Content Type: Article

  • Two for One: How the NCAA Rules Do Not Adequately Address Package Deals and a Proposed Rule to Prohibit Them

    ARTICLE

    Two for One: How the NCAA Rules Do Not Adequately Address Package Deals and a Proposed Rule to Prohibit Them

    October 25, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lauren Ferrante discusses the possible violations committed by member schools of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in the U.S. in their recruitment of good high school athletes into their athletic programs, focusing on the package deals made in NCAA men’s basketball. Read more here.

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  • McDermott Will & Emery Lawyers Examine Effectiveness of LPAs

    ARTICLE

    McDermott Will & Emery Lawyers Examine Effectiveness of LPAs

    October 25, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Elysa Jacobs and Ziva Robertson authored this bylined article on Lasting Powers of Attorney and the differences between instruction and preference.

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  • Prepare for the Worst, So It Won’t Happen

    ARTICLE

    Prepare for the Worst, So It Won’t Happen

    October 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Elysa Jacobs and Ziva Robertson authored this bylined article on the importance of Lasting Powers of Attorney and how they can prevent unforeseen problems.

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  • IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 10

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 10

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 10

    October 2018

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Arrest of FinCEN Employee for Unlawful Disclosure of SARs and SAR Information

    Arrest of FinCEN Employee for Unlawful Disclosure of SARs and SAR Information

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Arrest of FinCEN Employee for Unlawful Disclosure of SARs and SAR Information

    October 19, 2018

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Oct. 16, 2018, in an unprecedented action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York charged Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards (“Edwards”), a senior advisor at the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), in a criminal complaint with unlawfully disclosing suspicious activity reports (“SARs”) and conspiracy to make unauthorized disclosure of SARs. The Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”),[1] as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and its implementing regulations require certain financial institutions, such as banks, to file a SAR with FinCEN when they detect a known or suspected violation of federal law or regulation or suspicious activity relating to money laundering, terrorist financing or other criminal activity.[2] The information reported on the SAR is required to be provided pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g), as implemented by FinCEN regulations found at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.320. Covered financial institutions submit SARs to FinCEN through an electronic portal and FinCEN maintains a centralized database of SARs that it makes available to law enforcement and certain state and federal regulatory agencies.[3]

    The BSA imposes strict confidentiality requirements on the disclosure of information relating to a SAR, including the existence of a SAR or information that would reveal the existence of a SAR. Specifically, by way of example, “a financial institution that files a SAR — including its current or former directors, officers, employees or agents — may not notify any person involved in the transaction that the transaction has been reported.”[4] In addition, the BSA provides that no current or former officer or employee of, or contractor for, both federal or state governments, as well as local, tribal or territorial governments, may disclose to any person involved in a suspicious transaction that the transaction was reported “other than as necessary to fulfill the official duties of such officer or employee.”[5] In 2010, FinCEN implemented amended regulations to make clear that the SAR confidentiality provisions of the BSA extend not only to disclosure of a SAR to the subject of the report, but to any disclosures not otherwise authorized by FinCEN’s regulations.[6]

    According to the complaint, in October 2017, Edwards downloaded thousands of FinCEN files containing highly sensitive information relating to Russia, Iran and terrorist groups such as ISIS, to a flash drive. Edwards does not appear to have been involved in any official projects or tasks relating to these files. Throughout the course of 2018, Edwards unlawfully disclosed numerous SARs — and emails and investigative memoranda related to the SARs — to a reporter by taking photos of the SARs and texting them to the reporter through an encrypted application. Edwards and the reporter also engaged in telephone conversations. According to the complaint, the substance of the SARs related to matters and persons being investigated by the U.S. Office of the Special Counsel (among other investigative authorities), such as Paul Manafort, Richard Gates and the Russian Embassy. That information was subsequently published, over the course of a dozen news articles, by the news organization that employed the reporter. The complaint also describes how Edwards performed specific searches of FinCEN records at the request of the reporter. The specific reporter and news organization were not named in the complaint.

