Content Type: Article

  • Brexit Triggers Liability Risks for Shareholders of Germany Based Limited – Structuring Options

    ARTICLE

    Brexit Triggers Liability Risks for Shareholders of Germany Based Limited – Structuring Options

    November, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Upon Brexit becoming effective, corporate entities under English law with seat in Germany will most likely no longer enjoy freedom of establishment and be denied legal capacity in Germany. Shareholders are threatened with personal and unlimited liability. Various structuring options have been discussed so far to avoid such liability risks; rarely are there easy ways out. The German legislator now proposes further structuring options under the Fourth Amendment of the German Act on the Reorganization of Companies (UmwG). Companies should take action soon.

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  • The Top Hat-Exemption After Sikora

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    The Top Hat-Exemption After Sikora

    November 2018

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    Elizabeth Rowe, J. Christian Nemeth, and Joseph Urwitz authored this bylined article examining the recent appeals court decisions and their effects on exemptions to ERISA.

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    Authors

    J. Christian Nemeth

    Partner

    Chicago, Miami

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  • CFIUS: What Private Equity Funds Need To Know About Mandatory Declarations and the Expansion of Transactions Subject To Review

    CFIUS: What Private Equity Funds Need To Know About Mandatory Declarations and the Expansion of Transactions Subject To Review

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFIUS: What Private Equity Funds Need To Know About Mandatory Declarations and the Expansion of Transactions Subject To Review

    November 9, 2018

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States recently enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (“FIRRMA”), which both expands jurisdiction and codifies recent practices of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”).[1] As a result, CFIUS may now review the national security implications of acquisitions of control by foreign investors of U.S. businesses, certain minority investments and real estate acquisitions. If CFIUS finds a national security concern, it can seek mitigation, block a pending transaction or force divestiture of completed transactions. Exercising its new authority, CFIUS recently released interim rules, effective Nov. 10, 2018, relating to examinations of non-controlling foreign investments in critical technology, and requiring new mandatory pre-closing filings called “Declarations.”[2]

    FIRRMA makes a number of jurisdictional and procedural changes to CFIUS’s ability to review foreign investment in the United States. The full impact of FIRRMA will not be evident until all of its implementing regulations take effect. U.S. private equity funds that have significant investors from countries of recent CFIUS concern or that invest in critical technology industries should pay careful attention to the changes.

    The FIRRMA Pilot Program Signals Aggressive Expansion of CFIUS Review and Enforcement, but Leaves Unanswered Questions

    CFIUS has initiated a FIRRMA-authorized pilot program, which goes into effect on Nov. 10, 2018, that requires mandatory Declarations for certain transactions involving investments by foreign persons in certain U.S. businesses that produce, design, test, manufacture, fabricate or develop certain enumerated critical technologies. As a pilot program under FIRRMA, CFIUS was able to quickly implement these changes prior to the adoption of final rules and without observing the usual notice and comment period for new regulations. At least until supplanted by final rules or until the pilot program expires on Feb. 13, 2020, all foreign investments that fall within the scope of the pilot program are subject to the mandatory Declaration filing requirements. Parties who fail to file a required Declaration face potentially severe penalties of an amount up to the full value of the transaction. This is the first time that CFIUS has had the authority to impose financial penalties.

    Because of the risk of significant fines for noncompliance, the mandatory filing requirement makes, for the first time, the precise extent and scope of CFIUS definitions and requirements significant. Under the new rules, transactions that do not raise national security issues could nonetheless incur significant penalties if the parties fail to file based on their incorrect interpretation of a particular definition or regulation, or if CFIUS takes a contrary view on how they should be interpreted. For example, under CFIUS, a “foreign entity,” such as a Cayman Island fund, may not be a “foreign person” if it is ultimately controlled by U.S. individuals and no foreign individual, entity or government has any significant ability to control it. However, aside from a safe harbor described below, CFIUS has yet to provide clear guidance for funds that fall outside of its protection. Because of significant remaining ambiguity, many law firms have started to exclude CFIUS from their legal opinion letters pending greater clarity from the Treasury Department.

    CFIUS May Now Review Acquisitions of Certain Non-Controlling Interests in US Businesses

    Prior to FIRRMA, only transactions that resulted in “control” of a U.S. business were covered by CFIUS, with passive investments under 10 percent excluded from CFIUS jurisdiction. Now, any investment that does not result in “control” of a U.S. business can be a covered transaction if it provides a foreign investor with (1) access to nonpublic technical information; (2) board membership, observer rights or rights to nominate a director; or (3) any “involvement” in the U.S. business’s substantive decision-making regarding critical infrastructure, critical technologies or sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens. Previously, such non-controlling influence over an issuer, such as a board seat, was not by itself sufficient to trigger CFIUS jurisdiction. (However, CFIUS had asserted jurisdiction over such transactions in several instances despite lacking clear legislative authority to do so.)

    CFIUS Gains Authority To Review US Real Estate Acquisitions and Long-Term Leases

    FIRRMA extends CFIUS’ authority to the review of real estate acquisitions. Previously, CFIUS was limited to review of acquisitions of an existing “U.S. business,” which did not include empty land or buildings. Nonetheless, CFIUS in practice had begun challenging the foreign acquisition of real estate near sensitive government facilities starting in 2012 with the Ralls windfarm case, and later reviews of foreign acquisitions of the New York Waldorf Astoria Hotel and the San Diego Hotel del Coronado. FIRRMA codifies this ability of CFIUS to review foreign acquisitions of U.S. real estate. This review authority does not extend to real estate loans or financing unless the foreign person would acquire governance or financial rights comparable to an equity investment.

    CFIUS Gains Greater Resources To Review a Broader Range of Transactions

    Previously, CFIUS was a largely voluntary process. Parties to foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses generally self-determined whether notification was advisable. Voluntary filings were made when some question existed about whether CFIUS may object to a transaction, or if the buyer or lenders wanted assurance that the transaction would not be subject to CFIUS sanction. FIRRMA, for the first time, gives CFIUS the power to require the mandatory filing of notifications, specifically for acquisitions of U.S. businesses where a foreign government has a “substantial interest” in the buyer, and in other circumstances as CFIUS may choose to add. (Such mandatory “notifications” await further rulemaking and are not yet required, as opposed to the mandatory Declarations that go into effect Nov.10, 2018.)

    In addition to requiring mandatory notifications and significantly expanding the types of transactions subject to CFIUS review, FIRRMA also provides an additional $20 million of annual funding for CFIUS enforcement. Even more CFIUS funding is anticipated to result when its new authority to impose filing fees of up to $300,000 per transaction is implemented. These additional resources should enable CFIUS to cast a wider net, and will likely lead to it taking a closer look at more transactions, including those that are not notified.

    A New Safe Harbor Excludes Certain Private Equity Funds with Foreign Investors from CFIUS Review of Acquisitions of Non-Controlling Interests in US Businesses

    Given the imposition of mandatory reporting, FIRRMA provides some relief to private equity funds that have foreign investors, including foreign government investors, so that they are not required to make mandatory CFIUS filings in certain circumstances. In particular, FIRRMA provides a safe harbor exemption for acquisitions made by a U.S.-controlled investment fund with foreign limited partners. Subject to further rulemaking, a foreign limited partner that invests through such a fund and participates in a fund advisory board or committee will not result in the fund’s acquisition constituting a covered “other investment” if (1) the fund is managed exclusively by a U.S. general partner; (2) the fund’s advisory board does not have the ability to approve, disapprove or otherwise control the investment decisions of the fund or its GP; (3) the foreign investors do not have access to material non-public technical information related to the fund’s investments; and (4) the foreign investors do not otherwise have such control over the fund’s investments or its GP, including the right to unilaterally dismiss, select or determine the compensation of the GP.

    It is important to note that this safe harbor only applies to non-controlling investments by a U.S. fund. It does not apply to a fund’s acquisition of control over a U.S. business, nor to real estate acquisitions. However, the carve-out is consistent with (a) prior advice that a GP that operates an investment fund is considered to be solely controlled by its GP if the LP members have no authority to determine, direct or decide important matters affecting the partnership and any fund it operates (31 CFR § 800.204, Example 8); and (b) methods CFIUS has used to allow parties to proceed with a transaction after mitigating foreign ownership, control and influence by placing sole management control in the hands of U.S. citizens.

    Further, though future regulations may provide more clarity, it is likely that CFIUS will view a “fund of one,” certain co-investment vehicles and managed accounts of a foreign investor as cases in which the foreign investor “otherwise has the ability to control the fund,” making the safe harbor inapplicable.

    Private Equity Funds Should Assess How FIRRMA May Affect Their Investment Strategies

    Sponsors of private equity funds that make non-controlling investments in issuers and companies that operate U.S. businesses that deal in critical infrastructure, critical technology, or that maintain or collect sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens, may wish to review their fund documents, including LP agreements, to see if their organizational structure meet the requirements for the safe harbor described above or, if they do not, how they might be able to modify their governance in order to qualify.

    Foreign investors and funds with foreign investors should evaluate how FIRRMA and the new pilot program may increase the risk of CFIUS action with respect to transactions they are contemplating. It is now essential for funds to consult with CFIUS experts prior to formulating their investment strategies with respect to companies involved in critical technology, critical infrastructure and collection of sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens.

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz and Gregory L. Kinzelman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.


    [1] Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), Subtitle A of Title XVII of Public Law 115–232 (Aug. 13, 2018).

    [2] See 83 FR 51322 (Oct. 11, 2018).

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    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Prop. GILTI Regs: ‘Tested Income’

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    Prop. GILTI Regs: ‘Tested Income’

    November 9, 2018

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    Lowell Yoder authored this bylined article on proposed regulations and rules for determining the amount of inclusion in a US shareholder’s GILTI.

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    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Chapter 1: Distinguishing Research from Other Activities

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    Chapter 1: Distinguishing Research from Other Activities

    November 9, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Jennifer Geetter and Chelsea Rutherford authored Chapter 1, Distinguishing Research from Other Activities, in the third edition of this AHLA handbook, which outlines the regulatory requirements and legal challenges associated with the evolving area of human subject research and the role of institutional review boards (IRBs).

    The revised Common Rule, which takes effect January 21, 2019, will implement fundamental changes to the rules surrounding human subject research. This book provides compliance solutions for new and common problems IRBs face.

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    Authors

    Jennifer S. Geetter

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Can You Keep A Secret? Working With Silent Trusts

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    Can You Keep A Secret? Working With Silent Trusts

    November 8, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Nicole Mann and Jane Zhao authored this bylined article the potential benefits of silent trusts and considerations when managing and administering one as part of an estate plan.

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  • Opportunity Zone Rules Provide Rare Tax Benefits for Investors

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    Opportunity Zone Rules Provide Rare Tax Benefits for Investors

    November 7, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Steven Hadjilogiou and Michael Bruno authored this bylined article on the Opportunity Zone provisions that serve as an incentive for taxpayer investment in low-income neighborhoods and combined the benefits of both tax deferral and tax elimination.

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  • A Look at Tax Code Section 199’s Last Stand

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    A Look at Tax Code Section 199’s Last Stand

    November 6, 2018

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Kevin Spencer, Andrew Roberson, and Emily Mussio authored this bylined article on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s repeal of Section 199 and the impact it has made.

    This article was originally published in Law360 on November 6, 2018.

    In depth

    The Internal Revenue Service has been battling taxpayers for more than a decade on their Internal Revenue Code Section 199 deductions. Indeed, nearly every taxpayer, other than manufacturers, has been questioned in some fashion about their Section 199 deduction. In the wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which repealed Section 199, taxpayers are taking a last stand to claim the benefit and, in many instances, claiming substantial refunds for all open years. Listing Section 199 refund claims as a “campaign” was the IRS’ newest way of telling taxpayers: Let’s get ready to rumble!

    Where It All Began

    In 2004, Congress enacted Code Section 199 to tip the scales of global competitiveness in favor of doing more business in the United States. The primary purpose of the statute was to create jobs in the United States by encouraging businesses to manufacture and produce their products in the United States to strengthen the economy. And so, a tax deduction was born! The legislative history explains that the tax benefit, however, was not available for revenue earned for the provision of services. As the controversial history of Section 199 demonstrates, the line between providing services and producing property can be blurry in the modern business paradigm.

    Before being repealed by the TCJA — effective for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017 — IRC Section 199 allowed qualifying businesses to claim a tax deduction calculated as 9 percent of the lesser of qualified production activities income, or QPAI, or the taxpayer’s taxable income. The deduction was also limited to 50 percent of the W-2 wages paid by the taxpayer that were allocable to domestic production gross receipts, or DPGR. QPAI is defined as the taxpayer’s DGPR for the year less the costs of goods sold and expenses allocable to DPGR. DGPR is defined as the gross receipts of a taxpayer that are derived from the lease, rental, license, sale, exchange or other disposition of qualifying production property, or QPP, which was manufactured, produced, grown or extracted (“MPGE”) by the taxpayer in whole or in significant part within the U.S. Accordingly, the calculus by which the Section 199 deduction is determined is the amount of “profit” that a taxpayer made on the stream of qualifying revenue. Enumerated MPGE activities whose revenues qualify under Section 199 are: Qualified film, computer software, electricity, natural gas, potable water, tangible personal property and certain sound recordings.

    The IRS’ Enhanced Scrutiny of the Section 199 Deduction

    There are some areas of tax law that are marred with significant controversy with the IRS. It is no secret that the IRS has coordinated efforts to challenge transfer pricing and research and development credits. Section 199 is another one of the IRS’ areas of enhanced scrutiny. Indeed, the IRS has released a plethora of “guidance” relating to its interpretation of the contours of Section 199.

    Recently, the IRS has put Section 199 on its “Most Wanted” list, making it a “campaign” of the Large Business and International, or LB&I, division. In January 2017, LB&I announced a campaign for the “Domestic Production Activities Deduction, Multi-Channel Video Program Distributors and TV Broadcasters.” This campaign targeted taxpayers who claimed that they were producers of a qualified film when distributing channels and subscription packages that often included third-party content. Following the repeal of Section 199, in September 2018, LB&I rolled out an additional Section 199 campaign. This campaign focuses on all businesses filing a refund claim for additional domestic production activity deductions, or DPAD. The IRS explained: “[t]he campaign objective is to ensure taxpayer compliance with the requirements of IRC Section 199 through a claim risk review assessment and issue-based examinations of claims with the greatest compliance risk.”

    Controversy regarding Section 199 has centered on a few issues. We highlight these areas as we expect that they will garner the IRS’ focus as it audits tax returns and refund claims for tax years prior the repeal of Section 199.

    Contract Manufacturing

    The Section 199 deduction is permitted not only when the taxpayer does the MPGE itself, but also when the taxpayer hires another — a contract manufacturer — to perform the MPGE on its behalf. This is in line with the purpose of the statute — it encourages taxpayers to manufacture and produce within the U.S. In contract manufacturing arrangements, Congress specified that only one of the parties, either the contracting corporation or the contract manufacturer, would be entitled to the deduction on the same QPAI. Pursuant to Treasury regulations, the party with the “benefits and burdens” of ownership, or BBO, of the property during the production activity is entitled to the deduction.

    In ADVO Inc. v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court delivered a blow to taxpayers. There, the taxpayer contracted with a printer to print advertisements that the taxpayer delivered in free mailers to potential customers. The taxpayer designed the layout, colors, content, etc. for the ads, and delivered the ads ready to print to the printer. The printer took the ads and printed them according to the specifications of the taxpayer on paper purchased by the taxpayer. The Tax Court performed a BBO analysis to determine if the taxpayer was entitled to the Section 199 deduction. The court used well-established legal precedent and applied a nine factor test to analyze who “owned” the printed advertisements during the production process. In a highly fact-intensive analysis, the court determined that the taxpayer did not have the BBO of the printed ads during the printing process, and therefore was not entitled to the Section 199 deduction.

    The tax bar has almost universally criticized the analysis applied in ADVO, asserting that the Tax Court misunderstood how Section 199 and its calculus works. The Section 199 deduction is premised upon each stream of QPAI, and is not product specific. Accordingly, numerous taxpayers can claim a deduction relating to the same product, but each producer’s QPAI is determined on a different part of the multi-stage production process. Because many taxpayers believe that the IRS’ position on this issue is wrong, there has been substantial controversy at the administrative level and in court. The BBO analysis will be revisited in a case currently pending in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims involving the contract printing of the “Yellow Pages” by a third party. That case is expected to be tried in 2019, and its decision may shape other contract manufacturing cases that are in the pipeline.

    Computer Software

    One of the most contentious areas of Section 199 has been its application to revenues derived from computer software. Treasury Regulation Section 1-199-3(i)(6)(i) provides that DPGR includes gross receipts of the taxpayer that are derived from the “disposition” of computer software produced by the taxpayer in whole or in significant part within the U.S. However, Treasury Regulation Section 1-199-3(i)(6)(ii) provides that gross receipts derived from customer and technical support, telephone services, online services and other similar services do not constitute gross receipts derived from a disposition of computer software.

    Recognizing, however, that a taxpayer can make a disposition of software by placing it on a tangible medium — e.g., a disc — or by providing the customer with access to the software while connected to the internet or a private communications network, the regulations include an exception to this rule in instances when a taxpayer derives gross receipts from providing customers access to computer software produced in whole or significant part by the taxpayer within the United States for the customers’ direct use while connected to the internet or any other public or private communications network — “online software.” The gross receipts will be treated as derived from the disposition of computer software provided the requirements of either the “self-comparable test” or the “third-party comparable tests” are met.

    The self-comparable test is met when the taxpayer as part of its business earns gross receipts from the disposition of computer software to a customer that: (1) only has minor or immaterial differences from the online software, (2) was MPGE by the taxpayer in whole or in significant part within the United States and (3) has been provided to customers affixed to a tangible medium or by allowing the customers to download the computer software from the internet.

    The third-party comparable is met when a third-party earns gross receipts from the disposition of software to its customers affixed to a tangible medium or downloaded from the internet that is “substantially identical” to the taxpayer’s online software. “Substantially identical” means software that: (1) from a customer’s perspective, provides the same functional result as the online software and (2) has a significant overlap of features or purpose with the online software.

    The IRS maintains a very restrictive view of online software. For example, in Generic Legal Advice Memorandum 2014-008, (Nov. 21, 2014), the IRS determined that a taxpayer did not have DPGR when customers downloaded a bank’s online banking app to their computer or device at no cost. The IRS determined that the app was “online software” as described the regulations because the app did not operate unless it was connected to the internet. The IRS explained that downloading the app was not a “disposition” for Section 199 purposes. Further, the IRS determined that the taxpayer did not earn gross receipts from the deployment of the app. And, the IRS determined that the taxpayer did not satisfy either the self or third-party comparable tests.

    The GLAM demonstrates the IRS’ view of how online software can qualify for the Section 199 deduction, which severely limits taxpayers’ ability to claim the tax benefit in the context of an ever-changing technological marketplace.

    Like with contract manufacturing, numerous taxpayers have challenged the IRS’ position in court. Presently, the following cases are pending in the U.S. Tax Court addressing the computer software issue:

    BATS Global Markets Holdings Inc. v. Comm’r, Dkt. No. 1068-17 (Judge Kathleen Kerrigan) (no trial date set; status report track)

    Bloomberg LP v. Comm’r, Dkt. No. 3755-17 (Judge Robert Goeke) (no trial date set; status report track)

    Vesta Corp. v. Comm’r, Dkt. Nos. 26847-16, 26503-17 (Judge Mary Ann Cohen) (apparently the parties have settled the case, and have until Nov. 9, 2018, to submit stipulations for decision or stipulations of settled issues)
    Recently, the following cases settled prior to trial:
    HIBU Group (USA) Inc. v. Comm’r, Tax Court Dkt. No. 1043-16 (Judge Albert G. Lauber) (stipulated decision entered Sept. 25, 2018)

    Bare Escentuals Inc. v. Comm’r, Tax Court Dkt. No. 30729-15 (Judge David Laro) (stipulated decision entered May 4, 2017)

    Limited Brands Inc. v. Comm’r, Tax Court Dkt. No. 17903-10 (Judge Elizabeth Crewson Paris) (stipulated decision entered Apr. 14, 2016)

    Qualified Film

    Another area of IRS focus relates to its campaign on multi-channel video program distributors, or MVPDs, and television broadcasters who may claim that “groups” of channels or programs are “qualified film” eligible for the Section 199 deduction. The dispute centers on what constitutes “qualified film” — including whether this term should be interpreted in the singular or plural — and who is an MVPD.

    Section 199 permits a deduction based upon gross receipts of the taxpayer which are derived from any lease, rental, license, sale, exchange or other disposition of “any qualified film produced by the taxpayer.” Section 199(c)(6) defines “qualified film” as “any property described in section 168(f)(3) if not less than 50 percent of the total compensation relating to the production of such property is compensation for services performed in the United States by actors, production personnel, directors and producers” and includes “any copyrights, trademarks or other intangibles with respect to such film.” However, “qualified film” does not include property with respect to which records are required to be maintained under 18 U.S.C. Section 2257 — i.e., sexually explicit materials. “Qualified film” also includes “live or delayed television programming.” The “methods and means of distributing a qualified film” have no effect on the availability to claim the Section 199 deduction. IRC Section 168(f)(3), entitled “Films and Video Tape,” provides an exclusion from accelerated depreciation for “[a]ny motion picture film or video tape.”

    In IRS Technical Advice Memorandum 201049029 (Dec. 10, 2010), the taxpayer licensed programming content consisting of a group of programs produced by the taxpayer, programs produced by third parties, advertisements and interstitials to customers. The primary issue was whether the 24-hour feed should be treated as a single item for purposes of Section 199. The IRS determined that an entire 24-hour programming package was the “item” offered for sale, and that the package should be evaluated as a single qualified film for purposes of Section 199.

    However, the IRS issued Technical Advice Memoranda 201646004 (Nov. 10, 2016) and 201647007 (Nov. 18, 2016), the IRS determined that a subscription package of multiple channels of video programming transmitted by an MVPD to its customers via signal was not a “qualified film” as defined in Section 199(c)(6) and Treasury Regulation Section 1.199-3(k)(1). It also determined that an MVPD’s gross receipts from its subscription package are not from the disposition of a qualified film produced by the MVPD and are therefore not DPGR included in calculating the Section 199 deduction. The MVPD would only have DPGR from the subscription package to the extent its gross receipts are derived from an individual film or episode within the subscription package that is a qualified film produced by the MVPD. In the 2016 TAMs, the IRS argued that the definition of “qualified film” is limited to individual films and episodes.

    In Revenue Ruling 2018-3 (Dec. 21, 2017), the IRS changed course — again — and ruled that a package of films licensed to customers in the normal course of business may be an item under Treasury Regulation Section 1.199-3(d)(1)(i) for purposes of determining the DPAD under Section 199. The IRS has indicated that it will apply this new guidance as it moves forward with the execution of its Section 199 campaign on MVPD. However, issues remain in this area with respect to certain calculations necessary to claim the Section 199 deduction and what activities are considered “film production.” Thus, it is possible that the IRS may continue to pursue MVPDs and television broadcasters that have claimed the benefits of Section 199.

    Conclusion

    Although the TCJA repealed Section 199, it remains a contentious issue with the IRS. Because many taxpayers have or will file refund claims to seek the tax benefit before it is gone forever, we expect continued litigation until the issues are fully resolved by the courts. Before the final bell is struck, Section 199 is poised to leave a permanent mark on both taxpayers and the IRS.

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  • Taxing Digital Businesses: The New Landscape

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    Taxing Digital Businesses: The New Landscape

    November 6, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    James Ross and Sarah Gabbai authored this bylined article assessing the major changes in the taxation of digital businesses.

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  • First Circuit Holds Defendants Have Burden to Negate Loss Causation in ERISA Fiduciary Duty Cases

    First Circuit Holds Defendants Have Burden to Negate Loss Causation in ERISA Fiduciary Duty Cases

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    First Circuit Holds Defendants Have Burden to Negate Loss Causation in ERISA Fiduciary Duty Cases

    November 6, 2018

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has solidified a circuit split on who has the burden of proving loss causation in ERISA breach of fiduciary duty cases. The First Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits holding that once a plaintiff demonstrates a fiduciary breach, the defendant has the burden to negate loss causation. Other circuits, including the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, have held that a plaintiff bears to burden to establish loss causation. This issue is ripe for Supreme Court review.

    In depth

    The decision by the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Brotherston v. Putnam Investments, LLC, No 17-1711 (Oct. 15, 2018) solidifies a circuit split on whether an ERISA fiduciary has the burden to affirmatively negate loss causation when the plaintiff has established a breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The First Circuit sided with the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits, holding that once a plaintiff demonstrates a fiduciary breach under ERISA, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to demonstrate that the breach did not cause the plaintiff’s loss. The First Circuit’s decision has wide ranging implications and may garner the attention of the Supreme Court given the circuit split on this issue.

    In this case, the plaintiffs were two former employees of Putnam Investments, LLC (Putnam) who participated in Putnam’s 401(k) plan. The plaintiffs asserted that Putnam and the other named plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties by offering plan participants investment options that included all of Putnam’s mutual funds, irrespective of whether those funds were prudent investment options.

    The plaintiffs further alleged that Putnam structured fees and rebates in the plan in a manner that was unreasonable and treated plan participants worse than other investors who invested in Putnam funds. Based upon those allegations, the plaintiffs asserted claims under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty and also asserted that defendants engaged in prohibited transactions under ERISA.

    According to the trial court, the plaintiffs’ claims fundamentally asserted that by failing to implement or follow a prudent objective process for investigating and monitoring the individual merits of each of the plan’s investments in terms of costs, redundancy or performance, the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA. During a seven-day bench trial, the trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence presented to conclude that there was a failure to monitor plan investments independently, and therefore a failure to exercise the prudence required under ERISA. Nevertheless, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the breach of the duty of prudence claim mid-trial, concluding that plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that the breach caused plaintiffs to suffer a loss.

    The court of appeals focused much of its analysis on the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims. In particular, the court of appeals considered whether the plaintiffs were required to present evidence that the defendants’ fiduciary breach caused the alleged harm or, conversely, whether the burden shifts to defendants to negate any causal link between the fiduciary breach and the alleged harm.

    Before turning to the burden of proof, the court of appeals first analyzed plaintiffs’ theory of loss. The plaintiffs did not allege that the value of their investments decreased over time. Instead, the plaintiffs fundamentally alleged that their investments would have performed better had other funds been available as investment options.

    To evaluate the plaintiffs’ theory, the court of appeals first noted that a claim for breach of the duty to act prudently has three fundamental elements: breach, loss and causation. Having made that baseline observation, the court of appeals then turned to analyzing what constitutes a loss from an investor’s perspective.

    The court noted that if an investment increases in dollar value over time, many would not consider the investor to have suffered a loss. Nevertheless, the court of appeals stated that a “more sophisticated” view of loss would also recognize that when there is a choice among a number of investment vehicles, the decision to pick one investment over another may result in a measurable “loss of opportunity.” The court of appeals stated that this broader view of loss aligns with the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which states in determining whether a breach of a duty results in a loss, one must look to what the results “‘would have been if the portion of the trust affected by the breach had been properly administered.’”

    The court of appeals then turned to ERISA. The court noted that ERISA provides that a breaching fiduciary shall be liable to the plan for “any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.” 29 USC § 1109(a). According to the court of appeals, ERISA is thus broad enough to accommodate the “total return” principle recognized in the Restatement. The court of appeals then concluded, relying on the Restatement, that an ERISA trustee that imprudently performs its discretionary investment obligations, including the design of a portfolio of funds to offer as investment options in a defined contribution plan, “is chargeable with . . . the amount required to restore the values of the trust estate and trust distributions to what they would have been if the portion of the trust affected by the breach had been properly administered.”

    Having concluded that the plaintiffs presented a viable theory of loss under ERISA, the court of appeals turned to the issue of which party has the burden to prove that the fiduciary’s breach caused the loss in question once there is sufficient evidence of a breach of such a duty. In conducting its analysis, the First Circuit recognized a split among the circuits on this issue. The Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits have all found that once a fiduciary is found to have breached its fiduciary duty, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to establish that the breach did not cause the loss in question. On the other hand, the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have each held that it is the plaintiffs’ burden to establish the causal link between the fiduciary’s breach and the harm suffered by the plan.

    After recognizing the split among the circuits, the First Circuit joined the circuits that shift the burden to the defendants to negate a causal link between the fiduciary’s breach and the alleged harm to the plan once a breach of a fiduciary duty is established. The court based its decision in no small part on its view that the information regarding the fiduciary’s investment decisions lies within the fiduciary’s hands and, in the court’s view, common sense and principals of trust law support the position that fiduciaries should therefore have the burden to negate causation.

    The First Circuit’s decision in this case is notable because it appears to adopt an expansive view of what may constitute a loss under ERISA and clearly holds that when a plaintiff establishes that a fiduciary has breached a fiduciary duty under ERISA, the fiduciary bears the burden to negate the causal link between its conduct and the plaintiff’s alleged harm. Given the potential impact of the court’s decision and the growing split in the circuits on this critical issue, it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court will soon weigh in on this issue.

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