ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Executive Order on Hospital Price Transparency May Prompt Disclosure of Negotiated Prices
June 28, 2019
Read time: 8 min
President Trump has issued an Executive Order instructing several federal agencies to begin rulemaking processes intended to increase the transparency of hospital pricing. Among other measures, the Executive Order directs the Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services to begin a rulemaking process that would require hospitals to publicly post commercially negotiated rates with third-party payors.
This On the Subject provides an overview of historic developments in the regulation of hospital price transparency, summarizes key provisions of the Executive Order and analyzes various aspects of the Executive Order relevant to industry stakeholders.
On June 24, 2019, President Trump signed an Executive Order directing the Secretaries of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of the Treasury and Department of Labor to initiate rulemaking intended to bring greater transparency to negotiated prices between hospitals and commercial insurers. The Executive Order also called on the Secretaries to develop strategies relating to data and quality reporting, while also improving access to claims data from taxpayer-funded health care programs and group health plans. Among other directives, the Executive Order called on the Secretary of HHS to submit a report on additional steps the Trump Administration may take to address surprise medical billing.
Hospital Pricing Transparency Background
Hospital pricing transparency measures have been a focus of federal and state legislators for much of the past decade. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted in 2010, required US hospitals to make public a list of their standard charges. In 2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued guidelines regarding the requirement and promulgated a final rule in 2018 requiring hospitals to make their charges available via the internet. Various states have implemented their own hospital pricing transparency measures, including measures intended to prevent surprise billing.
In the midst of growing support for hospital pricing transparency regulations, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) raised concerns in 2015 regarding certain forms of increased price transparency. It concluded that forcing the disclosure of competitively sensitive health care pricing information may result in anticompetitive consequences. The FTC elsewhere has noted that such disclosures “may chill competition by facilitating or increasing the likelihood of unlawful collusion,” and recommended that legislators limit transparency to “the kinds of data that are most useful to consumers when selecting health care services and providers.”
On October 12, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order intended to promote health care choice and competition. That Order provided that rules and guidelines affecting the US health care system should improve access to information Americans need to make informed health decisions, including data about health care prices and outcomes. On December 3, 2018, HHS, together with Treasury and Labor, published a report proposing that price transparency efforts should distinguish between the charges a provider bills and the rates negotiated between payers and providers. The report found that “[b]oosting price transparency will likely have limited utility unless the dampening effect of third-party payment on consumer engagement is addressed.”
The Executive Order
On June 24, 2019, President Trump signed a new “Executive Order on Improving Price and Quality Transparency in American Healthcare to Put Patients First.” The administration takes the position that patients must know the price and quality of health care goods and services before they can make informed health care decisions. The Executive Order discussed the potential for pricing transparency to reduce prices, citing a study that found that giving patients the ability to “price shop” for imaging services was associated with a per-service savings of up to approximately 19%.
These principles underpinned the Executive Order’s directive to the Secretary of HHS to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking within 60 days requiring hospitals to publicly post charges and information, based on negotiated rates, for common “shoppable” items and services, in easy-to-understand, consumer-friendly and machine-readable format. The Secretaries of HHS, Treasury and Labor are also charged with issuing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking within 90 days and soliciting comment on a proposal to require health care providers, health insurance issuers and self-insured group health plans to provide or facilitate access to information about expected out-of-pocket costs for items and services to patients before they receive care.
In addition to these directives, the Executive Order required a report describing the manners in which the federal government and the private sector are impeding price and quality transparency for patients, and recommendations for eliminating those impediments; a “roadmap” to align data and quality measure reporting across Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and other federal health care programs; increased access to governmental and commercial third-party payor claims data; and a report on steps the administration may take to address surprise medical billing, among other directives.
Industry Responses
The American Hospital Association (AHA) and America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) quickly expressed concern that the Executive Order may result in higher prices to consumers. AHA noted that hospitals already provide consumers with information on pricing (see the ACA requirement above) and that publicly posting privately negotiated rates could undermine the competitive forces of private market dynamics. AHIP similarly noted that disclosing competitively negotiated prices would reduce competition and push prices higher, specifically referencing the FTC’s position discussed above. The American College of Physicians (ACP) released a statement supporting the Executive Order as consistent with its own position on transparency of out-of-pocket costs and quality data that allows consumers, physicians, payers and other stakeholders to compare and assess medical services and products in a meaningful way.
Analysis
The Executive Order alone does not create new transparency requirements; rather, it requires HHS and other agencies to initiate regulatory proceedings to propose and analyze transparency requirements. These agencies must follow notice and comment rulemaking procedures, which provide industry stakeholders with an opportunity to submit formal comments addressing the agency proposals. Agencies are required to consider and respond to comments from private stakeholders during such rulemaking proceedings.
While the Executive Order directs various agencies to issue proposed regulations concerning pricing transparency, any regulation that is finalized must be consistent with the statutes that it implements. The Executive Order does not specify which statute or statutes the administration believes authorize the actions proposed. If the final regulatory actions are inconsistent with the text of the relevant statutes, or are arbitrary and capricious for any other reason, or if the agencies fail to observe the procedural requirement established by the Administrative Procedure Act, they will likely be challenged in court.
If regulations are promulgated that require hospitals to disclose negotiated commercial third-party payor rates, such disclosures may affect market dynamics. Hospitals with comparatively lower reimbursement rates may be likely to leverage that price information in negotiations with third-party payors for higher reimbursement rates. Hospitals with higher reimbursement rates (and, presumably, higher patient cost-sharing responsibilities) will have to justify their higher prices to patients through quality of care, patient services or other competitive factors. As hospitals consider marketing campaigns intended to demonstrate their comparative value, it will become increasingly important to consider potential beneficiary inducement prohibitions and the nuances of appropriate marketing under the federal and state anti-kickback statutes.
The Executive Order’s directives raise a number of potential questions and concerns for industry stakeholders. For example, it is unclear how frequently hospitals may be required to submit pricing data or the format that data may take. Regulations may be proposed requiring hospitals to submit pricing data for individual items and services that are sometimes or always packaged or bundled into a single negotiated payment rate when furnished to patients enrolled in certain third-party payor plans. In addition to potential reporting challenges for hospitals, patients may review these prices and choose not to receive care based on a mistaken understanding that they would incur various charges that would be packaged or bundled in their case.
Challenges may also arise for hospitals utilizing value-based contracting structures, where ultimate third-party payment rates for hospital items or services may vary based on care furnished by other providers or patients enrolled in the same value-based plan. Hospitals may utilize contracted service providers that separately bill for items and services in connection with a hospital service, and it is unclear how these costs would be reported.
Industry stakeholders may address these and other questions and concerns in comments to proposed rules and advanced notices of proposed rulemaking to assist the Secretaries of HHS, Treasury and Labor in balancing the value of patient access to certain pricing data against potential antitrust implications, administrative burdens, and the potential risks associated with miscommunication and patient misunderstanding.
Considering Kisor’s Deference Decision In The Tax Context
ARTICLE
Considering Kisor’s Deference Decision In The Tax Context
June 27, 2019
Read time: 2 min
Andrew Roberson authored this bylined article on the US Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie and how it applies to tax cases.

IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 6
ARTICLE
IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 6
June 2019
Read time: 1 min
Dive into the June 2019 issue of IP Update: Vol. 22, No. 6

Family Ties: Connecticut Passes Paid Family and Medical Leave
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Family Ties: Connecticut Passes Paid Family and Medical Leave
June 27, 2019
Read time: 4 min
Connecticut adopted a new paid family and medical leave law. The law requires all private sector employers with employees who work in Connecticut to provide paid leave to eligible employees, and it expands the allowable reasons for eligible leaves.
Connecticut enacted a paid family and medical leave law, which provides paid leave to eligible employees and expand allowable reasons for such leave. This Connecticut statute closely tracks Massachusetts’s parallel statute and appears to be among the most generous paid family leave laws in the country. All private sector employers (and their employees who work in Connecticut) are covered.
Connecticut’s “Paid Family and Medical Leave” act funds a paid family leave program by assessing a mandatory payroll tax on employees of 0.5% of income, commencing in January 2021. This tax will be subject to the Social Security cap (currently $132,900). Employees, however, will not be eligible for paid leave until one year later: January 1, 2022.
Eligible employees will be able to take up to 12 weeks of paid leave in a 12-month period, for reasons covered under the existing Connecticut Family and Medical Leave Act (CFMLA). There will also be two additional weeks of compensation available for a serious health condition resulting in incapacitation that occurs during a pregnancy.
In addition to providing compensation, this new law expands CFMLA to cover employers with as few as one employee, and expands the definition of family member to a “spouse, sibling, son or daughter, grandparent, grandchild or parent, or an individual related to the employee by blood or affinity whose close association the employee shows to be the equivalent of those family relationships.” CFMLA provides coverage for employees who have been on the job “for at least three months immediately preceding his or her request for leave.”
The amount available to employees during leave is based on a sliding scale of 95% of the employee’s base weekly earnings up to a maximum cap of 60 times the state minimum wage. Connecticut’s minimum wage at the time benefits take effect will likely be $13 per hour, so a maximum benefit of $780 per week appears likely.
Connecticut’s law creates a Paid Family and Medical Leave Insurance Authority to oversee the leave program. Amounts are paid by a state trust fund established pursuant to the program, thus making the state of Connecticut, like Massachusetts, directly responsible for administering and paying benefits.
Although employers are not directly responsible for paying benefits under this Connecticut law, employers must (starting in 2022) notify employees both at the time of hire and annually thereafter of their right to benefits under the law. Retaliation by employers for utilizing the paid leave is, of course, prohibited.
Like the Massachusetts program established last year, Connecticut’s law permits employers to apply for an exemption if the employer provides a private plan with the same benefits as are available through the Connecticut state fund. Separately, employers participating in the state plan may require that employees substitute otherwise available paid vacation or other paid leave during a CFMLA leave, subject to the employee’s right to reserve up to two weeks of any such paid time off.
To implement the new Connecticut paid leave law, employers will likely need to work with their payroll providers. If an employer has employees in states outside of Connecticut and Massachusetts, the employer may want to consider whether an expansion of paid leave to other employees is feasible and desirable for uniformity within its workforce. If you have questions about the new law and its consequences for your employees, please contact your current McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.

Trust Wins Due Process Challenge to North Carolina State Income Tax
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Trust Wins Due Process Challenge to North Carolina State Income Tax
June 26, 2019
Read time: 11 min
Last week, the US Supreme Court ruled that North Carolina may not tax a trust’s income when the trust’s only contact with the state is the in-state residence of discretionary beneficiaries. The Due Process Clause requires a minimum connection between a state and the person it seeks to tax. The mere residency of the discretionary beneficiaries of a trust is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement.
On June 21, 2019, the US Supreme Court unanimously held that North Carolina’s tax law that imposes an income tax on trust income that is “for the benefit of” a North Carolina resident violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution when applied to tax the income of a trust on the sole basis of the in-state residence of discretionary beneficiaries. North Carolina v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, Case No. 18-457 (S. Ct. June 21, 2019) (Sotomayor, J.) (Alito, J. filing a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J. and Gorsuch J. joined).
The Kaestner trust was created by a New York resident, was subject to New York law, and had a trustee who was a resident of Connecticut. The trust documents and records were kept in New York and its assets were custodied in Massachusetts. The trustee made no direct investments in North Carolina. The only contacts the trust had with North Carolina was the in-state residence of its current beneficiaries. But none of the current beneficiaries had received a distribution from the trust during the relevant tax years, none of them had a right to compel distributions, none of them had any fixed right to receive future distributions, none of them had the right to assign their interests in the trust and none of them had the right to participate in investment decisions.
The Court’s conclusion in Kaestner is consistent with its 1929 decision in Safe Deposit Box and Trust Company v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929). Virginia imposed its intangible personal property tax on property held by the Maryland trustee of a trust held for the benefit of Virginia resident beneficiaries that was created by a Virginia settlor. The Court decided that the imposition conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment because the property sought to be taxed was wholly beyond the jurisdiction or control of Virginia.
The Kaestner decision, however, was rooted more specifically in the Due Process principles articulated in the Court’s 1992 decision in Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled on other grounds, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S.____ (2018). Quill confirmed that a state must satisfy a two prong test before it can impose its tax on a person, property, or transaction. First, there must be “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” Second, “the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State.” Standing alone, the in-state residency of beneficiaries who may never receive anything from the trust is not sufficient to satisfy these tests. If a state tax is to be justified by the state residence of a beneficiary, the beneficiary is required to have “some degree of possession, control, or enjoyment of the trust property or a right to receive that property.”
The Court’s decision in Kaestner is a narrow one. North Carolina and only one other state, Tennessee, have statutes that use the residency of trust beneficiaries as the sole criterion for the imposition of tax—but the opinion noted that Tennessee’s income tax will be phased out by 2021. The decision does not hold a statute of this type unconstitutional on its face. Instead, it holds only that the application of the rule to tax a trust that has no contacts with the state other than the residency of contingent beneficiaries will not survive a Due Process attack and offers no guidance as to the quantity of required relationship. The Court may well have reached a different conclusion if there had been more contacts between the trust and the state or if the trust instrument had given resident beneficiaries the right to receive future distributions of trust funds. The Court observed that California applies its tax on the basis of beneficiary residency only when the beneficiary’s interest is not contingent and expressly stated that it was not considering whether it would have reached a different result if the North Carolina resident beneficiaries were certain to receive trust funds in the future. In a footnote it mentioned that the taxpayer trust had raised no objection to the possible imposition of a state tax on a resident beneficiary when it received a future distribution of income accumulated in a prior year. Both California and New York have tax systems that impose a tax, commonly referred to as a “throw-back tax,” under certain circumstances on a resident beneficiary who receives trust income accumulated in a prior year. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §17745(b); N.Y. Tax Law §612(b)(40).
The decision does, however, provide some clues as to what the Court is likely to find sufficient when dealing with three of the criteria that other states use to justify the imposition of their taxes on trust income—the residency of the trustees, the place where the trust is administered and the residency of the settlor of the trust.
The residency of trustees
At least six states tax the income of trusts if one or more of the trustees are residents of the state—Arizona, California, Kentucky, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia.. At least eight other states require another connection such as the residence of the trust’s settlor or the residence of a trust beneficiary—these states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and North Dakota. There is a strong clue in the Kaestner opinion that the in-state residency of a trustee is a sufficient connection. The Court referred approvingly to its 1947 decision in Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947). In that decision, the Court upheld the right of Rhode Island to impose its intangible personal property tax on the resident trustee of a trust established under the will of a New York resident because the trustee is the owner of a legal interest in the trust property, “may incur obligations in the administration of the trust enforceable against him personally,” and, as a resident, is entitled to the benefit and protection of Rhode Island laws. Rhode Island had no other contacts with the trust.
The place where the trust is administered
At least eight states tax the income of trusts that are administered in the state—these states are Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina and Virginia (Nenno, Bases of State Income Taxation of Nongrantor Trusts). At least two other states, Hawaii and North Dakota, require another connection. The opinion’s clue as to the sufficiency of the administration connection is less clear. The decision tells us only that prior cases “suggest that a tax based on the site of trust administration is constitutional.” The prior cases referred to are Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) and Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939), neither of which deals directly with the significance of the place of administration. In both cases, not only were the trusts administered outside of the relevant state, but the residency of the trustees was also out of state.
The residency of the settlor of an inter vivos trust
Whether the residency of the settlor is a sufficient connection to permit a state to tax a trust is of far greater importance to taxpayers than the first two criteria. It is relatively simple for settlors to protect their trusts from state taxation by selecting trustees who live in states that do not impose tax based on the residence of trustees or on the place of trust administration. It is impossible for them to take steps to protect previously funded trusts from state taxation on this basis and far more inconvenient for them to change their domicile to protect trusts they may fund in the future.
At least 21 states now impose income tax on trusts created and funded by settlors who were state residents at the time the trusts became irrevocable. A few of them also require the residency of a trust beneficiary— Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
The Kaestner clue as to the insufficiency of the settlor’s residence is good news for taxpayers. The clue suggests that something else will likely be needed. The opinion states that there must be an inquiry into what the settlor “controls or possesses and how that interest relates to the object of the State’s tax.” It then refers to Curry v. McCanless, discussed above in relation to the trust administration connection, and another case decided the same year, Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939). In both cases the Supreme Court sustained the power of a state to tax a trust with a resident settlor but only because the settlor retained significant powers over the trust property. The settlor in the Curry case was the beneficiary of the trust during her life and retained the power to direct how the trust property would be disposed of at her death. The settlor in the Graves case retained the power to revoke the trust.
Obviously, an inquiry into a settlor’s retained control will find none in the case of a settlor who is no longer living. Even if the settlor is alive and a resident of the taxing state, if the trust is an irrevocable nongrantor trust which is intended to escape estate taxation at the death of the settlor, it is likely that the settlor will not have retained sufficient control over the trust to justify state taxation of the trust. A conclusion that the residency of the trust’s settlor alone is not sufficient to give a state taxing rights is consistent with most of the state court opinions that deal with this issue. The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Fielding v. Commissioner of Revenue, 916 N.W. 2d 323 (2018) is the most recent decision to reject the residency of the settlor as a basis for state taxation. The State of Minnesota filed a petition in the US Supreme Court on November 15, 2018, asking the Court to review this decision. If the Court grants the petition, the opinion it issues in the case may give a clearer answer to the question as to if and when the residency of a settlor of an inter vivos nongrantor trust may be used to satisfy the minimum connection test of the Due Process clause.
Practice Note: Kaestner teaches us that the residency of a discretionary beneficiary alone will not be enough to permit a state to tax a trust and that residency of the trust’s settlor will probably not be enough. There is a risk, however, that the existence of any additional factors will create a sufficient connection.
The settlor who wants to avoid state taxation of a trust with a beneficiary living in a state that uses the residence of a beneficiary either alone or in conjunction with other factors should consider eliminating all other contacts with the state and limiting that beneficiary’s control over and measurable interests in the trust. If, for example, a discretionary beneficiary has annual withdrawal rights, state taxation of the trust might survive a constitutional challenge. Because the future location of beneficiaries is difficult to predict, the trust instrument should contain sufficient flexibility to permit future restrictions to the beneficiary’s interest and controls over the trust.
Settlors who live in states that impose tax on trusts based on the in-state residency of the settlor will want to eliminate all other contacts between the state and their trusts and to minimize their controls over their trusts. The trustees should be out of state residents, the trust should be administered out of the state, the trust instrument should not provide that the trust is subject to the laws of the settlor’s state of residence, and the trustees should avoid investing in tangible personal or real property located in the state. In the case of trusts to be funded at death, inter vivos trusts rather than testamentary trusts should be used to receive trust assets in order to avoid an argument that the probate courts of the state of domicile at death have continuing jurisdiction over testamentary trusts.

Wyoming Updates Its Trust Company Legislation, Allows for Two-Family Private Trust Companies
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Wyoming Updates Its Trust Company Legislation, Allows for Two-Family Private Trust Companies
June 24, 2019
Read time: 5 min
Wyoming is one of the few states that authorize by statute private trust companies that serve a single family and trust companies that serve the general public. Effective July 1, 2019, House Bill 0030 updates the laws governing trust companies – read more about the key changes to legislation below.
Individuals who are establishing a Wyoming trust company, or who are administering a Wyoming trust company, should be aware of recent Wyoming law changes.
Wyoming is one of the few states that authorize by statute both (1) private trust companies that serve a single family, and (2) trust companies that serve the general public. In its most recent session, the Wyoming legislature passed House Bill 0030 updating the law governing trust companies. Governor Mark Gordon signed the Bill on February 14, 2019, which legislation is effective July 1, 2019. Here are the key changes:
- Reorganization: The new legislation reorganizes Chapter 5 of Title 13 of the Wyoming Statutes to provide separate chapters governing the formation and operation of public trust companies, chartered (regulated) family trust companies and private (unregulated) family trust companies. The reorganization simplifies and clarifies the law governing trust companies.
- Two Unrelated Families: A chartered family trust company can now provide fiduciary services to two unrelated families. This provision is unique in that most states with private trust company statutes do not allow multiple families to form a single private trust company. The family trust company must be chartered (regulated) to act for two families.
- Class Expansion: A chartered or private family trust company can now provide fiduciary services to (1) key employees and former key employees of entities that are majority-owned and controlled by family members and (2) trusts created by non-family members if all of the individual beneficiaries of the trust are family members. This expanded class of potential family trust company clients is more consistent with the class of “family clients” defined with respect to the family office exemption from registration as an investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The statute is now more aligned with the laws of other states that facilitate private trust company planning.
- Conflicts of Interest: The new legislation modernizes the rules governing potential conflict of interest transactions and facilitates transactions involving potential conflicts of interest with family members, affiliates of the family and the trust company serving in other capacities.
- Application to LLCs: New provisions clarify that a trust company organized as a limited liability company and managed by a manager or member is regulated in the same manner as a trust company organized as a corporation and managed by a board of directors.
- Application Simplification: The prior application requirements for a public trust company included certain procedures only applicable to banks that accept deposits. New procedures eliminate these bank-specific application requirements for public trust companies and establish a simplified and more efficient application process for public trust companies.
- Record Retention: The rules for record retention and record production applicable to a public trust company also are applicable to a chartered family trust company, which means a chartered family trust company must (1) permanently retain its corporate record book and ledger, (2) retain any transactional records for three years after the date the transaction is finalized, and (3) follow any additional record retention or record production regulations established by the Wyoming Banking Commissioner. These requirements do not apply to private family trust companies.
- Surety Bond Requirement: A chartered family trust company now must obtain a surety bond in the amount of $1,000,000 and the amount of the surety bond required for a public trust company is now $1,000,000, increased from $100,000. No surety bond is required for a private family trust company.
The new legislation governs the requirements and procedures for forming a new public or family trust company in Wyoming after July 1, 2019, and also the procedures for converting one type of trust company to another after the same date. Additionally, the ongoing operations and regulation (where applicable) of all existing public and family trust companies in Wyoming are subject to this new legislation after July 1, 2019. We encourage anyone interested in forming a trust company in Wyoming or anyone administering a trust company in Wyoming to contact your McDermott Will & Emery lawyer to review the implications of this legislation.
Website Printout: Acceptable Specimen of Use or Advertising?
ARTICLE
Website Printout: Acceptable Specimen of Use or Advertising?
June 24, 2019
Read time: 2 min
Katherine Tabor authored this bylined article summarizing the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s findings to deny registration of a mark since it was only used in advertising.
NHS Long-Term Plan: legislative proposals
ARTICLE
NHS Long-Term Plan: legislative proposals
June 24, 2019
Read time: 2 min
The UK health and social care select committee has today released its report on the NHS Long term plan: process for legislative change. In the report, the committee recognises that collaboration rather than competition is a better way for the NHS to respond to challenges. Whilst competition rules add cost and complexity, choice and competition can help raise standards and help innovation. Importantly, the committee concluded that the NHS should not become a monopoly as this would not be in the interest of patients. Sharon Lamb was pleased to give oral evidence and participate in the discussion. Sharon’s reflections on the importance of choice and the need to protect the market are recognised by the committee and included in the report: “It is not enough to say that patients have a constitutional right to choice if you do not also allow the market to provide.”

AHLA Health Law Watch 2019
ARTICLE
AHLA Health Law Watch 2019
June 2019
Read time: 2 min
This inaugural edition of Health Law Watch 2019, published by the American Health Lawyers Association, is designed to help legal practitioners stay up-to-date on health care’s most important issues. This book offers accessible yet sophisticated articles on 10 important topics in health law this year. Kerrin Slattery and Gary Scott Davis authored Chapter 1, “The Impact of Disruptors and Disruption in the Health Marketplace” and Tony Maida authored Chapter 5, “Fraud and Abuse – FCA Enforcement, New Laws and Regulatory Changes.”
This inaugural edition of Health Law Watch 2019, published by the American Health Lawyers Association, is designed to help legal practitioners stay up-to-date on health care’s most important issues. This book offers accessible yet sophisticated articles on 10 important topics in health law this year. Kerrin Slattery and Gary Scott Davis authored Chapter 1, “The Impact of Disruptors and Disruption in the Health Marketplace” and Tony Maida authored Chapter 5, “Fraud and Abuse – FCA Enforcement, New Laws and Regulatory Changes.”

Liability of the statutory auditor of the issuer towards investors due to an infringement of reporting requirements
ARTICLE
Liability of the statutory auditor of the issuer towards investors due to an infringement of reporting requirements
June 21, 2019
Read time: 2 min
Prof. Dr. Clemens Just and Anna Steudner comment on the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Dresden (OLG Dresden) as of 17 January 2019 (case no. 8 U 1020/18)