Content Type: Article

  • Tronox Securities Litigation Settlement Has Implications for Environmental Disclosures and Related D&O Insurance Claims

    Tronox Securities Litigation Settlement Has Implications for Environmental Disclosures and Related D&O Insurance Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Tronox Securities Litigation Settlement Has Implications for Environmental Disclosures and Related D&O Insurance Claims

    August 17, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A settlement has been announced in the Tronox Securities Litigation,[1] making it one of the first cases where the failure to publicly disclose environmental liabilities has resulted in a substantial settlement. The plaintiffs — investors in the Tronox IPO — claimed that they were defrauded by the defendants, who allegedly orchestrated a scheme to rid the Kerr-McGee Corporation of hundreds of million of dollars and decades of environmental legacy liability by dumping all of the company’s environmental liabilities into Tronox Incorporated, and then failed to adequately disclose these material liabilities to potential investors in Tronox’s IPO. The $37 million settlement is allocated between defendants Kerr-McGee, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Ernst & Young and certain individual directors and officers of Kerr-McGee and Tronox.[2]

    Tronox Securities Litigation

    The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 by making material misstatements and omissions in their public filings in order to defraud the public into investing in Tronox. According to the plaintiffs, defendants loaded Tronox with Kerr-McGee’s legacy environmental liabilities, then materially misrepresented the magnitude of Tronox’s environmental obligations so that Kerr-McGee could be acquired by defendant Anadarko for $18 billion, free and clear of the legacy environmental liabilities. To support their allegations, the plaintiffs cited a 2009 Form 8-K, in which Tronox admits that the 10-Qs and 10-Ks it previously filed “should no longer be relied on because the Company failed to establish adequate reserves as required by applicable accounting pronouncements” and noted that the Company had not yet completed a review of “all known sites where the company may have environmental remediation and other related liabilities” but that the “adjustments will be material.”

    The plaintiffs alleged that in contrast to the approximately $200 million listed on Tronox’s environmental remediation reserves, Tronox was actually burdened with up to $900 million of legacy liabilities, some of which arose from Tronox’s operations, while the rest came from the operations of Kerr-McGee. The plaintiffs further alleged that defendants intentionally neglected to disclose the existence of numerous “secret sites” at which defendants were well aware there existed significant environmental legacy liabilities. The complaint alleged that, as a result of these fraudulent acts, not only did Kerr-McGee benefit as an entity, but the individual Kerr-McGee directors and officers reaped a windfall in personal profits.

    The $14 million settlement share of the Tronox individual defendants will be paid by their directors and officers (“D & O”) insurance carriers, and, it appears that at least some portion of the $21 million share of the remaining defendants (other than Ernst & Young) will also be paid by insurance carriers. While many D&O policies have pollution exclusions, those exclusions should not preclude coverage for inadequate financial disclosures simply because the disclosures happen to be based on environmental liabilities, and many policies have carve outs to the pollution exclusion specifying that coverage for securities claims based on environmental disclosures are not excluded. Also, since D&O Policies have exclusions for claims arising out of fraudulent or intentional illegal acts, it seems likely that the policies here contain either non-imputation or final adjudication clauses, limiting the reach of the fraud exclusion. Otherwise, the plaintiffs’ claims would seem to fit squarely within the fraud exclusion and the insurers would not likely have contributed to settlement.

    The Bankruptcy Litigation

    Tronox, undercapitalized to fund all of its environmental liabilities, was forced to declare bankruptcy in January 2009. A trial is currently underway in the bankruptcy court, in which a Litigation Trust, pursuing claims on behalf of Tronox, is suing Anadarko and Kerr-McGee for $25 billion in damages with respect to Tronox’s environmental liabilities. Pursuant to a global settlement that allowed Tronox to emerge from bankruptcy last year, the United States Environmental Protection Agency will receive 88 percent of any damages recovered by the Litigation Trust and tort victims will share the remaining 12 percent. Like the securities plaintiffs, the Litigation Trust has alleged that Kerr-McGee orchestrated the transfer of its environmental liabilities to Tronox, and spun it off in an IPO to avoid liability for Kerr-McGee’s environmental legacy liabilities. Kerr-McGee has denied that there was any fraud.

    Authored by Howard B. Epstein and Theodore A. Keyes.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] In re Tronox, Inc. Securities Litigation, Civil Action No. 09-cv-06220-SAS, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

    [2] Tronox itself, which had declared bankruptcy, was not a party named to the suit.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Howard B. Epstein

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Theodore A. Keyes

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The Association Sanction as an Instrument of Self-Control in the Pharmaceutical Industry – with Special Consideration of the FSA Reform of December 01, 2011

    ARTICLE

    The Association Sanction as an Instrument of Self-Control in the Pharmaceutical Industry – with Special Consideration of the FSA Reform of December 01, 2011

    August, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Deniz Tschammler authored the article “Die Verbandssanktion als Instrument der Selbstkontrolle in der Pharmaindustrie – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der FSA-Reform vom 01. Dezember 2011”, featured in PharmR 2012, p. 322-326. in August 2012.

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 93

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 93

    August/September 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Patents

    Long Haul Patent Dispute: The Latest Chapter in The Aircraft Flat Bed Seat Litigation
    The High Court of England and Wales has held that the main patent (as amended) owned by Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited for flat bed airline seats is valid but not infringed by the seats manufactured by Contour Aerospace Limited and used by the airline defendants.

    Translations of Foreign Language Prior Art are Key in EPO Assessments
    In Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson T 1688/08, a technical appeals board of the European Patent Office disapproved of the Examining Division’s approach in assuming that the skilled person would look only at the English abstract and drawings of a foreign language prior art document when considering obviousness in relation to a patent application.

    Trade Marks

    UK IPO Publishes Practice Amendment Notice on the Interpretation of Trade Mark SpecificationsUK IPO Publishes Practice Amendment Notice on the Interpretation of Trade Mark Specifications
    In Practice Amendment Notice 01/12, the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) has clarified its approach to the interpretation of the specifications of trade mark applications in light of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s ruling in Case C-307/10 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys v Registrar of Trade Marks.

    Passing Off and Trade Marks

    Use of “Fine” for Estate Agency Services Constitutes Passing Off and Trade Mark Infringement
    In Fine & Country Limited and others v Okotoks Limited and others [2012] EWHC 2230 (Ch), 31 July 2012, the High Court of England and Wales has held that use of the word “fine” in relation to the provision of estate agency services constituted passing off and infringement of the “Fine & Country” trade mark, dismissing Okotoks Limited’s claims for revocation of the marks.

    Designs, Trade Marks and Passing Off

    High Court Holds That Replica Alloy Wheels Infringe BMW’s Community Registered Designs
    In Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft v Round and Metal Ltd and another [2012] EWHC 2099 (Pat), 27 July 2012, the High Court of England and Wales has held that replica alloy wheels for BMW and MINI cars infringed BMW’s Community Registered Designs (CRD). The “spare parts” defence under Article 110(1) of the Community Designs Regulation (6/2002/EC) (CDR) did not apply. The Court held further that the defendant infringed BMW’s Community trade marks (CTM) by importing and selling replica wheels into the United Kingdom.

    Design

    Amendments to UK Design Legislation
    Following a consultation on amendments to UK design legislation, the Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) proposes to remove the limitation on liability for innocent infringement of UK registered designs and to equalise the remedies available for innocent infringement of UK and Community design rights (CDRs).

    Commercial

    Consultation on The Implementation of The Consumer Rights Directive
    The UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) is consulting on its proposed approach to implementing the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) (CRD).

    Data Protection

    Information Commissioner’s Office Publishes Guidance on Deletion of Personal Data
    As part of a series of guidance, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has published new guidance on deleting personal information under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and how organisations and businesses can comply with the fifth data protection principle as set out in the DPA.

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  • What Do Retirement Plan Sponsors Have to Do Now that the ERISA 408(b)(2) Fee Disclosure Deadline Has Come and Gone?

    What Do Retirement Plan Sponsors Have to Do Now that the ERISA 408(b)(2) Fee Disclosure Deadline Has Come and Gone?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    What Do Retirement Plan Sponsors Have to Do Now that the ERISA 408(b)(2) Fee Disclosure Deadline Has Come and Gone?

    July 2012

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    By now, plan sponsors of most defined benefit and defined contribution plans should have received disclosure statements from “covered service providers” to their plans regarding whether the provider is, in fact, a “covered service provider.” If the provider is a “covered service provider,” the provider’s disclosure statement should also describe what services are being provided to the plan and the amount of compensation the provider receives for such services.

    A “Covered Service Provider” includes those providers who are engaged by the plan to provide services to the plan of $1,000 or more, including:

    • A plan fiduciary or trustee;
    • A registered investment adviser;
    • An investment contract provider;
    • An investment manager; and
    • An attorney, actuary, auditor, accountant, investment broker, insurance broker, custodian, third-party administrator or other similar provider who expects to receive $1,000 or more in indirect compensation.

    Trustees, including those not compensated directly by the plan, should only report on compensation they receive from third parties because the plan should know how much compensation it paid to each of the trustees.

    Review 408(b)(2) Statements for Reasonableness, Accuracy and Potential Conflicts of Interest

    If all of the plan’s covered service providers provided compliant disclosure statements by the July 1, 2012 deadline, plan sponsors must now begin assessing the reasonableness of each contract or agreement in light of the level and quality of services. Though there is no clear standard on what constitutes “reasonable,” and the DOL has made it clear that “reasonable” does not necessarily mean the lowest-cost option, the DOL has indicated that a responsible plan fiduciary must engage in some comparative analysis to ensure that a contract or arrangement is reasonable. If the plan sponsor lacks the expertise to perform a comparative review or evaluate the reasonableness of the fees, the sponsor should retain an outside consultant to assist with a fee benchmarking analysis. Moreover, if the fees are determined to be on the higher end of the spectrum, the fiduciaries should negotiate the fees down in an amended agreement with the provider, consider a new provider by conducting a search or, at least, document why the services provided warrant the higher fee.

    Plan fiduciaries should review the underlying service provider’s contracts to make certain that the contract terms are clear and that the contract allows for the provider’s services to be terminated on reasonably short notice. If the contract has not been re-negotiated in the last year or two, it is important to reevaluate the terms and renegotiate the agreement to ensure that the terms are the best possible for the plan and reasonable in the current marketplace. The fiduciaries should keep a clear record of the process used to evaluate the contracts, including any renegotiation or extension of terms.

    In addition, plan sponsors must review the disclosure statements to determine whether any conflict of interest exists and analyze each statement to make sure they meet the requirements of Section 408(b)(2) of ERISA. If a plan sponsor does not have enough information to determine whether a conflict exists, the plan sponsor should send a follow-up letter to the covered service provider asking the provider to disclose, in writing, any relationship with a plan fiduciary that could cause a conflict of interest, including a family or business relationship.

    Follow-up with Delinquent Covered Service Providers

    If a covered service provider did not provide the disclosure on time or provided a disclosure with incomplete or difficult-to-understand information, plan sponsors have a continued fiduciary obligation to request further information from the delinquent provider in order to avoid potentially becoming a party to a prohibited transaction with their plans.

    If, for example, a covered service provider did not respond to a plan sponsor’s initial disclosure request, the plan sponsor must send a second letter to the provider requesting the necessary information. If the provider fails to comply with this second written request within 90 days, the plan sponsor must notify the DOL of the provider’s failure to respond not later than 30 days after the earlier of the provider’s refusal to provide the necessary information or 90 days after the date of the plan sponsor’s second request.

    If a delinquent covered service provider does not respond to a plan sponsor’s second request for required information, a plan sponsor must revisit the arrangement with the delinquent covered service provider and determine whether to terminate or continue the arrangement. If, however, the requested information relates to future services and is still not disclosed by the end of the 90-day period, the plan sponsor must terminate the arrangement with the delinquent provider as soon as possible.

    Prepare 404(a)(5) Participant Disclosure Notices

    Plan sponsors of participant-directed individual account plans, such as 401(k) and 403(b) plans, should be drafting and reviewing initial participant fee disclosure notices, which must be distributed to plan participants and beneficiaries by Aug. 30, 2012. Plan sponsors that have not received draft notices from their vendors should reach out to their vendors as soon as possible.

    The notices, intended to help participants and beneficiaries make informed decisions about the management of their individual accounts, must provide the following categories of information:

    What Do Participants and Beneficiaries Need to Know?

    • General Operational and Identification Information: when they can give investment instructions and any limits on those instructions (i.e., transfer restrictions between designated investment alternatives), what designated investment alternatives are offered under the plan and any investment managers that the plan employs.
    • Administrative Expenses: what fees for general plan administrative services are charged against their individual accounts (e.g., legal, accounting and recordkeeping services) and how the charges are allocated (i.e., pro rata or per capita).
    • Individual Expenses: what expenses are charged against their accounts on an individual, rather than plan-wide, basis based on the participant’s or beneficiary’s actions (e.g., fees for processing loans, QDROs or hardship withdrawals).

    In addition, plan sponsors should ensure that participants’ quarterly statements are revised to include the new required information. These revised quarterly statements must be distributed in the third quarter of 2012.

    Authored by Ronald E. Richman, Susan E. Bernstein and Melissa J. Sandak .

    If you have any questions about the required disclosures, or if you need help reviewing the disclosure statements that you have already received or drafting follow-up communications to service providers, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Updates Form PF Frequently Asked Questions

    SEC Updates Form PF Frequently Asked Questions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Updates Form PF Frequently Asked Questions

    July 20, 2012

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 19, 2012, the staff of the Division of Investment Management of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Staff”) updated its Form PF Frequently Asked Questions (the “FAQs”) to include significant new interpretive guidance on Form PF. The FAQs are available on the SEC’s website.

    The FAQs address a number of important questions. Of particular note, with respect to the reporting of counterparty credit exposure in Questions 22, 23, 36 and 37 of Form PF, the Staff clarified that advisers should only include counterparties for over-the-counter derivative transactions, loans and loan commitments. Advisers should not include assets held in custody at their custodians or prime brokers (except to the extent such assets are held as collateral by such custodians or prime brokers in their capacity as derivative counterparties or lenders), and advisers should not include futures positions or excess margin held at a futures commission merchant (Q.22.1).

    The Staff also provided guidance on the definition of the term “borrowings,” which it interpreted broadly to include certain types of synthetic borrowings (Questions 12 and 43 of Form PF). Specific examples of borrowings provided in the FAQs include short sales, securities lending transactions, repos, variation margin owed but not yet paid and certain types of synthetic borrowings (Q.12.1).

    In light of the timing of these significant updates to the FAQs, the Staff has included guidance on whether advisers that have already set up systems to meet the initial Aug. 29 filing date are required to change their calculations for the initial filing to the extent the assumptions on which the answers in the initial filings are based differ from the guidance provided by the Staff. There is no extension to the deadline — advisers that meet the $5 billion threshold are still required to file on or before Aug. 29. However, the Staff has said that it will not recommend enforcement action if an adviser is unable to incorporate the Staff’s guidance, so long as: (i) the adviser’s assumptions were reasonable based on the facts and circumstances at the time its reporting system was developed, (ii) the assumptions or other approaches taken by the adviser in reporting information in its initial filing that are inconsistent with such guidance are identified in Question 4 of Form PF, and (iii) the adviser reflects such guidance in its Form PF reports filed after the initial filing (Q.A.3).

    Other topics covered by the FAQs include:

    • Adding deferred compensation as part of a fund’s net asset value (Q.G.1)
    • Using market value for derivatives (as opposed to gross notional value) in determining certain thresholds under Form PF (Q.11.1)
    • Determining the amount to be reported as a borrowing for short sales (Q.12.2)
    • Calculating a fund’s counterparty credit exposure, including specific calculations for securities lending, short transactions, repos and derivative transactions (Q.22.1-Q.22.5)
    • Requiring answers to Question 42 (the stress testing question), if a manager has models or other systems that have the ability to test the factors listed in Question 42 (Q.42.1)
    • Determining the aggregate value of derivatives positions (Q.44.1)

    Advisers that are required to file Form PF should review the latest updates to the FAQ and compare the Staff’s guidance with the current assumptions on which the answers in their Form PF filings will be based.

    Authored by Jennifer Dunn, Jason S. Kaplan and Patrick Dundas.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Jason S. Kaplan

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Update on Recent CFTC Actions Affecting Fund Managers

    Update on Recent CFTC Actions Affecting Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Update on Recent CFTC Actions Affecting Fund Managers

    July 20, 2012

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    There have been four recent developments with respect to Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) regulatory issues that directly affect fund managers:

    • The SEC and CFTC approved final rules defining the terms “swap” and “security-based swap.” Fund managers that have claimed or are considering claiming an exemption from registration as a commodity pool operator (“CPO”) pursuant to Rule 4.13(a)(3), with respect to private investment funds, or Rule 4.5, with respect to funds registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “De Minimis Exemptions”), will need to use these definitions in determining their eligibility to rely on the De Minimis Exemptions.
    • The CFTC issued no-action relief temporarily reinstating, until Dec. 31, 2012, the Rule 4.13(a)(4) exemption from CFTC registration for CPOs that was withdrawn in February 2012. CPOs can claim an exemption from registration pursuant to Rule 4.13(a)(4) even for funds formed after Apr. 24, 2012, which was the effective date of the February withdrawal of the rule.
    • In granting this no-action relief, the CFTC specifically rejected a request for an extension of the Dec. 31, 2012 deadline for CPO registration by fund managers that are unable to rely on the De Minimis Exemptions as amended earlier this year by the CFTC.
    • The National Futures Association (“NFA”) reminded fund managers of the changes going into effect after Dec. 31, 2012 and also announced the availability of a new option for fund managers to defer the effective date of a new registration to Jan. 1, 2013, the date as of which the Rule 4.13(a)(4) exemption can no longer be relied upon (the “NFA Guidance”).

    Final Rules Defining “Swap” and “Security-Based Swap”

    Under the new regulatory framework established by the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC was given regulatory authority over “swaps,” the SEC was given regulatory authority over “security-based swaps” and the CFTC and SEC were given joint regulatory authority over “mixed swaps.” In addition, the CFTC and SEC, in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, were authorized to further define the terms “swap” and “security-based swap.” The definitions of these terms determine the scope of a number of the CFTC’s and SEC’s recently-adopted regulatory initiatives, including rules requiring registration and regulation of swap dealers and major swap participants, rules imposing clearing, trade execution, reporting and recordkeeping requirements on the parties to swaps, and availability of the De Minimis Exemptions. The adoption of the definitive definitions by the CFTC and the SEC, which will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register, clears the way for these rules to go into effect.

    Significantly for fund managers, from Dec. 31, 2012 onward, swaps will be considered “commodity interests” for purposes of the determining a manager’s eligibility to rely on the De Minimis Exemptions made available by Rule 4.13(a)(3) (private funds) and Rule 4.5 (registered funds) under which fund managers need not register as CPOs with the CFTC. This means that the initial margin posted in connection with swap transactions will need to be included in determining whether a fund meets the “5 percent test,” of Rule 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(A) or Rule 4.5[1] and in determining whether the net notional value of commodity interests meets the “100 percent test,” established under these rules.[2] The 585-page release can be found on the CFTC’s website.[3] We will be addressing the specifics of the release in a future Alert.

    Temporary Reinstatement of the Rule 4.13(a)(4) Exemption from CPO Registration

    On Feb. 24, 2012, the CFTC issued final rules that rescinded the CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(4) exemption from CPO registration (and the accompanying CTA exemption for 4.13(a)(4) pools under Rule 4.14(a)(8)(i)(D)). However, the CFTC allowed private fund managers that claimed the exemption on or before April 24, 2012 to continue to rely on the exemption until Dec. 31, 2012. This meant that CPOs launching new funds after April 24 could not claim 4.13(a)(4) exemptive relief, while those that had claimed the exemption for their existing or newly launched funds prior to April 24 would have the benefit of the exemption until Dec. 31, 2012.

    On July 13, 2012, in response to a request for relief from industry groups,[4] the CFTC staff agreed that there is disparate treatment of similarly situated entities where the timing of a fund’s launch is the sole determining factor whether Rule 4.13(a)(4) is available and issued no-action relief to remedy the situation.[5] The relief effectively temporarily reinstates Rule 4.13(a)(4) even for CPOs of those funds for which the exemption was not claimed on or before April 24. Nonetheless, the relief reiterates that the Rule will be rescinded for all CPOs on Dec. 31, 2012. Since electronic filing of the 4.13(a)(4) exemption on the NFA’s website is no longer available, the exemptive filing is done by submitting a claim for exemption via email. The claim is filed by emailing certain basic CPO information to mdsionoaction@cftc.gov. Additionally, CTAs advising such funds can make a similar claim of exemption. These claims can be filed immediately.

    Denial of Relief Extending Effective Dates Past Dec. 31, 2012

    The above-mentioned industry groups’ request also asked the CFTC to extend the date as of which swaps would be considered to be commodity interests for purposes of the de minimis tests in Rule 4.13(a)(3) and Rule 4.5 until 10 months after the effective date of final rules defining the term “swap” and setting initial margin requirements for swaps. The CFTC denied this request, noting that fund managers are being given sufficient time to implement procedures for purposes of testing compliance with the De Minimis Exemptions since the definition of swap has now been adopted. The CFTC’s response further noted that, although margin requirements for uncleared swaps had not yet been adopted, those requirements would only be effective for swaps entered into after the effective date of any new rule and that, in the interim, CPOs should have the necessary information regarding margin payments made for their current swaps portfolio.

    NFA Guidance and Deferred Registration

    The NFA Guidance introduced a new feature to the registration process under which fund managers and advisers that need to register as CPOs by Jan. 1, 2013 have the option of completing the registration process now, but deferring the effectiveness of the registration until Jan. 1, 2013. Historically, the CPO registration process has taken approximately four-six weeks (but can vary widely, depending on the nature of the background information provided). The NFA expects an influx of many new registrants over the course of the next few months (from managers of private funds and registered funds that will no longer meet the requirements of the De Minimis Exemptions. Thus, it is expected that the registration process may take longer than usual as the year progresses. Under the registration option the NFA has made available, a fund manager will be able until the end of 2012 to continue to rely on the Rule 4.13(a)(4) or Rule 4.5 exemption as in effect prior to amendment and not be subject to various requirements applicable to registered CPOs (such as quarterly statements and audited year-end financial statements to investors, as well as the new Form CPO-PQR and Form CTA-PR) until Jan. 1, 2013.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    [1] Under the “5 percent test” in CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(A), the aggregate initial margin, premiums for commodity interests (and required minimum security deposit for retail forex transactions), determined at the time the most recent position was established, cannot exceed 5 percent of the liquidation value of the pool’s portfolio after taking into account unrealized profits and unrealized losses. The “5 percent test” in CFTC Rule 4.5(c)(2)(iii)(A) is quite similar except that commodity interests used for bona fide hedging purposes do not need to be counted.

    [2] Under the alternative “100 percent test” in Rule 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B), the aggregate net notional value of the pool’s commodity interest and security futures positions, determined at the time the most recent position was established, cannot exceed 100 percent of the liquidation value of the pool’s portfolio, after taking into account unrealized profits and unrealized losses. The “100 percent test” in CFTC Rule 4.5(c)(2)(iii)(B) is quite similar except that commodity interests used for bona fide hedging purposes do not need to be counted.

    [3] The text of the final rule release can be found at: http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/federalregister071012c.pdf. Please note that the text of the final rule release is subject to change until published in the Federal Register.

    [4] The request for no-action relief was submitted by the Managed Funds Association, Investment Adviser Association, Alternative Investment Management Association, Ltd. and the Investment Company Institute.

    [5] The no-action letter can be found at: http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/12-03.pdf.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • CJEU Rules First Sale Doctrine Applies to Digital Copies of Software in Europe

    ARTICLE

    CJEU Rules First Sale Doctrine Applies to Digital Copies of Software in Europe

    July 17, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In an eagerly-awaited judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that the first sale doctrine applies to digital copies of software sold in the European Union or European Economic Area.

    In Luxembourg on 3 July 2012, the CJEU held that the resale and use of used software is permissible under European copyright law. The Court found that, under the first sale doctrine, which is part of the Computer Program Directive (Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs), there is no difference between physical copies on a data carrier and digital copies distributed online. As the legitimate owner of the digital copy, a purchaser of used software is even allowed to download updates from the software vendor’s website.

    See more

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Claus Färber

    Counsel

    Munich

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  • Seventh Circuit Protects Nondebtor Licensee of Rejected Trademark License

    Seventh Circuit Protects Nondebtor Licensee of Rejected Trademark License

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Protects Nondebtor Licensee of Rejected Trademark License

    July 12, 2012

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on July 9 that the nondebtor licensee of a rejected trademark license may continue to use the trademark (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Mfg., LLC, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 2687939 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012) (Easterbrook, Ch. J.)). The court’s clear, concise and no-nonsense opinion explained that Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 365(g) deems a trustee’s rejection to be a “breach” of the contract, enabling “the other party’s rights [to] remain in place.” Id., at *3. In short, “nothing about [the rejection] process implies that any rights of the contracting party have been vaporized.” Id.

    Relevance

    Owners of intellectual property prefer to enter into license agreements, authorizing a licensee to use the intellectual property in exchange for fees or royalties. The owner’s bankruptcy, however, can have a significant impact because the license may constitute the cornerstone of the licensee’s business.

    Congress enacted the “Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act” (Code § 365(n)) on Oct. 18, 1988 to protect an intellectual property licensee by permitting it to retain rights under its license agreement despite the rejection of that agreement by the licensor’s bankruptcy trustee or by the debtor-licensor as chapter 11 debtor-in-possession. Among other things, Congress responded to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). In that case, the chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, as licensor, obtained leave to reject a technology licensing agreement under Code § 365(a) as a matter of business judgment. The court deprived the licensee of the right to use the licensed technology after rejection, however, limiting the licensee to a monetary damage claim with no right to specific performance. Despite the licensee’s claim of unfair prejudice, the court suggested that the licensee’s remedy lay with Congress. But the later 1988 legislation did not apply to licenses of trademarks, trade names or service marks (Senate Report, p.t. III. D, at 5, accompanying S. 1626, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. H 9484 (1988) H.R. Rep. No. 1012, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1988)). Because it rejects the holding of Lubrizol, the Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam decision admittedly “creates a conflict among the circuits.” Id., at *4. And because the entire Seventh Circuit declined “a hearing en banc,” the appellant in Sunbeam may very well seek review by the Supreme Court of the United States.

    Facts

    The debtor licensor authorized the licensee “to practice [the licensor’s] patents and put its trademarks on the completed [products], . . . authorizing [the licensee] to sell [products] for its own account if [the licensor] did not purchase them.” Id., at *1. After the licensor became the subject of a bankruptcy case, Sunbeam bought the debtor’s assets, including its patents and trademarks, but did not want the licensee “to sell [the debtor-licensor’s products] in competition with [its own] products.” Id. When the licensee continued “to make and sell” the licensor’s products, Sunbeam sued in the bankruptcy court, agreeing to share its recovery with the licensor’s trustee who had rejected the debtor’s contract with the licensee.

    The Bankruptcy Court’s Ruling

    The bankruptcy court, after trial, held that the licensee was entitled to continue making and selling the licensor-debtor’s products bearing the debtor’s trademarks. Id. Finding that Code § 365(n) did not answer “the question whether rejection of an intellectual property license ends the licensee’s right to use trademarks,” the bankruptcy judge authorized the licensee to continue using the trademarks “on equitable grounds” because the licensee had invested “substantial resources in making” the products. Id., at *2.

    The Appeal

    Sunbeam appealed directly to the Court of Appeals following certification by the district court. Id., at *1. The sole issue on appeal was “the effect of the trustee’s rejection . . . .” Id.

    The Code’s Omission of Trademarks: “Just an Omission”

    Code § 101(35A), where defining “intellectual property,” “does not mention trademarks,” said the Seventh Circuit. Id. Rejecting speculation by “some bankruptcy judges” as to whether the Fourth Circuit’s Lubrizol decision applied to trademark licenses, the Seventh Circuit said that “an omission is just an omission . . . . § 365(n) [that the later 1988 legislation] does not affect trademarks one way or the other.” Id. According to the relevant legislative history, moreover, Congress merely wanted “more time for study” when it made the omission, but “not to approve Lubrizol.” Id.

    The Court of Appeals rejected the bankruptcy court’s equitable analysis in Sunbeam. “There are hundreds of bankruptcy judges, who have many different ideas about what is equitable in any given situation. Some may think that equity favors licensees’ reliance interests; others may believe that equity favors the creditors, who can realize more of their claims if the debtor can terminate IP licenses. Rights depend, however, on what the Code provides rather than on notions of equity.” Id., at *2. Although the bankruptcy judge’s reasoning was “untenable,” the Seventh Circuit still affirmed because it found Lubrizol’s holding “mistaken.” Id., at *2.

    Analysis: Consequences of Contract Rejection

    Homing in on the precise language of Code § 365(g), the court found that “rejection takes effect immediately before the [bankruptcy] petition’s filing,” and “that rejection ‘constitutes a breach of such contract.’” Id., at *3. The court then used the Code’s terms to frame its analysis: “Outside of bankruptcy, a licensor’s breach does not terminate a licensee’s right to use intellectual property.” Id. Had the licensor in Sunbeam breached its contract prior to bankruptcy, it could not have ended the licensee’s “right to sell the [products] by failing to perform its own duties, any more than a borrower could end the lender’s right to collect just by declaring that the debt will not be paid . . . . What § 365(g) does by classifying rejection as breach is establish that in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights remain in place. . . . The debtor’s unfulfilled obligations are converted to damages; when a debtor does not assume the contract before rejecting it, these damages are treated as a pre-petition obligation, which may be written down in common with other debts of the same class.” Id.

    The trustee may have had other avoiding powers (fraudulent transfer; preference), but “never contended that [the licensor’s] contract with [the licensee] is subject to rescission.” Id., at *4. Moreover, contract rejection does not constitute rescission avoiding the contract and reinstating the parties to their prior position. Rather, it “merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform” and “has absolutely no effect upon the contract’s continued existence”. Id., quoting Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007). As the court noted, “Lubrizol . . . devoted scant attention to the question whether rejection cancels a contract, worrying instead about the right way to identify executory contracts to which the rejection power applies.” Id. Scholars have uniformly criticized Lubrizol, “concluding that it confuses rejection with the use of an avoiding power.” Id., citing Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy, 130-40 & n.10 (4th e.d. 2006).

    *   *   *

    The refreshing clarity of Sunbeam is welcome. For more than 25 years, courts and litigants have argued over the consequences of contract rejection. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari here, it will have one more “easy case” to resolve, “clearly and predictably using well established principles of statutory construction.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2093 (2012).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Eurozone Crisis: ISDA Publishes the Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol

    Eurozone Crisis: ISDA Publishes the Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eurozone Crisis: ISDA Publishes the Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol

    12 July 2012

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) published the ISDA Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol (the “Protocol”) on 11 July 2012.[1] The Protocol amends the 1992 version of the ISDA Master Agreement (“’92 ISDA”) to include the Illegality and Force Majeure provisions from the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement (“2002 ISDA”).

    The Protocol is part of ISDA’s more general efforts to provide an industry contingency plan for the Eurozone crisis.[2]

    Background

    There have been concerns about the impact of an exit of one or more Eurozone countries from the Euro as a currency on financial OTC derivatives transactions (“Transactions”).

    There is currently no legal process agreed upon for a country to exit the Euro and a number of potential scenarios have been identified. This uncertainty has in turn caused difficulty in identifying one clear process to deal with the impact of such an exit on Transactions. Examples of possible exit scenarios include:

    • An exit by one or more member states from the Euro in an agreed process;
    • A unilateral exit by one or more member states from the Euro;
    • Currency re-denomination (i.e., Euro ceasing to exist); and
    • Currency “split” (i.e., the split of the Euro into two or more currencies linked to different exchange rate mechanisms).

    The Protocol Amendments

    The Protocol enables adhering counterparties to amend the terms of each ’92 ISDA to include the Illegality and Force Majeure Termination Events of the 2002 ISDA. Unlike Events of Default, under a Termination Event, a party may elect to (i) terminate one or more specific Transactions affected by the triggering event which, for example, might be the inability of the counterparty to make a payment or delivery due a Eurozone country exiting the Euro, or (ii) terminate the ISDA Master Agreement and all Transactions covered by the agreement with its counterparty.

    Under the Illegality Termination Event (“Illegality”),[3] termination rights arise if, after a Transaction is entered into, it becomes unlawful under applicable law:

    (i)  For the office through which a party is acting to make and receive payments or deliveries with respect to such Transaction or to comply with any material provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement, or

    (ii)  For a party or its credit support provider to perform its obligations to make or receive a payment or delivery of collateral under a credit support document in relation to a Transaction.

    An example of an event which might constitute Illegality might be a change of legislation which made it unlawful for a party to continue to be a counterparty to a Transaction.

    Illegality is also a Termination Event under the ’92 ISDA. However, the 2002 ISDA (and the Protocol) version of Illegality occurs where a party is prevented from making or receiving a payment or delivery through the office through which it is acting regardless of whether or not it is able to make or receive a payment or delivery through another office.

    The Force Majeure Termination Event (“Force Majeure”)[4] covers events which fall outside of the Illegality event but which would hinder or prevent performance under the ISDA Master Agreement, such as the making or receiving of a payment by a party under a Transaction or the posting or receipt of collateral. Force Majeure also extends to actions taken by sovereign states (“act of state”) that might not fall within the scope of Illegality.

    The Illegality and Force Majeure events may only be triggered after giving effect to any applicable provision, disruption fallback or other remedy specified in the Transaction-specific terms or in the Transaction-specific ISDA product definitions, such as the 2002 Equity Derivatives Definitions or 1998 FX and Currency Option Definitions, which are applicable irrespective of the version of the ISDA Master Agreement.

    Illegality and Force Majeure also include a Waiting Period.[5] The rational behind the Waiting Period is that it is, in some cases, appropriate to wait and see whether or not the event giving rise to termination rights will/might be resolved rather than there being an immediate termination right in favour of the non-affected party. For example, in a Eurozone exit by a member state re-denominating its currency, an unscheduled public holiday or non-banking day could be announced by the exiting country or indeed a number of countries while the exiting country re-denominates its currency. In such circumstances, where payment obligations under a Transaction are denominated in Euro and the Euro currency continues to exist in its current form, albeit without the membership of the exiting country, it might be argued that the payment obligations of a counterparty being subject to an unscheduled public holiday should be postponed temporarily by the Waiting Period after which the payment obligation would resume rather than the termination of the Transaction. The Waiting Period in the case of Illegality is a period of three business days and in the case of Force Majeure, eight business days.

    The Protocol Mechanism

    A protocol mechanism has been used by ISDA previously as a response to a market requirement or a crisis. Counterparties to an ISDA Master Agreement adhere to a published protocol by delivering an adherence letter to ISDA and a list of adhering parties is then published by ISDA on their website.[6] The effect of adherence is to amend or incorporate certain terms in the agreement or in relation to Transactions between adhering parties without the need to individually amend a counterparty’s entire agreement population with each of its counterparties. Where parties incorporate the Protocol by reference as a term in their ’92 ISDA, they will not be required to adhere to the Protocol.

    The Protocol introduces a Limited Right to Revoke provision,[7] under which an adhering party may elect to revoke its adherence to the protocol annually during a specified annual period being between 1 October and 31 October in a calendar year.

    The protocol also includes the Ability of an Agent to Adhere to the Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol on Behalf of a Client provision.[8] This might be of interest to fund managers managing a number of funds or master funds being counterparties to ISDA Master Agreements (typically with banks or investment firms). Such managers may execute and deliver an Adherence Letter on behalf of their managed funds or master funds thereby reducing the operational burden and enabling a quicker and more convenient response than each managed fund or master fund adhering separately as a counterparty to an ISDA Master Agreement.

    Applicability

    It is important to note that the Protocol is not intended to address all Eurozone exit scenarios but rather form part of a contingency plan put forward by ISDA. For example, two non-Eurozone counterparties (a Cayman-organised fund and an English- or New York-organised dealer) to a swap consisting of Euro denominated payment obligations, may not necessarily be directly affected by or indeed prevented from making a Euro denominated payment where one or more member states exit the Euro and re-denominate their own currency but the Euro remains unchanged. In such a scenario, parties who are disrupted from making a payment or delayed in making a delivery due to a more general market disruption, may wish to review their Transaction-specific terms and applicable ISDA product definitions as to whether or not any termination rights arise or fallbacks become applicable in relation to their affected Transactions.

    Authored by Ron Feldman and Craig Stein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] http://www.isda.org/2012illegalityProt/illegalityProt.html.

    [2] http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/eurozone-contingency-planning/.

    [3] Schedule 1, paragraph (d).

    [4] Schedule 1, paragraph (h).

    [5] Schedule 1, paragraph (u).

    [6] www.isda.org.

    [7] Protocol, paragraph 2(d).

    [8] Protocol, paragraph 4(f).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Supreme Court Upholds Landmark Health Care Reform as a Tax

    Supreme Court Upholds Landmark Health Care Reform as a Tax

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Upholds Landmark Health Care Reform as a Tax

    July 10, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 28, Chief Justice Roberts announced the U.S. Supreme Court’s long-awaited decision to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, including the controversial individual mandate provision. Beginning in 2014, the mandate requires certain individuals to purchase health insurance that provides a minimum level of coverage or pay a financial penalty. The amount of the penalty for 2014 (due in April 2015) is the greater of $95 per adult and $47.50 per child (up to a maximum of $285 per family) or 1 percent of the individual’s household income. The penalty is phased in through 2016 to a maximum of $695 per adult ($2,085 maximum per family) or 2.5 percent of income, if greater. After 2016, the maximum penalty will be adjusted for cost-of-living.

    In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that while it would be unconstitutional to require individuals to purchase health insurance, Congress can impose an excise tax on those individuals who refuse to do so under its taxing power. Though not expressly called a “tax” in the legislation, the Affordable Care Act provides that the penalty is to be collected with the non-compliant individual’s taxes and must be assessed and collected in the same way as tax penalties.

    Though the Court did uphold the Affordable Care Act, stating it was confident that Congress would have wanted to preserve the Act if any of the contested provisions were struck down or modified, the Court did limit the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provision. Generally, the Affordable Care Act expands the scope of Medicaid and increases the number of individuals states are required to cover. The Act provides for increased federal funding to cover the states’ new costs for expanding their Medicaid programs, but also provides that if a state does not comply with the new coverage requirements the state will lose both future and existing federal funding. The Court ruled that Congress can condition future Medicaid funding on states’ compliance with new coverage requirements but that it cannot “penalize States that choose not to participate in [a] new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”

    Because the Affordable Care Act remains valid law, group health plans must continue to comply with the Act’s currently effective provisions (for example, providing coverage for adult dependent children, eliminating pre-existing condition exclusions for children under age 19, eliminating lifetime and annual dollar limits on essential health benefits unless a valid waiver of the annual dollar limit has been obtained and, for non-grandfathered plans, covering emergency services without pre-authorization and preventive services without cost-sharing). Furthermore, group health plans must prepare to adopt and implement the Act’s future requirement, including the following key provisions for 2012 and 2013:

    2012 Action Items

    • Providing the Summary of Benefits and Coverage (SBC) during open enrollments on or after Sept. 21, 2012; and
    • Reporting on Form W-2 the annual cost of group health care coverage for 2012 (though employers that contribute to multiemployer plans are currently exempt from this requirement).

    2013 Action Items

    • Amending Flexible Spending Account Plans to limit the maximum deferral to $2,500 for plan years beginning in 2013 (i.e., Jan. 1, 2013 for calendar year plans);
    • Increasing the FICA payroll tax withholding to include an additional 0.9 percent Medicare tax (in addition to the current 1.45 percent) on wages above $200,000 for individuals and $250,000 for married couples filing jointly;
    • Adding a new 3.8 percent tax on unearned income, including interest, dividends, capital gains and other investment income (though 401(k), pension and profit-sharing plans are exempt from this requirement); and
    • Notifying employees about the availability of state exchanges by March 2013.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Susan E. Bernstein and Melissa J. Sandak .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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