Content Type: Article

  • Industry Voices—How CEOs Can Compete as Nontraditional Partnerships Reshape Healthcare

    ARTICLE

    Industry Voices—How CEOs Can Compete as Nontraditional Partnerships Reshape Healthcare

    July 10, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stephen Bernstein authored this bylined article discussing how CEOs can play a role in laying the groundwork for productive collaborations, particularly with tech companies.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Buyers’ Immunity Under Employment Law is a Myth

    ARTICLE

    Buyers’ Immunity Under Employment Law is a Myth

    July 10, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Elivira Kras authored this bylined article on employment law liabilities that buyers may inherit following an asset purchase.

    In depth
    Authors

    Elvira R. Kras

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    More insights

  • New York Strengthens Employee Protections Against Discrimination and Harassment

    New York Strengthens Employee Protections Against Discrimination and Harassment

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Strengthens Employee Protections Against Discrimination and Harassment

    July 10, 2019

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 19, 2019, the New York State Legislature passed a bill that strengthens employee protections against harassment and other discriminatory practices in the workplace. Changes in the law include:

    • Replacing the “severe or pervasive” standard applicable in harassment cases with a lower standard;
    • Eliminating the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense;
    • Extending the limitations on nondisclosure agreements to all claims of discrimination;
    • Expanding the prohibition on mandatory arbitration to all claims of discrimination;
    • Requiring employers to provide additional information to employees regarding sexual harassment policies; and
    • Increasing the statute of limitations for sexual harassment claims to three years.

    The new law generally renders the state law to be consistent with New York City’s expansive Human Rights Law and extends protections previously enacted with respect to sexual harassment claims to all forms of discrimination in the workplace.

    Replacing the “Severe or Pervasive” Standard

    Instead of the previously applicable “severe or pervasive” standard for hostile environment claims, harassment constitutes unlawful discrimination if “it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of an individual’s protected characteristics. If, however, a reasonable victim with the same protected characteristics was exposed to the conduct and would consider it to be a “petty slight” or a “trivial inconvenience,” then the conduct does not amount to unlawful discrimination.  

    Eliminating the Faragher-Ellerth Defense

    The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense allowed employers to avoid liability if the employer had a reporting procedure and the complainant unreasonably failed to comply with it. Under the new law, if an employee does not follow the employer’s reporting procedure, that will not be determinative of whether an employer is liable.

    Extending the Limitations on Nondisclosure Agreements

    Under the new law, employers will be prohibited from using nondisclosure agreements for all claims of discrimination in the workplace unless confidentiality is the complainant’s preference. If there is a nondisclosure agreement, it must be in writing and in plain English language or in the primary language of the complainant.

    Furthermore, any term in a nondisclosure agreement that prevents the complainant from “initiating, testifying, assisting, complying with a subpoena from, or participating in any manner with an investigation conducted by the appropriate local, state, or federal agency; or filing or disclosing any facts necessary to receive unemployment insurance, Medicaid, or other public benefits to which the complainant is entitled” is void.

    Previously, the law granted complainants a mandatory 21-day period to determine their preference in keeping the matter confidential. After the 21 days, the law required the complainant’s preference to be recorded in writing, which the complainant could change within seven days.[1]

    Expanding the Prohibition on Mandatory Arbitration

    The new law will expand the law’s prohibition on mandatory arbitration to all discrimination claims in the workplace, to the extent consistent with federal law.

    Requiring Employers to Provide Additional Information Regarding Sexual Harassment Policies

    Under the new law, upon hire, employers must provide employees with information regarding the employer’s sexual harassment prevention policy and training program in the employee’s primary language. Information about the employer’s sexual harassment prevention policy and training must also be presented to each employee in writing during the yearly mandatory sexual harassment training.

    Increasing the Statute of Limitations for Sexual Harassment Cases

    Under the new law, the statute of limitations for sexual harassment claims in the workplace will be extended to three years. Filing an administrative complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights for other types of discrimination claims is still subject to a one-year period.

    Other Changes

    Previously, employers were liable for the sexual harassment of employees by a contractor, subcontractor, vendor or other person providing services pursuant to a contract in the workplace. The new law expands employer liability to all forms of discrimination against non-employees when the employer knows of the discrimination and fails to take action.

    The new law also requires a liberal construction of its provisions regardless of whether comparable federal laws have been construed differently. Exemptions and exceptions must also be narrowly construed.

    Additionally, in employment discrimination cases, courts are now required to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. Courts may also award punitive damages for claims of discrimination in the workplace.

    Lastly, the new law expands the definition of “employer.” The law applies to all employers and individuals, regardless of the number of employees they have. Under the new law, any person who has an employee, including those who employ a single domestic worker, is liable as an employer for any discrimination that occurs in the workplace. Prior to the amendments, only employees with four or more employees were covered (except with respect to sexual harassment claims).

    Once signed into law, most of the changes will go into effect within 60 days, unless stated otherwise.

    In response to this change in law, New York employers should review their policies, forms of agreement and training processes to ensure compliance.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Holly H. Weiss.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See “New York State and City to Mandate Anti-Sexual Harassment Training for Private Employers,” SRZ Alert, April 12, 2018, available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Infringer Need Not Have “Affixed” the Mark to Goods to Be Found Liable

    ARTICLE

    Infringer Need Not Have “Affixed” the Mark to Goods to Be Found Liable

    July 4, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Katie Bukrinsky authored this bylined article on the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision that using a competitor’s trademarks in marketing materials to promote competing products constitutes trademark infringement.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Digital Health in the United Kingdom: The New Regulatory Environment Under the Medical Device Regulation

    Digital Health in the United Kingdom: The New Regulatory Environment Under the Medical Device Regulation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Digital Health in the United Kingdom: The New Regulatory Environment Under the Medical Device Regulation

    July 3, 2019

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The MDR and other recent developments in the health care regulatory landscape pose new opportunities and challenges for medical software companies and investors in digital health in the United Kingdom. Although the regulatory landscape is changing, there is still no clear framework for reimbursement or tariffs for digital health tools and AI in the United Kingdom. This article sets out key considerations for digital heath developers and investors as they navigate this dynamic environment.

    In depth

    Investment in artificial intelligence (AI) and digital health technologies has increased exponentially over the last few years. In the United Kingdom, the excitement and interest in this space has been supported by NHS policies, including proposals in the NHS Long Term Plan, which set out ambitious aims for the acceleration and adoption of digital health and AI, particularly in primary care, outpatients and wearable devices.

    Although these developments are encouraging to developers, there is still no clear framework for reimbursement or tariffs for digital health tools and AI.

    At the same time, the plethora of new technologies has led to increased calls for regulation and oversight, particularly around data quality and evaluation. Many of these concerns may be addressed by the new Medical Device Regulation (MDR) and other regulatory developments. In fact, there is some risk that while regulatory landscape is moving quickly, the pricing environment is still a way behind.

    In May 2020, the new MDR will change the law and process of certification for medical software. The new law includes significant changes for digital health technologies which are medical devices. In March 2019, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) also published a new evidence standards framework for digital health technologies. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) already regulates online provision of health care, and there are calls for wider and greater regulation. The government has also published a code on the use of data in AI

    Digital Health Technologies and the MDR

    The new MDR will mean a significant change to the regulatory framework for medical devices in the European Union.

    As with the previous law, the MDR regulates devices through a classification system.

    The new regime introduces new rules for medical software that falls within the definition of device. This will mean significant changes for companies that develop or offer medical software solutions, especially if their current certification has been “up-classed” under the MDR.

    Key Takeaways for Investors in Digital Health Tools

    Companies and investors in digital health should:

    • Check whether their digital health tool is a medical device and caught by the MDR.
    • Review whether their proposed or current certification has changed under the new MDR.
    • Assess the new requirements on certification and general safety in the MDR as those apply to digital health tools.
    • Ensure that development programmes have taken into account the likely time period for certification, which may be lengthy due to shortages in Notified Bodies.
    • Build in the cost of any increased certification requirements and costs of compliance.
    • Take into account the CQC guidance for digital and online health care, and check whether the health tool and service will require CQC registration.
    • If the digital health tool is to be marketed and sold to NHS organisations, understand and take into account the NICE evidence standards framework for digital health technologies. Whilst these are stated to be complementary to the new MDR, the framework has different assessments and evidence requirements.
    • Have a clear strategy about access to market and reimbursement of technologies.
    • Consider the government’s Code of Conduct for data driven health and care technology.
    • Understand the implications of a “no deal” Brexit, especially if the technology is marketed across Europe.

    Medical Devices Regulation 2017: FAQ

    When is software a medical device?

    The MDR sets out clear rules on this, which are broadly similar to the previous position but provide helpful clarification.

    The key test relates to the purpose of the software. The MDR states:

    • Software in its own right, when specifically intended by the manufacturer to be used for one or more medical purposes, is a medical device.
    • Example: software used for diagnosis, or predicting disease

    • Software for a general purpose, even if used in a health care setting, is not a medical device.
    • Example: medical records software used as a storage or retrieval system

    • Software for lifestyle or well-being purposes is not a medical device.
    • Example: apps which monitor fitness levels, diet and wellbeing

    Many companies offering medical software will be familiar with the existing rules, but it is important to know that whilst the MDR principles are broadly similar to the old rules, the MDR introduces new requirements on classification of devices. These new classification requirements will affect many companies offering online health care tools, diagnosis and prediction tools, and software and AI.

    What are the new classification rules?

    The MDR sets out some specific criteria around the classification of medical software, which is likely to mean that many devices which currently qualify as class I under the existing regime (MDD) may move up a class under the MDR.

    The new rules are as follows:

    • Software intended to provide information used to take decisions with diagnosis or therapeutic purposes are Class IIa.
    • Software where these decisions have an impact that may cause a serious deterioration of a person’s state of health or a surgical intervention are Class IIb.
    • Software where these decisions have an impact that may cause death or an irreversible deterioration in a person’s health are Class III.
    • All other software is Class I.

    Whilst some software may remain as Class I, many devices are likely to move up a class level.

    This will mean more onerous responsibilities and increased rigour (and time) in relation to the certification of the device.

    When do the new rules come into force for medical software?

    The MDR came into force on 25 May 2017 but does not apply fully until May 2020.

    The MDR includes transition provisions for existing devices. The general principle is that certificates issued by Notified Bodies under the MDD will remain valid, but for varying periods depending on the certification.

    Many digital health tools are currently self-certified as Class I devices. If medical software continues to be a Class I device under the MDR, there is likely to be little practical difference for manufacturers, although manufacturers will need to comply with the increased obligations under the MDR.

    However, for current Class I devices which are “up-classed” under the MDR, the position is a little less clear. There are no express provisions in the MDR which deal with up-classing, and the express transitional provisions protect certificates “issues by Notified Bodies” rather than to self-certified devices.

    The prudent interpretation is that self-certification does not survive an up-class. This means that manufacturers of up-classed medical software will need to comply with the MDR and obtain certification from the MDR from May 2020.

    What is the position of Notified Bodies and the timing of certification?

    Notified Bodies are the organisations responsible for the issue of certificates for medical devices under both the MDD and the MDR.

    There are currently serious concerns about the workloads of Notified Bodies and the impact this may have on the timing of certification. Some estimates suggest that the workload of Notified Bodies has increased seven-fold as a result of MDR changes.

    This issue is exacerbated because certain Notified Bodies have also announced their intention not to pursue designation under the MDR, and no new organisations have applied to be Notified Bodies under the MDR.

    What are the new data, safety and evaluation requirements under MDR?

    Manufacturers must, of course, be mindful of data protection laws that apply to the development, trialling and use of medical devices.

    The MDR sets out greater rigour about the evaluation of software and the datasets used to verify and validate medical devices. Manufacturers will need to be able to show how their device has been tested to demonstrate conformity, in particular with regards to safety. For software, this includes detailed information about test design, study protocols, methods of data analysis in addition to data summaries and test conclusions, in particular about software verification and validation (describing the software design and development process and evidence of the validation of the software, as used in the finished device).

    For clinical evaluations, the manufacturer also must ensure that the data is evaluated and relevant to the risks and purpose of the device in question.

    In addition to the general safety requirements that apply to all medical devices, the MDR sets out some specific requirements for medical software. These new requirements include instructions for use of the software, which must contain minimum requirements for hardware and IT security measures and protections against unauthorised access.

    When does software qualify as an accessory?

    In some cases, software may also be an accessory (and therefore must comply with the certification rules for accessories). To qualify as an accessory, the software would have either (i) to enable the medical device to function, or (ii) to specifically and directly assist the medical functionality of the device.

    This consideration is especially relevant to the interoperability of software used as components or in conjunction with medical devices. There is no guidance on how these new rules in the MDR will work in practice, and it may sometimes be difficult to assess whether software is a device itself or an accessory.

    It is also possible that where different medical devices are offered on the market as a single system, multiple certifications may be required.

    How will a “no-deal” Brexit affect digital health regulation?

    Under the terms of the current proposed withdrawal agreement, the European Union and the United Kingdom will continue to operate under the existing recognition of certifications across Member States.

    However, if there is no deal, those transitional mutual recognition provisions will not apply. This is relevant to UK digital health providers that rely on their UK certification across Europe. From the date of Brexit, a UK manufacturer of a medical device will need to ensure that its device is certified by an EU Notified Body before it is placed on the EU market.

    Authors

    Sharon Lamb

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    More insights

  • Third Circuit Clarifies Appeal Process in Settlement and Reorganization Plan Disputes

    Third Circuit Clarifies Appeal Process in Settlement and Reorganization Plan Disputes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Third Circuit Clarifies Appeal Process in Settlement and Reorganization Plan Disputes

    July 3, 2019

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Third Circuit recently took a “pragmatic approach” when affirming lower court orders denying a stay of bankruptcy settlement distributions pending appeal. In re S.S. Body Armor I, Inc., 2019 WL 2588533 (3d Cir. June 25, 2019). After holding that the district court’s “stay denial order” was “final” for jurisdictional purposes, it also confirmed “the applicable standard of review” on motions for stays pending appeals.

    Relevance

    The Third Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling was timely. First, the Circuit had “no direct precedent on the finality of the” order before it. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 2019 WL 266853 (May 20, 2019), agreeing to address whether an order denying relief from the automatic stay is “final” under the bankruptcy appeals statute, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(i). The Sixth Circuit had held in Jackson that an order denying stay relief was “final,” rejecting “vague” and “unpredictable” tests adopted by other circuits. 906 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2018), citing In re Atlas IT Export Corp., 761 F.3d 177, 185 (1st Cir. 2014)(“Everything depends on the circumstances …”).

    A party appealing from a bankruptcy court’s approval of a settlement or confirmation of a reorganization plan must ordinarily seek a stay pending appeal. Otherwise, as the Third Circuit noted in Body Armor, if the “settlement proceeds are distributed before resolution of” the appeal, “that appeal is ‘all but assured’ to become moot.” Id. at *3, quoting In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2015).

    Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(m) provides that, absent a stay pending appeal, the reversal or modification on appeal of a bankruptcy sale order does not affect the validity of sale to a good faith purchaser. Code § 364(e) provides for the same result with a bankruptcy financing order. Drawing on these statutory mandates by analogy, courts have dismissed appeals from non-sale and non-financing orders as equitably moot when the appellant’s failure to obtain a stay pending appeal rendered the appellate court unable to fashion a remedy that would restore the interested parties to their former position. See, e.g., In re JMC Memphis, LLC, 655 F. App’x 802, 805 (11th Cir. 2016) (due to party’s failure to request a stay from either bankruptcy court or district court, court found it inappropriate to “unwind select portions of the settlement agreement.”); In re Allied Nev. Gold Corp., 725 F. App’x 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2018) (appeal from plan confirmation order dismissed as “equitably moot” when appellants sought to unscramble complex reorganization plan; appellants “did not timely seek or obtain a stay.”); In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 143-45 (2d Cir. 2005) (appeal of plan confirmation order dismissed as equitably moot when appellants never sought stay pending appeal or expedited review; vacatur of confirmation order could potentially unsettle substantially consummated plan). As shown below, the creditor in Body Armor appealed from the amount of the reserve to be set aside from which its legal fees could be paid. Because the order in question was neither an asset sale nor a financing order, statutory mootness was not relevant, but equitable mootness was.

    Facts

    The appealing creditor in Body Armor, “C,” was a law firm that had obtained a large cash settlement for the debtor’s estate. It had filed a fee application seeking $1.86 million but then later asked the bankruptcy court to set aside a $25-million reserve from which its fees could be paid. “Without determining the exact amount of attorney’s fees owed to [C], the Bankruptcy Court granted the motion in part, ordering Debtor to set aside $5 million from any settlement funds until resolution of [C’s] fee application.” Id. at *2. Because it thought the $5-million reserve “to be insufficient,” C appealed and also asked the bankruptcy court to stay any distributions from the settlement proceeds pending its appeal. Both the bankruptcy and district courts denied a stay pending appeal.

    The Third Circuit

    Appellate Jurisdiction. The court held that it had “jurisdiction to hear this appeal” under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (“final” order required). As noted, because the lower court’s stay denial order “all but assured” that C’s fee reserve appeal would become moot “since it opened the door to immediate settlement distributions,” that result would preclude C “from obtaining a full airing of its issues on appeal.” Therefore, the order appealed from the district court “was final, [as] was the Bankruptcy Court’s order.” Id. at *4-5. See Jackson Masonry, 906 F.3d at 502 (“The more significant and unrepairable the consequences, the more likely a given order really is final …. [I]n ordinary litigation parties generally can only appeal once the entire case is complete and all issues have been resolved, but in bankruptcy, parties can appeal discrete disputes within the overall case …. We decline to …. ignore the longstanding and textually-compelled rule of looser finality in bankruptcy.”), citing Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1696 (2015) (finality of bankruptcy order determined “first and foremost” by whether it “alters the status quo and fixes the rights and obligations of the parties.”).

    Judicial Requirements for Stay. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007 allows a party to move for a stay pending appeal. The judicially established criteria for ruling on these motions are like those for preliminary injunctions: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceedings; and (4) where the public interest lies.”

    Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). According to the Supreme Court, the first two criteria are “the most critical.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). Accord, Revel, 802 F.3d at 568 (strong showing of likelihood of success and irreparable harm). A “likelihood of success ‘is arguably the more important piece of the stay analysis.’” Id. In Revel, the Third Circuit adopted a “sliding-scale” approach to determine how strong a case the appellant must show: “[t]he more likely the [movant] is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in [its] favor; the less likely [it] is to win, the more [heavily] need [the balance of harms] weigh in [its] favor.” Revel, 802 F.3d at 569.

    Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals ordinarily reviews the denial of a stay “for abuse of discretion, giving proper regard to the district court’s feel of the case.” Id. at 567. Because the likelihood of success criterion turns on “a purely legal determination,” though, the court reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo. Body Armor, 2019 WL 2588533, at * 6, citing Revel, 802 F.3d at 567.

    The Merits. The Third Circuit found that C had “a fatally low likelihood of succeeding in its Fee Reserve Appeal,” compelling an affirmance of the district court’s denial of the stay, “even without considering any of the remaining stay factors.” Id. Applying the so-called “lodestar” method for calculating C’s requested fees to determine whether the $5-million reserve was adequate to cover C’s fee request, the bankruptcy court, said the Third Circuit, had found “a very low likelihood of [C’s] receiving a fee award in excess of $5 million.” Id. at *8. Moreover, the district court found that the bankruptcy court had not abused its discretion.

    The Court of Appeals thus found that “the $5 million reserve was sufficient” because an award in that amount “for 1502.2 hours of legal work” would “yield an hourly rate of $3,328.45 and a lodestar multiplier of over 9.” Id. As the court noted, C “showed tremendous skill and expended substantial time in preserving a highly valuable claim. But its attempts to argue that it is somehow due attorneys’ fees more than $5 million are belied by its initial fee application in the bankruptcy court,” where it “sought attorney’s fees totaling $1.86 million using a lodestar multiplier of 3.38,” asserting its request was reasonable.

    The Third Circuit was “confident that a $5 million reserve [was] sufficient to award [C] the attorneys’ fees it is due.” Id. Without further analysis, it affirmed the denial of a stay because C had “not carried its burden of demonstrating that it has a ‘significantly better than negligible’ chance of succeeding on the merits of its pending Fee Reserve Appeal.” Id. at *8, quoting Revel, 802 F.3d at 57.

    Comments

    1. The Body Armor jurisdictional holding on the finality of bankruptcy court orders is noteworthy. Consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s Jackson Masonry decision, it suggests how the Supreme Court will resolve a circuit split next term in that case: finality will turn on whether the order “finally dispose[s] of discrete disputes within the larger case.” Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692 (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 657n.3 (2006).
    2. Body Armor is also consistent with the many decisions denying a stay pending appeal because of the applicable stringent requirements. But the court’s heavy reliance on its earlier Revel decision shows that an appellant can obtain a stay by making a strong record. As the court there held when granting a stay and reversing the lower courts’ denial, “that [appellant] would prevail on the merits was all but assured …. [Appellant further] demonstrated that, absent a stay, it would lose its … business …, and this was sufficient to show irreparable harm.”). Revel, 802 F.3d at 575.
    3. The appellant in Body Armor alternatively relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(i) (courts of appeals may hear appeals from interlocutory orders “refusing … injunctions”) to support appellate jurisdiction, but the Third Circuit relied instead on the bankruptcy appeals statute, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). It declined to “reach” § 1292(a)(i). The dissenting judge in Revel, though, would have “reach[ed]” the jurisdiction issue under § 1292(a)(i) to uphold jurisdiction under that statute. Revel, 802 F.3d at 575n.2.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Florida Repeals Significant Portions of Certificate of Need Law

    Florida Repeals Significant Portions of Certificate of Need Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Florida Repeals Significant Portions of Certificate of Need Law

    July 1, 2019

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 26, 2019, Governor DeSantis approved HB 21, repealing significant portions of Florida’s long-standing certificate of need (CON) program. The new law will eliminate the CON requirement for general hospitals, complex medical rehabilitation beds and tertiary hospital services, and this repeal will remove major regulatory barriers to commencing or expanding many health care services in Florida.

    In depth

    On June 26, 2019, Governor DeSantis approved HB 21, repealing significant portions of Florida’s long-standing certificate of need (CON) program. Beginning July 1, 2019, the new law will eliminate the CON requirement for general hospitals, complex medical rehabilitation beds and tertiary hospital services. CON requirements for specialty hospitals will sunset two years later, on July 1, 2021.

    This repeal will remove major regulatory barriers to commencing or expanding many health care services in Florida, which proponents believe will lead to increased competition and decreased costs.

    Background of Florida’s Certificate of Need Law

    Florida’s CON program, administered by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), requires operators to obtain prior approval to construct or expand certain health care facilities, offer new services or purchase equipment in excess of a certain threshold. AHCA has historically granted approvals based on a determination of need in a geographic area known as the “fixed need pool,” which required health care facilities to demonstrate that there was an unmet need for their facility or expanded services as a prerequisite to obtaining a license to operate in the area.

    The 50-year old CON program applied to facilities including hospitals, nursing homes, hospice centers and intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled. It requires three different levels of review, depending on the type of facility and services provided: full, expedited and exempt. Under the current CON law, AHCA has only approved 16 of the 32 CON applications submitted from 2014 to 2018.

    In 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a report, Reforming America’s Health System through Choice and Competition. In this report, the federal government encouraged state action to repeal CON laws stating that these laws restricted patient choice and are a significant cause of escalating health care costs. As of May 2019, twelve states (California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming) do not have a CON requirement and four states (Arizona, Minnesota, Indiana and Wisconsin) have a limited CON program for certain health care facilities and services.

    With the approval of HB 21, Florida will become the fifth state with a limited CON program, requiring review for only certain facilities such as nursing homes and hospice centers.

    Repeal of Florida’s Certificate of Need Requirement

    Under the new Florida law, beginning July 1, 2019, general hospitals, complex medical rehabilitation beds and “tertiary hospital services,” including neonatal intensive care units and organ transplant centers (collectively, the Non-Restricted Facilities) will no longer be required to receive CON approval prior to opening new facilities or expanding their services. Therefore, starting July 1, anyone seeking to open a new, or expand services at an existing Non-Restricted Facility may do so subject only to AHCA’s licensure requirements. Those seeking to establish, or expand services at a Non-Restricted Facility will no longer need to demonstrate that the new facility or additional services fulfill an unmet need in the area. Further, this repeal will also eliminate the opportunity for established providers to oppose any new facilities or services that may interfere or compete with their current business.

    “Specialty hospitals” will become Non-Restricted Facilities two years later, on July 1, 2021. Fla. Stat. § 395.002 defines “specialty hospitals” as any “hospital” (as defined under Fla Stat. § 395.002 (12)) that “regularly makes available either:

    1. The range of medical services offered by general hospitals, but restricted to a defined age or gender group of the population;
    2. A restricted range of services appropriate to the diagnosis, case, and treatment of patients with specific categories of medical or psychiatric illnesses or disorders; or
    3. Intensive residential treatment programs for children and adolescents as defined in [Fla. Stat. § 395.002 (15)].”

    HB 21 does not repeal the CON requirements for nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities, hospice programs and intermediate care facilities (Restricted Facilities). Those seeking to establish, or expand services provided at Restricted Facilities will continue to be subject to the CON burdens, including required demonstration of an unmet need, and the ability of competitors in the marketplace to oppose their plans.

    Another key aspect of HB 21 includes requiring the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability to study and make recommendations to the legislature for licensure standards for tertiary hospital services by November 1, 2019, which may alter licensing requirements for such facilities in the future.

    Key Takeaways

    General hospitals, complex medical rehabilitation beds and providers of tertiary services will be free of the CON requirement beginning in July 1, 2019. Specialty hospitals will also no longer be subject to the CON requirement starting July 1, 2021.

    Parties seeking to establish, or expand services at nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities, hospice programs and intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled will still require a CON.

    The CON landscape is shifting in many states across the country. Dealmakers, health care facility operators and providers should continue to monitor CON laws in other states such as Alaska, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and Washington, as these states have introduced or passed similar bills to repeal or reform CON requirements in 2019.

    Caitlyn Cullen, a summer associate in our Miami office, also contributed to this On the Subject.

    Authors

    Gary Scott Davis PA

    Senior Counsel

    Miami

    Adam J. Rogers

    Partner

    Miami

    More insights

  • Illinois Estate Guardians Receive a New Job: Guardianship Estate Planning No Longer Optional?

    Illinois Estate Guardians Receive a New Job: Guardianship Estate Planning No Longer Optional?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Illinois Estate Guardians Receive a New Job: Guardianship Estate Planning No Longer Optional?

    July 1, 2019

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    When guardianship estate planning entered Illinois law in 1996, it was viewed as an optional benefit available to guardians to give disabled adults the tax savings available to abled people. That may be changing.

    In In re Estate of Rivera, the Appellate Court of Illinois addressed the process as part of a duty possessed by guardians of the estate of disabled adults. Estate guardians may now be required to petition the court to enact new estate plans – or modify existing plans – on behalf of their wards to include only those individuals whom the estate guardian has reason to believe the ward would choose to include if the ward was not under disability. The “best interests” standard that governs 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a-5), has been interpreted in Rivera as not only allowing deviation from intestacy in such plans, but perhaps even requiring it where the facts are compelling. Compelling facts likely include cutting out intestate heirs with no relationship or poor relationships with the disabled person. Compliance with this duty appears to impose a substantial burden on estate guardians.

    In depth

    Background

    The Illinois guardianship estate planning statute, 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a-5), allows the guardian of the estate of a disabled adult to establish estate plans for their ward on petition to the court. Historically, most estate guardians followed the rules of intestacy in implementing these estate plans. However, in 2015, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District held Section 5/11-18 statutorily empowers an estate guardian to petition a court to enact an estate plan that deviates from the rules of intestacy. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 2015 IL App (1st) 133247, ¶ 41, 36 N.E.3d 293.

    The court in Howell held that an estate guardian may petition the court to enact an estate plan that includes only those persons whom the guardian believes the ward would choose to include as beneficiaries because Section 11a-18(a) provides that the estate guardian shall apply the income and principal of the estate “for any other purpose which the court deems to be for the best interests of the ward, and the court may approve the making on behalf of the ward of such agreements as the court determines to be for the ward’s best interests.” The court in Howell concluded that it is in a ward’s best interests for the estate guardian to petition the court to enact an estate plan that disinherits a ward’s family members if the estate guardian has reason to believe that the ward would not wish for those family members to benefit from his or her death. The court in Howell also found that, in the event an estate guardian files such a petition, the court should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the ward’s “best interests” before granting the petition and enacting the plan.

    The Rivera Decision

    While Howell provided an estate guardian with the ability to take such action, the recent decision in Rivera has turned that ability into an obligation to consider taking such actions, particularly where heirship exclusions seem justified. In re Estate of Rivera, 2018 IL App (1st) 171214.

    The ward in Rivera, Inez Rivera, had never had testamentary capacity. In 2015, Inez’s estate guardian petitioned for and received authority to enact an estate plan for Inez. Since Howell was pending at this time, the guardian’s proposed estate plan followed the rules of intestacy.

    After Howell was decided, the estate guardian petitioned the court to amend Inez’s estate plan to benefit only Inez’s mother, who was the guardian of her person; Inez’s full sister; and Inez’s three half-sisters who lived with Inez. The estate guardian, after consulting with Inez’s mother, had reason to believe that Inez would only choose to benefit those individuals. Other facts about Inez’s relationship to her father suggested that she would have cut him out if she could.

    After conducting an evidentiary hearing on Inez’s best interests, the court granted the estate guardian’s petition over the objection of Inez’s father and eight of Inez’s other half-siblings. In particular, the court found that Inez’s mother cared for Inez exclusively from the time of Inez’s birth. Conversely, Inez’s father had never lived with Inez, had never cared for Inez, had been violent to Inez’s mother, and had fathered eight other children with other women besides Inez’s mother. Inez’s half-siblings who were children of her father did not have any relationship with Inez either.

    On appeal, the Court held that:

    “A ward’s best interests are not fixed and it would be unsound to conclude that a ward’s estate plan should be unmodifiable, particularly in this case where the ward is a young adult and her best interests may change over her lifetime. We find that an estate guardian is empowered and obligated by the Probate Act to amend a disabled ward’s estate plan when material circumstances change and an existing plan, whether it be an original or amended version, is no longer in the ward’s bests interests due to a change in circumstances.”

    In re Estate of Rivera, 2018 IL App (1st) 171214, ¶ 55 (emphasis added).

    The Result

    As a result of this holding in Rivera, guardians of the estate in Illinois should consider, in each case, whether compelling facts about family relationships dictate a need to compose a plan and offer it to the court for a hearing. If an estate guardian has reason to believe the ward’s plan should be implemented or modified to exclude any family members, the estate guardian should petition the court to establish or amend the plan.

    Authors

    David A. Baker

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • “Gay and Proud”: Groundbreaking Film Leads to Modern Non-Discrimination Legal Battle

    “Gay and Proud”: Groundbreaking Film Leads to Modern Non-Discrimination Legal Battle

    ARTICLE

    “Gay and Proud”: Groundbreaking Film Leads to Modern Non-Discrimination Legal Battle

    June 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    McDermott authored this bylined article on behalf of the Mattachine Society discussing the legal battle between Lilli Vincenz, filmmaker behind “Gay and Proud”, and a Virginia video business owner who refused to accommodate Vincenz because of her sexual orientation.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lisa A. Linsky

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Lisa M. Richman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • What Articles Don’t Usually Tell You About Reputation Management

    ARTICLE

    What Articles Don’t Usually Tell You About Reputation Management

    June 28, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Laura Scaife authored this bylined article outlining potential reputational risks stemming from social media and how to protect against data hacks and control your digital presence.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights