Content Type: Article

  • CFTC Publishes Final Rule on Collateral Segregation for Cleared Swaps

    CFTC Publishes Final Rule on Collateral Segregation for Cleared Swaps

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFTC Publishes Final Rule on Collateral Segregation for Cleared Swaps

    March 8, 2012

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) issued its final rules requiring futures commission merchants (“FCMs”) and derivatives clearing organizations (“DCOs”) to segregate collateral posted by customers with respect to cleared swaps (the “Collateral Rules”) pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).[1] The CFTC adopted the legal segregation with operational commingling model (the “LSOC Model”), which (1) requires FCMs and DCOs to segregate cleared swap customers’ collateral on their books and records, and prohibits them from commingling customer collateral with their own funds, but permits FCMs and DCOs to commingle customer collateral in accounts with other cleared swap customers; and (2) restricts a DCO’s ability to use non-defaulting customers’ collateral to cover a defaulting customer’s obligations in the event that a cleared swap customer defaults on its obligations to an FCM which, in turn, defaults on its obligations to the DCO (a “double default”), thereby reducing “fellow-customer risk” (i.e., the risk that a DCO would need to access the collateral of non-defaulting customers to cure an FCM default).

    Private investment fund managers, and the funds that they manage, should be aware of the Collateral Rules because they impact the fellow-customer, operational and investment risks to their collateral. In addition, the Collateral Rules affect the costs of entering into cleared swap transactions. The effective date of the Collateral Rules will be April 9, 2012. All parties, including private fund managers, must comply with the Collateral Rules by Nov. 8, 2012. While implementation may involve considerable operational changes at DCOs and FCMs, it is not expected that most fund managers will have to make significant changes to their current practices in order to comply with the Collateral Rules.

    The LSOC Model differs from the existing model that applies to futures (the “Futures Model”). Under the Futures Model, DCOs treat each FCM’s customer account on an omnibus basis without differentiating among customers. In the event of a bankruptcy of an FCM due to a double default under the Futures Model, the DCO would be able to access the collateral of non-defaulting customers and defaulting customers posted to the DCO to satisfy any loss in the customer account.[2]

    In the case of a bankruptcy of an FCM due to a double default under the LSOC Model, the most significant benefit to customers of the FCM is their protection (assuming that they are a non-defaulting customer) against fellow-customer risk. Where the shortfall is due to a fellow customer’s loss that exceeds both the customer’s collateral and the FCM’s ability to pay, i.e., a double default, the DCO would be able to access only the collateral attributable to defaulting customers to satisfy the loss and not the collateral of non-defaulting customers.[3] In the event of a double default, the adopted model improves on the current Futures Model by not permitting the DCO to access non-defaulting customer collateral in its default “waterfall” of funds to satisfy any losses created from a defaulting customer. In addition, the adopted model improves on the current Futures Model by requiring customer account data to be transmitted to the DCO daily, thereby providing up-to-date information on which to base account transfers and liquidations, and therefore increasing the portability of non-defaulting customers’ positions to other FCMs.

    The CFTC has acknowledged the limitations of the Collateral Rules in protecting cleared swap customer collateral due to an FCM’s bankruptcy with respect to operational risk or investment risk. Under both the LSOC Model and the Futures Model, if the FCM experiences a bankruptcy as a result of corporate financial difficulties unrelated to customer accounts, there will be no shortfall in the customer accounts and each customer’s account can be transferred or liquidated in full by the trustee. However, if the shortfall is due to operational risks such as fraud or mismanagement of customer accounts by the FCM, or investment risks resulting from extraordinary losses on permitted investments, customer positions and related collateral at a DCO may be delivered to the trustee of the bankrupt FCM or may be transferred to a solvent FCM, but only to the extent of each customer’s pro rata share.

    The CFTC may address operational and investment risks in future rulemakings. The CFTC is also considering whether to modify the Futures Model so that futures customers may benefit from protection against fellow-customer risk available to the cleared swap market customers under the LSOC Model.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors. 


     [1] Section 724 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended Section 4d of the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”), imposing on each FCM and DCO the following requirements with respect to collateral posted by customers: (1) the FCM must treat customer collateral as belonging to the customer; (2) the FCM must not commingle any customer’s collateral with its own property and generally must not use such collateral to margin any other customer’s swaps; (3) the DCO must not treat an FCM customer’s collateral as belonging to anyone other than the customer; and (4) the FCM and DCO may invest customer collateral only in certain permitted investments.  

    [2] In addition to the LSOC Model and the Futures Model, the CFTC considered other models, including the “Physical Segregation Model” and the “Legal Segregation with Recourse Model.” The Physical Segregation Model requires that each customer’s collateral is segregated in separate physical accounts as well as in the FCM’s books and records. The Physical Segregation Model is similar to the LSOC Model after an FCM bankruptcy. However, it would be much more expensive to implement this model. In other words, in spite of incurring greater costs, the level of protection for cleared swaps customers would be essentially the same for fellow-customer risks, investment risks, and operational risks. Therefore, the CFTC did not select this model. The Legal Segregation with Recourse Model is similar to the adopted model prior to a default, but after a double default, the DCO would be able to access the collateral of non-defaulting customers if the DCO’s own capital and FCM guaranty funds were insufficient. The CFTC also considered allowing each DCO to choose one of the foregoing models rather than mandating any particular one. The CFTC ultimately adopted the LSOC Model because it determined that the model strikes the best balance between costs and risks.  

    [3] To the extent that the defaulting customers’ collateral does not satisfy the loss, the DCO must use its default resources in an order pre-determined by the DCO’s rules. The default resources may include guaranty fund contributions, the DCO’s own capital, and the DCO’s right to call upon its members to contribute additional assets. 


     This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Supreme Court Decision of Interest for Religious Schools

    Supreme Court Decision of Interest for Religious Schools

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Decision of Interest for Religious Schools

    March 5, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a recent unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects religious organizations’, including religious schools’, employment decisions regarding ministers, from the anti-discrimination laws. The Courts of Appeals have long recognized the ministerial exception, a First Amendment doctrine that bars most employment-related lawsuits brought against religious organizations by employees that perform religious functions. On Jan. 11, 2012, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al., the Supreme Court acknowledged the ministerial exception, finding that it is based in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment (the “Religion Clauses”).

    The Supreme Court reasoned that because the First Amendment was adopted against a background of controversy between churches and the state over religious offices, the framers of the First Amendment intended that the Religion Clauses prevent the government from appointing ministers and from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own ministers. Upon recognizing the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, the Supreme Court further concluded that it protects from the anti-discrimination laws a religious group’s decision to terminate a teacher who was also one of the group’s ministers.

    Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School operates a kindergarten-through-eighth-grade school that offers its students a “Christ-centered education,” and employs both “lay” and “called” teachers. “Called” teachers are regarded as having been called to their vocation by God, must satisfy certain academic requirements (including Lutheran religious training) and receive a call from a congregation. Once called, the teacher receives the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” Cheryl Perich was employed by Hosanna Tabor as a called kindergarten teacher, which included teaching a religion class, leading the children in devotional exercises each day and attending a weekly school-wide chapel. Perich took disability leave at the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year after developing narcolepsy. Upon attempting to return to work in February 2005, Perich was notified that her position had been filled by a lay teacher for the remainder of the school year. Perich protested, stating that she had spoken with an attorney regarding her legal rights, and was then terminated. Subsequently, she filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) claiming discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The EEOC proceeded to file suit against Hosanna-Tabor alleging that Perich was terminated for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit.

    In reversing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception grounded in the First Amendment, but rejected the Circuit Court’s conclusion that Perich did not qualify as a minister because her job consisted of largely the same duties performed by a lay teacher. Adopting a totality of the circumstances approach, the Supreme Court concluded that Perich’s minister status was supported by several factors, including her title, training and employment duties. The Sixth Circuit erred by placing too much emphasis on the similarities between the responsibilities of the lay teachers and the called teachers, and Perich’s performance of secular duties, and placing too little emphasis on the fact that Perich was a commissioned minister. The Supreme Court concluded that dismissal of the employment discrimination suit is required by the First Amendment as Perich is a minister within the meaning of the exception.

    While the Supreme Court’s application of the ministerial exception in the context of an employment discrimination lawsuit is significant and new, its holding is limited. In its opinion, the Supreme Court refused to provide a rigid formula for determining when an employee qualifies as a minister. Further, it remained silent on whether the exception applies in other employment contexts, such as when an employee claims breach of contract or tortious conduct by his/her religious employer. Consequently, although schools with religious affiliations and their employees should be aware of the applicability of the ministerial exception to employment discrimination lawsuits, future litigation will be necessary to determine how broadly this exception will apply.


    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, LaKeisha M. Caton and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 88

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 88

    March, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Copyright

    Pub Landlords Found to Infringe the Premier League’s Copyright: Pyrrhic Victory After All?

    In Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2012] EWHC 108 (Ch) Lord Justice Kitchin has now accepted that the Defendant publicans communicated copyright works contained in foreign broadcasts of Premier League matches to the public, following the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruling to that effect in October 2011. However, in relation to the lawfulness of the Football Association Premier League’s licensing arrangements, Kitchin LJ was minded to grant a declaration to reflect the ruling of the CJEU that the agreements constituted a restriction on competition prohibited by Article 101 TFEU.

    The Protection of Football Fixture Lists Under the EU Database Directive

    On 1 March 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union passed judgement on Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd [2012] CJEU C-604/10, concludingthat the football fixture lists in question are not protected by copyright as there is insufficient intellectual creation on the part of the author.

    The “Innocent” Copying Defence: Only Applicable to Works Out of Copyright

    In David Hoffman v Drug Abuse Resistance Education (UK) Ltd [2012] EWPCC 2, the Patents County Court of England and Wales assessed the use of the “innocent copying” defence under Section 97 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. The defendant mistakenly believed that certain photographic works were Crown copyright and therefore it had permission to use them.


    Trade Marks

    Advocate General Considers Jurisdiction For Claims of Infringement of a National Trade Mark Online

    In Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH C-523/10 (Opinion of Advocate General) 16 February 2012, Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón considered that the proprietor of a national trade mark may be able to bring an infringement action in the Member State of registration against a third party that has registered a keyword used on a national search engine that is identical to the mark. This right was upheld even where the keyword is limited to searches carried out via the top-level domain for another Member State.

    Composite Marks: Identity, Similarity and Likelihood of Confusion

    In Ghias (t/a Griller) v Ikram [2012] EWPCC 3, Miss Recorder Michaels, sitting in the Patents County Court, partly upheld but largely dismissed claims of infringement under Section 10(1), (2) and (3) of the Trade Mark Act 1994 brought by a fast food business chain trading as “Griller”, against three similar businesses trading as “Griller”/“The Griller Original”, “The Griller King” and “Griller Hut”.

    E-Privacy

    Serious E-Privacy Breaches: ICO Guidance on Monetary Penalties

    The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has laid before the UK Parliament a draft of its new guidance on monetary penalties. The new guidance follows the introduction by the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulations 2011 of additional powers to impose monetary penalties for serious breaches of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.

    Confidential Information

    Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and The Scope of The Intellectual Property Exception

    In Stephen John Coogan v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 48 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upheld orders from the High Court of England and Wales requiring the private investigator for the former News of the World newspaper, Mr Mulcaire, to provide information regarding his phone hacking activities, despite Mr Mulcaire’s argument that to do so would infringe his privilege against self-incrimination.

    Registered Community Design

    Registered Community Designs Can Infringe Earlier Registered Community Designs

    The Court of Justice of the European Union has clarified the interpretation of the term “any third party” in Article 19(1) of the Community Designs Regulation (6/2002/EC) in its decision in Case C‑488/10 Celaya Emparanza y Galdos Internacional SA (Cegasa) v Proyectos Integrales de Balizamiento SL.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Boris Uphoff

    Partner

    Munich, Düsseldorf

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  • LBIE Update — UK Supreme Court Upholds Decision Expanding Client Money Pool Scope and Eligibility

    LBIE Update — UK Supreme Court Upholds Decision Expanding Client Money Pool Scope and Eligibility

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    LBIE Update — UK Supreme Court Upholds Decision Expanding Client Money Pool Scope and Eligibility

    March 1, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Feb. 29, 2012, the Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court”), the UK’s highest court, issued a majority decision upholding the U.K. Court of Appeal’s Aug. 2, 2010 ruling[1] regarding the scope of, and participation in distributions from, the Lehman Brothers Europe (International) (“LBIE”) pool of client money.[2] The Supreme Court’s landmark decision applies to all customers who agreed with their investment firm counterparty that their money would be treated as client money under the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority’s Rules (the “FSA Rules”), whether or not such money was actually segregated by the investment firm in accordance with the FSA Rules. The decision thus may impact not only holders of client money claims against LBIE, but also similarly situated holders of client money claims against MF Global UK, the London arm of futures merchant MF Global Inc.

    In depth
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  • US Securities Regulators Issue Guidance on Master/Sub-Account Arrangements

    US Securities Regulators Issue Guidance on Master/Sub-Account Arrangements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Securities Regulators Issue Guidance on Master/Sub-Account Arrangements

    February 28, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    U.S. securities regulators have issued a series of alerts and regulatory notices, and have brought several enforcement actions that have focused on master/sub-account relationships. The most significant of these is the guidance issued on Sept. 29, 2011, by the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”). Also of importance is Regulatory Notice 10-18 published by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) in April 20102 and Regulatory Circular RG10-101 issued by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”) in October 2010.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • US and International Community Continue to Expand Sanctions Against Iran

    US and International Community Continue to Expand Sanctions Against Iran

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US and International Community Continue to Expand Sanctions Against Iran

    February 17, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”), to protect the security and interests of the United States by helping to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. On Oct. 11, 2011, pursuant to Section 104(e) of CISADA, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury”), imposed a reporting obligation on all foreign banks that maintain relationships with Iranian-linked financial institutions and persons linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) as designated under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). Additionally, on Nov. 28, 2011, FinCEN issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, which would impose special measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (“PATRIOT Act”).

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • EU Short Selling Update — France, Belgium and Spain Lift Short Selling Restrictions on Financial Companies

    EU Short Selling Update — France, Belgium and Spain Lift Short Selling Restrictions on Financial Companies

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    EU Short Selling Update — France, Belgium and Spain Lift Short Selling Restrictions on Financial Companies

    February 16, 2012

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The ban on short selling financial companies traded on Spanish markets will be lifted with effect from 16 February 2012. The short selling bans on financial companies traded on markets in France and Belgium were lifted with effect from 13 February 2012. However, disclosure requirements with respect to certain short positions are in effect in each of these jurisdictions.

    Background

    Since 12 August 2011 the regulators of France (the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (“AMF”)), Belgium (the Financial Services and Markets Authority (“FSMA”)), Spain (the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (“CNMV”)) and Italy (the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e le Borse (“CONSOB”)) have had prohibitions in place on the creation or increase of short positions in certain financial stocks listed on the financial markets in those countries. For more information on the creation of the bans and their extension please refer to our previous Alerts.[1]

    Lifting of the Ban in France

    On 13 February 2012 the AMF published a news release on its website[2] announcing that the provisions prohibiting any creation of a net short position and increase of an existing one in relation to French equity securities in the financial sector ended on 11 February 2012 and is not being extended.

    The AMF also notes that a net short position disclosure regime (requiring disclosure to the AMF of any net short position in a French listed company of 0.2% or greater, with additional disclosures at every 0.1% thereafter) has been in place since 1 February 2011. French regulations require that any investor selling French listed shares must be in a position to deliver the securities it has sold within three trading days (T+3).

    Lifting of the Ban in Belgium

    Also on 13 February 2012 the FSMA announced on its website[3] that it had decided to modify its rules on short selling shares in Belgian financial institutions as from 13 February 2012 by replacing the interim ban on the holding of net short positions with a reporting obligation for significant net short positions and imposing a “locate rule”. The basis of the rule requires those persons who sell Belgian shares without possessing or having borrowed them at the time to have made arrangements to ensure that they may have a reasonable expectation that the shares sold can be delivered in a timely manner on the relevant date.

    The FSMA notes in its associated FAQs[4] that although short selling Belgian financial shares may now be permitted, significant net short positions in Belgian financials (representing a net short of 0.25%, or greater, of the capital of one of the relevant issuers) are once again subject to a reporting obligation.

    Lifting of the Ban in Spain

    On 15 February 2012 the CNMV announced on its website[5] that it had agreed to lift, with effect from 16 February 2012, the “preventive ban on establishing or increasing short positions on Spanish financial stocks that was agreed on 11th August 2011 and renewed on 25th August and 28th September [2011]”.

    The CNMV notes that its short selling disclosure rules remain in place for such stocks, being:

    • A requirement to disclose to the CNMV any individual net short positions that reach or exceed a threshold of 0.2% of the share capital of any company admitted to trading on Spanish markets. Further disclosures are required when a previously communicated position either reduced below that threshold or if it increases through further 0.1% thresholds at 0.3%, 0.4%, 0.5%, etc. net short.
    • In addition, the CNMV will publish all disclosures that exceed the 0.5% threshold on its website, including the identity of the short seller. For general information purposes, the CNMV will also aggregate all disclosures of 0.2% or greater that are made to it regarding net short positions in a particular Spanish listed company and will publish the figures on its website every two weeks. Such aggregated disclosures will not feature the identities of the short sellers, merely the name of the Spanish listed company and the total level of short positions in that company at the relevant time.

    The CNMV announcement also reminds market participants that Spanish securities rules prohibit any naked short selling of Spanish listed companies.

    Italy

    On 11 January 2012 CONSOB announced on its website[6] that it was extending the ban on short selling Italian financial sector companies until 24 February 2012. The CONSOB announcement noted that the ban could be modified or revoked depending on market conditions. At the time of writing, CONSOB had not announced any lifting of the ban in effect in Italy.

    Pan-European Short Selling Regulation

    European Union (“EU”) lawmakers have been developing a harmonised and unified pan-European short selling disclosure regime to be introduced from 1 November 2012 that would provide market participants with certainty as to the short selling rules in force in each of the 27 countries of the EU as the rules in each country will be the same. However, the proposed new rules would still allow national regulators to impose a short-term ban on short selling in domestic markets, but would significantly also give the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) the power to impose a ban on short selling across the whole of the EU when two conditions are satisfied:

    • ESMA determines that there is a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the EU, and;
    • Measures have not been taken by EU regulators, or those measures taken were not sufficient, to address the threat. For more information on the EU short selling regulation, please refer to our previous Alert.[7]

    Authored by Neil Robson and Daniel F. Hunter.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the authors.


    [1] See Client Alert (11 August 2011), available at /insights/france-spain-italy-and-belgium-to-impose-short-sale-restrictions/, and Client Alert (12 August 2011), available at /insights/france-spain-italy-belgium-and-other-jurisdictions-impose-short/ and Client Alert (25 August 2011), available at /insights/france-spain-italy-belgium-and-greece-extend-short-sale-bans-on/.

    [2] http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/10310_1.pdf.

    [3] http://www.fsma.be/en/News/Article/press/div/2012/2012-02-13_shortselling.aspx.

    [4] http://www.fsma.be/en/News/Article/faq/faq2mm.aspx.

    [5] http://www.cnmv.es/loultimo/levantamiento%20posiciones%20cortas.pdf.

    [6] http://www.consob.it/mainen/press_release/comunicato_20120111.htm.

    [7] See Client Alert (21 October 2010).


    Current as of 11 a.m. EDT, 16 February 2012. Please note that Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth and Zabel International LLP (together, “Schulte Roth & Zabel”) are providing the following information as a convenience to its clients and others based on information of which it is aware, from sources it has no reason to believe are unreliable. Schulte Roth & Zabel has not sought further verification with local counsel or any other persons of the information contained herein. Schulte Roth & Zabel is not providing legal advice herein and does not provide legal advice with respect to the laws or regulations of the jurisdictions below. Also, consider this Alert in light of prior advice you may have received, and consider that further information and clarifications may become available subsequent to publication of this Alert. Finally, this Alert does not and is not intended to serve as a list of short sale restrictions in all global jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Daniel F. Hunter

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • CFTC Finalizes Significant Rule Changes Affecting Fund Managers and Investment Companies

    CFTC Finalizes Significant Rule Changes Affecting Fund Managers and Investment Companies

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFTC Finalizes Significant Rule Changes Affecting Fund Managers and Investment Companies

    February 10, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Yesterday, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issued a final rule that rescinds the exemption from CFTC registration for commodity pool operators (“CPOs”), which is currently provided in CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(4). The CFTC also: amended CFTC Rule 4.5 to impose new conditions on the ability of mutual funds and other registered investment companies to effect transactions in futures and swaps without the need for CPO registration; imposed new data reporting requirements under Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR; rescinded the relief provided in CFTC Rule 4.7(b)(3), under which the annual reports of certain commodity pools were not required to be certified; instituted a new requirement that CPOs and CTAs annually file notices claiming an exemption from registration; and imposed additional risk disclosure requirements upon CPOs and CTAs that engage in swap transactions.

    Rescission of CPO Registration Exemption

    CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(4), which was adopted in 2003, generally exempts from CFTC registration CPOs of funds whose natural person investors are “qualified eligible persons” (“QEPs”) within the meaning of CFTC Rule 4.7(a)(2) (a category that includes “qualified purchaser” investors in funds offered pursuant to Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940) and whose non-natural person investors are either QEPs or “accredited investors” as defined in Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Regulation D. The CFTC’s rescission of the Rule will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. CPOs who have claimed the exemption (which includes the general partners of a large number of Section 3(c)(7) funds) and cannot avail themselves of any other exemption, must register with the CFTC by Dec. 31, 2012. It should be noted that the CFTC proposed, during 2011, to amend the definition of “commodity interest” in CFTC Rule 1.3 to include swaps. If this proposal is adopted, CPOs of funds that engage in swaps activity also may be required to register with the CFTC unless another exemption applies.

    Registration Lite for CPOs of 3(c)(7) Funds

    CPOs of funds whose investors are all QEPs may be able to avail themselves of “registration lite” under CFTC Rule 4.7, which provides relief from certain disclosure and periodic reporting requirements applicable to registered CPOs. A Client Alert providing a summary of Rule 4.7 and a checklist of key CFTC registration steps and requirements was issued on March 10, 2011.[1]

    The CFTC is still considering possible exemptions from registration for family offices and foreign advisers that might be similar to the SEC registration exemptions for these types of advisers.

    Continued Availability of “De Minimis” Exemption

    At the time that the CFTC issued its proposal to rescind Rule 4.13(a)(4) in February 2011, it also proposed to rescind Rule 4.13(a)(3), which exempts from registration CPOs of funds that have “de minimis” futures activity (i.e., either: (1) aggregate initial margin on futures positions and premiums on options on futures does not exceed five percent of the liquidation value of the fund’s portfolio (including unrealized gains and losses); or (2) aggregate notional value of such positions does not exceed 100 percent of the liquidation value of the pool’s portfolio (including unrealized gains and losses)). The CFTC has not rescinded 4.13(a)(3); accordingly, general partners of funds that use futures, but only within the defined minimum amounts, can continue to use this exemption. General partners of funds that previously relied on 4.13(a)(4) who find that in practice their funds do not actually trade futures above the 4.13(a)(3) minimums could consider switching to the 4.13(a)(3) exemption. In its Adopting Release, the CFTC notes that swaps activity will count toward the de minimis thresholds for purposes of determining the applicability of this exemption.

    Amendment of Rule 4.5 — Registered Investment Companies

    The CFTC has also amended Rule 4.5, which is the exclusion from the definition of CPO that investment companies registered under the 1940 Act have relied on to avoid the need for CPO registration. Rule 4.5 as amended imposes significant new conditions on claiming the exclusion. These changes will result in the need for CPO registration in situations where an investment company’s investment program has a significant commodities component or an investment company makes more than limited use of commodities and swaps for other than bona fide hedging purposes. Recognizing that the amendment of Rule 4.5 would subject investment companies and their advisers to possibly duplicative, inconsistent and conflicting disclosure and reporting requirements, the CFTC also proposed the adoption of various rule amendments intended to harmonize the compliance obligations arising under CFTC rules with those imposed by the 1940 Act and the rules adopted thereunder. Compliance with amended Rule 4.5 is required by the later of Dec. 31, 2012, or 60 days after the effective date of final rulemaking defining the term “swap.” Entities required to register due to the amendment of Rule 4.5 will become subject to CFTC recordkeeping, reporting and disclosure requirements 60 days following the effectiveness of the proposed rule amendments relating to investment companies.


    Authored by Ida Wurczinger Draim, Marc E. Elovitz, Kenneth S. Gerstein, Daniel F. Hunter, and George M. Silfen.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Daniel F. Hunter

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • New Temporary and Proposed Tax Regulations on Dividend Equivalents

    New Temporary and Proposed Tax Regulations on Dividend Equivalents

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Temporary and Proposed Tax Regulations on Dividend Equivalents

    February 9, 2012

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Section 871(m) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), was enacted to expand the definition of U.S.-source income subject to U.S. withholding tax to include “dividend equivalent payments,” which are amounts that (directly or indirectly) are contingent upon, or determined by reference to, the payment of a dividend from sources within the United States, and which are: (1) made on “specified notional principal contracts,” (a “Specified NPC”); (2) made pursuant to a securities lending or repurchase agreement; or (3) any other payment that the Treasury Secretary determined to be substantially similar to a payment described in (1) or (2) above.

    Currently, a notional principal contract (an “NPC”) is a Specified NPC if it provides for one or more amount(s) that (directly or indirectly) may be contingent upon, or determined by reference to, a dividend from sources within the United States and:

    • In connection with entering into such NPC, any long party to the NPC transfers the underlying security to any short party to the contract (i.e., “crossing in”);
    • In connection with the termination of such contract, any short party to the contract transfers the underlying security to any long party to the contract (i.e., “crossing out”);
    • The underlying security is not readily tradable on an established securities market; or
    • The underlying security is posted as collateral by any short party to the contract with any long party to the contract.

    The temporary regulations extend the current definition of a Specified NPC through Dec. 31, 2012. The proposed regulations clarify the meaning of “dividend equivalent,” broaden the definition of a Specified NPC and confirm withholding agents’ obligations with respect to dividend equivalents.

    Proposed Regulations

    Specified NPC: The proposed regulations redefine what is a Specified NPC in respect of payments made after Dec. 31, 2012, to include any NPC where:

    • The long party is “in the market” with respect to the underlying U.S. security, generally meaning that the long party (or any related party): (1) sells or otherwise disposes of the underlying U.S. security on the same day, or days, that the parties price the NPC; (2) purchases or otherwise acquires the underlying security on the same day, or days, that the NPC terminates; or (3) purchases or disposes of the underlying U.S. security at a price that is set or calculated in a way that is substantially identical to, or determined by reference to, an amount used to price or terminate the NPC (e.g., a forward contract), in each case not considering whether a transaction was entered into “in connection with” the swap;                                                                                                                                                               
      • The removal of the “in connection with” standard will likely be an issue for multi-strategy hedge funds with more than one portfolio manager, where one manager executes an NPC giving it long exposure to a U.S. equity, while on the same day, but in an unrelated transaction, another manager sells or otherwise disposes of the same U.S. equity. Such transaction would be unintentional and seemingly not in line with the goal of targeting abusive transactions seeking to avoid dividend withholding tax;
      • Unlike the current cross-in/cross-out standard, this new rule does not require that the short party acquire the underlying security from, or sell the underlying security to, the long party. In fact, a long party can be “in the market” even where the short party never holds the underlying physical position;
      • The long party will not be deemed to be “in the market” for purposes of Section 871(m) of the Code with respect to an underlying U.S. security if the amount of the underlying security disposed of at the time at which the NPC is priced, or the amount of the underlying security acquired at the time at which the NPC is terminated, is less than 10 percent of the notional principal amount of the NPC;
    • The underlying U.S. security is not regularly traded; a security is regularly traded if it is: (1) listed on a qualified national securities exchange; and (2) traded for at least 15 trading days during the 30 trading days prior to the date on which the parties price the NPC, counting only those days in which the underlying U.S. securities are traded in quantities that exceed 10 percent of the 30-day average daily trading volume (this is in contrast with the current standard, which requires that the underlying U.S. security be readily tradable to not be a Specified NPC);
    • The short party posts the underlying U.S. security as collateral and the underlying security represents more than 10 percent of the collateral posted by the short party on any date that the NPC is outstanding (thus market value fluctuations may be an issue; this is in contrast to the current rule, which applies to a posting of any amount of the underlying security as collateral in connection with entering into a swap);
    • The actual term of the NPC has fewer than 90 days, and will be reduced for any periods where the long party is a party to a transaction that offsets its position with respect to the NPC; also, it could encompass terminations outside the control of the long party (e.g., events of default or other credit events). This rule may cause investment funds who enter into NPCs as part of a high-frequency trading strategy to reconsider their investment strategies;
    • The long party controls, contractually or by conduct, the short party’s hedge or participates in an underlying equity control program;[1]
    • The notional principal amount of the NPC is greater than: (1) five percent of the total public float of the underlying security; or (2) 20 percent of the 30-day daily average trading volume of the underlying security. For each calculation, a taxpayer must aggregate the notional principal amounts of all NPCs for which it is the long party that reference the same underlying U.S. security (even if the swaps are not entered into by the same portfolio manager or trading group of a hedge fund or are entered into on different dates); or
    • The NPC is entered into on or after the announcement of a special dividend and prior to the ex-dividend date.

    If an NPC meets any one of these seven factors, it is a Specified NPC and a withholding agent is required to withhold on any dividend equivalents. In analyzing the seven factors, related persons (under Section 267(b) or Section 707(b)(1) of the Code) to the parties of an NPC are also considered parties to the NPC.

    Potential withholding agents such as dealers and investment funds going short on an NPC will likely seek to have counterparties make certain representations with respect to all seven factors and any related parties. Investment funds may seek to transact only with U.S. dealer counterparties or non-U.S. dealers, who will only act from their respective U.S. permanent establishments and provide an “ECI” representation, where no withholding is required. An investment fund may simply be unable to provide representations that negate the absence of the seven factors, not due to the presence of abusive facts but rather lack of control over facts that could make an NPC a Specific NPC.

    Dividend Equivalents — Gross Amounts, Estimates and Substantially Similar Amounts: A payment of a dividend equivalent includes any gross amount that is used in computing any net amount that is transferred to or from a taxpayer under the terms of the contract. Thus, even if no net payment is made or the party entitled to the gross amount is required to make a net payment to the other party, the dividend equivalent is equal to that gross amount.

    The proposed regulations specify that a payment is not a dividend equivalent if it is determined by reference to an estimate of an expected (i.e., not yet announced, declared or agreed) dividend, provided that there is no reference to, or adjustment for, the amount of any actual dividend.

    The proposed regulations also define what is “substantially similar” to dividend equivalents paid pursuant to a securities lending agreement, repurchase agreement or Specified NPC. Substantially similar payments are: (1) gross-up amounts paid by a short party in satisfaction of the long party’s tax liability with respect to a dividend equivalent; and (2) payments calculated by reference to a dividend from sources within the United States that are made pursuant to an equity-linked instrument other than an NPC, including a futures contract, forward contract, option or other contractual arrangement. It is unclear whether the proposed regulations will apply to a final payment made in 2013 that varies based on the amount of underlying dividends paid in 2012.

    For equity-linked instruments (e.g., futures, forwards, options and other contractual arrangements), it appears that one of the seven factors needs to apply before withholding is required.

    The proposed regulations also include an anti-abuse rule that permits the Treasury to treat payments made under a transaction or transactions as dividend equivalents if a taxpayer enters into such a transaction or transactions with a principal purpose of avoiding the withholding rules under Section 871(m) of the Code.

    Withholding Agents’ Responsibility When Outstanding NPCs Become Specified NPCs:The proposed regulations amend several regulations clarifying that an NPC that is not a Specified NPC at the time it is entered into but becomes a Specified NPC during the term of the contract will be treated as though it had been a Specified NPC during the entire term of the contract. The withholding agent will be responsible for reporting and depositing the amount of tax required to be withheld or paid over on all amounts that are recharacterized as dividend equivalents on the next payment date following the NPC’s characterization as a Specified NPC (including any termination date payment), even when the withholding agent does not know, or have reason to know, that the NPC has been recharacterized.

    The Treasury also expressly stated that in addition to the statute and regulations, it will continue to apply general common law principles and judicial doctrines to determine whether an NPC or other equity derivative represents tax ownership in the referenced equity.

    It may prove very difficult for withholding agents to fulfill their obligations and collect payment for tax, especially when they are the short party and they are not making a payment from which they could withhold. For an investment fund who is on the short side, a practical issue is how to enforce any required withholding given that dealer counterparties typically control the cash flows in connection with a transaction. In the case of the short party who generally has no control over the assets in respect of an NPC, such short party should ensure that it has the right to be fully indemnified by the long party in respect of any circumstance giving rise to withholding under Section 871(m) of the Code. Some U.S. equity derivative counterparties might seek to withhold on all amounts that can be calculated in reference to a dividend in respect of any non-U.S. counterparty or they might seek to exclude any dividend-related economics from trades altogether.

    The proposed regulations under Section 871(m) of the Code are generally effective on the date of publication in the Federal Register of the Treasury decision adopting such regulations as final regulations. Thus, payments made on or after the regulations are finalized may be subject to withholding, even if the contracts were entered into before the effective date. If the proposed regulations are not finalized prior to the expiration of the temporary regulations on Dec. 31, 2012, in the absence of any additional guidance, dividend equivalent payments made thereafter on all NPCs will likely be subject to dividend withholding tax.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your tax attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    [1] An underlying equity control program means any system or procedure that permits: (1) a long party to an NPC to direct how a short party hedges its risk under such NPC; or (2) a long party to acquire, or cause the short party to acquire, an underlying security in a transaction with a short party and to instruct the short party to execute such acquisition in the form of an NPC after acquiring such underlying security.  


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • The Cherryland Decision — Full-Recourse Enforcement of Non-Recourse Loans

    The Cherryland Decision — Full-Recourse Enforcement of Non-Recourse Loans

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Cherryland Decision — Full-Recourse Enforcement of Non-Recourse Loans

    February 3, 2012

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The economic decline in the real estate market has forced many borrowers of commercial mortgage-backed security (“CMBS”) loans into default situations, which, in the case of some borrowers with non-recourse loans, can trigger full-recourse provisions to guarantors under their “non-recourse” guaranties. A recent opinion of Michigan’s Appellate Court, if broadly adopted, would have a significant adverse effect on guarantors under their non-recourse guaranties. Under the reasoning of that court’s decision in Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cherryland Mall Limited Partnership,[1] a lender would be allowed to foreclose on a defaulted non-recourse CMBS mortgage loan and then recover a deficiency (i.e., the excess of the debt over the foreclosure sale price of the property) from the non-recourse guarantor merely because the guarantor failed to keep the borrower solvent. A default under a non-recourse loan may allow lenders to foreclose, sell the collateral and recover the deficiency judgment from the non-recourse guarantor (i.e., the difference between the debt and the selling price of the property).

