ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Clean Hydrogen Tax Benefits under the Inflation Reduction Act
September 9, 2022
Read time: 7 min
On August 22, 2022, US President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (the Act) into law, which includes $369 billion in energy and climate spending with an unprecedented focus on clean hydrogen. Specifically, the Act introduces a clean hydrogen production tax credit (PTC) and broadens the existing investment tax credit (ITC) in Section 48 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) to apply to hydrogen projects and standalone hydrogen storage technology. The Act further bolsters the hydrogen economy by enabling taxpayers to stack bonus credits and to capitalize on direct pay, as well as allowing the transferability of hydrogen-related tax credits.
CLEAN HYDROGEN PRODUCTION TAX CREDITS
The Act amends the Code to create a new Section 45V, which introduces a PTC for the production of “qualified clean hydrogen” during a 10-year period commencing on the date of when the qualified clean hydrogen facility in question was placed in service.[1]
Amount
The four-tiered incentive in any taxable year is calculated at an amount equal to $0.60/kilogram (kg) of qualified clean hydrogen produced multiplied by an applicable percentage based on the resulting lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate as follows:
| kgs of CO2e Produced per kg of QCH | Applicable Percentage |
|---|---|
| 2.5 – 4 kg of CO2e | 20% |
| 1.5 – 2.5 kg of CO2e | 25% |
| 0.45 – 1.5 kg of CO2e | 33.4% |
| 0 kg – 0.45 kg of CO2e | 100% |
The amount of the credit shall be multiplied by five in the event (1) the construction of the qualified clean hydrogen facility begins prior to 60 days after the US Secretary of the Treasury publishes guidance with respect to wage and apprenticeship requirements, and the prevailing wage requirements as set out in the Act are satisfied in the alteration or repair of such facility which occurs after such date. Or (2) the prevailing wage requirements and apprenticeship requirements as set out in the Act are satisfied with respect to the construction, alteration or repair of the qualified clean hydrogen facility in question (through the end of the PTC 10-year period).[2]
Definitions
The Act defines “qualified clean hydrogen” as hydrogen that is “produced through a process that results in a lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate not greater than four kilograms of CO2e per kilogram of hydrogen.” Such hydrogen must be produced in the United States in the taxpayer’s ordinary course of trade for sale or use and must be verified by an unrelated third party.
Furthermore, to meet the requirements of a “qualified clean hydrogen production facility,” the facility’s construction must begin before January 1, 2033, must be owned by the taxpayer and must produce qualified clean hydrogen.[3]
No Overlap with 45Q Tax Credits
The Act stipulates that no PTC under Section 45V shall be available for qualified clean hydrogen produced at a facility for which a carbon capture tax credit under Section 45Q is allowed in any current or prior taxable year. This means that a taxpayer may not stack Section 45V and Section 45Q credits where Section 45Q credits are available.[4]
CLEAN HYDROGEN INVESTMENT TAX CREDITS
In addition to the PTC for qualified clean hydrogen, the Act also introduces an ITC for clean hydrogen by allowing taxpayers to treat specified clean hydrogen production facilities as energy property under Section 48.[5]
Amount
The four-tiered incentive in any taxable year is equal to the energy percentage of the cost basis of each specified clean hydrogen production facility placed in service during such taxable year as follows:
| kgs of CO2e Produced per kg of QCH | Energy Percentage |
|---|---|
| 2.5 – 4 kg of CO2e | 1.2% |
| 1.5 – 2.5 kg of CO2e | 1.5% |
| 0.45 – 1.5 kg of CO2e | 2% |
| 0 kg – 0.45 kg of CO2e | 6% |
The amount of the credit shall be multiplied by five in the event (1) the energy project in question has a maximum net output of less than one megawatt of electrical or thermal energy, (2) the construction of the energy project in question begins prior to 60 days after the Secretary of the Treasury publishes guidance with respect to wage and apprenticeship requirements, or (3) the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements as set out in the Code are satisfied with respect to the construction, alteration or repair (through the end of the five-year recapture period following the date the project is placed in service) of the energy project in question.
In addition, such energy projects are also eligible for the 10% domestic content bonus credit amount and the 10% increase in credit rate for energy communities as set out in Section 48, resulting in potentially sizable incentives related to clean hydrogen projects.[6]
Definitions
For the purposes of the bonus multipliers set out in Section 48, “energy project” means a project consisting of one or more energy properties (i.e., specified clean hydrogen production facilities) that are part of a single project.
“Specified clean hydrogen production facility” is defined as a “qualified clean hydrogen production facility” (see above) (1) which is placed in service after December 31, 2022, (2) with respect to which (A) no tax credit has been allowed under Section 45Q (carbon capture tax credit) or 45V (QHC production tax credit), and (B) the taxpayer makes an irrevocable election to have the energy ITC apply, and (3) for which an unrelated third party has verified that the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate for each kg of hydrogen produced at such facility does not exceed 4 kg of CO2e.[7]
No Overlap with 45Q or 45V Tax Credits
The new hydrogen credit under Section 48 provides that no credit shall be allowed under Section 45Q or Section 45V for any taxable year with respect to any specified clean hydrogen production facility (as defined directly above), meaning that taxpayers cannot stack these credits on top of the energy ITC of Section 48.[8]
Hydrogen Storage
In addition to the foregoing, the Act includes a new Section 48 ITC for “energy storage technology,” which means “property (other than property primarily used in the transportation of goods or individuals and not for the production of electricity) which receives, stores, and delivers energy for conversion electricity (or, in the case of hydrogen, which stores energy), and has a nameplate capacity of not less than 5 kilowatt hours.” As a result, standalone hydrogen storage technology is now eligible for the Section 48 ITC, as well as the corresponding wage/apprenticeship bonus multiplier, domestic content bonus credit amount and the increase in credit rate for energy communities.[9]
DIRECT PAY AND TRANSFERABILITY
Another significant movement toward bolstering the hydrogen economy is the introduction of the ability to claim the value of the clean hydrogen PTC determined under Section 45V (as detailed above) through a tax refund as if it were an overpayment of taxes. For most credits, direct pay is only available for certain non-taxable entities but is available for all taxpayers in the case of the Section 45V credit. This direct pay mechanism will, theoretically, allow for project developers and sponsors to reap more of the benefits of hydrogen-related tax credits instead of having to share or transfer those benefits to other tax equity investors. Further, under the Act, these hydrogen-related credits would also be eligible, in the alternative, for transfer to unrelated persons in a non-taxable cash sale (another route that could simplify and reduce the costs associated with hydrogen-related technology and production facilities).[10]
Applied together, these hydrogen-related provisions provided by the Act create substantial incentives for developers and investors alike. Although only time will tell how this market will develop, specialists in the field of renewables believe the impact of the Act will be monumental in transitioning away from a fossil-fuel-driven economy and toward a clean hydrogen economy.

California Governor Signs Landmark Legislation That Gives Bargaining Power to Nonunionized Fast-Food Workers
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
California Governor Signs Landmark Legislation That Gives Bargaining Power to Nonunionized Fast-Food Workers
September 8, 2022
Read time: 7 min
On September 5, 2022, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed landmark legislation aimed at further regulating the working conditions and wages of California’s fast- food workers. This bill has immediate impact on certain employers and franchisors doing business in the Golden State.
Assembly Bill (AB) 257, also known as the Fast Food Accountability and Standards Recovery Act or the FAST Recovery Act, authorizes the creation of a Fast Food Council (Council) that will be tasked with establishing minimum standards with respect to the minimum wage, maximum hours of work, the standard conditions of labor and other working conditions for fast-food workers throughout California.
WHO IS AFFECTED BY THIS LEGISLATION AND WHO IS EXCLUDED?
The FAST Recovery Act is aimed at regulating fast-food chains, defined as a set of restaurants consisting of 100 or more establishments nationally that share a common brand or are characterized by standardized options for décor, marketing, packaging, products and services.
Eateries that operate within grocery stores and bakeries are not considered fast-food restaurants and are excluded from the legislation. Also excluded are any employees whose employment is covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement that expressly provides for the wages, hours of work and working conditions of the employees, and a regular hourly rate of pay that is no less than 30% more than the state minimum wage for those employees (if the agreement offers equivalent or greater protection than the Council’s standards).
WHAT IS THE FAST FOOD COUNCIL AND WHAT WILL IT DO?
The purpose of the Council is to establish statewide minimum standards with respect to wages, working conditions and training. If there is a conflict between rules issued by the Council and another state agency, the Council’s rules will apply.
In order to establish any standards, rules or regulations, the California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) must first receive a petition of at least 10,000 fast-food workers approving the creation of the Council. The first Council meeting will then take place within 90 days of the approval of the petition and will continue to meet once every six months until January 1, 2029.
The Council, established within the DIR, will consist of 10 members, including:
- One representative from the DIR
- Two representatives of fast-food restaurant franchisors
- Two representatives of fast-food restaurant franchisees
- Two representatives of fast-food restaurant employees
- Two representatives of advocates for fast-food restaurant employees
- One representative from the California Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development.
Governor Newsom will appoint the representatives of the state agencies, fast-food restaurant employees, fast-food restaurant franchisors and fast-food restaurant franchisees. The Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Rules Committee will each be tasked with appointing one representative of fast-food employees.
The Council cannot create new paid time off benefits like paid sick leave or paid vacation, and it also will not be permitted to establish regulations related to predictive scheduling. Further, the Council will not be permitted to encroach on the jurisdiction of the Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board but is permitted to petition for the adoption, amendment or repeal of any occupational safety and health standard.
WILL AB 257 AFFECT THE MINIMUM WAGE?
While the bill does not establish a new minimum wage for fast-food workers, it does establish a minimum wage cap for fast-food workers in California. Accordingly, any minimum wage established by the Council may not exceed $22.00 per hour in 2023. Thereafter, the highest hourly wage may increase by the lesser of 3.5% or the rate of change of the US Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers.
Local jurisdictions are still permitted to establish a higher minimum wage.
WHAT ARE LOCAL FAST FOOD COUNCILS AND WHAT POWER DO THEY HAVE?
Any county or city with a population of more than 200,000 will be permitted to establish a Local Fast Food Council (Local Council) that must include at least one representative of a fast-food restaurant franchisor or franchisee and at least one representative who is a fast-food restaurant employee. The remaining members will include a majority of representatives from local employment, health and safety agencies. Local Councils will be allowed to hold meetings, open to the public, where fast-food employees will have the opportunity to be heard. The Local Council can further provide written recommendations to the Council and will operate independently.
ARE THERE ANY DISCRIMINATION OR RETALIATION PROTECTIONS IN THE BILL?
Yes, a fast-food restaurant cannot discharge or in any way discriminate or retaliate against any employee who (1) complains or discloses noncompliance information regarding employee or public health or safety to the media, legislature or watchdog agency, (2) participates in any Council or Local Council meeting, or (3) refuses to perform work because they have reasonable cause to believe that the practices of that fast-food restaurant would violate worker or public health and safety laws or regulations.
Any employee discharged, discriminated against or retaliated against in violation of the bill has a right of action to reinstatement, treble damages for lost wages and work benefits and attorneys’ fees.
Further, the bill includes a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination or retaliation where a fast-food restaurant discharges or otherwise takes any other adverse action against an employee within 90 days following the date when the restaurant had knowledge of an employee’s complaint.
WHAT’S NEXT?
Given the ambiguity surrounding the definition of “fast food restaurant” within AB 257, more clarity is required for some employers to determine whether they fall within the scope of the bill. “Fast food restaurant” is defined as:
“any establishment in the state that is part of a fast food chain and that, in its regular business operations, primarily provides food or beverages in the following manner:
(1) For immediate consumption either on or off the premises.
(2) To customers who order or select items and pay before eating.
(3) With items prepared in advance, including items that may be prepared in bulk and kept hot, or with items prepared or heated quickly.
(4) With limited or no table service. Table service does not include orders placed by a customer on an electronic device.”
The definition creates uncertainty on whether AB 257 impacts certain chain employers that are traditionally not viewed by the public as “fast food restaurants.” For example, some businesses that solely prepare and sell beverages, such as coffee or tea shops or dessert vendors that sell ice cream, may be within the purview of the statute.
Additionally, as the Council creates an avenue for sectoral bargaining—when workers bargain with multiple employers to set standards across the industry—the impact of those standards on restaurants that are not covered by the law remains to be seen but will be closely watched as the Council creates basic minimum standards for workers that are sure to reverberate throughout the food and hospitality industry.
WHAT IS AHEAD?
This legislation was heavily backed by various labor organizations, most notably the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and is viewed as a significant victory for over half a million nonunionized workers in California. Many labor leaders, including SEIU President Mary Kay Henry, view this legislation as a watershed moment—permitting covered workers to participate in concert in another form of collective bargaining without having to endure the process of forming a union in an industry that has been difficult to organize as a result of high turnover and franchise ownership. On the other side, many practitioners opposing the bill believe it leaves open several preemption arguments, including that the law is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.
The day after Governor Newsom signed AB 257, the National Labor Relations Board published a notice of proposed rulemaking seeking to modify the joint employer standard. If the proposed rule is successful, it would also ease organizing and collective bargaining for franchise workers who are often linked to multiple employers.
We anticipate several legal challenges to this bill and will continue to monitor any further clarifications and developments concerning AB 257.

Healthcare Regulatory Check-Up | August 2022
ARTICLE / REPORT
Healthcare Regulatory Check-Up | August 2022
September 2022
Read time: 3 min
This issue of McDermott’s Healthcare Regulatory Check-Up highlights significant enforcement activity between July 21 and August 20, 2022. Key updates include a case in which the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided that the phrase “resulting from” in the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) creates a but-for causal requirement between an antikickback violation and the items or services included in the claim to the government. This decision established a circuit split regarding the appropriate standard for establishing causation in False Claims Act (FCA) cases related to AKS violations. In another notable case, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an unfavorable Office of Inspector General (OIG) advisory opinion and subsequent district court ruling related to a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s proposed copay assistance program. The Second Circuit held that “corrupt” intent is not required to establish an AKS violation. This issue also reviews several criminal and civil enforcement actions related to AKS violations and false claims allegations.
In addition to examining a recent OIG advisory opinion, we provide a summary of key healthcare-related provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act, which allows the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate drug prices under Medicare for the first time, and the Joint Commission’s new health equity standards for accreditations. Finally we take a look at recent CMS activity, including its 2023 proposed and final rules for its various prospective payment systems, along with a recent proposed rule updating CMS’s interpretation of the nondiscrimination provisions of Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).

FTC Flexes Its Muscle in Suit against Kochava (But May Not Like the Results)
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
FTC Flexes Its Muscle in Suit against Kochava (But May Not Like the Results)
August 31, 2022
Read time: 6 min
On August 29, 2022, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a lawsuit against Kochava, Inc. alleging that Kochava engaged in unfair and deceptive practices by selling the “precise location information” of consumers. This suit comes on the heels of the FTC’s announcement earlier this month that it would “crack down” on “commercial surveillance practices” and July’s warning that the agency would be exercising its enforcement authority against the “illegal” use and sharing of sensitive consumer data.
The FTC alleges that Kochava amassed a large amount of sensitive data by tracking the mobile advertising IDs from hundreds of millions of mobile phones, and that such data could be used to track people visiting abortion clinics, domestic abuse shelters, places of worship and other sensitive locations. The FTC then said that Kochava sold that data without first anonymizing it, allowing anyone who purchased the data to use it to track the movements of the mobile device users. The FTC wants to not only block Kochava from selling such data, but also require them to delete and destroy it. In its complaint, the FTC relied on the FTC Act’s general prohibition against “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” and alleged that the company unfairly sold the sensitive data.
Kochava, which beat the FTC to the courthouse and preemptively filed a lawsuit against the FTC prior to the FTC’s complaint, asserted that all of the location data came from third-party data brokers who obtained the information from consenting consumers. Despite the alleged consent, Kochava says it is in the process of implementing steps to remove health services location data from its database. Kochava argued that the litigation was the outcome of the FTC’s failed attempt to implement a vague settlement that had no clear terms and made the problem a moving target.
The Kochava suit brings to the forefront several competing policy considerations, the determination of which could shape the scope of the FTC’s enforcement authority for years to come. The first and foremost issue that the Kochava suit raises is whether the FTC has the authority to effectively impose a consent-based regime for the sale of sensitive consumer information when no federal law enforced by the FTC (other than the Children’s Online Privacy Protect Act (COPPA), which applies to data collected about children under 13) expressly provides for that requirement. While it is not uncommon for the FTC to take expansive views of its enforcement authority, that authority has been successfully challenged in recent years. (See AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC, which held that the FTC does not have the statutory authority to seek equitable monetary relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act).) Now, Kochava will test the FTC’s authority to regulate in the privacy space—and the FTC may not like the result.
In the unlikely event that Kochava were to litigate against the FTC all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, Kochava might find a receptive audience. Using West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency as precedent, the Supreme Court could conclude that US Congress did not grant the FTC authority to regulate privacy issues because the FTC Act does not expressly mention privacy regulation as being within the ambit of the FTC’s authority. This would be a big problem for the FTC, which has visions of engaging in formal rulemaking on privacy and data security.
Weighing in favor of the FTC’s complaint is the fact that the FTC appears to be cracking down on the precise types of privacy concerns that the public has been focused on in the wake of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Since Dobbs, we’ve seen companies and private citizens go through great lengths to protect the need for increased sensitivity and privacy for the information regarding a person’s visit to an abortion clinic. The FTC argues that this is exactly that type of sensitive geographic information that it seeks to protect, no doubt acting on US President Joe Biden’s executive order following Dobbs, which instructed the FTC to take action to protect consumer privacy regarding reproductive health. While the president’s executive order may give those marching orders to the FTC, it does not expand the FTC’s legal authority nor give them new powers.
As a result, the Kochava action, which is consistent with the FTC’s view of its own enforcement authority in the privacy space, pits an issue of great public concern against the hard and fast statutory limits of the FTC’s authority as granted by Congress. While the likeliest outcome is a settlement that does not adjudicate that the FTC has the authority to regulate issues of privacy, Kochava is nonetheless worth watching. Kochava could either cement the FTC’s authority to regulate in the privacy space or severely limit the FTC’s authority to do so, which might actually be the exact catalyst that Congress needs to finally pass a federal privacy bill.
If you are currently facing an FTC investigation, please reach out to your regular McDermott lawyer or contact Lesli Esposito, Amy Pimentel or David Saunders with any questions.
The Guide to Telecoms Arbitrations
ARTICLE
The Guide to Telecoms Arbitrations
August 2022
Read time: 2 min
Michael Darowski and Romilly Holland authored the chapter, Civil Unrest and Investor–State Claims in the Telecommunications Sector, in the Global Arbitration Review’s Guide to Telecoms Arbitration.

Ninth Circuit Holds Unimpaired Unsecured Creditors Entitled to Post-Bankruptcy Interest on Claims at Contractual Default Rate
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Ninth Circuit Holds Unimpaired Unsecured Creditors Entitled to Post-Bankruptcy Interest on Claims at Contractual Default Rate
August 31, 2022
Read time: 5 min
“Under the long-standing ‘solvent-debtor exception,’ plaintiffs [unsecured trade creditors] possess an equitable right to receive post-petition interest at the contractual or default state law rate, subject to any other equitable considerations, before [the debtor] collects surplus value from the bankruptcy estate,” held the Ninth Circuit on Aug. 29, 2022. In re PG&E Corporation, 2022 WL 3712498, *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) (2-1). “No circuit court [had] addressed the issue [i.e., rate of post-petition interest to unimpaired unsecured creditors], and bankruptcy courts have reached different conclusions.” Id., at *4. In this case, additional post-petition interest to unsecured creditors at contractual rates or the California statutory interest rate, rather than the then-applicable “much lower” 2.59 percent federal judgment rate, could total an additional $200 million. Id., at *3. The court did not impose either the contractual default rate or the California judgment rate, but instead remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court “to weigh the equities and determine what rate of interest plaintiffs are entitled to….” Id., at *13. But the Ninth Circuit warned the bankruptcy judge that “the solvent-debtor exception, though equitable in nature, does not give bankruptcy judges ‘free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with [their] personal views of justice and fairness.’“ Id. at *14. According to the court, “the record before us is limited,” causing the remand, but it saw nothing that would “defeat the presumption that plaintiffs are entitled to contractual or default post-petition interest.” Id.
Relevance
The Fifth Circuit heard argument in another similar case during October 2021 on a direct appeal from a Texas bankruptcy court’s holding that the “Bankruptcy Code [does not allow]… a solvent debtor to avoid paying unimpaired unsecured creditors a contractual liquidated damages claim and to avoid paying postpetition interest at contractual default rates.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 624 B.R. 178, 181 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020) (appeal pending in Fifth Circuit) (“Ultra”). A decision in Ultra is expected soon.
The PG&E decision is therefore important. In Ultra, the debtor argued, among other things, that the federal judgment rate is the “legal” rate of post-petition interest. The bankruptcy court in Ultra rejected that argument. Although the dissent in PG&E argued that “unsecured creditors are not entitled to any post-petition interest from a solvent debtor… not even PG&E advocated this position, instead conceding that the Code entitled plaintiffs… to post-petition interest… at the federal judgment rate.” PG&E, at *12.
The former Bankruptcy Act § 63(a) cut off interest at the petition date — the “default rule in bankruptcy law,” said the Ninth Circuit, 2022 WL 3712478, at *4. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911). But the Supreme Court later noted that the solvent debtor exception under English law “carried over into our system.” City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 330 n. (7) (1949). And the Second Circuit also held that it was the “opposite of equity to allow [a solvent debtor] to escape the expressly bargained-for” contractual interest provision. Ruskin v. Griffiths, 269 F.2d 827, 832 (2d Cir. 1959). Another bankruptcy court recently held in a Bankruptcy Code case, however, that post-petition interest should be calculated at the lower federal judgment rate, not the contractual or default rate. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. The Hertz Corp., 637 B.R. 781, 800-01 (Bankr. Del. Dec. 22, 2021). See also In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 540 B.R. 109, 124 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (interest based on “equitable principles,” at rate court “deems appropriate.”).
Comment
The Ninth Circuit’s sensible decision should be followed by the Fifth Circuit in Ultra. A circuit split would probably have to be resolved by the Supreme Court, a development that would only cause further uncertainty, delay and expense in the lower courts. The unsecured creditor interest-rate controversy should end. Appellate courts generally agree that oversecured creditors are entitled to contractual or default interest. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1989) (“Recovery of postpetition interest is unqualified” for “oversecured” creditor); In re Future Media Prod., 547 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008) (oversecured lender awarded post-petition interest at prepetition default rate); In re Gencarelli, 501 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (same).
Authored by Michael L. Cook and Douglas S. Mintz.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
Recent Developments in Tax Law: The Planned Global Minimum Tax
ARTICLE
Recent Developments in Tax Law: The Planned Global Minimum Tax
August 2022
Read time: 2 min
Dr. Gero Burwitz authored the article “Recent Developments in Tax Law: The planned global minimum tax”, featured in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), p. 1099 et seq. in August, 2022.

REAL ESTATE UPDATE: Trade Tax Liability on Rental Income and Capital Gains from Property Management in Germany?
ARTICLE
REAL ESTATE UPDATE: Trade Tax Liability on Rental Income and Capital Gains from Property Management in Germany?
August 2022
Read time: 2 min
New BFH ruling on domestic permanent establishments
For real estate investors who invest in German real estate with foreign companies, uncertainties regularly arise from the question whether service providers (e.g. asset or property managers) in Germany lead to a domestic permanent establishment and thus to a trade tax liability in Germany, e.g. for rental income and capital gains. Uncertainties had arisen in particular from a ruling by the Berlin-Brandenburg Fiscal Court (FG) in 2019, which had applied very strict standards.
In its recently published ruling of March 23, 2022, III R 35/20, the Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof, BFH) specified the requirements for the assumption of a domestic permanent establishment.

Multiple Layers of TCPA Defense Remain Important after Duguid
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / REPORT
Multiple Layers of TCPA Defense Remain Important after Duguid
August 26, 2022
Read time: 6 min
The Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in Facebook v. Duguid[1] changed the landscape of Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) litigation. For years prior, aggressive plaintiffs had stretched the TCPA’s antiquated language defining automatic telephone dialing systems (ATDS) well beyond its breaking point. The ATDS definition is critical, as use of an ATDS triggers consent requirements under Section 227(b) of the TCPA and failure to comply can result in catastrophic liability.
Duguid emphasized that Congress meant what it said in defining an ATDS, and its definition must be applied as written. An ATDS is defined as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”[2] The Supreme Court held that the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” was meant to qualify the entire preceding phrase, such that an automatic dialing system must use random or sequential number generators to either store or produce telephone numbers in order to qualify as an ATDS.
The Duguid holding is an important defense to expansive and atextual TCPA claims, and it has substantially reduced the number of ATDS claims filed each week. But it has not eliminated such claims, and the risk of liability under the ATDS provision, as well as other sections of the TCPA, remains a critical compliance challenge. Sophisticated entities that rely on outgoing calls and texts to communicate with clients, customers, patients, and employees continue to build multiple layers of defense to TCPA claims. Three recent developments emphasize why layered defense remains a prudent strategy:
1. Panzarella v. Navient Solutions, Inc. (3rd Cir. 2022)
In one of the first appellate cases interpreting the TCPA post-Duguid, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s decision in Panzarella v. Navient Solutions, Inc.[3] demonstrates that callers can still expect to be subject to litigation under the ATDS provision (if not necessarily liability).
Panzarella focuses on the term “equipment” in the definition of an ATDS. The Third Circuit reasoned that “equipment” does not only refer to the dialing system itself, but also encompasses any components that are used together to place a telephone call. Using this reasoning, the Court ruled that (for example) a SQL server that stores phone numbers and communicates with a dialing system to place telephone calls falls under the scope of “equipment” that is subject to the TCPA, based on its open-ended capacity.
The Third Circuit drew a relatively novel distinction for what equipment constitutes an ATDS, and which equipment triggers TCPA liability when used. In other words, the Court narrowly construed the Duguid decision, stating that it only served to resolve a circuit split by concluding that dialing systems that have the capacity to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential generator and dialing systems that have the capacity to store a telephone number using a random or sequential generator would qualify as an ATDS. But importantly for defendants, there is no liability unless the defendants actually used the capacity in question.
While the reasoning in Panzarella may be relatively novel, its implications are clear: Companies should be prepared to continue to defend against TCPA claims even in the wake of Duguid. Panzarella was resolved on an appeal of a successful summary judgment ruling—a good outcome for the defendant, but no doubt an expensive one. To the extent the Third Circuit’s distinction between capacity and use requires further clarification later, litigation risk (and expense) remains a consideration.
2. Potential Federal Legislation Expanding the Scope of the TCPA
HR 8334,[4] which was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on July 12, 2022, was conceived as a potential legislative response to Duguid. It introduces an important change by amending the definition of an ATDS by striking the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” altogether. This would mean that any dialing system that has the capacity to merely store or produce telephone numbers would fall under the scope of the statute, thereby reinstating the most plaintiff-friendly pre-Duguid interpretations of what constitutes an ATDS. It is unclear how this bill will progress, but HR 8334 is a signal that there are members of Congress who intend to expand the TCPA in ways that will lead to continued class-action litigation.
3. State “Mini-TCPA” Laws Expanding the Landscape of TCPA-Type Claims
The Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA)[5] took effect July 1, 2021. Much like the proposed language in HR 8334, it prohibits sales calls and texts placed using an “automated system for the selection or dialing of telephone numbers or the playing of a recorded message when a connection is completed to the number called” without first obtaining prior express written consent. This is an express response to Duguid and it substantially expands the types of dialing systems subject to TCPA-like restrictions and penalties. The FTSA has resulted in a wave of litigation in Florida. While we have successfully resolved a number of claims under this statute, larger constitutional and preemption issues loom. Although defendants will have strong arguments in this regard, the cost and risk of litigation in Florida remains a critical concern—and plaintiffs’ lawyers are ready to capitalize on it. We also observe that other states, including Michigan[6] and Oklahoma[7], are considering similar legislation.
* * *
McDermott works with clients every day to defend TCPA and FTSA claims, as well as to help develop defense-in-depth strategies to prevent claims in the first place. While Duguid is a helpful development in the law, sound compliance approaches remain vital—and are far less expensive than litigation.
[1] Facebook v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
[2] Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
[3] Panzarella v. Navient Solutions, Inc., ___ 3rd Cir. ____ (3rd Cir. 2022).
[4] HR 8334, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/8334/text?r=1&s=1.
[5] Florida Telephone Solicitation Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.059.
[6] Michigan HB 6307.
[7] Oklahoma Telephone Solicitation Act of 2022, http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/2021-22%20ENR/hB/HB3168%20ENR.PDF.

ThoughtLeaders4 Private Client Magazine ‘Next Gen Wealth’ Edition
ARTICLE
ThoughtLeaders4 Private Client Magazine ‘Next Gen Wealth’ Edition
August 26, 2022
Read time: 2 min
Nicholas Holland and Jennifer Ronz authored the article, Does Butler-Sloss and Ors V The Charity Commission and Attorney General Go Far Enough?, featured in ThoughtLeaders4 Private Client Magazine ‘Next Gen Wealth’ Edition.
