Content Type: Article

  • Dividend Policy in Family Businesses

    ARTICLE

    Dividend Policy in Family Businesses

    October 2018

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Norbert Schulte wrote this bylined article on dividend policies in family businesses.

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  • “Close Call” Involving Recurrent Online Sales Triggers Minimum Contacts, Specific Jurisdiction

    “Close Call” Involving Recurrent Online Sales Triggers Minimum Contacts, Specific Jurisdiction

    ARTICLE

    “Close Call” Involving Recurrent Online Sales Triggers Minimum Contacts, Specific Jurisdiction

    November 5, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lisa Peterson authored this bylined article summarizing the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision to affirm a district court’s opinion that a foreign company with sizeable online sales to United States customers subjected itself to jurisdiction in a trademark dispute.

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    Authors

    Lisa P. Rumin

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • ICOs Easily Explained: BGB

    ARTICLE

    ICOs Easily Explained: BGB

    November 3, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sebastian Keding and Thiemo Schäfer authored this bylined article on initial coin offerings (ICOs) and the rules for distance contracts that apply to this type of financing.

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  • Fifth Circuit Holds Asset Purchaser Unable To Acquire Rejected License Agreement

    Fifth Circuit Holds Asset Purchaser Unable To Acquire Rejected License Agreement

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Holds Asset Purchaser Unable To Acquire Rejected License Agreement

    November 2, 2018

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A license agreement “deemed rejected by operation of law” could not be acquired under a court-approved asset purchase agreement, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Oct. 29, 2018. In re Provider Meds LLC, 2018 WL 5317445, *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2018). Although the acquirer claimed “that it purchased a patent license from [the] debtors in bankruptcy sales of their estates,” the court explained that “a rejected executory contract … could not have been transferred by the bankruptcy sales in question … .” Id., at *1. The court also declined to “approve of the use of a” bankruptcy court sale order “to avoid the requirement that an executory contract be assumed and assigned under” Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 365. Id., at *9.

    Relevance

    The Fifth Circuit first resolved “whether the License Agreement was an executory contract” because the Code “does not define the term … .” Id., at *3. Second, the court dealt with the novel issue of whether the Code imposed a notice requirement on a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee’s time to assume a contract. Finally, the court addressed the consequences of contract rejection, an issue about which the circuits are presently split in another context. In fact, to resolve a circuit split, the U.S. Supreme Court just granted a petition for certiorari to address the effect of rejection on a trademark license. In re Tempnology LLC, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018) (2-1), cert. granted, 2018 WL 2939184 (Oct. 26, 2018) (after licensor-debtor rejects agreement, non-debtor licensee “left with only a pre-petition damages claim …”); contra, Sunbeam Products Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg. LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012) (non-debtor’s right to use debtor’s trademark continues post-rejection). See Michael L. Cook, “Split First Circuit Prevents Non-Debtor Licensee from Using Rejected Trademark License.” Pratt’s J. Bankr., L. 142 (April/May 2018).

    Facts

    Five corporate affiliates used remote pharmaceutical dispensing machines in violation of T’s patent. T sued the entities for patent infringement in a Texas federal court, but the parties later settled, with the defendants gaining a “non-exclusive perpetual license” to use T’s patent in exchange for “a one-time licensing fee of $4,000 for each … machine placed into operation after the execution of the agreement … .” 2018 WL 5317445, at *1. The defendants also had “to provide [T with] quarterly reports reflecting all new machines placed in service. The parties exchanged releases “except for the obligations specifically called for under” their settlement agreement. Due to the settlement, the federal court dismissed T’s patent infringement suit in 2010. Id.

    The defendants filed separate Chapter 11 petitions in 2012 and 2013, but each case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Five debtors were “parties” to the license agreement, but never “listed the License Agreement or [T] on their schedules” of assets and liabilities. Id.

    A lender, R, had a security interest in all of the debtors’ assets, but, more than 60 days after the conversion of the cases’ conversion to Chapter 7, agreed to purchase that collateral from three of the debtors’ estates instead of litigating its liens. Id., at *2. The bankruptcy court approved the asset sale in a separate sale order. No asset purchase agreement “explicitly referenced [T’s] License; instead, each [agreement] covered certain categories of subject property.” The sale orders entered by the bankruptcy court provided “that to the extent that any of the subject property was an executory contract it was ‘hereby ASSUMED by the Estate and immediately ASSIGNED to [R] under the applicable provisions of … the … Code.’” R believed that it “had purchased the License under the terms of the” sale orders. Id., at *2.

    A year after the bankruptcy court approved the asset sale and related agreements, T sued the debtors, alleging that they had failed to comply with their obligations under the Licensing Agreement “to provide quarterly reports and pay licensing fees … .” Id. As the asserted owner of the License, R “intervened and removed the proceeding to the bankruptcy court, arguing that the … debtor estates had assigned or otherwise transferred the License to [it].” Id.

    The Lower Courts

    The bankruptcy court held that R had no “rights under the License Agreement” because it “had not purchased the License under any of the” sale orders and, in any event, “the License Agreement was an executory contract that was rejected by operation of law [sixty days after the Chapter 7 order for relief,] prior to any alleged transfer.” Id., at *2. The district court affirmed.

    The Fifth Circuit

    License Agreement an Executory Contract. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, a contract is executory if “performance remains due to some extent on both sides” and if “at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material breach of the contract, thereby excusing the performance of the other party.” In re Murexco Petroleum, 15 360, 62 (5th Cir. 1994). The issue in Provider Meds, said the court, was whether “both sides … owed additional performance under the License Agreement, and whether any party’s failure to perform would constitute a material breach excusing the other side’s performance.” 2018 WL 5317445, at *3.

    The Fifth Circuit rejected R’s argument that T’s settlement obligation to refrain from suing the debtors was “illusory.” Id., at *4. Despite the earlier stipulated dismissal of T’s patent infringement suit, “principles of claim preclusion … would not have barred” T from suing the debtors. Id., at *6. Therefore, T “had an ongoing material obligation under the License Agreement to refrain from suing the debtors.” Id., at *6. Similarly, the debtors “also had corresponding material obligations under the License Agreement” requiring them “to take certain ongoing actions, such as filing quarterly reports and not discussing the settled lawsuit.” Id.

    The court further rejected R’s unsupported argument “that a license [which] is only ‘perpetual’ and not ‘perpetual and irrevocable,’ is irrevocable in the face of material breach … .” Id., at *7. The License here was “perpetual,” and thus “not revocable at will.” Id. “[B]oth sides [thus] had ongoing material obligations under the … License Agreement, making it an executory contract.” Id.

    Agreement Rejected by Operation of Law. Code § “365(d)(1) imposes a sixty-day deadline for a bankruptcy trustee to assume an executory contract, starting here with the cases’ conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. After that deadline passes, the contract will be deemed rejected by operation of law.” Id. Because the License Agreement here was executory, “it was deemed rejected when each of the bankruptcy estates failed to assume it prior to the expiration of the sixty-day period.” Id. This statutory deadline applies only in Chapter 7 liquidation cases, for, as the court noted, a trustee or a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession “may assume or reject an executory contract at any point before the plan is confirmed.” Id., at *3, citing Code § 365(d)(2) and In re O’Connor, 258 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2001). See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529 (1984) (reorganizing debtor needs more time to decide on rejection).

    No Notice Requirement. The court rejected R’s argument for avoiding the Code’s 60-day deadline because the debtors had failed to schedule the License Agreement and because the trustees were “unaware of the contract within the sixty-day period.” 2018 WL 5317445, at *7. “Like most circuits,” the Fifth Circuit had not addressed this issue “directly,” but stressed that the License Agreement “was a matter of public record” in the 2010 district court patent litigation. Id., at *8. Nor was there any evidence of “intentional concealment.” Id. Because Code § 365(d)(1) imposes no “actual or constructive notice requirement for when the sixty-day deadline applies,” the Fifth Circuit refused to “read such a requirement into the statute when doing so is not supported by the statutory text.” Id.

    The Effect of Rejection. The court also dismissed R’s argument that the trustees could sell the License Agreement even when it had been rejected. “The rejection of an executory contract places that contract outside of the bankruptcy estate … [and] cannot be sold under a provision that authorizes a trustee to sell ‘property of the estate.’” Id. For a contract to be sold under Code § 363, it must be “assumed and assigned under section 365.” Id.

    In sum, “the License Agreement was deemed rejected by operation of law when each trustee failed to assume it within the sixty-day period.” Moreover, “the statutory presumption of rejection after sixty days is conclusive where there is no suggestion that the Debtor intentionally concealed a contract from the estate’s trustee.” Id.

    Comments

    • Provider Meds shows inadequate pre-acquisition diligence by a prospective buyer. A little digging would have disclosed the rejection of the License Agreement. Within the past year, a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession lender made a similar mistake. Banco Panamericano Inc. v. City of Peoria Inc., 880 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2018) (lender with lien on all of Chapter 11 debtor’s assets failed to discover that lease, thought to be its collateral, had been terminated prior to financing). See SRZ Alert.
    • Aside from the previously noted Tempnology and Sunbeam circuit splits to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in the next year, the Connecticut Supreme Court defined the effect of bankruptcy on contracts last year: Bankruptcy “does not constitute a per se breach of contract and does not excuse performance by the other party in the absence of some further indication that the [debtor] either cannot, or does not, intend to perform,” held the Connecticut court in a lengthy opinion on Nov. 21, 2017. CCT Communications Inc. v. Zone Telecom Inc., 2017 WL 54777540, *13 (Ct. Nov. 21, 2017) (en banc), superseding 324 Conn. 654, 153 A.3d 1249 (2017).

    The Supreme Court rejected the trial courts’ erroneous finding that the plaintiff debtor’s bankruptcy petition “constituted a breach of [contract, permitting] the defendant to terminate that agreement.” Id. at *2. Because the trial court never found that the debtor (CCT) “either could not or did not intend to perform its obligations as a result of its bankruptcy filing,” it had not “breached the … agreement by filing for bankruptcy protection.” Id. at *13. Nothing in the contract itself supported the trial court’s “conclusion that filing the [bankruptcy] petition constituted a breach by [CCT].” Id.

    Equally important, the Connecticut court rejected the lower court’s enforcement of an “ipso-facto” bankruptcy termination clause, reasoning that the contractual language in this case “only” gave the non-debtor defendant “the option to terminate.” Id. at *12. Nor, on the facts of the case, could the non-debtor rely on the so-called judicially created “ride-through” exception to evade the Bankruptcy Code’s invalidation of ipso-facto termination clauses (§ 365(e)(1)). See Michael L. Cook “Connecticut Supreme Court Defines Bankruptcy Effect on Contracts,” 35 Bankr. Strategist No. 3 (Jan. 2018).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • What Are the Retirement Plan Dollar Limits for 2019?

    What Are the Retirement Plan Dollar Limits for 2019?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    What Are the Retirement Plan Dollar Limits for 2019?

    November 1, 2018

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Secretary of the Treasury announced the 2019 limits for qualified retirement plans and IRAs based on cost of living increases. The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers is the benchmark used to determine the index. As a result, many of the 2019 dollar limits will increase, as noted in the included chart, and a few limits will remain flat. IRS Notice 2018-83 sets forth the annual dollar limitations effective Jan. 1, 2019, as required under Section 415(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. For 2019, employees will be able to defer up to $19,000 into their qualified defined contribution plans, and an additional $6,000 for those over the age of 50, for a combined total of $25,000. Highly compensated employees who earn more than $125,000 and who participate in both qualified and nonqualified plans will have a slightly greater amount of their compensation allocated to the qualified plan with the increase of the compensation limit from $275,000 to $280,000.

    Employers and Plan Sponsors of qualified retirement plans should communicate these limits for 2019 to plan participants. We are available to advise you on updating your enrollment materials, summary plan descriptions, employee handbooks and other employee communications. If you have any questions about the new limits or any other employee benefit matters, please feel free to contact one of the authors.

    Click here to read this Alert.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ian L. Levin and Susan E. Bernstein.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ian L. Levin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Detroit Athletic Co.: Not Even a Sporting Chance for Registration

    ARTICLE

    Detroit Athletic Co.: Not Even a Sporting Chance for Registration

    November 1, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mary Hallerman authored this bylined article summarizing the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold the US Patent and Trademark Office’s refusal to register a mark based on a likelihood of confusion.

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  • With this 5-Point Plan, Germany Will Become the Blockchain Pioneer

    With this 5-Point Plan, Germany Will Become the Blockchain Pioneer

    ARTICLE

    With this 5-Point Plan, Germany Will Become the Blockchain Pioneer

    November 1, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sebastian Keding authored this bylined article on crypto currencies and the steps Germany can take to become a leader in blockchain technology.

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  • Selling CFC Stock: A Buyer’s Section 338 Election Can Be Beneficial

    Selling CFC Stock: A Buyer’s Section 338 Election Can Be Beneficial

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Selling CFC Stock: A Buyer’s Section 338 Election Can Be Beneficial

    November 1, 2018

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    Following the 2017 Tax Act, a domestic corporate purchaser of stock in a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) generally will desire to make a section 338(g) election. A section 338(g) election provides a stepped-up basis in the assets of the CFC, and thereby results in increased deductions for amortization and depreciation that will reduce the buyer’s future global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) by both reducing “tested income” and increasing “qualified business asset investment.” A section 338(g) election also can be beneficial for a domestic corporate seller of CFC stock, although not in all cases and the analysis can be complex.

    As discussed in a prior Insight, gain recognized by a domestic corporation on the sale of CFC stock is recharacterized as a dividend under section 1248 to the extent of the previously untaxed earnings and profits of the CFC and its subsidiaries. The amount treated as a dividend generally qualifies for a 100 percent dividends received deduction. Any remaining capital gain is subject to a 21 percent tax rate. A domestic purchaser (rather than the seller) generally is subject to tax on any Subpart F income and GILTI of the CFC for the entire year of sale, reduced by the amount of current year earnings treated as a dividend distributed to the seller, including any amount recharacterized as a dividend under section 1248.

    With a section 338(g) election, the target CFC is deemed to sell its assets and recognize any gain resulting from the deemed asset sale. If the seller is a domestic corporation, the CFC target’s gain on non-trade or business assets would generally be Subpart F income and the remaining amount (gain on the trade or business assets) would be tested income for GILTI purposes. The CFC’s tax year closes, and its Subpart F income and GILTI through the date of sale would be included in the gross income of the domestic seller (rather than the buyer).

    When a section 338(g) election is made, the domestic seller will also be taxed on the gain on the sale of the CFC stock, with the basis of such stock increased for the amount of any inclusions under Subpart F and GILTI for the year (including the Subpart F and GILTI income generated by the deemed asset sale). Subject to holding period requirements, the stock gain will be recharacterized as a deductible dividend under sections 1248 and 245A to the extent of the CFC’s prior year untaxed earnings and current year earnings that are not Subpart F income or tested income, as well as earnings arising from gain on the deemed sale of assets that are not subject to Subpart F or GILTI.

    To illustrate the effect of a section 338(g) election on a selling US shareholder, consider a domestic corporation that sells stock in a CFC for $700. The basis in the CFC stock is $400, and thus the seller has $300 of gain. Assume the untaxed earnings and profits of the CFC from prior years attributable to the seller is $100. If no section 338(g) election is made, $100 of the seller’s gain would be recharacterized as a dividend, and the seller would receive an offsetting $100 deduction under sections 1248 and 245A. The seller would pay a 21 percent tax rate on the remaining $200 of capital gain ($42 of tax).

    Now assume the same facts except that the buyer makes a section 338(g) election for the CFC, and the CFC recognizes $90 of deemed gain. Assume the gain is not Subpart F income but is tested income for GILTI purposes. Assume further that the CFC has $10 of additional tested income for the current year through the date of sale. Because the CFC’s tax year closes, the seller would generally be taxed under the GILTI regime on $100 at a 10.5 percent tax rate ($10.50 of tax), and the seller’s stock basis would be increased by $100. After taking into account the stock basis increase, the seller would have $200 of gain on the sale of the stock, $100 of which would be a deemed dividend and eligible for a $100 deduction. The remaining $100 of gain recognized would be capital gain taxed at 21 percent ($21 of tax). Thus, the seller’s total tax costs would be reduced to $31.50 (rather than $42) by converting a portion of the gain to GILTI.

    Under certain circumstances, a seller’s tax costs can increase with a section 338(g) election. For example, the GILTI inclusion resulting from the deemed asset sale and closing of the CFC tax year can sometimes cause a material reduction of the amount of gain that would have been recharacterized as a deductible dividend under section 245A if the election had not been made. In addition, the seller could have higher tax costs if the additional Subpart F or GILTI inclusions resulted in taxable income greater than the amount of gain on the sale of the stock, and the seller does not have capital gains to absorb the resulting capital loss.

    In summary, a section 338(g) election, in addition to generally being beneficial to a buyer, can also reduce a domestic corporate seller’s US tax costs on the sale of stock in a CFC. Under certain circumstances, however, the election can result in an increase in a seller’s tax costs. Therefore, a domestic seller should ensure that the stock sale agreement addresses the seller’s tax consequences resulting from a buyer making a section 338(g) election.

    Authors

    Timothy S. Shuman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Wilder

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • IRS To Extend Phase-In Period for US Dividend Equivalent Rules

    IRS To Extend Phase-In Period for US Dividend Equivalent Rules

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS To Extend Phase-In Period for US Dividend Equivalent Rules

    October 31, 2018

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Sept. 20, 2018, the IRS issued Notice 2018-72 (“Notice”) to, among other things, (1) announce that the IRS intends to amend the Section 871(m) Treasury Regulations to extend the phase-in period for delta-one transactions and delay the applicability of the Section 871(m) Treasury Regulations to non-delta-one transactions and (2) extend the application of the simplified standard for determining whether transactions are combined transactions for withholding agents.

    Extension of Phase-In Period

    The IRS intends to revise the Section 871(m) Regulations to extend the phase-in period for delta-one transactions and delay the applicability of Section 871(m) to non-delta-one transactions by providing that the Section 871(m) Treasury Regulations do not apply to a non-delta-one transaction entered into before Jan. 1, 2021.

    The IRS extends the phase-in period provided in Notice 2016-76, which provides that the IRS will take into account the extent to which the taxpayer or withholding agent made a good faith effort to comply with the Section 871(m) Regulations in enforcing those regulations for (1) any delta-one transaction entered into in 2017 through 2020 and (2) any non-delta-one transaction that is covered under Section 871(m) and entered into in 2021.

    Extension of the Simplified Standard for Determining Whether Transactions Are Combined Transactions for Withholding Agents

    The Notice extends the period during which the “simplified standard” for determining whether transactions are combined transactions for withholding agents provided in Notice 2016-76 and Notice 2017-42 to include 2019 and 2020.

    Under the “simplified standard,” a withholding agent is required to combine transactions for purposes of determining whether transactions are Section 871(m) transactions only when the transactions are over-the-counter transactions that are priced, marketed or sold in connection with each other.

    Please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel at your earliest convenience if you wish to discuss this notice.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • The Power of Two

    ARTICLE

    The Power of Two

    October 30, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Kerrin Slattery and Dale Van Demark authored this bylined article on partnerships in the health industry and how to ensure a successful collaboration.

    In depth
    Authors

    Kerrin B. Slattery

    Partner

    Chicago

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