Content Type: Article

  • Navigating hemp THC beverages

    Navigating hemp THC beverages

    ARTICLE

    Navigating hemp THC beverages

    Mar 4, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Nonalcoholic beverages infused with delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) derived from hemp (aka intoxicating hemp beverages) are becoming increasingly popular for consumers looking for an alternative to alcohol.

    With major alcohol retailers like Total Wine entering the cannabis space, alcohol beverage producers may be looking for opportunities to leverage their existing experience in manufacturing, marketing and distributing alcohol beverages towards the emerging intoxicating hemp beverage market. While intoxicating hemp beverages are arguably legal pursuant to the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 Farm Bill), risks remain under federal and state food and drug laws. Accordingly, beverage producers looking to enter this emerging market should become familiar with the ambiguities involved.

    Federal Treatment of Intoxicating Hemp Beverages

    The 2018 Farm Bill removed hemp, defined as cannabis (Cannabis sativa L.) and derivatives of cannabis with extremely low concentrations of delta-9 THC (specifically, no more than 0.3 percent THC on a dry weight basis), from the definition of “marijuana” in the Controlled Substances Act. The federal government defines hemp as “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.” Accordingly, products that meet the definition of “hemp” may be marketed and sold in the United States and are no longer classified under federal law as illegal drugs.

    How Is Hemp Regulated?

    Under the 2018 Farm Bill, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has been assigned to regulate hemp production.

    However, any hemp-derived foods, including beverages, are subject to regulation by the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). While the FDA has largely avoided enforcement actions against such products, focusing most of its efforts on products making unsubstantiated medical and therapeutic claims, it has clearly concluded that it is a prohibited act under federal law to introduce any food in the market to which THC or cannabidiol (CBD) has been added. Therefore, the risk of federal enforcement remains until the agency changes its stance towards THC as a beverage additive.

    State Regulation

    While the federal government has been inactive in this space, the legal status of intoxicating hemp beverage products varies significantly by state. On the one hand, several states, including Minnesota, have expressly legalized the inclusion of hemp-derived cannabinoids in beverage products, with clear regulations regarding testing, labeling, advertising and more. On the other hand, some states have legalized hemp beverage products but lack a robust regulatory framework – leading to a mostly unregulated, laissez-faire market.

    Further, many states fall into a grey area when it comes to the legality of such products. Some of these states have legalized hemp along the lines of the 2018 Farm Bill but have not officially opined on whether it can be added to beverage products, while others do not mention hemp products at all. A subset of states has expressly legalized hemp in beverages, as long as it complies with federal guidance, which currently does not affirmatively allow hemp to be used as a beverage additive.

    One of the most extreme measures taken by state officials to ban hemp from beverage products is currently underway in South Carolina. The state’s Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) recently issued a letter to the hemp industry warning that certain hemp products are not approved to be added to beverage products, including delta-9 THC.

    In its letter, the DHEC also ruled that labels and packaging may not contain references to “THC,” “CBD” or “delta-9” products, or isolates, as this implies the product is no longer a food item but is a drug and is unlawful.

    This new guidance is far from outlawing cannabinoids in beverages, but it affects a growing industry that has already been promoting intoxicating hemp beverages in the state. Indeed, some beverage manufacturers in South Carolina have been forced to halt production, citing confusion over the new labeling and packaging requirements. This demonstrates how the legal landscape around intoxicating hemp beverages can change rapidly.

    Finally, it is important to note that even states that expressly allow and regulate THC-infused beverage products fall into a grey area when we consider the current state of federal regulations. Until Congress acts or the FDA changes its stance towards THC as a beverage additive, we will continue seeing a patchwork of different approaches.

    Authors

    Alva C. Mather

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Christine Dower

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes

  • ALJ Rules That a Taxpayer Is a Qualified New York Manufacturer Even Though Qualifying Property Was Operated by a Third Party

    ALJ Rules That a Taxpayer Is a Qualified New York Manufacturer Even Though Qualifying Property Was Operated by a Third Party

    ARTICLE

    ALJ Rules That a Taxpayer Is a Qualified New York Manufacturer Even Though Qualifying Property Was Operated by a Third Party

    Mar 4, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The New York State Division of Tax Appeals determined that E. & J. Gallo Winery is a qualified New York manufacturer (QNYM) even though its only property in New York that could allow it to qualify for QNYM classification – a vineyard – was operated by a third-party contractor and Gallo did not have any of its own employees involved in the operation of the vineyard.

    Gallo is a multinational manufacturer of table wines that acquired a vineyard in New York and hired a third-party contractor to maintain and farm the vineyard “so as to produce the quantity and quality of grapes” that Gallo’s significant winemaking operations needed. “The service agreement [between Gallo and the third-party contractor] was not a lease,” but instead gave the contractor the responsibility of the “full and complete management, supervision and control of the development and operation of the . . . vineyard.” In this role, the contractor was required to hire employees and subcontractors. The service agreement with Gallo confirmed that the contractor was to be treated “in all respects [as] the sole employer of such persons, employer of such persons, employees, duly licensed contractors, or firms.”

    Gallo claimed it was a QNYM during the years at issue (2016 to 2019) under New York Tax Law §§ 210(1)(a)(vi) and 210-B(1)(b)(i)(A), which the administrative law judge (ALJ) summarized as requiring a taxpayer or combined group to have:

    • Been “principally engaged” (derived more than 50% of its gross receipts) in the production of goods by manufacturing, processing, assembling, refining, mining, extracting, farming, agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, viticulture or commercial fishing
    • Owned property in New York that had an adjusted basis of at least $1 million at the close of each taxable year or had all of its real and personal property located in New York
    • [Whereby] such property is principally used by the taxpayer in the production of goods by the same list of activities noted above, including manufacturing and viticulture.

    The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance agreed that Gallo satisfied the first two requirements, but claimed, pursuant to TSB-M-15(3)C, that Gallo failed to meet the third requirement because it did not have any employees related to the vineyard and, therefore, it did not actually use the relevant New York-located property in the production of goods.

    The ALJ, however, pointed out that “TSB-Ms are informational statements of the Division of Taxation’s policies” and “do not have legal force or effect.” And because the QNYM statute is a rate reduction and not an exemption, “it is to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.”

    In analyzing the statute, the ALJ found that there was no “employee requirement” like that in the alternative test (i.e., having 2,500 manufacturing employees and $100 million of manufacturing property in New York) to be considered a QNYM. Therefore, the ALJ stated, “there is no basis to import the requirements from one test to the other when the Legislature could have easily done such itself.” Instead, the ALJ determined that the New York-located property was “‘used by’ [Gallo] under the ordinary meaning of that term” and “[r]regardless of who is subcontracted to perform day-to-day labor at the [vineyard, Gallo] employed its grapevines for a purpose, and put the grapevines into service and [thus Gallo] qualifies” as a QNYM.

    Authors

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Hilkin

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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    Endnotes

  • Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (02/2024)

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (02/2024)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (02/2024)

    March 4, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    1. Ruling of European Court of Justice on jurisdiction in product liability case

    Another interesting judgment of the ECJ on jurisdiction in cross-border disputes was handed down on 22 February 2024 in a product liability case.

    In this case, a person living in Austria had purchased a motor caravan from a dealership in Germany. The vehicle was manufactured by two Italian manufacturers and delivered to the purchaser at a warehouse in Austria.

    The purchaser then brought an action against the two Italian manufacturers for tortious liability in Austria, claiming that the vehicle had been fitted with an illegal defeat device which reduced the effectiveness of emission control.

    Under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred have jurisdiction in matters relating to tort. According to longstanding case law of the ECJ, this place is both the place where the damage occurred and the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred, with the plaintiff being able to choose between the two.

    The manufacturers argued that the courts of the member state where the vehicle was purchased, in this case Germany, should therefore have jurisdiction over the case.

    The ECJ ruled that in the present case, the place where the damage occurred within the meaning of the Brussels Ia Regulation was the place where the defect in the vehicle manifested itself and produced “its harmful effects” – and according to the ECJ, that was not the place of purchase but rather the place of delivery, Austria.

    Relevant for: Manufacturers.

    Further details: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1

    2.German Federal Court of Justice rules on withdrawal right information in loan agreement to finance vehicle purchase

    Germany’s highest civil court, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”), has ruled on the validity of withdrawal right information provided by a lender to a consumer under a loan agreement linked to a vehicle purchase agreement as the loan financed the purchase of the vehicle.

    Pursuant to sec. 358 (2) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), a consumer’s withdrawal from a loan agreement that is linked to a purchase agreement also has the same effect on the purchase agreement so that the consumer is no longer bound by either agreement. This is the case even if the consumer had no right of withdrawal under the purchase agreement. A contract is considered to be “linked” to another contract if, for example, a loan finances the other agreement in whole or in part.

    In this case, the plaintiff had declared their withdrawal from the loan agreement on the grounds that they had not been properly informed of their withdrawal rights and that the 14-day withdrawal period had not yet commenced.

    The plaintiff argued, among other things, that the withdrawal information did not include the required information on the amount of daily interest payments to be made in case of a withdrawal for the time period between payout of the loan and repayment. The withdrawal information merely stated that no interest would be payable for that period. The plaintiff also pointed out that the information did not state the interest rate on arrears (Verzungszinssatz) applicable at the time of contract execution or how and when such interest rate would be changed.

    In its decision, the BGH found the information on the interest rate payable after a withdrawal to be correct. The court argued that by including that no interest was payable in the event of a withdrawal, the lender had waived its corresponding claims and placed the consumer into a more favorable position. Therefore, the information was not a breach of the lender’s obligations.

    Although the lender did not adequately inform the plaintiff about the applicable interest rate on arrears at the time of contract execution or its adjustment mechanism, but only provided the information that interest in the amount of “five percentage points above the base interest rate” was due, the BGH held that this did not prevent the commencement of the withdrawal period. According to a December ruling by the ECJ, inaccurate or incomplete information about the right of withdrawal prevents the withdrawal period from commencing only if the incompleteness or incorrectness of the information affects the consumer’s ability to assess the scope of his rights and obligations arising from the loan agreement or his decision to conclude the contract and, if applicable, deprives him of the opportunity to exercise his rights under essentially the same conditions as those that would have existed if the information had been provided completely and accurately. The BGH found that a consumer who is reasonably well-informed, reasonably attentive and overall reasonable would have also concluded the loan agreement if the information on the interest rate on arrears had been correct. Therefore, although the information provided was incomplete, the withdrawal period began to run after the loan agreement was entered into and had already expired when the plaintiff declared their withdrawal.

    The case illustrates that while incorrect information about the right of withdrawal can generally have a significant impact by failing to start the withdrawal period, not every inaccuracy necessarily results in an extension of the consumer’s right of withdrawal.

    Relevant for: Car manufacturers, dealerships, finance providers.

    Further details (available only in German): https://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/SharedDocs/

    3. Amendment to Passenger Vehicle Energy Consumption Labelling Ordinance becomes effective

    On 23 February 2024, the amendments to the Passenger Vehicle Energy Consumption Labelling Ordinance (Pkw-Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungs-Verordnung), which implement mandatory EU law, came into force.

    Under the updated regulations, the fuel consumption and carbon dioxide emissions of new vehicles must now be determined using the “Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Procedure” (WLTP) which is stricter than the “New European Driving Cycle” procedure previously used and is designed to provide more realistic figures.

    In addition, vehicle emissions will be classified in various classes and color-coded, ranging from Class A in green for zero-emission vehicles to Class G in red for high-emission vehicles. Unlike the previous emission categories, the new categories will no longer take into account the weight of the vehicle. That had previously allowed large and heavy vehicles to receive a better emissions rating than lighter vehicles with the same amount of emissions. The new emission labels will also distinguish between different types of drives, such as electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, vehicles with diesel or gasoline engines and vehicles powered by natural gas or fuel cells.

    Relevant for: Vehicle manufacturers.

    Further details (available only in German): https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/P-R/240223-pkw-envkv-pressepapier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6

    4. Agreement on new German law on liability insurance

    On 21 February 2024, the German parliament and state governments reached an agreement on the revised version of the German law on liability insurance.

    The original draft law would have made liability insurance mandatory for forklifts and other self-driven machinery, including lawn tractors. That requirement was now deleted from the draft so that operators of such machinery will not be required to obtain liability insurance. Instead, damages will be compensated by a compensation fund.

    The amendments to German national law implement EU directive 2021/2118.

    Relevant for: Companies operating self-driven machinery, insurance providers.

    Further details (available only in German): https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/104/2010420.pdf

    5. European Court of Justice rules on validity jurisdiction clause

    In a judgment dated 8 February 2024, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) ruled on the validity of jurisdiction clauses, which are often found in commercial agreements, especially in B2B contracts.

    In this case, two Slovakian entities had entered into loan agreements containing a jurisdiction clause that designated a court in the Czech Republic as the competent court for disputes arising under or in connection with the contracts. The lender subsequently assigned the claims to another Slovak entity.

    The Czech court asked the ECJ whether the jurisdiction clause had been validly agreed under EU Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels Ia Regulation”), since the transactions contemplated had no connection with the Czech Republic other than the jurisdiction clause. The Brussels Ia Regulation supersedes national rules on jurisdiction within its scope of application.

    The ECJ held that although in the present case, the only connection to the Czech Republic was indeed the jurisdiction clause, the mere wording of the applicable Article 25 of the Brussels Ia Regulation did not require any other connection to the chosen jurisdiction.

    However, according to settled case law cited by the ECJ, there must also be an “international element”. The ECJ reasoned that this was the case because two jurisdictions, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, were involved as a result of the jurisdiction clause agreed between the parties. According to the ECJ, no further connection is required.

    As a consequence, jurisdiction clauses that fall within the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation are valid in cases where they would not have been valid under national law.

    Relevant for: All companies.

    Further details: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=282586&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=166422

    In depth
    Authors
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  • Form ADV Reminder: 2024 Annual Amendment Due Date

    Form ADV Reminder: 2024 Annual Amendment Due Date

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Form ADV Reminder: 2024 Annual Amendment Due Date

    March 4, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Registered investment advisers and exempt reporting advisers are required to file their annual Form ADV amendment within 90 days after their fiscal year end. Private fund managers typically have Dec. 31 fiscal year ends, meaning their annual amendments are filed at the end of March of the following year. Because 2024 is a leap year, February has an extra day. Accordingly, managers with Dec. 31 fiscal year ends must file their upcoming annual Form ADV amendment by Saturday, March 30, 2024. While IARD, the system through which managers prepare and file Form ADV, is typically open on Saturdays, managers should consider filing by Friday, March 29, 2024, to account for any contingencies.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
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  • CPPA Releases Proposed Updates to CCPA Regulations and Unveils New Draft Privacy Assessment and ADM Rules

    CPPA Releases Proposed Updates to CCPA Regulations and Unveils New Draft Privacy Assessment and ADM Rules

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CPPA Releases Proposed Updates to CCPA Regulations and Unveils New Draft Privacy Assessment and ADM Rules

    March 1, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On February 23, 2024, the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) released proposed updates to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) regulations and draft updates to the Risk Assessment and Automated Decisionmaking Technology (ADM) regulations. These drafts will be reviewed at the upcoming March 8, 2024, CPPA Board meeting. We previously wrote about earlier versions of these draft regulations, which will usher in significant operational changes for businesses. While the revisions to the ADM and Risk Assessment rules reveal notable improvements, the proposed drafts continue to present significant new obligations that businesses should begin preparing for immediately.

    In depth

    Automated Decisionmaking Technology

    The draft ADM regulations include several noteworthy updates as outlined in an accompanying PowerPoint that the CCPA released publicly. These include:

    • Revised definition of ADM: The draft regulations propose important updates to the definition of what constitutes ADM. As we detailed previously, the definition in the last iteration was so broad so as to include calculators or even spreadsheet formulas. In the current draft, the definition of ADM expressly excludes ordinary technologies, such as calculators and domain registrations, so long as they are not used in a manner that replaces human decision-making. Ambiguity remains, however, as to what happens if one of the excluded technologies is used to facilitate human decision-making.
    • Revised definition of significant decision: As was true under the last iteration of the proposed regulations, the use of ADM for the purpose of making a significant decision triggers the need to conduct an assessment. The definition of “significant decision” has been narrowed in the latest draft to clarify the types of decisions that are “significant.”
    • Revised definition of behavioral advertising: There is a new proposed definition of behavioral advertising which makes clear that the term excludes “nonpersonalized advertising, provided that the consumer’s personal information is not used to build a profile about the consumer…” This is welcome news for companies that seek to advertise based on basic demographic information (e.g., all men or women in a state).

    While these definitional changes mark significant improvement, the notice and opt-out requirements of the prior drafts remain largely intact. Here, too, the draft regulations include a number of changes, including additional disclosures (e.g., no retaliation against customers who opt out) and additional detail around how the CPPA expects businesses to comply with the notice requirements of the draft ADM rules. The proposed regulations also make clear that certain exceptions to the opt-out right for ADM do not apply to the use of ADM for behavioral advertising based on data subject profiling.  This means the use of ADM for behavioral advertising may require opt-outs even where the advertising is based on first-party data.

    Privacy Risk Assessments

    As with the ADM draft regulations, the latest proposed regulations include helpful, and significant, revisions. In addition to several definitional changes, the draft regulations include a number of changes to the thresholds for conducting risk assessments. Risk assessments would now be triggered by the following uses of personal information:

    • Selling or sharing of information
    • Most instances of processing of sensitive information (now including information of a minor)
    • Using ADM for a significant decision or “extensive” profiling (a new term meaning work or educational profiling, public profiling or profiling for behavioral advertising)
    • Training ADM or artificial intelligence capable of certain actions, including significant decision-making and creation of deepfakes

    One of the welcome revisions to the assessment draft regulations is greater clarity around what elements must appear in the assessment as opposed to those that may appear in an assessment. The prior draft regulation seemed to suggest that companies would have to consider and document a wide array of considerations that might have had no applicability to the particular use case. The new draft regulations address some of that by clarifying that certain elements of the assessment are not strictly required.

    CCPA Regulation Changes

    The proposed changes to the existing CCPA regulations would expand consumer privacy rights while also adjusting certain financial thresholds of the CCPA, including the $25 million applicability threshold. Other changes include:

    • New monetary thresholds: If the proposed regulations come into effect, then retroactively effective January 1, 2023, the revenue threshold for a company qualifying as a business will increase from $25 million to of $27,975,000. In addition, monetary penalties will increase.
    • Expansion of the right to access: Businesses that maintain personal information for longer than 12 months must provide consumers with a method where they can request from businesses their personal information collected prior to the 12-month period preceding the date of the business’s request receipt.
    • Complaints with the CPPA or attorney general: Businesses must inform consumers that they can file complaints with the CPPA or the attorney general if they believe that their privacy rights have been violated and provide links to the compliant forms on their websites. This approach is aligned with other state consumer privacy laws, such as those in Colorado, Connecticut and Virginia.

    What’s Next?

    Formal rulemaking has not yet begun, though we expect the regulations to be finalized in the coming months. Companies should take this opportunity to assess their current readiness against the proposed regulations and understand what additional steps need to be taken to become compliant.