    Edwards was charged with violations of 31 U.S.C. § 5322 and 18 U.S.C. § 371 for unauthorized disclosure of suspicious activity reports and conspiracy to make unauthorized disclosures of suspicious activity reports, both of which carry a maximum sentence of five years in prison. When questioned by law enforcement officials, Edwards allegedly ultimately confessed to providing SARs to the reporter via the encrypted application, but denied knowing that the reporter intended to publish the information (although this statement is contradicted by allegations in the complaint). Edwards also declared that she is a “whistleblower” who provided the SARs to the reporter for “record keeping” purposes.

    The complaint also alleges that the associate director of FinCEN to whom Edwards reported in her official duties extensively communicated with the reporter via text message. Edwards’ supervisor is identified as a co-conspirator, but it does not appear that he or she has been charged at this time.

    This action by the U.S. Attorney’s Office highlights the importance of complying with the SAR confidentiality rules and the potentially severe consequences of failing to do so. While this case deals with a government employee, the rules apply equally to firms and their employees. Financial institutions may, therefore, want to consider using this opportunity to remind any employees who come into contact with SAR information to safeguard that information and strictly maintain its confidentiality.

    Authored by Seetha Ramachandran, Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Melissa G.R. Goldstein, Jennifer M. Opheim, Mari S. Dopp and Nicole Geoglis.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Titles I and II of Public Law 91–508, as amended, codified at 12 U.S.C. 1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951–1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332.

    [2] See The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Public Law 102-559, Title XV § 1517(b). 106 Stat. 4055, 4058-9 (1992); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (authorizing Secretary of the Treasury to require any financial institution, and any director, officer, employee or agent of any financial institution, to report suspicious transactions relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation). 

    [3] 73 Fed. Reg. 42405, 42407-9 (July 21, 2008).

    [4] 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A)(i).

    [5] 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A)(ii).

    [6] 75 Fed. Reg. 75594, 75595 (Dec. 3, 2010).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Two Circuits Limit Creditors’ Setoff Rights in Bankruptcy Cases

    Two Circuits Limit Creditors’ Setoff Rights in Bankruptcy Cases

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Two Circuits Limit Creditors’ Setoff Rights in Bankruptcy Cases

    October 18, 2018

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “The right of setoff … allows entities to apply their mutual debts against each other to avoid the pointless exercise of ‘making A pay B when B owes A.’” held the Seventh Circuit on Aug. 17, 2018. Berg v. Social Security Administration, 900 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) limits “a creditor’s right of setoff during the ninety-day period prior to the” date of bankruptcy, said the court. Id. “In plain English — a commodity rarely found in the … Code — this means that a debtor … may recover from a creditor … an amount set off by the creditor in the ninety days preceding … bankruptcy … but only to the extent that the creditor improved its position during that ninety-day period.” Id. The Seventh Circuit followed the language of the Code to reach an unanticipated result.

    The Third Circuit also recently denied a creditor’s right of setoff “on equitable principles” in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Rosenberg, 2018 WL3640987,*2 (3d Cir. July 31, 2018). It reasoned that “[s]etoff is ‘an equitable right to be permitted solely within the sound discretion of the court.” Id., quoting Foster v. Mut Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 614 A.2d 1086, 1095 (Pa. 1992). As shown below, the Third Circuit’s decision was hardly equitable to the creditor bank.

    The holdings of Berg and U.S. Bank are meaningless without reviewing their facts and the courts’ reasoning. The Code’s defined limit on setoff (Berg) and the judicially created equitable limit on setoff (U.S. Bank) are quite different in scope.

    Relevance

    A creditor’s right of setoff is a powerful state law remedy. The Code creates no “federal right of setoff,” but, “with certain exceptions, whatever right of setoff otherwise exists is preserved in bankruptcy.” Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995). Code § 553(a) not only preserves a creditor’s right of setoff, but Code § 506(a) also deems the creditor to have a secured claim for the amount subject to setoff. A creditor with a setoff right thus gains preferential treatment in bankruptcy because it can be paid in full to the extent of that right, rather than being paid with a percentage bankruptcy dividend. Studley v. Boylston Nat’l. Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913). But the Code also limits the creditor’s right of setoff and provides safeguards, some of which are summarized below. See generally Burton M. Freeman, “Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers,” 97 Banking L.J. 484 (1980) (“Freeman”).

    1. Automatic Stay. First, Code § 362(a)(7) stays a creditor from setting off “any debt owing to the debtor that arose” prior to bankruptcy “against any claim against the debtor.” To set off, therefore, a creditor must seek relief from the automatic stay.
    2. Property Subject to Setoff Protected. The trustee or Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) cannot use property subject to a setoff (e.g., cash collateral “deposit accounts”) without prior court authorization or lender consent. Code § 363(c)(2).
    3. Turnover Power Subject to Setoff. The Code’s general turnover requirement in § 542 is also subject to a creditor’s setoff right. See In re C.W. Mining Co., 749 F.3d 895 (10th Cir. 2014) (refusing to upset post-bankruptcy setoff by secured creditor without court authorization).
    4. Tax Overpayment Setoffs Not Stayed. Code § 362(b)(6) exempts the Internal Revenue Service from the automatic stay when a debtor overpays its taxes. It may set off the debtor’s refund against “an income tax liability.”
    5. No Improvement in Creditor’s Positon. As noted earlier, Code § 553(b) permits a trustee or DIP to recover from an offsetting creditor the amount by which it improved its position during the 90-day period prior to bankruptcy. Congress thus encouraged creditors not to set off, recognizing that a bank lender might pressure its debtor to increase its deposits after it learned of a likely bankruptcy filing. As shown in Berg, discussed below, a creditor’s improvement in position may be innocent but still recoverable. Freeman, supra, at 498-504 (“The setoff netting test is absolute and purely arithmetical; there is no insolvency test or subjective element … . There is no rational explanation other than an intent to penalize the exercise of an admittedly valid and legal right.”).

    The banking relationship provides a concrete example of how setoff works. Banks ordinarily require their borrowers to maintain a checking account with a “compensating balance.” When the borrower maintains a checking account, the bank owes the customer the credit balance in its account. The customer also owes the bank the unpaid loan balance. If, for example, the customer borrows $10,000 from the bank and maintains a checking account with a balance of $5,000, the bank owes the customer $5,000 on the account, while the customer owes the bank $10,000 on the loan. If the customer defaults, the bank can set off the account balance ($5,000) against the amount of the loan ($10,000). After the bank sets off, the customer owes the bank $5,000. Outside of bankruptcy, the bank does not have to seek judicial relief to set off and does not need its borrower’s consent. Still, the bank must take some action (e.g., a book entry) to reduce its customer’s account. Citizens Bank, supra, 116 S. Ct. at 286. Merely freezing the customer’s account does not constitute setting off. Id.

    The Seventh Circuit’s Berg Decision: A Creditor’s Innocently Improved Position

    The Social Security Administration (“Agency”) set off prior to bankruptcy the amount of a back-award ($20,307) that it owed to Berg, the debtor, against the amount that Berg owed the Agency due to an earlier Agency overpayment ($19,400). 900 F.3d at 665. Shortly thereafter, the Agency sent the debtor a check for $907, effectively recovering its earlier overpayment from her back-award. Id. at 866.

    The debtor promptly filed a bankruptcy petition and sued the Agency to recover the amount of back-benefits set off by the Agency ($20,307). The bankruptcy court “found that the elements for setoff under the [Code] were present.” The Agency “had a pre-petition claim [$19,400] against [the debtor] for return of its earlier overpayment; [the Agency] owed a pre-petition debt [$20,307] to [the debtor] because of the award of back-benefits; the obligations were mutual; and both the claim and the debtor were valid and enforceable.” Id., citing Code § 553(a) and In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park Inc., 337 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) (setoff allowed when debts are mutual and “the general rule is that mutuality is satisfied when the offsetting obligations are held by the same parties in the same capacity … are valid and enforceable, and … both offsetting obligations arise either pre-petition or post-petition, even if they are raised at different times out of different transactions.”).

    The bankruptcy court nevertheless found that the Agency had improved its positon during the 90-day pre-bankruptcy period before it set off. The 90th day prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy was May 9, 2014, when the debtor’s approved back-benefit totaled only $17,385. On that day, the debtor owed the Agency $19,400, meaning that the Agency had a statutory “insufficiency” of $2,015. Code § 553(b)(2) defines “insufficiency” to mean any amount “by which a claim against the debtor [Berg] exceeds any mutual debt owing to the debtor by [the Agency, as creditor].” 900 F.3d at 869. When the Agency later set off on July 30, 2014, about a week before bankruptcy, the debtor still owed the Agency $19,400 for an overpayment she received, but the Agency now owed her $20,307 for back benefits. That meant that there was no “insufficiency” on July 30, 2014, the date of setoff, “because the [Agency’s] debt to the debtor was now larger than the amount that she owed the [Agency]), and the [Agency] had improved its position in the amount of $2,015 during the 90-day preference period.” Id. at 866-67. Thus, reasoned the bankruptcy court, the Agency “was entitled to keep $17,385,” but the Agency had “to return $2,015 to [the debtor].” Id. 867.

    The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the debtor’s argument “that she had no benefits from which to take an offset until” a date later than July 30, 2014. Id. at 869. According to the court, under “the Social Security Act … a beneficiary has a right to payment of benefits as soon as the beneficiary survives to the end of the month that the beneficiary is eligible for benefits” — well before the setoff here. Id. at 870. Moreover, when the debtor had applied “for disability benefits in March 2014, she created an unliquidated, contingent claim against the [Agency] that related back to the … date that she became entitled to benefits … [, May 2013] … .” Id. at 871. Because the Agency owed Berg $17,385, it had an “insufficiency” of $2,015 on May 9, 2014, but had “no insufficiency on July 30, 2014,” when it set off. Id. The Agency “had improved its position in the amount of $2,015 during the 90-day preference period,” enabling the debtor to recover that amount. Id.

    As the Seventh Circuit explained, Code § 553 “does not bar setoffs entirely but simply prevents a creditor from improving its position during the 90-day pre-petition period. This limit on setoffs was imposed in order to allow the trustee to recover setoffs that improved the position of one creditor at the expense of all the others during the 90-day period prior to bankruptcy.” Id., citing In re Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 730 (7th Cir. 1986). But the Agency’s improvement in position was wholly innocent in Berg — no manipulation. The mere passage of time created increased benefits for the debtor and a statutory liability for the Agency.

    The Third Circuit’s U.S. Bank Decision: A Purportedly Equitable Limit on Setoff

    The Third Circuit barred a lender (U.S. Bank) with a $6.5-million judgment against a guarantor from setting off its judgment against the guarantor’s $6.1-million Florida judgment against the lender. The guarantor had obtained its judgment based on the lender’s bad faith filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition under Code § 303. According to the Third Circuit, the district court had not abused “its discretion in denying [the lender’s] motion for mutual judgment satisfaction based on equitable principles.” 2018 WL 3640987, at *2. Purportedly relying on applicable Pennsylvania law, the court reasoned that setoff is “an equitable right to be permitted solely within the sound discretion of the court.” Id. But the only Pennsylvania case cited by the Third Circuit for this broad proposition was Foster v. Mutual Fine, Marine and Inland Ins Co., 531 Pa. 598, 617 (1992). The court there, however, denied setoff in an in insurance company rehabilitation because a statute “expressly forbids a setoff of premium obligations,” and because a reinsurer may not “offset obligations … that had not matured.” Id. at 617, 621.

    The Third Circuit was apparently troubled by the nature of the defendant-guarantor’s judgment against the lender, stating that the “filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition has devastating consequences for the putative debtor … . Several [lower] courts have concluded that [the Code’s] equitable purpose would be frustrated if bad faith filers were allowed to offset a §303(i) judgment.” Id. It stressed the lender’s “bad faith when it filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition against” the guarantor. Id. at *3. Because the lender had sustained a judgment not only for compensatory damages but for “substantial punitive damages,” said the court, “equitable principles” barred the lender’s remedy of setoff. Id.

    The Florida district court decision awarding damages to the guarantor for the lender’s improper involuntary bankruptcy filing is briefly mentioned in the Third Circuit’s decision. “Although the District Court vacated the [jury’s] punitive damages award and reduced [its] compensatory damages award, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated the jury’s verdict … .” 2018 WL 3640987, at *1. But the Third Circuit failed to mention the Florida district court’s findings after an eleven-day trial:

    • “The [guarantor’s] liability case [against the lender] was a close call”;
    • The guarantor’s case relied heavily on “emotionally charged and at times inflammatory testimony”;
    • “The record is bereft of any maliciousness, intentional deception, or egregious conduct [by the lender] essential [to support] punitive damages.”;
    • “There is simply no pattern of bad acts”; and
    • The guarantor “has a prolific history of using litigation as a tool to enhance his own bargaining position.”

    Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables, XIV, LLC, 2014 WL 4810348, *2, *7, *8. (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2014).

    The Eleventh Circuit never addressed the merits of the jury verdict or the district court’s findings regarding the record. It merely vacated the district court’s order granting the lender’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, holding that it was untimely under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure although it was timely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV LLC, 818 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2016) (because post-trial motion was “not timely filed, we need to (and, indeed cannot address … merits”; “… district court … must apply [shorter] filing deadline … in … Federal Bankruptcy Rules … . ”).

    The Third Circuit in U.S. Bank relied on lower court decisions to support its decision. In re Macke Int’l Trade Inc., 370 B.R. 236, 255 (B.A.P.) (9th Cir. 2007); In re Diloreto, 442 B.R. 373, 376 (E.D. Pa. 2010); In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Me 1992) and In re Forever Green Athletic Field Inc., 2017 WL 1753104, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 4, 2017). But the cited cases, neither persuasive nor controlling, do not apply Pennsylvania law that may permit setoff of a judgment for a debt against a tort judgment based on the creditor’s attempt to collect a valid debt. See Porreca v. Marks, 23 Pa.D. 276, 277 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1913) (unpaid jeweler had customer arrested for larceny; customer obtained judgment for malicious prosecution; setoff still granted; customer awarded damages for jeweler-creditor’s error; “no reason why [customer] should not pay for article he purchased.”; and to deny setoff would be “inequitable and unjust.”).

    A hard look at the facts in U.S. Bank — something the district court failed to do[1] — shows why the decision is troubling. The lender had a final $6-million judgment against the guarantor for his admitted default. He had yet to pay a cent on that judgment. Nor did he deny the absurdity of making “A pay B when B owes A.” Studley v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913). It was also unfair to deny setoff to the bank when the defendant guarantor apparently had no intention of paying the bank what it owed.

    The Third Circuit’s per se rule barring setoff of a judgment for damages under Code § 303(a) may also be inconsistent with applicable Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Koken v. Legion Ins. Co., 900 Pa. D. 418, 426 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 2006) (setoff permitted when one party to contractual relationship committed a tort). Such a rule here imposed a double loss on the lender and gave the defendant-guarantor a windfall. The lender held a valid final judgment that would likely go unpaid without a setoff, in view of the guarantor’s asserted insolvency. Rosenberg, supra, 2014 WL 4810348, at *7. The Third Circuit failed to explain why the defendant-guarantor’s judgment against the lender was not itself a sufficient deterrent against a purportedly improper involuntary bankruptcy filing.

    Nothing in the Code should have superseded the bank’s state-law remedies here, particularly when Code § 553(a) preserves pre-bankruptcy state-law setoff rights subject only to specific narrow statutory exceptions that did not apply here. The Third Circuit should not have relied on vague “equitable powers” to add a remedy not authorized by the Code. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 987 (2017) (reversing Third Circuit, held that courts cannot, for equitable reasons, permit priority-skipping distributions not authorized by Code); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the … Code”); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2 Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990) (Bankruptcy courts “no longer have equitable powers to modify contracts to achieve fair distributions. [They] enforce entitlements created under state law.”). In U.S. Bank, fairness and equity mandated the lender’s ability to set off its judgment against the guarantor’s judgment. See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934) (“Equity does not demand that its suitors have led blameless lives.”) (Brandeis, J.).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The Third Circuit applied an “abuse of discretion” standard in U.S. Bank: “We will not disturb the District Court’s exercise of discretion unless no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.” 2018 WL 3640987, at *2, quoting Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2001).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

     

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  • Blurred Lines Songwriters Have Got to Give It Up for the Gaye Family

    ARTICLE

    Blurred Lines Songwriters Have Got to Give It Up for the Gaye Family

    October 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jodi Benassi authored this bylined article on the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to affirm in part and reverse in part a district court’s judgment ruling that the song “Blurred Lines” infringed Marvin Gaye’s 1970s song “Got To Give It Up.”

    In depth
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    Jodi Benassi

    Partner

    San Francisco

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  • INSIGHTS: Can You Keep A Secret? Working With Silent Trusts

    INSIGHTS: Can You Keep A Secret? Working With Silent Trusts

    ARTICLE

    INSIGHTS: Can You Keep A Secret? Working With Silent Trusts

    October 18, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Nicole Mann and Jane Zhao authored this bylined article the potential benefits of silent trusts and considerations when managing and administering one as part of an estate plan.

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  • Industry Voices—Why Are We Treating Social Determinants of Health as Another Healthcare Fad?

    ARTICLE

    Industry Voices—Why Are We Treating Social Determinants of Health as Another Healthcare Fad?

    October 16, 2018

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Adaeze Enekwechi authored this bylined article on the impact of “social determinants” on individuals’ health care.

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  • New CFIUS Rules May Impact All Foreign Investment in the United States

    New CFIUS Rules May Impact All Foreign Investment in the United States

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New CFIUS Rules May Impact All Foreign Investment in the United States

    October 16, 2018

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Department of the Treasury, acting in its role as chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), issued two interim rules implementing provisions of the recently enacted Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) on October 10, 2018. The first interim rule implements certain provisions of FIRRMA that became effective immediately upon its enactment and clarifies the processes, definitions, and procedures with respect to CFIUS review and investigation. The second interim rule, which is the subject of this newsletter, establishes a FIRRMA “pilot program” to address specific perceived risks to US national security.

    In depth

    On October 10, 2018, the US Department of the Treasury, acting in its role as chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), issued two interim rules implementing provisions of the recently enacted Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA). The first interim rule implements certain provisions of FIRRMA that became effective immediately upon its enactment and clarifies the processes, definitions, and procedures with respect to CFIUS review and investigation. We addressed key changes in our August On the Subject, FIRRMA Legislation Amending CFIUS Will Soon Be Signed into Law. The second interim rule, which is the subject of this newsletter, establishes a FIRRMA “pilot program” to address specific perceived risks to US national security.

    The first interim rule was effective upon its publication in the Federal Register on October 11, 2018. The second interim rule implementing the pilot program is effective on November 10, 2018, after completion of a thirty-day comment period. Both interim rules make significant changes to the jurisdiction and procedures of CFIUS that could affect all foreign investment in the United States.

    The Pilot Program

    Prior to FIRRMA, CFIUS’s authority did not extend to foreign direct investments in US businesses unless the foreign investor acquired a controlling interest. FIRRMA expands the jurisdiction of CFIUS by broadening the definition of “covered transaction” to include certain foreign direct investments in US business even in cases where the investment does not result in a controlling interest (“other investments” under FIRRMA). In order to capture such additional forms of foreign direct investment in US businesses, the pilot program implements FIRRMA’s establishment of mandatory declarations for certain transactions involving foreign investors.

    The scope of the pilot program extends to transactions that meet the following criteria:

    1. Pilot Program Industries. The pilot program targets 27 “Pilot Program Industries,” included in an Annex to the new rule and listed below. Treasury identified these industries as requiring immediate attention; they generally correspond to the sectors that have attracted the most intensive CFIUS scrutiny in recent years as possibly implicating US national security.

    2. Pilot Program US Businesses. The pilot program applies to any US business that “produces, designs, tests, manufactures, fabricates, or develops a critical technology that is either utilized in connection with the US business’s activity in one or more pilot program industries, or designed by the US business specifically for use in one or more pilot program industries.”

    3. Foreign Investor. While FIRRMA was enacted with a view to concerns particularly about Chinese access to US critical technologies, the statute does not expressly call out China. Rather, the pilot program applies to all non-US persons, no matter the country, and there are no exemptions, including for investors from countries considered to be close US allies.

    4. Pilot Program Covered Investments. For a non-controlling investment to be covered by the pilot program, it must provide the foreign investor with one of the following:

    • Access to any material nonpublic technical information in the possession of the target US business;
    • Membership or observer rights on the board of directors or equivalent governing body of the US business, or the right to nominate an individual to a position on the board of directors or equivalent governing body of the US business; or
    • Any involvement, other than through voting of shares, in substantive decision-making of the US business regarding the use, development, acquisition, or release of critical technology.

    5. Pilot Program Covered Transactions. The pilot program covers “pilot program covered investments,” described above, as well as any transaction that could result in foreign control of a “pilot program US business.”

    Mandatory Declarations or Joint Voluntary Notice

    Parties to a pilot program covered transaction must submit to CFIUS either a “declaration” (new under FIRRMA) or a full joint voluntary notice (as under current CFIUS rules and procedures) no later than 45 days prior to the expected completion date of the transaction. An exception applies for any transaction that is completed by November 10, 2018. For any transaction to be completed between November 10 and December 25, 2018, parties must file such declaration or joint voluntary notice by November 10 “or promptly thereafter” (31 C.F.R. §§ 801.401, 402). Declarations are abbreviated notices intended to be no more than five pages in length, and must include a description of the transaction, including the basis on which it is deemed to fall under the purview of the pilot program, along with information about the US business and the foreign investor (31 C.F.R. § 801.403). In the event parties choose to file a declaration instead of a full notice, within 30 days after the filing, CFIUS will take one of the following four actions: (1) request that the parties file a full joint voluntary notice; (2) invite further communication between the parties and CFIUS; (3) initiate a review of the transaction; or (4) notify the parties that CFIUS has completed all action (31 C.F.R. § 801.407).

    Parties to Covered Transactions Must Monitor and Strictly Follow the New Rules, or Else!

    The pilot program will be temporary, in effect for no more than 570 days following the date of FIRRMA’s enactment. Treasury will consider how it works in conjunction with new final rules that Treasury will be drafting and releasing for public comment in coming months. Treasury will incorporate aspects of the pilot program in the final rules. In the meantime, the new rules authorize CFIUS to impose penalties up to the value of a transaction for “any person who fails to comply with the requirements” of the new rules. In light of such a potential penalty for failing somehow to comply with the rules and with an uncertain view to additional regulatory changes ahead, US companies and potential foreign acquirers and investors in any US business must monitor these developments and must seriously consider CFIUS requirements. Further, parties to deals involving any foreign investment in a US business should carefully consider the CFIUS implications in structuring their transactions.

    PILOT PROGRAM INDUSTRIES

    Aircraft Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 336411

    Aircraft Engine and Engine Parts Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 336412

    Alumina Refining and Primary Aluminum Production
    NAICS Code: 331313

    Ball and Roller Bearing Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 332991

    Computer Storage Device Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 334112

    Electronic Computer Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 334111

    Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 336414

    Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Propulsion Unit and Propulsion Unit Parts Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 336415

    Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and Tank Component Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 336992

    Nuclear Electric Power Generation
    NAICS Code: 221113

    Optical Instrument and Lens Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 333314

    Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 325180

    Other Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 336419

    Petrochemical Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 325110

    Powder Metallurgy Part Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 332117

    Power, Distribution, and Specialty Transformer Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 335311

    Primary Battery Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 335912

    Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 334220

    Research and Development in Nanotechnology
    NAICS Code: 541713

    Research and Development in Biotechnology (except Nanobiotechnology)
    NAICS Code: 541714

    Secondary Smelting and Alloying of Aluminum
    NAICS Code: 331314

    Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, and Nautical System and Instrument Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 334511

    Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 334413

    Semiconductor Machinery Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 333242

    Storage Battery Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 335911

    Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 334210

    Turbine and Turbine Generator Set Units Manufacturing
    NAICS Code: 333611

     

    See Annex A to Part 801 – Industries here.

    Authors

    David J. Levine

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Raymond Paretzky

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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