Content Type: Article

  • Post-Verdict Motion for Increased Damages Ends on a Sour Note

    ARTICLE

    Post-Verdict Motion for Increased Damages Ends on a Sour Note

    July 18, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Katherine Tabor authored this bylined article summarizing the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s decision to affirm that a trademark owner was not entitled to an increased damages award after discovering that two of the defendants were not separate companies but, rather, divisions of a third defendant.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • How Substantial Is My Substantial Improvement?

    ARTICLE

    How Substantial Is My Substantial Improvement?

    July 16, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jeffrey Steiner and Pej Razavilar authored this bylined article discussing the opportunity zone requirement that previously used tangible assets must be substantially improved and in order to do so the property owner must double its initial cost basis in the property.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Myers May Make It Easier to Find Equitable Relief in Tax Court

    ARTICLE

    Myers May Make It Easier to Find Equitable Relief in Tax Court

    July 16, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Laura Gavioli authored this bylined article discussing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Myers v. Commissioner and the implications regarding the Tax Court’s powers to grant equitable relief.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Capital Markets & Public Companies Quarterly

    Capital Markets & Public Companies Quarterly

    ARTICLE

    Capital Markets & Public Companies Quarterly

    July 2019

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    During the previous quarter, the SEC proposed new rulemaking to reduce the number of smaller companies that become subject to enhanced reporting requirements through “accelerated filer” and “large accelerated filer” status. In addition, the US Supreme Court invalidated a widely accepted judicial test that required a showing of “substantial competitive harm” prior to excluding competitively sensitive information from public disclosure under FOIA. The SEC issued new interpretive guidance on its analysis of initial coin offerings and whether tokens issued in such offerings constitute securities. Finally, NASDAQ updated its definition of “family member” to more closely align its criteria for independent directors with the standard used by the New York Stock Exchange.

    In depth

    SEC Proposes Amendments to Accelerated and Large Accelerated Filer Definitions

    On May 9, 2019, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed amendments to the definitions for “accelerated filer” and “large accelerated filer” that would exclude from such definitions any company that is eligible for “smaller reporting company” (SRC) status under the SRC definition’s revenue test and raise the public float thresholds for exiting accelerated and large accelerated filer status.  The proposed amendments would reduce the number of smaller public companies that qualify for accelerated filer and large accelerated filer status and thus reduce the number of companies subject to the reporting and compliance burdens associated with such status.

    Specifically, the proposed amendments would exclude from both definitions of “accelerated filer” and “large accelerated filer” any company that qualifies for SRC status due to having annual revenues in its most recently completed fiscal year of less than $100 million. As discussed in our prior On the Subject, in 2018 the SEC expanded SRC eligibility by amending the SRC definition to apply the $100 million annual revenue threshold to all companies with a public float of less than $700 million. As a result of the amendments to the SRC definition, there was an overlap between companies that qualify for SRC status and those that qualify for accelerated filer status. Consequently, companies with $75 million or more of public float remained subject to the requirements that apply to accelerated filers despite qualifying for SRC status. The proposed amendments seek to reduce this area of overlap.

    Further, under the accelerated filer and large accelerated filer definitions currently in effect, a company that has achieved accelerated filer or large accelerated filer status maintains such status unless (as of the last business day of the issuer’s most recently completed second fiscal quarter) its aggregate worldwide market value of the voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates is less than $50 million and $500 million, respectively. The proposed amendments would increase the transition thresholds for accelerated and large accelerated filers becoming non-accelerated filers from $50 million to $60 million and for exiting large accelerated filer status from $500 million to $560 million. Under the proposed amendments, a company could also exit accelerated and large accelerated filer status if it again became eligible for SRC status under the revenue requirements.

    In addition to complying with accelerated filing deadlines, accelerated and large accelerated filers are required to comply with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by providing an auditor’s attestation of management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). If enacted, the amendments would relieve certain smaller companies with low revenue from the burdens of complying with the auditor attestation requirements. However, such companies would continue to be required to establish and maintain ICFR and have management assess the effectiveness of its ICFR.

    The public comment period for the proposed amendments ends on July 29, 2019.

    SCOTUS Quashes ‘Substantial Competitive Harm’ Requirement for Obtaining Confidential Treatment

    On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, holding that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption for commercial or financial information that is “confidential” does not require a showing that public disclosure of such information would cause “substantial competitive harm.” Instead, the Court held that an exemption from FOIA is available and appropriate “where commercial or financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy.” The holding invalidated a key criterion used by many federal agencies, including the SEC, as a necessary condition to granting confidential treatment to information provided to such agency by the public.

    Known as Exemption 4, FOIA’s mandate that federal agencies facilitate the public disclosure of government records of regulatory activity exempts “trade secrets and commercial or financial information” provided to the agency by the public that is “privileged or confidential.” In 1974, the D.C. Circuit, in National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton, held that interested parties seeking to shield agency information from public disclosure in reliance on Exemption 4, must also show that disclosure of such information would cause “substantial competitive harm.” Various courts of appeals followed by adopting a similar test.

    The “substantial competitive harm” test was adopted by the SEC through Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1 and it has long been a touchstone of the SEC staff’s review of requests seeking confidential treatment of business information that would otherwise be disclosed in filings made pursuant to the federal securities laws. In addition, the Court’s decision comes on the heels of the SEC’s first liberalization of the confidential treatment regime in decades. As discussed in our prior On the Subject, in March the SEC adopted amendments to Regulation S-K, rolling back strict procedures for obtaining confidential treatment for information contained in material agreements that are publicly filed. The amendments permit the omission of information, without the submission of a formal request, that is not material and for which public disclosure would likely cause competitive harm. The amendments also permit companies to omit schedules, exhibits or other attachments to material agreement exhibits if such attachments do not contain material information and the information therein was not otherwise disclosed.

    Of note, the Court’s holding retains as a criteria of relief under Exemption 4 that the federal agency offer assurances to the owner of such information that it will be kept private. Because the information at issue in Food Marketing Institute met this criteria, the Court did not address circumstances under which information could retain its confidential character despite the government’s refusal to provide such assurances, such as when a request for confidential treatment is denied. This raises the question as to when, if at all, under the SEC’s public disclosure regime, the criteria for granting confidential treatment can be more restrictive than the criteria under Exemption 4. In light of this uncertainty and the SEC’s amendments to confidential treatment requests, Companies are encouraged to reassess their public disclosures, particularly with regard to information that is of a competitively sensitive nature.

    SEC Issues Framework, No Action Letter Outlining ICO Securities Analysis

    On April 3, 2019, the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology (FinHub) of the SEC published informal guidance, titled “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” (the Framework), which provides analytical tools and a list of factors for determining whether a blockchain asset is a security under the US federal securities laws. The factors included in the Framework are based on an analysis of whether the blockchain asset is an “investment contract,” as that term was first used by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Howey and has been further clarified through subsequent case law.

    In addition, in connection with the release of the Framework, FinHub, through the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, issued a no action letter to TurnKey Jet, Inc. (TKJ) stating that it will not recommend any enforcement action against TKJ if it offers and sells its “tokenized” jet card, a blockchain asset that would likely be labeled a cryptocurrency, without registration under the federal securities laws. The no action letter is the first of its kind to analyze whether a blockchain asset is a security under the federal securities laws.

    In the TKJ no action letter, FinHub referenced several of the new Framework factors, including that:

    1. TKJ will not use any funds from its token sale to develop the its blockchain network, token platform or app, and each of these will be fully developed and operational at the time any TKJ Tokens are sold (in TKJ’s request for no action, TKJ stated that funds would be held in escrow until the TKJ Token is redeemed for air charter travel, at which time they will be disbursed to TKJ, or a participating broker or carrier);
    2. The TKJ Tokens will be immediately usable for their intended functionality (purchasing air charter services) at the time they are sold;
    3. TKJ will adopt technical and legal restrictions that will limit the transfer of TKJ Tokens to wallets within the TKJ platform only; and
    4. TKJ will sell its tokens at a price of one US dollar per token throughout the life of the program, and each token will represent a TKJ obligation to supply air charter services at a value of one US dollar.

    For additional commentary on the Framework and the TKJ no action letter, see our On the Subject.

    Nasdaq Changes Definition of ‘Family Member’ in Director Independence

    On June 12, 2019, Nasdaq filed a Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to amend the definition of “family member” in Nasdaq Listing Rule 5605(a)(2) as such definition applies to the determination of whether a listed company director qualifies as an “independent director.” The rule change excludes from the definition of “family member” step children and domestic employees sharing a home with the director. The purpose of the amendment is to more closely align Nasdaq’s rule with the rule used by the New York Stock Exchange regarding the criteria to be applied by a company’s board when determining a director’s independence.

    Subject to certain exceptions, Nasdaq Listing Rule 5605(a)(2) explicitly excludes from the definition of “independent director” any director who has a family member who:

    1. Accepted any compensation from the listed company in excess of $120,000 during any period of 12 consecutive months within the three years preceding the determination of independence;
    2. Is a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, any organization to which the listed company made, or from which the listed company received, payments for property or services in the current or any of the past three fiscal years that exceed 5% of the recipient’s consolidated gross revenues for that year, or $200,000, whichever is more;
    3. Is employed as an executive officer of another entity where at any time during the past three years any of the executive officers of the listed company served on the compensation committee of such other entity; or
    4. Is a current partner of the listed company’s outside auditor, or was a partner or employee of the listed company’s outside auditor who worked on the listed company’s audit at any time during any of the past three years.

    Nasdaq’s rules also preclude a director from being considered independent if such director is a family member of an individual who is, or at any time during the past three years was, employed by the company as an executive officer.

    Prior to the rule change, “family member” included children “by marriage” and anyone residing in a director’s home. In issuing the proposed amendment, Nasdaq stated that it does not believe that in all circumstances a relationship between a director’s step child or a live-in domestic employee and the listed company should preclude a director from being considered independent. However, notwithstanding the proposed rule change, boards of Nasdaq-listed companies are to continue to affirmatively determine that no relationship (familial or otherwise) exists that would interfere with a director’s exercise of independent judgment while carrying out their responsibilities.

    Pending any action taken by the SEC to disapprove the rule change, it will become effective on July 27, 2019.

    Authors

    Robert H. Cohen

    Partner

    Miami

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    William Hadler

    Partner

    Chicago

    Mark J. Mihanovic

    Partner

    Silicon Valley, Los Angeles

    Eric Orsic

    Partner

    Chicago

    Heidi J. Steele

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • District Court Finds No Implied Assumption of Contract

    District Court Finds No Implied Assumption of Contract

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    District Court Finds No Implied Assumption of Contract

    July 16, 2019

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    When a Chapter 11 debtor never sought “court approval to assume” an executory service contract, it “did not assume” the contract, held the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 28, 2019. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 2019 WL 271305, *1 (E.D. Va. June 28, 2019). Affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court agreed that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “requires court approval before assumption” and that “parties cannot assume contracts by words or conduct.” Id. According to the contract counterparty, “C,” the debtor had allegedly promised “to assume the contract,” Id. at *1, *2, but the bankruptcy court never decided the issue. Id. at *1n.2. In any event, said the district court, “this case is not the ‘rare instance’ in which a party’s conduct constitutes implied assumption,” citing In re A.H. Robins Co., 68 B.R. 705, 710 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986). The real question raised by Toys is whether a contract can ever be impliedly assumed by a trustee or Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”).

    Relevance

    The Toys decision confirms the general rule: a trustee or DIP must obtain prior “court approval” to “assume… any executory contract….” In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortg. Co., Inc., 715 F. 2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1983), quoting Code § 365(a). In other words, assumption “can only be effected through an express order of the judge.” Id. citing In re American National Trust, 426 F. 2d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1970). But the court in Toys barely dealt with the contract counterparty’s defensive argument that the debtor had impliedly assumed its contract, saying that courts “allow implied assumption… in rare circumstances,” with no meaningful analysis. Purporting to summarize one decision, it said that the court had permitted implied assumption when the debtor “tried to reject a real estate contract that required it to pay the broker a commission.” 2019 W.L. 2713051, at *2, citing In re Clavis Smith Building, Inc., 112 B.R. 768, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990). That summary is, of course, meaningless.

    The court in Toys also held that “[i]mplied assumption requires more than just the [debtor’s] ‘acceptance of benefits.’” Id. quoting In re A. H. Robins Co., 68 B.R. 705, 711 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 1986). The requirement of a court order is clear, but further analysis of those few cases that have permitted implied assumption of a contract would be helpful to courts and practitioners.

    Courts are generally correct in requiring prior court approval for contract assumption. As noted in Robins, which found no implied assumption, courts cannot ignore “the stated requirements of” Code §365(a) for prior court approval; to do so “could encourage collusion [by] a debtor-in-possession and specific creditors of [its] choosing [because] the parties could agree to effect an assumption of an executory contract between them and later present their actions to the court for the perfunctory step of nunc pro tunc court approval. If the court approval stage were relegated to the status of a mere formality, all notice requirements would be eviscerated and both the power of the court to grant approval and the conditional right of the creditors to object would be rendered meaningless.” Robins, 68 B.R. at 711. Courts also want to know and creditors also have a right to be heard when a DIP or trustee assumes a contract because administrative priority “is given to expenses arising under [any assumed] pre-existing contracts.” In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc., 76 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1996).

    Still, why have some courts permitted implied assumption? Are their decisions aberrational? Can these decisions be relied on in future cases? For sure, as Toys shows, an argument that the trustee or DIP’s acceptance of benefits mandates assumption will not succeed.

    Analysis of Implied Assumption Cases

    Actions and Benefits. One court held in In re Reda, Inc., 54 B.R. 871, 880 (Bankr. D. N.D. Ill 1985) “that a debtor had assumed [a] contract by its actions.” A fire insurance adjuster had entered into a pre-bankruptcy contract with the debtor in that case after the debtor’s restaurant sustained a fire. The debtor had agreed to pay the adjuster a percentage of any insurance proceeds by assigning a percentage of the proceeds to the adjuster. After finding that the debtor’s contract was executory, the court explained why the DIP had impliedly “assumed the contract.” Id. at 880. The DIP had accepted a settlement check from the insurance company, before any reorganization plan had been confirmed but never moved to assume the adjuster’s agreement. In the court’s view, the “debtor’s actions” presented the “rare instance” of implied assumption: “the adjuster “continued to provide services for the debtor” after bankruptcy; the “debtor knew what was happening”; the “debtor has willingly accepted the benefits of the contract and therefore must also assume the burdens”; and the debtor never requested the adjuster “to cease representing it in the handling of the fire loss.” Id. “But for the efforts of [the adjuster] there would be no fund [for creditors] to be battling over.” Id. at 881. “[T]he debtor could not accept the check without also obligating itself to pay” the adjuster under its pre-bankruptcy contract. Id. at n.25. In sum, the court relied not only on the unique benefit conferred on the estate by the adjuster, but also on the DIP’s knowing, willful conduct. Reda is a close case that, at most, should be limited to its facts. Other courts have either disagreed with or declined to follow its reasoning; See, e.g., In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 191 B.R. 117 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Consumer Health Services of America, Inc., 171 B.R. 917 (Bankr. D. Col. 1994).

    Continued Reliance and Benefits. Another bankruptcy court held that a DIP had impliedly assumed a pre-bankruptcy contract with a real estate agent who “was the sole procuring cause” of a contract for the sale of the debtor’s property. In re Clavis Smith Building, Inc. 112 B.R. 768, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990). Although the DIP sought court approval of the asset sale “without payment to” the agent, the agent argued that DIP had “assumed its agreement.” Id. Although “the debtor has not formally assumed the contract,” held the court, it has “assumed it by its words and deeds …. [The agent] was still obligated to nurse the [asset] sale through, oversee the completion of the construction of the house and … other details … [The] debtor relied on [the agent] for more than … providing a … buyer … [T]he debtor looked to [the agent] to draft [an] Agreement … “ Id. at 770. Unlike Reda, no other court has rejected Clavis. Both Robins and Toys, however, cite Clavis approvingly.

    Inaction: Acceptance of Benefits; Principles of Equity. Another bankruptcy court, in the context of a preference action, held that a debtor had impliedly assumed a contract because it “continue[d] to receive benefits under [the] contract” and “must also bear the burdens or obligations imposed under the contract.” In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium Inc., 22 B.R. 427, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1982), aff’d, 34 B.R. 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“. . . basic principles of equity” guided decision, “Having accepted the benefit of this. . . . agreement in the term of continued funding, the [trustee] cannot now be granted relief from the corresponding burden of the agreement . . . .”). Both courts in Yonkers apparently relied on the particular facts of the case to reach an equitable result. Their disregard of Code 365(a)’s clear language has led other courts to reject the Yonkers analysis. See, e.g., In re California Canners and Growers, 62 B.R. 18, 24 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (concurring opinion) (“I disagree with [Yonkers and another similar case] to the extent that they hold that the debtor’s continuance of a business relationship with the creditor justifies . . . recoupment of prepetition contract claims in the absence of court approved assumption of the contract under Code § 365(a)) ; In re Advanced Professional Home Health Care, Inc., 82 B.R. 837, 841 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1998) (Yonkers decided on “equitable principles”; “To deny the clear language of [§365(a)] requiring conscious decisions by the trustee, in favor of an equitable doctrine . . not mentioned in the Code is not possible for this court.”), rev’d on other grounds, 94 B.R. 95, 97 (E.D. Mich. 1988).

    Comment

    Implied assumption of a contract is indeed rare, requiring a persuasive set of facts and a sympathetic court. For practical purposes, practitioners should assume the doctrine is illusory, to be used only defensively as a last resort. Courts will, for valid reasons, require prior court approval. And creditors, whose claims will be subordinated to any assumed liability, will strenuously oppose any implied assumption argument.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • The Proposed FDII Regulations: Sale of Products to Foreign Customers

    ARTICLE

    The Proposed FDII Regulations: Sale of Products to Foreign Customers

    July 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder authored this bylined article discussing the proposed FDII regulations, which provide rules for determining when income from the sale of products qualify for the lower tax rate.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • Think Twice Before You Forward That Email!

    ARTICLE

    Think Twice Before You Forward That Email!

    July 12, 2019

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Gregory Ballard and Ludwig von Rigal authored this bylined article discussing the US Supreme Court’s decision in Lorenzo v. S.E.C. and its practical implications.

    In depth

    In March 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the SEC may discipline an individual for disseminating misstatements made by someone else. The case, Lorenzo v. S.E.C., 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019), marked the first time in a decade that the court has wrestled with “scheme” liability—so called in reference to the word contained in subsection (a) of Rule 10b-5, but not found in §10(b). But the justices struggled to find a principled way of explaining what types of conduct (beyond the making of misstatements or omissions and manipulation) may be actionable under §10(b), Rule 10b-5, and other provisions of the federal securities laws.

    In its first “scheme” liability decision, Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008), a majority of the court found no primary liability for a customer and supplier that entered into sham arrangements designed to allow a company to inflate revenues. This drew a heated protest from three dissenters who lamented “the Court’s continuing campaign to render the private cause of action under §10(b) toothless.” In their view, Congress enacted §10(b) “with the understanding that federal courts respected the principle that every wrong would have a remedy.” The majority and dissent did agree on one thing though—they both rejected the categorical assertion that only misstatements, omissions, and manipulation are actionable. The majority described the proposition as “erroneous” as “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive,” and the dissent agreed that “the statute covers nonverbal as well as verbal deceptive conduct.” This left open the question of exactly what other forms of conduct §10(b) might reach.

    With Lorenzo, the court has now made clear that dissemination of someone else’s false statements can be actionable conduct, at least in some circumstances. While the Stoneridgecourt had observed that the first element of a “typical” private §10(b) claim is “a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant,” Lorenzo may be read to expand this to “a material misrepresentation or omission made or disseminated by the defendant.” But Lorenzo did not answer the question of whether other types of conduct, if any, beyond misstatements (made or disseminated), omissions, or manipulation can give rise to liability, and on the question of exactly when a person may be liable for disseminating another person’s misrepresentation, the court left many questions unanswered.

    To the Lorenzo majority, it was “obvious” that the defendant’s conduct in sending emails with misleading content supplied by his boss, with scienter, was unlawful. At the same time, the majority “readily” imagined that imposing liability on a “mailroom clerk” for disseminating another person’s false statements would “typically be inappropriate.” The majority balanced its remarks about the likely non-liability of “actors tangentially involved in dissemination” with the admonition elsewhere in its opinion that even a “bit participant” can be liable if all of elements of the claim are present.

    The Lorenzo dissent protested that the facts the majority believed distinguished Mr. Lorenzo’s conduct from that of mailroom clerks or secretaries—e.g., he sent emails directly to investors, his title was vice president of investment banking—do not withstand scrutiny: “I can discern no legal principle in the majority opinion that would preclude the secretary from being pursued for primary violations of the securities laws.”

    Aside from mailroom clerks and secretaries, many people regularly play a role in disseminating information to investors. It is these people who should be most interested in Lorenzo.

    Could the person who operates the slide projector for an earnings announcement be charged with securities fraud? The person has a role in disseminating information to investors. Let’s say the person sat in on management preparation meetings and heard discussions of financial results that cast doubt on assertions in the slide deck, which might cause a regulator or plaintiff to say that she knew that the slides contained misrepresentations. Still, Lorenzo contains ample bases for arguing against this person’s liability. Unlike Mr. Lorenzo, she does not attach her name to the alleged statement and likely does not have a title that implies responsibility for the slides’ contents. To be sure, by flipping on the projector and advancing the slides, this person is involved in transmitting the misinformation to investors, but the role is tangential to the substance of the communication.

    The same kind of analysis could apply to an IT professional who arranges for filings to be made available on a company’s website. The person is merely involved in the mechanical process of making the documents electronically available for investors, not in personally communicating their contents. Just as the Lorenzo majority found it “difficult to see how [Mr. Lorenzo’s] actions could escape the reach of those provisions” of the securities laws, it is difficult to see how this person’s action could fall within the reach of those laws.

    How about an attorney or paralegal tasked with filing a Form 8-K on the SEC’s EDGAR website? Imagine that this person has been privy to internal communications indicating that the filing may be inaccurate. A regulator could argue that this person had the requisite state of mind to support liability and was involved in disseminating the misinformation. But this person is not attaching his name to the offending communication and is only indirectly involved in the process, posting the document to the website. The act of uploading a required filing to a public database seems much more tangential than what was at issue in Lorenzo, where the defendant sent emails directly to investors.

    What about an investor relations professional who forwards copies of annual reports or other public disclosure documents to shareholders? Again, assuming there is a basis for alleging this person came into contact with information in documents or meetings that betrays the accuracy of the disclosures, this person also could be at risk of being accused of securities fraud. Here, the person’s formal role and responsibilities for investor relations might heighten the risk, and the individual is directly communicating with investors. On the other hand, this person is merely distributing pre-existing disclosure documents that have presumably been made available publicly elsewhere, which should militate against personal exposure.

    All of these circumstances may be relevant—whether the person’s name is on the communication, whether the person helped draft the misleading content, whether the person has a title and responsibilities that suggest to the recipients of the communication that she has a substantive role in communicating information to investors and is doing more than merely transmitting it, whether the person invited questions or follow-up, how directly or tangentially the person was involved in communicating with investors—but Lorenzo fails to supply a ready principle that can be used to separate those who may be liable from those who may not be liable for disseminating false statements made by others to investors.

    In an effort to define and contain the scope of potential liability, venerable Supreme Court opinions (Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), for example) have zeroed in on §10(b), and noted pointedly that Rule 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to its authority—no matter its subsections and jumble of overlapping words and phrases—could not be interpreted to reach conduct not already captured by the language of the statute. Lorenzo marks a different approach—the language of §10(b) has been relegated to an appendix to the majority’s opinion, which focuses instead on the language of Rule 10b-5, aided by dictionary definitions such as “device” (something that “is devised”) and “scheme” (“something to be done”). In the end, the reader is left with little guidance beyond the court’s conclusion that these words must capture some forms of conduct beyond the making of misstatements.

    The law ought to be clear enough that people whose jobs involve communicating with investors (and anyone else) can know what conduct might get them into trouble. In fairness, people should be able to know in advance what the law forbids. Unfortunately, outside the typical contexts (misstatements, omissions, manipulation), uncertainty remains. Acknowledging as much, the Lorenzo majority observed that the provisions “capture a wide range of conduct,” and borderline cases “may present difficult problems of scope,” and “[p]urpose, precedent, and circumstance could lead to narrowing their reach in other contexts.” That is a remarkable thing to say 85 years after the leading statute was enacted, that the scope of prohibited conduct will continue to be the subject of case-by-case development depending on, for example, “circumstance.”

    Even the mailroom clerk is not completely safe. While offering this as an example of someone whose non-liability is self-evident, the justices were careful not to rule out the possibility that a mailroom clerk could do something that offends them and warrants liability—it would only “typically” be inappropriate to hold the clerk liable, in the majority’s words. Apparently, the court wanted to make clear that there might be that odd, atypical case where even this poor soul could be punished under §10(b).

    Reprinted with permission from the “July 15” edition of the “New York Law Journal”© 2019 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.
    Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.

    Authors
    More insights

  • Florida’s Court of Appeal Deals Blow to State’s Marijuana Oligopoly

    Florida’s Court of Appeal Deals Blow to State’s Marijuana Oligopoly

    ARTICLE

    Florida’s Court of Appeal Deals Blow to State’s Marijuana Oligopoly

    July 12, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Robert Kline authored this bylined article discussing Florida’s First District Court of Appeal’s decision challenging a statutory cap on the number of medical marijuana facilities in Florida.

    In depth
    Authors

    Robert M. Kline

    Counsel

    Miami

    More insights

  • OFAC Update: A Framework for Compliance and Recent Settlements

    OFAC Update: A Framework for Compliance and Recent Settlements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    OFAC Update: A Framework for Compliance and Recent Settlements

    July 12, 2019

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 2, 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) published “A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments” (“Framework”) outlining five critical components of a risk-based sanctions compliance program.[1] Along with the Framework, OFAC also released a list of compliance program deficiencies most commonly identified as root causes of apparent violations of OFAC regulations. As discussed below, several of these deficiencies have, in fact, been identified by OFAC in its latest settlements and findings, which reflect an aggressive approach to sanctions enforcement, including multimillion-dollar settlements for activity that was primarily conducted abroad by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies.

    OFAC’s “A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments”

    OFAC regulations do not require companies to maintain a sanctions compliance program, or “SCP” for short. Nonetheless, OFAC encourages firms subject to U.S. jurisdiction — including foreign entities that conduct business in or with the United States, U.S. persons, or using U.S.-origin goods or services — to adopt a formal SCP. The Framework is intended to assist such firms in developing, implementing and updating their respective SCPs. It also outlines how OFAC may evaluate apparent violations and resolve investigations resulting in settlement. More specifically, if, after determining that a civil monetary penalty is the appropriate administrative action in response to an apparent violation, OFAC will evaluate a firm’s SCP — consistent with the Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, App. A — and will consider favorably the existence of an effective SCP at the time of an apparent violation.

    While each firm’s risk-based SCP will depend on a variety of factors, including the company’s size and sophistication, products and services, customers and counterparties and geographic locations, each SCP should incorporate five essential components of compliance: (1) management commitment; (2) risk assessment; (3) internal controls; (4) testing and auditing; and (5) training.

    First, OFAC has stated that senior management’s commitment to, and support of, a firm’s SCP is one of the most important factors in determining the success of the SCP. Such support is essential in ensuring that the firm’s compliance unit receives adequate resources (including in terms of human capital, expertise and information technology) and that compliance personnel are delegated sufficient authority and autonomy to deploy policies and procedures in a manner that effectively controls risk. To this end, senior management should review and approve a firm’s SCP, recognize the seriousness of sanctions rules and promote a culture of compliance throughout the organization — including by discouraging misconduct, highlighting the potential repercussions of non-compliance and addressing the root causes of past violations.

    Second, firms should conduct routine, if not ongoing, risk assessments to identify potential OFAC issues, address the particular risks identified, and tailor policies, procedures, internal controls and training to mitigate such risks. The risk assessment should holistically review the firm from top to bottom and assess all touchpoints to the outside world, including, where applicable, customers, supply chains, intermediaries, counterparties, products and services, transactions and geographic locations. The risk assessment should be updated to reflect the root causes of any apparent violations or systemic deficiencies identified either during the routine course of business or through a testing or audit function. The risk assessment should also inform the extent of due diligence conducted at customer on-boarding, as well as in the context of mergers and acquisitions.

    Third, effective SCPs should include internal controls. To that end, firms should design and implement written policies and procedures outlining the SCP, including how to identify, interdict, escalate, report and keep records regarding activity that may be prohibited by OFAC.

    Fourth, firms should have a comprehensive and objective testing or audit function to identify SCP weaknesses and deficiencies and take immediate and effective action to remediate any gaps.

    Lastly, firms should provide OFAC-related training with a scope and frequency tailored to the firm’s risk profile.

    As noted above, OFAC also issued a non-exhaustive list of root causes associated with apparent violations of OFAC regulations. The aim of this list is to assist firms in designing, updating and amending their SCPs to avoid breakdowns. The root causes identified in the list include (1) lack of a formal OFAC SCP; (2) misinterpreting, or failing to understand the applicability of, OFAC’s regulations; (3) facilitating transactions by non-U.S. persons (including through or by overseas subsidiaries or affiliates); (4) exporting or re-exporting U.S.-origin goods, technology, or services to OFAC-sanctioned persons or countries; (5) utilizing the U.S. financial system, or processing payments to or through U.S. financial institutions, for commercial transactions involving OFAC-sanctioned persons or countries; (6) sanctions screening software or filter faults; (7) improper due diligence on customers/clients (e.g., ownership, business dealings, etc.); (8) de-centralized compliance functions and inconsistent application of an SCP; (9) utilizing non-standard payment or commercial practices; and (10) individual liability. With respect to individual liability, OFAC expressed concern about individual employees, particularly in high-level positions, who ignored warning signs that certain activity was likely prohibited or were aware of the misconduct and actually played an integral role with respect to the violations.

    Common to several of these deficiencies is the extension of OFAC’s reach to foreign-based operations. For example, OFAC stated that several firms did not understand — or blatantly disregarded — their status as a U.S. person, and thus, the fact that OFAC sanctions applied to them. This is particularly relevant to the applicability of the Cuba and Iran programs to U.S.-owned or controlled subsidiaries, where, for instance, foreign firms may not consider themselves to be U.S. persons, but may nevertheless be subject to OFAC rules and regulations. In addition, many non-U.S. persons were found to have violated OFAC regulations by processing financial transactions through the U.S. financial system.

    Many of these deficiencies were identified in the recent settlements and other findings described below. In the Framework, OFAC recommended that all organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction review OFAC’s settlements to reassess and enhance their SCPs.

    Stanley Black & Decker Inc. Settlement

    On March 27, 2019, Stanley Black & Decker Inc. (“Stanley Black & Decker”), based in New Britain, Connecticut, on behalf of itself and its subsidiary Jiangsu Guoqiang Tools Co. Ltd. (“GQ”), located in China, agreed to pay approximately $1.9 million to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sections Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (“ITSR”).[2] More specifically, between approximately June 2013 and December 2014, GQ exported and attempted to export 23 shipments of power tools and spare parts, with a total value of approximately $3.2 million, to Iran or to a third country with knowledge that such goods were intended for Iran, in violation of § 560.215 of the ITSR.

    Stanley Black & Decker initially identified GQ’s exports to Iran during acquisition negotiations in 2011, and required GQ to cease such sales as a precondition to closing. Following the closing, Stanley Black & Decker provided training to GQ’s employees, and GQ’s senior management executed written agreements in which they attested that GQ would not engage in transactions with Iran. Nevertheless, GQ continued to export goods to Iran through the use of non-routine business practices — GQ used trading companies located in the United Arab Emirates and China as conduits for the sales, created fictitious bills of lading with incorrect ports of discharge and places of delivery, and instructed their customers not to write “Iran” on business documents.

    Once Stanley Black & Decker became aware of the potential violations, it initiated an internal investigation, hired a third-party independent investigative company, and voluntarily self-disclosed the apparent violations on behalf of GQ. This action demonstrates that U.S. parent companies face exposure to civil monetary penalties through the actions of their foreign subsidiaries, even where they have taken steps to avoid such violations. U.S. companies should conduct sanctions due diligence, especially on foreign M&A targets, and monitor foreign subsidiaries for compliance through audit and testing functions.

    UniCredit Global Settlement

    On April 15, 2019, several entities within the UniCredit Group — including UniCredit Bank AG,[3] headquartered in Munich, Germany, UniCredit Bank Austria,[4] headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and UniCredit S.p.A.,[5] headquartered in Milan, Italy — agreed to pay over $1.3 billion in penalties as part of a global settlement with multiple U.S. law enforcement agencies[6] in connection with apparent violations of numerous sanctions programs between January 2007 and December 2011.[7] More specifically, all three UniCredit entities were found to have non-transparently routed U.S. dollar payments involving sanctioned countries, entities or individuals by removing, omitting or not revealing references to, or the interest or involvement of, sanctioned parties in the payment messages sent through U.S. financial institutions — a process known as “wire stripping.”[8]

    For example, in order to conceal from U.S. regulators and banks the involvement of sanctioned entities, UniCredit Bank AG designed and formalized a written policy instructing employees to process transactions with sanctioned entities in an “OFAC-neutral” manner so that “no US bank can see OFAC contents” in any payment message processed through U.S. financial institutions.[9] In addition, for at least two years after the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”) was added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) List, UniCredit Bank AG opened “safe accounts” to send IRISL-related payments through the United States in a manner that concealed information from U.S. financial institutions showing that IRISL and its related companies were the true originators or beneficiaries of the payment.[10]

    Similarly, UniCredit Bank Austria made a “business policy decision” to continue non-transparent payment processing and created written guidelines instructing employees to give “attention … that no obvious references in the payment request are included which can suggest an infringement of international regulations (e.g., reason for payment or acting parties).”[11] UniCredit Bank Austria also utilized a double MT202 method to process sanctioned transactions whereby the payment message that was sent to the U.S. correspondent bank did not contain information on the originator or beneficiary of the payment, while a separate message was sent to the overseas beneficiary bank, which contained information regarding the originator and beneficiary of the payment.[12]

    Notably, the UniCredit entities subject to this $1.3-billion penalty are foreign financial institutions headquartered and operating abroad. OFAC’s only apparent jurisdictional hook was that the transactions in question were U.S. dollar payments that passed through a U.S. financial institution. Thus, this case demonstrates OFAC’s expansive view of its jurisdiction and the importance of OFAC compliance even for foreign financial institutions.

    Expedia Group Inc. Settlement

    On June 13, 2019, Expedia Group Inc. (“Expedia”), headquartered in Bellevue, Washington, on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries worldwide, agreed to pay $325,406 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”), 31 C.F.R. part 501.[13] More specifically, between April 22, 2011 and October 16, 2014, certain of Expedia’s foreign subsidiaries assisted 2,221 persons, including Cuban nationals, with travel or travel-related services for travel within Cuba or between Cuba and non-U.S. locations.

    The apparent prohibited travel was electronically booked because of failures or gaps in Expedia’s technical implementations and other measures to avoid such apparent violations. In at least one case, Expedia failed to inform the subsidiary that it was subject to U.S. sanctions laws for 15 months.

    Once Expedia became aware of these apparent violations it self-disclosed them to OFAC. This settlement demonstrates OFAC’s willingness to fine U.S. companies for their oversight over foreign subsidiaries, which is an element identified as part of a root cause of SCP breakdowns or deficiencies. U.S. companies must ensure that foreign subsidiaries are compliant with OFAC’s regulations promptly following an acquisition.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Jennifer M. Opheim and Hannah M. Thibideau.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments” (May 2, 2019), available here.

    [2] U.S. Department of Treasury, Enforcement Information for March 27, 2019 (Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.), available here; U.S. Department of Treasury, Settlement Agreement (Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.), available here.

    [3] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Settlement Agreement (UniCredit Bank AG), available here.

    [4] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Settlement Agreement (UniCredit Bank Austria AG), available here.

    [5] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Settlement Agreement (OFAC and UniCredit S.p.A.), available here.

    [6] In addition to OFAC, as part of the global settlement, the UniCredit entities resolved actions with the U.S. Department of Justice, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the New York State Department of Financial Services and the New York County District Attorney’s Office.

    [7] The apparent violations relate to the following programs: the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544; the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515; the Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 537; the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538; the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 542; the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560; the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 570; and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594.

    [8] U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, “UniCredit Bank AG Agrees to Plead Guilty for Illegally Processing Transactions in Violation of Iranian Sanctions” (Apr. 15, 2019), available here.

    [9] U.S. v. UniCredit Bank AG, 1:19-cr-00128-BAG, Information at *2 (Apr. 15, 2019), available here.

    [10] Id.

    [11] UniCredit Bank Austria Non-Prosecution Agreement at *11 (Apr. 15, 2019), available here.

    [12] Id.

    [13] U.S. Department of Treasury, Enforcement Information for June 13, 2019 (Expedia Group, Inc.), available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Collective Investment Schemes & EU Holding Companies: A Multijurisdictional Analysis in Light of the CJEU Danish Cases

    Collective Investment Schemes & EU Holding Companies: A Multijurisdictional Analysis in Light of the CJEU Danish Cases

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Collective Investment Schemes & EU Holding Companies: A Multijurisdictional Analysis in Light of the CJEU Danish Cases

    July 12, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    On 26 February 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued long-awaited judgments in a group of cases concerning the Danish government withholding tax on dividends and interest paid by Danish companies to companies in other EU Member States (CJEU Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and 299/16; and Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16) (Danish Cases).

    The judgments dealt with the interpretation of the anti-abuse clauses laid down under Art. 1, para. 2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EU) (PSD) and Art. 5 of the Interest and Royalties Directive (2003/49/EC) (IRD).

    In light of the Danish Cases judgments, we prepared a special report to provide a comprehensive and high-level multijurisdictional analysis on the current risks involved in structures that are put in place under the most common market practice, specifically collective investment schemes and EU holding companies. The report draws a comparison between a number of EU jurisdictions—Italy, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom—based on two different case studies.

    In depth
    Tabs
    More insights
    Endnotes