Content Type: Article

  • The FTC Seeks Public Comments Following Introduction of Federal Privacy Bill

    The FTC Seeks Public Comments Following Introduction of Federal Privacy Bill

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The FTC Seeks Public Comments Following Introduction of Federal Privacy Bill

    August 15, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Data privacy and security are again taking center stage in Washington, DC. On the heels of Congress’s introduction of the American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced on August 11, 2022, that it was seeking public comments on 95 questions in an Advance Notice on Proposed Rulemaking for a Trade Regulation Rule on Commercial Surveillance and Data Security (ANPR). While members of the FTC have supported the ADPPA, they continue to express an interest in rulemaking that ultimately complements any legislation that may pass.

    For the FTC, any final rule would be promulgated under its power to regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices. Public comments provided in response to this ANPR will help direct the FTC as to which topics, if any, warrant inclusion in a final rule. While this ANPR does not bind the FTC to include certain topics in a final rule or even bind the FTC to finalize any rule at all, it seems likely that the FTC will try to finalize some privacy regulations before the end of the Biden administration. In fact, one of the primary drivers for regulating privacy appears to be the FTC’s desire to be able to penalize first-time offenders without first providing a warning as would be required following a Section 5 investigation.

    In depth

    HIGHLIGHTING FTC PRIORITIES

    The ANPR provides valuable insight into what members of the FTC ultimately hope to include in a final rule and indicates that the FTC may be interested in addressing a wide array of activities, practices and potential enforcement authority. Specifically, input has been requested related to “data security” and “commercial surveillance.” “Data Security” includes breach risk mitigation, data management and retention, data minimization, and breach notification and disclosure practices. “Commercial surveillance” includes the collection, aggregation, analysis, retention, transfer or monetization of consumer data and direct derivatives of that information, including information actively provided by and passively collected from consumers.

    The FTC’s 95 questions invite discussion on a range of topics—from the effectiveness of current privacy and data security requirements and balancing the costs and benefits of regulation, to the harm to children and teenagers that potential commentators believe results from current business practices. Several strategies appear under consideration to address these practices. This ANPR requests input on data minimization; stronger consumer consent; and principles of notice, transparency and disclosure. Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of the ANPR is the FTC’s floating of a trial balloon to enlist non-FTC, private entity assistance to administer and enforce any new regulations. Where standards for data practices, commercial surveillance and automated decision-making are considered, the FTC also requests input on whether the FTC or a third-party entity would be better suited for certifying compliance.

    KEY TAKEAWAYS

    Through the series of questions and an introduction setting the stage for this rulemaking, one key theme emerges: Despite questions regarding its authority to regulate in the manner it proposes and resource restraints potentially hindering the FTC’s enforcement activities, the FTC wants to establish clear requirements or benchmarks to incentivize companies to invest in compliance and privacy-protective measures. Here are the things we are keeping a close eye on as this rulemaking continues:

    • The FTC’s definitions of “data security” and “surveillance” are very broad, encompassing practices that are outside of the traditional understanding of those phrases. This could mean that the FTC’s rules could dictate appropriate practices for a company’s entire privacy program.
    • These questions provide the opportunity for companies and other stakeholders to comment on how they use information and how an FTC rule could impact their operations.
    • The FTC is considering the impact of existing laws, like the Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the forthcoming regime of state privacy laws taking effect in 2023. These are smart and important questions, as the FTC’s rules should not be adopted in a vacuum lest they serve little more than to complicate an already challenging and growing mosaic of privacy laws applicable to companies in the United States.

    The ANPR will soon be published in the Federal Register; stakeholders will then have 60 days to submit their comments. The FTC is also hosting a virtual public forum for the issues raised in its ANPR on September 8, 2022. The plans for and, ultimately, contents of a potential final rule remain a mystery for now, but this ANPR invites all stakeholders to weigh in and provide valuable insights for the FTC in shaping this rule.

    If you have questions about this ANPR or need any assistance with privacy program compliance, please reach out to your McDermott lawyer or contact Amy Pimentel.

    Authors

    David Sorenson

    Associate

    Los Angeles

    Amy C. Pimentel

    Partner

    Boston

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  • NYDFS Publishes Pre-Proposed Amendment to Cybersecurity Regulations (“Part 500”)

    NYDFS Publishes Pre-Proposed Amendment to Cybersecurity Regulations (“Part 500”)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    NYDFS Publishes Pre-Proposed Amendment to Cybersecurity Regulations (“Part 500”)

    August 15, 2022

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 29, 2022, the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) published pre-proposal amendments (“Proposed Amendments”)[1] to its cybersecurity regulations (“Part 500”).[2] While NYDFS will be accepting comments on the Proposed Amendments through its website until Aug. 18, 2022, there will still be a full 60-day notice and comment period before the amendments are final.

    Key provisions of NYDFS’s Proposed Amendments include: (1) new notification requirements; (2) new obligations for “Class A” companies; (3) new requirements concerning entity governance; (4) modifications to the compliance certification requirement; and (5) clarifications around penalties.

    1. Notification Requirements

    The Proposed Amendments would add additional reporting requirements, including the requirement to notify the NYDFS within 72 hours of any unauthorized access to privileged accounts or deployment of ransomware within a material part of an entity’s information systems. It should be noted that this requirement is in addition to the already existing requirement to notify NYDFS within 72 hours of any cybersecurity events that require notice to any supervisory body or that have a reasonable likelihood of materially harming a material part of an entity’s normal operations. Furthermore, the Proposed Amendments would add a new 24-hour notification obligation for ransomware payments, and a corresponding 30-day reporting requirement within which an entity must provide a written explanation of why payment was necessary, alternatives to payment that were considered and sanctions diligence that was conducted.

    2. Obligations for Class A Companies

    The Proposed Amendments would impose requirements on a new category of covered entities, “Class A” companies, which are defined as covered entities with either (1) over 2,000 employees or (2) over $1 billion in gross annual revenue averaged over the previous three years from all business operations of the covered entity and its affiliates. Under the Proposed Amendments, Class A companies must: (1) conduct independent audits of the cybersecurity program, at least annually; (2) conduct vulnerability assessments (such as systematic scans or reviews) at least weekly; (3) implement mandatory password vaulting solutions for privileged accounts; (4) maintain an endpoint detection and response solution to monitor anomalous activity, as well as a solution for centralized logging and security event alerting; and (5) utilize external experts to conduct a risk assessment at least once every three years.

    3. Enhanced Governance Requirements

    The Proposed Amendments would add additional requirements concerning entity governance. More specifically, the Proposed Amendments would require that, among other additional obligations: (1) the Chief Information Security Officer (“CISO”) have adequate independence and authority to ensure appropriate management of cybersecurity risks; (2) the CISO provide the board with additional detailed annual reporting on plans for remediating inadequacies, as well as timely reports regarding material cybersecurity issues or events; (3) the entity’s cybersecurity policy be approved by the board, rather than senior management; and (4) an entity’s board have sufficient knowledge and expertise (or be advised by persons with sufficient knowledge and expertise) to exercise effective oversight of cybersecurity risk.

    4. Certification/Acknowledgment of Compliance Modifications

    The Proposed Amendments would require that the annual certification of compliance be signed by the CEO and the CISO (or the CEO and senior officer responsible for the cybersecurity program where the entity lacks a CISO). The Proposed Amendments would also allow entities to submit an acknowledgment of less-than-full compliance for the prior calendar year. An entity which submits an acknowledgment of less-than-full compliance must also identify the cybersecurity program’s specific deficiencies, describe the nature and extent of noncompliance and identify the systems, areas and processes which require material improvement, updating or redesign. Furthermore, an entity which submits an acknowledgment of less-than-full compliance must be ready to provide NYDFS with documentation detailing the remedial efforts planned and underway, along with a timeline for implementing those efforts.

    5. Penalty Clarifications

    The Proposed Amendments would provide additional clarity concerning NYDFS’s penalty calculation process. For example, the Proposed Amendments note that the commission of a single act prohibited by Part 500, or the failure to satisfy an obligation required by Part 500, constitutes a violation, including an entity’s failure to comply for any 24-hour period with any section or subsection of Part 500. In addition, the Proposed Amendments include a list of factors that NYDFS will consider when assessing a penalty (e.g., cooperation, good faith, isolated incident v. systemic violations, etc.).

    Moving Forward

    While this Alert is not an exhaustive list of the modifications contained in the Proposed Amendments, it is intended to highlight key provisions of the Proposed Amendments, should these proposed provisions be finalized and adopted.

    Schulte Roth & Zabel’s lawyers are available to assist you in preparing a public comment or addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Schulte Roth & Zabel lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following attorneys:

    Donald J. Mosher – New York (+1 212.756.2187)

    Kara A. Kuchar – New York (+1 212.756.2734)

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471)

    Adam J. Barazani – New York (+1 212.756.2519)

    Jessica Romano – New York (+1 212.756.2205)

    Jessica Sklute – New York (+1 212.756.2180)

    Noah N. Gillespie – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7483)

    Hadas A. Jacobi – New York (+1 212.756.2055)

    Steven T. Cummings – New York (+1 212.756.2251)

    Rebecca A. Raskind – New York (+1 212.756.2396)

    Jesse Weissman – New York (+1 212.756.2460)


    [1] See Proposed Second Amendment to 23 NYCRR 500.

    [2] Compliance with Part 500 is required for any person or entity “operating under or required to operate under a license, registration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the [New York] Banking Law, the [New York] Insurance Law or the [New York] Financial Services Law.” See 23 NYCRR 500.1(c).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Federal Courts in Maryland and California Rule School’s Federal Tax-Exempt Status Constitutes Federal Financial Assistance Under Title IX

    Federal Courts in Maryland and California Rule School’s Federal Tax-Exempt Status Constitutes Federal Financial Assistance Under Title IX

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Courts in Maryland and California Rule School’s Federal Tax-Exempt Status Constitutes Federal Financial Assistance Under Title IX

    August 15, 2022

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Two recent federal court decisions have ruled that a school’s 501(c)(3) status constitutes federal financial assistance under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), obligating such schools to comply with Title IX. These recent decisions are a significant departure from the long accepted legal position that independent and private schools need not comply with certain federal non-discrimination laws, including Title IX (which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity), if the school does not accept federal financial assistance, and that a school’s 501(c)(3) status does not alone qualify as such assistance.

    The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland decided Buettner-Hartsoe v. Baltimore Lutheran High School Association[1] on July 21, 2022. In Buettner-Hartsoe, five former students sued their former independent high school, Concordia Preparatory School (“CPS”), claiming that school officials had failed to take any meaningful action in response to the students’ allegations of sexual assault and verbal sexual harassment by male students at the school. CPS argued claims brought under Title IX should be dismissed because the school was not a recipient of federal financial assistance during the relevant time periods. The Court concluded that the school’s federal tax exemption constituted federal financial assistance under Title IX, thus subjecting CPS to Title IX compliance.

    Just days later, on July 25, 2022, the United States District Court for the Central District of California ruled on E.H. v. Valley Christian Academy.[2] In this case, a female student who played football for a public school alleged that when she traveled to play a football game at Valley Christian (“VC”) in 2021, she was prohibited from playing future games against the private school after VC learned she was female. The student brought suit, in part alleging violations of Title IX. VC moved to dismiss the Title IX allegations, arguing that since the school did not receive federal financial assistance it was not subject to Title IX. In denying VC’s motion the Court held that the school’s 501(c)(3) status constituted federal financial assistance, and accordingly, VC was subject to Title IX.[3]

    These trial court decisions are noteworthy, as they serve as a substantial departure from prior interpretations of whether an independent school’s federal tax-exempt status constitutes federal financial assistance. In addition to Title IX, this decision could create obligations for schools under other federal laws, such as Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act (FERPA) and Title VI. These decisions are expected to be appealed and there are conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions. Accordingly, we recommend that independent schools in New York await further guidance. We will monitor these trial court decisions and this evolving legal landscape.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Donna K. Lazarus, and Laura R. Horowitz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Supreme Court to Consider Whirlpool’s Petition for Certiorari in Significant Subpart F Case

    Supreme Court to Consider Whirlpool’s Petition for Certiorari in Significant Subpart F Case

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court to Consider Whirlpool’s Petition for Certiorari in Significant Subpart F Case

    August 12, 2022

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On August 10, 2022, a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Whirlpool Financial Corporation & Consolidated Subsidiaries and Whirlpool International Holdings S.a.r.l. & Consolidated Subsidiaries (collectively, Whirlpool) was distributed to the Supreme Court of the United States for consideration at its upcoming conference on September 28, 2022.

    As we have previously discussed, Whirlpool—supported by three amici—asked the Supreme Court to review the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 2-1 decision that income earned by a Luxembourg controlled foreign corporation (CFC) was foreign base company sales income (FBCSI) under the branch rule of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 954(d)(2). The Sixth Circuit’s decision was based solely on its interpretation of IRC section 954(d)(2). Whirlpool’s petition and the three supporting amici briefs argue that the decision to focus solely on IRC section 954(d)(2) conflicts with regulations promulgated under IRC section 954(d)(2) (IRC section 954(d)(2) regulations) that taxpayers and their advisors have relied on for decades.

    It remains to be seen whether Whirlpool’s petition will be granted, but taxpayers and their advisors would be well-served if the Supreme Court accepts the challenge and provides clarity on whether agencies and courts must follow validly promulgated regulations, particularly regulations that US Congress specifically directed be promulgated to provide guidance to taxpayers.

    In depth

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    Whirlpool owned a Luxembourg CFC (Lux CFC) with one administrative employee located in Luxembourg. Lux CFC owned a Mexican disregarded entity (Mex DE) that manufactured products for the Lux CFC pursuant to a toll manufacturing services arrangement using seconded employees of a related Mexican CFC. Lux CFC sold the products to related persons. Lux CFC also owned the raw materials, work-in-process and finished goods, as well as the machinery and equipment used to manufacture the products—all of which were located in Mexico.

    Mexico taxed the manufacturing service fee earned by the Mex DE. Under a Mexican Maquiladora incentive regime, Lux CFC was deemed to not have a taxable permanent establishment (PE) in Mexico, and thus, its income was not subject to taxation in Mexico. Luxembourg viewed Lux CFC as deriving its sales income through a Mexican PE and, under the income tax treaty with Mexico, taxed only income derived in Luxembourg for administrative services.

    THE TAX COURT AND SIXTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

    The US Tax Court, in a published opinion issued in 2020, addressed the application of the FBCSI regulatory manufacturing branch rule to the income derived by Lux CFC. For this purpose, the Tax Court treated Lux CFC’s income from selling products to related persons as not FBCSI under the general rule of IRC section 954(d)(1) because it assumed that the manufacturing exception applied. However, it held that the income of Lux CFC not derived by the Mex DE was FBCSI under the IRC section 954(d)(2) regulations. Significantly, the Tax Court found that the regulations were validly promulgated.

    The Sixth Circuit majority affirmed, focusing solely on its interpretation of IRC section 954(d)(2). Thus, the majority did not address the validity or requirements of the IRC section 954(d)(2) regulations. IRC section 954(d)(2) provides that if a CFC carries on activities through a foreign branch, the branch rule applies if the arrangement has “substantially the same effect as if such branch or similar establishment were a wholly owned subsidiary,” deriving the income attributable to the branch’s activities. The Sixth Circuit majority interpreted the language as applying when the CFC’s income is subject to deferral and then concluded that the amount of a CFC’s FBCSI under IRC section 954(d)(2) income is 100% of the CFC’s income, including the income of the manufacturing branch.

    As we have previously discussed, the Sixth Circuit majority’s interpretation is contrary to the IRC section 954(d)(2) regulations. However, the majority indicates that, to the extent these narrow its interpretation of IRC section 954(d)(2), they are invalid. The dissent, on the other hand, would have applied the rules in the IRC section 954(d)(2) regulations and held that once it is concluded the branch rule applies, the amount of FBCSI would be determined by reapplying IRC section 954(d)(1), treating the branch as a separate CFC.

    THE SUPREME COURT CERTIORARI STAGE

    Whirlpool, supported by two amici, sought rehearing and rehearing en banc with the Sixth Circuit. However, both requests were denied. On June 30, 2022, Whirlpool filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review the Sixth Circuit’s decision and provide guidance on “whether or in what circumstances a statute that is expressly conditioned on regulations to be promulgated by an agency may be enforced without regard to such regulations.” (See our prior discussion, “Will the Supreme Court rule on Whirlpool’s subpart F income case?,” for more information).

    Whirlpool’s petition argued that the Sixth Circuit’s decision upsets the reliance interests of taxpayers who have relied on the IRC section 954(d)(2) regulations in structuring their operations for more than 50 years. The brief also argued that the Sixth Circuit’s decision will produce billions of dollars of unjustified tax liability and create two different tax regimes across the nation: one in the Sixth Circuit where FBCSI is determined based solely on the statute and one everywhere else where it is determined based on the statute and the regulations mandated by Congress.

    The two amici who supported Whirlpool’s request for a rehearing with the Sixth Circuit, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group (joined by the National Foreign Trade Council, the Information Technology Industry Council and TechNet) (collectively, Industry Group), submitted amicus briefs in support of Whirlpool’s petition with the Supreme Court. Additionally, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Deloitte Tax LLP and KPMG LLP (collectively, Accounting Firms) joined forces to submit an amicus brief in support of Whirlpool to bring to the Supreme Court’s attention the “exceptionally important” nature of the case (the brief states that Ernst & Young LLP, the remaining member of the “Big 4,” did not participate because it is Whirlpool’s financial statement auditor).

    NAM’s brief set forth two arguments. The first argument is that “the Sixth Circuit applied an entirely novel interpretation—not found anywhere in the Code or Treasury regulations and not advanced by the agency nor adopted by the Tax Court—that conflicts with decades-old regulations promulgated contemporaneously with the underlying statute and at Congress’s express command in section 954(d)(2) itself.” NAM explained that the Sixth Circuit expressly disregarded nearly 60-year-old regulations that have been applied continuously and consistently by the Internal Revenue Service and relied on by taxpayers. A logical extension of the decision would be to preclude taxpayers from relying on other regulatory rules that limit FBCSI under IRC section 954(d)(2). Thus, NAM requested that the Supreme Court intervene to prevent the Sixth Circuit’s approach from (1) exacerbating the hardships facing US manufacturers and (2) penalizing branch structures that NAM’s members have been operating for years.

    The second argument is that “reliance on validly promulgated regulations—and therefore regulated parties’ ability to comply with the laws—is the bedrock of administrative law. If taxpayers must follow regulations or face the prospect of civil (and perhaps even criminal) penalties, then so too must the government be held to its binding, published actions.” Specifically, NAM argued that because the plain language of section 954(d)(2) mandates that taxpayers must apply additional rules provided “under regulations prescribed by the Secretary,” taxpayers must be able to rely on those rules when arranging their business affairs. Further, NAM’s members have for decades relied on the nearly 60-year-old regulations at issue in organizing their global matters. NAM explained that the Supreme Court has the precedent and justification to intervene and reject the Sixth Circuit’s approach, thus preventing further infringement on taxpayers’ reliance rights with respect to valid regulations. Finally, rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s approach would prevent the real possibility of subjecting NAM’s members to billions of dollars of unexpected and unjustified taxes.

    The Industry Group’s brief argues that Congress specifically called for implementing regulations in the text of IRC section 954(d)(2). Such regulations were enacted almost immediately by the US Department of the Treasury and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars restructuring in reliance on such regulations. However, the Sixth Circuit’s “radical interpretation” focusing solely on IRC section 954(d)(2) casts doubt on decades of planning and reliance on such regulations. Further, the decision creates significant uncertainty about the future applicability of these long-standing regulations. Additionally, the decision creates a difference in tax regimes governing foreign sales income—one in the Sixth Circuit and one everywhere else. Such a discrepancy only compounds uncertainty for US taxpayers. Accordingly, the Industry Group concluded that the Supreme Court’s review and reversal of the Sixth Circuit’s decision is necessary to protect US multinational reliance interests on the long-standing regulations and maintain the ability for such US companies to effectively compete on a global scale.

    Finally, the Accounting Firms’ brief asserts that Congress has enacted various IRC provisions dependent on “regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” Such provisions affect large swaths of US economic and everyday life and thus the question of whether IRC provisions, which are expressly conditioned on regulations, can be interpreted without regard to such regulations has implications far beyond the definition of FBCSI at issue in Whirlpool’s case. In order for the tax system to function properly, the Accounting Firms argued that taxpayers should be able to rely on the fact that regulations will be taken into account in the administrative and judicial interpretation of IRC provisions, especially those provisions whose effect is expressly conditioned on the issuance of such regulations. Taxpayers who use regulations to assist in complying with their code obligations have enormous reliance interests on those regulations being used to interpret and apply the statutory provisions pursuant to which they are promulgated. As such, the Accounting Firms requested that the Supreme Court grant Whirlpool’s petition to address the substantial uncertainty created by the “Sixth Circuit’s disregard of the [IRC Section 954(d)(2) regulations].”

    Interestingly, the government took another approach. It submitted a waiver of “its right to file a petition in this case, unless requested to do so by the Court.” By doing so, the government avoided (at least for now) having to address any of Whirlpool’s or the amici’s arguments and taking a position on whether, or when, a court may limit its analysis to statutory text when Congress has specifically mandated the issuance of regulations and an agency has complied with such a mandate.

    WHAT’S NEXT?

    As noted above, Whirlpool’s petition is scheduled to be considered during the Supreme Court’s conference on September 28, 2022. Under Supreme Court Rule 10, “[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.” The primary reasons considered are:

    • A US Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another US Court of Appeals on the same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power
    • A state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a US Court of Appeals
    • A state court or a US Court of Appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

    Under the Supreme Court’s customary rule, four out of the nine Supreme Court justices must vote to accept a case for a writ of certiorari to be granted. Most of the current justices participate in a “cert pool” as part of the decision process. In the “cert pool,” the clerks of the participating justices assign the petitions for a writ of certiorari amongst themselves and then prepare memorandums for the justices, recommending whether the Court should accept the case. If accepted, the case would be scheduled for briefing and oral argument.

    Although the Supreme Court generally only accepts 100 to 150 out of the more than 7,000 petitions it is asked to review each year, Whirlpool and the amici have made a strong case for granting the petition. The issue of whether agencies and courts can ignore validly promulgated regulations—particularly those expressly mandated by Congress to provide guidance to the regulated public—is an important one. As illustrated by the amici, in a tax context, the issue impacts thousands of taxpayers and their advisors and involves billions of dollars. Additionally, the overall implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision affects all regulated parties where there are regulations implementing a particular statute.

    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

    David G. Noren

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Elizabeth Chao

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Too Little Too Late: No Tenable Misappropriation Claim Based on 11-Year-Old Prototype

    Too Little Too Late: No Tenable Misappropriation Claim Based on 11-Year-Old Prototype

    ARTICLE

    Too Little Too Late: No Tenable Misappropriation Claim Based on 11-Year-Old Prototype

    Aug 11, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a dispute between an employer and a former employee, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment against an employer asserting trade secret misappropriation and breach of implied-in-fact contract claims relating to an 11-year-old prototype developed by a former employee. The Court also affirmed the district court’s finding of litigation misconduct by the former employer but vacated the lower court’s award of attorneys’ fees, remanding the case for a more detailed justification for the considerable award. REXA, Inc. v. Chester, Case Nos. 20-2953; -3213; -2033 (7th Cir. July 28, 2022) (Wood, Hamilton, Brennan, JJ.)

    Mark Chester is a former employee of Koso America, a manufacturer of hydraulic actuators. Chester participated in a 2002 project at Koso that sought to develop a new flow matching valve for Koso’s actuators. While the project team failed to design a new flow matching valve, they did manage to develop an experimental prototype of an actuator with solenoid valves. Koso abandoned the new design because of the improbability of commercial success, and the prototype was disassembled. Chester—who had never signed a confidentiality or employment agreement with Koso—resigned from Koso in 2003 and later joined MEA Inc. in 2012. In 2013, 11 years after developing the Koso prototype, Chester helped MEA design a new actuator with solenoid valves and an improved motor. MEA filed a patent application in 2017 claiming the actuator, and the US Patent & Trademark Office issued a notice of allowance in 2018 based on the improved motor limitations.

    REXA, a successor company to Koso, sued Chester and MEA for misappropriation under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA) and for breach of an implied-in-fact contract. REXA alleged that MEA and Chester misappropriated the 2002 designs by filing the 2017 patent application and by incorporating the 2002 designs into MEA’s Hawk brand actuator, and that Chester breached an implied-in-fact obligation to assign any patent rights associated with the 2017 application to REXA. Chester and MEA accused REXA of improper conduct during discovery after REXA appended a confidentiality agreement that Chester had never received to Chester’s 2002 bonus letter and used the manipulated document during Chester’s deposition. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled for Chester and MEA and awarded them almost $2.4 million in attorneys’ fees for REXA’s litigation misconduct. REXA appealed.

    Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

    The Seventh Circuit first considered the trade secret misappropriation claim, specifically whether REXA had identified a trade secret with enough specificity. The ITSA requires that a plaintiff “present a specific element, or combination of elements, that is unknown to the trade and was allegedly misappropriated.” Applying this standard, the Court found that REXA had not identified any protectable trade secrets because it had broadly asserted that the “2002 designs” qualified as trade secrets without explicitly identifying an element that was not well known in the industry.

    The Seventh Circuit further concluded that even if REXA had identified a specific and protectable trade secret, Chester and MEA would not be liable for misappropriation. With respect to the patent application, the Court reasoned that it was uncertain whether the 2002 prototype would have met the improved motor limitations of the allowed claims, and that REXA’s allegations were founded on “a series of untenable inferences.” The Court also noted the following points:

    • Eleven years had passed between Chester’s work on the Koso prototype and his work on the MEA actuator.
    • Chester never saw the source code or test results for the prototype.
    • Chester did not take any prototype documentation from Koso.

    The Court similarly concluded that Chester had not misappropriated a trade secret by developing MEA’s Hawk actuator because the prototype and the MEA actuator were significantly different, and it was inconceivable that Chester could have retained knowledge of source code (that he never saw) for more than 11 years.

    Implied-in-Fact Contract

    Turning to the contract claim, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that an implied-in-fact contractual obligation can be enforced by successors-in-interest like REXA, but nonetheless concluded that Chester had not breached an implied-in-fact contractual obligation to assign his patent rights to REXA. If an employer specifically directs an employee to develop a particular machine or process during the employee’s employment, the employer is the owner of any resulting inventions. The Court noted that Koso had not directed Chester to make a solenoid valve actuator. Instead, Koso had requested a new flow matching valve. As a result, REXA was not entitled to Chester’s patent. REXA also alleged that Chester had breached an implied contractual duty of confidentiality, but the Court swiftly dismissed the claim as precluded by the ITSA, which abolished all common law causes of action based on misuse of confidential information.

    Attorneys’ Fees

    The Seventh Circuit considered whether the lower court had abused its discretion by awarding almost $2.4 million in attorneys’ fees to Chester and MEA. The Court observed that it was extremely improbable that REXA had combined the confidentiality agreement and bonus letter by accident because REXA had used the misleading document in an attempt to trick Chester into admitting he had received the confidentiality agreement (when he had not). According to the Court, this conduct was sufficient to support a finding of litigation misconduct and sanctions. Nevertheless, the Court vacated the attorneys’ fees award because the district court did not adequately address REXA’s objections to the award based on excessive and improper attorney billing. The Court remanded the case to allow the district court to justify its decision to grant such a substantial award.

    Authors
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    Endnotes

  • The Inflation Reduction Act: Overview of New Corporate Minimum Tax

    The Inflation Reduction Act: Overview of New Corporate Minimum Tax

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Inflation Reduction Act: Overview of New Corporate Minimum Tax

    August 10, 2022

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On August 7, 2022, the US Senate passed the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (the Act), a budget reconciliation bill recently introduced by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV). The bill dropped most of the proposed tax-related changes in the Build Back Better Act of 2022 that passed the US House of Representatives last November and in the US Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Fiscal Year 2022 budget and Green Book. The bill does, however, feature a new 15% minimum tax on corporations with book profits exceeding $1 billion (Book Minimum Tax or BMT), a tax previously proposed by the Biden administration. Having cleared its greatest hurdle in the Senate, the Act, including the Book Minimum Tax, appears very likely to become law.

    In depth

    The Book Minimum Tax would impose on any “applicable corporation” a tax equal to the excess of (1) 15% of the applicable corporation’s adjusted financial statement income for the taxable year, reduced by its “corporate AMT foreign tax credit,” for the taxable year (tentative minimum tax), over (2) its regular tax liability plus any base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) imposed under section 59A for the taxable year. If enacted, the Book Minimum Tax would be effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2022. Taxpayers are generally allowed to credit the BMT paid in a prior year against their regular tax liability for a future year to the extent the regular tax liability exceeds the amount of its tentative minimum tax for the future year.

    DEFINITION OF APPLICABLE CORPORATION

    “Applicable corporation” means any corporation (excluding S corporations, regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts) that satisfies the “average annual adjusted financial statement income test” (Book Income Test) for one or more prior taxable years ending after December 31, 2021. A corporation meets the Book Income Test if its average annual adjusted financial statement income for the three-taxable year period ending with the relevant taxable year exceeds $1 billion. For example, a calendar year corporation in 2023 would compute its average annual adjusted financial statement income for the three-year period running from 2020 to 2022 to determine if it exceeds the $1 billion threshold. For this purpose, the annual adjusted financial statement income is determined without adjustment for any negative adjusted financial statement income (financial statement NOL) carried over from a previous year.

    A modified Book Income Test is applied to determine applicable corporation status when the corporation in question is a member of a foreign parented multinational group. A foreign parented multinational group is established for this purpose by two or more entities that are included in the same applicable financial statement for a taxable year if: (1) at least one entity is a domestic corporation and another entity is a foreign corporation, and (2) the common parent of such entities is (or is deemed under forthcoming regulations to be) a foreign corporation. For this purpose, a foreign corporation’s US trade or business is treated as a separate domestic corporation wholly owned by the foreign corporation.

    Under the modified Book Income Test, a corporation that is a member of a foreign parented multinational group is an applicable corporation if (1) the average annual adjusted financial statement income of the corporation and all foreign members of its foreign parented multinational group for the three-taxable year period ending with the relevant taxable year together exceeds $1 billion; and (2) the corporation’s average annual adjusted financial statement income for the three-taxable year period ending with the relevant taxable year (determined without adjustment for any financial statement NOL carried over from a previous year and after applying aggregation rules, generally described below) is at least $100 million.

    Solely for purposes of determining applicable corporation status, all adjusted financial statement income of persons treated as a single employer with a corporation under section 52(a) or (b), with certain modifications, is treated as adjusted financial statement income of such corporation. Thus, income of members of the same controlled group and flow-through entities under common control is generally aggregated for purposes of applying the Book Income Test.

    If a corporation has been in existence for less than three taxable years, the Book Income Test is computed based on the period it was in existence instead of the three-year period. In the case of a short taxable year, the income is annualized based on the number of months in the short period.

    Once a corporation satisfies the Book Income Test for a taxable year, the corporation will, regardless of its average adjusted financial statement income in subsequent years, continue to be treated as an applicable corporation subject to the Book Minimum Tax unless an exception applies.

    EXCEPTIONS TO CONTINUING APPLICABLE CORPORATION STATUS

    A corporation may shed its applicable corporation status if it has a change in ownership or does not satisfy the Book Income Test for its current taxable year and a number (to be determined by the Treasury) of consecutive previous taxable years, provided, in either case, that the Treasury also determines that it would be inappropriate to continue to treat the corporation as an applicable corporation. Shedding applicable corporation status does not insulate the corporation from becoming an applicable corporation in a later year if the Book Income Test is satisfied.

    COMPUTATION OF ADJUSTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT INCOME

    “Adjusted financial statement income” means the pre-tax net income or loss of the taxpayer reported on its applicable financial statement for said taxable year, subject to certain adjustments. The key adjustments are as follows:

    1. Members of a consolidated group. In the case of a taxpayer that is a member of a consolidated group, the group’s applicable financial statement is treated as the taxpayer’s applicable financial statement. Such group appliable financial statement income is then adjusted to (1) take into account items allocable to members of the consolidated group and (2) exclude income items of any non-member affiliates that are included on the applicable financial statement but not on the consolidated return. However, if the taxpayer receives dividends from a non-member affiliate, or otherwise takes into account income or deductions with respect to the non-member affiliate, the dividends and other amounts are taken into account in computing its adjusted financial statement income.
    2. Income or loss of flow-through entities. If the taxpayer is a partner in a partnership, only its distributive share of the partnership’s net income or loss is taken into account. If the taxpayer is the sole owner of a disregarded entity, the disregarded entity’s adjusted financial statement income is taken into account.
    3. Pro rata share of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) income or loss. If the taxpayer is a US shareholder of one or more CFCs, the taxpayer’s adjusted financial statement income is adjusted to take into account its pro rata share of the CFC’s net income or loss set forth on their applicable financial statements (CFC Adjustment). The pro rata share for this purpose is determined under rules similar to section 951(a)(2). In the event a CFC Adjustment is negative for a taxable year, the current year adjusted financial statement income does not take into account such negative CFC Adjustment. Instead, the negative amount is carried forward and may reduce the CFC Adjustment in a succeeding taxable year.
    4. Effectively connected income for foreign corporations. If the taxpayer is a foreign corporation, the principles of section 882 regarding effectively connected income apply for purposes of determining the foreign corporation’s adjusted financial statement income.
    5. US federal income taxes and foreign income taxes. US federal income taxes and foreign income taxes are not taken into account in determining a taxpayer’s adjusted financial statement income. The treatment of US and foreign taxes is discussed in further detail below.
    6. Depreciation deductions. Significantly, the Act allows taxpayers to reduce their adjusted financial statement income by taking into account depreciation deductions with respect to tangible property under section 167, including bonus depreciation. In contrast, taxpayers cannot adjust for amortization deductions under section 197, with a limited exception for certain qualified wireless spectrum used in a telecommunications business. In each case, the amount of depreciation or amortization is adjusted to take into account amounts that are already included in the taxpayer’s applicable financial statement.

    The Act also includes specific adjustments to take into account: (1) applicable financial statements that cover a period other than the taxable year; (2) amounts described in section 1382(b) for cooperatives; (3) certain deductions allowed for Alaska Native corporations; (4) elections for direct payment of certain credits under section 48D(d) or section 6417; (5) exclusion of certain mortgage servicing income of a taxpayer other than a regulated investment company; (6) exclusion of book income, cost or expense related to a covered benefit plan that is not taken into account under applicable tax provisions; and (7) exclusion of income derived by tax-exempt entities, other than unrelated trade or business income.

    Other than the adjustments described above, a taxpayer’s adjusted financial statement income generally does not take into account other tax provisions. For example, adjusted financial statement income is not adjusted to reflect: (1) limitations on interest expense deductions under section 163(j); (2) limitations on deductions for certain employee remuneration that exceeds $1 million under section 162(m); (3) limitations on loss carryforwards under section 382 or (4) amounts that may be included in taxable income in a period prior to their recognition for book purposes under the all events test or section 451(c).

    FOREIGN TAXES AND DIRECT AND INDIRECT FOREIGN TAX CREDITS

    Importantly, taxpayers compute their adjusted financial statement income based on their pre-tax income (or loss) without taking into account any US federal income taxes or foreign income, war profits or excess profits taxes (within the meaning of section 901). Thus, US and foreign income taxes on the applicable financial statements of the taxpayer or CFCs, if any, generally are added back when computing adjusted financial statement income. To avoid double taxation, however, the proposed legislation would require the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service to issue regulations providing that a portion or all of such foreign taxes are not disregarded if the taxpayer elects not to claim any foreign tax credits under sections 901 and 960. Alternatively, under the proposed legislation, a taxpayer that elects to claim foreign tax credits under sections 901 and/or 960 for the taxable year is allowed to reduce its tentative minimum tax by its “corporate AMT foreign tax credit” for the taxable year.

    “Corporate AMT foreign tax credit” generally equals the sum of (1) foreign taxes paid or accrued by a domestic applicable corporation and taken into account on the domestic applicable corporation’s applicable financial statement (such as withholding taxes, or foreign income taxes on branch income, that would give rise to a section 901 credit); and (2) foreign taxes paid or accrued by the applicable corporation’s CFCs that are taken into account on the applicable financial statement of the CFCs (and therefore included in the applicable corporation’s adjusted financial statement income ratably). Furthermore, the corporate AMT foreign tax credit, with respect to the foreign taxes paid or accrued by the CFCs, is limited to 15% of the applicable corporation’s CFC Adjustment for the taxable year described above. For this purpose, the excess is generally carried forward to the succeeding five years.

    Notably, the proposed legislation does not incorporate any limitations under section 904 in determining corporate AMT foreign tax credit. Thus, there are no restrictions on cross-crediting between high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions. The proposal likewise does not include other limitations under section 904, such as limitations related to separate limitation loss and overall domestic loss. Additionally, the indirect corporate AMT foreign tax credit with respect to CFCs is not subject to the “haircut” on credits under section 960(d). By imposing the 15% limitation, however, the Act provides less favorable treatment for foreign taxes paid or accrued by CFCs compared to foreign taxes directly paid by a US taxpayer.

    GENERAL BUSINESS CREDITS

    Although the BMT limits many tax preference items in the Code, corporations will continue to benefit from the research credit and other general business credits under section 38. The Act includes conforming amendments to section 38(c) which, for many taxpayers, will not limit their use of general business credits. As amended, section 38(c) generally limits the use of such credits to an amount equal to the excess, if any, of the taxpayer’s net income tax over 25% of its net income tax as exceeds $25,000. The taxpayer’s net income tax for this purpose includes its regular tax liability and BMT.

    NET OPERATING LOSS

    A financial statement NOL for a taxable year is carried forward to the following taxable year. Financial statement NOLs can offset up to 80% of the taxpayer’s adjusted financial statement income, computed without regard to any NOL carryforward, in a subsequent taxable year. Financial statement NOLs may be carried forward indefinitely. As noted above, while a financial statement NOL is taken into account in computing a taxpayer’s adjusted financial statement income, it is disregarded for purposes of applying the Book Income Test in determining applicable corporation status.

    For this purpose, financial statement NOL is defined narrowly. It includes only NOLs set forth on applicable financial statements for taxable years ending after December 31, 2019, taking into account modifications for adjusted financial statement income described above and without regard to financial statement NOL carryforward from a prior year. Accordingly, while post-2019 financial statement NOLs may be carried forward indefinitely, all pre-2020 NOLs are disregarded in computing an applicable corporation’s adjusted financial statement income under the proposed legislation.

    CREDIT FOR PRIOR YEAR MINIMUM TAX LIABILITY

    In connection with the Book Minimum Tax, the Act would amend section 53(e) to allow an applicable corporation to offset its regular tax liability for the current taxable year by the amount of its Book Minimum Tax in prior years to the extent said Book Minimum Tax has not been credited against the applicable corporation’s regular tax liability in prior years. The amount of such credit for a taxable year is limited to the excess of the taxpayer’s regular tax liability over its tentative minimum tax, which equals 15% of its adjusted financial statement income minus any corporate AMT foreign tax credit.

    TREATMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL TAX

    The proposed legislation does not make any special adjustments for US state and local income taxes. When computing adjusted financial statement income, special adjustments are only made to disregard US federal income and foreign income taxes in the manner described above. Accordingly, US state and local taxes presumably are included as book deductions and reflected as such when computing adjusted financial statement income.

    OBSERVATIONS

    The proposed legislation provides relief for certain tax preference items when determining the amount of BMT owed, including accelerated depreciation deductions for tangible personal property, general business credits and pension deductions. In contrast, other frequent sources of disparity between book and tax amounts are not excepted, such as goodwill amortization, stock compensation expenses, certain accrued liabilities and the section 250 deduction.

    If enacted, the Book Minimum Tax may, by increasing the tax rate on US companies, reduce the instances in which other countries’ OECD Pillar 2 rules (such as the UTPR) could apply to domestic profits of US companies. Because of differences between the Book Minimum Tax base and the Pillar 2 tax base, however, the Book Minimum Tax would not prevent the application of Pillar 2 rules to US companies’ domestic profits. Additionally, because the Book Minimum Tax does not impose a minimum tax on a country-by-country basis, it also would not prevent the application of other countries’ Pillar 2 rules to CFCs and foreign branches of US companies.

    Authors

    Brian H. Jenn

    Partner

    Washington, DC, Chicago

    Jeffrey Maydew

    Partner

    Chicago

    Barry J. Quirke

    Partner

    Chicago

    Alex Cheng-Yi Lee

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Inside Out: Is a Recent Crypto Asset Insider Trading Case a Prelude to More SEC Enforcement Actions?

    Inside Out: Is a Recent Crypto Asset Insider Trading Case a Prelude to More SEC Enforcement Actions?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Inside Out: Is a Recent Crypto Asset Insider Trading Case a Prelude to More SEC Enforcement Actions?

    August 10, 2022

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 21, 2022, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil enforcement action alleging that from at least June 2021 to April 2022, the three named defendants orchestrated and perpetrated an insider trading scheme amassing over $1.1 million in illicit gains from crypto asset trading.[1] The action alleges that Ishan Wahi, who was formerly employed by Coinbase as a product manager, tipped off Nikhil Wahi and Sameer Ramani with non-public information regarding certain crypto assets that had been approved for listing on Coinbase. This information allowed Wahi and Ramani to purchase said crypto assets and profit after the listings were publicly announced. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) also brought a criminal indictment, charging wire fraud conspiracy and wire fraud in connection with the scheme.[2] Most notably, the SEC’s enforcement action is premised on allegations that “at least nine” of the 25 crypto assets purchased and sold throughout the alleged scheme are securities.[3]

    In that regard, this case differentiates itself from the DOJ’s recent indictment of former OpenSea Product Manager Nathanial Chastain. Despite the DOJ’s use of the phrase “insider trading” in its indictment of Chastain, the SEC declined to charge him or allege that the non-fungible tokens (NFTs) involved are securities. In contrast, in SEC v. Wahi, the SEC formally charged the defendants with having violated the federal securities laws, specifically the antifraud provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

    Although SEC insider trading cases are not uncommon, this SEC enforcement action is the first where the security is a crypto asset. As a result, the outcome of SEC v. Wahi may have far-reaching consequences with regard to cementing the SEC’s authority to regulate the crypto asset industry. Further, this action may be the spark that ignites a wave of SEC enforcement actions against other players in the industry.

    In depth

    SEC ALLEGATIONS OF CRYPTO ASSET SECURITIES

    While the SEC noted that the defendants’ scheme involved at least 25 crypto assets, the SEC’s complaint identifies only nine crypto assets that are alleged to constitute securities. As with prior SEC enforcement actions involving crypto assets, the SEC’s securities analysis of these nine crypto assets is based on the definition of “investment contract” as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.¸ 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (Howey Test). Under the Howey Test, investment contracts involve an investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others. For each of the nine crypto assets cited by the SEC, the complaint sets forth the purported basis for a common enterprise and delves into why there was a reasonable expectation of profits based on the efforts of others. In other words, the SEC’s complaint provides a roadmap of the facts it has examined in determining whether each crypto asset is a security, including: (1) a company’s public statements regarding the potential for crypto asset purchasers to realize profits; (2) the involvement of management teams in the ongoing success of the crypto asset and (3) efforts to promote the utilization of secondary market platforms.

    To demonstrate the presence of a “common enterprise” within the meaning of the Howey Test, the SEC emphasized that the founders and executives who launched these crypto assets designed its ecosystem, through staking incentives or otherwise, such that purchasers would collectively benefit from profits generated by said ecosystem. The SEC also cited to statements by the founders that funds raised from the sales of these crypto assets would be pooled and used to develop the network for the common benefit of the purchasers and future holders of the crypto assets. Further, the SEC claimed that the fact that the founders and executives themselves held large amounts of the crypto assets suggested that the economic incentives of insiders and public purchasers of the crypto assets were aligned.

    In alleging that purchasers of these crypto assets held a “reasonable expectation of profits based on the efforts of others,” the SEC referred to statements made by the founders and company executives promoting the crypto assets to purchasers based on the potential to earn profits. These statements included excerpts from white papers, company websites, social media posts and other public statements that reference the investment potential, past performance or future demand for, or scarcity of, the crypto asset. The SEC also noted efforts by such persons to create a secondary market for said crypto assets, including through listings on exchanges. Finally, the SEC noted marketing materials and other public statements that included the work histories of the founders and management team, touting their expertise and credentials. The SEC claimed that these statements created an implied reliance that such executives would perform critical roles in increasing the value of the crypto assets.

    THE PUBLIC’S RESPONSE TO SEC ALLEGATIONS

    Many have viewed the SEC’s actions in this case as notice that other crypto assets, including those that are listed popular exchanges, may be deemed to be, or determined to be, securities. Coinbase responded to the action by stating that it disagrees with this conclusion. Coinbase also implicitly called to question the forum in which this debate is being brought, from a position of enforcement rather than one of guidance and rulemaking: “Coinbase has a rigorous process to analyze and review each digital asset before making it available on our exchange—a process that the SEC itself has reviewed. This process includes an analysis of whether the asset could be considered to be a security[.]”[4]

    On the same day that the Wahi action was filed, Coinbase also submitted a petition for rulemaking to the SEC, requesting additional regulations that would bridge the shifting paradigm from centralized exchanges to distributed ledger technologies, including rules that would clarify the process for identifying when a crypto asset is a security.[5] Other private sector actors have responded to Wahi by distancing themselves from the underlying allegations, with some exchanges proactively delisting the nine crypto assets identified by the SEC as securities.[6]

    Other regulators of the crypto asset industry also had strong responses to the SEC bringing an enforcement action under these circumstances. In a public statement, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commissioner Caroline D. Pham expressed concern with the SEC’s approach, characterizing it as “a striking example of ‘regulation by enforcement’” and claiming that the “SEC’s allegations could have broad implications beyond this single case, underscoring how critical and urgent it is that regulators work together.”[7] Similar to Coinbase, Commissioner Pham advocated for rulemaking initiatives, which would benefit from a public notice-and-comment process, rather than enforcement.

    WHAT’S NEXT?

    The enforcement action brought by the SEC in SEC v. Wahi marks a novel and perhaps monumental public moment in the debate over crypto assets and their potential categorization as securities. The outcome of this most recent SEC enforcement action will not only provide additional color as to the SEC’s assessment of crypto assets vis-à-vis the securities laws but may be a prelude to additional crypto asset enforcement actions to come. It should not be lost on the industry that Wahi comes in the direct wake of the SEC’s hiring of more than 50 staff members for its newly minted Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit.[8] At the very least, Wahi marks a notable push for the SEC to reach SEC Chairman Gary Gensler’s stated goal of meeting the expectations of the public to “police wrongdoing in the crypto market.”[9]

    Wahi also reignites an ongoing question as to which regulator should have enforcement authority over the crypto asset industry. For example, earlier this year CFTC Chairman Rostin Benham publicly reiterated the need for the CFTC to have additional authority to regulate crypto assets.[10] In comparison, Chairman Gensler has publicly stated that when crypto assets functionally operate as securities, just like with any other security, it remains the SEC’s prerogative to develop “robust ways to protect investors.”[11] In a public tweet, Chairman Gensler further provided that “[t]here is no reason to treat the crypto market differently just because a different technology is used.”[12] Under the recently proposed Financial Innovation Act, a bipartisan effort from Senators Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), attempts to group crypto assets into categories based on the unique characteristics of the particular crypto asset. Industry participants have sought clarity on the classification of crypto assets by regulation rather than enforcement actions. For now, market participants are left to attempt to interpret the actions by the SEC and how (and whether) they apply to other crypto assets.

    Authors

    Daniel L. Woodard

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Ethan M. Heller

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Rachel Rosen

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Colorado Continues to Whittle Away at Non-Compete Agreements

    Colorado Continues to Whittle Away at Non-Compete Agreements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Colorado Continues to Whittle Away at Non-Compete Agreements

    August 9, 2022

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Effective August 10, 2022, Colorado’s laws governing restrictive covenants shall be amended to provide additional limitations and hurdles for employers who seek non-compete and non-solicit agreements with their employees, including compensation thresholds and notice requirements. The new law also sets forth steep penalties for any violations. This article provides the details of these new restrictions.

    In depth

    OVERVIEW

    Effective August 10, 2022, employers in Colorado will need to comply with additional limitations with regard to restrictive covenants. Specifically, Colorado’s general law renders non-competition provisions illegal. The law then sets forth a small number of narrow exceptions to permit certain restrictions, namely:

    1. Non-competes and non-solicits for a worker who, at the time the covenant is entered into and at the time it is enforced, earns a certain annualized cash compensation at or above a specified threshold
    2. Recovery of certain education and training expenses
    3. Reasonable confidentiality
    4. Covenants for the purchase and sale of a business or assets thereof
    5. Repayment of a scholarship provided to an apprentice who fails to comply with the scholarship agreement.

    In each case, the law further provides that notice of the restrictive covenant and the terms of the covenant must be provided in writing. Failure to comply with the new state law subjects the employer or company to significant penalties.

    The details of each of these exceptions, the notice requirement and penalties are provided below.

    HIGHLY COMPENSATED EMPLOYEES

    Under the highly compensated employee exception, first, restrictive covenants are permitted only if deemed necessary for the protection of trade secrets and only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect those trade secrets.

    In order to be subject to a non-competition provision, an employee must be a “highly compensated employee” who is currently receiving cash compensation (salary, fee or other compensation) in an annualized amount equal to $101,250 as of 2022. (We note that the salary threshold is to be reviewed and adjusted yearly).

    To be subject to a non-solicitation provision, an employee must be earning at least 60% of the threshold amount—more specifically, an annualized amount equal to $60,750 (or, $101,250 multiplied by .60)—as of 2022 (also to be adjusted annually).

    These salary thresholds must be met both at the time the contract was executed and at the time the covenant is enforced. It is unclear what “at the time it is enforced” is intended to mean, and whether this will be interpreted as the employee’s final salary at the employer enforcing the covenant or the employee’s current compensation at the new competing employer. However, we suspect that courts will interpret the law based on the employee’s final salary before termination.

    OTHER PERMISSIBLE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

    The Colorado law provides the following additional exceptions to the general prohibition of restrictive covenants in these circumstances:

    1. Covenants for the purchase and sale of a business or the assets of a business
    2. Provisions permitting the recovery of training and education expenses, if the training is distinct from normal on-the-job training, limited to the reasonable costs of the training and decreasing pro rata per month over two years following the training, and only to the extent such recovery would not violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
    3. Provisions requiring the repayment of a scholarship provided to a worker in an apprenticeship, but only if the individual fails to comply with the conditions of the scholarship
    4. Reasonable confidentiality agreements relevant to the employer’s business, if such agreements do not prohibit disclosure of information that a) arises from the “worker’s general training, knowledge, skill, or experience, whether gained on the job or otherwise,” b) “is readily ascertainable to the public,” or c) “a worker otherwise has a right to disclose as legally protected conduct.”

    NOTICE REQUIREMENT FOR NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

    Even if the above exceptions are met, any non-compete is void unless notice is provided as required under the new law. Specifically, notice of the covenant not to compete and the terms of the covenant must be provided in a separate document in either of the following ways:

    1. To a prospective worker before the worker accepts the employer’s offer of employment
    2. To a current worker at least 14 days before the earlier of a) the effective date of the covenant or b) the effective date of any additional compensation or change in the terms and conditions of employment that provides consideration for the covenant.

    The notice must be in clear and conspicuous terms and must be signed by the individual. The notice must be provided with the agreement containing the non-compete, identifying the agreement by name. Moreover, the notice must state that the agreement contains a non-compete that could restrict the employee’s options for subsequent employment following their termination of employment and must direct the employee to the specific section or paragraph of the agreement containing the non-compete.

    The worker may request an additional copy of the covenant not to compete once each calendar year.

    RESTRICTIONS SPECIFIC TO PHYSICIANS

    The Colorado law provides that any non-compete covenant or provision of an employment, partnership or corporate agreement between physicians that restricts the right to practice medicine upon termination of the agreement is void. However, the law permits physicians to agree to pay damages in an amount reasonably related to the injury suffered by reason of termination of such an agreement. While this provision may read like a liquidated damages provision, the few Colorado court opinions on the statute do not support the parties estimating and defining liquidated damages in advance. Rather, the Colorado Court of Appeals has held that damages payable pursuant to this statute cannot be analyzed prospectively, but rather must be determined upon the termination of employment. (See Crocker v. Greater Colorado Anesthesia, P.C., 2018 COA 33 (Colo. App. 2018); See also Wojtowicz v. Greely Anesthesia Servs., P.C., 961 P.2d 520 (Colo. App. 1997).)

    PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS

    Employers that violate Colorado’s new restrictive covenant law may be found liable for actual damages, reasonable costs, attorneys’ fees, and statutory penalties of up to $5,000 “per worker or prospective worker harmed by the conduct.” Statutory penalties may be reduced or eliminated upon the employer’s showing of a good-faith and reasonable belief that its acts or omissions were not violative of the law.

    CHOICE OF LAW

    The new Colorado law provides that Colorado law must govern the enforceability of a non-competition covenant for any employee, who, at the time of termination, primarily resides and works in Colorado.

    EFFECTIVE DATE

    The new Colorado law, including the “highly compensated worker” exception, will only apply to covered agreements entered or renewed on or after August 10, 2022. These requirements will not apply retroactively.

    THE McDERMOTT DIFFERENCE

    For any assistance in drafting and enforcing restrictive covenant agreements—in Colorado or otherwise—please feel free to contact the McDermott employment team.

    Authors

    Brian Mead

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • The Proposed Share Buyback Tax under the Inflation Reduction Act

    The Proposed Share Buyback Tax under the Inflation Reduction Act

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Proposed Share Buyback Tax under the Inflation Reduction Act

    August 9, 2022

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 includes an excise tax that, if enacted, will make share repurchases by publicly traded companies more costly starting in 2023.[1] The proposed tax is meant to be a significant revenue-raiser, partially filling a revenue gap created by the removal of the carried interest provisions from the bill and modifications to the proposed book minimum tax.[2] Although the excise tax may seem straightforward when viewed at a high level, the text of the provision reveals some unexpected results.[3]

    In depth

    OVERVIEW

    The tax on share repurchases is imposed at a 1% rate on the total value of shares repurchased during the company’s tax year. The tax applies to most types of share repurchases made by US publicly traded companies, irrespective of whether a particular share repurchase is or is not part of a share buyback program. Because the new tax is an excise tax, it applies at a flat rate without regard to whether the repurchasing company has taxable income or loss during the year. The tax is imposed on the repurchasing corporation and is a nondeductible expense.[4]

    When computing the tax base, the amount of repurchased shares is reduced by the value of any newly issued shares. In this way, the tax may be thought of as a tax on the net number of shares that are retired during the year. Companies are, in effect, given credit for new shares that are issued in a primary or secondary offering, shares issued to satisfy option exercises and shares issued to provide stock-based compensation.[5]

    If enacted as is, the tax would apply to repurchases that take place after December 31, 2022. The cutoff for the effective date turns on whether a particular share repurchase was consummated after that date. In contrast, the date when a particular share repurchase plan was announced or approved is irrelevant. There is no grandfather rule or transition relief for shares that are repurchased in 2023 pursuant to a share repurchase program that was authorized in 2022 or earlier.

    The tax also applies to repurchases in 2023 irrespective of whether the corporation happens to be on a fiscal or calendar year for tax purposes.[6]

    A de minimis threshold prevents the tax from being imposed if the total share repurchases during the year does not exceed $1 million.

    APPLIES TO US PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES

    The excise tax applies almost exclusively to US publicly traded corporations. Share repurchases by foreign parented corporate groups generally escape taxation, even repurchases of American Depositary Receipts or shares that are publicly traded on US exchanges.

    A company is considered “publicly traded” for this purpose if its shares are traded on any established securities market. This includes companies with shares that are traded on a regional or local market, not just companies that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the Nasdaq Stock Market. The tax also applies to US companies with shares that are traded on non-US exchanges, such as the London Stock Exchange, Euronext N.V. and Toronto Stock Exchange.

    In the case of a foreign publicly traded corporation, the excise tax applies in limited circumstances. The excise tax may apply to a foreign parented publicly traded group if, for example, a controlled US subsidiary happens to purchase the foreign publicly traded parent’s shares. This aspect of the tax could pose a trap for the unwary in the mergers and acquisitions sector, but it will be easy enough for the well-advised to navigate around.

    The provision includes a protective measure designed to prevent the excise tax from being an incentive to invert. In general, if a US corporation inverts in a transaction after September 20, 2021, share repurchases by its new foreign parent are potentially subject to the tax. This is the case if the US corporation inverted in a transaction in which the foreign parent is treated as a surrogate foreign corporation.[7] In such a case, the excise tax applies to the publicly traded foreign parent’s share repurchases if they are made within a 10-year applicable period following the inversion.

    “REPURCHASES” ARE BROADLY DEFINED

    Although the provision is colloquially referred to as a tax on “buybacks,” it is computed based on the value of shares “repurchased” by the publicly traded company. A repurchase is further defined for this purpose as a “redemption” of stock within the meaning of section 317(b). This definition expands the scope of the provision to include several types of transactions that are not considered “buybacks” in the traditional sense.

    For example, a repurchase for this purpose may include an acquisition by the issuer of its own stock for cash, irrespective of whether the purchase is made on the open market or in a private transaction. Shares that are repurchased by the issuer to effectuate a “bootstrap” acquisition or leveraged buyout could be caught in the net of the excise tax.[8] The same could be true for cash that is issued for fractional shares in an acquisition.[9] A “repurchase” could, in theory, even include the mere repayment of preferred stock at its maturity.[10]

    A repurchase for this purpose includes both direct purchases of stock by the publicly traded parent and indirect purchases effectuated by a controlled corporate subsidiary or a controlled partnership.[11] A corporation generally is “controlled” for this purpose if more than 50% of its stock is owned, directly or indirectly, by vote or value by the publicly traded parent.

    The excise tax only applies to repurchases of stock and so a mere repayment of debt, including long-term debt that is considered a “security” for subchapter C purposes, will not be subject to the tax. Similarly, the repurchase of an unexercised option or warrant should not constitute a repurchase of stock.[12] Also, a transaction in which the issuer’s own stock is the only consideration exchanged for the repurchased stock ought not to be subject to the tax because an issuer’s own shares are not considered “property” under section 317.[13]

    The provision includes a grant of regulatory authority to expand the application of the tax further, permitting the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to include within the definition of “repurchase” transactions that it determines are “economically similar to” redemptions.[14]

    CERTAIN ACQUISITIONS THAT ARE NOT “REPURCHASES”

    The provision provides a limited number of exceptions to the scope of the tax. The provision provides an exception for repurchases “to the extent” the transaction is “part of a section 368 reorganization and no gain or loss is recognized on such purchase by the shareholder.”[15] This should provide partial or total protection for section 368(a)(1)(E) recapitalizations and acquisitive reorganizations to the extent that the shareholders obtain tax-free treatment.[16]

    A significant exception also applies to “any case” in which the repurchased shares, or an equal amount of stock, is “contributed to an employer-sponsored retirement plan, employee stock ownership plan, or similar plan.” Thus, a public company can repurchase shares from the public and use them to satisfy stock options or make equity contributions to a retirement plan without being subject to the tax.

    The provision also excepts repurchases “to the extent that the repurchase is treated as a dividend for purposes of this title.” Dividend-equivalent redemptions under section 302(d) should be excluded as a result, provided that the distribution is treated as a dividend and not a return of capital. This may allow for some share repurchases from large shareholders to be excluded for purposes of the tax. In most cases, however, purchases from small public shareholders will be considered sale or exchange transactions under section 302(a) and ineligible for the exception.[17]

    CALCULATING THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF REPURCHASED SHARES

    Much remains to be seen about how the Treasury will implement the provision in regulations and how the Internal Revenue Service will enforce the provision on audit. For example, the tax is applied to the amount of repurchased shares by reference to their “fair market value.” This raises the question of how fair market value will be determined and how publicly traded corporations can comply with the proposed statute given the typically large volume of share repurchases in buyback programs and fluctuations in public share prices over the course of a tax year. One step that the Treasury might consider taking in this regard would be to use its regulatory authority to permit taxpayers to rely on their US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting when computing the tax. Under SEC rules, publicly traded companies typically must disclose, on a monthly basis, the total number of shares purchased and the average price paid per share. These amounts typically appear in schedular form in a company’s 10-Q.[18]

    CONCLUSION

    Share buyback programs will continue to be popular with publicly traded companies, even if the proposed legislation is enacted. The structural incentives for share buyback programs will continue to outweigh the cost of the proposed excise tax. The tax will, however, have an impact on the margins, affecting the decisions of most US publicly traded companies when determining how best to redeploy cash. Companies will also have an incentive to accelerate future share repurchases into calendar year 2022 before the proposed legislation takes effect.

    Authors

    Jeffrey Maydew

    Partner

    Chicago

    Meaghan A. Wolfe

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • The Crypto Winter of Discontent Gets Colder with First of Its Kind Insider Trading Charges

    The Crypto Winter of Discontent Gets Colder with First of Its Kind Insider Trading Charges

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Crypto Winter of Discontent Gets Colder with First of Its Kind Insider Trading Charges

    August 9, 2022

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As market and regulatory uncertainty swirl around cryptocurrencies and other digital assets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) have taken divergent approaches to charging digital asset insider trading. For its part, the SEC, in a recent enforcement case, asserts jurisdiction over certain cryptocurrencies as “securities” and brought traditional insider trading charges under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.[1] The DOJ, however, has avoided “securities” designations altogether by using wire fraud and other non-securities criminal charges to pursue insider trading related to a variety of digital assets including non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”) and cryptocurrencies.[2] Prior to June 1, 2022, the DOJ’s use of wire fraud to combat insider trading of digital assets may have seemed “novel.” However, the DOJ has recently adopted the approach that regardless of the underlying instrument (NFTs, debt, cryptocurrencies, insurance products or any other non-security product), it is willing to bring fraud charges where it believes it can prove trading based on fraudulently obtained confidential information. [3]

    The divergent SEC and DOJ approaches played out on July 21, 2022, when the SEC and DOJ filed parallel insider trading cases against a former Coinbase Global, Inc. (“Coinbase”) employee (Ishan Wahi), his brother (Nikhil Wahi) and a friend (Sameer Ramani).[4] Both cases are based on the defendants’ trades in digital assets that were slated for listing on Coinbase before the listing announcements were made public. The DOJ Indictment—the first cryptocurrency insider trading case brought by the DOJ —bypassed the “are they” or “aren’t they” securities question by charging the trio of defendants with conspiracy and wire fraud for allegedly insider trading in six digital assets before they were listed on Coinbase (including two that the SEC considers securities).[5] The SEC’s Complaint, however, alleges that nine of the so-called crypto assets at issue are in fact securities under SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (“Howey”).[6]

    The unspoken implication of the SEC’s Complaint is that by listing the nine digital asset “securities” on its exchange, Coinbase engaged in the offering of unregistered securities. After the filing of the DOJ and SEC insider trading charges, it was reported that Coinbase is the subject of an SEC investigation related to listing unregistered securities. Coinbase’s Chief Legal Officer, Paul Grewal declared, in response to the SEC Complaint, that “Coinbase does not list securities on its platform. Period.”[7] In a Petition for Rulemaking (the “Petition”), also filed on July 21, Coinbase criticized the lack of guidance from the SEC regarding digital assets and offered a roadmap to the SEC for crafting a regulatory framework tailored to digital assets.[8] In its Petition, Coinbase called out the SEC for failing to “constructively engage with digital asset market participants on the design of a workable regulatory framework” and asked that the SEC “propose and adopt rules to govern the regulation of securities that are offered and traded via digitally native methods, including potential rules to identify which digital assets are securities.”[9] The Petition also offers some suggestions, and invites others to do the same, in carving a regulatory path forward including: (1) a critical analysis of the challenges of applying existing rules to digital assets (for example, digital assets are not well suited for purchase and sale in a broker-intermediary model); (2) clear delineation between which digital assets are securities and which ones are not so that issuers and purchasers are not confused; (3) disclosure requirements tailored to the unique features of digital assets; and (4) real-time settlement of digital asset transactions to maintain the pace digital asset investors expect.[10]

    Both the SEC’s Complaint and the DOJ’s Indictment reflect the different approaches that enforcement authorities are taking in prosecuting potentially fraudulent trading in digital assets. But neither action definitively answers the question of when securities laws might apply to digital assets and when they might not.

    When Are Digital Assets Securities?

    The insider trading scheme alleged by the SEC and DOJ is straightforward. Ishan Wahi was a manager in Coinbase’s Assets and Investing Products group. He allegedly tipped his co-defendants with non-public information identifying digital assets to be listed by Coinbase and when they would be listed. The two co-defendants purchased the digital assets before each were listed and sold them (at a profit) in heavy trading that followed the announcement of their listing.[11]  Although the SEC’s Complaint refers to 25 different crypto assets purchased as part of the alleged scheme, only nine digital assets are specifically identified as securities for the purposes of the insider trading charges:[12]

    • AMP (created by Flexa Network, Inc.)
    • RLY (created by Rally Network, Inc.)
    • DDX (associated with the DerivaDEX protocol)
    • XYO (created by XY Labs, Inc.)
    • RGT (originally minted by Rari Capital)
    • KROM (issued by Kromatika Finance)
    • LCX (created by Liechtenstein Cryptoassets Exchange)
    • POWR (issued by Power Ledger Pty. Ltd.)
    • DFX (issued by DFX Finance).

    These nine digital assets run the gamut of token types. For example, according to the SEC’s analysis, RLY is a governance token that provides holders with voting power “over the development and structure of the business, including the right to propose changes.”[13] XYO tokens function as a form of currency to pay others that operate in the XY ecosystem.[14] And POWR tokens are described as an “asset token” used on the Power Ledger platform and from which users will receive a portion of revenue.[15]

    The Complaint highlights the SEC’s position that the nine digital assets at the center of its case satisfy the Howey investment contract test because each asset at issue “constitutes an investment of money, in a common enterprise, with a reasonable expectation of profit derived from the efforts of others.”[16] As to the first and second prongs of the Howey test – an investment of money in a common enterprise – the Complaint alleges that “each of the nine crypto assets securities were offered and sold by an issuer to raise money that would be used for the issuer’s business. In the offerings, the issuers directly sold crypto asset securities to investors in return for consideration . . .”[17]

    For example, AMP token holders “stake Amp into pools that secure the network” and “[i]f the collateral pools are profitable, investors who stake Amp can share in the profits.”[18] In the case of RGT, “funds raised from RGT investors were pooled to raise capital and develop the Rari protocol. . . [and] funds raised from the liquidity mining program would go towards, among other things, developing additional Rari products and the Rari protocol.”[19] In another example, the LCX token was marketed as a “chance to be a part of LCX’s vision to bridge the gap between traditional finance and the new monetary world powered by blockchain and cryptocurrencies.”[20] Notably, the features of the nine digital assets, though not identical, include tools like staking, liquidity mining, governance and voting and ecosystem building that are common features in decentralized finance platforms.

    On the third Howey prong – reasonable expectation of profit derived from the efforts of others – the Complaint alleges that for each of the nine digital assets, the “issuers and their management teams [addressed] the investment value of the tokens, the managerial efforts that contribute to the tokens’ value, and the availability of secondary markets for trading the tokens . . . [such that] a reasonable investor in the nine crypto asset securities would continue to look to the efforts of the issuer and its promoters, including their future efforts, to increase the value of their investment.”[21]

    The allegations of the SEC’s Complaint emphasizes that each of the nine digital assets was promoted as a “profit opportunity” to holders or that it could be traded on secondary platforms, like Coinbase.[22] For example, DDX holders could “stake” their DDX “to a DerivaDex ‘insurance fund’ . . . [and] contribute their DDX tokens to the fund, creating liquidity that could be used to insure parties if a transaction fails. As the insurance pool grows and earns fees, participants who staked their DDX may receive additional DDX tokens and thereby greater opportunities to profit.”[23] Similarly, KROM holders were permitted to stake their tokens to the Kromatika platform and earn, “a revenue share from the fees that are charged for using the Kromatika platform.”[24]  Again, while the “profit” features of the nine digital assets are not identical, they cover “earnings” features associated with many digital assets currently available including, staking rewards, waived fees for transactions in the “ecosystem,” lock up rewards and pool rewards.

    Implications for the Digital Asset Marketplace and Beyond

    As a practical matter, any determination (and therefore, clarity) by a court whether the nine digital assets in the SEC’s Complaint are securities under federal securities laws will require patience that may never be rewarded. With pending criminal charges against three defendants, the SEC proceedings could be temporarily stayed while the DOJ and defendants focus resources on addressing the criminal charges. And beyond the allegations of the Complaint, the SEC offers no broader guidance as to the designation of these specific nine assets — or any other digital assets — as securities. Commissioner Caroline D. Pham of the Commodities Future Trading Commission observed that the Complaint is “a striking example of regulation by enforcement . . . [with] broad implications beyond this single case, underscoring how critical and urgent it is that regulators work together.”[25] In short, there is unlikely to be any near term resolution of the SEC’s Complaint that would quell the uncertainty surrounding regulatory treatment of digital assets, making requests for guidance from regulators increasingly urgent.

    In the interim, issuers of digital assets, particularly digital assets bearing any resemblance to the nine now characterized by the SEC as “securities” are left to grapple with an uncertain regulatory landscape. Coinbase and other exchanges likely must decide whether to delist similar digital assets. And issuers and exchanges alike are potentially weighing options to defend against allegations of unregistered securities offerings.

    The implications of both the SEC’s case and the DOJ’s case should prompt everyone who engages with digital assets to pause. For example, other similarly situated issuers of digital assets should consider whether the SEC could make the same securities case against their digital assets. Exchanges, lending platforms and broker-dealers might want to assess whether they need to re-categorize the digital assets that they are listing. As the SEC ramps up enforcement activity in this area, investment advisers should reassess their existing analyses regarding the impact on their clients and operations of treating cryptocurrencies as securities – particularly with respect to insider trading, personal trading and Custody Rule compliance. Treatment of certain digital assets as securities could materially impact liquidity in the U.S. and elsewhere, and advisers should consider the potential impacts on portfolio management and whether existing risk disclosures are adequate.

    Authored by Stephanie R. Breslow, Charles J. Clark, Kara A. Kuchar, Craig S. Warkol, Philip J. Bezanson, and Shannon B. Wolf.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your lawyer or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Stephanie R. Breslow

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Shannon B. Wolf

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights