Content Type: Article

  • HHS’s CARES Act Final Rule Better Aligns Part 2 Substance Use Disorder Patient Records Confidentiality Regulations with HIPAA

    HHS’s CARES Act Final Rule Better Aligns Part 2 Substance Use Disorder Patient Records Confidentiality Regulations with HIPAA

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    HHS’s CARES Act Final Rule Better Aligns Part 2 Substance Use Disorder Patient Records Confidentiality Regulations with HIPAA

    March 28, 2024

    Read time: 3 min

    Overview

    On February 8, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) jointly issued a final rule to amend the Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder (SUD) Patient Records regulations under 42 C.F.R. Part 2 (Part 2), applicable to certain federally assisted SUD treatment programs (Part 2 Programs), to implement Section 3221 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. The final rule modifies longstanding restrictions under Part 2. It newly permits disclosures of SUD patient records (Part 2 Records) for treatment, payment and health care operations purposes under a general consent and makes other changes to align Part 2’s record requirements with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) privacy, breach notification and enforcement regulations applicable to protected health information (PHI).

    OCR Director Melanie Fontes Rainer said, “The Final Rule strengthens confidentiality protections while improving care coordination for patients and providers. Patients can seek needed treatment and care for substance use disorder knowing that greater protections are in place to keep their records private, and providers can now better share information to improve patient care.”

    The final rule compliance date is February 16, 2026, giving entities two years to make the necessary updates to their privacy, security and information-sharing practices. For more information about the CARES Act, see this On the Subject. For more information about the proposed rule issued under the CARES Act, see this On the Subject.

    In depth
    Tabs

    Jennifer S. Geetter

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

    Kyle E. Hafkey

    Associate

    Boston

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (03/2024)

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (03/2024)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Mobility@McDermott: Monthly Update (03/2024)

    March 28, 2024

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    1. Leasing provider liable for behavior of car dealership employees in court case relating to vehicle purchase option after end of leasing agreement

    When a customer decides to lease a vehicle offline, the first point of contact is often a car dealership. In a recent case decided by the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart (Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart), a written purchase offer made to a lessee by dealership employees ended up costing the leasing provider the majority of the lease payments.

    In this case, a corporate lessee entered into a four-year leasing agreement with a total kilometer allowance of 80,000 kilometers, a down payment of EUR 10,000 and monthly payments of EUR 999. He made it clear to the dealership employees that he would not lease the vehicle unless he received a binding offer prior to the commencement of the lease agreement to purchase the vehicle at the end of the contract. In response, the dealership employees provided him with a written statement in which they undertook to offer the customer the vehicle at the end of the lease for a purchase price of EUR 50,505.72.

    After the leasing agreement was signed, the dealership sold the leased vehicle to the leasing provider, who in turn provided it to the customer, who then used it for four years. During that time, the lessee drove around 10,000 kilometers. At the end of the lease term, the lessor asked the customer to return the vehicle. After the customer asked to buy the car as agreed with the dealership employees, the leasing provider insisted that they return the vehicle because the purchase right had been agreed between the dealership and the customer without the involvement of the leasing provider. According to the lessor, the dealer could not sell the car to the customer because the dealer did not own the car – the lessor did and apparently had other plans for the car.

    In response, the customer stated that the lease had to be cancelled because the right to purchase had been critical to his decision to lease the car. As a result, the customer agreed to return the car in exchange for a refund of all his payments under the leasing agreement in the amount of EUR 64,796.32, less a compensation for use.

    In its judgment of 5 March 2024, the court sided with the lessee. It found that when agreeing on the right to purchase with the lessee, the dealership employees had a duty to inform him that the purchase of the vehicle was uncertain and would only be possible if the leasing provider cooperated, as it would then be the owner of the vehicle. Since the lessee had expressly stated that he would not enter into the lease without such a purchase option, the court found that the dealership employees had a duty to inform him of this without being asked. Failure to do so constituted a breach of a pre-contractual obligation.

    While it was true that the leasing provider was not directly involved in the negotiations and claimed to have no knowledge of the written purchase option granted to the lessee by the dealership, the court ruled that the leasing provider was responsible for the conduct of the dealership employees as if the leasing provider itself had breached the pre-contractual duty. While offering a purchase option is usually considered to be in the sole interest of the dealer (because it allows the dealer to sell the vehicle to the lessee), in this case the court found that it was also in the interest of the leasing provider because the lessee would not have entered into the lease agreement otherwise.

    As a result, the lessee was only required to return the vehicle to the lessor in exchange for a payment of EUR 59,036.72 – the full amount of the lessee’s lease payments less a compensation for use which the court calculated to be EUR 5,759.60.

    While it remains to be seen whether other courts will side with the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart in similar cases, the case illustrates that the practice of many leasing providers to use dealership employees as intermediaries when concluding into leasing agreements can lead to liability risks for the lessor.

    Relevant for: Leasing providers, car dealerships.

    Further details here (available in German only)

    2. EU parliament adopts European AI Act

    On 13 March 2024, a majority of the European Parliament passed the groundbreaking European AI Act. According to the Parliament, it is the world’s first regulation of artificial intelligence.

    The AI Act applies to anyone who develops, offers or uses artificial intelligence within the EU. The details will be implemented by member states in their respective jurisdictions. This includes sanctions for violations of the AI Act, as local oversight authorities will complement a central „AI Office“ and „AI Board“ at the EU level. The fines for violations are steep – up to 7 % of global annual turnover or EUR 35 million for prohibited AI violations, up to 3 % for other breaches and up to 1.5 % or EUR 7.5 million for providing false information. There are different liability caps for SMEs and start-ups. It is envisaged that all aspects of the law will be implemented within two years.

    The intention behind the AI Act is to strike a balance between user safety, ethical concerns and innovation. It uses a risk-based approach with the intention of nuanced regulation of AI.

    As the scope of the AI Act is very broad, it is expected to have a significant impact on automakers in many aspects, including autonomous driving.

    Relevant for: OEMs.

    Further details here and here

    3. EU member states reach agreement on CSDDD after significant amendments

    After considerable controversy among EU member states, on 15 March 2024 they agreed on a revised version of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (“CSDDD”). In the updated version – which must still be approved by the European Parliament before it comes into force – the number of companies falling within the scope of the new law is significantly lower than in previous drafts.

    The law now applies to companies with more than 1,000 employees (up from 500) and a net turnover of more than EUR 450 million (up from EUR 150 million). It makes EU companies responsible for environmental harm and human rights abuses in their supply chains.

    On 19 March 2024, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament approved the bill. The vote in the European Parliament will take place on 24 April 2024.

    After the CSDDD becomes effective on EU level, it will have to be implemented on a national level.

    Relevant for: All companies.

    Further details here

    4. Ruling by European Court of Justice on free access to EU Harmonized Standards

    A court ruling by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) on 5 March 2024 regarding access to EU Harmonized Standards has received widespread attention.

    The EU Harmonized Standards are technical standards developed by the European Standardization Organisations (“ESOs”) for numerous product categories in order to implement European risk regulation requirements. The European Commission reviews and publishes these standards. Once published, compliance with the essential requirements of risk regulation is presumed when the technical standards are used. Compliance with the standards therefore allows companies to comply with the regulations without having to review and implement them themselves – a great advantage, especially for SMEs.

    The work of the ESOs is financed by the fees that are charged to companies for access to the harmonized standards. In the case decided by the ECJ, two NGOs had sued to make the EU Harmonized Standards for children’s toys available for free, arguing that they were part of EU law and therefore EU citizens had a right to access them free of charge.

    The ECJ agreed with the plaintiffs and considered the EU Harmonized Standards to be part of EU law due to their mandatory legal effect. The court argued that there was an overriding public interest in free access to the standards. Legal experts are now concerned about the financing of the standards’ development.

    Relevant for: OEMs.

    Further details here

    5. German Federal Court of Justice to hear case on warranty claim for 40 year old car

    Germany’s highest civil court, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) will hear a case concerning warranty claims in connection with the sale of a vintage car on 10 April 2024.

    In this case, the plaintiff had purchased a Mercedes SL 380 first registered in 1981 with a mileage of approximately 150,000 kilometers. In the listing of the car, the seller, the defendant in the case, excluded their statutory liability for material defects of the vehicle, as is possible under German law for the sale of used goods between consumers. The defendant also stated that the air conditioning “works perfectly”. Two months after the purchase, the plaintiff informed the defendant that the air conditioner was not working and needed to be repaired at a cost of approximately EUR 1,750. The plaintiff is now seeking reimbursement from the seller for the repair costs.

    According to the long-standing practice of the German Federal Court of Justice, a complete exclusion of warranty does not apply to aspects of purchased goods that have been expressly agreed upon by the parties. In this case, however, the lower courts rejected the plaintiff’s claim based on the argument that in case of the purchase of a 40-year-old car, the buyer must always expect that maintenance will be required even if a certain condition of the car is expressly upon by the parties. According to the courts, the purchaser could therefore not have expected the air conditioner would continue to work after the purchase.

    Relevant for: Parties involved in vehicle sales.

    Further details here (available in German only)

    6. New UN cybersecurity regulations to start applying to all new vehicles in EU in July

    On 1 July 2024, the UNECE R155 cybersecurity regulation will become mandatory for all new vehicles in the EU. The regulation was introduced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, a regulatory forum that harmonizes vehicle regulations. Its goal is to improve cybersecurity in vehicles. Given the increasing importance of software in vehicles, the regulation responds to the vulnerability to hackers.

    Under the regulation, OEMs must not only adapt their vehicles’ technology to comply with the cybersecurity requirements, but more importantly, ensure that management processes and internal procedures comply with the regulation. This can be challenging as the vast majority of software is typically developed by suppliers rather than by OEMs themselves. As a result, several automakers have decided to phase out older models.

    Relevant for: OEMs.

    Further details here

    In depth
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  • Standard-Essential Patents: The Growing Rift Between the United States and Europe

    Standard-Essential Patents: The Growing Rift Between the United States and Europe

    ARTICLE

    Standard-Essential Patents: The Growing Rift Between the United States and Europe

    March 28, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Numerous contemporary technologies, such as the internet, WiFi, cellular communications, video streaming, computer memory, and computer bus architectures, operate under the governance of industry standards. These standards delineate their necessary functionality and ensure seamless compatibility across devices manufactured by different companies. Typically, technology firms and researchers collaborate within standard-defining organizations (SDOs), also known as standard-setting organizations (SSOs), to draft these standards. The process mirrors legislative procedures. In this article, Hon.-Prof. Dr. Henrik Holzapfel and Dr. Laura Katharina Woll, LL.M., explore the contrasting approaches taken in the United States and Europe—two regions at the forefront of disputes related to Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs).

    In depth
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  • Wertpapierprospektrecht

    Wertpapierprospektrecht

    ARTICLE

    Wertpapierprospektrecht

    2023

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Prof. Dr. Clemens Just is editor and co-author of the commentary “Wertpapierprospektrecht” published by C.H. Beck Verlag in its 2nd edition. Other authors include among others Dr. Thorsten Voß, Dr. Corinna Ritz and Dr. Michael Zeising.

    The new edition deals with questions of securities law. The focus is on the preparation and implementation of the approval procedure at BaFin.

    In depth
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  • California DOJ Plans to Use Cartwright Act to Revive Criminal Enforcement Efforts

    California DOJ Plans to Use Cartwright Act to Revive Criminal Enforcement Efforts

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California DOJ Plans to Use Cartwright Act to Revive Criminal Enforcement Efforts

    March 26, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 6, 2024, Paula Blizzard, the California Department of Justice’s antitrust chief, announced on a panel at the American Bar Association’s National Institute on White Collar Crime that the California Attorney General’s Office plans to revive criminal antitrust prosecutions under California’s Cartwright Act. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq.

    In depth

    Blizzard’s announcement addressed the following points:

    • The attorney general’s office intends to coordinate with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division in its criminal enforcement efforts. DOJ’s Acting Chief of Criminal Enforcement Emma Burnham echoed the sentiment and addressed how state and federal agencies may work together in this capacity.
    • The Cartwright Act, California’s flagship antitrust statute, was intended to reach anti-competitive conduct beyond its federal counterpart, the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. Specifically:
      • Violations of the Cartwright Act carry heavy criminal penalties, up to hundreds of thousands and even millions of dollars for individuals and companies alike.
      • Third parties supplying information in furtherance of a conspiracy may constitute actionable “furnish[ing of] information” under the Cartwright Act.
      • Cartwright Act violations need not meet the heightened pleading standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) or the enhanced pleading standards for fraud. In Blizzard’s words, “You do not have to be doing the types of things that you do, for instance, in an enhanced pleading for fraud … And according to the [Cartwright Act] I also don’t have to say very much, so we’ll see how that goes.”
      • The act deems noncompetes and no-poach agreements as per se illegal, which was recently codified in state legislation in early 2024. This legislative move parallels DOJ’s enforcement efforts over the last three years targeting nonsolicitation and no-poach agreements as per se illegal under the Sherman Act.

    What This Means

    • This announcement represents a significant shift in the attorney general’s enforcement strategies, considering the office has not brought a criminal Cartwright Act action in over 25 years. Given the DOJ’s fervor in increasing its own criminal antitrust prosecution efforts, there is little doubt that both state and federal criminal antitrust enforcement will continue to grow, and so will joint collaborations among state and federal agencies.
    • The Cartwright Act’s broader scope will allow the attorney general’s office to condemn a wider range of conduct that might not otherwise violate other states’ or federal antitrust statute counterparts.
    • The Cartwright Act’s low pleading standard and the California Unfair Competition Law’s minimum standing requirements open the door to a greater number of follow-on private class actions and civil lawsuits, typically brought in conjunction with criminal indictments, which also might not be pursued in other state and federal jurisdictions.
    • Healthcare and Big Tech companies have frequently been the focus of federal enforcement announcements, investigations and litigations, and they are likely to be the focus of the attorney general’s office. In California, these industries may face broader scrutiny than they have under the Sherman Act.
    • Blizzard also made specific reference to potential antitrust enforcement related to the substantial number of government contracts in California, particularly given that the California economy is the fourth largest in the world.

    What Companies Should Do

    Now, more than ever, companies in all industries – not just those subject to heavy antitrust enforcement actions – need to carefully reexamine their operations to ensure antitrust compliance. Companies are wise to seek experienced antitrust counsel’s advice to minimize the risks of facing possible civil or even criminal lawsuits from both state and federal authorities. In light of DOJ’s revitalized corporate enforcement policy, companies and executives must strengthen, and pay close attention to, their internal compliance controls while proactively considering the implications of greater Cartwright Act-related enforcement by the attorney general. This is particularly true in the healthcare and technology sectors as well as for companies that have government contracts.

    McDermott’s California-based antitrust, white-collar and employment teams have comprehensive experience advising and counseling clients facing investigations as well as criminal and civil matters before the California Attorney General’s Office, including with respect to government contracts. The team includes seasoned lawyers who understand the California statutes that the attorney general’s office will use in enforcement proceedings and who have particular knowledge of the healthcare and technology industries. Please reach out to the authors to discuss the potential legal implications for your business and join the next 2024 Enforcement Outlook Webinar Series to learn more about enforcement priorities.

    Authors

    Michelle Lowery

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Chicago

    Betty (Yajing) Zhang

    Associate

    Los Angeles

    Russell Hayman

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Julian L. André

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    More insights

  • Unveiling the Chaos: Rogue Filings at Companies House and the Quest for Reform

    Unveiling the Chaos: Rogue Filings at Companies House and the Quest for Reform

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Unveiling the Chaos: Rogue Filings at Companies House and the Quest for Reform

    March 26, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Companies House, the UK’s official company register, has recently come under the spotlight due to a series of rogue filings that have affected over 190 companies, including several high-profile organizations such as Sainsbury’s, Macquarie and the Bank of England, to name few. The filings, falsely indicating the release of existing charges, have raised serious questions about the integrity and reliability of the corporate register, igniting a debate on the need for legislative and procedural enhancements to protect investors against such vulnerabilities.

    In response, Companies House has embarked on an ambitious reform plan, coinciding with the introduction of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act (ECCTA) aimed at granting the register greater powers to vet and rectify information.

    In depth

    Legal Implications of Erroneous Release

    Charges capable of registration under the Companies Act 2006 (Act) must be registered within 21 days of the date of creation of the charge. The registration process can be considered straightforward and may be initiated by the chargor or any person with an interest in the charge, including the chargeholder or its legal advisers. Thus, the Companies House register plays a pivotal role in ensuring the correct priority of rights in an insolvency scenario: a security which is not registered within the prescribed timeframe will likely be void against liquidators, administrators and creditors.

    To release a charge, in addition to any document evidencing the formal release and any other procedural requirements which may be necessary, it is also considered best practice to inform Companies House of such discharge. While not a legal requirement strictly speaking, doing so benefits the security provider by notifying third parties. However, the level of scrutiny on the discharge filing appears less strict (and it is usually processed rather quickly) – which is because even though the relevant charge is removed from the register, the security itself may not (yet) be released.

    Whilst an erroneous or even fraudulent release may seem just an innocent mistake, it can lead to greater consequences in private equity and leveraged finance transactions.

    Compromised Position of Secured Parties

    A charge that is mistakenly marked as discharged at Companies House could jeopardize the secured party’s (most frequently, a lender) position. Although the underlying security agreement may still be valid between the parties, the erroneous discharge could mislead third parties and potentially affect the lender’s priority in case of the subsequent borrower’s insolvency.

    Protective Measures

    Rectifying an erroneous release may require corrective filings with Companies House and, in more complex cases, applying to the court for an order to correct the register. The parties involved may also want to enter into new agreements to reaffirm the security interest if a charge was wrongly discharged, which can again affect the secured party’s priority vis-à-vis subsequent creditors. In fact, this process does not always restore the original priority of the charge, especially against third parties who were not aware of the mistake in the first place.

    The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act

    The recent issues with rogue filings at Companies House have highlighted the urgent need for reforms to improve the security and reliability of corporate filings. The ECCTA is a positive step towards achieving these goals. By empowering Companies House with enhanced capabilities to request evidence and eliminate inaccurate data, the ECCTA seeks to bolster the transparency and reliability of corporate information.

    Stricter Verification Requirements

    Key elements of the ECCTA include amendments to the Companies Act 2006 to introduce stricter requirements for companies registered in England and Wales in their interactions with Companies House. These amendments encompass new identity verification requirements for directors, persons with significant control (PSCs), and members of a limited liability partnership, alongside restrictions on who can file documents on behalf of companies, changes to company record-keeping requirements, restrictions on the use of corporate directors, and enhanced powers for Companies House to verify, remove, or decline information on the companies register.

    As a result, Companies House will take a pivotal role in the fight against economic crime transitioning from a passive repository of company information to a more proactive gatekeeper, ensuring the reliability of company data and enhancing its powers to investigate and enforce compliance.

    The new reforms introduced by the ECCTA include a “failure to prevent fraud” offense for organizations that cannot demonstrate having “reasonable procedures” in place to prevent fraud. Additionally, there are requirements for identity verification for registered company directors and those filing on behalf of companies, as well as measures to improve the accuracy of financial information on the register.

    Implementing the ECCTA will still require substantial secondary legislation and updates to Companies House’s operations systems and these changes will roll out gradually, contingent upon the development of necessary systems and legislation. However, the reform marks a notable advance in the UK’s regulatory framework to deter economic crime and enhance corporate transparency, with significant implications for how companies operate and are regulated – and a cascade effect on cross-border transactions involving a UK holding or subsidiary. It represents a notable progress in the UK’s efforts to fight economic crime and boost corporate transparency contributing to make the UK a less appealing target for criminals exploiting corporate entities for illicit purposes.

    With the right assistance from experienced advisors, particularly those familiar with private equity and leveraged finance matters, market players will not need to worry so strongly that they can effectively achieve protection when dealing with registering and (most importantly) keeping in force their charges, especially in cross-border transactions.

    Authors

    Aymen Mahmoud

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Giulia Venanzoni

    Counsel

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • FDA Releases Final Guidance on New Dietary Ingredient Notification Procedures and Timeframes

    FDA Releases Final Guidance on New Dietary Ingredient Notification Procedures and Timeframes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FDA Releases Final Guidance on New Dietary Ingredient Notification Procedures and Timeframes

    March 26, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 5, 2024, the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) released final guidance titled “Dietary Supplements: New Dietary Ingredient Notification Procedures and Timeframes: Guidance for Industry.” The guidance is meant to help manufacturers and distributors of new dietary ingredients (NDIs) and dietary supplements navigate the process of submitting new dietary ingredient notifications (NDINs) to the FDA. The guidance finalizes Section V of the 102-page 2016 draft guidance and answers questions related to other sections of the draft guidance. The FDA indicated that the decision to separate the finalized versions of the 2016 draft guidance into discrete sections for ease of use is responsive to comments received on the draft guidance. As the FDA continues to review and analyze the remaining sections of the draft guidance, it will issue those sections as separate final guidance.

    In depth

    Background

    Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), NDIs are considered dietary ingredients that have not previously been used in food or dietary supplements. Dietary ingredients include vitamins, minerals, amino acids, concentrates and extracts that were not marketed in the United States before October 15, 1994.

    Currently, under Section 413(a)(2) of the FD&C Act, a manufacturer or distributor of an NDI must submit a premarket safety notification (known as an NDIN) to the FDA at least 75 days before selling the product through interstate commerce. The NDIN must provide citations to published articles that support the safety of the NDI or the dietary supplement containing the NDI. If a manufacturer or distributor does not submit an NDIN and receives approval as required, the dietary supplement containing the NDI is considered to be adulterated.

    The NDIN must include the following:

    • Name and address of the notifier
    • Name of the NDI, including the Latin name for botanicals
    • Description of the dietary supplement
    • Level of the NDI in the dietary supplement
    • Recommended or suggested conditions of use for labeling
    • Ordinary conditions of use of the supplement if there are no recommended conditions
    • History of the use or other evidence supporting the safety of the dietary ingredient
    • Authorized signature of the manufacturer or distributor

    FDA regulations also provide the administrative procedures for filing an NDIN. After filing a notification, the notifier is prohibited from introducing the product into interstate commerce for 75 days from the filing date. Notably, the newly released guidance clarifies that submitting additional information that is deemed substantive will change the filing date to the date on which the additional information was submitted.

    Key Topics

    Who needs to submit an NDIN?

    Manufacturers or distributors of a dietary supplement with an NDI are required to submit an NDIN.

    How should the information be presented in the NDIN?

    The NDIN should be well organized to promote efficiency in review. The FDA encourages notifiers to submit electronically, although paper submissions are also permitted. A single NDIN may cover multiple dietary supplements. The NDIN should include a description of the NDI and the manufacturing process; documentation of the NDI’s physical, chemical and molecular composition and structure; and a specification sheet identifying the safety attributes of the NDI. For example, a botanical has different chemical and physical properties based on the part of the botanical from which the ingredient is derived. An NDIN should specify whether the NDI comes from the root or the leaf of the botanical, along with its properties. The description should also explain how the NDI will be used, specify the level of the NDI per serving, identify other dietary and non-dietary ingredients in the supplement that will be interacting with the NDI and, most importantly, provide any data or other evidence that supports the safe use of the NDI.

    NDINs must also include a full copy of any publications referenced in the notification in support of the NDI’s safety. Abstracts are not accepted.

    What information should not be included in the NDIN?

    The FDA reminded notifiers that information included in the NDIN should be relevant to the NDI and should not include information that falls outside the scope of safety, context for use and/or the manufacturing process.

    When should an NDIN be submitted?

    NDI manufacturers and distributors must submit an NDIN at least 75 days prior to marketing the dietary supplement via interstate commerce.

    Notifiers may contact the FDA at NDITEAM@fda.hhs.gov with the subject line “[Firm Name] Pre-NDIN Meeting Request” to get preliminary and nonbinding feedback on a potential NDIN.

    What happens after the NDIN is submitted?

    The filing date of the NDIN is when the FDA receives a complete NDIN. An incomplete NDIN does not satisfy the notification requirement in Section 413(a)(2) of the FD&C Act. Therefore, if the dietary supplement is placed on the market, it will be deemed adulterated until the review process is complete. The FDA will contact the notifier with questions or requests for amendments during the review process.

    When will the NDIN be posted publicly?

    For 90 days after the filing date, the FDA will not disclose the content or existence of the notification. After 90 days, however, the notification will be publicly available on the NDIN docket on www.regulations.gov. As the public posting of the NDIN will exclude any trade secrets or confidential commercial information, notifiers should clearly identify any information they believe is a trade secret or confidential in a separate document that accompanies the NDIN.

    Next Steps

    Although it has been eight years since the FDA issued guidance on the dietary supplement notification and review process, the recently released guidance indicates a renewed focus on this topic. Interested stakeholders are encouraged to take advantage of this opportunity to submit to the FDA any electronic or written comments they have regarding the final guidance or the remaining sections of the draft guidance that have yet to be finalized.

    If you are interested in submitting comments or would like more information on the FDA’s amendments, please contact Jamie Ravitz, Paul Gadiock, Jeff Weinstein, Rachel Gartner, Marissa Hill Daley, Karis Jackson or any other member of McDermott’s Food, Drug & Medical Device Regulatory Practice Group.

    Authors

    James R. Ravitz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Paul S. Gadiock

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Marissa Hill Daley

    Law Clerk

    Washington, DC

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  • Gesellschaftsrechtliche Nebenvereinbarungen in Europa

    Gesellschaftsrechtliche Nebenvereinbarungen in Europa

    ARTICLE

    Gesellschaftsrechtliche Nebenvereinbarungen in Europa

    March 26, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Prof. Dr. Clemens Just is a co-author of the handbook “Gesellschaftsrechtliche Nebenvereinbarungen in Europa,” published in its 2nd edition by Nomos Verlag, edited by Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Peter Kindler, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Simon Laimer, LL.M., RA Dr. Christoph Perathoner, LL.M. As part of daily contract drafting practice, agreements that stand alongside or supplement a company’s articles of association are commonplace. When these supplementary agreements involve relationships with multiple legal systems, precise understanding of them is crucial for legal classification.

     

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  • Damages Are Adequate – But Is It Sufficiently Serious?

    Damages Are Adequate – But Is It Sufficiently Serious?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Damages Are Adequate – But Is It Sufficiently Serious?

    March 21, 2024

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a highly-anticipated judgment dated January 30, 2024, the Court of Appeal confirmed that in a procurement challenge under the Public Contract Regulations 2015 (PCR), a finding of a manifest error will not automatically mean that the error is ‘sufficiently serious’ to justify an award of damages.

    In depth

    Background

    The procurement in question was for the provision of nationwide orthodontic services, although the challenge related to a contract for services in East Hampshire for a 7-year term worth £32.7 million (the Procurement). Braceurself was the incumbent, but its bid (one out of two) was unsuccessful, and the contract was awarded to a company known as PAL in these proceedings. The difference between the two bids was very close: PAL scored 82.5%, whereas Braceurself scored 80.25%.

    Braceurself issued proceedings challenging the Procurement on a number of fronts, seeking to have the score corrected and the contract awarded to Braceurself. The issue of proceedings engaged the automatic suspension under the PCR. NHS England brought its application to lift the automatic suspension and was successful, primarily as Judge Bird found that “in this case damages would be an adequate remedy”. It is notable that in NHS England’s own submissions, it accepted that if Braceurself were to succeed in proving a breach at trial, “it would be compensated in damages if the suspension were lifted on the basis that it would have been awarded the contract”.

    As a result of the suspension being lifted, the contract was awarded to PAL, and Braceurself amended its pleadings to proceed for the remedy left available: damages.

    First Instance

    On 20 June 2022, Mr Alexander Nissen KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (the Judge), handed down a judgment on liability, finding that from the numerous claims that Braceurself had made, there had been a single manifest error. In a question regarding Clinical and Service Delivery, one criterion concerned accessibility to the premises. As Braceurself’s premises were on the first floor, its bid needed to cater for those patients who could not use the stairs to access the service. In addressing this part of Braceurself’s bid, NHS England made two errors. Braceurself had proposed to use a device called a stair climber. Mistakenly, NHS England evaluated Braceurself’s bid on the basis that it was proposing to install a stair lift. NHS England also mistakenly thought that, by way of partial solution, Braceurself was offering services at alternative premises at least to those patients who could not use the stairs. The suggestion was that the equipment at the alternative premises would not be of the same standard. In fact, Braceurself was only making an offer to use alternative premises as a result of a flood or fire which rendered its primary site unusable. The Judge concluded that these mistakes had a causative impact on NHS England’s scoring and were material to the outcome, finding that Braceurself should have been awarded 2.5% more, making it the successful bidder.

    The question of whether the breaches were sufficiently serious to justify an award of damages were left to a further hearing, and on September 16, 2022, the Judge handed down the so-called ‘Francovich Judgment’. In Francovich v Italy (C-C/90) [1991] ECR 1-5357, the CJEU identified three conditions which had to be met for State liability to pay damages for a breach of EU law. They were that: (i) the rule that has been infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; (ii) the breach must be “sufficiently serious”; (iii) there must be a direct causal link between the breach and the loss of damages sustained. Per Brasserie du Pecheur v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] QB 404, it was left to the member states to set the decisive test for finding if a breach is sufficiently serious.

    This test was addressed by the House of Lords in R v SoS for Transport Ex Parte Factortame (No.5) [2000] 1 AC 524 (Factortame), a case examining UK-enacted legislation which imposed conditions of registration on fishing vessels based on British nationality. Lord Clyde identified eight factors (which are sometimes referred to as the ‘Factortame checklist’), which were usefully summarised by Richards LJ in Delaney v SoS for Transport [2015] 1 WLR 5177:

    36 …Lord Clyde identified the following factors, though the list was not exhaustive: (1) the importance of the principle which has been breached; (2) the clarity and precision of the rule breached; (3) the degree of excusability of an error of law; (4) the existence of any relevant judgment on the point; (5) the state of the mind of the infringer, and in particular whether the infringer was acting intentionally or involuntarily (i.e. whether there was a deliberate intention to infringe as opposed to an inadvertent breach); (6) the behaviour of the infringer after it has become evident that an infringement has occurred; (7) the persons affected by the breach, including whether there has been a complete failure to take account of the specific situation of a defined economic group; and (8) the position taken by one of the Community institutions in the matter. He said that the application of the “sufficiently serious” test “comes eventually to be a matter of fact and circumstance”; no single factor is necessarily decisive; but one factor by itself might, particularly where there was little or nothing to put in the scales on the other side, be sufficient to justify a conclusion of liability.

    The application of the Francovich conditions to the award of damages in a public procurement case was authoritatively determined by the Supreme Court in Energy Solutions EU Limited v Nuclear Decommissioning Authority [2017] UK SC 34 (see in particular [25]-[27] and [39] of the judgment of Lord Mance).

    In the Francovich Judgment therefore, the Judge duly considered the Factortame checklist in this consideration of whether the one error was sufficiently serious to result in an award of damages. The Judge found that: factors (1) and (2) in the checklist had been made in Braceurself’s favour, but that factors (3) and (5) were in NHS England’s favour; with the remaining factors being neutral, the balance overall fell in NHS England’s favour. In particular, the Judge emphasised that he found that there was one single breach in an otherwise carefully planned, well organised Procurement, and that the purpose in the scoring of the relevant question, which was to maximise access to publicly funded orthodontic services for those who have a disability, was laudable.

    Appeal

    The main issue on appeal was:

    In considering whether the breach is ‘sufficiently serious’ for the purposes of Francovich damages, is the finding that, but for the breach, the contract would have been awarded to the appellant, decisive?

    Put simply, Coulson LJ said no. This was for a number of reasons, including:

    1. If a breach is sufficiently serious because the wrong bidder got the contract, without nothing more and regardless of the circumstances of the breach itself, then the second Francovich condition would add nothing and would “collapse” into the third.
    2. What matters for the purposes of the second condition is the nature or quality of the breach, not its effect. And in this exercise: “A deliberate decision to do something with a high change that loss will be caused is at one end of the culpability spectrum; something going wrong due to inadvertence, misunderstanding or oversight, is at the other”.
    3. An approach that makes the first two factors of the Factortame checklist decisive of the ‘sufficiently serious’ test is not in accordance with the domestic authorities.

    As to the second issue on appeal, regarding the two factors that the Judge held to be in NHS England’s favour, Braceurself’s submission that a manifest error can never be excusable was rejected. Coulson LJ recognised that factors (3) and (5) focused “squarely” on the conduct and state of mind of the infringer and that in his experience : “it is often quite easy to track a mistake made during an evaluation process back to its source; indeed, that is the whole point oft there being a proper ‘paper trail’ relating to the tender evaluation, which an aggrieved tenderer can follow to see precisely where the process went wrong”. And if there are evidential difficulties, “the judge can draw inference from the evidence he or she does have”.

    Coulson LJ also expressly addressed the question as to whether Braceurself had been left without an effective remedy, and accepted that, in a public procurement challenge, “there is a potential conflict between the result at the interim stage of the litigation (when the respondent sought to remove the stay) and the final stage (when the judge came to consider whether the breach that he had found was sufficiently serious to warrant damages)”. Whilst acknowledging that this result was “most unfortunate”, Coulson LJ found that it was “not incoherent” – it is the consequence of there being two different exercises, two different sets of evidence and two different sets of governing principles in the interlocutory and final stages, which may produce different results. In this regard, Coulson LJ again focused on the otherwise well-run procurement, concluding that “A single, inadvertent breach in an otherwise impressive and careful procurement exercise caused the wrong result” but this was, in his experience, very rare.

    Turning briefly to NHS England’s two points of appeal, Coulson LJ found that:

    1. the Judge was wrong to find that there was a manifest error, or at the very least, was wrong to find that error would have resulted in an increase to Braceurself’s score, leading to the conclusion that Braceurself’s original score should have remained;
    2. notwithstanding the above, in circumstances where the Judge did find that there was a manifest error, he was correct to attempt a re-marking exercise to determine whether that error in the marking of the tenders would have led to a different result based on the evidence provided.

    Comment

    Claimants in public procurement challenge often face an uphill battle – at the start of a claim, the Claimant has none of the documents, and when documents are disclosed, they may be within a confidentiality ring.

    Even if enough documents are disclosed, the contracting authority will likely win its application to lift the automatic stay, leaving the Claimant with its often less favoured remedy of damages. In our experience, in most procurement challenges, the Claimant’s first priority is not usually seeking damages – they want the contract (or at least for the procurement to be re-done).

    And now, if a claimant does manage to overcome these struggles and show that the contracting authority made an error, it may not get anything to reward its efforts.

    However, it is important to remember the focus placed both at first instance and by Coulson LJ on the finding of just one error, in an otherwise well-run procurement. We hope this will be a distinguishing factor going forward.

    Finally, we note that all of this comes at a time where the new Procurement Act 2023, along with the accompanying amended Provider Selection Regime 2023 for NHS services (the PSR), have just come into force. The PSR will mean that fewer NHS services contracts need to be procured in the first instance. Public authorities will still need to comply with standards of fairness and transparency but moving forward it any challenge to decisions made under a competitive process under the PSR will need to be made via a judicial review.

    Authors

    Sharon Lamb

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Kimberley Smith

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • The List Grows: Kentucky Lawmakers Close In on Comprehensive Privacy Law

    The List Grows: Kentucky Lawmakers Close In on Comprehensive Privacy Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The List Grows: Kentucky Lawmakers Close In on Comprehensive Privacy Law

    March 20, 2024

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Consult our interactive state privacy law map to learn more about all of the enacted state consumer privacy laws.

    Kentucky may soon join the expanding list of states with comprehensive privacy laws. Kentucky House Bill 15, an act related to Kentucky consumer data privacy (KCDPA), made its way through the Kentucky Senate with a unanimous vote on March 11, 2024. The bill is back with the Kentucky House, which will now have the opportunity to sign off on minor amendments. Pending passage in the House and Governor Andy Beshear’s subsequent signature, regulated entities will have until January 1, 2026, to prepare for the KCDPA to take effect.

    As has become the trend, and similar to the recently passed New Hampshire law, the KCDPA closely resembles the Virginia model. This article summarizes the primary components and highlights key differences of the Kentucky bill.

    In depth

    Who Does the KCDPA Apply To?

    The KCDPA, which does not include a revenue threshold, applies to any person that conducts business in Kentucky or produces products or services that are targeted to Kentucky residents and, during a calendar year, either:

    1. Controls or processes the personal data of at least 100,000 Kentucky consumers, or
    2. Controls or processes the personal data of at least 25,000 Kentucky consumers and derives more than 50% of their gross revenue from the sale of personal data

    Who Is a “Consumer”?

