Content Type: Article

  • NAFTA in Transition: The Current State of Play and What Comes Next

    ARTICLE

    NAFTA in Transition: The Current State of Play and What Comes Next

    June 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lisa Richman authored this chapter discussing the fate of the North American Free Trade Agreement and how it compares to the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lisa M. Richman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Focus on Innovation Centers: Tax Exemption Considerations for HHS Innovation Investments

    Focus on Innovation Centers: Tax Exemption Considerations for HHS Innovation Investments

    ARTICLE

    Focus on Innovation Centers: Tax Exemption Considerations for HHS Innovation Investments

    June 19, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Tax-exempt hospitals and health systems (HHSs) are increasingly partnering with for-profit businesses as part of their innovation strategies. Navigating the complex tax and other legal issues that can arise from these arrangements and negotiating successful business relationships are critical for the success of the collaboration. In the third installment in our Focus on Innovation Centers series, Erika Mayshar and Robert Louthian, III review the top tax exemption considerations for HHS business and legal teams.

    In depth
    Authors

    Robert C. Louthian , III

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • New York State Ends Religious Exemptions to Vaccinations

    New York State Ends Religious Exemptions to Vaccinations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York State Ends Religious Exemptions to Vaccinations

    June 19, 2019

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 13, 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed a bill that amends the Public Health Law and bans all religious exemptions from required vaccinations for school children in the state. New York Public Health Law Section 2164 previously provided for an exception to the vaccination requirements for school students if the student’s parent(s) or guardian held “genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the practices herein required.” The new bill eliminates this exception entirely. A medical exemption, in which a physician licensed to practice in New York certifies that immunization may be detrimental to a child’s health, remains.

    Schools in New York State, including independent schools, may not permit any child to be admitted to school or to attend school for more than 14 days without providing adequate certification that they have received all of the required immunizations[1] (or extended to not more than 30 days where the student is transferring from out of state or from another country and can show a good faith effort to get the necessary certification or other evidence of immunization). The new law extends this 14-day period to 30 days if the parent or guardian of a student can prove that the school-aged child has received the first dose of all required immunizations and has scheduled appointments for the completion of the immunization series. This extended grace period expires on June 30, 2020.

    This law takes effect immediately. We expect to see legal challenges of the law on constitutional and other grounds. New York joins California, Mississippi, Maine and West Virginia in passing laws to eliminate religious exemptions.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Donna K. Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Public Health Law Section 2164 requires children aged two months to 18 years be immunized against poliomyelitis, measles, mumps, rubella, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, varicella, hepatitis B and, where applicable, Haemophilus influenza type b (Hib) and pneumococcal disease.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Your Reputation and the Importance of ‘Active Management’ – Expert View

    ARTICLE

    Your Reputation and the Importance of ‘Active Management’ – Expert View

    June 18, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Laura Scaife authored this bylined article discussing the importance of active reputation management in the age of social media and steps to take to mitigate the reputational risk from a data hack.

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  • Employee Benefit Plans with Master Trust Investments – Financial Statement Changes

    Employee Benefit Plans with Master Trust Investments – Financial Statement Changes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Employee Benefit Plans with Master Trust Investments – Financial Statement Changes

    June 18, 2019

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) adopted changes to the required financial statement disclosures of employee benefit plans with investments in master trusts. The changes will standardize the content and presentation of information reported in plans’ financial statements.

    In depth

    Many employee benefit plans hold investments in master trusts. As described by FASB, a master trust for employee benefit plans has an institutional trustee and holds assets of more than one plan sponsored by a single employer or by a group of employers under common control.

    FASB issued Accounting Standards Update 2017-06 to provide additional guidance on disclosure of an employee benefit plan’s interest in a master trust. The changes are aimed particularly at defined contribution plans, which generally have divided interests (rather than percentage interests) in master trusts. The guidance is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2018, and applies retrospectively to each period for which financial statements are presented.

    The FASB guidance addresses several significant items:

    1. A typical defined contribution plan’s interest in a master trust and a change in that interest must be presented as separate line items in the statement of net assets available for benefits and the statement of changes in net assets available for benefits.
    2. A typical defined contribution plan must disclose the fair value of each general type of investment of a master trust, as well as the dollar amount of the plan’s interest in each type of investment.
    3. A plan must disclose the master trust’s other assets and liabilities, as well as the dollar amount of the plan’s interest in those other assets and liabilities.
    4. Notes to financial statements must disclose the net appreciation or depreciation in the fair market value of master trust assets.
    5. Notes to financial statements must disclose the basis used to allocate net income and total investment income.
    6. Health and welfare plans with Section 401(h) accounts are no longer required to provide investment disclosures.

    These changes should make financial statements more consistent and understandable, particularly for defined contribution plans.

    Authors

    Alan D. Nesburg

    Counsel

    Chicago

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  • Kardashians Walk – Trademark Licensee Has No Standing to Sue for Infringement

    ARTICLE

    Kardashians Walk – Trademark Licensee Has No Standing to Sue for Infringement

    June 17, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mary Hallerman authored this bylined article summarizing the US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit’s decision to affirm that an exclusive foreign licensee lacked standing to sue for trademark infringement in the United States and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the case Kroma Makeup EU LLC v Boldface Licensing + Branding Inc.

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  • Taxation of U.S. Shareholders of Foreign Corporations After Tax Reform, Part 2

    Taxation of U.S. Shareholders of Foreign Corporations After Tax Reform, Part 2

    ARTICLE

    Taxation of U.S. Shareholders of Foreign Corporations After Tax Reform, Part 2

    June 17, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Ellen Harrison co-authored this bylined article examining estate planning strategies to mitigate some of the adverse tax consequences of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s changes to the corporate anti-deferral tax regime.

    In depth
    Authors

    Ellen K. Harrison

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Taxation of CFC Income: The Paradigm

    ARTICLE

    Taxation of CFC Income: The Paradigm

    June 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder authored this bylined article providing an overview of the tax treatment of income earned by controlled foreign corporations following the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The article also discusses the impact on multinational corporations with different global tax profiles and suggests directional planning to minimize unintended tax costs of the new rules.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • EMIR REFIT: Investment Funds Are Required to Notify the FCA and ESMA If They Exceed the Clearing Threshold with Effect from 17 June 2019

    EMIR REFIT: Investment Funds Are Required to Notify the FCA and ESMA If They Exceed the Clearing Threshold with Effect from 17 June 2019

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    EMIR REFIT: Investment Funds Are Required to Notify the FCA and ESMA If They Exceed the Clearing Threshold with Effect from 17 June 2019

    13 June 2019

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    EMIR REFIT enters into force on Monday, 17 June 2019 (“Effective Date”).

    Under EMIR REFIT, financial counterparties (“FCs”) are required to calculate their aggregate month-end average positions in derivatives for the previous 12 months to determine whether they exceed one or more of the clearing thresholds specified in EMIR. The definition of FC includes alternative investment funds (“AIFs”) and UCITS.

    The clearing thresholds are: (1) OTC credit derivatives — €1 billion; (2) OTC equity derivatives — €1 billion; (3) OTC interest rate derivatives — €3 billion; (4) OTC foreign exchange derivatives — €3 billion; and (5) OTC commodity derivatives and other OTC derivatives — €3 billion. Fund managers must carry out the calculation on a fund-by-fund basis (rather than aggregating positions across all funds under management). In accordance with ESMA FAQ, FCs must determine whether they have exceeded these clearing thresholds by the Effective Date.

    If an FC exceeds one or more of the clearing thresholds, it will be subject to the clearing obligation in respect of all in-scope OTC derivative products across all asset classes.

    FCs that exceed one or more of the clearing thresholds are required to notify ESMA using the forms available here, as well as their regulator. In the case of non-EU AIFs (e.g., Cayman funds) managed by UK AIFMs, the notification must be made to the FCA via Connect.

    FCs can choose not to conduct the calculation, in which case they will also need to notify their regulator and ESMA, as above. Electing not to make such a calculation will result in the FC automatically becoming subject to the clearing obligation for all in-scope OTC derivative products across all asset classes.

    FCs whose OTC derivatives positions are below the clearing thresholds are exempt from the EMIR clearing obligation (but remain subject to the margin obligations for uncleared derivative transactions) and are not required to notify ESMA or their regulator.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Federal Agencies Ruled Not ‘Persons,’ May Not Petition for AIA Reviews

    Federal Agencies Ruled Not ‘Persons,’ May Not Petition for AIA Reviews

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Agencies Ruled Not ‘Persons,’ May Not Petition for AIA Reviews

    June 12, 2019

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Supreme Court has now held that a federal agency is not a “person” under the America Invents Act (AIA). Therefore, a federal agency cannot be a petitioner seeking review under the various AIA patent review procedures.

    In depth

    The US Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that the United States Postal Service, a federal agency, is not a “person” under the America Invents Act (AIA) and therefore cannot be a petitioner in a Covered Business Method (CBM) review under the AIA. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, Case No. 17-1594 (S. Ct. June 10, 2019) (Sotomayor, J.) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

    Return Mail is the holder of a United States patent that claims a method for processing undeliverable mail. Return Mail alleged that its patent was infringed by an enhanced address-change service for processing undeliverable mail implemented by the US Postal Service. The Postal Service petitioned for ex parte reexamination of the patent, and the Patent Office confirmed the patent’s validity. Return Mail sued the Postal Service in the Court of Federal Claims, and the Postal Service petitioned the Patent Office to institute a CBM review. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) concluded that Return Mail’s claims were patent ineligible and canceled the claims underlying the patent.

    Return Mail appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing in part that the AIA only authorizes “a person” other than the patent owner to petition for review and the Government (of which the Postal Service is an agency) is not “a person.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB. IP Update, Vol. 20, No. 9. Return Mail sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on the question of whether the Postal Service is a “person” eligible to petition for AIA review. IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 11.

    Justice Sotomayor authored the majority opinion, holding that the Postal Service is not a “person” within the meaning of the AIA and therefore did not have standing to petition for CBM review. She was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan.

    The Government Is Presumptively Not a “Person”

    Because the AIA does not explicitly define “person,” all nine justices appear to have agreed that the Court should apply the “longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign.”

    The majority, which held that the presumption was not overcome, required that the Postal Service “must point to some indication in the text or context of the statute that affirmatively shows Congress intended to include the Government.” By contrast, the dissent focused on precedent holding that the presumption is “no hard and fast rule of exclusion” that may be overcome when “the purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history or the executive interpretation . . . indicate an intent” to include the Government.

    The Post Office offered three primary arguments, each ultimately rejected, in support of its interpretation of “person” to include the Government. First, the Patent Act consistently uses “person” to include the Government. Second, the Patent Office has interpreted “person” in related provisions, specifically those governing ex parte reexamination, as including the Government. Third, the Government may be liable for patent infringement and should therefore be accorded the same defenses (and defensive procedures) as private litigants.

    The Consistent-Usage Principle

    The Post Office argued that its interpretation of “person” to include the Government in the AIA is supported by other references to a “person” in the Patent Act (35 U.S.C.) that include the Government.

    The majority found that the usage of “person” in the Patent Act is inconsistent with respect to whether the Government is included and, therefore, that the consistent-usage principle does not apply. Although the Government is expressly permitted to apply for patents and therefore the best-known provisions of the Act include the Government as a “person” (e.g. § 102 stating that “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .”), the Patent Act sometimes refers to a “person” in a way that excludes the Government. For example, the majority wrote that the Patent Act provides that the administrative patent judges comprising the PTAB must be “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability;” requires the Patent Office Director to treat as confidential any referral to the Attorney General of suspected fraud in the patent process unless the United States charge “a person” with a criminal offense in connection with the fraud; and authorizes the Patent Office to cover the expenses of “persons” other than federal employees attending programs on intellectual-property protection. These exemplary usages of “person” persuaded the majority that “person” was not used consistently in the Patent Act to include the Government.

    The dissent observed that the examples provided by the majority are instances in which the Government cannot possibly be considered a “person.” For example, the Government can never serve as an administrative patent judge, can never be subject to criminal prosecution for fraud and can never attend a program on intellectual-property protection. Accordingly, the dissent found the examples on which the majority relied were not probative of how the Patent Act generally refers to “person.”

    The Executive Interpretation

    The Postal Service argued that its interpretation of “person” to include the Government is further supported by the Patent Office’s longstanding treatment, enshrined in the 1981 edition of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP), of federal agencies as “persons” who may cite prior art to the agency or request an ex parte reexamination of an issued patent.

    The majority found this executive interpretation simply irrelevant because of distinctions it found between ex parte reexamination and AIA review proceedings. In particular, the majority noted that ex parte reexamination proceedings are distinct from AIA review proceedings because reexamination is “internal” to the Patent Office and the challenger is not permitted to participate, whereas the AIA reviews are adversarial proceedings between petitioners for review and patent owners. The majority also concluded that Government is in a unique position relative to private infringers because § 1498 limits patent owners to bench trials before the Court of Federal Claims and monetary damages, whereas § 271 permits patent owners to demand jury trials in the district courts and seek other types of relief. Finally, the majority observed that there was no “settled meaning” of “person” with respect to the AIA because “there is nothing to suggest that Congress had the 1981 MPEP statement in mind when it enacted the AIA.”

    The dissent, by contrast, viewed the executive interpretation of “persons” with respect to ex parte reexaminations as evidence, which, alongside legislative intent for the AIA to “improve the quality of patents” and “make the patent system more efficient,” weighed in favor of an expansive interpretation of “persons.”

    The Government Is Not Like Other Potential Infringers

    The Postal Service’s third argument for its interpretation of “person” was that it must be a “person” under the AIA because, like other potential infringers, it is subject to civil liability and can assert a defense of patent invalidity. The majority found this unpersuasive because (1) the Government can still defend infringement allegations in the Court of Federal Claims, (2) the Government is not subject to the same liability or other forms of relief as other litigants, and (3) it would be awkward to force civilians to defend the patentability against one federal agency before another federal agency.

    The dissent focused on the Patent Act’s explicit statement that the Government may “undertake all other suitable and necessary steps to protect and administer rights to federally owned inventions on behalf of the Federal Government.” (§207(a)(3)). This language, according to the dissent, favored including the Government within “persons” who may petition for AIA review because one purpose of AIA review proceedings is to protect patented inventions from claims of infringement by clearing away conflicting patents.

    The dissent also criticized the majority’s “awkwardness” argument for ignoring that the Government has long been able to invoke other forms of administrative review to challenge the patentability of privately owned patents and that a private party challenging a Government patent in an AIA review would also be litigating against the Government before a Government agency.

    Finally, the dissent argued that although the Government is not subject to all forms of relief for patent infringement that are available against private infringers, it may still be subject to large damages awards, the threat of which creates a strong need for speedy resolution of disputes regarding patent validity.

    Finding no satisfactory explanation for why Congress would have wanted to deny Government agencies the ability to invoke AIA review procedures, the dissent argued that “the statutes’ purposes, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history and the longstanding executive interpretation, together with the way in which related patent provisions use the term ‘person,’ demonstrate that Congress meant for the word ‘person’ to include Government agencies.”

    Practice Note: This case involved a federal agency as petitioner. It remains for another day to see if state governments (or their alter egos) will be similarly barred from access to the AIA.

    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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