Content Type: Article

  • Second Circuit Decision Reassures Bankruptcy Claim Purchasers on Enforceability of Recourse Against Sellers

    Second Circuit Decision Reassures Bankruptcy Claim Purchasers on Enforceability of Recourse Against Sellers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Decision Reassures Bankruptcy Claim Purchasers on Enforceability of Recourse Against Sellers

    September 24, 2012

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently vacated a decision by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had declined to enforce the contractual allocation of claim impairment risk between a bankruptcy claim buyer and its seller.[1] Relying on the plain language of the documents, the Second Circuit held in Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. (Longacre) that the debtors’ objection to the claims had triggered the seller’s repurchase obligation. The District Court had granted summary judgment to ATS, the seller of certain bankruptcy claims, in a suit brought by two Longacre funds, the buyers of the claims.[2] In the suit, Longacre was seeking to enforce provisions of the claims purchase documents that required ATS to repurchase the claims because the debtors had filed an objection to the claims under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code (claim disallowance when creditor received preference) and/or breached its representation and warranties concerning the claim. Rather than enforce the plain language of the claims purchase documents, the District Court had found against Longacre, reasoning that the debtors’ objection under section 502(d) were not substantive objections to the merits of a claim. The District Court also determined that ATS had not breached its representations and warranties regarding the absence of potential preference actions because it had no knowledge of potential preference actions. The District Court’s decision challenged the bankruptcy claims market’s expectations that claims buyers will be able to exercise any agreed upon contractual “put right” when a debtor objects to a purchased claim. The Second Circuit’s decision will go a long way to reassure the bankruptcy claims market and reduce unnecessary uncertainty as to the enforceability of common risk allocation provisions in bankruptcy claims purchase documents.

    Background: Risk Allocation in the Secondary Market for Bankruptcy Claims

    Buyers of bankruptcy claims have to address at least three types of risk when purchasing a bankruptcy claim: recovery risk, notional amount risk and counterparty credit risk. Recovery risk is the risk that the amount and timing of distributions on the face amount of the claim changes (e.g., the debtor pays 30 cents in notes instead of 80 cents in cash per dollar of the claim’s face amount). Notional amount risk is the risk, often overlooked, that the face amount of the claim is reduced and/or subordinated to other claims (e.g., a $100,000 claim is allowed as only a $70,000 claim reducing the total recovery on the claim, even if the recovery percentage is as expected). Finally, counterparty credit risk becomes a factor to the extent the claim purchase documents allow a buyer to look to its seller for recourse or indemnification for an impairment of the claim’s notional amount.

    Unlike recovery risk and counterparty credit risk, which can be mitigated through pre-trade diligence, notional amount risk is allocated between buyers and sellers in the claims purchase documents. The bankruptcy claims trading market has coalesced around three types of documentation structures allocating this notional amount risk. In so-called “recourse” claims purchase documents, the buyer is granted a put right, i.e., the right to require the seller to repurchase the claim, if the notional or face amount of the claim is impaired or, in some cases, becomes subject to a potential impairment which can include the claim simply having been objected to by the debtor, any creditors’ committee or other third party. In “non-recourse” claims purchase documents, there is no direct put right, but the seller will generally indemnify the buyer for any breaches of representations and warranties, including those covering the risk of an impairment of the claim. The seller’s indemnification and the scope of the heavily negotiated representations and warranties often allow the buyer, through litigation, to end up in the same economic position as in a “recourse” claim purchase document. Lastly, in “as-is” purchase documents, the buyer generally takes on the full amount of notional risk, as the seller is not providing any put right, and only limited representations and warranties, which are often knowledge qualified. For claims with very uncertain notional amounts and where neither buyer nor seller is willing to take on this large notional risk, the parties often agree to a holdback of the purchase price until part or the entire claim amount is crystallized.

    District Court Decision in Longacre

    Delphi Automotive Systems and certain of its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors”) filed for voluntary Chapter 11 petitions on Oct. 8 and 14, 2005 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”).[3] On Dec. 14, 2006, Longacre Master Fund Ltd. and Longacre Capital Partners (QP) LP (collectively “Longacre”) purchased bankruptcy claims (the “Claims”) against the Debtors from ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. (“ATS”) at 89 percent of the Claims’ face amounts.[4]

    On Feb. 3, 2010, the Debtors filed their Forty-Fourth Omnibus Claims Objection (the “Omnibus Objection”), which included an objection to the Claims.[5] The Omnibus Objection served to preserve the Debtors’ right under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to object to claim subject to a preference action,[6] and in particular sought to “object to each Preference-Related Claim pending the conclusion of the Avoidance Action related to such Claim,” and to “obtain ‘entry of an order preserving the Reorganized Debtor’s objection to the Preference-Related Claims.’”[7] The Bankruptcy Court entered such an order on April 5, 2010, recognizing the objections and providing that the objection to each such claim “is hereby deemed preserved pending the conclusion of the Avoidance Action related to such Preference-Related Claim.”[8] Subsequently, the Debtors served a complaint (the “Complaint”) on ATS seeking to recover alleged preferential payments made to ATS in the 90 days prior to the Debtors’ petition date.[9]

    The claims purchase documents between ATS and Longacre (the “Agreement”) was structured as a “recourse” agreement.[10] The Agreement provided Longacre with the option to require ATS to refund the purchase price and pay interest at 10 percent on the amount from the date of the Agreement to the date the refund is paid, in the event of an “Impairment” under Paragraph 7 of the Agreement,[11] and in the event of a “Possible Impairment” not resolved within 180 days under Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.[12] In addition, the Agreement required ATS to resolve any “Possible Impairments” within 180 days.[13]

    ATS was not able to resolve the Complaint until March 30, 2011, when the Debtors withdrew the Omnibus Objection.[14] In the meantime, on Aug. 25, 2010, Longacre had notified ATS that it had not fully resolved the Complaint and the possible impairment of the Claims within the required 180 days (i.e., by Aug. 9, 2010).[15] However, ATS did not refund the purchase price as demanded by Longacre. Accordingly, Longacre sued ATS asserting various causes of action for breach of contract, seeking recovery of the interest owed on the purchase price from the date of the Agreement until the Claims were allowed.[16] Both ATS and Longacre filed motions for summary judgment.[17] The District Court granted ATS’ motion for summary judgment and denied Longacre’s motion.[18] As Longacre only appealed the dismissal of counts one, six and seven, none of the other counts were at issue before the Second Circuit.[19]

    Longacre’s complaint count one alleged that the Debtors’ objection constituted an “Impairment” under paragraph 7 of the Agreement.[20] That paragraph provides that a claim is impaired when “all or any part of the Claim is . . . objected to . . . for any reason whatsoever, pursuant to an order of the Bankruptcy Court.”[21] The District Court granted summary judgment to ATS on count one because in the District Court’s interpretation, the Debtors’ objection was not an “Impairment” or “Possible Impairment” as defined in the Agreement, as the Omnibus Objection was only a preservation of the Debtors’ right to objection. Moreover, objections under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code do not contest the validity or amount of, and is not a lien or encumbrance on, the claim.[22]

    Longacre’s count six alleged that ATS breached its warranty in paragraph 4 of the Agreement that “to the best of ATS’s knowledge, the Claim is not subject to any defense, claim or right of setoff, reduction, impairment, avoidance, disallowance, subordination or preference action.”[23] The District Court granted summary judgment to ATS on count six because Longacre had failed to show that ATS had knowledge at the time of the sale of any impairments to the claim.[24] The representation that the claim was not subject to any “defenses, claims, rights to set-off, avoidance, or disallowance” was knowledge qualified and Longacre failed to prove that ATS had knowledge of the possibility of a 502(d) objection to the claims. The district court was not willing to find at the summary judgment stage that the contract unambiguously required representations and warranties to be satisfied after the date of the Agreement.[25] Lastly, Longacre’s count seven sought indemnification based on the breaches described in the other counts, including counts one and six.[26]

    Second Circuit Decision Vacates District Court

    The Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment on each of the appealed dismissed counts. Specifically, with respect to Longacre’s count one, the Second Circuit held that “nothing in the language of Paragraph 7 [of the Agreement] requires that the objection be meritorious” and Paragraph 16 requires the temporary return of the purchase price when there is an unresolved “Possible Impairment.” Moreover, the Second Circuit held that ATS’s obligation to repurchase the claims was triggered when the Debtors filed their Omnibus Objection “stating they were ‘objecting to’ the [Claims], and the Bankruptcy Court issued an order stating that the ‘Objection’ was preserved,” regardless if the “objection” constituted a reservation of rights.[27]

    The Second Circuit also vacated the District Court’s finding that there was no reasonable issue of fact as to the knowledge of ATS that the Claims “[are] not subject to any . . . impairment . . . or preference action, in whole or in part, whether on contractual, legal, or equitable grounds, that have been or may be asserted by or on behalf of the Debtors or other party to reduce the amount of the Claim[s] or affect its validity, priority or enforceability”.[28] The Second Circuit found that it was undisputed that the Debtors made a payment to ATS within the 90 days period before its filing for bankruptcy so ATS could have known that it was possible that the Debtors could bring a preference action that might impair the Claims.[29] Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that there was a material issue of fact as to whether ATS had knowledge of the possibility of a preference action and related objection.[30]

    Takeaways

    While it appears that Longacre may ultimately be able to enforce its contract, it had to go through the time and expense of litigation and an appeal to get to the result it likely thought the Agreement provided for on its terms. Thus, despite this reassuring clarification by the Second Circuit, it remains crucial for buyers who want their sellers to take on notional amount risk that the trigger for the put right or the forward looking nature of the representations and warranties in the purchase agreement is unambiguous.

    As a result, the trigger for any put right should be broad enough to cover not only existing, but also possible, impairments that have been or may be asserted in the case which affect or could affect the buyer’s ability to receive a timely distribution on the claim. Additionally, the forward looking nature of a seller’s representations and warranties in connection with a recourse transaction could be clarified to provide a guarantee with respect to the validity of the notional amount of the claim both on and after the effective date of a claim purchase.

    Authored by David J. Karp and Erik Schneider.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. (Longacre), No. 11-3414-cv, sum. order, (2d Cir. Spt. 14, 2012).

    [2] Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. (ATS), 456 B.R. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated and remanded, Longacre, No. 11-3414-cv, sum. order, (2d Cir. Spt. 14, 2012).

    [3] ATS, 456 B.R. at 635.

    [4] Id. at 636.

    [5] Longacre, at *2.

    [6] Under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, “the court shall disallow any claim of any entity” that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 547.

    [7] Longacre, at *2.

    [8] Id.

    [9] ATS, 456 B.R. at 637.

    [10] SeeATS, 456 B.R. at 636-37.

    [11] Paragraph 7 of the Agreements reads as follows: “Subject to paragraph 16 below, in the event all or any part of the Claim is … offset, objected to, disallowed, subordinated, in whole or in part, in the Case for any reason whatsoever, pursuant to an order of the Bankruptcy Court (whether or not such order is appealed) … (collectively, an “Impairment”), Seller agrees to immediately repay, within 5 business days on demand of Buyers (which demand shall be made at Buyers’ sole option), an amount equal to the portion of the Minimum Claim Amount subject to the Impairment multiplied by the Purchase Rate …, plus interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from the date hereof to the date of repayment.” ATS, 456 B.R. at 637.

    [12] Paragraph 16 of the Agreement reads as follows: “[I]n the event a possible Impairment is raised against the Claim in the Case and actually received by Buyers (a “Possible Impairment”), Buyers shall promptly notify Seller…. If at any time after the 180th calendar day following the day on which the Possible Impairment was filed against the Claim or otherwise formally commenced (herein, the “Limitation Day”), Seller’s opposition and/or defense against the Possible Impairment has not been fully resolved and is not likely to be fully resolved within a reasonable period of time, then Seller must immediately repay an amount calculated in accordance with paragraph 7, as if there were an Impairment in respect of all or part of the Claim and Buyers had made a demand under paragraph 7. If after the Limitation Day Seller is subsequently successful (wholly or partly) in opposing or defending against such Possible Impairment, Buyers agree to promptly pay, on demand of Seller, an amount equal to the portion of the Claim subject to the Possible Impairment that was successfully opposed or defended and to which a repayment previously was made under this paragraph 16 multiplied by the Purchase Rate, plus interest thereon at 10% per annum from the date of repayment by Seller under this paragraph 16 to the date the payment is made by Buyers.” Id.

    [13] Id.

    [14] Id. at 639.

    [15] Id. at 638-39.

    [16] Id. at 639. Longacre was, however, not seeking repayment of the purchase price, as the objections to the claim had been dismissed and resolved. The total interest Longacre was seeking was $817,037.17. Id.

    [17] Id. at 635 (while ATS had initially filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it later converted it to a motion for summary judgment).

    [18] Id. at 644.

    [19] Longacre, at *3. Note that Longacre did not appeal the dismissal of its second (i.e., the claim was “Impaired” due to offset), third (i.e., breach of “valid claim” representations), fourth (i.e., breach of representation that seller has no liability or obligation as to the claim), and fifth (i.e., breach of representation that the claim is free from lien, encumbrances and set-offs) causes of actions. Thus, these dismissals were not reviewed by the Second Circuit.

    [20] Id.

    [21] Id.

    [22] Id.

    [23] Id.

    [24] Id.

    [25] ATS, 456 B.R. at 642-643 (“The representations and warranties were made as of Dec. 14, 2006 (the ‘Effective Date’), the date the Agreement was fully executed, and do not purport to serve as a guarantee of the future.”).

    [26] Longacre, at *3.

    [27] Id. at *4.

    [28] Id. at *5.

    [29] Id.

    [30] Id.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Debtor’s Attempted Subordination of Former Corporate Parent’s Claim

    Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Debtor’s Attempted Subordination of Former Corporate Parent’s Claim

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Debtor’s Attempted Subordination of Former Corporate Parent’s Claim

    September 21, 2012

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently dismissed a corporate debtor’s attempt to subordinate its former corporate parent’s contract damage claim on the ground that it was a securities fraud claim. CIT Group Inc. v. Tyco Int’l., Inc. (In re CIT Group Inc.), 2012 WL 3854887 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2012), affirming 460 B.R. 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). When dismissing the debtor’s subordination complaint, the bankruptcy court had found that the former parent’s claim was not, as the debtor had asserted, a securities fraud claim falling under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 510(b) (“for damages arising from the purchase or sale” of the debtor’s securities). Id., at *1. The Court of Appeals essentially agreed with the bankruptcy court that the former parent’s tax sharing agreement with the debtor was not “an equity interest,” but “rather a creditor claim.” Id., at *2. In sum, reasoned the court, the former parent never assumed the risks of a shareholder.

    Background

    Bankruptcy Code § 510(b), entitled “Subordination,” automatically subordinates, in relevant part, securities fraud claims for rescission, damages, or reimbursement or contribution: “[f]or the purpose of distribution . . ., a claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, [or] for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, . . . shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal to the claim or interest represented by such security.” [Emphasis added.] Thus, any other claims or interests “senior or equal to” the claim represented by the security will prime the securities fraud claim.

    A purchaser of securities from the debtor who has been defrauded will typically try to bootstrap its claim so as to be treated like other creditors in a bankruptcy case. When enacting Code § 510(b), however, Congress allocated the risk of an illegal securities offering to the purchasers rather than to creditors, requiring automatic subordination of these claims. See H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1977).

    Facts

    The former parent and the debtor subsidiary (“CIT”) had entered into a tax agreement years prior to bankruptcy in the context of an initial public offering (“IPO”) of all of the debtor’s common stock. Id., at *1. Among other things, the parent agreed to indemnify the debtor subsidiary against any tax burdens arising from the debtor’s pre-IPO merger with an affiliate, while the debtor subsidiary had agreed to repay the corporate parent for the debtor’s use of an affiliate’s tax benefits to offset taxable revenues. As part of the consummated IPO, the corporate parent had, of course, given up any “direct or indirect equity interest in” the debtor. During its later Chapter 11 reorganization, CIT rejected the tax sharing agreement with its former parent under Code § 365(a). The parent then filed a damage claim under Code § 365(g) for the debtor’s breach of that agreement.

    Procedural Summary

    The debtor sued its former parent, seeking a judgment subordinating the parent’s claim to that of other creditors, relying on Code § 510(b), alleging that the parent’s claim was a “claim . . . for damages arising from the purchase or sale” of the debtor’s shares, and was thus subject to subordination. After the bankruptcy court granted the former parent’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the debtor’s subordination complaint, the bankruptcy court, at the debtor’s request, certified a direct appeal to the Second Circuit.

    The Court of Appeals

    The court summarily affirmed the bankruptcy court, “substantially for the reasons stated in its thoughtful and comprehensive Dec. 21, 2011” decision. Id., at *2. First, “the purpose of [Code §] 510(b) was to prevent disfavored equity claims in bankruptcy from being disguised as higher-priority creditor claims.” Id., at *1. In an earlier case, In re Med Diversified, 461 F.3d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 2006), the court said that claims should be subordinated if the claimant “(1) took on the risk and return expectations of a shareholder, rather than a creditor, or (2) seeks to recover a contribution to the equity pool presumably relied upon by creditors in deciding whether to extend credit to the debtor.” Applying the reasoning of Med Diversified, the bankruptcy court in CIT agreed that “the Tax Agreement has a nexus to the issuance of the stock in the IPO in that both were agreed to in connection with the spinoff of [the debtor] from [its former corporate parent].” 460 B.R. at 639. Nevertheless, the existence of a “mere ‘connection’ between the claim and the purchase or sale of a security [was] not enough to support a finding that the claim ‘arises from’ the purchase or sale and should be subordinated unless the purposes of the statute would be served thereby.” Id., at 639. Because it found that the Tax Agreement was not an equity interest in the debtor, “but rather a creditor claim,” the court declined to subordinate the claim. Id., at 644.

    Finally, explained the bankruptcy court, “there is nothing inherent in an inter-affiliate tax agreement that would justify treating [the former parent’s] interest like equity. In general, tax sharing agreements are enforced in bankruptcy and create contractual debtor-creditor relationships.” Id., at 642 (citations omitted).

    Comment

    1.  The CIT decision follows not only the reasoning of the “leading case and only published decision of the Second Circuit,” Med Diversified, 460 B.R. at 637, but also rulings in other circuits. In Med Diversified, in contrast, the issue was “whether a claim for fraudulent inducement and breach of contract for failure to issue common stock in the debtor in exchange for the plaintiff’s shares in another company was one ‘arising from’ an agreement to purchase or sell a security.” 461 F.3d at 255. Reading the words “arising from” broadly, the court found that the claimant in Med Diversified had taken on the “risk and return expectations of a shareholder” because he “bargained not for cash but to become a stockholder in the debtor . . . .” Id., at 256. Although the debtor in Med Diversified never issued any stock to the plaintiff, “Congress and the courts have clearly elevated the issue of risk . . . to the fore,” requiring subordination of the plaintiff’s claim under Code § 510(b). Id., at 259. Accord, In re Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2002) (claims subordinated; arose from breach of agreement to use best efforts to register stock; claimants were “equity investors seeking compensation for a decline in the value of” the debtor’s stock; although claimants never intended to buy a long-term stake in debtor, claims subordinated because “claimants retained the right to participate in corporate profits” of debtor; Code § 510(b) prevents claimants from using breach of contract claim to recover value of equity investment “in parity with general unsecured creditors”); In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) (subordinated claim for fraud; shareholder deceived into holding and not selling his securities; claimant sought to shift losses onto creditors; fraudulent retention claim based on “a risk only the investors should shoulder.”); In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 2001) (subordinated claim arising from breach of obligation to deliver stock under merger agreement because “investors and creditors have different expectations;” investor has “greater financial expectations” than a creditor).

    2.  CIT is also consistent with decisions of other courts holding Code § 510(b) not applicable. See, e.g., In re Nations Rent, Inc., 381 B.R. 83, 92 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (claims not for “damages . . . arising from or caused by fraud, a securities [law] violation or . . . in connection with the issuance of stock;” claimants not “investors,” but were seeking “bargained for sales price.”); In re Direct TV Latin Am., LLC, 2004 WL 302303, *4, *11 (D. Del. 2004) (no subordination of claim arising from membership interest put agreement when value of put tied to arbitrary number, not debtor’s enterprise value; claimant had no right to participate in management or any other indicia of share ownership; claimant never sought “equity interest” in debtor). To paraphrase Freud, sometimes a claim is just a claim.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • English High Court Clarifies Post-Settlement Treatment of Interest and Fees for Secondary Market Participants

    English High Court Clarifies Post-Settlement Treatment of Interest and Fees for Secondary Market Participants

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    English High Court Clarifies Post-Settlement Treatment of Interest and Fees for Secondary Market Participants

    14 September 2012

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A recent High Court decision demonstrates one occasion where a secondary market buyer of bank debt may be required to pay its seller monies under a credit agreement after a settlement date has passed. This decision is important for European distressed debt market participants trading on Loan Market Association (“LMA”) documents, as it clarifies that a buyer’s payment obligations to a seller may continue after a transaction has closed, and it further highlights that pre-trade diligence should include a clear understanding of how and when interest, fees or any other repaid cash is allocated.

    Background

    Tael One Partners Ltd. (acting in its capacity as general partner of The Asian Entrepreneur Legacy One LP) (“Seller”) was an original lender of US$32 million under a 24-month, US$100 million syndicated credit agreement dated 16 April 2009 (as amended and restated on 26 Nov. 2009). The agreement provided for the borrower to pay interest at a rate of 11.25 percent p/a, accruing daily but payable three months in arrears, and a “Payment Premium” to be made alongside the repayment of the principal amount of the loan, varying between 17-20 percent depending on the circumstances surrounding the repayment.

    On 14 Jan. 2010, the Seller transferred US$11 million of its debt position to Morgan Stanley & Co. International PLC (“Buyer”). The trade was conducted on the basis of the LMA standard terms and conditions for par trade transactions (“ST&C”).[1] A pricing letter was executed with a schedule setting out amounts payable by the Buyer, including interest. The elected form of interest treatment was “Paid on Settlement Date,” and there was also no reference to the Payment Premium mentioned. The Buyer subsequently sold its position onwards to a third-party.

    On 16 Dec. 2010, the borrower repaid the loan in full and paid the Payment Premium to all lenders of record. The Seller subsequently contacted the Buyer requesting the Seller to pay it the proportion of the Payment Premium relating to the US$11 million traded debt which had accrued as of 14 Jan. 2010. This request was disputed by the Buyer.

    Analysis

    The High Court focused on the agreed terms of trade between the Buyer and the Seller, which included interest being calculated on a Paid on Settlement Date basis. The relevant LMA ST&Cs documenting this form of interest treatment are Condition 11.3 and Condition 11.9: 

    • Condition 11.3(a) states that “the Buyer shall pay to the Seller on the Settlement Date … any interest or fees accrued up to but excluding the Settlement Date in respect of the Purchased Assets (other than (i) PIK Interest and (ii) the fees referred to in paragraph (b) of condition 11.9 … which are payable after the Trade Date.”
    • Condition 11.9(a) states that “any interest or fees … which are payable under the Credit Agreement in respect of the Purchased Assets and which are expressed to accrue by reference to the lapse of time shall, to the extent that they accrue in respect of the period before (and not including) the Settlement Date, be for the account of the Seller and, to the extent they accrue in respect of the period after (and including) the Settlement Date, be for the account of the Buyer.” 

    The Buyer argued that the Seller was not entitled to a proportion of the Payment Premium because the Payment Premium did not “accrue” either up to the settlement date (Condition 11.3(a)) or in respect of the period before the settlement date (Condition 11.9(a)). Counsel for the Buyer further argued that Conditions 11.3(a) and 11.9(a) should be read together and that Condition 11.9(a) simply defined what is capable of falling within Condition 11.3(a), helping parties identify what is to be paid on the settlement date of a bank debt transaction. The Buyer’s argument was based on the assumption that a secondary bank debt transaction is meant to be concluded by payment of the settlement amount on the settlement date, supporting the “clean break” of a transaction between old lender and new lender under a credit agreement.

    The court did not accept the Buyer’s arguments, instead providing a distinction in the explicit wording under both Conditions 11.3(a) and 11.9(a), which resulted in a separate scope of application between both conditions. As condition 11.3(a) addresses “fees accrued up to … the Settlement Date,” it must therefore deal with amounts which have accrued up to an identified point of time (i.e., the Settlement Date). Separately, condition 11.9(a) addresses “fees … to the extent they accrued in respect of the period before the Settlement Date,” which must therefore account for amounts which accrue by reference to a period of time, not at or by a particular time. The court inferred from this distinction that Condition 11.9(a) addresses interest and fees which may only accrue at a later date but which accrue in respect of an earlier period (i.e., prior to settlement date). Any other interpretation of Condition 11.9(a) would make the condition redundant vis-à-vis Condition 11.3(a). 

    Decision

    The court determined that Condition 11.9(a) covered the treatment of Payment Premium, as it addressed interest and fees which may only accrue at a later date, but had accrued in respect of an earlier period. While the court felt the Payment Premium could be categorized more as “interest” as opposed to a “fee” for the purposes of Condition 11.9, it accepted the Seller’s argument to treat it as a “fee,” and took the view that it was almost analogous to a commitment fee, where a borrower pays a lump sum to a lender for making an advance available. Consequently, the Buyer was required to pay the Seller the Payment Premium amount that had accrued in respect of the US$11 million traded portion up to 14 Jan. 2010.

    Significance

    The findings of this High Court case demonstrate that settlement of a debt trade may not always signify the end of cash payments between the parties. While parties will try to reconcile amounts owed on the date of a bank debt transfer, there remain instances where future payments may still be required to be made, which debt trading parties should review as part of their pre-trade diligence.

    Authored by David J. Karp.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author 


    [1] Effective 25 Jan. 2010, the LMA modified its documentation so that only one set of terms and conditions govern both “par” and “distressed” trade transactions. As this trade occurred prior to the modified documentation going live, the conditions referenced in this Alert are based on the old terms and conditions which are no longer in force. However, it should be noted that the LMA language set out in this Alert has not changed in form following such modification.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • New York Expands Permissible Employee Wage Deductions

    New York Expands Permissible Employee Wage Deductions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Expands Permissible Employee Wage Deductions

    September 11, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Amendments to Section 193 of the New York Labor Law (“Section 193”) that expand permissible employee wage deductions were signed into law by Governor Cuomo on Sept. 7, 2012 and are effective sixty (60) days from the signing (the “Effective Date”).

    Since at least 2010, the New York State Department of Labor (“NYS DOL”) has interpreted Section 193 narrowly, opining that most employee wage deductions that are not specifically enumerated are prohibited. For example, deductions for mistaken wage overpayments have been prohibited. Under Section 193, allowable deductions from an employee’s wages were limited to deductions authorized by law (e.g., tax withholdings and Medicare contributions), insurance premiums, pension or health and welfare benefits, contributions to charitable organizations, payments for United States bonds, payments for dues to a labor organization and similar payments for the benefit of the employee (the “Catch-All Exception”).

    The amendments to Section 193 are designed to counter the NYS DOL’s recent limited view of the Catch-All Exception. The amendments will now permit additional deductions for prepaid legal plans; purchases made at events sponsored by, or contributions to, a bona fide charitable organization; discounted parking or transportation passes; discounted gym memberships; cafeteria, vending machine and pharmacy purchases made at an employer’s place of business; child care expenses; tuition, room and board, and other fees for educational institutions; and housing payments at no more than the market rates by non-profit hospitals.

    Subject to future NYS DOL regulations, Section 193 also will now specifically permit employers to make deductions for an overpayment of wages that is due to mathematical error or other clerical errors and to recoup salary or wage advances. The future regulations are expected to address the periodic amounts that may be recovered and the timing, frequency, duration and method of repayment, and procedures for employees to dispute the amount of the overpayment or seek a delay of the deduction. Notably, the amendments only reference employee loans in the context of permissible deductions for salary or wage advances. The NYS DOL has previously taken a limited view of whether employee loans, whether repaid via wage deductions or otherwise, are permitted under Section 193.

    Prior to making any permissible deductions, an employer must provide the employee with written notice of the terms and conditions and/or benefits of the deduction, and the employee must consent voluntarily to the deductions in writing. The amendments require that an employee’s written authorization for deductions be kept on the employer’s premises for the duration the employee’s employment and for six additional years after his employment ends. The employee may revoke his consent in writing at any time. In addition, an employer must notify an employee of any substantial change in the terms or conditions of the payment as soon as possible, and before an increased deduction is made.

    The amendments to Section 193 expire three years after the Effective Date, unless further legislative action is taken. Until the NYS DOL issues its regulations on the amendments, employers should proceed cautiously in making deductions from employees’ wages or providing loans to employees.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold and Adam J. Rivera.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • ISDA Publishes Tri-party IA Notices for the Custody of Collateral for OTC Swap Counterparties

    ISDA Publishes Tri-party IA Notices for the Custody of Collateral for OTC Swap Counterparties

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    ISDA Publishes Tri-party IA Notices for the Custody of Collateral for OTC Swap Counterparties

    September 4, 2012

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) recently published Tri-party IA Notices as part of its ongoing roll-out of documentation developed in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Tri-party IA Notices are supplemental documentation designed to expedite the negotiation of control-agreement documents for establishing third party custodian relationships for over-the-counter derivatives contracts and swap arrangements.

    Swap counterparties that are neither swap dealers nor major swap participants (generally, the “buy-side”) may elect to custody posted Independent Amounts with a third party custodian, instead of with their swap dealer counterparties. In the event the swap dealer counterparty were to become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, the other party would be an unsecured creditor with respect to any collateral that it may have posted to the swap dealer counterparty under the ISDA Master Agreement and related Credit Support Annex.[1] Using a third party custodian to hold any collateral posted with a swap dealer may allow a buy-side counterparty to obtain the return of its collateral upon the designation of an Early Termination Event or after the occurrence of a Termination Event or Event of Default, including a Bankruptcy Event of Default. Other insolvency proceeding regimes have similar concepts.

    The buy-side has experienced increased costs and delays as they attempt to negotiate the documentation necessary to set-up a third party custodian relationship. The agreements generally include an account control agreement, a fee letter, a sample notice of exclusive control and a termination notice. In an attempt to expedite the negotiation of these agreements, ISDA published the Tri-party IA Notices which are the Notice of Exclusive Control, Pledgor Access Notice (usually referred to as the Notice of Termination) and the Conflicting Instructions Provision. The ISDA Tri-party IA Notices do not provide a template account control agreement; ISDA only provides the supplement documentation which will reference the account control agreement which will be supplied by the third party custodian.

    The Notice of Exclusive Control and Pledgor Access Notice are very similar, except that the Secured Party (the swap dealer) sends the Notice of Exclusive Control to the third party custodian (the “Securities Intermediary”) following an Event of Default or Specified Condition where the buy-side counterparty is the Defaulting or Affected Party, and the Pledgor (the buy-side party to the swap) sends the Pledgor Access Notice to the Securities Intermediary following an Event of Default or Specified Condition where the Secured Party is the Defaulting or Affected Party. Also, each letter contains two versions identified as Version A and B. Version A permits the party sending the notice to withdraw all of the collateral in the account whereas Version B requires that the party sending the letter identify the Independent Amount which is required to remain in the account and the Independent Amount which is excess collateral. For example, if the Pledgor is sending Version B of the Pledgor Access Notice, it would only be entitled to withdraw the Excess Independent Amount and the Required Independent Amount would remain in the account for the benefit of the Secured Party even if the Secured Party is the Defaulting or Affected Party under the ISDA Master Agreement.

    The ISDA Tri-party IA Notices do not address two of the key points that are generally addressed during negotiations. Some swap dealers may want the right to dispute the occurrence of an Event of Default or Specified Condition, although each of these terms has a relevant cure or notice requirement in the ISDA Master Agreement. Separately, swap dealer counterparties may want to incorporate a waiting period or delayed release time between the time the Notice of Exclusive Control or Pledgor Access Notice is delivered to the Securities Intermediary and is declared an effective notice by the Securities Intermediary and the time when the Securities Intermediary releases the collateral to the Secured Party or Pledgor (as the case may be). Proposed waiting periods or delayed release times are generally 2 business days.

    The five major elections to be made in the Notice of Exclusive Control and Pledgor Access Notice are:

    1. A swap counterparty selects whether it may obtain the collateral because of the occurrence of a Specified Condition and/or Event of Default, or it may refer to specific events as they appear in the Schedule or pre-printed form of the ISDA Master Agreement;
    2. A swap counterparty selects whether the mere occurrence of an Event of Default or Specified Condition will give rise to the right to obtain the collateral, or whether the right commences after an Early Termination Date has either occurred or been designated as a result of the occurrence of an Event of Default or Specified Condition;
    3. The swap counterparty must provide information on where the collateral should be transferred to it;
    4. The parties may identify whether the Event of Default or Specified Condition is an “indisputable event,” which in most cases refers to a Bankruptcy Event. When a party identifies a particular event as an “indisputable event” in the Notice of Exclusive Control or Pledgor Access Notice, it is representing to the Securities Intermediary that dispute resolution procedures, delivery delays or similar conditions will not apply to the release of collateral. If the “indisputable event” is defined as a “Bankruptcy Filing Evidence Event,” the parties are required to provide at least one piece of evidence of the “indisputable event,” but providing evidence is not a condition for the Securities Intermediary releasing the collateral; and
    5. The parties may choose to require that the Securities Intermediary forward a copy of each notice to the other party.

    The third document included in the ISDA Tri-party IA Notices is the Conflicting Instructions Provision, which will supplement the account control agreement. This document determines what the Securities Intermediary should do if it receives a Notice of Exclusive Control as well as a Pledgor Access Notice. The options are: (i) the first document delivered to the Securities Intermediary wins (subject to Securities Intermediary’s ability to declare when each became effective and subject to any dispute resolution provisions), (ii) the Notice of Exclusive Control prevails or (iii) the Securities Intermediary may elect to refrain from releasing the collateral until it obtains a legal opinion, joint written instruction from the Secured Party and Pledgor or final court order.

    Authored by Paul N. Watterson, Jr., Craig Stein and Nanette Aguirre.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Upon a bankruptcy of an entity, the “automatic stay” generally would preclude creditors from exercising remedies against the debtor during its bankruptcy case. The Bankruptcy Code contains “safe harbor” provisions, however, aimed at protecting parties’ rights and remedies under a swap agreement, notwithstanding the automatic stay. These provisions permit a party to a swap agreement to terminate, liquidate and accelerate the swap agreement upon its counterparty’s bankruptcy, and setoff any net loss against collateral posted in connection with the swap agreement, all without the need for court approval. The Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions are inapplicable to a return of excess collateral posted for the debtor’s benefit. Thus, upon the bankruptcy of the swap dealer counterparty, if the collateral were posted directly with such entity, the automatic stay would preclude the other party from taking actions to collect its excess collateral, and the other party would be left with a general unsecured claim for return of its collateral.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Paul N. Watterson, Jr.

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Eighth Circuit Rejects “Balancing of the Equities” Test for Creditor’s Recoupment

    Eighth Circuit Rejects “Balancing of the Equities” Test for Creditor’s Recoupment

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eighth Circuit Rejects “Balancing of the Equities” Test for Creditor’s Recoupment

    August 31, 2012

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held on Aug. 3, 2012, that equitable considerations could not prevent a creditor’s recouping amounts owed to it by a chapter 7 debtor. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 2012 WL 3139364, *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). Reversing the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”), the Eighth Circuit explained that “once a party meets the same-transaction test . . . a court should not impose an additional ‘balancing of the equities’ requirement” on the doctrine of recoupment. Id. Ending a three-year battle in three courts over the sum of $45,316, the court’s straightforward ruling resulted in a win for a disability insurer. In reality, however, nobody won.

    What is Recoupment?

    “Recoupment allows a defendant to deduct its claim from the amount the plaintiff could otherwise recover if the claim arises out of the same transaction or subject matter on which the plaintiff sued.” Id., at *2, citing In re NWFX, Inc., 864 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1989). The doctrine comes not from the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), but is a common law rule permitting a creditor to reduce its liability by the amount of the debtor’s obligation to the creditor so long as the two debts arise out of the same transaction. See, e.g., In re Anes, 195 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Newberry Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1996). At most, the parties’ obligations must “arise out of a single integrated transaction so that it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of the transaction without meeting its obligations.” University Medical Center v. Sullivan, 973 F.2d 1065, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso, 278 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2002). Ordinarily, an “overpayment [by the creditor] or something like it is required to trigger recoupment.” Michael L. Temin, Bankruptcy Litigation Manual, § 10.07 at 10-15 (2011-12 rev. ed.).

    Recoupment Available In Bankruptcy

    Recoupment, unlike a creditor’s right of setoff, “is unaffected by bankruptcy.” Id. A creditor with a right of recoupment in a bankruptcy case can recoup the full amount it is owed, to the exclusion of other creditors. Anes, 195 F.3d at 182. Although similar to the creditor’s right of setoff, recoupment is a more powerful tool. Id.; Newberry, 95 F.3d at 1399. First, a creditor’s recoupment right is not subject to the Code’s automatic stay. Id.; see also Code, § 362(a)(7) (applying automatic stay only to setoff). Second, a recouping creditor may apply its pre-bankruptcy claims against the debtor’s post-bankruptcy claims, a remedy not available in the setoff context. Anes, 195 F.3d at 182; Newberry, 95 F.3d at 1398-99. A recouping creditor may thus receive preferred treatment even when setoff is unavailable (e.g., a pre-bankruptcy claim by the creditor and a post-bankruptcy claim by the debtor). Newberry, 95 F.3d at 1399. As a result, “[i]n light of the Bankruptcy Code’s strong policy favoring equal treatment of creditors and bankruptcy court supervision over even secured creditors, the recoupment doctrine is a limited one and should be narrowly construed.” In re McMahon, 129 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1997).

    Facts

    The debtor, an individual employed by the state of Missouri, received long-term disability benefits through a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company. In August 2006, prior to his bankruptcy filing, Standard began paying him disability benefits. Those benefits, according to the policy, had to be reduced by any benefits the debtor received under the Social Security Act. The debtor therefore authorized Standard to withdraw from his bank account any retroactive Social Security disability benefits. On July 17, 2008, the debtor received a lump-sum award of retroactive Social Security benefits in the amount of $45,316.54. Standard withdrew this amount from Terry’s bank account one week later.

    The debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on July 31, 2008. The bankruptcy trustee later demanded that Standard turn over the $45,316.54 on April 20, 2009, asserting it was a voidable preference under Code § 547. Standard immediately complied, but then began deducting $430.20 each month from Terry’s bank account to recover the retroactive benefits. When the bankruptcy court suggested that these monthly deductions might violate the Code’s automatic stay or its discharge injunction, Standard repaid the previous retroactive withholdings to the debtor, but reserved its rights to reinstate deductions if a court were to determine that they were permissible. The debtor then sued Standard, seeking a declaratory judgment that Standard was not entitled to recoup the $45,316.54.

    Litigation History

    The three-year litigation history between Standard and the debtor entailed two bankruptcy court rulings, and at least one decision by the BAP prior to the Eighth Circuit’s dispositive ruling. Although the lower courts had eventually determined that the parties’ rights arose out of the same transaction, the bankruptcy court, according to the BAP, had to weigh the “equities” of permitting recoupment. 443 BR 816, 821.

    The bankruptcy court then held that it would be inequitable to permit Standard to recoup. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 453 B.R. 760, 764 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. April 13, 2011). It reasoned that (i) requiring a disabled debtor to repay the funds a second time would be inequitable, (ii) recoupment would impose hardship and impair the debtor’s fresh start, and that (iii) Standard would have had a greater net recovery had it challenged the trustee’s preference demand. Id., at 763-4. In short, it reasoned, Standard was “simply in a better position to sustain [the] loss than the Debtor . . . and not just because Standard [was] a ‘big insurance company with deep pockets.’” Id. The court still allowed Standard an unsecured claim, an ineffectual remedy.

    Eighth Circuit Ruling

    Standard appealed, arguing that (1) the BAP had erred in ordering the bankruptcy court to weigh the equities, and that (2) the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion. 2012 WL 3139364, at *1.

    The Eighth Circuit agreed with Standard: the “BAP [had] erred by introducing a separate ‘balancing of the equities’ test into the doctrine of recoupment and by invoking these equitable principles to deny Standard a right of recoupment after finding that the obligations at issue arose out of the same transaction.” Id., at *4. Moreover, “[f]airness and equity may influence whether two competing claims arise from the same transaction, but a court should not impose an additional ‘balancing of the equities’ requirement once a party meets the same-transaction test.” Id., at *4.

    Comments

    1. The Terry ruling is creditor-friendly, but the creditor still had to expend time and money to recover $45,316 over a three-year period. It may have won this battle over a legal principle that never should have been litigated.
    2. Terry is consistent with the holdings of most other Circuits. In re Slater Health Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejected separate “balancing of the equities” test for recoupment in bankruptcy; “. . . analysis of the recoupment issue should both begin and end with the same transaction question without discussing other equitable issues;” government adjustment for Medicare overpayment constitutes recoupment); In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). See also In re Malinowski, 156 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1998) (held, claims failed to meet same-transaction test); In re Peterson Distributing, Inc., 82 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); In re University Med. Ctr., 973 F.3d 1065 (3d Cir. 1992) (each yearly payment to a Medicare provider constitutes separate transaction; recoupment of past overpayments from current payments improper).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and Karen S. Park.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Reminder: Additional Gifting Opportunities in 2012

    Reminder: Additional Gifting Opportunities in 2012

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reminder: Additional Gifting Opportunities in 2012

    August 30, 2012

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Tax legislation passed at the end of 2010 temporarily lowered the federal estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax rates to 35 percent; increased for 2011 and 2012 the federal estate tax exemption from $3.5 million to $5 million; increased the federal GST tax exemption from $1 million to $5 million and reunified the federal estate and gift tax exemptions so that an individual can gift up to $5 million through 2012 free of federal gift tax. Additionally, because such legislation indexed the federal estate, gift and GST tax exemptions for inflation, such exemptions have increased further, from $5 million to $5.12 million for 2012. In order to take advantage of the increased exemptions and low transfer tax rates, as well as historically low interest rates, you may wish to implement one or more of the planning techniques discussed in this Alert before the end of this year.[1]

    Increased Exemptions, Low Tax Rates

    You may wish to consider making substantial gifts this year, while transfer tax exemptions are high and transfer tax rates are low.

    • Currently, married couples that fully utilized their federal gift tax exemption in 2011 by making aggregate gifts of $10 million, reduced by prior taxable gifts, have an additional $240,000 (and individuals have an additional $120,000) that they can give without paying any federal gift tax.
    • Those who did not utilize their gift tax exemption in 2011 still have until December 31, 2012, when the tax legislation is scheduled to expire, to make aggregate gifts of up to $10.24 million for a married couple (up to $5.12 million for an individual), reduced by prior taxable gifts, without paying any federal gift tax. Whether such gifts make sense from a tax perspective will depend on your specific situation, including consideration of whether any state gift tax might apply. (The federal gift tax exemption is in addition to the following, which you can give each year free of federal gift tax: $13,000 to an unlimited number of people; unlimited payments of tuition directly to qualifying educational organizations; and unlimited payments directly to providers of medical care or medical insurance.)
    • The federal gift tax rate is scheduled to revert to 55 percent in 2013 (from 35 percent now). To the extent that you wish to make gifts in excess of your current $5.12 million exemption, you should consider making these gifts this year while the federal gift tax rate is only 35 percent.
    • Now is also a good time to consider transferring assets into a long-term GST exempt trust. A married couple establishing GST exempt trusts today can shield assets worth up to $10.24 million (plus all future appreciation) from wealth transfer taxes for approximately 100 years in New York or in perpetuity in certain other jurisdictions.
    • By utilizing the balance of your remaining lifetime gift tax exemption, you may also save substantial state estate tax on your death. Since the majority of states do not impose a gift tax, any gifts made by residents of such states will not create a state gift tax liability. Many of these states (including New York), however, do impose an estate tax; therefore, to the extent that you reduce your estate by lifetime gifts, your estate will save state estate tax on these amounts. For example, if a New York resident who has not yet made any taxable gifts, gives away $5.12 million before the end of 2012, his estate will save approximately $460,000 in New York estate tax at his death as compared to the New York estate tax his estate would owe if he were to make such gifts at his death.

    Historically Low Interest Rates

    With IRS interest rates at near all-time lows, you may wish to consider estate planning techniques such as intra-family loans, GRATs and sales to irrevocable grantor trusts. These techniques generate the most transfer tax savings when IRS interest rates are low.

    Review Wills and Revocable Trusts

    Many Wills and revocable trusts include a provision creating a trust (an “exemption trust”) that will be funded with the maximum amount that can pass free of federal estate or GST tax at the person’s death. Given the increased federal estate and GST tax exemption amounts for 2012 (i.e., $5.12 million), you should review your estate plan and your finances to determine whether it is appropriate for you and your spouse to fund your respective exemption trusts with the maximum exemption amount (or possibly a lesser amount), if the exemption remains at a high level. To arrive at such determination will require a case-by-case analysis based upon your financial, tax and personal circumstances.

    Please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel at your earliest convenience if you wish to discuss these or other gifting opportunities as they may apply to your specific financial and personal situation. These valuable transfer tax opportunities will expire at the end of 2012 and, in some instances, may be very beneficial to implement well in advance of that deadline.


    [1] The tax laws discussed in this Alert apply only to persons who are citizens or residents of the United States. Additionally, the techniques mentioned are described in greater detail in SRZ’s Nov. 4, 2011 Alert, Unique Gifting Opportunities Through the End of 2012.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • CFTC Staff Issues New FAQ Guidance for CPO, CTA Registration and the “De Minimis” Exemption

    CFTC Staff Issues New FAQ Guidance for CPO, CTA Registration and the “De Minimis” Exemption

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFTC Staff Issues New FAQ Guidance for CPO, CTA Registration and the “De Minimis” Exemption

    August 24, 2012

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Effective Dec. 31, 2012, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) Rule 4.13(a)(4)[1] exemption from registration as a commodity pool operator (“CPO”) will no longer be available. Private fund managers who rely on this exemption must find an alternative exemption or otherwise register with the CFTC as a CPO. In addition, mutual funds and other registered investment companies will have to comply with new conditions under amended Rule 4.5 if they engage in futures, commodity options or swap transactions.

    The CFTC retained the “de minimis” exemption from CPO registration for CPOs of funds that have de minimis futures activity (i.e., either (1) the aggregate initial margin and premiums on commodity interest positions does not exceed five percent of the liquidation value of the fund’s portfolio (including unrealized gains and losses) or (2) the aggregate notional value of such positions does not exceed 100 percent of the liquidation value of the fund’s portfolio (including unrealized gains and losses)).

    The CFTC is also imposing new data reporting requirements for registrants under Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR.[2]

    FAQ Guidance

    On Aug. 14, 2012, the CFTC staff issued a set of responses to frequently asked questions to clarify rule changes with respect to registration and exemptions for CPOs and commodity trading advisors (“CTAs”). The following is a brief overview of the more notable points:

    • Valuation of Swaps for Net Notional Calculation: With respect to the net notional threshold for the Rule 4.13(a)(3) de minimis exemption, the CFTC staff is taking the position that the “notional value” is the same as the amount required to be reported by swap counterparties as the notional amount.
    • Special Purpose Vehicles: Wholly owned subsidiaries of private or registered commodity pools (i.e., SPVs) are themselves commodity pools and would thus need to either meet the de minimis test on their own accord (i.e., by looking directly at the SPV portfolio) or otherwise have the CPO of the SPV register. However, even if the CPO of the SPV would be required to register, it would be exempt from providing certain disclosure documents and financial statements to the pool.
    • Form CPO-PQR: The CFTC staff has stated that no additional guidance with respect to the Form CPO-PQR will be forthcoming until next year. As such, the CFTC staff has indicated that CPOs and CTAs should make “reasonable assumptions consistent with a good faith effort” in their CPO-PQR filings.
    • Exempt Funds Transitioning to 4.7 “Regulation Lite” in 2013: Funds relying on Rule 4.13(a)(4) that will transition to registering and relying on Rule 4.7 will not be required to reconfirm that all existing investors in the fund are QEPs.
    • Funds of Funds: The CFTC staff has reaffirmed that the Appendix A guidance (which was removed when the CFTC amended the applicable rules) for funds of funds relying on the de minimis exemptions under Rule 4.13(a)(3) (private funds) or Rule 4.5 (registered funds), can still be relied upon until the CFTC adopts revised guidance. In practice, funds of funds have found compliance with Appendix A guidance to be difficult.
    • Temporarily Exceeding the 4.13(a)(3) De Minimis Thresholds: The CFTC staff confirmed that a fund would not be in violation of the Rule 4.13(a)(3) exemption if it temporarily crosses the de minimis thresholds so long as the fund is in compliance with the trading threshold at the time a position is established.
    • Applicability of Prior No-Action Letters to Boards of Directors and General Partners: The CFTC staff has historically issued no-action letters allowing a general partner or board of directors to not register as a CPO if, among other things, it delegates its rights and obligations with respect to the operation of the pool to the investment manager and agrees to a joint and several liability agreement for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. The CFTC staff has indicated that firms may rely on these no-action letters without seeking independent no-action relief.
    • 2012 Annual Report Filings: While registered CPOs are required to file year-end annual financial reports, the CFTC staff has confirmed that CPOs who are having their exemption withdrawn on Jan. 1, 2013 (and thus registering as of that date) will only be required to file their first annual report for the fiscal year 2013.
    • Bona Fide Hedging Excluded for Registered Funds Relying on the De Minimis Exemption: While registered funds may exclude bona fide hedging when determining if a fund is below the de minimis thresholds, the CFTC staff has confirmed that bona fide hedging does not extend to derivatives positions used to manage cash and other risk management positions that don’t otherwise meet the definition of bona fide hedging.

    For additional details, the full FAQ text can be found at: http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/faq_cpocta.pdf.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    [1] CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(4), which was adopted in 2003, generally exempted from CFTC registration CPOs of funds whose natural person investors are “qualified eligible persons” (“QEPs”) within the meaning of CFTC Rule 4.7(a)(2) (a category that includes “qualified purchaser” investors in funds offered pursuant to Section 3(c)((7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940) and whose non-natural person investors are either QEPs or “accredited investors” as defined in Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Regulation D.

    [2] Additional details about these changes can be found in SRZ’s July 20, 2012 Alert, Update on Recent CFTC Actions Affecting Fund Managers.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Update for Swap Counterparties: New Web Portal Launched to Assign CFTC Interim Compliant Identifiers

    Update for Swap Counterparties: New Web Portal Launched to Assign CFTC Interim Compliant Identifiers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Update for Swap Counterparties: New Web Portal Launched to Assign CFTC Interim Compliant Identifiers

    August 23, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) and SWIFT have launched a Web portal to begin assigning CFTC Interim Compliant Identifiers (CICIs) as required by the CFTC’s Data and Recordkeeping Rule. All swap counterparties are required to be identified by a CICI. All swap counterparties currently adhering to the ISDA Dodd-Frank Protocol are required to list this identifier in their Questionnaires and in some cases may not have to provide operative documentation or sensitive information as part of this protocol if such has already been provided to DTCC and SWIFT when registering for their CICI. Swap counterparties with CICIs would be deemed in compliance with ISO 17442, which sets forth the terms of a global framework for Legal Entity Identifiers (LEI) from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the G20. ISO 17442 is aimed at assigning a legal identifier to all swap counterparties trading OTC swaps globally in an effort to minimize systemic risk.

    Register for the ISDA Dodd-Frank Protocol.

    If you have any questions, please contact Paul Watterson, Jr., Craig Stein or your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Paul N. Watterson, Jr.

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The New Derivatives Definitions — What Fund Managers Need to Know

    The New Derivatives Definitions — What Fund Managers Need to Know

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The New Derivatives Definitions — What Fund Managers Need to Know

    August 21, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In July 2012, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC” and, together with the CFTC, the “Commissions”) jointly adopted new rules and interpretations (the “Definitions Release”) to define the terms “swap,” “security-based swap,” and “security-based swap agreement” (collectively, “Product Definitions”), to provide for the joint regulation by the Commissions of “mixed swaps” and to impose record-keeping requirements with respect to “security-based swap agreements.” The Definitions Release was published in the Federal Register on Aug. 13, 2012. With certain exceptions, the effective date of the Definitions Release will be Oct. 12, 2012.

    The publication of the Definitions Release will result in many of the rules previously adopted by the Commissions pursuant to Title VII (“Title VII”) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) going into effect over the next several months. The Definitions Release is an important part of this framework because it helps determine the types of transactions that will be subject to regulation by the CFTC, the SEC or both under Title VII and the regulations adopted thereunder.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Paul N. Watterson, Jr.

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights