Content Type: Article

  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 87

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 87

    February, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Copyright

    UK Patents County Court Finds Copyright Subsists in Digitally Manipulated Photograph

    In Temple Island Collections Ltd v New English Teas Ltd [2012] EWPCC 1 (12 January 2012), Judge Birss QC found that an image belonging to New English Teas infringed the copyright subsisting in a digitally manipulated photograph of a London scene created by Temple Island Collections

    Trade Marks

    Wella Fails to Prove Distinctiveness of SHAPER Mark

    In Wella Corporation v Alberto-Culver Company [2011] EWHC 3558 (Ch), the UK High Court upheld the decision of a UK Intellectual Property Office Hearing Officer who rejected the application by Wella Corporation to invalidate the Alberto-Culver Company mark FUNKY SHAPER based on Wella’s earlier Community trade mark for SHAPER.

    Copyright

    CJEU Rules on Copyright Protection of Photographic Portraits

    In Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH 1 December 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that portrait photographs enjoy the same copyright protection as any other work. The CJEU also found, however, that exceptions exist that allow the media to publish such photographs without consent.

    E-Commerce / Domain Names

    Nominet Proposes Changes to UK Generic Top Level Domain Name Registration Rules

    Nominet, which runs one of the world’s largest internet registries and manages over nine million domain names, has proposed changing the rules of domain name registration for .ltd.uk, and .plc.uk domains to ensure that each company is entitled to a unique domain name. The change is intended to also reduce the potential for abuse.

    New Generic Top Level Domain Application Process Launched

    After more than seven years of planning, the application process for new generic top level domains (gTLDs) has been launched. As of 12 January 2012, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers began accepting applications for new gTLDs. There are currently just 22 gTLDs. For a mere US$185,000, anyone, anywhere in the world, whether a public or private entity, will be able to apply to create and operate a new gTLD, provided they can demonstrate the operational, technical, and financial capability to run a registry.

    Privacy and The Cloud: An EU Perspective

    By using cloud computing, companies cut costs by outsourcing data storage tasks, which means they no longer have to maintain expensive servers. However, this technological advance represents “one of the biggest challenges to data protection and data security of EU citizens” according to EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding. As a result, reform of the current European legislation on data protection is necessary.

    Data Protection

    EU Privacy: Proposal for A New Regime

    On 25 January 2012, the European Commission published the long-awaited and much-anticipated draft legislation that comprehensively reforms EU data protection law. The new legislation imposes significant changes to the way in which businesses comply with data protection laws in the European Union.

    Patents

    EU Patent Package Receives a Mixed Reaction

    The Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament has backed proposals for the new “EU patent package”, consisting of a unitary patent, language regime, and unified patent court. However, the proposals continue to face stiff criticism from academics and practitioners across the European Union, as well
    as from the UK Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee.

    Advertising and Marketing

    “UK’s Safest Broadband”: TalkTalk in Breach of CAP and BCAP Code

    TalkTalk’s adverts claiming to offer the “UK’s safest broadband” have been found to be in breach of the Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) and Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice (BCAP) Code. Although TalkTalk intended the claim to relate only to connections between the telephone network and router, the fact that its HomeSafe service only provided basic security between the router and computer led the Advertising Standards Authority to find a breach of CAP and BCAP rules relating to misleading advertising, substantiation, and other comparisons.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Boris Uphoff

    Partner

    Munich, Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • CFTC Publishes Final Swap Data Rules and Real-Time Reporting Rules

    CFTC Publishes Final Swap Data Rules and Real-Time Reporting Rules

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFTC Publishes Final Swap Data Rules and Real-Time Reporting Rules

    February 1, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) published its final rules regarding swap data recordkeeping and reporting (the “Swap Data Rules”) pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). The Swap Data Rules will put into effect the requirements under Title VII of Dodd-Frank that all swap data be reported to a swap data repository (“SDR”). In certain circumstances, U.S. private fund managers on behalf of the funds that they manage will be required to report this information to an SDR. All counterparties, including U.S. private fund managers on behalf of the funds that they manage, will be required to keep detailed records of their swaps for five years following termination of the swaps. The earliest anticipated date for compliance with the requirements of the Swap Data Rules for certain swaps will be the later of July 16, 2012, or 60 days after the publication of the definitions of swap dealer (“SD”) and major swap participant (“MSP”). However, non-SD/MSPs that have the obligation to report will have an additional 90 or 180 days, depending upon the type of swap, to report their swaps.

    In addition, the CFTC published its final rules regarding real-time public reporting of swap transaction data (the “Real-Time Rules”). The Real-Time Rules set forth how SDRs will report the data that they collect to the public, including time delays and procedures intended to protect counterparties’ anonymity.

    In depth
    Authors

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Eleventh Circuit Insulates Hedge Fund Investors in Ponzi Scheme From Fraudulent Transfer Attack

    Eleventh Circuit Insulates Hedge Fund Investors in Ponzi Scheme From Fraudulent Transfer Attack

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eleventh Circuit Insulates Hedge Fund Investors in Ponzi Scheme From Fraudulent Transfer Attack

    February 1, 2012

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on Oct. 27, 2011, held “that a defrauded investor [in a Ponzi scheme] gives ‘value’ to the Debtor[s] in exchange for a return of the principal amount of the investment, but not as to any payments in excess of principal.” Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 2011). Although the defendant investors “held an equity interest in the insolvent debtors,” the court reasoned that “defrauded investors have a claim for fraud against the debtor arising as of the time of the initial investment.” Id. (citing decisions from the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits). According to the court, it was ruling on a single narrow “issue of first impression in this Circuit”: whether the return of a nominal equity investment to a defrauded hedge fund investor constituted “value.” Id. at 625.

    Facts

    Each of the debtors “was structured either as a limited liability company or a limited partnership.” Id. at 626. Typical of other Ponzi schemes, “capital contributions made to the Debtors by later equity investors were used to repay earlier investors more than their investments were actually worth, as well as fictitious profits.” Id.[1] The debtors were able to “induce prospective investors to make new equity investments . . . through execution of a limited liability company agreement, a limited partnership agreement, and/or a subscription agreement.” Id. Thus, “each investor defendant held an equity interest in one or more of the debtors, denominated as a membership unit or limited partnership interest.” Id.

    The Lower Court

    The trustee sued to recover the distributions made to the investors, alleging that all payments made to the investors prior to the collapse of the debtors’ Ponzi scheme were fraudulent transfers under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 548(a)(1)(A) and applicable state law (“made . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors). Id. at 625. In response, the investors asserted an affirmative defense under Code § 548(c), claiming that the transfers were “for value and in good faith.” Id. After the bankruptcy court denied the trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment on the sole issue of “value,” it certified the trustee’s appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Because transfers “made in furtherance of [a Ponzi] scheme are presumed to have been made with the intent to defraud” creditors, the trustee argued that “transfers to redeem an equity investment in an insolvent entity (initially made free of fraud) cannot constitute a transfer ‘for value.’ ” Id. at 626-27.

    Court of Appeals

    The Eleventh Circuit accepted the “general rule” adopted by other Circuits that the “return of the principal amount” of the defrauded investor’s investment constituted “value.” Id. at 627 (citing Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2008); Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1995)). “Courts have recognized that defrauded investors have a claim for fraud against the debtor arising as of the time of the initial investment.” Id. (citing Jobin v. McKay (In re M&L Business Mach. Co., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1340-42 (10th Cir. 1996); Wyle v. Ryder (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 1991)). Any “fictitious profits” paid to the investors, however, are recoverable by the trustee because “they exceed the scope of the investors’ fraud claim” and are thus not made for “value.” Id. (citing Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedge- Investments, Assoc., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 1996); In re United Energy, 944 F.2d at 595, n.6).

    The trustee argued that the other Circuit decisions were based on either tort or contract claims held by the defrauded investors. Because the investors in Perkins held an equity interest in the insolvent debtors, payments to the defendant investors, asserted the trustee, were redemptions of “their equity interests and were not made in satisfaction of a debt.” 661 F.3d at 627. Because “transfers to redeem an equity investment in an insolvent entity . . . cannot constitute a transfer ‘for value,’ ” reasoned the trustee, cases such as Donell, Scholes and Jobin did not apply. See, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir. 1983) (held corporate debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value when shareholder redeemed equity investment).

    The Court of Appeals in Perkins rejected the trustee’s argument because of the existence of a Ponzi scheme. Id. at 628. Unlike the routine equity redemption case, investors here “were fraudulently induced into making their initial investments,” and “possessed fraud claims that would be satisfied in whole or in part by virtue of the later transfers.” Id. Although the trustee “asked the court to focus solely on the form of the investment to the exclusion of all other factors, and to ignore the realities of how Ponzi schemes operate,” the Eleventh Circuit would not apply a “form over substance rule in fraudulent transfer actions involving Ponzi schemes.” Id. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had been “the only [other] court of appeals to address this issue” and to apply “the general rule to equity investors in a Ponzi scheme,” rejecting “any attempts to distinguish between the forms of the investment.” Id. (citing AFI Holding, 525 F.3d at 708-09 (investor “acquired a restitution claim at the time he bought into [the] Ponzi scheme, . . . [and] [i]t is this restitution claim, in toto, that [the investor] exchanged when [the debtor] returned [the investor’s] principal ‘investment’ amount.”)). As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, the “general rule applies in a Ponzi scheme setting regardless of whether good faith investors have an equity interest in, or some other form of claim against, the legal equity constituting the instrument of the fraud.” Id. at 628-29. In short, “later transfers from the debtors up to the amount of the investment satisfied the investor defendants’ restitution or fraud claims and provided value to the Debtors.” Id. at 629.

    Comment

    The battle is not over for the defendant investors. They still have to convince the bankruptcy court that they acted in “good faith” to prevail on their defense under Code § 548(c). See, e.g., Orlick v. Kozyak (In re Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc.), 309 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (held commissions paid to transferee, to extent they did not exceed value of services rendered in good faith, without knowledge of debtor’s Ponzi scheme, not subject to avoidance as constructively fraudulent transfers); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Hays (In re Hannover Corp.), 310 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2002) (held when transferee had no way of knowing that debtors were insolvent and when, upon reading newspaper stories about a fraud suit against the debtor, transferee undertook its own investigation, contacting SEC and Federal District Court, and receiving assurances that it could continue to accept payments from debtor, transferee had received payments in good faith); In re Bayou Group LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (held bankruptcy court improperly granted summary judgment against defendants in Ponzi scheme fraudulent transfer case on bad faith ground because it had “significantly expanded the scope of information prior courts have found sufficient to require inquiry”; rejected bankruptcy court’s test of “some infirmity in” debtor’s business or “integrity of management” as “so broad as to be indefinable”; instead, defendant on inquiry notice only when it has information “suggesting [debtor’s] insolvency or a fraudulent purpose in making a transfer . . . .”); In re Manhattan Invs. Fund Ltd., 2009 WL 1528764 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirmed jury verdict in favor of defendant who “had conducted itself in good faith throughout the period of the transfers in question.”).[2]

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] “The essence of a Ponzi scheme is to use newly invested money to pay off old investors and convince them that they are earning profits rather than losing their shirts.” Id. at 625 n.1.

    [2] SRZ represented defendants in both In re Bayou Group LLC and In re Manhattan Invs. Fund Ltd.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule and Concurrent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Implement the Dodd-Frank Act Remittance Transfer Provisions

    Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule and Concurrent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Implement the Dodd-Frank Act Remittance Transfer Provisions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule and Concurrent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Implement the Dodd-Frank Act Remittance Transfer Provisions

    January 27, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 20, 2012, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a final rule amending Regulation E (12 C.F.R. Part 1005) (the “Final Rule”), which implements the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1693, et seq.) (“EFTA”) and the Official Interpretations (Supplement I to Part 1005) to the regulation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)) added a new section to EFTA to require remittance transfer providers (“RTPs”), which include, e.g., traditional money transmitters, banking institutions and certain providers of prepaid cards that provide international remittance transfers in the normal course of their business to provide certain consumer protections. The Final Rule implements such protections by providing consumers with certain disclosures and error resolution rights when sending remittance transfers to consumers or businesses abroad. The Final Rule does not apply to business-to-consumer or business-to-business transactions. The Final Rule is effective one year from the date it is published in the Federal Register.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Seventh Circuit Holds Real Estate Debtor Cannot Cram Down Undersecured Lender With Bonds

    Seventh Circuit Holds Real Estate Debtor Cannot Cram Down Undersecured Lender With Bonds

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Holds Real Estate Debtor Cannot Cram Down Undersecured Lender With Bonds

    January 25, 2012

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of a single asset real estate case on Jan. 19, 2012, reasoning that the debtor’s proposed substitute collateral “was not the indubitable equivalent of the [undersecured lender’s] mortgage.” In re River East Plaza, LLC, 2012 WL 169760, *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012) (Posner, J.). In the court’s words, the debtor “wanted [the lender] out of there and decided to seek confirmation of a [reorganization] plan . . . that would replace the [lender’s] lien on [a Chicago office] building with a lien on $13.5 million in substitute collateral, namely 30-year Treasury bonds that would be bought by an investor in the reorganized firm.” Id. at *4. The court’s concise opinion provides a sensible, clear guide to: (1) the so-called “cramdown” of secured claims; (2) the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 1111(b) election available to secured lenders; and, most important, (3) what constitutes the “indubitable equivalent” of a lender’s collateral under Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).

    Facts

    The debtor owned a Chicago office building subject to the lender’s first mortgage. After the debtor defaulted in 2009, it later filed a Chapter 11 petition in February 2011, “just hours before” a scheduled foreclosure sale. Id. at *1. Although the debtor owed the lender $38.3 million, it valued the building “at only $13.5 million,” a valuation that the Seventh Circuit believed may have been “too low.” Id. at *3. Rather than asserting a $13.5 million secured claim plus a $24.8 million unsecured claim as lenders often do,[1] the lender made the critical § 1111(b)(1)(B)(2) election, leaving it with a “secured claim for $38.3 million and no unsecured claim.” Id. at *3.

    Rationale for § 1111(b) Election

    The court concisely explained why the lender here exchanged its secured and unsecured claims for a single secured claim equal to the face amount of the unpaid mortgage balance. “The swap [i.e., § 1111(b) election] is attractive to a mortgagee who believes both that the property that secures his mortgage is undervalued and that the reorganized firm is likely to default again — which often happens . . . .” Id. at *3. The election thus enables the creditor, in the event of a further default after the value of the property has risen, “to apply a higher value of the collateral to the satisfaction of the debt than if he had accepted a secured claim equal to the lower value of the collateral at the time of bankruptcy.” Id. In other words, had the lender not made the § 1111(b) election, “it would receive some fraction of its unsecured claim . . . , and would continue after the bankruptcy to have a $13.5 million claim secured by the building . . . . In contrast, given [the election here], if the value of the building rose . . . to $20 million by the time the former debtor again defaulted, [the lender] . . . would realize all $20 million because [its] secured claim would exceed that amount.” Id. The relevant real estate market here had been depressed, causing the lender to expect the property’s value to rise.

    Cramdown

    The word “cramdown” is bankruptcy parlance for a drastic measure enabling a reorganization plan proponent to get the bankruptcy court to confirm a plan despite the opposition of a creditor class — here, the senior secured lender. Among other things, Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b) requires, as a threshold matter, that the proposed plan not only be “fair and equitable” (defined by case law) as to the dissenting class, but that the plan also not “unfairly discriminate” against the dissenting class. In addition, the Seventh Circuit in River East described the three alternative ways how a plan “can be crammed down [the lender’s] throat under one of the three subsections of” Code § 1129(b)(2)(A):

    “. . . (i), the reorganized debtor keeps the property and may be allowed to stretch out the repayment of the debt beyond the period allowed by the loan agreement, but the lien remains on the property until the debt is repaid.”;

    “. . . (ii), the debtor auctions the property free and clear of the mortgage but the creditor is allowed to ‘credit bid,’ meaning to offer at the auction, not cash, but instead a part or the whole of [its] claim, . . . so that, for example, [the lender in River East] could bid $20 million for [the debtor’s] building just by reducing its claim from $38.3 million to $18.3 million.”; or

    “(iii), the lien is exchanged for an ‘indubitable equivalent.’ . . . .”

    “[This] last subsection is the one River East invoked in its proposed plan of reorganization — unsuccessfully.” Id. at *2.

    The bankruptcy court in River East had rejected the debtor’s proposed plan, permitted the lender to foreclose, and dismissed the reorganization case. By affirming, the Court of Appeals found that the debtor had avoided “the requirement in a subsection [(§ 1129(b)(3)(A)] (i) cramdown of maintaining the mortgage lien on the debtor’s property by transferring [the lender’s] lien to different collateral . . . in the name of indubitable equivalence.” Id. at *2. But, as the court explained, “the substitute collateral . . . was not the indubitable equivalent of [the] mortgage.” Id.

    Why the Substitute Collateral Failed the Indubitable Equivalent Test

    The debtor tried to argue that the substitute collateral, $13.5 million in U.S. treasury bonds with a thirty-year maturity, “would grow in value . . . through the magic of compound interest to $38.3 million, thus guaranteeing that [the lender] would be repaid in full,” and making the “substitute collateral . . . equivalent to” the lender’s lien. Id. at *4. The debtor also argued that the lender “wanted to thwart the bankruptcy” case; “to foreclose its mortgage and . . . thus become the building’s owner” so as to benefit from any appreciation in value should the real estate market recover. Id. According to the Court of Appeals, however, “there is nothing wrong with a secured creditor’s wanting the automatic stay lifted so that it can maximize the recovery of the money owed it.” Id.

    The lender here, by making the § 1111(b) election, gave up its unsecured claim, a critical fact in the court’s analysis as to why the substitute collateral was not the “indubitable equivalent” of the original mortgage. As the court explained,

    “. . . [t]he lien on the Treasury bonds proposed by River East would not be equivalent to [the lender’s] retaining its lien on the building. Suppose the building turns out to be worth $40 million five years from now, yet [the debtor], having borrowed heavily in the interim to finance improvements to bring the building’s value up to that level, defaults. With its lien intact and the bankruptcy court unlikely in this second round of bankruptcy to stay foreclosure, [the lender] would be able to foreclose, and so would be paid in full. In contrast, if its lien were transferred to the substituted collateral, it would have to wait another 25 years to recover the $38.3 million owed it. Over that long period there almost certainly would be some inflation, so that in real terms the substituted collateral would turn out to be worth less.”

    Id. at *5 (emphasis added).

    Substituted collateral may only constitute the “indubitable equivalent” if it is “more valuable and no more volatile than a creditor’s current collateral . . . .” Id. The problem in River East was that “long-term Treasury bonds carry a substantial inflation risk, which might or might not be fully impounded in the current interest rate on the bonds.” Id. at *6. Although the bonds might eventually be more valuable than the building itself, “because of the different risk profiles of the two forms of collateral, they are not equivalents, and . . . the choice between them should [not] be made for the creditor by the debtor.” Id. Indeed, the debtor’s “aim may have been to cash out [the lender’s] lien in a period of economic depression and reap the future appreciation in the building’s value when the economy rebounds. Such a cashout is not the indubitable equivalent of a lien on the real estate, and to require it would be inconsistent with § 1111(b) of the Code . . . .” Id. “By proposing to substitute collateral with a different risk profile, in addition to stretching out loan payments,” the debtor was essentially “proposing a defective” cramdown plan under Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (debtor keeps property subject to lien until full repayment and makes installment payments with present value equal to creditor’s secured claim). Id. Although “subsection (i) is friendly to debtors,” the debtor in River East “wanted to make it friendlier still by squeezing a modified form of a subsection (i) cramdown into subsection (iii).” Id. at *7.

    Single Asset Real Estate Cases Are Time-Sensitive

    Code § 362(d)(3)(A) requires the bankruptcy court in a single asset real estate case to “grant relief from the [automatic] stay [of foreclosure], such as by terminating, annulling, modifying or conditioning such stay” unless within 90 days of the commencement of the reorganization case, “the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time.” The debtor’s substitute collateral proposal was the second reorganization plan that the bankruptcy court had rejected. Id. at *4. As a result, the statutory 90-day deadline had expired, requiring the bankruptcy court to vacate the automatic stay, enabling the lender to proceed with its foreclosure sale, leaving the debtor with nothing to reorganize, and requiring dismissal of the entire case. Despite the debtor’s proposing yet a third plan in River East, “the bankruptcy judge had lost patience,” “refused to consider” it, “lifted the automatic stay, and dismissed” the case. Id. at *7.

    According to the Seventh Circuit, the bankruptcy judge had not abused his discretion “because there was bound to be a wrangle [in the third plan proposal] over the current value of the building and the proper interest rate.” Id. Moreover, the debtor had already undermined “its credibility by submitting two plans that sought to circumvent the statute, and the 90-day” deadline had expired. Id. In the words of the Court of Appeals, the lender had been forced to wait “years to enforce its lien, [and] the bankruptcy judge was not required to stretch out the Chapter 11 [case] any longer.” Id.

    Comments

    1. The Court of Appeals and bankruptcy judge saw through the debtor’s attempted manipulation of the reorganization process. In short, the debtor and its investors were seeking to reap the anticipated increase in the property’s value. “[They] [p]robably . . . expected the value of the building to appreciate and didn’t want to share that appreciation with [the lender]. Id. at *4.

    2. River East confirms the wisdom of having an exit strategy before filing a Chapter 11 petition. A single asset real estate case does not give the debtor time to experiment with alternative reorganization proposals, as the debtor in River East tried to do. Indeed, losing credibility with the court in any reorganization is usually fatal.

    3. The Seventh Circuit also noted that the “logic” of its earlier June 28, 2011 River Road[2] decision forbids the “end run” tried in River East. Id. at *2. In the earlier case, now before the Supreme Court, the debtor “sought to avoid the creditor’s right to credit bid under [Code §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)](ii) by invoking indubitable equivalence.” Id. In River East, the debtor tried “to avoid the requirement in a [Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)] (i) cramdown of maintaining the mortgage lien on the debtor’s property by transferring [the lender’s] lien to different collateral, also in the name of indubitable equivalence.” Id. Because the proposed “substitute collateral . . . was not the indubitable equivalent” of the original mortgage, the bankruptcy court could not confirm the River East plan, regardless of how the Supreme Court rules in River Road. Id.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or the author.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Additional Gifting Opportunities in 2012

    Additional Gifting Opportunities in 2012

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Additional Gifting Opportunities in 2012

    January 24, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Tax legislation passed at the end of 2010 temporarily lowered the federal estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax rates to 35 percent; increased for 2011 and 2012 the federal estate tax exemption from $3.5 million to $5 million; increased the federal GST tax exemption from $1 million to $5 million; and reunified the federal estate and gift tax exemptions so that an individual can gift up to $5 million through 2012 free of federal gift tax. Additionally, because such legislation indexed the federal estate, gift and GST tax exemptions for inflation, such exemptions have increased further, from $5 million to $5.12 million for 2012. In order to take advantage of the increased exemptions and low transfer tax rates, as well as historically low interest rates, you may wish to implement one or more of the planning techniques discussed in this Alert before the end of this year.[1]

    Increased Exemptions, Low Tax Rates

    You may wish to consider making substantial gifts this year, while transfer tax exemptions are high and transfer tax rates are low.

    • Currently, married couples that fully utilized their federal gift tax exemption in 2011 by making aggregate gifts of $10 million, reduced by prior taxable gifts, have an additional $240,000 (and individuals have an additional $120,000) that they can give without paying any federal gift tax.
    • Those who did not utilize their gift tax exemption in 2011 still have until December 31, 2012, when the tax legislation is scheduled to expire, to make aggregate gifts of up to $10.24 million for a married couple (up to $5.12 million for an individual), reduced by prior taxable gifts, without paying any federal gift tax. Whether such gifts make sense from a tax perspective will depend on your specific situation, including consideration of whether any state gift tax might apply. (The federal gift tax exemption is in addition to the following, which you can give each year free of federal gift tax: $13,000 to an unlimited number of people; unlimited payments of tuition directly to qualifying educational organizations; and unlimited payments directly to providers of medical care or medical insurance.)
    • The federal gift tax rate is scheduled to revert to 55 percent in 2013 (from 35 percent now). To the extent that you wish to make gifts in excess of your current $5.12 million exemption, you should consider making these gifts this year while the federal gift tax rate is only 35 percent.
    • Now is also a good time to consider transferring assets into a long-term GST exempt trust. A married couple establishing GST exempt trusts today can shield assets worth up to $10.24 million (plus all future appreciation) from wealth transfer taxes for approximately 100 years in New York or in perpetuity in certain other jurisdictions.

    Historically Low Interest Rates

    With IRS interest rates at near all-time lows, you may wish to consider estate planning techniques such as intra-family loans, GRATs and sales to irrevocable grantor trusts. These techniques generate the most transfer tax savings when IRS interest rates are low.

    Review Wills and Revocable Trusts

    Many Wills and revocable trusts include a provision creating a trust (an “exemption trust”) that will be funded with the maximum amount that can pass free of federal estate or GST tax at the person’s death. Given the increased federal estate and GST tax exemption amounts for 2012 (i.e., $5.12 million), you should review your estate plan and your finances to determine whether it is appropriate for you and your spouse to fund your respective exemption trusts with the maximum exemption amount (or possibly a lesser amount), if the exemption remains at a high level. To arrive at such determination will require a case-by-case analysis based upon your financial, tax and personal circumstances.

    Please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel at your earliest convenience if you wish to discuss these or other gifting opportunities as they may apply to your specific financial and personal situation since these valuable transfer tax opportunities will expire at the end of 2012 and, in some instances, may be very beneficial to implement well in advance of that deadline.


     [1] The tax laws discussed in this Alert apply only to persons who are citizens or residents of the United States. Additionally, the techniques mentioned are described in greater detail in our November 4, 2011 Alert, available at: /insights/unique-gifting-opportunities-through-the-end-of-2012//.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • SEC Staff Issues Guidance on Registration of Investment Advisory Affiliates

    SEC Staff Issues Guidance on Registration of Investment Advisory Affiliates

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Staff Issues Guidance on Registration of Investment Advisory Affiliates

    January 23, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan, 18, 2012, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management issued a no-action letter[1] permitting registered advisers to private funds (“filing advisers”) to include general partners and similar SPVs of their affiliated funds on the filing adviser’s Form ADV. In addition, U.S. filing advisers who have affiliated investment advisory firms which are controlled by, or under common control with, the filing adviser, may include such affiliates (“relying advisers”) on their Form ADV, when they are considered part of a single advisory business. The staff set forth certain circumstances where a single advisory business would exist, absent facts suggesting otherwise. This Alert focuses on the practical implications for our clients of the Staff’s no-action letter.

    Fund General Partners, Managing Members and Similar SPVs

    Fund general partners, managing members and other similar SPVs generally do not need to separately register provided that the SPV, its employees and persons acting on its behalf are subject to supervision and control by the registered adviser, and therefore are “persons associated with” the registered adviser. This position applies to registered advisers with single or multiple SPVs.An SPV with independent directors may also rely on this position provided that those independent directors are the only persons acting on the SPV’s behalf that the registered adviser does not supervise and control.

    Investment Advisory Affiliates — Single Registration

    Many registered advisers have investment advisory affiliates formed to manage different funds, to permit different compensation structures or formed for tax liability or other purposes. The Staff’s response permits a registered adviser to file a single Form ADV — for the filing adviser and its relying advisers — provided that the filing adviser’s affiliates are controlled by or under common control with the filing adviser — and the filing adviser and each relying adviser collectively conduct a single advisory business as set forth in the no-action letter. Filing a single registration is permitted, but it is not required and advisers have the option to separately file if they otherwise qualify.

    The Staff’s no-action letter is critical for U.S. advisers with international affiliates (in the U.K., Hong Kong or elsewhere). These international advisory affiliates may provide research, advice or trading services to the U.S. registered adviser and/or the private funds it advises. The Staff’s response permits the filing adviser to include these affiliates on the filing adviser’s Form ADV, rather than separately filing for each affiliate, subject to the conditions in the letter. The Staff’s response applies only in situations where the filing adviser has its principal office and place of business in the United States.

    All of the substantive provisions and rules under the Advisers Act apply to the filing adviser and each relying adviser’s dealings with each of its clients, regardless of whether any client or adviser is a U.S. person. Another key condition is that the advisers operate under a single code of ethics and compliance policies in accordance with the Advisers Act and administered by a single chief compliance officer. The Staff noted, however, that a relying adviser operating in a different jurisdiction may have obligations that differ from the filing adviser or another relying adviser.

    The filing adviser must state in the Miscellaneous Section of Schedule D of Part 1A of Form ADV that it and its relying advisers are together filing a single Form ADV in reliance on the guidance. The filing adviser must identify each relying adviser by completing a separate Section 1.B of Schedule D for each relying adviser, identifying it by including the notation “relying adviser,” and must include all information concerning the filing adviser and each relying adviser in the Form ADV.

    Authored by Paul N. Roth and Marc E. Elovitz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


     [1] Copies of the Staff’s no-action letter and the letter from the ABA Subcommittee on Hedge Funds, which requested the Staff’s position, are available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2012/aba011812.htm. Please refer to the Staff’s response for the conditions to permit a filing adviser to include its investment advisory affiliates as relying advisers on its Form ADV.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Paul N. Roth

    Senior Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Bankruptcy Court Approves Plan to Liquidate CDO

    Bankruptcy Court Approves Plan to Liquidate CDO

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Bankruptcy Court Approves Plan to Liquidate CDO

    January 19, 2012

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a liquidation plan for collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”). The plan incorporates a settlement between senior noteholders who had initiated the bankruptcy case by filing an involuntary petition against the CDO, and junior noteholders who were appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s April 26, 2011 order granting the involuntary petition. A previous Client Alert reviewed the bankruptcy court opinion denying the junior noteholders’ motion to dismiss the filing.[1]

    While the senior noteholders’ ability to achieve a successful confirmation demonstrates that, under certain circumstances, bankruptcy may be a viable option for investors seeking to maximize returns on troubled CDO investments by actively managing the CDO’s collateral, a number of issues raised by the junior noteholders that were expected to be resolved on appeal will remain open. Additionally, this case presents another clear example that “bankruptcy remote” does not necessarily mean “bankruptcy proof.”

    Settlement Resolves Competing Plans

    ZING VII was a CDO that owned a broad array of structured products, including residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities and tranches of other CDOs (a so-called “CDO squared”). ZING VII issued several tranches of notes, secured by its assets, in the aggregate amount of approximately $365 million. As a result of deteriorating market conditions, ZING VII’s notes became undercapitalized, triggering a covenant default under the indenture.

    Notwithstanding the default, ZING VII’s indenture did not permit a liquidation of its assets absent consent of ZING’s junior noteholders. Accordingly, senior noteholders filed an involuntary petition in bankruptcy court to effectuate a liquidation of ZING VII’s assets that would have left junior noteholders out of the money.

    After the senior noteholders commenced the involuntary case, junior noteholders[2] challenged the petition and filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case. As discussed in greater detail below, the bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss.[3] Thereafter, the junior noteholders objected to the senior noteholders’ liquidation plan and filed their own disclosure statement and liquidation plan. Unlike the plan set forth by the senior noteholders, which called for an accelerated liquidation of ZING VII’s assets, the junior noteholders’ plan called for a liquidation over time. Such a liquidation, it argued, would allow value to reach the junior noteholders.

    On Oct. 5 and 6, 2011, the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing to consider confirmation of the senior noteholders’ plan. The hearing was adjourned to permit settlement discussions to occur between the senior and junior noteholders. As a result of a court-supervised mediation, the senior and junior noteholders reached a settlement, which ultimately was embodied in a jointly filed plan, providing for a cash payment of $4.375 million to junior noteholders.[4] The plan projects that senior noteholders will receive approximately $152.5 million, representing a recovery of over 80 percent of outstanding principal.

    Previously Raised Questions Remain Unresolved

    An Aug. 26, 2011 decision of the Bankruptcy Court had denied on several grounds the junior noteholders’ motion to dismiss the involuntary bankruptcy petition filed by the senior noteholders. The court, citing a procedural technicality, did not allow the junior noteholders to question the petitioning creditors’ qualifications and found that ZING VII was eligible to be a debtor under Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and that the senior noteholders did not file the petition in bad faith.

    The decision left unresolved the question of whether the petitioning creditors were qualified to file the involuntary petition. In its motion to dismiss, the junior noteholders argued that the senior noteholders were not qualified to be petitioning creditors because they did not hold claims that exceeded the value of collateral securing such claims by the amount prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code Section 303(b). Rather, they held non-recourse notes whose value could never exceed the value of the collateral. The court did not address the merits of this argument. Instead, it held that the junior noteholders could “not question the petitioning creditors’ qualifications,” because the debtor failed to contest the petition in the time prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code and the court already entered an order for relief by default.[5]

    The junior noteholders also urged the bankruptcy court to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was filed in bad faith. The junior noteholders argued that the petitioning creditors’ status as secured — rather than unsecured — creditors was indicia of bad faith. Noting its finding that the junior noteholders could not challenge the petitioning creditors’ qualifications, the bankruptcy court found no reason to consider that factor as a basis for dismissal. The junior noteholders originally appealed this portion of the bankruptcy court’s ruling,[6] but agreed to withdraw their appeal as part of the settlement.[7]

    The court had also reserved for the confirmation hearing the question of whether the plan put forth by the senior noteholders treated creditors fairly and equitably. The junior noteholders argued in the motion to dismiss that the plan would not reorganize ZING VII, “but merely transfer the [underlying mortgage-backed securities and other assets] to [the senior noteholders] without benefiting other creditors.”[8] The court noted that liquidation is an appropriate Chapter 11 purpose and that “classes of unsecured creditors and equity interests may be wiped out” so long as the plan satisfies the “fair and equitable” standard under Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court expressed that it would reserve judgment until confirmation, however, on whether the plan satisfied this standard.[9] As a result of the settlement these questions remain unanswered.

    Potential Implications

    Although several questions impacting distressed CDOs were left unanswered, the ZING VII case demonstrates that, under certain circumstances, CDO noteholders may be able to use the bankruptcy process to accelerate the liquidation of underperforming CDOs.

    Further, the case reinforces a critical point previously raised by the bankruptcy court in the General Growth Properties bankruptcy case — that “bankruptcy remote” does not mean “bankruptcy proof.”[10] Here, the bankruptcy court analyzed the provisions in ZING VII’s indentures that limited noteholders’ ability to commence an insolvency proceeding (so called “non-petition clauses”) and found that, while these clauses prevented junior noteholders from filing an involuntary petition against ZING VII, they did not mention the senior noteholders. Thus, the court concluded that the non-petition clauses were intended to serve as, and for the “benefit of senior noteholders, not a limitation on their rights to file a petition.” As such, investors are advised to carefully review an entity’s organizational and transactional documents to determine the scope of “bankruptcy remote” limitations on commencing an insolvency proceeding.

    Authored by Lawrence V. Gelber, David J. Karp, Daniel V. Oshinsky, Craig Stein and Aaron B. Wernick.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See Zais Investment Grade Limited VII — CDO Noteholders Take Advantage of Chapter 11, Schulte Roth & Zabel Client Alert, Oct. 3, 2011

    [2] ZING VII’s collateral manager, Zais Group LLC, and a senior noteholder joined the motion to dismiss.

    [3] See In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII, 455 B.R. 839 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2011).

    [4] The original senior noteholders’ plan had provided for the junior noteholders to receive no distribution.

    [5] 455 B.R. at 846.

    [6] See Designation of Record and Statement of Issues to be Presented On Appeal, Case No. 11-20243 (RTL) [D.I. 152].

    [7] A separate senior noteholder also appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision but it too agreed to withdraw its appeal as part of the settlement.

    [8] Id. at 847.

    [9] Id.

    [10] See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Daniel V. Oshinsky

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • FinCEN Issues Final Rules and Interpretive Guidance Relating to Prepaid Access

    FinCEN Issues Final Rules and Interpretive Guidance Relating to Prepaid Access

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN Issues Final Rules and Interpretive Guidance Relating to Prepaid Access

    January 13, 2012

    Read time: 18 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 29, 2011, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, issued a final rule (the “Prepaid Access Rule” or the “Rule”), amending the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) rules relating to prepaid access.[1] In particular, the Prepaid Access Rule (i) renames “stored value” as “prepaid access” and defines that term; (ii) deletes the terms “issuer” and “redeemer” of stored value; (iii) imposes suspicious activity reporting and customer and transactional information collection requirements on both providers and sellers of prepaid access, as well as a registration requirement on providers only; and (iv) exempts certain categories of prepaid access products and services posing lower risks of money laundering and terrorist financing from certain BSA requirements.

    Separately, on July 21, 2011, FinCEN published a final rule, revising the regulations regarding money services businesses (“MSBs”) to clarify those activities which subject a person to the BSA rules pertaining to MSBs and subjecting certain foreign-located MSBs with a U.S. presence to the BSA rules (the “MSB Rule”).[2] A separate Client Alert addressing the MSB Rule was issued on Oct. 26, 2011.[3]

    On Sept. 9, 2011, as a result of industry comment, FinCEN issued Notice 2011-3 (the “Notice”), extending the effective date of the Prepaid Access Rule for sellers and providers of prepaid access, and the date that providers of prepaid access must comply with the registration requirement under the Rule.[4] As a result of this Notice, FinCEN expects providers of prepaid access to comply with the following requirements of the Prepaid Access Rule by Sept. 27, 2011:

    • Development of an AML program that is risk-based and commensurate with the location, size and types of financial services offered (31 C.F.R. §1022.210 (a) and (b));
    • Reporting of suspicious transactions (31 C.F.R. §1022.320); and
    • Maintenance of additional records by providers and sellers of prepaid access (31 C.F.R. §1022.420).

    Pursuant to this Notice, FinCEN gave providers of prepaid access an extension of time until March 31, 2012 to comply with all remaining aspects of the Rule. The Notice also provides sellers of prepaid access with an extension of time until March 31, 2012 to comply with the requirements of the Rule.

    In the Notice, FinCEN indicated that it would not initiate any compliance matter or enforcement action against providers and sellers of prepaid access prior to March 31, 2012 for violations of the Prepaid Access Rule, nor assess any civil monetary penalties for violations of the Rule that occurred prior to March 31, 2012.

    We address first the new anti-money laundering regulatory requirements for providers and sellers of prepaid access and then discuss the definitions relating to the Prepaid Access Rule. In doing so, we also review FinCEN’s publication of frequently asked questions on Nov. 2, 2011 (the “FinCEN Guidance”) and information provided during FinCEN’s webinar on Nov. 11, 2011.[5]

    Requirements Relating to Providers and Sellers of Prepaid Access

    The Registration Requirement: Pursuant to the Prepaid Access Rule, each MSB (whether or not licensed as a MSB by any state), including but not limited to providers of prepaid access, and excepting agents and sellers of prepaid access, must register with FinCEN by completing FinCEN Form 107, Registration of MSB. As part of its registration, each MSB must maintain a list of its agents.[6]

    Compliance with the requirement that a complete list of prepaid programs be submitted with registration will require a change to FinCEN Form 107, Registration of MSB. Accordingly, the Notice provides that compliance with the registration requirements set forth in 31 C.F.R. §1022.380 is not required until March 31, 2012, by which time the revised FinCEN Form 107 is expected to be final.[7]

    Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Program: Each MSB, as defined by 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff), which includes, among others, sellers and providers of prepaid access, is required to “develop, implement, and maintain an effective anti-money laundering program … that is reasonably designed to prevent the MSB from being used to facilitate money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.”[8] Pursuant to the AML program requirements of the Rule, a provider or seller of prepaid access must:

    • Establish procedures to verify the identity of a person who obtains prepaid access under a prepaid program; and
    • Obtain identifying information concerning such a person, including name, date of birth, address and identification number.[9]

    A seller of prepaid access must also establish procedures to verify the identity of a person who obtains prepaid access to funds that exceed $10,000 during any one day and obtain identifying information concerning such a person, including name, date of birth, address, and identification number. The identifying information must be retained for five years from the date of the sale of the prepaid access device or vehicle. For a provider of prepaid access, the identifying information must be retained for five years after the last use of the prepaid access device or vehicle.

    In the Preamble to the Prepaid Access Rule, Treasury explains that these “requirements are intended to mirror the customer identification programs required of other financial institutions and draws on the explanations and interpretations issued with respect to those requirements.”[10]

    Reports of Suspicious Transactions: The Rule requires a provider and seller of prepaid access to file with Treasury, to the extent and manner required under 31 C.F.R. §1022.320, “a report of any suspicious transactions relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation.” Providers and sellers of prepaid access will use FinCEN Form 109, the same SAR form that all MSB filers use.[11]

    Additional Recordkeeping Requirements: The Rule requires that each provider of prepaid access “shall maintain access to transactional records generated in the ordinary course of business that would be needed to reconstruct prepaid access activation, loads, purchases, withdrawals, transfers, or other prepaid-related transactions” for a period of five years.[12]

    These records would routinely reflect (i) the type of transaction (e.g., ATM withdrawal and point-of-sale purchase; (ii) the amount and location of the transaction; (iii) the date and time of the transaction; and (iv) any other unique identifiers related to the transaction. These records need not be kept in any particular format, or by any particular participant in the prepaid program. However, the provider of prepaid access is responsible for complying with these recordkeeping requirements. The records must be easily accessible and retrievable upon the request of FinCEN, law enforcement or judicial order.[13]

    Definitions Relating to Prepaid Access Rule

    Provider of Prepaid Access: Treasury defines a provider of prepaid accessas“the participant within a prepaid program that agrees to serve as the principal conduit for access to information from its fellow program participants.” Specifically, the Prepaid Access Rule provides that “[t]he participants in each prepaid program must determine a single participant within the prepaid program to serve as the provider of prepaid access,” and that each of the participants within a prepaid program must contractually agree who among the group will be designated as the provider of prepaid access.[14] Under this approach, the designated provider of prepaid access is responsible for managing the prepaid program in a way that complies with the regulatory requirements.[15] In the absence of a participant being designated and registering as a provider of prepaid access, “the provider of prepaid access is the person with principal oversight and control over the prepaid program.”[16]

    The determination of the person who exercises “principal oversight and control over the prepaid program is a matter of facts and circumstances.” The activities that indicate principal oversight and control include:

    • Which entity organized the prepaid program;
    • Which entity sets the terms and conditions of the prepaid program and determines that the terms have not been exceeded;
    • Which entity determines the other businesses that will participate in the prepaid program, which may include the issuing bank, the payment processor or the distributor;
    • Which entity controls or directs the appropriate party to initiate, freeze or terminate prepaid access; and
    • Which entity engages in activity that demonstrates oversight and control of the prepaid program.[17]

    FinCEN recognizes that each of the foregoing may not be present in any single participant.

    Banks serving in a role that could otherwise fit the definition of a provider of prepaid access are not subject to the Prepaid Access Rule because FinCEN has excluded banks from its definition of MSBs.[18] In situations in which a bank exercises “principal oversight and control” over a prepaid program, no participant is required to register as the provider of prepaid access. However, if a participant other than a bank chooses to register, that participant is considered the provider of prepaid access and has the responsibilities under the Rule, notwithstanding the bank’s participation in the prepaid program. The Rule does not relieve banks of any of their existing BSA obligations, including those with respect to prepaid programs with which they are involved.[19]

    Seller of Prepaid Access: Treasury defines a seller of prepaid accessasany person that receives funds or the value of funds in exchange for an initial loading or subsequent loading of prepaid access, if that person:

    • Sells prepaid access offered under a prepaid program that can be used before verification of customer identification under 31 C.F.R. §1022.210(d)(1)(iv); or
    • Sells prepaid access (including closed loop prepaid access) to funds that exceed $10,000 to any person during any one day,[20] and has not implemented policies and procedures reasonably adapted to prevent such a sale.[21]

    Addressing the second prong above, the FinCEN Guidance provides that there is no one set of policies and procedures that is “reasonably adapted” to prevent sales of prepaid access that exceed $10,000 to any person during any one day. Such policies and procedures must be risk-based and appropriate to the particular retailer in question, taking into account facts such as its typical customers, its location(s), and the volume of its prepaid access sales.

    The FinCEN Guidance clarifies that the Prepaid Access Rule is not intended to cover the distribution of prepaid access products to other businesses for further distribution or sale to end users/consumers by those other businesses, regardless of whether the activity exceeded $10,000 to one business (i.e., person) in one day. Rather, FinCEN explains that the definition is intended to address sales to the end user/consumer of the prepaid access product, not businesses in the distribution channels that move the prepaid access products to the market.[22]

    Treasury provides definitions for the terms “prepaid access” and “prepaid program,” which are set forth below.

    Prepaid Access: Treasury defines “prepaid access” as including “[a]ccess to funds or the value of funds that have been paid in advance and can be retrieved or transferred at some point in the future through an electronic device or vehicle, such as a card, code, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, or personal identification number.”[23] Treasury explained in its press release that the Prepaid Access Rule would cover prepaid devices such as “plastic cards, mobile phones, electronic serial numbers, key fobs and/or other mechanisms that provide a portal to funds that have been paid for in advance and are retrievable and transferable.”

    Prepaid Program: Treasury defines a “prepaid program” as “an arrangement under which one or more persons acting together provide(s) prepaid access.”[24] Prepaid access arrangements can vary greatly, ranging from travel programs to university campus programs to public transportation programs and many others, all with specific features and characteristics targeted to different audiences and activities.[25]

    Exclusion From Prepaid Program: The Prepaid Access Rule excludes certain low-risk prepaid access arrangements from the definition of a prepaid program. Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff)(4)(iii), an arrangement is not a prepaid program if:

    • It provides closed loop prepaid access to funds not to exceed $2,000 maximum value that can be associated with a prepaid access device or vehicle on any day;[26]
    • It provides prepaid access solely to funds provided by a federal, state, local, territory and insular possession, or tribal government agency;
    • It provides prepaid access solely to funds from pre-tax flexible spending arrangements for health care and dependent care expenses, or from Health Reimbursement Arrangements (as defined in 26 U.S.C. §§105(b) and 125) for health care expenses; or
    • It (1) provides prepaid access solely to: (i) employment benefits, incentives, wages or salaries; or (ii) funds not to exceed $1,000 maximum value and from which no more than $1,000 maximum value can be initially or subsequently loaded, used, or withdrawn on any day through a device or vehicle (sometimes referred to as the “de minimis exception”); and (2) does not permit: (i) funds or value to be transmitted internationally; (ii) transfers between or among users of prepaid access within a prepaid program; or (iii) loading additional funds or the value of funds from non-depository sources.[27]

    The FinCEN Guidance provides greater clarification concerning the above exclusions from the prepaid program. With respect to the first exclusion concerning the “closed loop prepaid access” provision in 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff)(iii)(A), FinCEN explains that a closed loop prepaid access below the $2,000 threshold even where it can be used internationally is not part of a prepaid program.[28] FinCEN also explains that the $2,000 threshold for closed loop prepaid access attaches to the device or vehicle, not the person, and that it does not require aggregation of all purchases of separate (i.e., distinct) closed-loop prepaid access devices or vehicles bought by an individual in a single day. FinCEN notes that businesses that sell more than $10,000 of any type of prepaid access to an individual in a day may be sellers of prepaid access under the Rule.[29]

    Additionally, the FinCEN Guidance provides that no more than $2,000 can be associated with each closed loop prepaid access device or vehicle in one day. Accordingly, if the closed loop prepaid access arrangement permits either individual reloads of more than $2,000 per device, or cumulative reloads per device that total more than $2,000 in one day, the arrangement no longer qualifies for the “closed loop prepaid access” exception from the definition of a prepaid program under the Rule. For example, if a closed loop prepaid access device or vehicle has a value of $1,500, and the holder spends $1,000 and subsequently reloads $600 before the end of the day, this prepaid access would fall within the definition of a prepaid program because $2,100 has been associated with the prepaid access within one day.[30]

    The “closed loop prepaid access” exception from the definition of a prepaid program under the Rule is no longer valid if a cash redemption is provided other than what is required by state law. For example, for customer service purposes, some companies may offer to send an unhappy customer a check for a de minimis amount of funds, such as $20.00, on their closed-loop card. Under that scenario, the arrangement would no longer qualify for the “closed loop prepaid access” exception from the definition of a prepaid program under the Rule. However, where state law requires, as a matter of law, de minimis payouts for closed-loop products, if a prepaid program complies with such state law, the “closed loop prepaid access” exception from the definition of a prepaid program under the Rule is still valid.[31]

    With respect to the second exclusion concerning the prepaid access to government funds provision in 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff)(iii)(B), FinCEN explains that this exclusion is applicable to government agency sponsored cards, as well as loads from government entities, such as tax refunds from the Internal Revenue Service, social security payments, or federal payroll payments. So long as the prepaid access is limited to the initial loading of funds from a government entity, and no other funds can be accessed through that prepaid access, then that prepaid access arrangement is considered a solely government funded product and would fall under the second exclusion from the Rule. FinCEN cautions the industry that where programs allow the initial load from the government entity, but thereafter allow the consumer to continue to use the prepaid access with the feature that it can reload the prepaid access with funds not derived from the government, the commingling of government funds with non-government funds would cause the prepaid access no longer to fall under this second exclusion.[32] However, FinCEN explained that an exception does occur when an excluded prepaid access product that was initially limited to government funds, falling under the second exclusion, is subsequently converted to a different product that qualifies under a different exclusion.[33]

    The FinCEN Guidance also addresses other scenarios which raise questions of whether certain prepaid access devices are prepaid programs under the Rule:

    • An arrangement that provides reloadable temporary prepaid access devices is excluded from the definition of a prepaid program, regardless of whether the temporary device is reloadable, so long as its maximum value, use, or withdrawal limit is less than $1,000 on any day, and it cannot be used internationally, reloaded at a non-depository source, or used to transfer value among users.[34]
    • A provider or seller of phone cards usable solely to obtain phone service is providing or selling closed loop prepaid access. A provider of closed loop prepaid access is not a prepaid program provider unless the amount of the closed loop prepaid access associated with any one prepaid access device exceeds $2,000. The ability to use the device internationally does not change the analysis for closed loop prepaid access.[35]

    Many devices sold for future access to products or services (e.g., songs, iTunes, telephone minutes, megabytes, wireless top-up, games, software, etc.) would likely be considered prepaid access devices under a prepaid program subject to the Rule. Depending on the structure of the program, they would probably be considered closed loop prepaid access and as such would not be part of a prepaid program under the Rule unless they allowed maximum value or loads above the $2,000 threshold.[36]

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Donald J. Mosher, William I. Friedman and Matthew P. Truax.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] 76 Fed. Reg. 45,403 (July 29, 2011) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §§1010.100(ff), (ww), and (kkk), 1022.210, 1022.320, 1022.380 and 1022.420 (2011)); see also FinCEN Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Report (Jan. 5, 2011), available at: http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/annual_report_fy2011.pdf.

    [2] See 76 Fed. Reg. 43,585 (July 21, 2011) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §§1010.100(ff), 1010.605(f), 1021.311(c), 1022.210(d), 1022.380(a)(b) and 1022.410(a)(b) (2011)).

    [3] See Client Alert (Oct. 26, 2011), available at: /insights/fincen-issues-final-rules-relating-to-msb-definitions/.

    [4] FinCEN Notice 2011-3 Administrative Relief for Sellers and Providers of Prepaid Access [hereinafter Notice 2011-3], available at: http://www.fincen.gov/whatsnew/pdf/20110909.pdf.

    [5] FinCEN Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Prepaid Access Rule [hereinafter FinCEN Guidance], available at: http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20111102.pdf; “FinCEN Webinar: Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access,” Office of Regulatory Policy, FinCEN (Nov. 9, 2011) [hereinafter FinCEN Webinar], available at: http://treas.yorkcast.com/webcast/Viewer/?peid=65574c79c238460888609760473589dc1d.

    [6] See 31 C.F.R. §§1022.380(a)(3) and 1010.100(ff)(7). The MSB registration requirement does not apply to the U.S. Postal Service, or agencies of the United States, of any state, or of any political subdivision of a state.

    [7] See 76 Fed. Reg. 62,149 (Oct. 6, 2011), available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-10-06/pdf/2011-25607.pdf (for FinCEN notice and request for comments to a revised Form 107).

    [8] 31 C.F.R. §1022.210(a).

    [9] 31 C.F.R. §1022.210(d)(1)(iv).

    [10] 76 Fed. Reg. at 45,413.

    [11] 31 C.F.R. §1022.320(a); FinCEN Guidance at 6, Question 18.

    [12] 31 C.F.R. §1022.420.

    [13] 76 Fed. Reg. at 45,414.

    [14] 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff)(4)(i); see FinCEN Guidance at 2, Question 2.

    [15] FinCEN Guidance at 4, Question 10. According to FinCEN’s Guidance, a prepaid access program manager that is a participant in a prepaid program subject to the Prepaid Access Rule, but is not the provider of prepaid access for that program (i.e., another party has registered as the provider of prepaid access), has no obligations under the Rule.

    [16] 31 C.F.R.§1010.100(ff)(4)(ii); see FinCEN Guidance at 2, Question 2.

    [17] 31 C.F.R.§1010.100(ff)(4)(ii).

    [18] 76 Fed. Reg. at 45,405, note 27. Banks are subject to distinct FinCEN rules implementing the BSA with respect to their products and services generally.

    [19] FinCEN Guidance at 4, Question 9.

    [20] A “day,” as used throughout the Prepaid Access Rule, is determined by each company’s policies and procedures. For example, FinCEN explained that a “day” could start at 6:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time and end at 6:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time of the next day. See FinCEN Webinar.

    [21] 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff)(7); see FinCEN Guidance at 2-4, Questions 3, 6 and 7. A “closed loop prepaid access” is defined as “prepaid access to funds or the value of funds that can be used only for goods or services in transactions involving a defined merchant or location (or set of locations), such as a specific retailer or retail chain, a college campus, or a subway system.” 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(kkk). These may include, for example, a mall card, which can be used at one location, such as the mall, and is accepted among a number of different unaffiliated merchants that are located in the mall. SeeFinCEN Webinar. An “open loop prepaid access,” on the other hand, typically carries the network brand of a Master Card, Visa, Discover, American Express, etc., and can be used at any merchant or location, so long as the merchant accepts such network brand. Id.

    [22] FinCEN Guidance at 3, Question 5; FinCEN Webinar.

    [23] 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ww).

    [24] Id. at §1010.100(ff)(iii); see FinCEN Guidance at 1, Question 1.

    [25] FinCEN Guidance at 1, Question 1.

    [26] Id. at 6, Question 15-17; see supra note 22 (for definition of a “closed loop prepaid access”).

    [27] 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff)(4)(iii); see also FinCEN Guidance at 2, Question 1.

    [28] FinCEN Guidance at 6, Question 15.

    [29] Id., Question 16.

    [30] Id., Question 17.

    [31] FinCEN Webinar.

    [32] Id.

    [33] Id.

    [34] FinCEN Guidance at 4-5, Question 11.

    [35] Id. at 5, Question 12.

    [36] Id., Question 13.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • New Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors

    New Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors

    January 12, 2012

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted amendments to the accredited investor net worth test (as set forth in Rule 501(a)(5) (“Rule 501”) of Regulation D, the private placement safe harbor promulgated under Section 4(2) of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)). The amendments, which will take effect on Feb. 27, 2012: (1) conform Rule 501 to the modifications made to the net worth test previously effected by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”);[1] (2) add a new provision that requires an investor to include in the calculation of net worth certain incremental debt secured by the primary residence (which would not be included if the net worth calculation were made in accordance with the net worth standard effected by Dodd-Frank); and (3) add a new “grandfather” provision that allows certain investors to continue to use the pre-Dodd Frank net worth test.[2]

    Offers and sales of securities by private funds are typically made under Rule 506 of Regulation D as a “safe harbor” from registration under the Securities Act. Purchasers of securities in such offerings generally must be “accredited investors,” as defined under Rule 501(a). An individual investor may meet the definition of accredited investor by satisfying the net worth test under Rule 501, which defines an accredited investor as “[a]ny natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000.” Before Dodd-Frank amended the net worth test, net worth (which is not defined in the Securities Act or any rule promulgated thereunder) was commonly understood to mean the excess of total assets over total liabilities, including the investor’s primary residence.

    Consistent with the modifications effected by Dodd-Frank, and subsequent guidance issued by the SEC,[3] amended Rule 501 excludes from net worth an investor’s primary residence and debt that is secured by the investor’s primary residence up to the fair market value of the primary residence. However, amended Rule 501 includes a new provision that requires an investor to include as a liability any increase in the amount of debt secured by the investor’s primary residence incurred within 60 days before the investor enters into the transaction for which it is making the accredited investor representation. This 60-day “look-back” is intended to address potential incentives for investors to incur debt secured by a primary residence for the purpose of artificially inflating their net worth. Finally, amended Rule 501 also includes a “grandfather” provision that allows an investor to use the pre-Dodd-Frank net worth test if: (1) the investor purchases securities in accordance with a right to purchase such securities (e.g., a statutory right, a right arising under an entity’s constituent documents or a contractual right) that was held by the investor on July 20, 2010; (2) the investor qualified as an accredited investor on the basis of net worth at the time the investor acquired such right; and (3) the investor held securities of the same issuer, other than such right, on July 20, 2010.

    The amendments to Rule 501 become effective on Feb. 27, 2012, and the new net worth standard applies only to offers and sales of securities occurring on or after such date. Accordingly, investors making subscriptions for interests in private investment funds after Feb. 27, 2012, must certify that they are accredited investors under the new standard to the extent the offer and sale is made under Regulation D and the investor is relying on the net worth standard. Specifically, managers will need to update their subscription agreements to ensure that any new investor or current investor that is making an initial or additional subscription and that relies, directly or indirectly, on the net worth standard, certifies its status as an accredited investor under the new net worth test. Such investors may include individual investors, entity investors, IRAs, Keogh Plans or other self-directed defined contribution plans, and trusts, whether investing in a domestic or offshore fund. Funds do not need to obtain new certifications from existing investors, unless the existing investor is making an additional subscription.

    Authored by Jason S. Kaplan and Patrick Dundas.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Upon the enactment of Dodd-Frank on July 21, 2010, the accredited investor standard was modified so that a natural person is no longer permitted to include the value of his or her primary residence in determining whether such person meets the $1 million net worth test.  

    [2] See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Release No. 33–9287 (Dec. 21, 2011).

    [3] The SEC issued guidance on July 23, 2010, providing that in calculating net worth, the investor may exclude the amount of any indebtedness secured by the primary residence, up to the fair market value of the primary residence (indebtedness in excess of the fair market value should be considered a liability and deducted from the investor’s net worth).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Jason S. Kaplan

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights