ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
CFTC Staff Letter 25-14: What Is a “U.S. Person”?
June 9, 2025
Read time: 6 min
On May 21, 2025, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) Market Participants Division and Division of Market Oversight jointly issued Staff Letter 25-14 in response to a request from SCB Limited, a Bahamas-based proprietary trading firm engaged in digital asset futures, options, and swaps trading on non-US exchanges.[1]
In examining whether activity or ownership with a US nexus subjects a non-US firm to CFTC registration, reporting, and compliance obligations, CFTC staff provided useful guidance on the application of the following cross-border definitions:
The SCB Request and the Facts at Issue
In its request, SCB stated that it would like to expand its activities into the United States through the engagement of US-based traders, quantitative researchers, and software developers. However, given its intended product mix of foreign futures and CFTC-regulated swaps and the potential interaction between US-based traders and SCB headquarters in the Bahamas, SCB first sought confirmation from the CFTC as to whether it would be “located in the United States” for purposes of the CFTC’s foreign exchange regulations or a “U.S. person” for purposes of the CFTC’s swap regulations.
The consequences of being “located in the United States” or a “U.S. person” in this context are far reaching and include:
- Any non-US exchanges that provide direct access to SCB to transact in foreign futures would be required to register with the CFTC as a foreign board of trade (FBOT).[2]
- Any non-US brokers that SCB uses to transact in foreign futures on non-US exchanges would be required to register with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant (FCM).[3]
- SCB’s trades in virtual currency options and perpetual contracts swap transactions would count toward the swap dealer (SD) de minimis threshold calculation and could subject SCB to SD registration.[4]
- Any non-US exchanges on which SCB trades swaps would be subject to registration as swap execution facilities pursuant to CFTC Regulation 37.3(a)(1).30
- Any non-US exchanges on which SCB transacts in swaps, as well as any non-US brokers utilized by SCB to engage in these transactions, would be subject to registration requirements as FCMs.[5]
- SCB’s swap transactions would be subject to the reporting requirements in Parts 43 and 45 of the CFTC’s regulations.[6]
The CFTC Staff’s Interpretation
The CFTC staff clarified that whether SCB – or any similarly situated entity – is a US person depends on two key factors: “place of organization” and “principal place of business,” consistent with prior CFTC guidance and the Supreme Court of the United States’ Hertz ruling, which held that a corporation’s “principal place of business” is its “nerve center,” where officers direct, control, and coordinate activity.[7]
The CFTC concluded that because SCB was organized in the Bahamas and its officers operated from there, it qualified as a non-US person under all five relevant regulatory definitions. Specifically, the CFTC concluded that SCB is a “non-U.S. person” under the Swap Dealer De Minimis Exception, is not a “U.S. person” under the 2013 Cross-Border Guidance for swaps reporting rules, is a “foreign located person” for purposes of the Foreign FCM Exemption, is not a “person located in the United States” for foreign futures rules, and is not a “participant located in the United States” under FBOT rules.[8] Importantly, the CFTC staff explicitly rejected several factors as irrelevant to the US person analysis, noting that “(1) the engagement of U.S.-based traders, quantitative researchers and software developers employed by [a Bahamas affiliate]; (2) the licensing of certain trading technology from the related firm; and (3) the hosting of trading technology on U.S.-located servers, would not impact SCB’s status[.]”[9]
The CFTC concluded that, so long as SCB remained headquartered abroad and its management remained offshore, its various US connections did not transform it into a US person.
Why It Matters for the Crypto Industry
Staff Letter 25-14 provides valuable guidance for crypto-native trading firms, market makers, liquidity providers, and exchanges operating cross-border businesses. The decentralized nature of digital assets and related services presents complications for determining an entity’s principal place of business and jurisdictional nexus. The CFTC’s approach in Staff Letter 25-14 is a significant step in resolving the ambiguity introduced by two recent enforcement actions. In 2023, the CFTC’s case against Binance suggested that US ownership, US-based developers, and technology infrastructure could create US person status and subject a non-US firm to full CFTC oversight.[10] Similarly, in a controversial 2024 enforcement action, the CFTC issued a cease and desist order against Falcon Labs, Ltd., an entity organized under the laws of the Seychelles for failing to register with the CFTC as a FCM..[11] In the Falcon Labs Order, the CFTC applied the jurisdictional test applicable to FCMs, in a manner which created a “novel U.S. location test” that “impose[d] new CFTC FCM registration requirements on non-U.S. brokers.”[12]
Staff Letter 25-14 rejects the novel theories advanced in the Binance case and Falcon Labs Order, returning to a more traditional focus on incorporation and management location in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hertz.
Limitations and Key Takeaways
Staff Letter 25-14 offers important guidance for global crypto firms, emphasizing that incorporation and senior management location are central to determining US person status under CFTC cross-border rules. US ownership, staffing, technology licensing, or US-hosted infrastructure alone do not trigger jurisdiction under current interpretations, which reaffirms prior guidance and contrast with earlier aggressive enforcement stances. The letter, however, reflects staff views (not binding on the CFTC or courts) and applies narrowly to SCB’s facts, offering no safe harbors and leaving enforcement risk intact. While some ambiguity remains, the clarification helps ensure that incidental US ties do not automatically subject non-US firms to broad CFTC oversight.

No Loss, No Problem: SCOTUS Expands Wire Fraud Reach in Kousisis Ruling
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
No Loss, No Problem: SCOTUS Expands Wire Fraud Reach in Kousisis Ruling
June 9, 2025
Read time: 8 min
On May 22, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States (the Court) issued its opinion in Kousisis v. United States, holding that a defendant may be convicted of wire fraud for inducing a victim to enter a contract under materially false pretenses, even if the defendant did not intend to cause, and did not cause, an economic loss.
In this case, the defendants, an industrial painting company (the company) and its project manager, falsely represented to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) that the company’s bids on two projects were compliant with PennDOT’s disadvantaged-business program. Though the projects were otherwise performed to PennDOT’s satisfaction, the company and its project manager were tried and convicted for federal wire fraud under a fraudulent inducement theory. Resolving a circuit split, the Court affirmed their convictions.
In contrast to a string of recent decisions from the Court narrowing the wire fraud statute (see, e.g., Ciminelli v. United States), the Court’s unanimous decision here upheld an expansive view of the wire fraud statute as not requiring an economic loss where a defendant obtains money or property – here a valuable government contract – under false pretenses. The Court identified materiality as the safeguard that will prevent every false statement in connection with a contract application – whether a government contract or not – from becoming a federal crime. This decision solidifies, across the country, the use of the criminal wire fraud statute by prosecutors to pursue companies based on representations made in connection with contracts even where there is no actual monetary loss and may impact claims incorporating the wire fraud statute in the civil context.
The Facts
The company won two government contracts with PennDOT to carry out paint and repair work on Philadelphia landmarks that had fallen into disrepair. These contracts were largely funded through federal grants PennDOT received from the US Department of Transportation (DOT), which required that grant recipients, like PennDOT, establish and implement a disadvantaged-business program. A disadvantaged business, under the relevant federal regulations, is a small business that is majority owned and controlled by individuals who are socially and economically disadvantaged.
PennDOT’s disadvantaged-business program required that bidders commit to subcontracting a percentage of the total contract value to a disadvantaged business. In bidding on the projects, the company represented to PennDOT that it would obtain painting supplies from a disadvantaged business (the supplier). After winning the contracts, the company also reported making payments to the supplier in connection with this requirement, and PennDOT paid the company per the terms of their contracts.
The company, however, had not actually contracted with the supplier to obtain paint supplies. Instead, the company and the supplier had agreed that the supplier would simply serve as a pass-through entity to meet the disadvantaged-business requirement for the bids. The company instead negotiated with its true paint suppliers, who then generated purchase orders that they billed to the supplier, and the supplier then added a fee and invoiced the company. The company would then issue separate checks for the supplier’s fee and for the actual suppliers’ supplies, and the supplier earned a fee without actually supplying any paint.
PennDOT was unaware of the pass-through scheme for the duration of the contract and was ultimately satisfied with the company’s work. When the scheme was eventually discovered, a grand jury indicted the company and its project manager for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and they were both convicted at trial of three counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy. The defendants then moved for a judgment of acquittal based on PennDOT’s satisfaction with their performance under the contracts, arguing that the prosecution had not proven that they defrauded PennDOT of “money or property,” as required under the federal wire fraud statute.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion for a judgment of acquittal, and the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed its decision. Because a circuit split existed as to whether federal fraud convictions could be maintained in the absence of the defendant seeking to cause the victim net pecuniary loss, the US Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
Siding with the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions, holding that a federal wire fraud conviction premised on a fraudulent inducement theory does not require any net pecuniary loss to the victim: “Under the fraudulent-inducement theory, a defendant commits federal fraud whenever he uses a material misstatement to trick a victim into a contract that requires handing over her money or property—regardless of whether he seeks to cause the victim net pecuniary loss.”
As a textual matter, the Court stated that the wire fraud statute is “agnostic” about economic loss, reading “obtain” to encompass scenarios where money or property is received, even if the victim has received something of equal value in return. The Court also concluded that to the extent the common law required that the victim suffered an injury, there was no settled rule that this injury needed to be economic, and, in fact, that it was “the deception-induced deprivation of property—not economic loss—that common-law courts generally deemed injurious.”
The defendants argued that a no-loss fraud can only cause injury where it related to unique property (e.g., a particular horse or particular artwork), but the Court rejected that standard, instead looking to the existing materiality standard for determining whether misstatements rise to the level of fraud: “[T]he common law has long embraced a different standard—namely, materiality—as the principled basis for distinguishing everyday misstatements from actionable fraud.” The Court went on to note the standard for materiality laid out in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, namely that “a misrepresentation is material if a reasonable person would attach importance to it in deciding how to proceed, or if the defendant knew (or should have known) that the recipient would likely deem it important.” Notably, Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence emphasizing that, although it was uncontested by the parties, he was “skeptical” the government could meet the “high bar” for materiality had it been contested because, inter alia, the contracts at issue totaled more than 1,000 pages and contained numerous requirements and the disadvantaged-business requirements were irrelevant to the fundamental purpose of the contracts, which were “for bridge repairs, not minority hiring.”
Further, the Court distinguished the defendants’ fraud from fraudulent-inducement schemes relating strictly to the government’s regulatory power (e.g., fraud to get a gaming license), which the Court has previously found to be insufficient to sustain a wire fraud conviction. The Court viewed the defendants’ scheme as being focused on “lin[ing] their pockets” as opposed to “thwarting PennDOT’s disadvantaged-business initiative.” In addressing the Court’s recent rejection of the right-to-control theory in Ciminelli, the Court explicitly stated that its decision was not a repackaging of that theory, distinguishing the present case by the fact that the defendants’ scheme sought money, a “traditional property interest,” as opposed to an intangible interest, like the right to impartial government.
Finally, the Court rejected the defendants’ concern that affirming their convictions would render every intentional misrepresentation in connection with a contract or application as federal wire fraud. In doing so, the Court cited the “demanding” materiality requirement as the key principle limiting the universe of potential claims, explaining that the fraudulent inducement theory only “criminalizes a particular species of fraud: intentionally lying to induce a victim into a transaction that will cost her money or property.”
Key Takeaways
- After meaningfully contracting the scope of the federal fraud statutes in Ciminelli, the Kousisis decision represents a significant endorsement of federal prosecutors’ ability to make aggressive use of the federal fraud statutes. But materiality will continue to remain a key limitation.
- While the decision relates strictly to the federal wire fraud statute, the government will also likely apply it to other federal fraud statutes that have text similar to the wire fraud statute, including the mail fraud, bank fraud, and healthcare fraud statutes, none of which mention economic loss.
- Companies that contract with government entities have long faced the risk of False Claims Act (FCA) enforcement based on asserted false statements to the government (and even in the absence of economic loss). Kousisis expands the prospective that similar conduct might now give rise to criminal mail and wire fraud prosecutions. This may impact how companies facing FCA inquiries engage with the government and how they approach compliance with respect to government contracts, in particular.
- Similarly, Kousisis may impact the scope of civil claims brought under the wire fraud statute, including civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, which are increasingly being brought by plaintiff’s firms in a number of contexts, including healthcare and data privacy. In particular, plaintiffs may no longer need to establish economic loss in connection with each fraud-based predicate act to support a RICO claim if they can assert fraudulent inducement.
If you have questions about the potential impact of Kousisis and next steps for your business, contact the authors of this article or your regular McDermott lawyer.

Doing Deals in the EU: Pitfalls in European M&A Transactions
ARTICLE
Doing Deals in the EU: Pitfalls in European M&A Transactions
June 9, 2025
Read time: 13 min
When analyzing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the European Union and related pitfalls that may arise, strategic and institutional investors should remember that, while the EU legal framework is harmonized in several fields, M&A transactions and contractual relationships in general are still very much driven by the local rules applicable in the relevant EU country. As a result, even an investor from one EU country may encounter unexpected obstacles in pursuing a transaction in another EU country with which the investor is not familiar.
This guide aims to provide examples of issues that investors may face when acquiring a company (or business) located in the EU, with the caveat that, as mentioned, the lack of harmonization across the EU may mean that certain issues are present only in some countries. Therefore, the first pitfall is that each EU country has its own nuances that may lead to surprises.
Freedom of Contract: Is This Real?
Despite decades of efforts to facilitate cross-border transactions by strengthening the principle of “freedom of contract” at an EU level, most EU countries still have stringent rules that significantly limit the parties’ ability to determine the content of an agreement or, more generally, a transaction, including in the context of inter-European M&A deals.
A purchase agreement governed by the law of an EU country (whether as the law chosen by the parties or otherwise) would be typically subject to the limitations imposed by those provisions of the legal system of such country which are mandatory and cannot be derogated by the parties. In certain EU countries such limitations may be rather stringent and impact a broad range of clauses (as specified below).
Also, the parties’ right to choose the law governing the purchase agreement in an M&A transaction in Europe, which may be seen as a way for the parties to pick a legal system which allows more freedom in determining the content of their agreement, is often constrained by the applicable rules on conflicts of laws. These rules may, in particular, prevent the parties from avoiding certain overriding mandatory substantive provisions in force in other countries, such as the country where the agreement must be enforced (in case of litigation) and, in some instances, where the transaction must be performed. Such mandatory provisions may prevail (to some extent and under certain circumstances) over any conflicting clause agreed by the parties under the relevant agreement even when the governing law chosen by the parties allows them.
In light of the above, the choice of any more flexible foreign law as the one applicable to the purchase agreement in a European M&A transaction should not in principle be seen as certainly allowing full freedom to determine the terms of such an agreement.
On the contrary, particularly in circumstances where the parties choose the law of a country that has no connections with the transaction, such choice may raise more uncertainty regarding the extent to which the law of other countries (which, in the case of an M&A deal, would likely be the country where the target is located and/or where the purchase agreement would need to be enforced) may be applied in place of the law chosen by the parties.
It is therefore customary in Europe to make purchase agreements subject to the law of the country of the target.
That being said, below are some examples of mandatory provisions often present in the legal systems of EU countries, which may prevail over anything agreed to the contrary by the parties in an M&A transaction in Europe (including, potentially, in cases where the parties have chosen a different governing law for the reasons mentioned above).
- Statute of Limitations. In M&A deals, a key element from an investor’s perspective is the ability to rely on a full set of representations and warranties given by the seller(s) on the target and its operations. These are typically subject to survivability periods, which may vary depending on the type of representation and warranty. The parties often take for granted that any survivability period they agree upon under the relevant purchase agreement would be enforceable. However, certain European jurisdictions contain stringent provisions on the statute of limitations that may, or otherwise may be deemed to, apply to the remedies for breach of representations and warranties. In such cases, if the statute of limitations expires before the end of the survivability period, the investor may face a risk that a claim made after the expiry of the statute of limitations may be deemed unenforceable in court, even if at the time of the claim the (allegedly) breached representation or warranty is still active according to the terms of the agreement. An investor should, therefore, assess whether any such risk exists in the relevant jurisdiction and, to the extent possible, carry out a global assessment of the trueness and accuracy of the representations and warranties before the statute of limitations set forth in the applicable law expires.
- Duration and Geographical Scope of Restrictive Covenants. In several jurisdictions, time and/or geographical limitations are imposed on any restrictive covenants that may be undertaken by a party. In the context of European acquisitions, this may apply to noncompete, non-solicitation, or similar post-closing covenants. The investor should carefully consider the scope of any such covenants with a view to ensuring full enforceability in accordance with the terms agreed with the seller(s).
- Knowledge. While in other jurisdictions the actual or constructive knowledge of a party may have a lower impact on the implications arising from an agreement, under the laws of several EU countries, this may actually affect the position of a party, including with respect to the remedies available to a buyer in connection with a breach of representations and warranties arising from circumstances of which the buyer was aware. Sandbagging clauses (whereby the buyer reserves the right to make a claim for breach of representations and warranties even if it was aware of such breach before the signing of the purchase agreement) may be disregarded by a court, also in light of the good faith principle that typically applies to the parties in most EU jurisdictions. When dealing with findings made by the investor and its advisors during the pre-signing phase, a safe approach would be to address them in the purchase agreement through ad hoc special indemnities whereby both parties acknowledge the identified issue, and the seller expressly takes the risk of any loss arising from such issue.
- Liquidated Damages. Several European countries have adopted civil law (as opposed to common law) systems. Purchase agreements sometimes contain “liquidated damages” clauses aimed at entitling the nonbreaching party to claim a predetermined amount as compensation for damages caused by a contractual breach of the other party, thus releasing the nonbreaching party from the burden of proof with respect to the actual damage suffered from the relevant breach. In M&A transactions, liquidated damages often are used as a remedy for the buyer in connection with a breach by the seller of certain of its obligations, such as noncompete covenants. It is worth noting that civil law systems (like those in force in some EU countries) usually allow the court to adjust (and basically reduce) the stated amount of liquidated damages when such amount is deemed to be unfair. In European acquisitions that imply the application of civil law provisions, the buyer should take into account that, when the amount of liquidated damages applicable to obligations undertaken by the seller is set at an unequitable level (also for the purposes of discouraging the seller from breaching such obligations), chances are that a breaching seller may successfully claim in court a reduction of its exposure under the “liquidated damages” clause.
- Restrictions on the Exemption from Liabilities. Purchase agreements entered into in connection with M&A deals often include clauses that limit or exclude liabilities for breach of obligations undertaken by a party thereunder. While these clauses are mainly used to protect a seller, it is not uncommon to see limitations or exclusions of liabilities of a buyer in the case of a breach of any of its undertakings. Once again, the laws of some European jurisdictions restrict the scope of such exclusions and limitations, in particular by denying their enforceability in the case of a breach arising from willful misconduct or, in some jurisdictions, gross negligence on the part of the breaching party. An investor should be advised that its obligations under the purchase agreement may expose it to liabilities (or liabilities in excess of the maximum amounts agreed by the parties) notwithstanding any contractual exclusion or limitation of its liabilities.
Regulatory Approvals: Increasing Scrutiny
In addition to the merger control clearances that may be required based on the applicable thresholds or approvals from regulators in connection with the acquisition of targets operating in regulated markets (e.g., banking, insurance, and telecommunication), EU countries have been experiencing a progressive strengthening of the scrutiny powers granted to local governmental authorities regarding acquisitions of targets operating in certain critical sectors, including the 11 critical sectors defined in the EU Critical Entities Directive (CER Directive).
Enacted in 2019, the CER Directive established a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments. However, the regulation left broad discretion to each country on its implementation. As a result, each EU country has adopted (or simply updated) its own unique screening system. Certain EU countries that had already taken a stringent approach to governmental scrutiny of foreign investments in critical sectors before the enactment of the CER Directive maintained, or even strengthened, their system.
Currently, the range of sectors and related transactions on which local governments have screening powers is often wide, and the exact perimeter is sometimes unclear, thus raising concern on whether a transaction must be disclosed to the government for the purpose of obtaining its approval. In some instances, even EU-to-EU and domestic transactions are subject to the relevant regulations and the scrutiny of the government. Also, considering that the sanctions for failing to disclose a transaction may be severe, the parties are now often inclined to notify the government and seek its approval even when the investment relates to sectors or targets that were previously deemed not critical.
An investor acquiring, or otherwise investing in, an EU target (or even a non-EU target with assets or subsidiaries in the EU) should carefully assess whether the transaction would be, or may be construed as, falling within the scope of the governmental screening and approval required under the local regulations on investments in critical sectors. Any such requirement may have an impact on the timing, as the related approval process may take months, and on the actual outcome of the transaction, in case the approval is denied or it is given with prescription by the local government.
Finally, the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), enacted in 2022 to address market distortions caused by foreign subsidies, has introduced a new regulatory hurdle for M&A transactions in the EU, in addition to merger control and foreign direct investment screening. Namely, M&A transactions involving a buyer and/or a target that has received a foreign financial contribution must be disclosed to and approved by the European Commission if certain conditions set forth in the regulation are met.
Financial Assistance Restrictions and Implications on the Structure of the Transactions
Legal systems in force in the EU typically contain provisions prohibiting, at least in certain instances, a target company from financing (whether through loans, securities, guarantees, or similar means) the acquisition of its own shares (or equity interests). Each country has different rules, sometimes with exceptions that are often linked to the type of transaction. Also, certain jurisdictions allow whitewash procedures whereby a target company may be allowed to provide financial assistance. On the other hand, the meaning of the term “financial assistance” is often intended to be very broad, thus including leveraged buyouts and other transactions that may indirectly result in financial support being granted by the target or its subsidiaries.
When structuring the funding of an acquisition in the EU, an investor should consider the local provisions to ensure that the funding would not constitute a violation of local laws on financial assistance.
Employees: Consultation and Protection
Protection of employees is a very sensitive issue in most European legal systems. As a result, the application of mandatory provisions relating to the employees may be triggered by the acquisition of an EU business. These may include mandatory prior consultation procedures (mostly required in connection with asset deals, but which may also apply to share deals implemented in certain jurisdictions), obligation to maintain the employees’ pre-closing status, rights of certain employees to indemnification if they (even voluntarily) leave the company after its sale, etc. Stringent limitations apply to the ability of a company to dismiss employees. An investor should not, therefore, assume that any post-closing reorganization plans that contemplate a layoff of the target’s personnel could be implemented without limitations or encumbrances. An adequate assessment of any impact that employment laws may have on the transaction should be carried out during its structuring, as they may affect timing, formalities, and costs.
Closing Formalities: Is a Notary Public Required?
In some European countries, the involvement of a notary public may be required in connection with the sale of shares (or equity interests). In such countries, the functions of the notary public include material responsibilities and authority (as a public officer) with regard to the identification and certification of the signatories, their powers, the content of the executed documents, and, to some extent, their validity under local laws. In this situation, it is necessary to liaise timely with the notary public to make sure that any documents are approved before the closing date and that any pre-closing formalities (including evidence to the notary public of the powers granted to the signatories) are duly and timely completed.
Potential Indirect Taxes
It is not uncommon that the sale of shares (or equity interests) or assets may trigger transfer taxes or similar taxes in the EU. In certain countries, such taxes may be material, as they may represent a percentage of the value of the transaction or of the underlying assets. It is worth assessing in advance any tax implications when investing in an EU company, as they may also play a role in the structuring of the acquisition.
Access more resources and get in touch with our experienced deal team by visiting mwe.com/crossborder.

Bulletin Concurrence XIV
ARTICLE
Bulletin Concurrence XIV
June 2025
Read time: 2 min
We are delighted to share the fourteenth Bulletin Concurrence which aims to keep you up to date with the key developments in competition law over the first quarter of 2025.
Read the full Bulletin Concurrence XIV (in French).

Recent developments in tax law – Federal Fiscal Court on the employer status of permanent establishments
ARTICLE
Recent developments in tax law – Federal Fiscal Court on the employer status of permanent establishments
2025
Read time: 2 min
In three landmark rulings, the Federal Fiscal Court has decided that permanent establishments are not employers within the meaning of double taxation agreements. The rulings have significant implications for (domestic and foreign) payroll tax obligations in the case of international employee assignments.
In the article “BFH on the employer status of permanent establishments” by Dr. Gero Burwitz and Jonathan Storz, published in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht, you can find out what income tax obligations apply to groups with cross-border structures, what tax risks they face, and what structuring options companies should now consider.

Family Office Symposium 2025 | Key Takeaways
ARTICLE
Family Office Symposium 2025 | Key Takeaways
April 30 – May 1, 2025
Read time: 10 min
McDermott’s Family Office Symposium 2025 brought together more than 400 single-family office executives and industry leaders to uncover new opportunities, exchange best practices, and strengthen relationships. Focused on the most pressing challenges and emerging opportunities in the family office landscape, the event delivered fresh perspectives and actionable ideas.
During this discussion, the panel explored how evolving roles and compensation models are reshaping the family office talent market.
Top takeaways included:
- The growing number of family offices, combined with the retirement of experienced executives, is creating a strong demand for skilled professionals and leadership successors. At the same time, existing employees are experiencing role expansion (scope creep), driving the need for additional hires.
- Family offices are leveraging competitive compensation – including co-investments and carried interest – to attract and retain talent. Tailored incentive plans aligned with organizational goals are increasingly essential, especially in investment roles with competitive compensation expectations. Clearly defining co-investment terms (e.g., asset eligibility, participation criteria and use of leverage) is crucial.
- A strong organizational culture and alignment with the principals’ values are critical to long-term employee satisfaction. Offering growth opportunities, such as promotions and cross-functional experiences, enhances engagement and loyalty.
- Partnering with recruiters who understand the unique family office environment enhances hiring effectiveness. Benefits such as relocation support, family leave, and medical coverage – alongside flexible in-office policies – further reinforce a compelling and supportive workplace.

IRS Roundup May 15 – June 2, 2025
ARTICLE
IRS Roundup May 15 – June 2, 2025
Jun 5, 2025
Read time: 3 min
Check out our summary of significant Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidance and relevant tax matters for May 15, 2025 – June 2, 2025.
IRS GUIDANCE
May 15, 2025: The IRS issued Notice 2025-29, providing guidance on the corporate bond monthly yield curve, corresponding spot segment rates under Internal Revenue Code (Code) § 417(e)(3), and the 24-month average segment rates under Code § 430(h)(2). The notice also provides guidance on the interest rate for 30-year Treasury securities under Code § 417(e)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (for plan years in effect before 2008) and the 30-year Treasury weighted average rate under Code § 431(c)(6)(E)(ii)(I).
May 15, 2025: The IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2025-12, providing prescribed rates for federal income tax purposes for June 2025, including, but not limited to:
- Short-, mid-, and long-term applicable federal rates for June 2025 for purposes of Code § 1274(d)
- Short-, mid-, and long-term adjusted applicable federal rates for June 2025 for purposes of Code § 1288(b)
- The adjusted federal long-term rate and the long-term tax-exempt rate, as described in Code § 382(f)
- The federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, an interest for life, or for a term of years, or a remainder or a reversionary interest for purposes of Code § 7520.
May 19, 2025: The IRS released Internal Revenue Bulletin 2025-21. It includes Revenue Procedure 2025-19, which provides the 2026 inflation adjusted amounts for Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) as determined under Code § 223, as well as the maximum amount that may be made newly available for excepted benefit health reimbursement arrangements under Code § 54.9831-1(c)(3)(viii). Revenue Procedure 2025-19 is effective for HSAs for the 2026 calendar year and for excepted benefit health reimbursement arrangements beginning in 2026.
May 22, 2025: The IRS issued a notice to US taxpayers living or working abroad, encouraging them to file their 2024 federal income tax returns by June 16, 2025.
June 2, 2025: The IRS issued Notice 2025-27, providing interim guidance on the application of the corporate alternative minimum tax (CAMT), as well as relief from certain additions to tax for a corporation’s underpayment of estimated tax under Code § 6655. Among other things, this notice also provides an optional simplified method for determining applicable corporation status and waives certain additions to tax under Code § 6655 concerning a corporation’s CAMT liability under Code § 55. The US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the IRS also plan on issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, revising the CAMT proposed regulations in § 2.02(2) of this notice to include a method for determining applicable corporation status.
The IRS also released its weekly list of written determinations (e.g., Private Letter Rulings, Technical Advice Memorandums, and Chief Counsel Advice).
TAX CONTROVERSY DEVELOPMENTS
On May 22, 2025, the US Tax Court issued its opinion in Facebook Inc. v. Commissioner.
THE “BIG, BEAUTIFUL BILL”
The “Big, Beautiful Bill” passed the US House of Representatives on May 22, 2025, and is now being deliberated in the US Senate. Changes are expected to be made, as adjustments to the tax-focused reconciliation bill is a key focus of senators.

Target LLCs as S corporations: The boilerplate operating agreement and the importance of Revenue Procedure 2022-19
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Target LLCs as S corporations: The boilerplate operating agreement and the importance of Revenue Procedure 2022-19
June 4, 2025
Read time: 8 min
Many closely held businesses operate through entities classified as “S corporations,” an elective federal income tax regime that combines elements of corporate and partnership taxation. Among other reasons, S corporations are frequently viewed as tax-favorable vehicles because their flow-through nature allows for a single layer of federal income tax.
Electing and maintaining S corporation status requires adherence to strict requirements. During (or sometimes prior to) a sales process, such requirements are frequently scrutinized as part of tax diligence. For S corporations formed as limited liability companies (LLCs), a recurring pre-closing deal issue is the discovery of an inadvertent creation of a prohibited “second class of stock” caused by provisions in the target S corporation’s LLC operating agreement. This second class of stock invalidates the target’s S corporation election (S Election) from the date the offending provisions in its LLC operating agreement were adopted – in some cases, from the date the LLC was formed.
In October 2022, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue Procedure 2022-19 to provide a mechanism to resolve certain “foot faults” that made an S Election invalid without the need to seek a private letter ruling (PLR) from the IRS, which adds time, cost, complexity, and uncertainty to a transaction.
S corporations generally
A qualifying domestic corporation (or an eligible entity that elects to be treated as such) may elect to be treated as an S corporation for federal income tax purposes. Like partnerships, an S corporation’s items of income, gain, losses, deductions, and credits flow through to its owners. An S corporation files an annual federal income tax return and issues a Schedule K-1 to each of its shareholders to report each shareholder’s proportionate share of the S corporation’s tax items.
To elect and maintain S corporation status, an entity must (1) be a domestic corporation (or an eligible entity electing to be treated as such), (2) have only allowable shareholders, (3) have no more than 100 shareholders, (4) have only one class of stock, and (5) not be an “ineligible” corporation (i.e., certain financial institutions, insurance companies, and domestic international sales corporations). Permitted shareholders include individuals, certain trusts, and estates while prohibited shareholders include partnerships, corporations, and nonresident aliens.
Generally, a corporation is treated as having one class of stock if all outstanding shares of the corporation’s stock grant identical rights to distribution and liquidation proceeds. A purported S Election filed by an entity when it has a “second class of stock” is invalid. Certain agreements, such as buy-sell agreements among shareholders, transfer restriction agreements, and stock redemption agreements, generally do not create a “second class of stock,” provided that a principal purpose for such agreement is not to circumvent the “one class of stock” requirement.
Validity of an S Election
Confirming the validity of a target LLC’s S Election during diligence is crucial to structuring a transaction. For example, if a deal requires the target S corporation to undergo a pre-closing “F” reorganization and it is later determined that its S Election was invalid, then the purchaser may bear the cost of the target’s historic unpaid corporate level tax. Similarly, if instead the transaction is structured as a purchase of the target LLC’s “stock” with the seller and purchaser agreeing to make a Section 336(e) election (to treat the purchase of “stock” as an asset sale resulting in a basis step-up in the LLC’s assets), such election will be invalid if the target LLC’s S Election is invalid.
The boilerplate operating agreement
Many multimember LLCs are treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes and for that reason, their operating agreements often contain, among other provisions, a myriad of boilerplate citations to partnership tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, priority operating distribution waterfalls, and provisions requiring liquidating distributions to be made based on capital accounts or on a priority liquidating distribution waterfall.
If such provisions are followed as set forth in the applicable operating agreement, disproportionate distributions may be made to the LLC’s members, thereby resulting in the LLC having a second class of stock. The IRS takes the position that the mere existence of such provisions (i.e., “non-identical governing provisions”) has the effect of invalidating an S Election, even if such provisions are not followed and all distributions (if any) are or were made proportionally to the LLC’s members. In Revenue Procedure 2022-19, the IRS sought to provide relief for situations, such as the latter scenario, so that an entity that otherwise made a valid S Election would not be required to pursue a PLR pursuant to Code Section 1362(f) for retroactive relief.
Revenue Procedure 2022-19
Revenue Procedure 2022-19 allows S corporations and their shareholders to retroactively resolve frequently encountered issues with certainty and without needing to pursue a PLR. The six areas identified in Revenue Procedure 2022-19 that are resolvable without obtaining a PLR are:
- One class of stock requirement and governing provisions, including “principal purpose” conditions
- Disproportionate distributions
- Certain inadvertent errors or omissions on IRS Form 2553 or IRS Form 8869
- A missing administrative acceptance letter for S Election or qualified subchapter S subsidiary (QSub) election
- A federal income tax return filing inconsistent with an S Election or a QSub election
- “[N]on-identical governing provisions.”
Provisions in a target LLC S corporation’s operating agreement that have the effect of creating more than one class of stock (e.g., partnership tax provisions) are referred to as “non-identical governing provisions” and result in the LLC’s S Election being invalid (even if the LLC never made a disproportionate distribution). Revenue Procedure 2022-19 provides retroactive relief for such situation provided the LLC meets the following conditions:
- The LLC has or had one or more “non-identical governing provisions.”
- The LLC has not made (or deemed to have made) disproportionate distributions.
- The LLC has consistently and timely filed IRS Form 1120-S (S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation) for each taxable year of the LLC beginning with the tax year in which the first “non-identical governing provision” was adopted and through the tax year immediately preceding the tax year in which the LLC made a request for corrective relief.
- The IRS has not yet discovered any “non-identical governing provision.”
If the LLC satisfies those four conditions, then Revenue Procedure 2022-19 sets forth a process for the LLC to obtain relief that does not require any filing with the IRS. Specifically, the LLC must prepare a statement, signed under penalties of perjury by a person authorized to sign the LLC’s tax return (i.e., Form 1120-S), that (1) details the “non-identical governing provision(s),” (2) describes each corrective action taken to correct or remove the “non-identical governing provisions,” and (3) includes a list of all persons who have been members (shareholders) since the “non-identical governing provision(s)” took effect until the LLC adopted the new “identical governing provision(s).” Revenue Procedure 2022-19 requires the LLC to retain such statement and other applicable documentation in its permanent records.
A purchaser will often require the seller to amend the LLC’s operating agreement prior to closing to remove the “non-identical governing provision(s).” Notwithstanding the relative ease by which relief is secured in situations where an operating agreement contains one or more “non-identical governing provisions,” a purchaser must evaluate through appropriate diligence whether the target LLC S corporation meets the eligibility requirements for such relief – in particular, whether the LLC has ever made (or is deemed to have made) disproportionate distributions while it purported to be an S corporation. This can be a challenging endeavor in situations where an LLC has been operating as a S corporation for many years, where the LLC has many members, or where members have been added or removed. Accordingly, a purchaser is well advised to include relevant representations and warranties and post-closing covenants in the applicable transaction documents and negotiate indemnities (potentially supported by escrows) where appropriate. A purchaser might also consider an alternative acquisition structure if the target LLC S corporation is ineligible for relief under Revenue Procedure 2022-19 (or there is sufficient uncertainty as to whether the target LLC S corporation is eligible for relief) and the time to obtain relief from the IRS pursuant to Code Section 1362(f) would extend beyond the desired closing horizon.
Conclusion
Purchasers and sellers should carefully review the operating agreement of a target LLC that has been operating as an S corporation because of the risk that provisions in its operating agreement may invalidate an otherwise valid S Election. Depending on how a transaction is structured, an invalid S Election can result in adverse tax consequences. Fortunately, Revenue Procedure 2022-19 provides taxpayers with an easier procedure for obtaining relief for inadvertent and minor errors that might invalidate an otherwise valid S Election. A purchaser must still carefully evaluate whether the target LLC S corporation is eligible for such relief.
Former associate Olivia Sica also contributed to this article.

FTC Revives Orange Book Listing Challenges
CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY
FTC Revives Orange Book Listing Challenges
June 3, 2025
Read time: 5 min
On May 21, 2025, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued its third round of warning letters – and its first under the Trump administration – against pharmaceutical manufacturers for allegedly improper listing of patents in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Orange Book. The FTC made clear that its prerogative under President Trump’s leadership is to seek “transparent, competitive, and fair healthcare markets.”
The FTC issued renewed warning letters to drugmakers that did not delist previously challenged Orange Book listings, disputing more than 200 patents across 17 brand-name pharmaceuticals. The patents relate to device components of combination drug-device products treating asthma, diabetes, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The FTC alleges the device patents constitute improper listings that allow brand-name manufacturers to delay – or even prohibit – generic competition. These patents were previously the subject of warning letters the FTC issued in November 2023 and April 2024 to more than a dozen pharmaceutical manufacturers. Although some manufacturers delisted patents in response to the initial warning letters, others chose to continue listing the targeted patents in the Orange Book.
Background
The FTC issued a policy statement in 2023 under Chair Lina Khan declaring that “improper” pharmaceutical patent listings in the Orange Book may constitute an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. The patents are listed for the purpose of putting generic rivals on notice to deter patent infringement. The FDA, however, takes only a ministerial role as to listing patents and does not assess whether patents are properly listed in the Orange Book. Following the 2023 policy statement, the FTC issued a series of warning letters to manufacturers. We previously explored the FTC’s renewed stance against Orange Book listings and the listing dispute involving Teva Pharmaceutical Industries in this article.
In the FTC’s recent warning letters, the agency cites the December 2024 US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision in Teva Branded Pharm. Prods. R&D, Inc. v. Amneal Pharms. of N.Y., LLC as support for their assertion that the previously identified patents are improperly listed. The Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court’s order requiring Teva to delist five patents associated with its ProAir® HFA inhaler, a drug-device combination product, from the Orange Book. The court found Teva had improperly listed its ProAir HFA inhaler patents in the Orange Book for primarily two reasons:
- First, Teva had misinterpreted the requirements set forth in the listing statute by arguing that the term “drug” encompasses any component of an article that treats a disease, and therefore its patents claiming the device components would also “claim the drug.” The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding that determining whether a patent is properly listed “requires what amounts to a finding of patent infringement,” and the mere fact that a product could infringe a patent does not mean the patent “claims” the underlying drug.
- Second, Teva argued that a patent can be listed when it claims any part of the product other than the active ingredient, and therefore its patents that claim the device component are valid. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding that in order for a patent to claim the “drug” and be listed in the Orange Book, the patent must claim at least the active ingredient of the approved product, as the active ingredient provides the primary mode of action of the drug.
The Federal Circuit subsequently denied Teva’s request for an en banc rehearing in March 2025. Notwithstanding Teva’s petition seeking Supreme Court review, Teva must now delist the five patents.
What’s Next
On the day following the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the FTC issued a press release applauding the Federal Circuit’s holding and reiterating its position that, due to the 30-month statutory stay triggered by listing patents in the Orange Book, improper listings can negatively affect competitive conditions permitting generic entry of competing drug products. The press release, however, was issued in the waning days of Chair Khan’s tenure with a Democratic majority at the FTC, and practitioners and industry stakeholders alike questioned whether the FTC’s policy on Orange Book listings would continue under a Republican-led FTC. The recent warning letters suggest that, under current Chair Andrew Ferguson, the FTC appears to be sticking to the prior administration’s policy and remains focused on enhancing competition between brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals to lower healthcare costs.
The Federal Circuit’s decision vindicated the FTC’s position against improper listings in the Orange Book and likely empowered the agency to undertake the most recent enforcement efforts despite the change in administration. The agency’s continued scrutiny of patent listings in the Orange Book indicates it is possible the FTC may pursue enforcement actions concerning its Orange Book challenges in the future. Therefore, brand-name manufacturers are advised to carefully review their current listings, paying particular attention to the underlying claim of the patent, as patents that do not claim the active ingredient in the drug may be considered improperly listed. Brand-name manufacturers are encouraged to proactively seek counsel when conducting such reviews to ensure compliance.
For more information, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.

New Jersey Proposes Rules for the New Jersey Data Privacy Act
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
New Jersey Proposes Rules for the New Jersey Data Privacy Act
June 3, 2025
Read time: 7 min
New Jersey’s Office of Consumer Protection has prepared proposed rules for the New Jersey Data Privacy Act (NJDPA) (Proposed Rules). While the bulk of the Proposed Rules consist of recitations of the obligations found in the NJDPA, there are several materially new requirements that may come as a surprise to companies, including new definitions and compliance obligations. These new requirements are borrowed largely from existing California and Colorado privacy regulations. The comment period for the Proposed Rules will be open through August 1, 2025. Companies wishing to comment on the Proposed Rules should reach out to their regular McDermott lawyer or the one of the authors.
For more information about the applicability of the NJDPA, see our Global Privacy & Cybersecurity Resource Center.
New Definition of “Personal Data”
One of the cornerstones of any consumer privacy law is the definition of “personal data.” Consistent with other state laws, the NJDPA defines that term as “any information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable person.” The Proposed Rules, however, go further, introducing a more expansive version of which data elements, when combined, could be “reasonably linkable” to a person or device.
Specifically, the Proposed Rules define “Personal Data” so as to include “(1) full name; (2) mother’s maiden name; (3) telephone number; (4) IP address or other unique device identifiers; (5) place of birth; (6) date of birth; (7) geographical details (for example, zip code, city, state or country); (8) employment information; (9) username, email address, or any other account holder identifying information (including, but not limited to social media accounts; (10) mailing address and (11) race, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression.” It is difficult to understand the breadth of this definition, which stretches far broader than any other state consumer privacy or breach law.
The Proposed Rules attempt to limit the reach of these elements by explaining that the above data elements are “reasonably linkable” only “if [they] can identify a person or a device linked to a person when aggregated with other data.” This means a date of birth alone may not be “personal data,” but some combination of the 11 items above could be “reasonably linkable.”
New Controller Obligations
The Proposed Rules include new controller obligations, including the requirements that controllers:
- Create and maintain a data inventory documenting the types of personal data that the controller possesses, where the data is stored, and who has access to the data.
- Immediately delete a Consumer’s sensitive data after the Consumer revokes consent for the Controller to process their personal data.
- Maintain records of data subject requests for 24 months.
- Add significant detail to their data privacy impact assessments, including evaluating specific types of harm and incorporating technical details about the processing activity that is the basis for the assessment.
Privacy Notice Requirements
The Proposed Rules introduce accessibility requirements to disclosures, which are common to most websites. For example, the Proposed Rules require that disclosures to consumers be accessible to consumers with disabilities and be available in languages in which the business normally interacts with its customers. A more interesting requirement is that the disclosures be easily printed.
In addition, the Proposed Rules would introduce the requirement for companies to disclose (1) more granular descriptions of the data collected; (2) the length of time each category of information will be retained; (3) a statement regarding whether the business knowingly sells or shares the personal information of minors; and (4) additional detail regarding the data subject request process used by the business. The Proposed Rules also introduce a suite of disclosures necessary for any company that profiles consumers for a decision that has a significant effect on the consumer (e.g., lending or housing).
The Proposed Rules also clarify that privacy notices do not require a separate section for New Jersey-specific disclosures.
Loyalty Program Notices
The term “loyalty” appears in the NJDPA twice, both times in acknowledgements that those programs are allowable. The Proposed Rules, however, introduce an array of requirements for loyalty programs, beginning with the development and distribution of a “Loyalty program notice,” which must include a variety of details about the program, similar to California’s financial incentive disclosure requirements.
Designated Methods for Submission of Data Subject Requests and Related Requirements
The NJDPA gives controllers the freedom to provide an email, website, or toll-free number through which data subject requests can be made. However, borrowing a page from California, the Proposed Rules would require that the controller provide two methods, one of which must be a toll-free telephone number.
Also new in the Proposed Rules is a requirement that for any data request not effectuated within 10 business days of receipt, a business must contact the data subject to “confirm receipt” of the request.
With respect to denials of consumer requests, the Proposed Rules would require the disclosure of the express reasons the request was denied, including, for example, an explanation of what information would be necessary to verify identity in the instance where lack of verification was a basis for the denial.
The Proposed Rules take yet another page from California by including requirements regarding the level/quantity of verifications that need to be performed for each type of request. For example, for a right to know, businesses must verify two pieces of information, whereas for a right to access, the business must verify three pieces of information from the requestor.
Again borrowing from California, the Proposed Rules have language regarding browser opt-out signals, which largely tracks the current California Consumer Privacy Act rules.
Introducing “Duty of Care”
Perhaps one of the more troubling aspects of the Proposed Rules is the introduction of a section related to reasonable data security that parrots language associated with fiduciary duty. The Proposed Rules refer to the NJDPA obligation to safeguard information as a “Duty of Care,” a label that is sure to draw the attention of the plaintiff’s bar and perhaps provide a method for an end-run around the prohibition on private rights of action under the NJDPA.
Consent Requirements
The Proposed Rules also borrow from existing Colorado regulations regarding the obtaining of consent when required under the NJDPA. Substantively mirroring the existing Colorado regulations, the Proposed Rules introduce several pages of requirements for obtaining valid consent, including a requirement that consent be refreshed after 24 months if there have not been any intervening interactions with the consumer.
Increased Requirements for Avoiding Dark Patterns
The NJDPA provides that consent is not effective if obtained through a so-called “dark pattern.” The Proposed Rules add substantially more detail to what constitutes a “dark pattern,” including:
- Controllers must not bundle Consumer choices in an incompatible manner, such as by requiring consumers to consent to the sale of location-based data to receive location-based services.
- Controllers cannot present Consumers with preselected or default choices.
- Controllers must not impair a consumer’s ability to make a choice, such as by requiring the consumer to click through “multiple disruptive screens” to opt out.
- Controllers must fix circular or broken links and nonfunctional email addresses that they know of or should know of.
Business Action Items
The comment period on the Proposed Rules is open until August 1, 2025.
For more information, or if you would like to submit comments to the Proposed Rules, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.