    The KCDPA considers a consumer to be an individual who is a resident of Kentucky, acting only in the individual context (excluding employment or commercial).

    What Is “Personal Data”?

    The definition of personal data under the KCDPA directly reflects Virginia: information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable individual, specifically excluding de-identified data or publicly available information. As with “personal data,” the KCDPA’s definitions of de-identified data and publicly available information also mirror Virginia’s language.

    Who Can Enforce?

    Kentucky’s attorney general has exclusive enforcement power. The attorney general must provide businesses with a 30-day notice-and-cure period prior to taking any action in response to a violation, the cost of which can accrue at a rate of up to $7,500 per violation.

    Who Is Exempt?

    The KCDPA includes several broad entity-level exemptions, including common ones for:

    • Any city or state government body or agency
    • Nonprofit organizations
    • Higher education institutions
    • Covered Entities and Business Associates under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and
    • Any financial institution subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

    Distinct from Virginia, the KCDPA includes an unusual entity-level exemption for organizations that do not provide net earnings to or benefit anyone within the organization entity and that process data solely in connection with assisting law enforcement agencies with suspected insurance-related criminal acts or fraud or assisting first responders.

    The KCDPA also includes the now standard plethora of data-level exemptions for data processed in accordance with a litany of federal laws including, but not limited to, HIPAA, federal research laws and regulations (such as the Common Rule), the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, the Farm Credit Act and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).

    What Obligations Are Imposed?

    The obligations imposed on the controllers under the KCDPA should not surprise anyone with familiarity of the other state privacy laws. For example, such obligations include requirements to:

    1. Limit the collection of personal data to what is adequate, relevant and reasonably necessary in relation to the purposes for which such data is processed
    2. Avoid processing personal data for secondary reasons (purposes that are neither reasonably necessary to nor compatible with the initial disclosed purposes) without the consumer’s prior consent
    3. Establish, implement and maintain reasonable administrative, technical and physical data security practices
    4. Not process personal data in violation of laws that prohibit unlawful discrimination against consumers, and refrain from discriminating against consumers that exercise their rights
    5. Not process the consumer’s sensitive data without the consumer’s consent, or in the case of sensitive data collected from a known child (under 13 years old), without parental consent in accordance with COPPA requirements, and
    6. Provide consumers with a reasonably accessible, clear and meaningful privacy notice that includes the disclosures now common under state consumer privacy laws

    What Consumer Rights Are Created By the KCDPA?

    The KCDPA will require controllers to provide Kentucky consumers the following rights:

    1. The right to confirm whether or not the controller is processing the consumer’s personal data and to access that data, unless access would require the controller to reveal a trade secret
    2. The right to correct personal data, considering the nature of the personal data and the purposes for processing the personal data
    3. The right to delete personal data, with respect to the data provided by or obtained about the consumer
    4. The right to data portability
    5. Opt-out rights for targeted advertising, the sale of personal data and profiling, where profiling is being used to produce a legal or similarly significant effect, and
    6. The right to appeal rights requests that have not been fulfilled

    Sensitive Data

    The KCDPA has a familiar definition of sensitive data, including information that reveals:

    • Racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, mental or physical health condition or diagnosis, sexual orientation, or citizenship or immigration status
    • The processing of genetic or biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual
    • Personal data collected from a known child (under 13), or
    • Precise geolocation data (within a 1,750-foot radius)

    As mentioned above, controllers are required to obtain consumer’s consent prior to processing sensitive data (or, in line with COPPA, obtaining a parent’s consent where processing data collected from a known child).

    Response to Consumer Requests

    Under the KCDPA, controllers must respond to a data subject request within 45 days after receipt, with a 45-day extension available as reasonably necessary. If denied, the controller must provide a method to appeal the denial of a request and make the process conspicuously available. A decision on the appeal must be provided within 60 days of receipt of the consumer’s appeal. If an appeal is denied, the decision must include a method for the consumer to submit a complaint with the attorney general.

    Data Protection Assessments

    Like its predecessors in other states, the KCDPA requires controllers to conduct “data protection impact assessments” whenever the controller is:

    1. Processing personal data for targeted advertising
    2. Selling personal data
    3. Processing personal data for the purposes of profiling, where such profiling presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of unfair or deceptive treatment of consumers or results in other substantial injury to consumers
    4. Processing sensitive data, and/or
    5. Processing personal data that presents a heightened risk of harm to consumers

    These assessments must explain the benefits to involved parties and risks to consumer rights that may flow, both directly and indirectly, from this processing activity. Reflecting its peer laws in other states, the KCDPA permits impact assessments performed for other state privacy laws to satisfy the assessment requirements under this law.

    Data protection assessment requirements only will apply to processing activities created on or after June 1, 2026.

    When Does the KCDPA Take Effect?

    The KCDPA is slated to take effect January 1, 2026.

    ***

    Establishing a comprehensive privacy program that is tailored to your organization and thoroughly addresses imposed obligations is a critical task that requires an understanding of your organization’s personal data practices and various legal requirements. If you have questions or need assistance in readiness work for the new state consumer laws, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or reach out to Jon Ende or Allison Tassel.

    Authors

    Jonathan Ende

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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