    Background

    Prior to the proliferation of non-recourse mortgage financing, a traditional mortgage loan usually involved a first lien mortgage secured by real property, and often, a personal guaranty from a principal of the borrower (or from an affiliated creditworthy entity of the borrower) from whom the lender could seek repayment on the mortgage debt. Changes occurred in the 1990s when CMBS loans became commonplace. In addition to opening up the capital markets to the real estate financing arena, the CMBS market was instrumental in establishing the development of non-recourse, asset specific lending.

    In order to offer non-recourse loans, CMBS lenders require what is referred to as “asset isolation,” meaning that lenders will agree not to pursue recourse liability against the borrower or guarantor (other than for customary “bad boy” carve-outs as more particularly discussed below) so long as the financed asset is sufficiently protected from creditors of the parent and affiliates of the borrower. To successfully “isolate” an asset, CMBS loans typically require the borrower to make both separateness and single purpose entity (“SPE”) covenants in the borrower’s organizational documents and in the loan documents. These require the borrower to remain separate and distinct from its parent and its affiliates.

    Referring to a CMBS loan as “non-recourse” may therefore be somewhat of a misnomer, because CMBS lenders will almost always require a principal of the borrower, or an affiliated creditworthy entity, to execute and deliver a personal guaranty in which the guarantor’s personal liability under the loan is triggered upon the violation of one of the “bad boy” carve-out exceptions. The extent of a guarantor’s liability for a “bad boy” act is dependent upon which carve-out exception is triggered from the “bad boy” act. For the most part, there are two different types of carve-outs: (1) “above the line” or “actual-loss” carve-outs in which the guarantor is liable only for any actual loss suffered by the lender as a result of the “bad boy” act; and (2) “below the line” or “full recourse” carve-outs, in which the guarantor is liable for the entire amount of the debt. A violation of the separateness or SPE covenants by the borrower will almost always trigger some recourse under the guaranty. Depending on how the loan documents were negotiated between the lender and the borrower, the breach of the SPE covenants will trigger either full recourse or just liability for actual loss — and this distinction is quite meaningful.

    Cherryland Decision

    The recent Cherryland decision from Michigan’s Appellate Court, which upheld a lower court decision ruling that the loan in question became fully recourse to the guarantor as a result of the borrower “[failing] to maintain its status as a single person entity” has many borrowers scrambling, and rightly so, and many lenders exercising their option to look to guarantors for repayment of defaulted loans. In October 2002, Cherryland Mall Limited Partnership (the “Cherryland Borrower”) obtained an $8.7 million “non-recourse” mortgage loan (the “Cherryland Loan”) from Archon Financial LP (“Archon”). As a condition precedent to making the Cherryland Loan, Archon required a principal of the Cherryland Borrower (the “Guarantor”; together with the Cherryland Borrower, collectively, the “Defendants”) to execute a “bad boy” carve-out guaranty (the “Guaranty”), which provided, among other things, that a violation of the SPE covenants would trigger the Cherryland Loan to be fully recourse to Guarantor. Following the closing the Cherryland Loan, Archon sold the Cherryland Loan to Wells Fargo Bank, NA (the “Plaintiff”) which later securitized the Cherryland Loan.

    Eventually, an event of default occurred under the Cherryland Loan as a result of the Borrower’s failure to make its required mortgage loan payments, which ultimately led to a foreclosure auction. At the foreclosure sale, the Plaintiff was the highest bidder, with a credit bid of $6 million, leaving a deficiency of close to $2.1 million from the amount owed under the Cherryland Loan. In an effort to recover the deficiency, the Plaintiff sued the Guarantor alleging that the Guarantor was liable for the full amount of the deficiency on the grounds that the Borrower breached the non-recourse covenants of the Guaranty, which required it to “maintain its status as a single purpose entity as required by, and in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Mortgage.” Cherryland at 7. Plaintiff’s argument, with which the lower court agreed, was that the SPE covenants in the Cherryland Mortgage (the “Mortgage”) were all found under Section 9 (“Section 9 of the Mortgage”). Specifically, Section 9 of the Mortgage stated that the Borrower “covenants and agrees … that [the Borrower] is and will remain solvent and … will pay its debts and liabilities … from its assets as the same shall become due.” The Plaintiff argued that the Borrower’s failure to make mortgage loan payments resulted in its insolvency, thereby breaching an SPE covenant listed in the Mortgage. On Dec. 27, 2011, in a surprising ruling, the Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

    The Defendants did not dispute that the Plaintiff would be entitled to full-recourse against the Guarantor under the Guaranty if the Borrower failed to maintain its status as an SPE; rather, the Defendants argued that the CherrylandNote, Mortgage and Guaranty all failed to properly define the term “single purpose entity” and that the provisions in Section 9 of the Mortgage, even under the heading entitled “Single Purpose Entity/ Separateness,” were not clearly defined as SPE covenants that the Borrower was obligated to comply with under the terms of the loan documents.

    The Court of Appeals’ rationale in rejecting the Defendants’ argument was that although the loan documents did not specifically define “single purpose entity,” the itemized list of covenants under Section 9 of the Mortgage was customary and commonly found in CMBS loan documents and were customarily considered SPE covenants. In fact, the amicus briefs submitted on behalf of the Defendants by the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association and the Mortgage Bankers Association described the same provisions as were set forth in Section 9 of the Mortgage but referred to such provisions as “separateness covenants.” Although this “could indicate that defendants [were] correct and that there [were] no SPE covenants contained in the mortgage, only separateness covenants,” the Court of Appeals held that “separateness is a component part of SPE [status], such that maintaining SPE status requires abiding by the separateness covenants.” Cherryland at 11. SPE provisions and separateness covenants are similar concepts and so, by claiming that Section 9 of the Mortgage contained only separateness covenants, the Court of Appeals found that the Defendants were actually conceding that Section 9 of the Mortgage contained the SPE covenants due to the fact that separateness covenants and SPE covenants are so intertwined.

    Due to the interplay between the “separateness” and SPE concepts, the Court of Appeals also found that it was reasonable and logical that Section 9 of the Mortgage was entitled “Single Purpose Entity/Separateness.” Although the Cherryland Mortgage clearly stated that headings and captions “are for convenience of reference only and are not to be construed as defining or limiting, in any way, the scope or consent of the provisions,” the Court of Appeals held that headings and captions are meant to provide reference points and to indicate where certain language will likely be found. Id. at 12, Pursuant to the Cherryland Loan documents, the Borrower was required to maintain its status as a “single purpose entity” as provided in the mortgage. Because the only reference to “single purpose entity” status in the mortgage was found in the heading of Section 9 of the Mortgage, the Court of Appeals concluded that “it [was] natural and logical to conclude that all of section 9, but that also only section 9, are the terms necessary to maintain SPE status.” Id.

    Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that the covenants set forth in Section 9 of the Mortgage are commonly considered SPE covenants. The Court of Appeals relied on case law that analyzed loan documents with similar or identical headings and provisions such as Section 9 of the Mortgage and, in each case, the respective court analyzing the applicable provision concluded that such covenants were in fact SPE covenants that if breached would result in full-recourse liability to the guarantor. Id.

    The Defendants also argued that, in the alternative, even assuming that Section 9 of the Mortgage was the section setting forth the SPE covenants, the provision that required the Borrower to remain solvent was not breached because it was never the intention of the parties to make the Cherryland Loan full recourse to the Guarantor unless the Borrower became insolvent as a result of the Borrower’s misappropriation of funds or its intentional or willful bad acts. The idea that a property owner would become insolvent due to a decline in property value, rather than an intentional or willful “bad acts,” was never contemplated by the Defendants at the origination of the Cherryland Loan. The Court of Appeals rejected the Defendant’s alternative argument as well because the loan documents did not specify the manner in which the insolvency must occur; rather, the loan documents clearly stated that “any failure to remain solvent, no matter what the cause, is a violation.” Id. at 15. Additionally, the Court of Appeals was unwilling to explore the “intent” of the parties because the language in the loan documents was not ambiguous and would not require any extrinsic evidence in order to be interpreted. Contract law prohibits a court from resorting to extrinsic evidence to interpret language unless there is a question of the language’s meaning.

    Lastly, the Defendants argued that a holding which interpreted the carve-out language to allow for the Cherryland Loan to become full-recourse to the Guarantor if the Borrower became insolvent for any reason was against public policy and would lead to “economic disaster for the business community.” Id. at 16. However, the Court of Appeals was unwilling to save the Borrower from a bad bargain and held that policy based change should come from the legislature and not the judicial bench.

    Chesterfield Decision

    In another case decided just days before Cherryland, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan came to a similar conclusion in 51382 Gratiot Avenue Holdings, LLC v. Chesterfield Dev. Co.[2] In Chesterfield the borrower defaulted on its mortgage loan and the plaintiff sued the loan’s guarantor for a deficiency of $12 million, created by the difference between the balance remaining on the loan and the value of the foreclosed property. Unlike in Cherryland however, the language in the Chesterfield loan documents was clear. It expressly provided that the loan would be fully-recourse against the guarantor if the borrower became “insolvent or fail[ed] to pay its debts and liabilities from its assets as the same shall become due.” Chesterfield at 13. The Chesterfield court concluded that the language was not ambiguous and that a plain reading of the contract provided full-recourse when the borrower’s debt exceeded the value of its assets (insolvency) and when borrower failed to make its mortgage loan payments on time (failure to pay debts and liabilities).

    Conclusion

    Commentators over the years failed to grasp the possibility that an economic decline could force borrowers into default, resulting in violations of the covenant to remain solvent and triggering the full recourse provision in the “bad boy” guaranties such as the one in Cherryland. The Cherryland ruling should have borrowers on high alert as it may provide lenders with a viable opportunity to recoup from guarantors any deficiency once a property is sold in a foreclosure sale. Borrowers should make sure that the carve-out language (and all other provisions of the loan documents) is clear and concise and reflects the intent of the parties that a non-recourse loan is truly non-recourse and only becomes recourse only for intentional and willful bad acts committed by a borrower. Borrowers may also want to examine their existing loan documents before taking any actions with respect to a specific loan. Understanding what will trigger full-recourse liability, even if it is not what the borrower believed it bargained for, may prevent borrowers and guarantors from being personally liable for their debt obligations.

    If the Cherryland ruling is accepted by courts in other jurisdictions, many “non-recourse” loans will essentially become fully recourse loans. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the SPE covenants in Section 9 of the Mortgage requiring the Cherryland Borrower to remain solvent essentially nullifies the whole concept of a non-recourse loan. The full effect of the Cherryland ruling is not yet clear; however, some are predicting a disastrous domino effect due to the fact that guarantors often guaranteed multiple CMBS loans, believing that they could not be held personally liable so long as they did not commit a willful or intentional bad act. Just one or two deficiency judgments against guarantors may cause their own insolvency, thereby triggering defaults on the other CMBS loans they guaranteed. Unfortunately for “non-recourse” guarantors, simply avoiding committing a willful or intentional bad act will not be sufficient if the Cherryland decision is accepted by courts in other jurisdictions.


    Authored by Jeffrey A. Lenobel, Julian M. Wise, and Abigail Lamb.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

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    Julian M. Wise

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