Content Type: Article

  • Used Software: ECJ allows reselling Downloads

    ARTICLE

    Used Software: ECJ allows reselling Downloads

    July 3, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Ralf Weisserand Dr Claus Färber have authored this article on Used Software: ECJ allows reselling Downloads.

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    Dr. Claus Färber

    Counsel

    Munich

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 92

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 92

    July, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Trade Marks

    CJEU Dismisses Appeal Relating to Application to Register a Slogan as a Trade Mark
    In Smart Technologies ULC v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2012] C-311/11 P, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has dismissed an appeal against a decision by the EU General Court that upheld a finding by the Board of Appeal of the Office For Harmonization for the Internal Market that the slogan WIR MACHEN DAS BESONDERE EINFACH (German for “we make special (things) simple”) was devoid of distinctive character in respect of various computer-related goods.

    Advocate General Gives Opinion on “Genuine Use” of a Community Trade Mark
    Advocate General Sharpston delivered her opinion in Leno Merken BV v Hagelkruis Beheer BV C‑149/11 on 5 July 2012. The preliminary reference from the Dutch courts, better known as the ONEL/OMEL reference, sought clarification on the extent to which a Community trade mark (CTM) must be used in the Community for that use to be considered genuine use under Article 15(1) of the CTM Regulation.

    Patents

    Apple Smart Phone Patents Found Invalid by High Court of England and Wales
    In HTC Europe Ltd and another v Apple Corporation [2012] EWHC 1789 (Pat), on 4 July the High Court of England and Wales declared three Apple patents to be invalid: two patents cover aspects of touch-screen technology, including the “swipe to unlock” feature, and the third provides the ability to change languages for text messages. If they had been valid, they would have been infringed by the mobile phones produced by HTC. A fourth patent, which relates to manipulation of photographs on the screen by gestures, was held to be valid but not infringed.

    European Parliament Vote on EU Unitary Patent Law Postponed
    The European Parliament has postponed a planned vote on the unitary patent law it drafted jointly with the European Council. The delay has occurred because the Council made certain amendments to the proposed text of the draft law to limit the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

    Multiple Sclerosis Drug Patent Survives Lack of Technical Contribution and Ambiguity Attacks
    After a 13 day trial, featuring 11 expert witnesses, the validity of Yeda’s glatiramer acetate patent has been upheld by Mr Justice Arnold in Generics (t/a Mylan) v Yeda and Teva [2012] EWHC 1848 (Pat). This case considered interesting issues relating to the clarity of drafting patent specifications and reliance upon post-published evidence in proceedings.

    CJEU Clarification on Granting Interim Cross-Border Injunctions in Patent Cases
    The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled in Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV C 616/10 that the practice of granting cross-border injunctions in preliminary proceedings involving European patents where co-defendants are accused of the same infringement is not prohibited by rules on exclusive jurisdiction.

    Data Protection

    Article 29 Working Party Issues Opinion on Cloud Computing
    The Article 29 Working Party on 1 July 2012 adopted Opinion 05/2012 on cloud computing (WP 196) in which it reviewed the rights and obligations placed on various parties when processing personal data in the cloud. The Opinion considers the applicable principles for both controllers and processors from the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and the e-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC as amended).

    Copyright

    CJEU Confirms That Resale and Use of Used Software is Permissible Under European Copyright Law
    In Luxembourg on 3 July 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that the resale and use of used software is permissible under European copyright law. The CJEU found that, under the first sale doctrine, which is part of the Computer Program Directive (Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs), there is no difference between physical copies on a data carrier and digital copies distributed online. As the legitimate owner of the digital copy, a purchaser of used software is even allowed to download updates from the software vendor’s website.

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  • The Elusive Insurable Interest Requirement:  Are You Sure the Insured is Insured?

    The Elusive Insurable Interest Requirement: Are You Sure the Insured is Insured?

    ARTICLE

    The Elusive Insurable Interest Requirement: Are You Sure the Insured is Insured?

    Winter 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Caitlin Orr co-authored this piece exploring how to avoid pitfalls in an article for the Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal.

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  • Update on Reorganization Financing: Prepayment Premiums, Commitment Fees and Post-Bankruptcy Interest

    Update on Reorganization Financing: Prepayment Premiums, Commitment Fees and Post-Bankruptcy Interest

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Update on Reorganization Financing: Prepayment Premiums, Commitment Fees and Post-Bankruptcy Interest

    June 19, 2012

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Chapter 11 creditors’ committees and debtors continue to challenge lenders’ prepayment premiums, commitment fees and post-bankruptcy interest claims in reorganization cases. Nevertheless, courts regularly reject these challenges in well-reasoned decisions. This Alert focuses on two of these recent decisions: In re Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 2017952 (9th Cir. BAP June 5, 2012) (held, lenders’ commitment paid by chapter 11 debtors pursuant to court order not subject to “turnover”) and In re Madison 92nd Street Associates LLC, 2012 WL 1995129 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2012) (overruled debtor’s challenges to lender’s (a) prepayment premium and (b) calculation of post-petition, pendency interest).

    Commitment Fee Not Recoverable

    The debtors in Fleetwood Enterprises sought and obtained bankruptcy court approval of an interim debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing arrangement over the creditors’ committee’s opposition. Because the debtors proved without contradiction that the financing was the only credit available to fund their reorganization, the bankruptcy court granted their request under Bankruptcy Code § 364(c)(1). The committee did not complain about the reduced interest rate on the DIP financing, but did object strenuously to the up-front $2.4 million commitment fee, arguing that it should not be “earned on receipt.” Id., at *5. In particular, other than to pay the commitment fee, the debtors never ultimately drew on the available credit line because they had withdrawn their financing motion after the court had entered an interim financing order, relying instead on cash collateral. Id., at *4. The committee insisted, therefore, that lenders had received a “windfall.” 2012 WL 2017952, at *13., But the lenders’ counsel made it clear during the approval hearings that the financing was expressly contingent upon payment of the commitment fee (e.g., “no fee, no credit”). Id. The bankruptcy court received further evidence and heard testimony as to the absolute necessity for the financing in order to avoid a shutdown. Id.

    Committee’s Arguments: The committee later sought a turnover of the commitment fee, arguing that the debtors “received no discernable benefit in exchange for the $2.4 million paid to” the lender. Id., at *5. The committee also argued that the commitment fee was not entitled to an administrative expense priority because it was not “an actual and necessary expense of” the case, and that the order authorizing the commitment fee was subject to further review or modification. Id.

    Lenders’ Response: The lenders argued that (a) the court had “thoroughly considered” the commitment fee; and that (b) the undisputed evidence in the record showed that the commitment fee was an express “precondition to the Lenders’ agreement to extend financing.” Id. Although the bankruptcy court conceded the commitment fee “resulted in a windfall to Lenders,” it still denied the committee’s turnover motion, reasoning, among other things, that its earlier decision approving the commitment fee had been “final.” Id., at *6.

    Appellate Ruling: Affirming the bankruptcy court, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) stressed that the lower court had, after deliberation, authorized payment of the commitment fee. “[I]f an entity has previously obtained a bankruptcy court order authorizing it to retain the property in question, [Bankruptcy Code § ]542(a) will not require turnover of the property.” Id., at *7, quoting 5 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 542.02, at 542-9 (16th ed. 2011). Moreover, the committee never showed that the bankruptcy court’s “prior authorization [was] inappropriate for some legal or factual reason.” Id., at *8.

    First, “the bankruptcy court carefully reviewed the requirements of § 364 and the evidence used to support its [order] and concluded that Debtors needed the interim credit facility or risked going out of business; concluded that the DIP Credit Agreement provided the most viable lending package in comparison to other alternative credit facilities, if any; and concluded that Lenders had the financial means to perform under the DIP Credit Agreement . . . and did perform on the Closing Date after being paid the Commitment Fee . . . .” Id. Moreover, the bankruptcy court could not “remove a material part of an agreement over the objection of one of the parties and order the balance of the agreement enforced.” Id., at *9. Indeed, the “lenders’ good faith was not in question . . . .” Id.

    The BAP rejected the committee’s argument that the commitment fee was not entitled to an administrative expense priority because of a purported lack of a direct and substantial benefit to the estate. “While recognizing that § 364(b) requires a finding that the debt was an actual, necessary cost and expense of preserving the estate, § 364(c)(1), which grants priority over § 364(b) claims, does not contain such a requirement.” Id., at *10. Thus, a “claim that has been granted such a priority [under § 364(c)] is not . . . properly treated as an administrative expense, because it has priority over administrative expenses and permitted only if the debtor ‘is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable . . . as an administrative expense’ even though the plan of reorganization must provide for payment of the claim as a condition of confirmation.” Id., at *11, quoting 3 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 364.04[2](a), at 364-13) (16th ed. 2011).

    Prepayment Premium and Post-Petition Pendency Interest Allowed

    The bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York, in Madison 92nd Street Associates, supra, rejected (a) the debtor’s challenge to a $3.1 million prepayment premium and (b) the debtor’s demand for a post-petition, pendency interest rate on the lender’s foreclosure judgment at the federal judgment rate of approximately 0.2 percent, rather than the New York statutory rate of 9 percent. 2012 WL 1995129, at *1. The debtor had the right to prepay the loan only after the 36th month under a mortgage on the debtor’s hotel. Id. If the lender, however, had to accelerate the loan during the initial 36 months for any reason “other than casualty or condemnation,” the debtor agreed to pay a 5 percent prepayment premium on the outstanding balance of the loan. Id. The debtor did not dispute its default and the lender’s acceleration during the initial 36-month period. After the debtor’s default, the lender foreclosed in New York and ultimately obtained a consensual judgment on May 26, 2011. Id., at *2. The consensual judgment included the 5 percent prepayment premium. Id. Although the lender’s foreclosure sale was automatically stayed upon the filing of the debtor’s chapter 11 petition, the debtor sold its hotel under a confirmed reorganization plan, with the lender’s lien attaching to the sale proceeds. Id. “[C]ontending that the prepayment premium should be disallowed and the post-petition interest rate should be fixed at the federal judgment rate,” the debtor objected to the lender’s secured claim. Id.[1]

    No Relitigation of Consent Foreclosure Judgment: The court first held that debtor’s objection to the prepayment premium, a component of the lender’s judgment, is “barred under the doctrine of res judicata” because “a consent judgment has the same res judicata effect as a judgment on the merits.” Id. There was no dispute that the state court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment; the judgment included the 5 percent prepayment premium; the debtor was party to the state court foreclosure action; and the debtor had “expressly consented to the judgment.” Id.

    The debtor was not attempting to raise a “bankruptcy issue,” but argued instead “that the prepayment premium [was] unenforceable under non-bankruptcy law.” Id., at *3. It should have made that argument “before the state court,” reasoned the court. Id. Because “the debtor consented to the inclusion of the prepayment premium as part of the [State court foreclosure] Judgment,” it could not relitigate the issue in the bankruptcy court. Id.

    Prepayment Premiums Enforceable in New York: The court further noted that, in any event, “prepayment premiums are generally enforceable under the New York common law ‘rule of perfect tender in time.’ This rule prohibits the prepayment of the loan under the rationale that the lender has the absolute right to receive the bargained-for income stream over the life of the loan.” Id. Moreover, the loan agreements here clearly required “the payment of the prepayment premium even after default and acceleration,” effectively making it a “liquidated damages clause.” Id., at *4.

    No Penalty: The court similarly rejected the debtor’s characterization of the prepayment premium as an “unenforceable penalty.” Id. Relying on state law, the court noted the debtor’s failure to show that the lender’s damages were “readily ascertainable or that the premium was conspicuously disproportionate to” the lender’s losses when the parties entered into the loan agreement. Id., at *5. “The prepayment premium was designed to compensate [the lender] for the lost stream of interest payments. [The lender’s] damages would depend on future changes in interest rates, which were not readily ascertainable at the inception of the Loan Agreement. In addition, had the debtor actually prepaid the loan, [the lender] would at least have had the principal to invest elsewhere. However, the debtor did not pay the loan, and [the lender] lost the use of its money as well as its income stream.” Id., at *5. In short, the debtor provided “no persuasive justification for disturbing the bargain struck by the parties.” Id.

    New York Legal Interest Rate: The court further rejected the debtor’s attempt to impose the lower federal judgment rate of interest on the lender’s judgment. The lender was oversecured, and its right to post-petition pendency interest was governed by Bankruptcy Code § 506(b), which permits a lender to recover not only “interest on such claim,” but also “any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State statute . . . .” Id., at *5. Although § 506(b) does not establish an appropriate interest rate, most courts “have concluded that the appropriate rate should be the one provided in the parties’ agreement or for the applicable law under which the claim arose, the so-called contract rate of interest.” Id., at *6. When an agreement fixes a rate, “courts have recognized a rebuttable presumption that the contract rate applies post-petition, subject to adjustment based on equitable considerations.” Id.

    The debtor failed to rebut the presumptive “contract rate.” The lender was “not guilty of misconduct”; the statutory rate was not “a penalty”; the debtor was “liquidating,” and will require no “fresh start”; and according to the debtor’s own judicial admissions, it is unlikely that unsecured creditors would be prejudiced by the application of the New York statutory 9 percent rate of interest. Id., at *7. Finally, in the court’s view, the debtor “offered no justification for the use of the near-zero federal judgment rate as opposed to some other rate between the federal judgment rate and 9%.” Id., at *8. As the court stated, although “equitable principles play a role in the selection of the appropriate pendency interest rate under § 506(b), the ability to adjust the presumptive rate is quite limited, and in this case, missing.” Id.Accord, In re Urban Communicators PCS Ltd. P’ship, 394 B.R. 325, 338-340 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (when debtor solvent, courts reluctant to modify contract interest rate; no unfair windfall to equity; parties knowingly bargained for higher default rate; default rate not a penalty), citing Ruskin v. Griffiths, 269 F.2d 827, 832 (2d Cir. 1959); In re 785 Partners LLC, 470 B.R. 126, 134-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).


    Authored by Michael L. Cook and David M. Hillman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

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  • EEOC Issues New Guidance Regarding Applicants and Employees with Criminal Records

    EEOC Issues New Guidance Regarding Applicants and Employees with Criminal Records

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    EEOC Issues New Guidance Regarding Applicants and Employees with Criminal Records

    June 12, 2012

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    New guidance from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) provides that employment decisions based on criminal history may constitute employment discrimination and suggests that employers eliminate policies or practices that generally exclude people from employment based on criminal records. New York law has long limited the use of arrests, criminal charges and convictions in employment decisions. This Alert summarizes the EEOC’s guidance, revisits federal and New York state laws regarding background checks and permissible uses of criminal records in connection with employment decisions, and addresses how to comply simultaneously with the statutes and disclosure obligations imposed in federal securities regulations.

    EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions

    The EEOC Office of Legal Counsel issued Enforcement Guidance (“the Guidance”) on April 25, 2012 consolidating and updating its previous guidance regarding the use of arrest or conviction records in employment decisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The Guidance confirms what some courts and other guidance had concluded — that under some circumstances, use of an applicant’s or employee’s criminal history to make an employment decision may violate the prohibition against employment discrimination under Title VII.

    Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, but does not reference criminal history. The Guidance cites national data on criminal records showing that policies that exclude applicants from employment based on criminal history have a disparate impact on certain protected classes of individuals.

    The Guidance describes two ways an employer may defend employment decisions based on criminal history. First, there is no violation if the consideration of criminal history is job-related for the position in question and the employment decision is consistent with business necessity. To fall within this exclusion, either (a) the criminal conduct may validly exclude the applicant for the position in question under the EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5), meaning there is data or analysis about the relationship between the specific criminal conduct and specific work performance or behavior, or (b) the employer may develop a targeted screen. Targeted screening of the specific candidate and criminal history at issue involves an individualized assessment that must consider, at a minimum, the following factors: (1) the nature of the crime committed, (2) the time elapsed since the crime was committed, and (3) the nature of the job sought. The policy must provide for individual assessment of employees and applicants to determine whether it is job-related and consistent with business necessity. Failure to individually assess does not create a violation of Title VII in and of itself, but failure to do so increases the likelihood of a violation.

    The second defense is compliance with federal law. If federal law or regulations preclude hiring based on criminal history, then employers do not violate Title VII by making employment decisions based on such criminal history. For example, the National Child Protection Act of 1993, as amended by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, allows for federal criminal background checks of individuals who work for, own, or operate a business that provides care to the elderly or individuals with disabilities, as well as those who are responsible for the safety and well-being of children. The Guidance warns that an employer may not have such defense if it asserts that state and local laws and regulations prohibit the hiring. State and local laws and regulations are preempted by Title VII if they “purport to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.” If an employer’s exclusionary policy or practice is not job-related and consistent with business necessity, the fact that it was adopted to comply with a state or local law or regulation does not necessarily shield the employer from Title VII liability.

    The Guidance outlines the important distinction between arrest and conviction records. Arrests do not establish criminal conduct because they may not result in criminal charges and even once charged, the accused is innocent until proven guilty. Because arrests are not sufficient to establish criminal conduct, a policy or practice based on arrest alone is generally not job related or consistent with business necessity so as to fall within the first exception discussed above. New York employers also should be aware that the New York State Human Rights Law prohibits inquiry or adverse action based on an arrest or criminal accusation not then pending.

    According to the Guidance, a conviction is generally sufficient evidence of criminal conduct under most circumstances. An employer, therefore, may be able to make an employment decision based on conduct underlying a conviction if the conduct makes the individual unfit for the position without violating Title VII under the exception described above. New York employers, however, must be aware of the requirements of New York law described below on the use of criminal convictions in employment decisions. The Guidance also suggests that there may be reasons that an employer should not rely on evidence of a conviction for an employment decision (e.g., the fact that a significant number of state and federal criminal record databases include incomplete criminal records) and therefore the targeted screening of the individual applicant should take such factors into consideration.

    The Guidance’s Best Practices section suggests that employers should eliminate policies or practices that generally exclude people from employment based on criminal records. Instead, the Guidance suggests that employers should develop a narrowly tailored written policy with screening procedures and individualized assessments to fall within the exceptions described above. The EEOC also recommends training decision-makers, such as managers and hiring personnel, about Title VII and its prohibition on employment discrimination. These individuals should be advised that when asking questions about criminal records, they should limit inquiries to records for which exclusion would be job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. They should also be reminded to keep information about applicants’ and employees’ criminal records confidential.

    New York Laws Limiting Use of Criminal Background in Employment Decisions

    New York employers must also consider state laws restricting the use of criminal history in employment decisions. New York Executive Law Section 296 makes it unlawful to inquire about or take adverse employment action based upon a non-pending arrest or criminal accusation that was terminated in favor of an employee or applicant. The statute explicitly exempts inquiries required or permitted by statute. New York Correction Law Article 23-A governs how and when an employer can use a criminal conviction in determining whether to hire a new employee or take adverse action against an existing employee. Section 752 of Article 23-A prohibits denial of employment based on conviction for criminal offenses unless there is a direct relationship between the criminal offense and the job or an unreasonable risk to property. Section 753 of Article 23-A describes the factors an employer must consider in hiring decisions involving a conviction. For more information about Article 23-A and amendments to the New York General Business Law that increased protection for employees and prospective employees with criminal convictions, effective Feb. 1, 2009, please see our Nov. 20, 2008 Alert.

    Criminal Background Disclosure Requirements of Form ADV

    Employers that are registered as investment advisers, or that file as exempt reporting advisors with the Securities and Exchange Commission, are required to make inquiries of certain employees to ensure that their disclosures on Form ADV are accurate. Inquiries beyond the substantive scope of Form ADV, or made to individuals not covered by Form ADV, could potentially subject employers to liability under Title VII or New York law as described above. If an inquiry pursuant to Form ADV uncovers a criminal conviction, the employer should perform the individualized assessment discussed above (and also set forth in the EEOC Guidance) before taking adverse employment action, to fall within the EEOC’s defense for targeted screening and the exception under New York Corrections Law for crimes with a direct relationship to the job.

    Additional Background Check Requirements Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act

    Employers must also be cognizant of the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which regulates how background history is obtained and used. Under the FCRA, employers that use investigative services must obtain an employee’s written consent before seeking an employee’s credit report, investigative consumer reports (which could include background checks), or conducting background checks. Employers who decide not to hire someone or to take adverse action against an employee based on information obtained in these reports must provide a copy of the report and let the applicant or employee know of his or her right to challenge the report under the FCRA. Information obtained from the applicant or employee during this process should be considered when making employment decisions.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Marc E. Elovitz, Scott A. Gold and Emma S. Hansen.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 91

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 91

    June, 2012

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Privacy

    European Working Party Provides Opinion on Exemptions to Cookie Consent
    The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has released an opinion on the exemptions to the requirement to obtain consent prior to placing small data files (cookies) on computers of website users, arising from Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC, as amended by the Citizen’s Rights Directive (2009/136/EC)).

    General

    Article 5(3): Jurisdiction Should not be Allowed for Declarations of Non-Liability in Tort
    In Folien Fischer AG and another v RITRAMA SpA [2012] C-133/11, Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen gave the opinion that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation does not confer jurisdiction where an alleged wrongdoer brings an action for a declaration that the alleged victim has no claim in tort.

    Initiative on a Clean and Open Internet
    The European Commission launched on 4 June 2012 a public consultation on procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content, such as racist content, child abuse content or phishing content, hosted by online intermediaries.

    Trade Marks

    Changes in Economic Behaviour Not Necessary to Prove Detriment to the Distinctive Character of a Trade Mark
    In Environmental Manufacturing LLP v Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market [2012] T-570/10, the Court of Justice of the European Union has held that a trade mark owner does not need to prove a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or services for which their mark was registered in order to show detriment to the distinctive character of the mark under Article 8(5) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation (207/2009/EC).

    CJEU Rules on Use of Nice Classification Headings in Trade Mark Applications
    In its ruling in Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys v Registrar of Trade Marks [2012] C-307/10, the Court of Justice of the European Union has placed the burden on the applicant to ensure that goods and services included in a trade mark application are listed precisely and clearly enough to enable authorities and traders to determine, on the sole basis of that list, the scope of the trade mark rights.

    Earlier National Trade Marks Must Have Distinctive Character in Opposition Proceedings
    In Formula One Licensing v OHIM P-196/11 P, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that the General Court was wrong to determine that an earlier national trade mark registration lacked distinctive character in opposition proceedings. The validity of an earlier national trade mark can only be considered in national cancellation proceedings.

    Patents

    Wound Dressing Patent Lives to Fight Another Day
    In Smith & Nephew Plc v Convatec Technologies Inc. [2012] EWHC 1602 (Pat), the High Court of England and Wales has permitted the amendment of a patent for a method of preparing a light-stabilised form of silver as an antimicrobial material for use in wound dressings and medical devices, and held the amended patent to be valid.

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  • SEC and CFTC Publish Entity Rule Definitions: Impact on Private Investment Funds

    SEC and CFTC Publish Entity Rule Definitions: Impact on Private Investment Funds

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC and CFTC Publish Entity Rule Definitions: Impact on Private Investment Funds

    May 22, 2012

    Read time: 16 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Final Rule Related to Dealer, Major Participant and Eligible Contract Participant Published

    On April 27, 2012, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” and, together with the CFTC, the “Agencies”) published their joint final “entity definitions” rule (the “Entity Rule”) in a release (the “Entity Rule Release”) defining the terms “Swap Dealer” and “Security-Based Swap Dealer” (“SBS Dealer” and, together with Swap Dealer, “SD”), “Major Swap Participant” and “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” (together, “MSP”) and “Eligible Contract Participant” (“ECP”).[1] The final rules related to the product definitions of “swap” and “security-based swap” are expected to be published by the Agencies in the coming months. The Entity Rule together with the pending product definitions are important because effective dates of many of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) implementing regulations are keyed off of the finalization of the definitions. SD and MSP registration will not be required until 60 days after the product definitions are finalized. The changes to the ECP definition will be effective on Dec. 31, 2012.

    Impact of the Entity Definitions on Private Investment Funds

    Most private investment funds are not expected to fall into the definitions of SD or MSP and therefore are not likely to be directly subject to the Entity Rule related to these definitions.[2] However, private investment funds will be indirectly affected because of the obligations of SDs, for example, to request additional collateral from their fund counterparties. The Agencies also indicated they will issue separate releases addressing the application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank to non-U.S. persons.

    Definitions of “Swap Dealer” and “Security-Based Swap Dealer”

    Most private investment funds are not likely to be SDs and therefore will not be subject to the various SD requirements. The statutory term SD is defined in Dodd-Frank as any person who: (i) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in swaps; (iii) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account; or (iv) engages in activity causing itself to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps. If an entity satisfies any of the prongs of the definition, it will be an SD. However, there is a statutory exclusion for swap activities that are not part of “a regular business” and a de minimis exemption.

    The Entity Rule and the Entity Rule Release provide interpretive guidance to the statutory framework. The guidance makes clear that the Agencies are taking a policy-based approach to determining which entities are covered as SDs, and there are no bright-line tests. In general, application of the framework first requires review of the facts and circumstances of each entity, and if any of the swap dealer provisions are satisfied, the second step is to review whether the entity satisfies one of the specified exemptions.

    The facts and circumstances test will enable the Agencies to apply a policy-based approach. The Entity Rule provides that the traditional “dealer-trader” distinction (used in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) with respect to broker-dealers) is an appropriate set of principles to apply in determining what entities should be treated as SDs, although the differences between the swap market and the market for securities (other than security-based swaps) prevent the Agencies from applying the traditional “trader-dealer distinction” in full. Provisions of the Entity Rule that are relevant to the SD analysis include whether the entity (i) provides liquidity by accommodating demand for or facilitating interest in swaps; (ii) has clientele and actively advertises or solicits clients; (iii) acts as a market maker on an organized exchange or trading system; and (iv) helps to set pricing, among other provisions. Private investment funds would not generally satisfy these requirements. The fact that an entity is “commonly known in the trade as a dealer or a market maker” or “holds itself out as a dealer” also would be indicia of SD qualification. One factor mentioned in the Entity Rule Release, for example, is that any entity which is a primary member of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association — which excludes entities that participate in derivative transactions solely for the purposes of asset management — may be an SD. Also outlined by the Entity Rule as a factor to consider is whether an SD “makes a market in swaps” which means that it is an entity that is “routinely standing ready to enter into swaps at the request or demand of a counterparty” and that is compensated through spreads or fees and not for the change in the value of the swaps it enters into.

    As noted above, there is a statutory exception for activities that are not part of “a regular business.”[3] (The Agencies state that the phrases “ordinary course of business” and “a regular business” are “essentially synonymous.”) The Entity Rule Release provides that “a regular business” includes: (i) entering into a swap for the purpose of satisfying the business or risk management needs of the counterparty (as opposed to entering into swaps to accommodate one’s own demand or desire to participate in a particular market); (ii) maintaining a separate profit and loss statement reflecting the results of swap activity or treating swap activity as a separate profit center; or (iii) having staff and resources allocated to dealer-type activities with counterparties, including credit analysis, customer onboarding, and confirmation generation, among other factors. These criteria generally do not cover private investment funds, but note that the Agencies declined to provide any categorical exemptions for private investment funds or any other type of business from coverage as an SD.

    If an entity satisfies the SD definition, the entity would not be an SD if it were to satisfy the de minimis exemption. The Entity Rule Release provides that any entity that engages in a de minimis quantity of dealing in connection with swaps will not have to register as an SD. There is a phase-in period for application of the de minimis threshold which would allow the Agencies to study the markets as they evolve in the new regulatory framework.

    During the phase-in period, the threshold for SDs will initially be $8 billion for both swaps and security-based swaps; provided that security-based swaps that are not credit default swaps will have a threshold of $400 million. The Agencies believe that for special entities — such as municipalities, endowments and employee benefit plans — a $25 million gross notional threshold is appropriate (there is no phase-in period). For swaps and security-based swaps subject to a phase-in period, over the course of the phase-in period, the threshold would be reduced from $8 billion to $3 billion for swaps and security-based swaps that are credit default swaps; security-based swaps that are not credit default swaps will have a threshold reduced from $400 million to $150 million. The de minimis exemption takes into account the notional amount of an entity’s swap or security-based swap positions (not taking into account any netting or offsetting positions) over the prior 12 months.

    The phase-in will not be longer than five years. The Agencies will each conduct a study regarding the appropriate threshold for SD registration. The CFTC will consider market data addressing swap dealing activity over a period of approximately two years. It will produce a report which is required to be completed by no later than 30 months following the date that a swap data repository first receives swap data under the CFTC’s regulations and the report will be published for public comment. The SEC will also produce a report required to be completed by no later than three years following a “data collection initiation date” that is the later of: the last compliance date of the registration and regulatory requirements for SBS Dealers under the Exchange Act or the first date on which compliance with the trade-by-trade reporting rules for credit-related and equity-related security-based swaps to a registered security-based swap data repository is required. The Entity Rules provide that nine months after publication of the report, each of the CFTC and the SEC may promulgate an order that the phase-in period will end as of the date set forth in that order, or issue for public comment a notice of proposed rulemaking to modify the de minimis threshold. The final rules also provide that each Agency may change the requirements of the de minimis threshold by rule or regulation if data suggests that different de minimis thresholds would be appropriate.

    The SD definition provides that the Agencies may designate an entity as a dealer for one type, class or category of swap or security-based swap, or specified swap or security-based swap activities, without the entity being considered a dealer for other types, classes, categories or activities.

    Definitions of “Major Swap Participant” and “Major Security Based Swap Participant”

    Private investment funds generally are not likely to fall within the objective numerical criteria of the definition of MSP. The Entity Rule Release states that the number of persons covered by the definition of “major swap participant” is estimated to be six or fewer and the number of “security-based swap participants” is estimated to be fewer than five and, the Entity Rule Release continues, “in actuality, may be zero.”

    A private investment fund would be considered an MSP if it meets any one of the following tests:

    (i) Maintains a “substantial position” in any of the major swap categories, excluding positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk and positions maintained by certain employee benefit plans for hedging or mitigating risks in the operation of the plan. “Substantial position” is determined by using objective numerical criteria. The tests adopted by the Agencies account for both current uncollateralized exposure and potential future exposure. In general, uncollateralized exposure is the current net exposure to each counterparty, obtained by marking-to-market positions using industry standard practices, and subtracting the value of the collateral the entity has posted in these positions. The thresholds adopted for the first test are the daily average current uncollateralized exposure in a calendar quarter of $1 billion in the applicable “major”[4] category (except that the threshold for the rate swap category is $3 billion);

    (ii) Holds outstanding swaps which create “substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States banking system or financial markets.” The determination of a “substantial counterparty exposure” is for both current uncollateralized exposure (as discussed above, but instead of “major” categories, the uncollateralized exposure for all the entity’s positions) and the potential future exposure associated with an entity’s positions. In general, potential future exposure is calculated based upon risk factors; for example, the duration of the position, whether there are daily marks and whether the position is cleared, among other factors, are all taken into account. The thresholds adopted for the second test are $2 billion in daily average current uncollateralized exposure plus potential future exposure in the applicable major category of swap or security-based swap (except that the threshold for the rate swap category is $6 billion); or

    (iii) Is a “financial entity” that is “highly leveraged relative to the amount of capital such entity holds and that is not subject to capital requirements established by an appropriate Federal banking agency” and that maintains a “substantial position” in any of the major swap categories.

    With respect to the MSP analysis for beneficial owners of managed swap and security-based swap positions, the Entity Rule Release states that the analysis relates to the where the risk associated with those positions resides. For example, if the counterparties to a swap or security-based swap position within a managed account have recourse only to the assets of that account in the event of default — and lack recourse to the other assets of the beneficial owners — the beneficial owner would not have to count those swaps and security-based swaps for their MSP analysis.[5]

    The final rules provide that if an entity meets the criteria for qualifying as a MSP, but does not exceed the relevant threshold by more than 20 percent in a particular quarter, it will not have to register unless at the end of the next fiscal quarter, the entity exceeds the related threshold.

    The Agencies acknowledged that only a limited number of entities would have positions with sufficient size to qualify them as an MSP and commenters expressed concern about the costs and burdens associated with performing the MSP calculations on a daily basis, particularly given the complexity of the calculations. Therefore, the Agencies developed three safe harbors. The first safe harbor does not require the MSP calculations to be performed by an entity. An entity will not be an MSP and not have to perform calculations if: (i) the express terms of an entity’s arrangements relating to swaps and security-based swaps with its counterparties at no time would permit the entity to maintain a total uncollateralized exposure of more than $100 million to all such counterparties, including any exposure that may result from the application of thresholds or minimum transfer amounts established by credit support annexes or similar arrangements; and (ii) the person does not maintain notional swap or security-based swap positions of more than $2 billion in any major category of swaps or security-based swaps, or more than $4 billion in aggregate. The second and third safe harbors require the same calculations to be performed, but on a less frequent basis than daily.

    Changes to the ECP Definition

    Dodd-Frank imposes a new requirement that all swaps and security-based swaps with non-eligible contract participants (“ECPs”) must be executed on a designated market or securities exchange, that a registration statement be in effect for any security-based swap entered into with a non-ECP and that entities that deal in securities-based swaps with non-ECPs must register with the SEC as broker dealers. Dodd-Frank revised the definition of ECP, and the Entity Rule and Entity Rule Release provide further definition and guidance. The term ECP has also been modified. Prior to Dodd-Frank, a commodity pool was an ECP it if had $5 million in total assets, regardless of whether all of the participants in the commodity pool were ECPs. For retail foreign exchange transactions, Dodd-Frank imposes a requirement that all direct participants in commodity pools would need to be ECPs (a look-through provision). This is important because commodity pools with direct participants that are not ECPs would be permitted to enter into retail foreign exchange transactions only in specific enumerated circumstances.

    There is a carve-out to the look-through provision, however. The participant in the commodity pool that is a direct participant in the transaction-level commodity pool will not be considered for purposes of the ECP test unless the transaction-level commodity pool, any commodity pool holding a direct or indirect interest in such commodity pool, or any commodity pool in which such transaction-level commodity pool holds a direct or indirect interest, was put in place to evade the restrictions placed on non-ECPs.

    If a private investment fund wishes to take advantage of the $5 million ECP test, it has certain responsibilities to ensure that its investors are ECPs themselves. All investors in the fund will have to certify initially and at the time of each investment that it is an ECP. A private investment fund may rely on this representation, so long as it has a reasonable basis to do so. If an investor loses its ECP status, the CFTC provides a private fund with time to remedy the situation, so long as it is done in as timely a manner as possible.

    The CFTC also provides private investment funds with a safe harbor which would not require private investment funds to look through to their investors. A commodity pool that enters into a retail forex transaction does not have to look through to its investors to confirm ECP status if: (i) the pool is not formed to evade this new definition; (ii) the pool has more than $10 million in total assets; and (iii) the pool is formed and operated either by a registered commodity pool operator (“CPO”) or a CPO that qualifies for the de minimis 4.13(a)(3) exemption. Given the recent repeal of Rule 4.13(a)(4) by the CFTC and the inclusion of swaps in the definition of “commodity interests,” more private investment fund managers will be required to register as a CPO. The adopting Entity Rule Release also provides that offshore commodity pools that have only non-U.S. persons are automatically considered ECPs for purposes of retail forex transactions.

    Conclusion

    Sixty days after the publication of the product definitions, SDs and MSPs will be required to register. In addition, if an entity passes the SD threshold, the entity must register within a two-month period. The changes to the ECP definition will be effective on Dec. 31, 2012 and compliance with the retail forex look-through is Dec. 31, 2012.

    Authored by Craig Stein and Kristin Boggiano.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The rule also provides an interim final rule related to activities that qualify as “hedging,” for which the Agencies seek additional comments. The definition of “hedging” is not discussed in this Alert because it is not generally relevant to private investment funds.

    [2] Although there is no categorical exemption for private investment fund managers, the Entity Rule applies to the entity actually entering into the swaps and swaps entered into by the private investment funds managed by the manager are not attributed to the manager. Therefore, private investment fund managers which do not themselves enter into swaps should not be subject to registration under the Entity Rule.

    [3] There are other exclusions not discussed in this Alert because they are unlikely to be relevant to private investment funds, such as: (i) exclusions for entities that are floor traders; (ii) exclusions for insured depository institutions that originate loans with customers; (iii) exclusion for inter-affiliate swaps and security-based swaps; and (iv) exclusions for cooperatives that enter into swaps or security-based swaps with their members, among others.

    [4] The “major” categories are, with respect to swaps: rate swaps, credit swaps, equity swaps and other commodity swaps and, with respect to security-based swaps: debt security-based swaps and “other” security-based swaps.

    [5] The Entity Rule Release provides that the swaps or security-based swaps of the client accounts managed by private investment fund managers do not need to be considered when determining whether private investment fund managers are MSPs.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Eleventh Circuit Reverses TOUSA District Court Decision and Holds Lenders Liable for Fraudulent Transfer

    Eleventh Circuit Reverses TOUSA District Court Decision and Holds Lenders Liable for Fraudulent Transfer

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eleventh Circuit Reverses TOUSA District Court Decision and Holds Lenders Liable for Fraudulent Transfer

    May 21, 2012

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on May 15, 2012, reversed a district court’s February 2011 decision that lenders were not liable on a fraudulent transfer claim. In re TOUSA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 (11th Cir. 5/15/12).[1] It rejected the district court’s finding that corporate subsidiaries had received “reasonably equivalent value” when they encumbered their assets to secure a loan made to them and their corporate parent. Agreeing with the bankruptcy court’s earlier 2009 decision, the Court of Appeals held that the “bankruptcy court did not clearly err . . . [T]he Subsidiaries did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the liens” they had granted to the so-called “Term Lenders.” Id., at *4. Also, reasoned the court, “the bankruptcy court correctly ruled that the [defendant] Transeastern Lenders [whose loan was repaid] were entities ‘for whose benefit’ the liens were transferred,” thus making them liable to pay the value of the liens, roughly $403 million.[2] Id.

    Relevance

    TOUSA is not the typical upstream guaranty fraudulent transfer case. It essentially holds that a secured “rescue loan” to help a troubled company avoid bankruptcy will probably not constitute reasonably equivalent value: “The opportunity to avoid bankruptcy does not free a company to pay any price or bear any burden.” Id., at *39. Even more provocative was the court’s casual warning to lenders generally: ” . . . every creditor must exercise some diligence when receiving payment from a struggling debtor [and] when it is being repaid hundreds of millions of dollars by someone other than its debtor.” Id., at *46. With no supporting authority, the court ignored the district court’s reliance on case law “generally caution[ing] against imposing exhaustive duties to investigate upon banks and other creditors.” 444 B.R. 613, 675 (S.D. Fla. 2011), citing N.Y. Assets Realization Co. v. McKinnon, 209 F. 791, 793 (2d Cir. 1913) (“It would be an exceeding great hardship on the debtor if the creditor had the right to refuse to accept payment of the debt after it was due . . . .”); In re Presidential Corp., 180 B.R. 233, 239 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (“A party who receives a subsequent transfer . . . should not be required to investigate the source of the deposits [or] the source of the funds.”).

    Facts

    TOUSA, Inc. (the “Parent”) held a 50 percent equity stake in a joint venture funded by the “Transeastern Lenders” with $675 million in loans, and had guaranteed repayment of the loans. When the joint venture defaulted, the Transeastern Lenders sued the Parent on its guaranty (the “JV Litigation”) for $2 billion. Id., at *6. To settle the JV Litigation, the Parent paid $421 million to the Transeastern Lenders on July 31, 2007 (the “Settlement Payment”). Id.

    The Parent raised $500 million of new term loans (“New Loans”) from a group of lenders (the “Term Lenders”) to fund the settlement. Id., at *6-7. Some of the Parent’s Subsidiaries were co-borrowers under the New Loans, securing their obligations with liens on their assets. Id. The Parent used the New Loan proceeds from the Term Lenders to repay the Transeastern Lenders a reduced amount ($421 million instead of the original $675 million loaned). Id., at *7. The Subsidiaries had not been liable to the Transeastern Lenders, nor were they defendants in the JV Litigation, and they received none of the Term Loan proceeds. Six months after the closing of the New Loans, on January 29, 2008, the Parent and the Subsidiaries filed Chapter 11 petitions. Id. The creditors’ committee, on behalf of the Subsidiaries, sued the Transeastern Lenders and the Term Lenders in the bankruptcy court, claiming, among other things, that the Term Lenders’ liens on the assets of the Subsidiaries were fraudulent transfers because of (a) the insolvency or (b) undercapitalization of the Subsidiaries, and (c) the failure of the Subsidiaries to receive “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the transfer of the liens. Id., at *8. The parties had conceded the insolvency of the Subsidiaries. Id., at 33.

    The bankruptcy court avoided as fraudulent transfers (a) the obligations incurred by the Subsidiaries to the Term Lenders; (b) the liens on the assets of the Subsidiaries granted to the Term Lenders to secure the New Loans, and (c) directed recovery of, among other things, $403 million plus interest from the Transeastern Lenders as the entities for whose benefit the transfers were made Id., at *10. Only the bankruptcy court’s fraudulent transfer money judgment for $403 million against the Transeastern Lenders was the subject of the district court’s 2011 ruling. But “[b]ecause the district court ruled on issues . . . central to the separate appeals of the [Term] Lenders, the district court allowed [them] to intervene in this appeal . . . ” Id., at *31. Thus, the Term Lenders’ liens will probably be invalidated on remand.

    Bankruptcy Court’s Fact Findings Not Clearly Erroneous; Subsidiaries Received No Reasonably Equivalent Value

    The Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy court’s fact findings were supported by the record, were not “clearly erroneous,” and should not have been reversed by the district court. Id., at *32-40. Under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B), because of the admitted insolvency of the Subsidiaries, the plaintiff committee only had to prove that they “received less than . . . reasonably equivalent value in exchange for” granting liens on their assets.

    The bankruptcy court held that the Subsidiaries did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” when they granted liens on their assets to secure their obligations to the Term Lenders. The dispute in the lower courts was whether indirect economic benefits (e.g., avoidance of bankruptcy by the Subsidiaries) constituted “value” and, if so, whether that value was reasonably equivalent to the obligations incurred by the Subsidiaries.

    Declining to adopt either lower court’s definition of “value,” the Court of Appeals instead deferred to the bankruptcy court’s reasoning. Even if the Subsidiaries received some value in the form of indirect economic benefits in the 2007 settlement, they failed to receive “reasonably equivalent value” for the $403 million in obligations that they incurred. Id., at *34, *37.

    The Transeastern Lenders and Term Lenders argued that the Subsidiaries had benefited from the 2007 transaction by avoiding an earlier bankruptcy. Id., at *35-36. According to the court, however, “even assuming that all of the TOUSA entities would have spiraled immediately into bankruptcy without the July 31 Transaction, the Transaction was still a more harmful option.” Id., at 37 quoting In re TOUSA, 422 B.R. 783, 847 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). Moreover, reasoned the Court of Appeals, the evidence supported a finding that the Subsidiaries’ bankruptcy filing was “inevitable.” Id., at *37-39. Prior to the July 31 transaction, TOUSA’s officers had expressed grave concerns about taking on more debt given the severe housing market decline. Id., at *39. Based on the circumstances at the time the transaction was contemplated, there was no chance that the 2007 transaction would generate a positive return. Id., at *40. Therefore, any “benefits to the . . . Subsidiaries were not close to being reasonably equivalent in value to the $403 million of obligations . . . they incurred.” Id., at *37.

    The Transeastern Lenders Received Most of the Loan Proceeds

    Once the liens were avoided, Section 550(A)(1) allows the recovery of property or its value from the initial transferee or “an entity for whose benefit such transfer was made (a “Transfer Beneficiary”).” The bankruptcy court held that the Transeastern Lenders were Transfer Beneficiaries because the loan transaction was intended for the benefit of Transeastern Lenders. The Transeastern Lenders argued that they were not Transfer Beneficiaries of the initial transfer (i.e., grant of liens), but were instead subsequent transferees of the loan proceeds. The distinction between Transfer Beneficiary liability and subsequent transferee liability was critical because only a subsequent transferee can avail itself of a good faith defense.

    Relying on the language of Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1), the Court of Appeals agreed with the bankruptcy court “that the Transeastern Lenders were ‘entities for whose benefit’ the liens were transferred.” Id., at *40-46. In other words, the “Transeastern Lenders directly received the benefit of the [New Loans] and the Transaction was undertaken with the unambiguous intent that they would do so.” Id., at *26, quoting In re TOUSA, 422 B.R. at 870.

    The court likened the facts here to another Eleventh Circuit case, In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart, 845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir. 1988), (held, creditor liable for payment received from bank on letter of credit when debtor had given bank collateral to secure its reimbursement obligation to bank; entire transaction intended to benefit creditor). Here, the Subsidiaries granted liens to the Term Lenders to secure the payment to the Transeastern Lenders. Id., at *43. Thus, the Transeastern Lenders were entities for whose benefit the Subsidiaries’ pledges were made under Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1). Id.

    Arguing as subsequent transferees, the Transeastern Lenders asserted the good faith defense under Bankruptcy Code § 550(b). According to the Court of Appeals, however, the loan documentation showed that when the Subsidiaries granted liens to the Term Lenders, the loan proceeds went through a conduit entity directly to the Transeastern Lenders, but not through the Parent. Id., at *44. The Transeastern Lenders, in the court’s view, should have questioned the source of the payment, exercised “some diligence,” and apparently should have rejected payment. Id., at *46.

    Remedies To Be Determined On Remand

    The bankruptcy court had avoided the subsidiaries’ grant of liens, and had directed the return of $403 million from the Transeastern Lenders. It also imposed damages and ordered the disgorgement of professional fees. The Eleventh Circuit directed the District Court to resolve, in the first instance, “the remedies ordered by the bankruptcy court,” plus “matters of judicial assignment and consolidation . . . .” Id., at *49. The parties had sought different judges on remand. These matters, according to the Court of Appeals, were “not ripe for our review.” Id., at *46.

    The litigation will continue on remand. But the lenders here have an uphill fight.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and David M. Hillman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See court decision.

    [2] The bankruptcy court “credited the expert opinion testimony of an accountant who had calculated that the Conveying Subsidiaries had incurred $403 million of obligations when they granted liens to help secure $500 million of loans” from the Term Lenders. Id. at *13.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Loan Market Association Updates European Secondary Trading Documentation

    Loan Market Association Updates European Secondary Trading Documentation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Loan Market Association Updates European Secondary Trading Documentation

    May 21, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Effective for trades entered into on or after 14 May 2012, the Loan Market Association (“LMA”) amended certain secondary trading documentation relating to (1) the treatment of delayed settlement compensation and (2) the payment of transfer fees in a bank debt transfer.

    The revisions made reflect changes to certain default positions under the LMA regime:

    1. The incorporation of Delayed Settlement Compensation (“DSC”) in a bank debt trade is now automatic unless specifically excluded by the trading parties at time of trade. This is in contrast to the previous position of DSC, which required its incorporation to be specifically agreed to between a buyer and a seller. The inclusion of DSC is a commercial arrangement between the parties, structured to put them in the same economic position they would have been in vis-à-vis the bank debt had their trade settled within T+10 for par trade transactions and T+20 for distressed trade transactions.
    2.  Unless agreed otherwise, the payment of any transfer fees due in the context of a bank debt transfer will now be shared equally between buyer and seller. Additionally, if a buyer or seller allocates a trade to more than one entity, the relevant counterparty will only be responsible for payment of half of one fee. This is a change from the previous position which allowed parties to allocate the economic costs between themselves, with the buyer responsible for the administrative payment of the fee to the agent.

    The LMA has also revised some of the terminology in its Netting Agreements, Termination and Transfer Agreements and Termination Agreements, though this does not effect any substantive change to the structure of the documentation to be executed, or the process to be undertaken, by parties in any of these transactions.

    A notable omission from the recent revisions to the secondary trading documentation is any incorporation of the principles set out under the “LMA Transparency Guidelines,” originally released by the LMA in June 2011. The LMA Transparency Guidelines differentiate between different levels of confidential information a party receives in the context of being a bank debt lender to a particular borrower, and sets out a number of best practice guidelines to which parties to a bank debt transaction should adhere. At the time of its release, the LMA stated that it would contemplate incorporating certain principles set out in the LMA Transparency Guidelines into future secondary trading documentation, where applicable. Many secondary loan market participants view these guidelines unfavourably and the Alternative Investment Management Association circulated a letter to the LMA in March 2012 outlining concerns about the impact these guidelines could have on future lending and trading liquidity. Therefore, the LMA’s decision not to include any language in its secondary trading documentation incorporating the guidelines may be seen as a positive result by many market participants. There is no indication at this time when or if the LMA will update its secondary trading documentation further to incorporate such guidelines.

    For a comprehensive discussion of the LMA Transparency Guidelines and the treatment of bank debt as an asset class in the UK, please access our 2 May 2012 webinar, “European Distressed Debt and Claims Trading — Spotlight on Compliance and Regulatory Issues.”

    Authored by David J. Karp and Roxanne Yanofsky.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • New York State Education Department Releases Guidance to Help Schools Comply with the Dignity Act

    New York State Education Department Releases Guidance to Help Schools Comply with the Dignity Act

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York State Education Department Releases Guidance to Help Schools Comply with the Dignity Act

    May 16, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In November 2010, we alerted you to the passage of the Dignity for All Students Act (the “Dignity Act”), an act amending the New York State Education Law to provide that no student shall be subjected to “harassment” by employees or students on school property or at a school function. The Dignity Act, which takes effect on July 1, 2012, requires school districts to, in part, revise their codes of conduct and adopt policies intended to create a school environment free from harassment and discrimination.

    The Dignity Act, and the implementing regulations of the Commissioner of Education, do not apply to private, religious or denominational institutions. Nonetheless, we advise such schools to review the Dignity Act, the regulations and the Guidance (described below) in addressing bullying and cyberbullying, and in crafting policies and codes of conduct.

    In order to implement the Dignity Act, the Board of Regents, on March 12, 2012, approved amendments to the Commissioner of Education’s Regulations. Section 100.2(l)[1] is amended to require school district codes of conduct to include:

    • Provisions prohibiting discrimination and harassment against any student by employees or students on school property or at a school function that creates a hostile environment by conduct, with or without physical contact and/or by verbal threats, intimidation or abuse, or such a severe nature that: (1) has or would have the effect of unreasonably and substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance, opportunities or benefits, or mental, emotional and/or physical well-being; or (2) reasonably causes or would reasonably be expected to cause a student to fear for his or her physical safety. Such conduct shall include, but is not limited to, threats, intimidation or abuse based on a person’s actual or perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group, religion, religious practices, disability, sexual orientation, gender or sex;
    • Provisions for responding to such acts of discrimination or harassment against students by employees or students on school property or at a school function;
    • A bill of rights and responsibilities of students which focuses upon positive student behavior and a safe and supportive school climate, which shall be written in plain language, publicized and explained in an age-appropriate manner to all students on an annual basis; and
    • Guidelines and programs for in-service education programs for all district staff members to ensure effective implementation of school policy on school conduct and discipline, including but not limited to, guidelines on promoting a safe and supporting school climate while discouraging, among other things, discrimination or harassment against students by students and/or school employees, and including safe and supportive school-climate concepts in the curriculum and classroom.

    The Board of Regents also approved an amendment of section 100.2(c) of the Commissioner’s Regulations to require “for all public school students, other than students in charter schools, instruction in civility, citizenship and character education as required by section 801-a of the Education Law, including, but not limited to, awareness and sensitivity to discrimination or harassment and civility in the relations of people of different races, weights, national origins, ethnic groups, religions, religious practices, mental or physical abilities, sexual orientations, genders, and sexes.”

    On April 10, 2012, the New York State Education Department and the Dignity Act Local Policy and Implementation Task Force released Dignity Act Guidance (the “Guidance”) to help school districts in updating their codes of conducts in accordance with the Act and its implementing regulations described above. The Guidance, among other things, sets forth statutory definitions that should be included in updated codes of conduct, provides information on a Dignity Act Coordinator and reporting mechanisms, and suggests individual remedial measures and school-wide or environmental remediation strategies that may be included in a code of conduct.

    A copy of the Guidance is available at: p12.nysed.gov/dignityact/documents/DASACodeofConductFinal44-1.pdf.


    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

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    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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