Content Type: Article

  • FinCEN Issues Final Rule Requiring Reporting of Beneficial Ownership Information

    FinCEN Issues Final Rule Requiring Reporting of Beneficial Ownership Information

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN Issues Final Rule Requiring Reporting of Beneficial Ownership Information

    October 20, 2022

    Read time: 23 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Sept. 30, 2022, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of the Treasury (“FinCEN”) issued a final rule (the “Final Rule”)[1] implementing beneficial ownership information reporting requirements under the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), enacted as part of the Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Act of 2020.[2] As discussed in greater detail below, the Final Rule requires certain legal entities formed or registered to do business in the United States (each, a “Reporting Company”) to report to FinCEN certain identifying information regarding (i) individuals with equity ownership of, or substantial control over, the Reporting Company; (ii) individuals responsible for filing certain documents with FinCEN on behalf of the Reporting Company; and (iii) the Reporting Company itself. Information reported to FinCEN is to be held in a non-public database maintained by FinCEN, which will be accessible to United States government agencies, tax authorities, law enforcement and, with the Reporting Company’s consent, certain financial institutions.[3]

    FinCEN has adopted the Final Rule largely as proposed in December 2021,[4] with certain modifications “intended to minimize unnecessary burdens on [Reporting Companies].”[5] The requirements outlined in the Final Rule will become effective Jan. 1, 2024.

    This Alert summarizes key takeaways from the Final Rule.

    1. What Is the Purpose of the Reporting Requirements Outlined in the Final Rule?

    The CTA was enacted to expand the United States government’s ability to collect beneficial ownership information (“BOI”) in order to protect United States national security and the United States financial system from illicit use. Such information, FinCEN explains, will help “prevent drug traffickers, fraudsters, corrupt actors such as oligarchs, and proliferators from laundering or hiding money and other assets in the United States.”[6]

    FinCEN points out that illicit actors frequently rely on shell companies “to obfuscate their identities and launder their ill-gotten gains through the United States,” a practice that FinCEN describes as undermining United States national security and threatening United States economic prosperity. By “shielding” the identities of the true owners and control persons of entities formed or registered in the United States, criminals are effectively allowed to hide behind shell and front companies in order to access the United States financial system, which in turn, puts small, law-abiding United States businesses at a disadvantage. FinCEN also highlights that “Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 . . . underscored that Russian elites, state-owned enterprises, and organized crime, as well as Russian government proxies have attempted to use U.S. and non-U.S. shell companies to evade sanctions imposed on Russia.”

    2. Which Entity Is a “Reporting Company” Required to File Reports With FinCEN under the Final Rule?

    Subject to numerous exemptions (designed to exclude many regulated entities and operating businesses, as discussed below), a Reporting Company includes (i) a domestic corporation, limited liability corporation (LLC), limited partnership, business trust or any other entity created by filing a document with a secretary of state or comparable United States office; and (ii) a foreign company registered to do business in any U.S. state or Tribal jurisdiction.[7]

    Certain subsidiaries of an entity that is exempt from the definition of “Reporting Company” are similarly exempt from BOI reporting requirements.[8]

    In response to public comments to the proposed rule asking FinCEN for greater clarification on which entities qualify as Reporting Companies, FinCEN notes that “state corporate formation law and practices dictate whether an entity is a [Reporting Company].”[9]

    3. What Information Will a Reporting Company Be Required to Disclose to FinCEN?

    Each Reporting Company will be required to identify itself to FinCEN in a Beneficial Ownership Information Report (“BOI Report”) and disclose therein certain information regarding its Beneficial Owners and Company Applicants (defined below, respectively), as well as additional identifying information regarding the Reporting Company.

    Beneficial Owner Information. The Final Rule requires each Reporting Company to disclose to FinCEN the following information pertaining to each of its Beneficial Owners: (i) full legal name; (ii) date of birth; (iii) complete current street address (residential or business); (iv) a unique identifying number from an acceptable identification document;[10] and (v) an image of the document from which the unique identifying number was obtained.

    Company Applicant Information. Reporting Companies created after Jan. 1, 2024 are required to disclose the same identifying information for Company Applicants as is required for Beneficial Owners, except that a business address rather than residential address may be provided. The Final Rule, however, does not require Reporting Companies existing or registered at the time of the Final Rule’s effective date to report on their Company Applicants.[11]

    Additional Self-Identifying Information. Each Reporting Company must also disclose to FinCEN the following self-identifying information:

    • Company’s full name;
    • Any trade name or “doing business as” name;
    • Business street address;
    • State or Tribal jurisdiction of formation; and
    • Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Taxpayer Identification Number (or, in the case of a non-U.S. Reporting Company, any tax identification or similar number issued by the relevant non-U.S. jurisdiction and the name of that jurisdiction).

    4. Who Can Access a Reporting Company’s BOI Report?

    The CTA only authorizes FinCEN to disclose reported BOI “in limited circumstances” to an enumerated group of governmental authorities and financial institutions.[12] FinCEN explains that “[g]iven the sensitivity of the reportable information, the CTA imposes strict confidentiality, security, and access restrictions on the data FinCEN collects.”[13] For example, financial institutions will only be able to access BOI, with the consent of the Reporting Company, in order to help the financial institution comply with its requirements under the Customer Due Diligence (“CDD”) rule. Additionally, a financial institution’s regulator will obtain BOI that has been provided to a financial institution that it regulates “for the purpose of performing regulatory oversight that is specific to that financial institution.”[14]

    5. Who Is a Beneficial Owner?

    The Final Rule defines a Beneficial Owner as an individual who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise (i) owns or controls not less than 25 percent of the ownership interests of a Reporting Company; or (ii) exercises substantial control over a Reporting Company. The Final Rule provides standards for calculating an individual’s “ownership interests” and outlines various activities that could constitute “substantial control” of a Reporting Company.

    • Ownership Interests. Ownership interests include equity in the Reporting Company, as well as other types of interests, such as capital or profit interests, including partnership interests, convertible instruments, warrants or rights, or other options or privileges to acquire equity, capital or other interests in a Reporting Company. Debt instruments are included in ownership interests if they enable the holder to exercise the same rights as one of the specified equity or other interests, including the ability to convert the instrument into one of the specified equity or other interests.[15] An individual may reach the 25 percent threshold by jointly owning or controlling with one or more other persons an undivided ownership interest in a Reporting Company.
    • Substantial Control. The Final Rule provides three specific indicators of substantial control: (i) service as a senior officer of a Reporting Company; (ii) authority over the appointment or removal of any senior officer or dominant majority of the board of directors (or similar body) of a Reporting Company; and (iii) direction, determination or substantial influence over important matters of a Reporting Company.

    The Final Rule also includes a catch-all provision to make clear that substantial control can take additional forms not specifically listed. Thus, an individual may be determined to directly or indirectly exercise substantial control over a Reporting Company through a variety of means, such as (i) board representation; (ii) ownership or control of a majority or dominant minority of the voting shares of the Reporting Company; (iii) holding rights associated with any financing arrangement or interest in a Reporting Company; (iv) controlling one or more intermediary entities that separately or collectively exercise substantial control over a Reporting Company; (v) having in place arrangements or financial or business relationships, whether formal or informal, with other individuals or entities acting as nominees; or (vi) through any other contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise. Notably, unlike FinCEN’s CDD rule, the Final Rule’s definition could require information to be provided on more than one individual under the substantial control prong.

    • Exclusions. A Beneficial Owner does not include (i) an individual acting as a nominee, intermediary, custodian or agent on behalf of another individual; (ii) an employee of a Reporting Company, acting solely as an employee and not as a senior officer, whose substantial control over or economic benefits from such entity are derived solely from the employment status of the employee; (iii) a Reporting Company’s creditors, unless the creditor holds at least 25 percent of the Reporting Company or has substantial control over the Reporting Company; (iv) an individual whose only interest in a Reporting Company is a future interest through a right of inheritance; or (v) a minor child, if the information of a parent or guardian is reported.[16]

    6. Who Is a Company Applicant?

    A Company Applicant is defined in the Final Rule as (i) the individual who directly files a document that creates a domestic Reporting Company or who first registers a foreign Reporting Company with a secretary of state or similar office in the United States; or (ii) the individual who is “primarily responsible for directing or controlling such filing if more than one individual is involved in the filing of the document.”[17] FinCEN clarifies that a Company Applicant could therefore include an individual outside of the Reporting Company, such as an outside counsel or paralegal, if such person oversees the preparation of a creation document for the Reporting Company, as well as directly files it with the appropriate authority.[18]

    7. What Is a FinCEN Identifier?

    In order to “minimize burdens” on Reporting Companies “associated with the collection of beneficial ownership information, including by eliminating duplicative requirements; and . . . ensure the beneficial ownership information reported to FinCEN is accurate, complete, and highly useful,”[19] and “[g]iven the sensitivity of the reportable information,”[20] any person required to report BOI to FinCEN will be eligible to obtain a “FinCEN Identifier” and provide such FinCEN Identifier to a Reporting Company to be included on a BOI Report in lieu of having to provide the underlying information requested on the BOI Report. A FinCEN Identifier is a unique identification number that FinCEN will issue to Beneficial Owners, Company Applicants or Reporting Companies upon request, provided that certain conditions are met.[21]

    With respect to Beneficial Owners and Company Applicants, FinCEN will issue a FinCEN Identifier if an individual submits to FinCEN the same four pieces of identifying information as would be required in a BOI Report.[22]

    Reporting Companies that have provided their BOI to FinCEN will also be eligible to receive a FinCEN Identifier upon filing their initial BOI Report under certain circumstances.[23]

    8. What Entities Are Exempted From the Definition of Reporting Company?

    Closely paralleling the exemptions in the Customer Identification Program (“CIP”) and CDD rules,[24] the Final Rule provides 23 exemptions from the definition of Reporting Company, many of which are for entities “already subject to substantial federal and/or state regulation or already have to provide their beneficial ownership information to a governmental authority.”[25] Such exemptions include the following:[26]

    1. A securities issuer registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or otherwise required to file information under section 15(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
    2. An investment company[27] that is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under the Investment Company Act of 1940[28] (“40 Act”).[29]
    3. An investment adviser[30] that is registered with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940[31] (“Advisers Act”).[32]
    4. A venture capital fund adviser that is (i) described in section 203(l) of the Advisers Act, and (ii) that has “filed Item 10, Schedule A, and Schedule B of Part 1A of Form ADV, or any successor thereto, with the [SEC].”[33]
    5. A money services business.[34]
    6. A bank.[35]
    7. A depository institution holding company.[36]
    8. A federal or state credit union.[37]
    9. A broker-dealer registered under section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and defined in § 3 of the same.[38]
    10. A futures commission merchant, introducing broker, swap dealer, major swap participant, commodity pool operator and commodity trading adviser registered with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.[39]
    11. An insurance company as defined in § 2 of the 40 Act.
    12. A state-licensed insurance producer.[40]
    13. A securities exchange or clearing agency.[41]
    14. A domestic governmental authority.[42]
    15. Any public accounting firm registered in accordance with § 102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.[43]
    16. Any regulated public utility that provides telecommunications services, electrical power, natural gas or water and sewer services within the United States.[44]
    17. Any financial market utility designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council under section 804 of the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010.[45]
    18. A tax exempt entity.[46]
    19. An entity assisting a tax exempt entity.[47]
    20. An inactive business.[48]
    21. Any “pooled investment vehicle” that is operated or advised by a (i) bank, (ii) Federal or State credit union, (iii) SEC-registered broker-dealer, (iv) SEC registered investment company or investment adviser or (v) venture capital fund adviser.[49]

      The Final Rule defines a “pooled investment vehicle” to mean (i) any investment company, as defined in section 3(a) of the 40 Act;[50] or (ii) any company that (a) would be an investment company under that section but for the exclusion provided from that definition by paragraph (1) or (7) of section 3(c) of the 40 Act, and (b) is identified by its legal name by the applicable investment adviser in its Form ADV (or successor form) filed with the SEC or will be so identified in the next annual updating amendment to Form ADV required to be filed by the applicable investment adviser pursuant to rule 204–1 under the Advisers Act.[51] Such pooled investment vehicles are not required to file a BOI Report with FinCEN between their formation date and the date they are identified by a legal name by their applicable investment adviser in Form ADV (or successor form) filed with the SEC.[52]

    22. Larger operating companies that (i) “employ[] more than 20 employees on a full-time basis in the United States”; (ii) “filed in the previous year Federal income tax returns in the United States demonstrating more than $5,000,000 in gross receipts or sales in the aggregate,” including the receipts or sales of other entities owned by the entity and through which the entity operates; and have (iii) “an operating presence at a physical office within the United States.”[53]
    23. Subsidiaries of certain exempt entities, i.e., entities whose ownership interests are “controlled or wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more” exempt entities other than money services businesses, pooled investment vehicles, entities assisting a tax‐exempt entity, or inactive entities, are also exempt from BOI reporting requirements.[54]

    9. Which Exemptions From the Definition of Reporting Company Apply to Investment Funds and Investment Advisers?

    The Final Rule exempts from the definition of “Reporting Company” many private investment funds and their advisers, relieving the majority of funds and advisers from reporting their beneficial ownership information to FinCEN. More specifically, the Final Rule exempts from the definition of Reporting Company: mutual funds; SEC registered investment advisers; venture capital fund advisers (as defined under Rule 203(l)-1); and pooled investment vehicles formed under the laws of the United States that are operated or advised by a bank, credit union, broker-dealer, SEC-registered investment adviser or venture capital fund adviser. Each of these entities is not required to submit a BOI Report to FinCEN.

    However, other investment advisers that are not registered with the SEC, such as state-registered investment advisers and advisers relying on the “private fund adviser exemption,” available to advisers that solely advise private funds if the adviser has assets under management in the United States of less than $150 million (under Rule 203(m)-1), are not included in the list of exemptions from the definition of Reporting Company. Neither are the pooled investment vehicles operated and advised by such advisers. Such advisers, and the pooled investment vehicles they manage, will thus be required to file BOI Reports with FinCEN unless another exemption to the definition of Reporting Company applies. For example, FinCEN provides that an investment adviser that is not otherwise exempt may be able to rely on the exemption available for an entity that employs more than 20 employees on a full-time basis in the United States, has more than $5 million in gross receipts or sales in the aggregate, and maintains a physical office presence within the United States.[55]

    Because private investment fund managers often advise numerous funds and special purpose vehicles, both foreign and domestic, it is important for them to become familiar with the Final Rule’s requirements and incorporate any applicable reporting obligations into their compliance functions.

    10. When Must Reporting Companies File BOI Reports With FinCEN?

    Reporting Companies formed or registered before Jan. 1, 2024 will have one year (until Jan. 1, 2025) to file their initial reports, whereas Reporting Companies formed or registered after Jan. 1, 2024, will have 30 days after receiving actual notice of their formation or registration to file their initial reports. Thereafter, Reporting Companies will have 30 days to report any changes to the BOI provided in their previously-filed reports. Reporting Companies will further be required to correct any inaccuracies in their BOI Reports within 30 days of becoming aware of or having reason to know of any inaccurate information included in such Reporting Companies’ earlier BOI Reports.[56]

    These timing provisions differ slightly from those initially proposed by FinCEN. FinCEN had originally proposed a 14-day window for newly-qualified Reporting Companies to file an initial report and for Reporting Companies to correct information included in a previous report. FinCEN extended this time period in the Final Rule to 30 days in response to public comments.[57]

    11. What Are the Penalties for Non-Compliance With the Final Rule’s Requirements?

    The Final Rule sets penalties for failing to report or reporting inaccurate or incomplete information. Any person who (i) willfully provides, or attempts to provide, false or fraudulent beneficial ownership information, including a false or fraudulent identifying photograph or document; or (ii) willfully fails to report, complete or update beneficial ownership information (a) shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $500 for each day that the violation continues or has not been remedied and (b) may be fined not more than $10,000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.[58] The Final Rule clarifies that this applies to individuals, including Beneficial Owners, as well as Reporting Companies. However, there is a safe harbor if a report that contains inaccurate information is voluntarily corrected within 90 days so long as the inaccurate report was not submitted to evade the reporting requirements or with actual knowledge of its inaccuracy.[59]

    Lastly, with respect to compliance, the preamble to the Final Rule indicates that “FinCEN intends to prioritize education and outreach to ensure that all reporting companies and individuals are aware of and on notice regarding their reporting obligations.”[60] FinCEN notes that the effective date of Jan. 1, 2024 and the one-year compliance period essentially give existing reporting companies over two years from the publication of this rule to prepare to come into compliance with their reporting obligations. FinCEN will take into consideration the request to add examples of reporting violations in any future guidance or Frequently Asked Questions issued by FinCEN.

    12. What Are FinCEN’s Next Steps in Implementing the CTA?

    The Final Rule is one of three FinCEN rulemakings planned to implement the CTA. FinCEN will engage in two additional rulemakings to (i) establish who is permitted to access BOI Reports filed with FinCEN, for what purposes BOI Reports can be accessed and what safeguards will be put in place to protect and secure BOI; and (ii) revise FinCEN’s CDD rule to align with the Final Rule. FinCEN states that it is continuing to “develop the infrastructure to administer these requirements, including the information technology system that will be used to store [BOI] in accordance with the strict security and confidentiality requirements of the CTA.”[61]

    Conclusion

    The Final Rule brings the United States AML regulatory framework one step closer to transparency regarding the beneficial ownership of entities operating within the United States financial system. The centralized BOI database to be created pursuant to the CTA, and the information required to be reported pursuant to the Final Rule, will provide United States financial regulators, law enforcement and financial institutions with additional information to combat financial crime, as contemplated by Congress and the CTA.

    In preparation for filing BOI Reports in line with the Final Rule’s requirements, Reporting Companies should ensure that they are in possession of any information required to be included in such BOI Reports prior to the Jan. 1, 2025 filing deadline and that each Reporting Company has policies and procedures in place to ensure its ongoing compliance with FinCEN’s requirements.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    Betty Santangelo – New York (+1 212.756.2587)

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471)

    Hannah M. Thibideau – New York (+1 212.756.2382)

    Kyle B. Hendrix – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7465)


    [1] FinCEN, Final Rule, Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 87 Fed. Reg. 59.498 (Sept. 30, 2022), (hereinafter, “Final Rule”). See also FinCEN, Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule Fact Sheet (Sept. 29, 2022), [hereinafter “Fact Sheet”].

    [2] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (CTA §§ 6401–03).

    [3] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,501.

    [4] For more information regarding the CTA and AML Act generally, please see our prior Alert “Passage of Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 Includes Comprehensive BSA/AML Reform Measures.”

    [5] Id. at 59,509. For FinCEN’s proposed rule, see FinCEN, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 86 Fed. Reg. 69,920 (Dec. 8, 2021).

    [6] Fact Sheet, supra.

    [7] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593.

    [8] Id.

    [9] Id. at 59,538.

    [10] Acceptable identification documents include (1) non-expired passport issued by the United States government; (2) non-expired identification document issued by a state local government or Indian Tribe for the purpose of identifying the individual; (3) non-expired driver’s license issued by a State; or (4) non-expired passport issued by a foreign government. Final Rule at 59,519. The identification document must specify the jurisdiction in which it was issued. See Fact Sheet, supra.

    [11] Reporting Companies formed or registered after the effective date of the rule are similarly excluded from the requirement to update company applicant information. See Fact Sheet, supra.

    [12] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,507.

    [13] Id. (providing that “Federal agencies, for example, may only obtain access to BOI when it will be used in furtherance of a national security, intelligence, or law enforcement activity. For state, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, ‘a court of competent jurisdiction’ must authorize the agency to seek BOI as part of a criminal or civil investigation. Foreign government access is limited to requests made by foreign law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges in specified circumstances.” [Internal citations omitted]).

    [14] Id., citing 31 U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2)(C).

    [15] This is similar to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) definition of “equity security” in 17 C.F.R. § 230.

    [16] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,595; see also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(a)(3)(B)).

    [17] Id. at 59,596.

    [18] Id. at 59,536.

    [19] 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(4).

    [20] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,507.

    [21] Id. at 59,507.

    [22] I.e., the individual’s (1) full legal name; (2) date of birth; (3) complete current street address (residential or business); and (4) unique identifying number from an acceptable identification document. See 31 U.S.C. 5336(b)(3)(A)(i).

    [23] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,507.

    [24] See 31 CFR §§ 1020.315(b)(2) through (b)(4) (listing exemptions from the bank CIP rule); 31 CFR §§ 1010.230(e)(2) and (h) (listing exemptions from the CDD rule).

    [25] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,539.

    [26] See Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593–94. See also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(a)(11)(B)) (providing for the same in the statutory context).

    [27] As defined in section 3 of the 40 Act (15 USC § 80a-3). Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593.

    [28] 15 USC § 80a-1, et seq.

    [29] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593–94; see also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(a)(11)(A)(x)).

    [30] As defined in section 202 of the Advisers Act (15 USC § 80b-2).

    [31] 15 USC § 80b-1, et seq.

    [32] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593–94; see also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(a)(11)(A)(x)).

    [33] Final Rule 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,594; see also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(a)(11)(A)(xi)).

    [34] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593.

    [35] As defined in (i) section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 USC § 1813); (ii) section 2(a) of the 40 Act (15 USC § 80a-2(a)); and (iii) section 202(a) of the Advisers Act (15 USC § 80b-2(a)). Id.

    [36] Any bank holding company as defined in section two of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841), or any savings and loan holding company as defined in section 10(a) of the Home Owners’ Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 1467a(a)). Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593; see also id. at 59,540-41.

    [37] As defined in § 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 USC § 1752). Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593.

    [38] 15 USC § 78o and 15 USC § 789c, respectively. Id.

    [39] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,594.

    [40] I.e., an insurance producer that has “an operating presence at a physical office within the United States” and is “authorized by a State and subject to supervision by the insurance commissioner or a similar official or agency of a State.” Id.

    [41] FinCEN notes that the per the SEC’s website, there are currently only 38 such agencies in the United States altogether. Final Rule, Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,566.

    [42] A “governmental authority” means any entity (i) “established under the laws of the United States, an Indian tribe, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or under an interstate compact between two or more States” that (ii) “[e]xercises governmental authority on behalf of the United States or any such Indian tribe, State, or political subdivision.” Final Rule, Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,593.

    [43] 15 U.S.C. 7212. Final Rule, Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,594.

    [44] As defined in 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(33)(A). Id.

    [45] 12 U.S.C. § 5463. Id.

    [46] A tax exempt entity is defined to mean an organization that is (i) described in § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (“Code”) (determined without regard to § 508(a) of the Code) and exempt from tax under § 501(a) of the Code; or (ii) a political organization as defined in § 527(e)(1) of the Code that is exempt from tax under § 527(a) of the Code; or (iii) a trust described in paragraphs (1) or (2) of § 4947(a) of the Code. See Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,594. Recognizing public comments FinCEN received raising concerns about potential exploitation of this exemption, FinCEN intends to monitor its application and “assess the need for further guidance, notices, or FAQs accordingly.” Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,541-42.

    [47] An “entity assisting a tax-exempt entity” is an entity that “(i) operates exclusively to provide financial assistance to, or hold governance rights over, a tax-exempt entity, (ii) is a U.S. person, (iii) is beneficially owned or controlled exclusively by one or more U.S. persons that are U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and (iv) derives at least a majority of its funding or revenue from one or more United States persons that are United States citizens or lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,542.

    [48] To be exempt from the CTA’s reporting requirements as an “inactive entity,” a business must (i) have been in existence on or before Jan. 1, 2020 (the date of enactment of the CTA); (ii) not be engaged in active business; (iii) not be owned by a foreign person, whether directly or indirectly, wholly or partially; (iv) not have “experienced any change in ownership in the preceding 12-month period,”; (v) not have “sent or received any funds in an amount greater than $1,000, either directly or through any financial account in which the entity or any affiliate of the entity had an interest, in the preceding 12-month period”; and (vi) not otherwise hold any kind or type of assets, whether in the United States or abroad, including any ownership interest in any corporation, limited liability company or other similar entity. Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,545.

    [49] Id.; see also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(a)(11)(A)(xviii)).

    [50] 15 USC § 80a-3(a).

    [51] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,596.

    [52] Id. at 59,544.

    [53] Id. at 59,594.

    [54] Id.

    [55] See Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,584.

    [56] See Fact Sheet, supra.

    [57] See Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,560.

    [58] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,596; see also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(h)).

    [59] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,513; see also CTA § 6403 (adding 31 USC § 5336(h)(4)(3)(C)(i)).

    [60] Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59,546.

    [61] Fact Sheet, supra.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kyle B. Hendrix

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • CPPA Releases Updated CCPA Regulations

    CPPA Releases Updated CCPA Regulations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CPPA Releases Updated CCPA Regulations

    October 19, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On October 17, 2022, the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) released its much-anticipated updates to the proposed California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) regulations in response to the hundreds of public comments received by the CPPA to its originally proposed regulations. This alert summarizes the revised regulations, which will be the subject of four days of CPPA board meetings occurring on October 21 to 22, 2022, and again on October 28 to 29, 2022. The revisions will also likely trigger an additional comment period, and further changes are possible. We will continue to provide updates as they occur.

    In depth

    KEY TAKEAWAYS

    While some onerous provisions remain, many changes to the proposed regulations will lessen the burden on businesses as compared to the originally proposed regulations. For example:

    • Many of the previously “mandatory” technical requirements are now “permissive”;
    • The changes either eliminate or ease requirements to flow down rights requests (such as “Do Not Sell” requests);
    • There is now clarification that the right to limit the use or disclosure of Sensitive Personal Information (SPI) only applies to SPI used to make an inference about an individual; and
    • Service providers are no longer required to explicitly state in contract that they may use personal information to build or improve the quality of their services, or to prevent, investigate or detect security incidents and other malicious activity.

    However, several more burdensome requirements have not changed, including:

    • The Global Privacy Control remains mandatory; and
    • There remain strict limitations on processing for “incompatible” purposes.

    We describe the changes in more detail below.

    SOME ONEROUS PROVISIONS REMAIN

    Despite support in the public comments for certain changes, some of the more onerous regulatory provisions remain.

    Opt-Out Preference Signal Remains Mandatory: Although many hoped that the requirement to honor Global Privacy Control (GPC) signals would be made optional, the modified regulations continue to require businesses to honor GPC signals (i.e., user-enabled online signals about a user’s opt-out preferences).

    Stringent “Compatible Processing” Limitations Remain: Many had also hoped that modified regulations would ease strict limitations on processing data for unrelated purposes. Although the CPPA did add more “factors” to provide flexibility, the regulations continue to require consent for businesses to process personal information for purposes beyond (i) what a reasonable consumer would expect and (ii) where there is a weak link between the initial purpose and that secondary purpose. For example, a weak link exists between the consumer’s reasonable expectations that the personal information will be collected to provide a requested cloud storage service and the use of that same information to research and develop an unrelated facial recognition service.

    Contracts Required with all Data Recipients: Although often overlooked, the CPRA amendments to the CCPA would require contracts not only with contractors and service providers but also with “third-party” data recipients. The regulations now both (a) require businesses to execute contracts with third parties to whom data is sold or shared and (b) prohibit third parties from collecting, using or otherwise processing personal information absent such a contract.

    MOST OTHER CHANGES LESSEN OPERATIONAL BURDENS

    Most of the regulation changes will lower compliance burdens on businesses, even if the changes do not go as far as many had hoped. Key examples include:

    • Section 7002 has been substantially modified to provide “factors” that businesses (and the CPPA) will use to determine whether data use by a business was “reasonably expected” by the consumer or, if not, whether a business needs to obtain consent to engage in such secondary data uses.
    • Section 7012 no longer requires businesses to disclose the identity or privacy practices of third parties that directly collect information from consumers via the business’s digital or physical properties.
    • Sections 7014 and 7027 confirm that the right to limit SPI uses and disclosures does not apply to sensitive personal information unless the SPI is used to infer characteristics about a consumer.
    • Section 7022 lessens the operational burden for service providers/contractors to provide a “detailed explanation” why deletion requests cannot be flowed down to service providers/contractors (or why the service providers/contractors cannot comply).
    • Section 7023 eliminates the requirement for businesses to flow down contested correction requests.

    If you have questions about your obligations under the CCPA or need any assistance with privacy program compliance, please reach out to your McDermott lawyer or contact Elliot Golding, Katy Linsky, Amy Pimentel, Austin Mooney or David Saunders.

    Authors

    Elliot R. Golding

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Kathryn Linsky

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Amy C. Pimentel

    Partner

    Boston

    David P. Saunders

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • CMS Seeks Provider and Stakeholder Feedback on First National Directory of Healthcare Providers and Services

    CMS Seeks Provider and Stakeholder Feedback on First National Directory of Healthcare Providers and Services

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Seeks Provider and Stakeholder Feedback on First National Directory of Healthcare Providers and Services

    October 18, 2022

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released a Request for Information (RFI) seeking comments on the creation of a national directory of healthcare providers and services that would become a “centralized data hub” with information on providers and services throughout the country. The RFI is open for a 60-day public comment period ending December 6, 2022.

    In depth

    CMS is soliciting feedback on the creation of the first national directory of healthcare providers and services (NDH), which would contain information on healthcare providers and services across the country. CMS states that the NDH would improve and support interoperability throughout the healthcare sector for payers and providers while making it easier for patients to identify, compare and locate providers who meet their specific needs and preferences, such as those related to office accessibility, languages spoken or other data. CMS proposes that consolidating provider data into a single source would ultimately reduce the unnecessary burden placed on providers to maintain dozens of separate directories while improving access to care. The new system would be used in place of commercial payor directories and allow payers to update their own directories seamlessly from a single directory. CMS is proposing integrating the NDH with current CMS-maintained systems (i.e., NPPES, PECOS and Care Compare).

    CMS requests stakeholder input on whether such a directory would improve patient choice and access to care by making it easier for patients to identify, locate and compare providers; and how creating a single, centralized system could reduce the burden of directory maintenance for payers and providers and promote information accuracy for patients. Further, the RFI asks for input on “the [directory] concept and potential benefits, provider types, entities and data elements that could be included to create value for the health care industry, the technical framework for a [directory], priorities for a possible phased implementation, and prerequisites and actions CMS should consider taking to address potential challenges and risks.”

    The RFI is open for a 60-day public comment period ending December 6, 2022.

    KEY TAKEAWAYS

    An NDH would be a marked shift from the current fragmented landscape of provider databases. Although such a shift may alleviate the stress experienced by patients who struggle to find up-to-date information about providers in their network and by providers that face redundant and burdensome reporting requirements to multiple databases, the database could create risks for providers.

    Notably, there is a high likelihood that the information for the NDH would be pulled from CMS-maintained systems, such as NPPES, PECOS and Care Compare. The data currently maintained in those systems may be outdated or inaccurate, and could include information that providers may not want readily accessible in a public database. Further, in order to ensure accurate and current data in the NDH, CMS may employ enhanced validation efforts, which may be burdensome or disruptive to providers. CMS may also threaten or impose sanctions on providers who fail to report updated information in a timely manner or who report inaccurate or inconsistent information. Providers should consider these potential impacts when responding to the RFI.

    Provider feedback to the RFI will help CMS gain a better understanding of the present scope of healthcare databases and assist CMS in identifying the potential benefits and drawbacks of creating a centralized data hub for healthcare providers.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Monica Wallace

    Partner

    Chicago

    Carole M. Becker

    Partner

    Miami

    More insights

  • IRS Releases Memorandum Regarding Advance Payments of Section 367(d) Inclusions

    IRS Releases Memorandum Regarding Advance Payments of Section 367(d) Inclusions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Releases Memorandum Regarding Advance Payments of Section 367(d) Inclusions

    October 17, 2022

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On September 23, 2022, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released a memorandum (AM 2022-003) concluding that taxpayers cannot make advance payments of section 367(d) inclusions except in the limited situation in which the US transferor receives boot in connection with the initial transfer of intangible property (IP) to a foreign corporation. The memorandum is relevant to any taxpayers who made, or are considering making, advance payments of section 367(d) amounts. In our view, the memorandum (which does not have precedential value) is not persuasive, and both its reasoning and its conclusion are inconsistent with prior IRS guidance and analogous long-standing case law.

    In depth

    OVERVIEW OF SECTION 367(d) AND NOTICE 2012-39

    Section 367(d) generally provides that when a US person (USP) transfers IP to a foreign corporation in an otherwise tax-free exchange under sections 351 or 361, the US transferor is treated as having sold the IP in exchange for contingent payments and receiving amounts which would have been received annually in the form of such payments. The amounts included in the US transferor’s income (i.e., the section 367(d) inclusions) are treated as ordinary income and royalties for purposes of determining the source and foreign tax credit limitation category. See sections 865(d)(1)(B) (source); 367(d)(2)(C) (foreign tax credit limitation category). See also section 904(d)(3)(A); Reg. §1.904-5(b) (look-through rules).

    In Notice 2012-39, the IRS treated boot received in an outbound section 367(d) transaction as an advance payment of the section 367(d) inclusion. In the Notice, the IRS described a situation in which a US Parent (USP) owns a US company (UST) with a basis and value of $100, and UST owns IP with a basis of $0 and a value of $100. Pursuant to an “all-cash D” reorganization, UST transferred IP with a value equal to $100 to a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) owned by USP in exchange for $100 and then UST distributed the cash to its USP in liquidation. As described in the Notice, UST would report the $100 received from CFC as tax free under section 361, and USP would report no dividend income or gain from receiving the $100 cash under the “gain within boot” rule in section 356(a)(1) (because there was no built-in gain in the stock of UST). According to the Notice, taxpayers would take the position that “the transactions have resulted in a repatriation in excess of $100x ($100x at the time of the reorganization and then through repayment of the receivable in the amount of USP’s income inclusions over time) while only recognizing income in the amount of the inclusions over time.” Thus, USP could receive, for example, $200 of cash ($100 from the initial transfer and $100 over time related to the section 367(d) inclusions) but only include $100 in income (over time on the section 367(d) inclusions).

    To address what the IRS and the US Department of the Treasury perceived to be an inappropriate repatriation of cash, the Notice provided that in such a situation, the $100 received by UST in the initial outbound section 367(d) transaction is treated as an advance payment of the deemed section 367(d) royalties, resulting in immediate ordinary income for UST (and thus a later payment of $100 of cash would be subject to the normal distribution rules and not excluded from income pursuant to section 367(d)).

    In earlier guidance, the IRS also treated cash boot received in connection with outbound section 351 transfers as prepaid deemed royalties and an immediate section 367(d) income inclusion for the US transferor in CCA 200610019 and PLR 2008845044. In reaching its conclusion, the IRS stated in CCA 200610019: “To the extent that this amount exceeds the §367(d) payment for the year, it is treated as an advance payment on the future §367(d) income and is included in income in the year it is received.”

    AM 2022-003

    For the first time, AM 2022-003 argues that taxpayers should not be able to accelerate section 367(d) inclusions through advance payments in any case other than where the payment is made at the time of the initial outbound transfer. The memorandum asserts that section 367(d)’s underlying policy is that, instead of recognizing gain upfront, the US transferor should have an annual section 367(d) inclusion determined by reference to the exploitation of the IP annually over its useful life. However, even when advance payments are made, the section 367(d) amount is determined by reference to the exploitation of the IP annually over its useful life. An advance payment merely means that the amount is included in the US transferor’s income in an earlier year.

    Additionally, the IRS argues that because neither section 367(d) nor the relevant regulations explicitly provide for advance payments, no section 367(d) amounts can be included in income as an advance payment if made any time after the initial outbound transaction. The IRS further argues that because a section 367(d) transaction is not a licensing arrangement, the fact that taxpayers generally can make advance payments of royalties in licensing arrangements is irrelevant. Though there are differences between licensing arrangements and section 367(d) transactions, the differences do not compel a conclusion that advance payments of section 367(d) inclusions cannot be made. Indeed, Congress has provided similar tax treatment by expressly treating section 367(d) inclusions as royalties for purposes of determining their source and foreign tax credit category. And in the section 367(d) context, existing guidance (described above) establishes that advance payments can, in fact, be made.

    The IRS additionally states that advance payments of section 367(d) amounts would raise administrative concerns because such an approach would require the IRS to “evaluate whether a purported advance payment ultimately captured undetermined amounts of future inclusions.” However, advance payments do not raise any administrative concerns other than those already raised by the payment of boot in the scenarios described in Notice 2012-39 and other prepayment situations. For example, the amount of an advance payment allocated to section 367(d) inclusions for future years would need to be determined, regardless of whether the advance payment was a payment of boot upon an initial transfer of the IP.

    Moreover, the IRS attempts to distinguish Notice 2012-39 by limiting it to outbound transfers of IP in exchange for boot. The IRS states that in a situation involving a prepayment that is not in connection with an initial section 367(d) transfer, “there is no transfer of boot in respect of intangible property, no policy concern regarding repatriation, and section 367(d) clearly applies.” The IRS’s attempt to distinguish the Notice is not persuasive. The policy concern described in the Notice of the amount of repatriation exceeding income inclusions was addressed by treating cash received as a prepayment of section 367(d) amounts (thus, the US taxpayer would have $100 income on $100 cash repatriation through the prepaid section 367(d) amounts). With respect to a prepayment after an initial transfer, this policy concern is similarly addressed by respecting cash received as a prepayment of section 367(d) amounts (thus, the US taxpayer would have $100 income on $100 cash repatriation through the prepaid section 367(d) amounts). In addition, as noted above, a prepayment of a section 367(d) amount is still within the purview of section 367(d); it is just an acceleration of the income inclusion under section 367(d).

    Respecting advance payments of section 367(d) amounts as prepayments of future section 367(d) amounts is consistent with principles found in general tax law regarding the treatment of prepayments. Well-established, long-standing precedent provides that prepayments generally are taken into account currently by the payee and respected as prepayments. (See, e.g., Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (cash paid to a dance studio for lessons was included in income when the cash was received, not when the lessons were provided); American Automobile Ass’n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) (prepaid membership dues were included in income when the dues were received, even though the dues related to services for future years); Karns Prime & Fancy Food v. Comm’r, 494 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2007) (amounts constituted income when received because the taxpayer’s right to keep the funds depended solely on its compliance with a supply agreement). Cf., Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990) (“From the moment an advance payment is made, the seller is assured that, so long as it fulfills its contractual obligation, the money is its to keep.”).)

    TAKEAWAYS

    AM 2022-003 is important because it provides the IRS’s current views concerning the treatment of a prepayment of section 367(d) amounts. The IRS confirms that it interprets section 367(d) and the regulations as providing that a prepayment can be made for section 367(d) inclusions upon the initial transfer of the IP to a foreign subsidiary. By seeking to distinguish prepayments of royalties, AM 2022-003 appears to accept that royalties can be prepaid, which generally would be treated the same to a US taxpayer as an advance payment of section 367(d) amounts.

    AM 2022-003 also lays out the IRS’s current position that taxpayers cannot make advance payments of section 367(d) amounts after the year of transfer. There is no basis in the Internal Revenue Code or regulations for distinguishing such advance payments from initial advance payments, and such a position diverges from the prior approach taken by the IRS in Notice 2012-39 and other existing guidance. Taxpayers who already made advance payments of section 367(d) inclusions should be aware of the memorandum and prepared to challenge the IRS’s position. Other taxpayers should understand the IRS’s position before deciding to make such advance payments.

    Authors

    Elizabeth Chao

    Partner

    Chicago

    Caroline H. Ngo

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Wilder

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • A Look Through New York City’s Upcoming Wage Transparency Law

    A Look Through New York City’s Upcoming Wage Transparency Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    A Look Through New York City’s Upcoming Wage Transparency Law

    October 17, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Effective November 1, 2022, New York City employers are required to comply with Local Law 59 of 2022, commonly known as the New York City Wage Transparency Law, by including compensation data in their job advertisements. The Wage Transparency Law requires employers to include minimum and maximum wage rates in job postings.

    In depth

    WHAT IS THE WAGE TRANSPARENCY LAW?

    The Wage Transparency Law makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer or employment agency to advertise a job, promotion or transfer opportunity without stating the minimum and maximum hourly wage or salary compensation in the advertisement. The law permits employers to list the “good faith” range, which means the employer may ultimately choose to pay an amount outside of this range.

    WHICH EMPLOYERS ARE COVERED?

    The Wage Transparency Law applies to all New York City employers with at least four employees, if at least one employee is located within New York City.

    WHICH POSITIONS ARE COVERED?

    Any advertisement for a job, promotion or transfer opportunity that would be performed, in whole or in part, within the five boroughs of New York City is covered by the Wage Transparency Law. This includes both in-person work at a New York City commercial address, and remote work from a New York City residential address. This is true regardless of the medium by which the advertisement is disseminated, and thus the Wage Transparency Law applies equally to postings on internal bulletin boards or intranet listings, emails, internet advertisements, printed flyers distributed at job fairs and newspaper advertisements.

    Jobs that can be performed remotely from anywhere, including but not limited to New York City, are theoretically covered by the Wage Transparency Law. It is unlikely, however, that the New York City Commission on Human Rights (Commission) would seek out violations with little nexus to New York—for example, if the employer is based outside of New York City, with only one employee located in New York City, and is posting for a position that could be performed from anywhere in the world. On the other hand, if the employer has a New York City office and the employee may occasionally be asked to come into the workplace, this posting could be covered.

    Employers can still choose to hire or transfer employees without using a written job advertisement. This caveat may be particularly relevant for employers who use executive search firms, rather than traditional written job advertisements, to fill senior-level positions.

    WHAT MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE POSTING?

    Employers are required to state the good-faith minimum and maximum base compensation for each posted job. “Good faith” means a salary range that an employer honestly believes that the employer is willing to pay at the time the job advertisement is posted. “Salary” includes the base annual or hourly wage that will be paid to a successful applicant. Salary does not include any other forms of compensation or benefits, such as:

    • Employer-sponsored insurance benefits
    • PTO, vacation or sick time
    • Retirement funds, such as 401(k)
    • Severance opportunities
    • Overtime opportunities
    • Commissions, bonuses, stock or value of other employer-provided benefits, like meals, cell phone reimbursements, etc.

    Employers may choose to include any or all of the benefits information listed above within their job postings, but they are not required to do so.

    WHAT ARE THE PENALTIES FOR FAILING TO COMPLY?

    The Commission is tasked with enforcing the Wage Transparency Law. The statutory civil penalty for an employer’s first violation of the Wage Transparency Law is $0, provided that an employer can show that it has cured a violation within 30 days of service of the complaint. Civil penalties for uncured or subsequent violations, however, may be as high as $250,000.

    In addition, employees may either file a complaint with the Commission or bring a lawsuit against their current employers for violations of the Wage Transparency Law. Notably, the law, as newly amended for the November 1, 2022, effective date, no longer affords a private right of action to outside job applicants.

    ANYTHING ELSE?

    As of November 6, 2022, Westchester County, home to some of the closest suburbs to New York City, will impose its own pay transparency law, requiring employers to disclose the good-faith wage ranges for positions that are required to be performed, in whole or in part, within Westchester County. This means that New York City employers advertising a hybrid remote-and-in-person role could find themselves subject to both New York City’s and Westchester County’s laws.

    WHAT’S NEXT?

    On November 1, 2022, New York City will join the growing number of state and municipal jurisdictions that have already implemented wage transparency laws. Employers should take care to ensure that their job postings comply with the Wage Transparency Law’s requirements by the end of the month.

    Authors

    Abigail M. Kagan

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Nicholas C. Meyer

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights

  • Fifth Circuit, Like Ninth Circuit, Allows Post-Bankruptcy Contract Rate Interest in Solvent Debtor Case

    Fifth Circuit, Like Ninth Circuit, Allows Post-Bankruptcy Contract Rate Interest in Solvent Debtor Case

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit, Like Ninth Circuit, Allows Post-Bankruptcy Contract Rate Interest in Solvent Debtor Case

    October 17, 2022

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “…[B]ecause Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a reorganized solvent debtor had to “pay what it promised now that it is financially capable.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2022 WL 8025329, *1, (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (2-1). Moreover, “given [the debtor’s] solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon … contractual default rate …,” not the “much lower Federal Judgment Rate . . .,” held the court. Id. This $387 million win for creditors follows the similar recent $200 million creditor victory in the Ninth Circuit. In re PG&E Corporation, 46 F. 4th 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) (2-1) (“Under the long-standing ‘solvent debtor’ exception,” unsecured creditors have “equitable right to receive post-petition interest at . . . contractual or default state law rate, subject to any other equitable consideration; “because of limited” record, case remanded to bankruptcy court with “presumption” of “contractual or default post-petition interest.”).

    Relevance

    “No circuit court [had] addressed the issue [i.e. rate of post-petition interest to unimpaired unsecured creditors], and bankruptcy courts have reached different conclusions in the rare solvent debtor case,” noted the Ninth Circuit on Aug. 29, 2002, in the PG&E case, 46 F. 4th at 1052, a decision not mentioned by the Fifth Circuit in Ultra. And “this is not the ordinary case,” said the Fifth Circuit. 22 WL 8025329, at *8. Some lower courts, for example, had held that post-petition interest should be calculated at the lower federal judgment rate, not the contractual default rate. In re The Hertz Corp., 647 B.R. 781, 800-01 (Bankr. D. Del. 2021). See also In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 540 B.R. 109, 124 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (interest based on “equitable principles” at rate court “deems appropriate.”).

    Facts

    The affiliated debtors in Ultra (collectively, “Ultra”) were insolvent when they commenced their Chapter 11 cases but “became supremely solvent” during bankruptcy. Id., at *1. “Ultra proposed a $2.5 billion [reorganization] plan” providing full cash payment to creditors plus pre-bankruptcy interest at the Federal Judgment Rate “for the duration of the bankruptcy [case].” But two groups of creditors claimed not only a “Make-Whole Amount,” a lump sum “calculated to give them the present value of the interest … they would have received but for Ultra’s bankruptcy,” but also “post-petition interest” at the contractual default rate.

    Make-Whole Amount Unmatured Interest and Liquidated Damages. The Fifth Circuit rejected the creditors’ argument that the Make-Whole is not governed by Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 502(b)’s bar on unmatured interest. “But the Make-Whole Amount… is both liquidated damages and the ‘economic equivalent of unmatured interest’ – indeed, that is its whole point.” Id., at *7. Because the court also held that “solvent-debtor exception survived the … Code’s enactment and applies to this case… Ultra must pay the Make-Whole Amount.” [16] When a solvent debtor, like Ultra, “is able to pay its valid contractual debts, traditional doctrine says it should – bankruptcy rules notwithstanding.” Id., at *8.

    Solvent-Debtor Exception. The Code “does not specifically address the solvent-debtor scenario,” but “traditional bankruptcy practice has always provided an exception” to the Code’s bar on unmatured interest claims. Id., citing, Am. Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266 (1914) (if debtor solvent, “interest as well as principal should be paid.”); City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 330 n. 7 (1949) (English solvent-debtor exception “carried over into our system.”). Because the solvent-debtor exception existed under the Code’s predecessor statute, Code § 502(b)(2) does not eliminate it. Here, “the exception operates …… to suspend § 502(b)(2) disallowance of [the] Make-Whole Amount.” Id.

    Make-Whole Enforceable As Liquidated Damages Under Applicable New York Law. The court further rejected Ultra’s argument that the Make Whole was an unenforceable penalty under applicable New York Law. “Ultra fail[ed] to meet its burden” of showing that the Make-Whole Amount was “unreasonably disproportionate.” Id., at *14., citing JMD Holding Corp. v. Congress Financial Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 373, 376 (borrower failed “to show that … early termination fee is an unenforceable penalty.”). “The Make-Whole Amount serves as liquidated damages for Ultra’s breach; the post-petition interest compensates for Ultra’s lag in paying the accelerated principal (and the Make-Whole itself), which were already due and payable for the duration of the bankruptcy. Separate harms warrant separate recoveries.” Id. Because the “Make-Whole Amount is enforceable under New York Law, … § 502(b)(1) does not stand in the way of the solvent-debtor exception.” Id.

    Post-Petition Interest at Contractual Default Rate. “[T]he Code does not preclude unimpaired creditors from receiving default-rate post-petition interest in excess of the Federal Judgment Rate in solvent-debtor Chapter 11 cases …. And as a matter of equity creditors are entitled to contractually specified rates of interest ‘on’ their claims when a solvent debtor is fully capable of paying up… As the bankruptcy court explained well, …’[w]hen the struggle is between creditors and equity holders, as opposed to creditor and creditors, [creditors’] equitable right [to contractual post-petition interest rates] is critical.’“ Id., at *16.

    Dissent: Code Bars Make-Whole Amount. According to the dissent, because “the Make-Whole Amount is unmatured interest in disguise,” barred by Code §502(b)(2), “the Code bars the Make-Whole Amount.” Id., at *17. Further, it said, “the solvent-debtor exception didn’t survive adoption of the … Code,” which “overrides the solvent-debtor exception.” Id. It rejected “with deepest respect,” the majority’s legal analysis as “convoluted.” Id., at *20.

    Comments

    1. Two important Circuits are now in agreement, having rendered carefully reasoned, sensible and fair opinions. For the moment, the Supreme Court has no reason to review these decisions that can only arise in the rare solvent-debtor case.
    2. The sophomoric dissents in PG&E and Ultra were overwrought. They were also unfair, unconvincing and unnecessary.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your lawyer or the author.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Corporate Criminal Liability in England & Wales: Former Lord Chancellor Signals that Reform is on the Way

    Corporate Criminal Liability in England & Wales: Former Lord Chancellor Signals that Reform is on the Way

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Corporate Criminal Liability in England & Wales: Former Lord Chancellor Signals that Reform is on the Way

    October 14, 2022

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Former Lord Chancellor Sir Robert Buckland KC MP has reportedly hinted that new corporate ‘failure to prevent’ offences may be added to the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (the Bill) that is currently making its way through Parliament. Speaking at an event hosted by the American Bar Association on 10 October 2022, Mr Buckland (now the Secretary of State for Wales) stated that he is “sure there will be further amendments tabled to the Bill, particularly centred around failure to prevent economic crime”. His remarks come after the Law Commission (a statutory independent body tasked with keeping the laws of England & Wales under review) published its much-anticipated Options Paper in June 2022, setting out ten potential options for the reform of the laws of England & Wales on corporate criminal liability.

    This is the latest development in an area of law which has been the subject of significant criticism from prosecutors in recent years, largely due to the legal and evidential difficulties experienced in securing corporate convictions in a number of high-profile cases.

    Four of the ten options advanced by the Law Commission relate to the potential introduction of new corporate ‘failure to prevent’ offences in areas such as fraud and human rights abuses, while the remaining six options include: maintaining the status quo (which now appears not to be the UK Government’s preference); modifying the scope of who constitutes a company’s ‘directing mind and will’; introducing new civil and administrative monetary penalties; and / or enhancing corporate compliance obligations. Significantly, the Law Commission considered and rejected the possible introduction of a general corporate ‘failure to prevent economic crime’ offence. This suggests that Mr Buckland’s remarks referred to the introduction of specific ‘failure to prevent’ offences (e.g., in relation to fraud), rather than a broader offence referring to economic crime more widely.

    Given the apparent direction of travel as articulated by Mr Buckland, it seems likely that the scope of criminal liability for companies will expand over the coming years. As such, there is little room for complacency and companies may wish to give renewed thought as to whether existing policies and procedures are sufficiently broad, have been properly implemented and will withstand scrutiny by the authorities.

    In depth

    Background: Current Law in England & Wales

    As the law currently stands in England & Wales, criminal liability for certain offences can be attributed to companies through the ‘Identification Principle’, which provides that, in general and with the exception of certain strict liability offences (e.g., in the health and safety sphere) or ‘failure to prevent’ offences (discussed further below), a company can only be liable for an offence where the individual committing the offence represents that company’s ‘directing mind and will’ (i.e., an individual or group of individuals who are sufficiently senior that their conduct and state of mind can be attributed to the company). Under the current law, this directing mind will generally be that of the members of the board of directors (individually or collectively) and those to whom they (or a company’s articles of association) have expressly delegated relevant authority.

    However, over time and as this principle has been applied by the courts, numerous practical difficulties have arisen, especially when seeking to establish the directing mind of large companies with complex governance structures.

    In R v Andrews Weatherfoil [1972] 1 WLR 118, the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of a company accused of corruption, partly on the basis that the employee paying the bribe (a manager of a division) did not have the requisite status and authority for his mental state to be attributed to the company. Almost 40 years later, in R v St Regis Paper Co Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 2527, a company successfully appealed against a conviction based on the actions of one of its technical managers who dishonestly recorded false entries and submitted misleading reports to the regulatory body for environmental pollution control. Part of the court’s reasoning was that the company had express environmental policies in place which did not grant the technical manager any discretion to falsify records (indeed, a key part of the individual’s role was to promote best practice in environment performance at the company).

    Issues related to the Identification Principle came to a head more recently in R v Barclays plc & Anor [2018] (Southwark Crown Court), which was effectively upheld by the High Court in SFO v Barclays plc & Anor [2018] EWHC 3055 (QB). In that case, fraud charges were dismissed against Barclays plc and Barclays Bank plc, despite the fact that (taking the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO’s) case at its highest) the former chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) were alleged to have been involved in the relevant conduct.

    On the facts of that case, the High Court found that the bank’s directing mind was that of the full board of directors and the particular committees to which specific authority to undertake the relevant transactions had been delegated. As the full board / committees did not authorise the CEO and CFO to enter into the relevant transactions, the bank could not, it was found, be liable for their acts. This differs from the legal position in relation to partnerships and limited liability partnerships, whereby (as set out in statute) the partnership as a whole will incur criminal liability for the actions of any partner or member acting in the course of business of the firm.

    Calls for Reform

    The current law has been criticised as inadequate in addressing misconduct carried out by employees of larger companies. Lisa Osofsky, the current Director of the SFO, in common with her predecessor, has called several times for reform, stating that the law in England & Wales makes it “very difficult to hold companies with complex governance structures to account for their fraudulent conduct”. Ms Osofsky and others have noted that senior employees are not always privy to operational-level business decisions (and so the Identification Principle makes it difficult for prosecutors to attribute the wrongdoing of mid-level employees to the company) and it will rarely be the case that the board of directors as a whole can be said to have authorised alleged criminal conduct.

    Due to these challenges, prosecuting agencies such as the SFO and the Crown Prosecution Service have called for the expansion of the ‘failure to prevent’ model of offence. This type of offence was introduced into UK law by section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 (failure to prevent bribery) and can also be found in sections 45-46 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion). The model criminalises companies for failing to prevent the criminal conduct of their ‘associated persons’ (i.e., persons who perform services for or on their behalf), subject to a defence of the company having had in place adequate (or reasonable) procedures designed to prevent such conduct. This both avoids the need to rely on the Identification Principle and incentivises companies to invest in their compliance programmes.

    One suggestion for reform has been the introduction of a broad ‘failure to prevent economic crime’ offence, which would encompass a range of financial crimes such as fraud, money laundering and false accounting. It has even been suggested that the range of offences falling within the definition of ‘economic crime’ could match the extensive list of the offences that can be the subject of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), as listed in Part II of Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

    Against this background, in November 2020 the UK Government asked the Law Commission to examine the issue and publish a paper providing an assessment of different options for reform. In its terms of reference for the review, the Law Commission stated that it would be guided by the need to ensure the proper accountability of companies which engage in criminal conduct, without imposing disproportionate burdens upon businesses.

    Options Paper

    Following a public consultation, the Law Commission published its Options Paper on 10 June 2022, outlining ten potential options for reform as follows:

    (A) Option 1

    Retaining the Identification Principle as it stands (in other words, maintaining the status quo).

    (B) Option 2A

    Allowing conduct to be attributed to a company if a “member of the corporation’s senior management engaged in, consented to, or connived in the offence”.

    Under this option, ‘senior management’ would mean “any person who plays a significant role in the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the organisation’s activities are to be managed or organised, or the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities”. Consent generally refers to situations in which permission is given to commit an offence, whereas connivance refers to ‘wilful blindness’.

    (C) Option 2B

    The same as Option 2A, with the addition that ‘senior management’ will be deemed to include the company’s CEO and CFO as a minimum.

    This option appears specifically designed to address the situation which arose in Barclays, whereby the CEO and CFO were not deemed to have been acting as the directing mind of the bank.

    (D) Option 3

    A new offence of ‘failure to prevent fraud’ by an associated person which would be committed where an associated person (such as an employee or agent) commits an offence of fraud with intent to benefit the company or another person on behalf of the company.

    As with section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010, this would apply when a company has not put in place reasonable procedures to prevent its associated persons from committing fraud for the benefit of the company.

    (E) Option 4

    A similar offence of ‘failure to prevent human rights abuses’.

    (F) Option 5

    A similar offence of ‘failure to prevent ill‑treatment or neglect’.

    (G) Option 6

    A similar offence of ‘failure to prevent computer misuse’.

    This would criminalise a company’s failure to prevent offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, such as the offence of unauthorised access to computer material (i.e., hacking). The Law Commission intends for this option to be considered as part of the Home Office’s current review of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 rather than as a standalone measure.

    (H) Option 7

    Make publicity orders (requiring a company to publish details of its conviction) available in all cases where a company has been convicted of an offence.

    (I) Option 8

    A new regime of administratively imposed monetary penalties.

    These monetary penalties would apply where a criminal act (e.g., a fraud) is perpetrated by a company’s associated person with the intention of benefiting the company. In such cases, the company would be liable to pay a monetary penalty which is enforceable as a civil debt unless it could show that it took reasonable steps to prevent the wrongdoing. As this would be a civil (as opposed to a criminal) sanction, the burden for enforcement would be lower.

    (J) Option 9

    Civil actions in the High Court, giving the High Court the power to impose civil monetary penalties on companies that have facilitated serious crime.

    These penalties could operate in a situation where company decision-makers have not participated in a crime, but the way in which the company has conducted itself has facilitated it. In setting out this option, the Law Commission gave the example of a monetary penalty being imposed on a company after the trial of individuals for offences committed in the course of their employment at the company. This would effectively enable punitive measures to be taken against a company while avoiding the need for a criminal conviction.

    (K) Option 10A

    A reporting requirement based on section 414CB of the Companies Act 2006, requiring public interest companies to report on anti-fraud procedures.

    Section 414CB of the Companies Act 2006 requires ’public interest companies’ (i.e., publicly traded companies, banks and insurance companies with over 500 employees) to publish a ‘non-financial and sustainability information statement’ containing a report on their performance and impact in environmental, social and governance (ESG) and anti-bribery and corruption fields (among others). Option 10A would require public interest companies to include information on steps they have taken to prevent fraud in these statements.

    (L) Option 10B

    A reporting requirement based on section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, requiring large corporations to report on their anti-fraud procedures.

    Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides that legal entities carrying on at least part of their business in the UK, with a total annual turnover of not less than £36 million, are required to prepare an annual ‘slavery and human trafficking statement’. In a similar manner, option 10B would require such entities annually to publish information concerning steps they have taken to prevent fraud committed by associated persons.

    Dismissed Options

    The Law Commission also considered the following models, which were ultimately excluded from the options published:

    A broad offence of ‘failure to prevent economic crime’

    This option was rejected by the Law Commission as the concept of ‘economic crime’ would, in its view, likely be too broad and render compliance overly burdensome on companies. It would also leave many companies with overlapping duties, such as those under the UK anti-money laundering regime or financial/prudential regulations.

    The doctrine of respondeat superior (‘let the master answer’)

    Under this doctrine (also referred to as ‘vicarious liability’), which is applied in many United States jurisdictions, the criminal acts or omissions of any employee committed in the course of their employment, no matter how junior, can be attributed to a company.

    The Law Commission indicated concerns about the “inappropriateness of the breadth” of the doctrine and noted that, while this model is favoured by some respondents as a route to making company prosecutions easier to achieve, this is not the intention behind the Options Paper. Overall, the Law Commission reasoned that the implementation of this model would “represent a fundamental change in corporate criminal liability” in England & Wales and so, in view of the criticisms of the doctrine and the practical concerns about the lack of prosecutorial safeguards, could not recommend it as an alternative to the Identification Principle.

    Models of attribution based on ‘company culture’ or similar

    These models would enable a company to be convicted of an offence on the basis of its company culture or systems. This can be seen in Australian law, where some fault elements—such as intent—can be attributed to a company on the basis that its culture or policies and procedures encouraged or permitted the commission of the offence by employees. However, the Law Commission noted that there has been significant debate in Australia about the effectiveness of these provisions, in large part due to a lack of clarity as to the boundaries of company culture.

    COMMENT

    Undoubtedly, many companies will breathe a sigh of relief that a broad ‘failure to prevent economic crime’ offence as proposed by the SFO is not one of the options recommended by the Law Commission. Companies understandably might have struggled to imagine how they could effectively implement a coherent suite of policies and procedures in relation to all 49 categories of offence (plus ancillary offences such as attempts or conspiracies to commit an offence) that are available for a DPA.

    Also absent from the Options Paper are any options focused on facilitating the imposition of criminal liability on companies for sanctions breaches. This is not overly surprising given the apparent enforcement focus on civil fines as opposed to criminal liability for sanctions breaches (as reflected in the recent power given to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation to impose strict liability civil fines on persons or entities that breach sanctions laws). That being said, if the criminal enforcement of economic sanctions increases (e.g., in light of the sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), similar issues related to the Identification Principle may arise and lead to calls for sanctions-specific form.

    As for the actual content of the Options Paper, a variety of stakeholders, including Members of Parliament from the UK’s main political parties and anti-corruption groups, had criticised it for a lack of focus and for failing to set out a well-defined course of action. Such stakeholders may, however, draw some comfort from Mr Buckland’s recent comments that additional failure to prevent offences may be introduced to the Bill, though the detail and scope of such proposals remain to be seen.

    In any case, given political developments (including a strengthened desire to fight economic crime as a result of the war in Ukraine) and the pressure from across the political spectrum for reform, companies may benefit from pre-emptively undertaking risk assessments and identifying any gaps in their policies and procedures focused on the prevention of fraud and other economic crimes. This also chimes with an increased focus on compliance globally, not only in terms of reducing financial crime but also in the context of responding to investors’ expectations, effective ESG programmes and good governance generally.

    Helpfully in this regard, the SFO has published guidance setting out its expectations as to what constitutes an effective compliance programme. While the Government mulls the Law Commission’s various options for reform, companies may wish to revisit their existing policies and procedures to ensure that they are fit for purpose according to the criteria set out in the guidance.

    Authors

    Simon Airey

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    James Dobias

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    William Merry

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    More insights

  • ESMA Template Reporting To Be Required for EU Institutions Which Invest in Non-EU Securitisations

    ESMA Template Reporting To Be Required for EU Institutions Which Invest in Non-EU Securitisations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    ESMA Template Reporting To Be Required for EU Institutions Which Invest in Non-EU Securitisations

    October 13, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The European Commission (the “Commission”), on 10 Oct. 2022, provided the European Parliament with a report on the functioning of the EU Securitisation Regulation[1]. In this report the Commission concluded that EU institutional investors in non-EU securitisations are not meeting their verification obligations under the Securitisation Regulation if the reporting requirements stipulated by the Securitisation Regulation, notably the use of European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) templates, are not complied with.

    To date it has been a grey area as to whether non-EU securitisations (i.e., transactions which involve no EU originator, CLO manager or issuer) were required to report using the ESMA templates. The market practice which has developed has been not to use the ESMA templates and for that fact to be disclosed in the offering documents, with the onus placed upon investors to decide whether or not they may invest in the transaction in the absence of these.

    The Commission has invited ESMA to revisit its existing disclosure templates for securitisations, including considering removal of unnecessary fields or fields that are technically difficult to complete, and aligning the templates more closely to investors’ needs. As part of this, the Commission suggests that ESMA should consider whether loan-by-loan information is useful and proportionate to investors’ needs for all securitisations. The Commission also invited ESMA to propose a more simplified form of reporting template for private securitisations (i.e., those for which there is no Prospectus Regulation Prospectus), which currently is the status of most non-EU securitisations.

    Market Impact

    For future non-EU CLOs and securitisations we expect that EU investors will now require the documentation to include a commitment for reporting to be provided in the format prescribed by the ESMA templates as a condition to investing in such transactions.

    It should also be noted that the Securitisation Regulation prescribes certain disclosures to be made prior to pricing. This includes the provision of transaction documentation to investors. In Europe this has been done in draft form with such documentation stated to be subject to amendment and finalisation prior to closing. Moving forward, EU investors may also seek similar disclosures in relation to non-EU transactions.

    For existing transactions there is a question as to whether there will be any grandfathering. As this circumstance is not a change in law, but rather the Commission providing its interpretation of the existing law, the Commission may view grandfathering as inappropriate.

    Therefore, CLO and securitisation managers, originators and arrangers may receive calls from EU investors requesting that they incorporate ESMA template reporting into existing deals. Failing that some EU investors could feel obliged to sell positions. We believe that, as it is not in the EU’s interests to compel a fire sale which would result in losses to EU financial institutions, regulators will be accommodating when it comes to requirements for exiting positions.

    Any future simplification by ESMA of the reporting templates would only have prospective effect. The Commission did not suggest that EU investors may wait for ESMA to produce new streamlined templates before implementing the reporting for non-EU transactions.

    What are the ESMA reporting templates?

    The EU Securitisation Regulation required ESMA to design reporting requirements for securitisations containing information on their underlying exposures, structure and performance. ESMA published templates differentiated by asset class and whether or not the securitisation is an asset-backed commercial paper issuance. Most transactions will need to use two of the templates, the first being the one relating to the particular underlying exposure asset class, so in the case of CLOs the one for corporate loans, and secondly the investor report template.

    The reports are required to be made available on a quarterly basis and within at least one month of the related interest payment date. The cut-off date for information included in the report is no more than two months prior to the report date.

    Contractually the obligation to report would usually be imposed on the issuer, with the CLO manager and trustee agreeing to provide support. It has also become common for the issuer to sub-contract its reporting obligation to specialist reporting providers.

    UK Investors

    The Commission’s pronouncements should not impact UK investors. Indeed the UK Securitisation Regulation explicitly provides that non-UK securitisations do not need to report on UK templates (which are equivalent to the ESMA ones) as long as they make available information which is substantially the same as that which would have been made available for UK securitisations.


    Authored by Stuart Axford, Phillip Azzollini, Daniel Oshinsky, Martin Sharkey, and Craig Stein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Stuart Axford

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Daniel V. Oshinsky

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Martin Sharkey

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Save It for a Rainy Day Part 2: IRS Announces Additional Plan Amendment Extensions

    Save It for a Rainy Day Part 2: IRS Announces Additional Plan Amendment Extensions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Save It for a Rainy Day Part 2: IRS Announces Additional Plan Amendment Extensions

    October 12, 2022

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On September 26, 2022, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) extended the amendment deadline for non-governmental qualified retirement plans, plans covered under Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and individual retirement accounts (IRAs). The extensions included many of the amendment deadlines under the Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act of 2019 (SECURE Act), the Bipartisan American Miners Act of 2019 (Miners Act), and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). See our prior On the Subject about this earlier extension. Missing from this earlier IRS extension was a postponement of deadlines relating to certain CARES Act provisions, in particular those related to COVID-related distributions and loan relief, as well as deadlines relating to disaster-related loans or distributions under the Taxpayer Certainty and Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2020 (Disaster Act).

    NEW IRS EXTENSION

    IRS Notice 2022-45 provides a new extension to December 31, 2025, of the special amendment deadlines included in Section 302 of the Disaster Act and in Section 2022 of the CARES Act.

    • Section 2022 of the CARES Act provided for COVID-related distributions, increased loan amounts and delayed loan repayments.
    • Section 302 of the Disaster Act provided favorable tax treatment for certain disaster-related loans or distributions.

    Previously, amendments for these CARES Act and Disaster Act provisions would have been required by the end of the 2022 plan year. The Notice also clarifies that CARES Act and Disaster Act amendments adopted before the new December 31, 2025, deadline will not cause the plan to fail to satisfy the anti-cutback requirements of Code Section 411(d)(6) or of Section 204(g) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

    The extension applies to individual retirement accounts (IRAs), to qualified plans that are not governmental plans and to Code Section 403(b) plans that are not maintained by a public school. The amendment deadlines for Code Section 403(b) plans maintained by a public school, and for governmental plans (including plans covered by Code Section 457(b)), remain slightly different.

    ACTION ITEM

    Most tax-qualified retirement plans and Code Section 403(b) plans that elected to offer COVID-related distributions and loan relief can now wait to adopt changes required under the CARES Act, SECURE Act, MINERS Act or Disaster Act in a single amendment no later than December 31, 2025.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • UK Directors’ Duties – What Are You Owed as a Creditor, and When?

    UK Directors’ Duties – What Are You Owed as a Creditor, and When?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    UK Directors’ Duties – What Are You Owed as a Creditor, and When?

    October 11, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The UK Supreme Court issued a key judgement on 5 Oct.[1] which clarifies the law relating to when directors of a UK company need to consider the interests of creditors.

    The UK Companies Act 2006 enacted, for the first time, a partial codification of directors’ duties[2]. That codification was “partial” as the codified duties were expressly based on prior common law rules and equitable principles, and as those duties were to be interpreted and applied in the same way as the existing common law rules and equitable principles.

    However, the codification did not deal with how, when and to what extent directors might owe duties to creditors of the company, or to consider their interests, though it expressly made it clear that the duty to promote the success of a company for the benefit of its members (i.e. shareholders) as a whole was “subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors …”[3].

    Prior to the Supreme Court judgement, case law had suggested that directors owe duties in some circumstances (i.e. where a company is insolvent or on the verge of insolvency) to consider the interests of creditors as well as shareholders, and even that such a duty may be enforceable by creditors directly. There was also uncertainty as to how early that duty might arise when a company has some degree of actual or anticipated financial difficulty.

    The Supreme Court’s judgement clarifies that the directors of a UK company are duty bound to consider the interests of creditors when: (a) the company is “insolvent or bordering on insolvency” or (b) where an actual insolvent liquidation or administration is probable. Where an actual insolvency or administration is not inevitable, the director’s duty to promote the success of a company for the benefit of its members as a whole will remain relevant, but the directors will need to balance the interests of creditors and shareholders and act accordingly. It was also clarified that (i) there was no duty to consider the interests of creditors (absent the circumstances above) if it is more likely than not that the company will at some point be unable to pay its debts as they fall due and (ii) there was a sliding scale in determining the priority of members’ as opposed to creditors’ interests, such that the worse the financial situation of a company is, in other words the more probable an insolvent liquidation or administration becomes, the more the directors should prioritise the interests of creditors over those of its members.

    Finally, it was confirmed that there was no separate “creditor duty” imposed on directors, the core duty remains a duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company, but in the circumstances described above the directors must consider the interests of creditors along with those of members. It therefore follows that the duty is owed (where it is owed at all) in respect of creditors generally and not to them individually (or as a sub-class), and that the duty is owed to the company and cannot, other than through a liquidator or administrator, be enforced by the creditors directly.

    For managers holding debt instruments of a UK company, the directors will not usually be bound to specifically consider your interests save where the company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency, or where such event is probable. However, in those circumstances, the personal nature of (and personal liability attaching to) director’s duties should weigh on the minds of directors, and managers should not be shy in reminding them of that accordingly where circumstances warrant it. In particular, where this duty does arise, it will bear on the director’s consideration of whether they should authorise or recommend the payment of a dividend (even when the accounts show sufficient distributable reserves).

    Authored by Jim McNally.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] UKSC 2019/0046 (BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana SA)

    [2] Chapter 2, Companies Act 2006.

    [3] Companies Act 2006, s.172(3).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights