Content Type: Article

  • OFAC Focuses on Oligarchs, Adds Sanctions on Russian Persons and Entities

    OFAC Focuses on Oligarchs, Adds Sanctions on Russian Persons and Entities

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    OFAC Focuses on Oligarchs, Adds Sanctions on Russian Persons and Entities

    April 26, 2018

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Friday, April 6, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated the Russia/Ukraine and Syria sanctions by, among other things, designating a number of individuals and companies as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs).[1] The new Russia/Ukraine sanctions mark the first time that OFAC has designated publicly traded companies as SDNs — a significant development for firms that trade in the securities of these companies or otherwise have ongoing relationships with them. The new sanctions also designate as SDNs several well-known Russian industrialists with ownership interests in various public companies, requiring firms to assess whether entities not specifically named on the SDN List would be considered blocked parties (i.e., SDNs under OFAC’s 50 percent rule,[2] which includes entities that are, in the aggregate, 50 percent or more owned by one or more SDNs). Finally, the new sanctions are noteworthy in that they extend to foreign persons who “knowingly facilitate significant transactions” for any person subject to U.S. sanctions, their child, spouse, sibling or parent.

    The new sanctions were issued pursuant to Executive Orders 13661, 13662 and 13582. These actions follow OFAC’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) Section 241 report in late January 2018.[3] In the Section 241 report, OFAC identified senior Russian government officials and oligarchs, but did not impose sanctions against them. The new sanctions target a number (but not all) of those previously identified government officials and oligarchs, as well as corporate entities associated with them, freezing all of their assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. persons from dealings with them. The new sanctions also designate as SDNs a state-owned Russian weapons trading company and its subsidiary, a Russian bank.

    General Licenses

    To allow U.S. persons to divest from relationships that violate the new sanctions, OFAC has over the last several weeks issued various general licenses, including General License 12A, “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind Down of Operations or Existing Contracts,”[4] General License 13, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Divest or Transfer Debt, Equity, or Other Holdings in Certain Blocked Persons,”[5] and General License 14, “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind Down of Operations or Existing Contracts with United Company RUSAL PLC.”[6]

    On Monday, April 23, 2018, OFAC issued General License 12A (which replaces and supersedes General License 12 of April 6, 2018, to provide for the new General License 14, discussed below). General license 12A allows U.S. persons to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions and activities with certain blocked persons and entities for a limited time period (until 12:01 am, Eastern Daylight Time, on June 5, 2018), to the extent they are “ordinarily incident to and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of operations, contracts or other agreements, including the importation of goods, services, and technology into the United States.”[7] General License 12A allows wind-down transactions and activity as described above, with the following blocked persons: AgroHolding Kuban, Basic Element Limited, B-Finance Ltd., EN+ Group PLC, JSC EuroSibEnergo, GAZ Group, Gazprom Burenie OOO, Ladoga Menedszhement OOO, NPV Engineering Open Joint Stock Company, Renova Group, Russian Machines, United Company RUSAL PLC (“RUSAL”),[8] or any other entity in which these blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or more interest.

    General License 12A does not, however, authorize any divestiture or transfer of debt, equity or other holdings to or for the benefit of the blocked entities it identifies, or the exportation of goods from the U.S. General License 12A also requires that any payment for the direct or indirect benefit of a blocked person named in the license must be made into a blocked, interest-bearing account in the United States.

    In FAQs accompanying the sanctions, OFAC also clarifies that permitted transactions include salary payments, pension payments and other benefits or services to U.S. persons who are employees of the blocked persons named in General License 12A.[9] The FAQs also clarify that, absent authorization from OFAC, continued employment or board membership with an entity designated under E.O. 13661 or E.O. 13662, or blocked by operation of the 50 percent rule, are prohibited, and advise U.S. persons who are employed by or hold board memberships in any designated company to evaluate whether activities necessary to exit that relationship are authorized, and if not, to seek guidance or a specific license from OFAC.[10]

    General License 13, issued April 6, 2018, similarly provides a grace period (until 12:01 am, Eastern Daylight Time, on May 7, 2018), during which U.S. persons are allowed to conduct transactions or other activity “ordinarily incident and necessary to divest or transfer debt, equity, or other holdings in the blocked persons [specified below] to a non-U.S. person, or to facilitate the transfer of debt, equity, or other holdings” in the same blocked persons by a non-U.S. person to another non-U.S. person. Transactions permitted under General License 13 include facilitating, clearing and settling transactions to a non-U.S. person to divest debt, equity or other holdings in the blocked persons, including on behalf of U.S. persons. General License 13 allows such transactions and activity with respect to the following: EN+Group PLC, GAZ Group, and United Company RUSAL PLC. General License 13 does not, however, allow a U.S. person “to sell debt, equity, or other holdings, to; to purchase or invest in debt, equity, or other holdings in; or to facilitate such transactions with, directly or indirectly,” any blocked person or entity, including blocked persons identified in the license.[11]

    On Monday, April 23, 2018, OFAC issued General License 14, which extends the grace period for maintenance or wind down transactions involving United Company RUSAL PLC and its subsidiaries until 12:01 am, Eastern Daylight Time, on Oct. 23, 2018. OFAC also issued new FAQs related to General License 14. Any funds in accounts of blocked persons that were blocked as of 12:01 am on April 23, 2018 remain blocked, but such funds may be used consistent with the above maintenance or wind-down activity. The license does not permit divestiture or transfer of debt, equity or other holdings in or for the benefit of RUSAL, or the unblocking of any property related to RUSAL except as provided in the license, but exports to RUSAL are permitted for maintenance or wind-down purposes. Payments authorized by General License 14 license do not need to be deposited into a blocked account at a U.S. financial institution.

    U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by each of these three licenses are required, within 10 business days after the expiration date of the applicable general license, to file with OFAC a detailed report of each transaction, including the names and addresses of parties involved, the type and scope of activities conducted and the dates on which the activities occurred.

    In response to questions from the industry regarding General License 13, which limits divestments of debt, equity or holdings in certain blocked persons to non-U.S. persons, OFAC has indicated that it plans to publish guidance clarifying that it will allow financial institutions or registered broker-dealers in securities to rely upon the information ordinarily available to them for purposes of conducting the activities authorized under General License 13. But, consistent with FAQ 116,[12] if a U.S. broker is involved in the divestment or transfer of equity, debt or other holding and has information in its possession leading it to know or have reason to know that the buyer is a U.S. person, it is responsible for making sure that the transaction does not occur. OFAC has indicated that it expects U.S. persons to conduct due diligence on their own direct customers, and OFAC will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the processing of the transaction to determine what, if any, enforcement action to take.

    OFAC also clarified, in FAQs accompanying the new Russia/Ukraine sanctions, that if a person designated under the new sanctions owns less than 50 percent of a U.S. company, the U.S. company itself is not blocked, but that U.S. company must block all property and interests in property in which the designated person has an interest.[13] This FAQ guidance could have significant consequences for any U.S. company whose shares are publicly traded and potentially owned by a newly designated SDN. OFAC notes that depending on the nature of the blocked property, the U.S. company may be able to continue operations, but encourages such companies to seek further guidance.

    CAATSA’s Extension to Foreign Persons

    CAATSA permits the Treasury to impose mandatory sanctions on foreign persons “that Treasury determines, inter alia, knowingly facilitate significant transactions, including deceptive or structured transactions, for or on behalf of any person subject to U.S. sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation, or their child, spouse, parent, or sibling.”[14] These secondary sanctions are applicable with respect to the Apr. 6 designations.

    OFAC’s FAQs explain that it will consider the “totality of the facts and circumstances” in determining whether a transaction is “significant,” which is the primary factor that triggers secondary sanctions.[15] The FAQs outline other factors that could impact its analysis, including “(1) the size, number, and frequency of the transaction(s); (2) the nature of the transaction(s); (3) the level of awareness of management and whether the transaction(s) are part of a pattern of conduct; (4) the nexus between the transaction(s) and a blocked person; (5) the impact of the transaction(s) on statutory objectives; (6) whether the transaction(s) involve deceptive practices; and (7) such other factors that the Secretary of the Treasury deems relevant on a case-by-case basis.”[16]

    The FAQs also note that a transaction is not “significant” if a U.S. person could participate in it without a specific license.[17] Therefore, according to OFAC, activity authorized by General Licenses 12A, 13 and 14 would not be considered “significant” for purposes of imposition of secondary sanctions.[18]

     

    Authored by Seetha Ramachandran, Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Jennifer M. Opheim and Lauren E. Davis.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


     

    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.


     

    [1] Announcement and details available here.

    [2] Details of the 50 percent rule available here, under heading Entities Owner by Persons Whose Property and Interest in Property are Blocked (50 percent).

    [3] For a fuller explanation of the prior Russian sanctions, see “Treasury Identifies Russian Political Figures and Oligarchs,” SRZ Alert, Feb. 1, 2018, available here, and “Sanctions Update: Russia, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela,” SRZ Alert, Aug. 2, 2017, available here, republished in The Hedge Fund Journal, August 2017.

    [4] Full content for General License 12A available here.

    [5] Full content for General License 13 available here.

    [6] Full content for General License 14 available here.

    [7] See General License 12A available here.

    [8] See information on General License 14, included below, for the specific parameters of the license relating to United Company RUSAL PLC.

    [9] See FAQ 567 available here.

    [10] See FAQ 568 available here.

    [11] See General License 13 available here.

    [12] See FAQ 116 available here.

    [13] See FAQ 573 available here.

    [14] See FAQ 574 (summarizing CAATSA Section 228) available here.

    [15] See FAQ 542 available here.

    [16] Id.

    [17] See FAQ 574 available here.

    [18] See Id. and FAQ 579 available here.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • US Supreme Court For AIA Proceedings, All or Nothing at All

    US Supreme Court For AIA Proceedings, All or Nothing at All

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Supreme Court For AIA Proceedings, All or Nothing at All

    April 26, 2018

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a 5-4 decision, the US Supreme Court reversed a decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, holding that once the Patent Trial & Appeal Board of US Patent & Trademark Office (PTAB or Board) institutes an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, it must review each and every claim challenged in the petition. Going forward, the PTAB will no longer be permitted to engage in the practice of “partial institution,” i.e., of only some of the claims challenged in the petition.


    McDermott Will & Emery law clerk Paul St. Marie, Jr. also contributed to this article.

    In depth

    SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, Director of the USPTO (No. 16-969).

    In a 5-4 decision, the US Supreme Court reversed a decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, holding that once the Patent Trial & Appeal Board of US Patent & Trademark Office (PTAB or Board) institutes an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, it must review each and every claim challenged in the petition. Going forward, the PTAB will no longer be permitted to engage in the practice of “partial institution,” i.e., of only some of the claims challenged in the petition. (Gorsuch, Justice, joined by Roberts, Chief Justice. and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, Justices.) (Ginsburg, Justice, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justices, dissenting.) (Breyer, Justice dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justices.).

    This dispute arose when SAS filed a petition for IPR challenging all 16 claims of a patent owned by ComplementSoft. The Board determined that SAS only demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on nine of the challenged claims, thereby declining to institute an IPR on the remaining seven claims. In declining to institute on those seven claims, the Board relied on a regulation that states that the PTO director (director) “may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 CFR § 42.108(a). In its Final Written Decision, the Board found all but one of the instituted claims unpatentable, and was predictably silent with regard to the seven claims on which it did not institute. SAS appealed to the Federal Circuit, which (over a “vigorous” dissent by Judge Newman) upheld the regulation. IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 12.

    In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court found that § 318(a) of the American Invents Act (AIA) supplies a clear answer to the question where it states that the Board “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” The Court found this directive both mandatory and comprehensive, analogizing it to civil litigation where a plaintiff would expect to have a decision on all the claims in the complaint and not just “those the decision maker might wish to address.” The Court also dismissed the director’s argument for partial institution because the power to do so simply does not appear in the AIA, and the text that Congress chose to utilize strongly counsels against permitting “partial institution.”

    The Supreme Court next addressed the comprehensive AIA framework for IPR proceedings to show that Congress was clear when requiring institution of all claims. Justice Gorsuch cited § 312(a)(3), explaining that the petition, not the institution decision, defines the contours of the proceeding. Next, citing § 314(b), Gorsuch stated that the director’s decision to institute “pursuant to [the] petition” is simply a yes or no choice—not a piecemeal determination.

    Additionally, citing § 314(a), The Supreme Court explained that the statute requires institution when a reasonable likelihood of success is shown for “at least one of the claims challenged in the petition.” As the majority explained, this requirement combined with the need to use the petition itself as the procedural contour of the proceeding suggests, if anything, a regime where reasonable likelihood of success on one claim is both necessary and sufficient to justify review of all the challenged claims.

    AIA § 316(a)(8) was also informative for the Court, since it discusses the patent owner’s response “to the petition” and not their response to the instituted claims. Lastly, the Court noted that §318(a) mandates that the Board issue a final decision for “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.”

    In contradistinction to AIA proceedings, the Supreme Court looked to the provision covering a related proceeding, ex parte reexamination, where the director is explicitly granted discretion to determine, on a claim-by-claim basis, whether to review for patentability. 35 USC § 303(a).

    In attempting to reconcile the statutory sections of the AIA, the director argued justification for the Board to exercise discretion in the language of §§ 314 and 318. According to the director, since § 314 is directed to claims in the petition while § 318 is directed to claims challenged in the by the petitioner, there is enough linguistic discrepancy to find the number of claims in the petition to be something less than those eventually challenged by the petitioner in the actual IPR proceeding. As Justice Gorsuch stated, “[w]e just don’t see it,” noting that whatever differences there may be are insufficient to authorize the PTO’s regulation. If anything, this discrepancy could be a result of the patent owner’s ability to either cancel, settle or amend various claims (powers specifically within the statute’s text), thereby making the claims in the petition less than those eventually challenged.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the director’s final two arguments. One, a policy argument, as being in the wrong forum; and the other, an argument based on the reviewability of institution decision as being outside the scope of Cuozzo’s limitations on appellate review. As for the policy argument that investing the Board with discretion for partial institution promotes efficiency at the PTAB, thus expediting the streamlined nature of the IPR system, the Court simply noted that was a job for Congress. The Director’s argument that reviewing a decision not to institute on some challenged claims was violative of the Court’s Cuozzo decision (IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 7), was also rejected, Here, the Court noted that this was not a case where the determination of a likelihood of success is being challenged, but rather an appeal over whether the Director exceeded its statutory authority in declining to institute all claims despite finding the requisite likelihood of success for at least one challenged claim.

    One dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg, was short, yet strongly worded. Ginsburg noted that the viewing the combination of the majority’s interpretation of § 318(a) and the absence of a mandate to institute IPRs at all under Cuozzo, the Board could simply decline to institute on petitions having some challenged claims where no reasonable likelihood of success is demonstrated while simultaneously noting that other claim challenges warrant ex parte reexamination. Such a procedure would permit petitioners to file multiple petitions in order to determine which claims are most likely to be instituted and then file amended petitions that would receive institution. Justice Ginsburg finds it difficult to believe that Congress would implicitly authorize this practice while clearly precluding the more rational way of weeding out insubstantial challenges through the Board’s process of “partial institution.”

    Another dissent, by Justice Breyer, noted many linguistic gaps in the statutory framework that the majority found so clear. For example, Breyer explained that the phrase “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner” is not clear as to whether those claims are from the “original petition.” Under the majority view, if 16 claims are challenged, and 15 of the challenges are found to be frivolous, the Board is nevertheless now required to issue appealable decisions on each of these claims as opposed to the PTAB’s regulatory framework where only a decision on the one non-frivolous claim would be appealable and the decision not to institute IPR on the remaining 15 claims would not be appealable.

    Breyer’s dissent also focused on the need to effectuate the purpose of the statute, and avoid a “rigid” reading of the statute as was done by the majority. The dissent points to the director’s ability to institute as an authorization of discretion because some challenges are allowed and others are not. The dissent wonders why a hard line to stop at all claims or no claims is preferred over the more efficient claim-by-claim alternative.

    The dissent also found the majority’s reading of the statute at odds with Cuozzo, noting that it was difficult to understand why Congress would make decisions not to institute non-appealable and wholly within the director’s discretion while simultaneously requiring institution of all challenged claims even if a likelihood of unpatentability is demonstrated for only one. In Breyer’s view, that paradigm creates appellate review of final decisions upholding the patentability of claims in cases where a petitioner, in its petition, failed to raise a reasonable likelihood that a claim(s) was invalid. This additional work for the PTAB and the Federal Circuit, argues the dissent could not have been the intent of Congress when creating a more streamlined and inexpensive procedure for patentability review.

    Practice Note: Going forward, institution decisions will be based on whether the petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

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  • Eleventh Circuit Decision Expands Circuit Split on the FCA’s Statute of Limitations

    ARTICLE

    Eleventh Circuit Decision Expands Circuit Split on the FCA’s Statute of Limitations

    April 26, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Matthew Knowles and Nicholas Alarif wrote this blog post summarizing the April 11, Eleventh Circuit decision on the question whether False Claims Act (FCA) relators can rely on the three-year statute of limitations extension in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in cases where the United States declines to intervene.

    In depth
    Authors

    Matthew L. Knowles

    Partner

    Boston

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  • Digital Asset Trading Platforms Are Getting Attention from Both Federal and State Regulatory Agencies

    Digital Asset Trading Platforms Are Getting Attention from Both Federal and State Regulatory Agencies

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Digital Asset Trading Platforms Are Getting Attention from Both Federal and State Regulatory Agencies

    April 26, 2018

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Trading venues for blockchain tokens and other digital assets, such as exchanges and alternative trading systems and other liquidity providers are becoming subject to increased regulatory scrutiny from both federal and state regulators. The SEC and the New York Attorney General have directed their focus to digital assets exchanges, reminding both operators and users of trading platforms that such exchanges must fulfill all applicable registration and related regulatory requirements, and we expect other state regulators to follow suit.

    McDermott Will & Emery law clerk Michael Wasenius also contributed to this article.

    In depth

    As we anticipated in the January 10, 2018, McDermott Will & Emery On the Subject, titled Five Regulatory Implications for Blockchain Tokens as an ‘Asset Class,’ trading venues for blockchain tokens and other digital assets, such as exchanges and alternative trading systems and other liquidity providers are becoming subject to increased regulatory scrutiny from both federal and state regulators.

    Securities and Exchange Commission Statement Warns Investors and Operators That Online “Exchanges” for Digital Assets May Need to Be Registered

    The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Divisions of Enforcement and Trading and Markets issued a Statement on Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets on March 7, 2018 (the SEC Statement). The SEC Statement addressed the use of online platforms as “exchanges” for cryptocurrencies and digital assets without proper registration as either a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system (an ATS). 15 U.S.C. § 78e. The SEC warned investors that platforms may be labeled as an “exchange,” and appear to be carrying out the functions of an exchange, but lack proper regulatory oversight.

    In the SEC Statement, the SEC also offered guidance to market participants operating online trading platforms. An online trading platform that functions as an exchange for digital assets that may be classified as “securities” must register with the SEC as either a national securities exchange pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Securities Exchange Act or as an ATS pursuant to Regulation ATS. 15 U.S.C. § 78f; 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a1-1. In order to be registered as a national securities exchange, an operator must (1) satisfy all the regulatory requirements for registration as a national securities exchange, including designing rules to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts on such exchange; (2) function as a self-regulatory organization which provides rules and procedures for monitoring and disciplining its members for violation of the securities laws or rules established by the exchange; and (3) maintain compliance with SEC requirements on an ongoing basis. Alternatively, an operator may rely on an exemption from registration as a national securities exchange pursuant to Regulation ATS. An ATS is exempt from national securities exchange registration, but must (1) register as a broker dealer, (2) join a self-regulatory organization (most commonly the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) and (3) comply with the securities laws and member rules established by the self-regulatory organization.

    The New York Attorney General’s Virtual Markets Launched an Integrity Initiative That Focuses on Digital Asset “Exchanges”

    On April 17, 2018, The New York State Attorney General launched the Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative, and issued a statement titled “A.G. Schneiderman Launches Inquiry Into Cryptocurrency ‘Exchanges’” (as described therein, the Initiative), to investigate the policies and procedures of platforms exchanging digital assets and cryptocurrencies. The aim of the Initiative is to increase transparency and accountability in the market for digital assets and cryptocurrencies. The New York Attorney General has sent requests for information on the operations, internal controls and consumer protection efforts of platform operators to 13 virtual currency trading platforms. The request includes a questionnaire, available here, which covers six major categories: (1) Ownership and Control, (2) Basic Operation and Fees, (3) Trading Policies and Procedures, (4) Outages and Other Suspensions of Trading, (5) Internal Controls and (6) Privacy and Money Laundering. Through the questionnaire, the Attorney General “seeks to increase transparency and accountability in the virtual currency marketplace—and better inform the actions of enforcement agencies, investors, and consumers in this space.” A.G. Schneiderman Launches Inquiry Into Cryptocurrency “Exchanges” (Apr. 17, 2018). The Initiative makes clear that the Attorney General’s office is taking a very broad approach in investigating the digital asset platforms’ compliance with regulatory requirements and investor protection initiatives under New York State law. N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352.

    As described herein, both the SEC and the New York Attorney General have directed their focus to digital assets exchanges, reminding both operators and users of trading platforms that such exchanges must fulfill all applicable registration and related regulatory requirements. We expect other state regulators to follow suit. Market participants operating digital asset trading platforms or exchanges, and investors utilizing such platforms and exchanges should seek the advice of legal counsel to determine the applicable federal and state registration requirements.

    Authors

    David L. Taub

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • A Note from the Editor-in-Chief: Deduction for FDII

    ARTICLE

    A Note from the Editor-in-Chief: Deduction for FDII

    March-April 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder wrote this bylined article on foreign-derived intangible income (FDII), which is subject to a lower tax rate under the Tax Act. “FDII provides an important benefit to domestic corporations that sell property to foreign customers, provide services to foreign customers, or license intangible property to foreign parties,” Mr. Yoder wrote.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • First Circuit Rejects Fraudulent Transfer Attack on Lender’s Transfer of Asset Sales Proceeds

    First Circuit Rejects Fraudulent Transfer Attack on Lender’s Transfer of Asset Sales Proceeds

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    First Circuit Rejects Fraudulent Transfer Attack on Lender’s Transfer of Asset Sales Proceeds

    April 24, 2018

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A bankruptcy trustee could not “avoid [a] debtor’s transfer” of encumbered asset sale proceeds when the debtor holds the funds “as a mere disbursing agent [under] a contract that” restricted its use, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on April 18, 2018. Keach v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Co. (In re Montreal, Me. & Atl. Ry.), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 9772 *14 (1st Cir. Apr. 18, 2018). Affirming the dismissal of the trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint under Maine’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), made applicable by Bankruptcy Code § 544(b), the First Circuit stressed that the debtor “lacked a cognizable property interest in the [funds] paid to the [defendant].” Id. at *15.

    Facts

    The debtor railroad had two secured lenders (one senior to the other) with liens on all of its U.S. assets. Id. at*2-3. To obtain needed cash for continued operations, “the debtor asked the senior lender [the Federal Railroad Administration] to amend its existing loan agreement so as to provide ‘a limited waiver of its existing senior lien over the debtor’s assets.’” Id. at *3. That waiver “would take effect ‘upon the closing of the proposed sale’” of assets to a third party, for which the senior lender would receive a “replacement lien on certain of the debtor’s [Canadian property . . . .]” Id.

    The senior lender conditioned its limited waiver on the debtor’s compliance with certain conditions. On the closing of the asset sale, the debtor was required “to convey the proceeds to an escrow agent.” Id. at *4. Once the senior lender perfected its lien on the debtor’s Canadian property and received $2.4 million of the sale proceeds, among other things, the debtor had to “distribute the remainder of the proceeds to [the defendant junior secured lender].” Id.

    “The debtor distributed the proceeds in accordance with the waterfall provision of” its amended loan agreement with the senior lender. The junior lender received full payment of its secured claim. More than two years later, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition and a court-approved trustee took charge of the debtor’s estate.

    The Lower Courts

    The trustee sued the junior lender, “seeking to avoid the waterfall disbursement made to it as constructively fraudulent under . . . Maine’s [UFTA], . . . .” Id. at *5. The junior lender moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that “the waterfall disbursements did not consist of ‘assets’ belonging to the debtor.” Id. The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, reasoning that the waterfall disbursements were part of a single transaction, with the sale proceeds remaining encumbered by the senior lender’s lien up until the time of the disbursement. The district court affirmed.

    The Court of Appeals

    Bailment/Trust Analysis. The First Circuit adopted a different legal analysis to reach the same result. It stressed that “the debtor did not hold an interest in [the sale proceeds] that is voidable . . . ,” regardless of whether the assets being sold were encumbered by the senior lender’s lien when “the waterfall disbursement to [the junior lender] was made . . . .” Id. at *11. According to the “plain language” of the senior lender’s amended loan agreement, “the relationship between the contracting parties (the debtor and the [senior lender]) was akin to a bailment, . . . an arrangement involving ‘the delivery of personal property by one person to another in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract . . . that the trust shall be faithfully executed and the property returned or duly accounted for when the special purpose is accomplished . . . .’” Id.

    The senior lender “initially held title to the [encumbered assets] as mortgagee.” Id. By amending its loan agreement, it “approved the [asset] sale . . . and waived its lien. With respect to [the sale proceeds], the [senior lender] required, among other things, that the proceeds . . . be paid to an ‘escrow agent’ for the special purpose of distributing those funds to the parties enumerated” in the amended agreement. Id. at *12. In short, “the debtor could not have put the proceeds to any use that was not authorized by the [senior lender] under the terms of the [amended agreement].” Id. That amendment “had the effect of forbidding the debtor from using the proceeds to pay general creditors save for the approximately $1 million that was earmarked for accounts payable.” Id. Because the debtor was a mere disbursing agent, “the trustee cannot avoid the debtor’s transfer of the funds . . . .” Id. at *14.

    Good Commercial Sense. The First Circuit stressed the “good commercial sense” underlying its analysis. It would “prevent unsecured creditors from sharing in funds that the debtor could not have retained for its own use . . . . [S]uch limitations are consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that the law ‘does not authorize a trustee to distribute other people’s property among a [debtor’s] creditors.’” Id., citing Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1962). In sum, “the debtor was a mere ‘transfer station along the road to payment’ of the parties specified under the waterfall provision” in the amended loan agreement. Id. It thus “lacked a cognizable property interest in the waterfall distribution paid to [the junior lender].” Id. at *15.

    The asset sale proceeds here never “belonged outright to the debtor prior to consummation of the relevant transactions, but, rather, were subject to the [senior lender’s] mortgage and lien.” Id. at *16. As the trustee conceded, the senior lender “would have been entitled to the proceeds” from any asset sale. Id. Although the senior lender “granted a limited waiver of its lien, it conditioned that waiver on the debtor’s distribution of the proceeds in compliance with the [amended loan agreement’s] waterfall provision.” Id.

    The senior lender thus chose “to allocate the proceeds to which it was entitled among certain of the debtor’s creditors, an allocation that it apparently concluded” was in its interest. Because it had “imposed conditions that preclude[d] the debtor from exercising effective control over the sale proceeds,” the “waterfall disbursement to [the junior lender] did not consist of property of the debtor’s estate.” Id. That the “debtor briefly possessed the sale proceeds (apparently as an escrow agent) does not mean that it had any discretion to use those proceeds as it saw fit.” Id. at *17. Quoting the leading bankruptcy treatise, the court explained that “if property is in a debtor’s hands as bailee or agent,” the bankruptcy trustee may not recover it. Id. Quoting 5 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 541.05 (16th rev. ed. 2017). The court thus rejected the trustee’s attempt to equate “possession” with “control.” Id. at *17.

    A Senior Lender’s Discretion. Calling it “magical thinking,” the court rejected the trustee’s argument that the senior lender’s agreement to take less than the full amount of its claim was evidence of the debtor’s control. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9772, at *18. According to the court, “the debtor could never have sold the [assets], let alone decided how to distribute the sale proceeds, without the [senior lender’s] approval.” The [senior lender’s] decision to divert the proceeds of the sale to less senior creditors may seem unusual, but the [senior lender] is not a typical transacting party,” but “an executive agency of the United States, which employs the lending program to maintain and improve the nation’s railroads.” Id.

    Comment

    The First Circuit first relied on basic property rights under state law before applying federal law. As the U.S. Supreme Court held, state law determines the existence and extent of a debtor’s property interest. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979). After applying state law, the court then applied federal law to determine whether the debtor’s interest belonged to the debtor’s estate. In re WEB2B, 815 F. 3d 400, 405 (8th Cir. 2016).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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