverage. If written application is required for renewal, the SBC must be provided no later than the date on which the materials for application are distributed. If renewal is automatic, the SBC must be provided no later than 30 days before the first day of the new policy or plan year.The final rule contains an exception for fully-insured plans whose terms of coverage are finalized within 30 days of the new policy year. For these plans, because the SBC cannot be provided within the required timeframe, the SBC must be provided as soon as practicable, but in no event later than seven (7) business days after the earlier of the date policy is issued or the date the issuer receives written confirmation of the plan’s or individual’s intent to renew.
    • Special Enrollment:Special enrollees must receive an SBC within 90 days from their date of enrollment. Plan administrators will note that this is the same timing requirement that applies to distribution of summary plan descriptions to special enrollees.

    The SBC can be provided as a hard copy or electronically, though the form of electronic delivery will depend on whether the participant or beneficiary is already covered under a group health plan or is merely eligible for, but not yet enrolled in, coverage.

    Participants and beneficiaries already covered under a group health plan can receive the SBC electronically if the requirements of the Department of Labor’s safe harbor for electronic distribution of plan materials are met (e.g., if the plan or issuer takes appropriate measures (i.e., return-receipt) to ensure that participants and beneficiaries actually receive the SBC). These participants and beneficiaries also have the right to request a paper copy of the SBC free of charge.

    For participants and beneficiaries who are not yet covered under a group health plan, but are eligible for such coverage, the SBC can still be provided electronically if the electronic form is “readily accessible” (i.e., posted on an internal website) and a paper copy is provided free of charge upon the participant’s or beneficiary’s request. If the SBC is posted on a website, the health insurance issuer or group health plan must timely notify participants and beneficiaries, in writing (either paper or email), that the documents are available on the website. This writing must also include the address of the website and inform participants and beneficiaries that they can request a paper copy of the SBC free of charge.

    Risk of Duplication

    For fully-insured group health plans, PPACA requires both the health insurance issuer and the plan to provide an SBC to a participant or beneficiary. Similarly, because PPACA requires each participant and beneficiary to receive a copy of the SBC, participants and beneficiaries residing at the same address covered by the same health plan could receive multiple copies of the same SBC.

    The final rule clarifies who must provide the SBC to prevent unnecessary duplication of information. Generally, if either the health insurance issuer or group health plan timely provides the SBC to plan participants and beneficiaries, both the issuer and the health plan will have fulfilled their obligation. The Departments expect plans and issuers to coordinate who will be responsible for providing the SBC. Similarly, one SBC may be provided to a participant and any beneficiary residing at the same address unless the beneficiary’s last known address differs from the participant’s last known address. In this case, the health insurance issuer or group health plan would be required to provide separate SBCs to both the participant and the beneficiary.

    Notice of Modification

    Group health plans and health insurance issuers must provide notice of any material modifications made to the terms of coverage if the modifications are not reflected in the most recent SBC. For this purpose, the final rule clarifies that a “material modification”: (1) is any change that would affect the information provided in the SBC; (2) is not reflected in the most recent SBC; and (3) occurs independently of a renewal or reissuance of coverage. If a material modification occurs, the notice of modification must be provided to enrolled individuals no later than 60 days before the date on which the change becomes effective.

    Plan administrators will note that this timing requirement differs from ERISA’s requirement that a summary of material modifications (“SMM”) must generally be provided within 210 days of the close of the plan year in which the change is adopted. To avoid unnecessary duplication, the preamble to the final rule clarifies that if an ERISA-covered plan provides a complete notice of material modification, as required by PPACA, within the 60-day period preceding the effective date of the modification, the plan will be treated as having satisfied its requirement under ERISA to provide a SMM and no additional SMM will be necessary.

    Exceptions to the Rule

    Though the final rule emphasizes that there is no exception from the SBC requirement for large or self-insured group health plans, SBCs do not have to be provided for stand-alone dental or vision plans. Similarly, an SBC does not have to be provided for health flexible spending accounts (“FSAs”) if the benefits offered under the health FSA constitute excepted benefits (i.e., accident-only or disability income coverage). If the benefits offered under a health FSA are not excepted benefits but the health FSA is integrated with other major medical coverage, the final rule clarifies that an SBC can be prepared only for the major medical coverage and the benefits and coverage offered under the health FSA can be noted in the appropriate areas of the major medical SBC.

    Penalties

    In an answer to a set of Frequently Asked Questions posted on the DOL website, the Departments clarified that they will not impose penalties on group health plans and health insurance issuers during the first year of applicability if the plan or issuer is working “diligently and in good faith” to timely provide the SBC in the form required by the final rule.

    After the first year of applicability, if an entity required to provide the SBC (i.e., the plan sponsor or other designated administrator of a group health plan or health insurance issuer) willfully fails to provide the SBC, under PPACA the entity will be subject to a fine not to exceed $1,000 per failure. A separate fine may be imposed on the entity for each individual or employer who does not receive the appropriate SBC.

    The Department of Labor expects to issue regulations in the future that provide for civil penalties should a plan or issuer fail to comply with the SBC requirements. In addition, under Section 4980D of the Internal Revenue Code, an excise tax will be imposed on any group health plan that fails to comply with the SBC requirements. The amount of the excise tax is $100 per day per individual for each day that the plan fails to comply with the SBC requirements, though there are exceptions that reduce the amount of the excise tax (for example, if the failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect).

    How to Prepare

    In order to avoid potentially steep penalties and ensure timely compliance with the SBC requirement, plan administrators of self-insured group health plans should begin to compile the information that must be included in the SBC and begin to consider how they will distribute the SBC to plan participants and beneficiaries. Plan administrators of fully-insured group health plans should revisit their third party administrator agreements with their health insurance issuers and revise as necessary to ensure that the appropriate entity will be providing the SBC.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Melissa J. Sandak .

    If you have questions about the SBC requirement or need help preparing the SBC (or any other plan or participant communication materials) or reviewing and revising a third party administrator agreement, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • District Court Upholds Future Claimants’ Due Process Rights Against Broad Releases in Section 363 Sale Order

    District Court Upholds Future Claimants’ Due Process Rights Against Broad Releases in Section 363 Sale Order

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    District Court Upholds Future Claimants’ Due Process Rights Against Broad Releases in Section 363 Sale Order

    April 5, 2012

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “District Court”) on March 29, 2012 held that a bankruptcy court sale order issued under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Section 363”) could not extinguish state law successor liability personal injury claims brought against the purchaser by third parties injured after the close of the bankruptcy case, but whose injuries arose out of conduct of the debtor prior to its bankruptcy. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Industries, Inc.), 2012 WL 1038672 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet considered this issue, the District Court’s decision is in line with those of other circuit courts that have ruled on similar issues. SeeLemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 (5th Cir. 1994); Epstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). This decision has important practical implications for purchasers of assets from a debtor’s estate.

    Facts

    Grumman Olson Industries, Inc. (“Grumman”), a manufacturer of products used in truck bodies, filed for Chapter 11 protection in late 2002. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico, 2012 WL 1038672 at *1. In July 2003, a predecessor of Morgan Olson LLC (“Morgan”), purchased certain of Grumman’s assets in a Section 363 sale. Id. The bankruptcy court order approving the sale (the “Sale Order”) provided that the sale would be “free and clear of all . . . claims . . . and all debts arising in any way in connection with any acts of [Grumman]” and that Morgan would not be subject to “any liability for claims against [Grumman] . . . including, but not limited to, claims for successor or vicarious liability . . .” Id. at *2. Almost three years after the close of Grumman’s bankruptcy case, Ms. Frederico (“Frederico”) was injured when the truck she was driving, which included products manufactured by Grumman prior to the bankruptcy case, struck a telephone pole. Frederico filed a complaint against Morgan for Grumman’s allegedly defective products under New Jersey’s successor liability law (the “New Jersey Action”). Id. Morgan then filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, seeking, among other things, to bar Frederico from pursuing the New Jersey Action. Id.

    Applicable Law

    Although a purchaser of assets is not generally liable under traditional common law for the seller’s liabilities, courts have crafted certain specific exceptions. One exception is New Jersey’s “product line exception,” under which a purchaser may be subject to successor liability if it purchases a “substantial part of [a] manufacturer’s assets and continu[es] to market goods under the same product line.” Lefever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enters., Inc., 160 N.J. 307, 310, 734 A.2d 290 (N.J. 1999). The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the product line exception survives even when the assets are transferred pursuant to a sale order in a bankruptcy case. See id. at 316-18. In the New Jersey Action, Frederico argued that Morgan is subject to successor liability under the product line exception. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico, 2012 WL 1038672 at *2.

    Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the sale of a debtor’s assets “free and clear of any interest in such property of any entity other than the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Courts in the Second Circuit have interpreted Section 363 to allow the sale “free and clear” of any interests as well as all “claims.” See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009). The Bankruptcy Code broadly defines “claim” to include any “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

    The District Court

    Affirming the bankruptcy court, the District Court held that the Sale Order did not exonerate Morgan from potential liability to Frederico and dismissed Morgan’s adversary complaint. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico, 2012 WL 1038672 at *14-15. Thus, despite the broad release language of the Sale Order, Frederico could continue to pursue her successor liability claims against Morgan in the New Jersey Action. See id. at 14.

    The District Court first rejected Morgan’s preemption argument, i.e., that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Lefever, that the product line theory of successor liability survives a bankruptcy court sale order, violated the constitutional supremacy of federal bankruptcy laws over state laws.[1] See id. at *4-5. The District Court observed that the constitutionality of the Lefever decision was not the subject of the appeal before it.  Rather, the only issue at hand was whether enforcement of the Sale Order would be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code and due process. Id. at *5.

    The District Court then considered the underlying policy for permitting sales under Section 363 to be “free and clear” of “claims” that arise from the property being sold, not only “interests” in the property, as the text of the statute may suggest. See id. at 5. Echoing the bankruptcy court, the District Court explained that the broad reading of “free and clear” to include tort claims serves to prevent tort claimants from directly suing purchasers and thereby jumping ahead of more senior creditors in violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority framework. See id. at *6. A broad application of the “free and clear” language also maximizes the value to the debtor’s estate by limiting prospective purchasers’ exposure to liability and thereby encouraging higher bids for the assets. Id.

    After embracing this expansive reading of “free and clear,” the District Court was left to consider whether the Sale Order could extinguish Frederico’s claims. Id. To determine whether a claim that first arose after the conclusion of the bankruptcy case, but as a result of a debtor’s prepetition conduct (a “future claim”), can be extinguished by a Section 363 sale order, the District Court first looked to precedent that analyzed whether future claims fall within the meaning of “claims” in other bankruptcy contexts. See id. at *7-8. Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have considered and decided this issue, holding that the definition of “claim” cannot include the claims of unidentified future claimants.[2] See id. Although the Second Circuit has yet to weigh in on this issue, it has previously observed the potential for practical issues, such as serving notice and “perhaps constitutional problems,” that would result if future claims were treated as falling within the Bankruptcy Code definition of “claim.” See, e.g., In re Charteuagay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991). Citing the long-recognized importance of notice and due process in the bankruptcy context, the District Court observed that courts consistently hold that future claims cannot be discharged by bankruptcy court orders because it is not possible to provide notice to unidentified future claimants. See Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico, 2012 WL 1038672 at *9-10.

    The District Court then applied this reasoning to a “free and clear” sale order under Section 363, noting that the same due process concerns apply regardless of whether the debtor sells its assets under Section 363 or confirms a plan of reorganization. Seeid. at *10. This is consistent with the rulings of other courts that have raised notice and due process concerns when considering successor liability in a Section 363 sale order context. See, e.g., Schwinn Cycling & Fitness Inc. v. Benonis, 217 B.R. 790, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that enforcing a Section 363 sale order to enjoin a future claimant’s state law action would deny the claimant’s due process rights and that the impossibility of providing notice to such unidentified future claimants did not lessen the due process implications). Specifically, the District Court held that, because Frederico did not receive adequate notice in the bankruptcy case and therefore did not have an opportunity to participate in the case, enforcing the Sale Order to bar her right to seek redress in the New Jersey Action would deprive her of due process.[3] See id. at *11. In so ruling, the District Court made a policy pronouncement that the important policy of maximizing value to the estate does not outweigh the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of affording claimants the opportunity to be heard and the constitutional right to due process. See id. at *13. The District Court warned that an alternative approach, one that elevated maximizing value to the estate over the due process rights of future claimants and allowed the court to extinguish all future claims without notice, would make the assets of a debtor more valuable not only to creditors but also to managers and shareholders, and could entice companies to file for bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to the purposes of bankruptcy law. See id. at *14.

    Practical Considerations

    The District Court’s decision makes clear that prospective purchasers of assets from debtors in the Southern District of New York, whether purchased pursuant to a plan or a sale order under Section 363, must consider the potential for successor liability for future claims. The District Court, although sympathetic to the concern that the uncertainty of future claims might have a chilling effect on the market for debtors’ assets, essentially instructed potential purchasers to adjust their offers to take into account the risk of future claims. See id. at *12. Depending on the business of the target debtor, understanding these risks could well determine the success or failure of a purchase of assets under Section 363 or a reorganization plan.

    Authored by Lawrence V. Gelber and Neil S. Begley.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”).

    [2] SeeEpstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The debtor’s prepetition conduct gives rise to a claim to be administered in a case only if there is a relationship established before confirmation between an identifiable claimant or group of claimants and that prepetition conduct.”); Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that even the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “claim,” cannot be interpreted to extend to claims of claimants who were completely unknown and unidentified at the time of the petition and “whose rights depended entirely on the fortuity of future occurrences”).

    [3] The District Court acknowledged that some bankruptcy cases, particularly those with debtors facing mass tort liability, have addressed the potential for future claims with a “future claim representative” who acts on behalf of the interests of future claimholders, such as negotiating a reserve fund to pay future claims as they arise. See Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico, 2012 WL 1038672 at *12-13. The District Court explicitly did not express a view on whether a future claims representative would have been appropriate in this case. Id. at *13.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • US Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Section 16(b)’s Statute of Limitations

    US Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Section 16(b)’s Statute of Limitations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Section 16(b)’s Statute of Limitations

    April 3, 2012

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261, 566 U.S. ___ (2012), the United States Supreme Court recently addressed the timeliness of claims under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 — the provision of the securities laws that permits recovery of certain “short-swing trading” profits. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). Section 16(b) provides that “no . . . suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such [short-swing] profit was realized.” In Simmonds, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations should be read literally (as a two-year statute of repose), or whether the limitations period is subject to principles of tolling. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held below that the Section 16(b) limitations period is tolled until a Section 16(a) statement is filed disclosing the short-swing trades.

    In a short, eight-page decision, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding that under the so-called “Whittaker Rule” the statute of limitations is tolled until the filing of a Section 16(a) report. The Simmonds court made clear that, to the extent the Section 16(b) limitations period is subject to tolling at all, any tolling of the limitations period must cease when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, facts that support a claim. However, the court was evenly split on the question of whether Section 16(b)’s limitations period can be tolled in the first place, or whether it is a period of repose. Thus, the issue of whether the Section 16(b) statute of limitations can be equitably tolled remains unsettled as a matter of Supreme Court jurisprudence.

    The Simmonds case arose when Vanessa Simmonds filed suit under Section 16(b) in the Western District of Washington against 54 underwriters, alleging that they employed a variety of mechanisms to artificially inflate the aftermarket price of the stock following various initial public offerings and that this conduct allowed them to profit from the aftermarket sales. 24 of the underwriters successfully moved to dismiss the claims on statute of limitations grounds, and Simmonds appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the underwriters’ failure to comply with Section 16(a)’s reporting requirements tolled the two-year limitations period for her alleged Section 16(b) claim. The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations is tolled until the insider discloses his transactions in a Section 16(a) filing “regardless of whether the plaintiff knew or should have known of the conduct at issue.” Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010). In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its previous holding in Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp, 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1981).

    On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties, as well as the United States as amicus curiae, presented three competing interpretations of Section 16(b)’s limitations period: (1) the Ninth Circuit’s “disclosure approach,” under which the running of the statute of limitations is tolled until a Section 16(a) report is filed; (2) a strict approach under which Section 16(b) is treated as a statute of repose not subject to any tolling; and (3) a “notice” or “discovery” approach under which the limitations period is tolled either until the insider files a Section 16(a) statement or until the plaintiff becomes aware of the facts and circumstances that would support a valid Section 16(b) claim.

    In an 8-0 decision,[1] the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and determined that it erred in holding that the limitations period is tolled until the filing of a Section 16(a) statement. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261, slip op. at 4, 566 U.S. ___ (2012). Justice Scalia, writing for the court, noted that if Congress had wanted the limitations period to be tolled until a Section 16(a) statement was filed, it could have easily done so by providing in the statutory text that the period runs from the time such a statement was filed. Id. at 4-5. The court also dismissed the contention that the doctrine of equitable tolling for the fraudulent concealment of facts supports the “disclosure approach” because it is a well-settled principle of law that equitable tolling ceases when the fraudulently-concealed “facts are, or should have been, discovered by the plaintiff.” Id. at 5. Allowing tolling to continue beyond this point would be “inequitable and inconsistent with the general purpose of statutes of limitations.” Id. at 6. The court placed particular emphasis on the inequity of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in a case like Simmonds, in which the underwriters can plausibly claim that they were not required to file a Section 16(a) statement. There, the Ninth Circuit’s rule would essentially force them to either file a Section 16(a) statement or to “face the prospect of Section 16(b) litigation in perpetuity.” Id. at 6.

    The Supreme Court thus discarded the Ninth Circuit’s “disclosure approach.” However, although the court’s rejection of the Ninth Circuit approach was unanimous, it was split 4-4 on the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the argument that Section 16(b) establishes a period of repose not subject to tolling. Id. at 8. Therefore, this portion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was affirmed without precedential effect. The court then remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to consider how the traditional rules of equitable tolling apply to the facts of the case. Id. This command suggests that the court favors an approach under which the limitations period is tolled until such time as the facts supporting a Section 16(b) claim are, or should have been, discovered by the plaintiff. But the 4-4 split on the tolling issue means that the Supreme Court has not made a pronouncement on whether Section 16(b)’s limitations period should be subject to tolling at all.


    Authored by William H. Gussman, Jr.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or the author.

    In depth
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    William H. Gussman Jr.

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 89

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 89

    April, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Full Printable Version in PDF Format

    Contracts

    Court of Appeal of England and Wales Considers “Best” and “All Reasonable” Endeavours

    The Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Jet2.com Limited v Blackpool Airport Limited [2011] EWHC 1529 (Comm) has provided guidance on the enforceability of “best endeavours” and “all reasonable endeavours” clauses. In doing so, a distinction was drawn between a clause in which the object is so uncertain that the clause would be incapable of creating a binding obligation and a clause that is imprecise in scope but is binding as its object can be placed in context.

    Trade Marks

    Court of Justice of the European Union Provides Ruling on Keyword Jurisdiction

    The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH C-523/10, has ruledthatunder Article 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation, an advertiser that uses a keyword that infringes a national trade mark on a country-specific top-level domain (TLD) of a Member State other than the Member State where the national trade mark is registered, can be sued in its Member State of establishment.

    Data Protection

    International Chamber of Commerce UK Cookie Guide

    The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has issued guidance to help website operators and users understand and apply the changes to the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 relating to cookies that will come into force in the United Kingdom on 25 May 2012.

    Working Party Opinion on The European Commission’s Data Protection Reform Proposals

    The Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (the Working Party) has adopted an opinion on the European Commission’s proposals for reform of current data protection law. The opinion highlights a number of concerns and suggested improvements, but in general the Working Party welcomes the proposals.

    Patent

    Drug Formulation Patent Found to be Invalid in the United Kingdom but Valid in Other Jurisdictions

    Mr Justice Arnold’s decision in Teva and others v Astrazeneca AB [2012] EWHC 655 (Pat)invalidated Astrazeneca’s patent for a sustained release formulation of the anti-psychotic drug quetiapine in the United Kingdom, on the grounds of obviousness, just days after the same patent was found to be valid in the Netherlands.

    Copyright

    Cross-Border Sales: Tension Between Copyright Distribution Rights and Free Movement Rules

    Advocate General Jääskinen has concluded that there is a distribution by sale in a Member State if a seller targets consumers and enables the purchase of copyright-protected works in that State. In addition, he has found that compliance with copyright protection in this context does not result in a disproportionate effect on the free movement of goods.

    Confidentiality/Copyright

    The High Court of England and Wales Rules on Formula One Confidentiality and Copyright Infringement

    In Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team SDN BHD and others [2012] EWHC 616 (Ch), the High Court of England and Wales ruled on claims for contractual and equitable breach of confidence and copyright infringement brought by one Formula One (F1) race team operator against another. The judgment deals with quantum as well as liability.

    Registered Community Designs

    High Court of England and Wales Rules on Threats and Jurisdiction in Declaration for Non-Infringement

    In Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd and others v Apple Inc [2012] EWHC 889 (Ch), the High Court of England and Wales considered several preliminary issues in a case involving Apple’s registered Community design for a tablet computer.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Boris Uphoff

    Partner

    Munich, Düsseldorf

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  • The JOBS Act: Provisions Relating to Private Funds and Facilitating Access to Capital

    The JOBS Act: Provisions Relating to Private Funds and Facilitating Access to Capital

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The JOBS Act: Provisions Relating to Private Funds and Facilitating Access to Capital

    March 28, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 27, 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (H.R. 3606). President Obama is expected to sign the JOBS Act into law.

    Provisions Relating to Private Funds

    Of particular interest to private funds and their managers are the provisions of the JOBS Act which: (1) eliminate the ban on general solicitation and general advertising under Regulation D in connection with sales to accredited investors; and (2) increase the threshold for becoming a reporting company under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), from 500 shareholders of record to either: (a) 2,000 shareholders of record; or (b) 500 shareholders of record that are not accredited investors.

    The JOBS Act directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to amend Regulation D, within 90 days after its enactment, to provide that the prohibitions against general solicitation or general advertising shall not apply to offers and sales of securities pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D, provided all purchasers are accredited investors. It also amends Section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) to provide that offers and sales pursuant to Rule 506 (as amended) shall not be deemed public offerings under the Federal securities laws as a result of general advertising or general solicitation.

    The Act also directs the SEC to amend Rule 144A, within 90 days after the enactment of the Act, to provide that securities sold thereunder may be offered to persons other than qualified institutional buyers, including by means of general solicitation or general advertising, so long as they are sold only to persons reasonably believed to be qualified institutional buyers.

    Provisions Relating to Facilitating Access to Capital

    The JOBS Act is intended to stimulate job creation by facilitating access to capital markets for emerging growth companies (defined as a company with total annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion during its most recently completed fiscal year). The Act streamlines the initial public offering (“IPO”) process for emerging growth companies by permitting such companies to confidentially submit to the SEC a draft registration statement prior to public filing, and by exempting emerging growth companies from certain of the disclosure requirements that are applicable to issuers registering securities with the SEC in an IPO. Also, following the completion of an IPO, emerging growth companies are exempt from certain of the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on public companies (including the requirement under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that an issuer’s independent auditor provide an attestation relating to internal controls).

    The Act also includes provisions which provide an exemption from registration under the Securities Act for “crowdfunding,” which refers to raising small amounts of capital from large numbers of investors, and an expansion of the exemption provided in Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (which is most often used by small businesses) by increasing the dollar value of securities that may be sold by an issuer pursuant to such exemption from $5 million to $50 million. The SEC is directed by the legislation to issue rules to carry out the crowdfunding provisions within 270 days after enactment.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • New York State Tax Changes Effective April 1 Will Benefit Independent Schools

    New York State Tax Changes Effective April 1 Will Benefit Independent Schools

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York State Tax Changes Effective April 1 Will Benefit Independent Schools

    March 27, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    For calendar quarters beginning on or after April 1, 2012, certain private schools previously subject to New York’s Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Mobility Tax (the “MCTMT”) will now be exempt from paying such tax.

    The MCTMT, administered at the state level, is a quarterly tax imposed on certain employers and self-employed individuals engaging in business within the metropolitan commuter transportation district, which encompasses the counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Nassau, Suffolk, Orange, Putnam, Dutchess and Westchester. Due quarterly, the MCTMT tax rate is generally 0.34 percent of an employer’s payroll expense for all covered employees.

    In December 2011, the governor approved legislation to amend the New York tax code governing the MCTMT. The following are three of the key changes:

    • Exemption for Private Schools: “Eligible educational institutions,” including “nonpublic elementary or secondary school[s] that provides instruction in grade one or above,” will be exempt from payment of the MCTMT. For calendar quarters beginning on or after April 1, 2012, exempt private schools will neither have to file nor pay the MCTMT.
    • Savings for Self-Employed Individuals: The threshold above which self-employed individuals (including partners in partnerships and members of limited liability companies treated like partnerships) are subject to the MCTMT has been increased from $10,000 to $50,000 in net earnings from business activity carried on in the metropolitan commuter transportation district, per tax year. This change takes effect for any tax year beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2012.
    • Lower Tax Rates for Small Businesses: The payroll expense threshold above which an employer is subject to the MCTMT has been increased from $2,500 per quarter to $312,500 per quarter. The tax rate on smaller businesses has also been amended to provide for tax relief. The tax rate for employers whose quarterly payroll expense is between $312,500 and $375,000 has been decreased to 0.11 percent of payroll expense for that quarter; for employers whose quarterly payroll expense is over $375,000 but under $437,500, the quarterly rate will become 0.23 percent; and for employers whose quarterly payroll expense exceeds $437,500, the 0.34 percent tax rate will remain in effect. This change takes effect for calendar quarters beginning on or after April 1, 2012.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Danielle K. Ives and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert or the MCTMT, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • FinCEN’s ANPRM on Customer Due Diligence for Financial Institutions — Comments Due May 4

    FinCEN’s ANPRM on Customer Due Diligence for Financial Institutions — Comments Due May 4

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN’s ANPRM on Customer Due Diligence for Financial Institutions — Comments Due May 4

    March 9, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 5, 2012, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury”), issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (“ANPRM”) requesting input from various industries on customer due diligence (“CDD”) requirements for financial institutions. Financial institutions that would be covered by this CDD rule would include banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities (“covered financial institutions”). In addition, other industries such as money service businesses, including providers of prepaid access; insurance companies; casinos; dealers in precious metals, stones and jewels; non-bank mortgage lenders or originators; and other entities under FinCEN’s regulations, may also be subject to this proposal in the future, even though they may not all be subject to the same AML requirements. FinCEN has requested that comments on these issues be received on or before May 4, 2012.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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