    If you have questions or need assistance with CCPA compliance or other state privacy laws, please contact any of the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    David P. Saunders

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Soaring to New Heights: The IRS’s Crackdown on Aircraft Usage by Corporations and High-Income Earners

    Soaring to New Heights: The IRS’s Crackdown on Aircraft Usage by Corporations and High-Income Earners

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Soaring to New Heights: The IRS’s Crackdown on Aircraft Usage by Corporations and High-Income Earners

    March 1, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has announced plans to initiate dozens of new audits this spring in an attempt to limit personal usage of corporate aircraft. These audits will focus primarily on “highest risk” corporations and large partnerships, IRS Commissioner Danny Werfel stated. Werfel added that audits of high-income earners will likely follow to “ensure that high-income groups are not flying under the radar.”

    In depth

    Background

    Generally, the cost of the use of corporate aircraft can be a deductible business expense. However, the use of a corporate aircraft must be allocated between business use and personal use. While business use of a corporate aircraft is a deductible business expense and excluded from the executive’s income, personal use of a corporate aircraft can adversely affect the deductibility of related travel costs and, with certain important exceptions, is includible in the executive’s Form W-2 wages.

    There have been significant increases in spending on personal use of corporate aircraft. According to a recent Wall Street Journal report, large, publicly traded companies spent an estimated $65 million in 2022 for personal corporate aircraft usage by executives, an increase of roughly 50% from 2019. Much of the personal use of corporate aircraft is attributable to travel associated with working remotely and challenges stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. While the IRS has historically audited corporate aircraft issues, including as part of its much-touted executive audits almost 20 years ago, this is a singularly focused audit initiative.

    “Tens of millions of dollars” of tax deductions are at stake, according to Werfel. The bonus depreciation deduction is one of the most lucrative deductions currently for corporate aircrafts and may be the target of most of the audits. The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 allows for 100% bonus depreciation and expensing of private jets – which permitted taxpayers to write off the full cost of aircrafts purchased and put into service between September 2017 and January 2023. After 2023, the deduction will decrease by 20% each year until it is fully phased out by 2027. However, the US House of Representatives recently passed the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act of 2024, which extends the 100% bonus depreciation rate until the end of 2025.

    Observations

    The IRS will reportedly use advanced analytics and other resources funded by the Inflation Reduction Act to examine corporate aircraft usage more closely. This area has not been highly scrutinized during the last decade. An April 2023 IRS report on tax audit data states that “continued resource constraints have limited the agency’s ability to address high-end noncompliance” and that in the 2018 tax year, audit rates for people making more than $10 million were 9.2%, down from 13.6% in 2012. And, in the same period, overall corporate audit rates fell from 1.3% to 0.6%.

    The audits present, as stated by Werfel, “a significant opportunity to collect a significant amount of revenue” and help close the “tax gap” of approximately $700 billion per year. While Werfel stressed that the IRS does not take the position that all large corporations and high-income earners are noncompliant or are purposefully engaging in evasive behaviors, this increased audit activity will result in IRS challenges to many compliant taxpayers. The National Business Aviation Association has countered that the IRS audit initiative “amounts to nothing more than an audit in search of a problem,” noting that it “is difficult to understand why the agency is suggesting that these companies – some of the most respected, well-managed businesses in the world – are not in compliance with applicable tax laws.”

    Given the value of the corporate aircraft deductions and corresponding income inclusion issues, these in-depth IRS audits will focus on identifying deficient recordkeeping, disallowing business deductions and recharacterizing C-suite executive wage income, all with the eye toward using the test audits to develop broader audit guidelines for future use.

    To adequately prepare for this increased audit activity, employers with corporate aircrafts should review the following:

    • Existing recordkeeping (e.g., is it contemporaneous with corporate flights, does it capture all relevant detail (including who is on board and the purpose of the trip), is it audit-ready)
    • Corporate aircraft personal and entertainment usage for compliance with written policies
    • Leveraging the complex income exclusions for an executive’s personal use of corporate aircraft
    • Any changes in the business home of executives since the COVID-19 pandemic that might impact existing reporting positions on personal versus business use
    • W-2 reporting of personal usage of corporate aircraft, including various Subtitle C wage and information reporting exclusions

    Being proactive rather than reactive is the best method to keep the skies friendly. The time to prepare for an IRS corporate aircraft audit is now (especially for the personal use exclusions) and not when the company receives an IRS audit notice. Distinguishing between business, personal and entertainment travel – including ascertaining an executive’s tax home post-COVID-19 – is not always straightforward. McDermott lawyers have extensive audit experience addressing these matters.

    Authors

    Andrew C. Liazos

    Partner

    Boston, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Jennifer D. Hill

    Associate

    Atlanta

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  • McDermott presents the main topics and regulations as well as current case law for Leaseholds in Germany

    McDermott presents the main topics and regulations as well as current case law for Leaseholds in Germany

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    McDermott presents the main topics and regulations as well as current case law for Leaseholds in Germany

    March 1, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Leaseholds play an important role in the real estate industry. It is therefore becoming increasingly important for real estate investors, project developers and the public sector to take a closer look at the content, structure and legal consequences of leaseholds. In addition, politicians are increasingly viewing leaseholds as an “instrument of strategic land policy in Germany”, with the result that local authorities in particular are increasingly only issuing larger project developments on the basis of leaseholds.

    Our newsletter series “Erbbaurecht kompakt” (in German) presents the key topics and regulations as well as current case law relating to leaseholds. In our first article, we present the most important basics of leasehold law in the form of an FAQ.

    In depth
    Authors

    Philipp-Gerald Hammes

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • Badgerow Enforced: District Court Lacks Independent Jurisdiction to Enforce Arbitration Award

    Badgerow Enforced: District Court Lacks Independent Jurisdiction to Enforce Arbitration Award

    ARTICLE

    Badgerow Enforced: District Court Lacks Independent Jurisdiction to Enforce Arbitration Award

    Feb 29, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s arbitration award because the district court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction, independent from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), to enforce the award. SmartSky Networks, LLC v. DAG Wireless, LTD, Case No. 22-1253 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2024) (Diaz, Thacker, Rubin, JJ.)

    SmartSky Networks filed suit in the district court against Wireless Systems Solutions and related companies and individuals over alleged breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation and deceptive trade practices. The parties entered into a business relationship regarding wireless communications in 2017. The relationship was governed by several agreements in the form of statements of work, purchase orders and a teaming agreement.

    After filing suit in the district court, SmartSky submitted an arbitration demand against Wireless Systems. The related companies and individuals voluntarily agreed to submit to arbitration with respect to SmartSky’s claims filed against them. Wireless Systems moved to stay the district court action pending arbitration. The arbitration tribunal found in favor of SmartSky and issued an award, which included monetary damages in favor of SmartSky and a permanent injunction against the other parties. Thereafter, SmartSky filed a motion to enforce the award, and the district court confirmed the award. Wireless Systems and the related entities appealed.

    The threshold question on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. Wireless Systems argued that the 2022 Supreme Court decision in Badgerow v. Walters dictated that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award. In Badgerow, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court faced with an application to enforce or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 or 10 of the FAA must have a basis for subject matter jurisdiction independent from the FAA and apparent on the face of the application. The Supreme Court further held that “look-through” jurisdiction (when a court looks beyond a petition to compel arbitration to the underlying controversy to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists) only applies to petitions to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA, and that such jurisdiction is not available for Section 9 and 10 applications to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration awards.

    Reviewing the district court ruling de novo, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Court reasoned that at the time the parties filed their respective Section 9 and 10 applications, the dispute focused on the enforceability of the arbitral award and not on the issues and claims already resolved by the tribunal. For the district court to find that it had jurisdiction over the contract dispute between the parties, the district court had to “look through” to the civil lawsuit and determine that a federal claim existed. Ruling consistently with Badgerow, the Court determined that “look-through” jurisdiction is not available for Section 9 and 10 applications. The Court reasoned that once the tribunal ordered that all claims between SmartSky and Wireless Systems be arbitrated and the related companies and individuals voluntarily consented to arbitration, no claims remained pending before the district court. The Fourth Circuit clarified that a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate applications or petitions brought under one section of the FAA does not automatically extend to applications or petitions brought under a different section of the FAA. Moreover, Badgerow neither created nor left intact a continuing jurisdiction rule to allow a district court that previously stayed a case to retain or extend its subject matter jurisdiction over subsequent Section 9 and 10 applications.

    Practice Note: The Fourth Circuit’s ruling reaffirms Supreme Court precedent regarding subject matter jurisdiction in the district court for enforcing an arbitration award. Parties should consider this line of case law before agreeing to mandatory arbitration clauses or voluntarily consenting to arbitration.

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  • Delaware Court Invalidates Stockholder Agreement Governance Provisions

    Delaware Court Invalidates Stockholder Agreement Governance Provisions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Delaware Court Invalidates Stockholder Agreement Governance Provisions

    February 29, 2024

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In holding that certain provisions within the stockholder agreement of a Delaware corporation are invalid under the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), the Delaware Court of Chancery has created a framework for evaluating whether an agreement impermissibly restricts the authority and duty of directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation in their best judgment. While the case, West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co., C.A. No. 2023-0309-JTL (Del. Ch. February 23, 2024), may be appealed by the defendant, the opinion provides important guidance for corporate planners when crafting agreements pertaining to internal governance of a Delaware corporation.

    In depth

    The Facts

    Prior to Moelis & Company, a Delaware corporation (the Company), going public in an initial public offering, the Company’s founder, CEO and chairman of the board (the Founder), along with certain affiliates, entered into a stockholder agreement (Stockholder Agreement) with the Company, which was fully disclosed to the Company’s investors. The Stockholder Agreement granted the Founder (directly and indirectly) expansive rights pertaining to the management and governance of the Company, which the Court described as the Pre-Approval Requirements, Board Composition Provisions and Committee Composition Provision.

    Pre-Approval Requirements. These obligate the Company’s board of directors (the Board) to obtain the Founder’s prior written consent before taking certain actions, which encompass virtually everything the Board can do, including, inter alia, issuing securities, incurring debt, amending the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, removing or appointing senior officers, adopting a budget and business plan, declaring dividends, and causing the Company to merge, sell substantially all assets or dissolve.

    Board Composition Provisions. These ensure that the Founder can select a majority of the directors through the following contractual obligations:

    • The Company must use best efforts to maintain the size of the Board at no more than 11 seats unless the Founder consents to an increase in the number of directors (Size Requirement).
    • The Founder can name designees equal to a majority of the Board seats (Designation Right).
    • The Board must nominate the Founder’s designees as candidates for election (Nomination Requirement).
    • The Board must recommend that stockholders vote in favor of the Founder’s designees (Recommendation Requirement).
    • The Company must use reasonable efforts to enable the Founder’s designees to be elected and continue to serve (Efforts Requirement).
    • The Board must fill any vacancy in a seat occupied by a Founder designee with a new Founder designee (Vacancy Requirement).

    Committee Composition Provision. This forces the Board to appoint to any committee such number of the Founder’s designees proportionate to the number of the Founder’s designees on the full Board. The Board cannot create a committee with a different number of Founder designees or an independent committee without any Founder designees unless the Founder consents.

    The plaintiff, a Company stockholder, claimed that these provisions violate Sections 141(a) and 141(c) of the DGCL. The plaintiff’s claim was based on Delaware precedent holding that a governance restriction in an agreement (as opposed to the corporation’s certificate of incorporation) is invalid when it, either directly or indirectly, has “the effect of removing from directors in a very substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on management matters” or “tends to limit in a substantial way the freedom of director decisions on matters of management policy.” (Referred to as the Abercrombie test by the Court.)

    The Court of Chancery’s Analytical Framework

    Based on Sections 141(a) and 141(c) and Delaware precedent, the Court created a two-step framework under which challenges to an agreement should be analyzed for compliance with Section 141(a). First, the Court must determine whether the challenged provision is part of an internal governance arrangement. If not, then the inquiry ends. If so, then the Court moves to the second step – the Abercrombie test – to determine whether the provision imposes a restriction that violates Section 141(a).

    First Step:  Is the Provision Part of the Company’s Internal Governance Arrangement?

    Section 141(a) polices external arrangements that seek to implement internal restrictions on a board of directors’ ability to exercise its power and fulfill its duties. Determining whether an external contract establishes a governance arrangement (as opposed to a commercial arrangement) is a matter of degree, but the Court provided the following seven factors to consider:

    • Governance agreements frequently have a statutory grounding in the DGCL. For example, stockholder agreements are grounded in Section 218, merger agreements in Section 251, officer employment agreements in Section 142 and asset sale agreements in Section 271.
    • The corporation’s counterparties in a governance agreement hold roles as intra-corporate actors (i.e., officers, directors, stockholders or their affiliates), whereas a standard commercial counterparty might be a supplier, customer or service provider.
    • The challenged provision seeks to specify the terms on which intra-corporate actors can authorize the corporation’s exercise of its corporate power, such as by requiring or prohibiting voting in a certain way or forbidding actions that directors could otherwise take.
    • Unlike a commercial contract, a governance agreement does not readily reveal an underlying commercial exchange. The point of a governance arrangement is the governance, whereas in a commercial arrangement there is a clearer exchange of consideration.
    • The relationship between the contractual restrictions and a commercial purpose. Features in a commercial arrangement that touch on governance often are intended to protect the underlying commercial transaction, whereas in a governance arrangement, the governance rights are the point.
    • The presumptive remedy for breach. In a commercial agreement, the presumptive remedy will be damages tied to the commercial bargain; whereas a governance arrangement will involve control rights, so the presumptive remedy will be equitable relief enforcing the right.
    • The duration of the contract and the corporation’s ability to terminate it. A commercial agreement is more likely terminable or has a limited duration, and a governance arrangement is more likely to be enduring and the corporation lacks the ability to freely terminate.

    Second Step: Does the Challenged Provision Improperly Restrict the Board?

    If the Court determines that the challenged provision appears in a contract is part of the corporation’s governance arrangement, the Court will then apply the Abercrombie test to determine validity under Section 141(a). This requires the Court to assess whether the provision, directly or indirectly, (i) has the effect of removing from the directors in a very substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on management matters or (ii) tends to limit in a substantial way the freedom of director decisions on matters of management policy.

    Delaware courts have invalidated direct board-level constraints (i.e., purports to bind the board or individual directors, as in “the board shall” or “the board shall not”) and have invalidated direct company-level constraints (i.e., purports to bind the company, as in “the company shall” or “the company shall not,” where the issue requires a board decision). The Court also explained that, albeit less frequently, Delaware courts have invalidated indirect board-level constraints (i.e., imposes a sufficiently onerous consequence on the board or individual directors for taking or not taking the specified action) and indirect company-level constraints (i.e., imposes a sufficiently onerous consequence on the company for taking or not taking an action that requires a board decision). But in each case, the constraint only applies to governance arrangements – a constraint that appears in a non-governance arrangement does not give rise to a Section 141(a) issue.

    Specifically with respect to stockholder agreements (which are permitted by Section 218(c) of the DGCL – though the Court in dicta suggested that Section 218 should be amended to provide more clarity as to what stockholder agreements can accomplish), the Court presented a simple test for determining when a provision is not subject to Section 141(a): Does the contractual provision address an action that an individual stockholder or a group of stockholders collectively could take (e.g., exercising their voting rights)? If yes, then stockholders can contract over that action in advance without implicating Section 141(a). However, if the provision purports to enable stockholders to manage the business and affairs of a corporation, it is invalid – that specific authorization must come from either the DGCL or the certificate of incorporation.

    The Holding

    Utilizing this framework, the Court concluded that the challenged provisions in the Stockholder Agreement were prototypical governance provisions in a prototypical governance agreement and were therefore part of the Company’s internal governance arrangement. The Court held that the Pre-Approval Requirements, Recommendation Requirement, Vacancy Requirement, Size Requirement and Committee Composition Provision were facially invalid. The Court noted, however, that if they were contained in the Company’s certificate of incorporation, they could be valid (though with some limitations, since a certificate of incorporation cannot override a mandatory feature of the DGCL and even if in the certificate of incorporation, it would remain subject to an as-applied challenge under equitable principles).

    The Pre-Approval Requirements are facially invalid because they require the Founder’s prior approval before the Board can act on virtually every important management matter, effectively rendering the Board an advisory body and likely having a chilling effect on the matters the Board would potentially present to the Founder for approval.

    The Recommendation Requirement, Vacancy Requirement, Size Requirement and Committee Composition Provision are facially invalid because each remove from the directors in a very substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on a management matter (i.e., who should serve as a director, the size of the Board and who should serve on a committee).

    On the other hand, the Court held that the Designation Right (which enables the Founder to specify individuals as potential candidates for election), the Nomination Right (which enables a Founder nominee to stand for election), and the Efforts Requirement (which requires the Company to take reasonable actions to cause the Founder’s designees to be elected to the Board, such as by including information about them in the Company’s proxy statement) are not facially invalid. None of these provisions imposed a restriction on the Board’s ability to exercise its management authority and fulfill its duties. While not facially invalid, these provisions could still be subject to an as-applied challenge if such provisions are applied inequitably – every corporate action is twice tested, first for technical compliance with the DGCL and the corporation’s governing documents and second for compliance with equity.

    Key Takeaways

    • While Moelis may be appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, it provides guidance pertaining to the validity of provisions contained in many stockholder agreements and other governance arrangements (such as settlement agreements resolving proxy contests with activist investors) that purport to restrict the ability of a Delaware corporation’s board of directors to fully and freely exercise their authority to manage the corporation in accordance with their fiduciary duties.
    • The provisions at issue in Moelis were held to be facially invalid but the Court suggested that many of the provisions could have been valid if instead contained in the Company’s certificate of incorporation – Section 141(a) allows for a certificate of incorporation to modify the power of the board to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Parties can therefore include governance provisions in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation – with the caveat that even provisions in a certificate of incorporation cannot override a mandatory feature of the DGCL. Further, Section 102(d) of the DGCL provides that any certificate of incorporation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside such certificate, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the certificate of incorporation is clearly and explicitly set forth therein. Thus, another option would be for parties to include such governance provisions in a separate agreement and then incorporate by reference those governance provisions into the certificate of incorporation. We note, however, that it remains to be seen what level of specificity that would be required for such incorporation by reference to satisfy the Section 141(a) issues raised in Moelis.
    • Under Delaware law, all corporate actions are twice tested: once for legal validity (such as for compliance with Section 141(a)) and second for equity. The Court invalidated the challenged provisions for failure to comply with the DGCL – they were not legally valid provisions. The Court therefore did not need to address whether the valid provisions (or the invalidated provisions had they been legally valid) would satisfy the second part of the test. This leaves open the possibility for challenges to such provisions on equitable grounds. For example, even if a governance provision is valid (e.g., a provision included in the certificate of incorporation) it could be unenforceable if applied inequitably.
    Authors

    Nathan E. Barnett

    Partner

    Wilmington

    Ethan H. Townsend

    Partner

    Wilmington

    Benjamin Strauss

    Partner

    Wilmington

    Marina C. Leary

    Associate

    Washington, DC, Wilmington

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  • Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | February 2024

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | February 2024

    ARTICLE

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | February 2024

    February 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Unified Patent Court (UPC) is revolutionizing the way patents are enforced in Europe, and McDermott’s intellectual property team is here to help you navigate this dynamic landscape. Our Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court newsletter is designed to keep patent holders and legal departments well-informed. And with an on-the-ground team in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, we offer a unique cross-border perspective.


    In depth
    Authors

    Diana Pisani

    European Patent Attorney

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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