Content Type: Article

  • Private use of the Internet and email at work: More security for employers at last?

    Private use of the Internet and email at work: More security for employers at last?

    ARTICLE

    Private use of the Internet and email at work: More security for employers at last?

    July 15, 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The HR News blog provides regular updates on recent developments in German employment law (in German). The latest blog post provides insights on “Private use of the Internet and email at work: More security for employers at last?”.

    Visit the blog and/or register now for regular HR NEWS updates (in German).

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Philip Uecker

    Associate

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • Shell Shocked: Judge’s Travel Plans Turn the Tide in Shrimp Dispute

    Shell Shocked: Judge’s Travel Plans Turn the Tide in Shrimp Dispute

    ARTICLE

    Shell Shocked: Judge’s Travel Plans Turn the Tide in Shrimp Dispute

    Jul 11, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Addressing the scope of a magistrate judge’s Article III authority, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated a judgment and remanded the case for a new trial because the magistrate judge performed non-ministerial acts without obtaining proper consent. PB Legacy, Inc v. Am. Mariculture, Inc., Case No. 22-12936 (11th Cir. June 18, 2024) (Pryor, C.J.; Brasher, J.) (Jordan, J., concurring).

    PB Legacy sued American Mariculture for trade secret misappropriation and other claims after PB Legacy failed to timely remove its shrimp from Mariculture’s facility, which Mariculture then used to start a competing company. During the trial, the district judge instructed that all arguments had to conclude by a certain date because of a scheduled flight. Although arguments ended on time, the jury engaged in extensive deliberations. On the day of the district judge’s flight, he proposed that the magistrate judge receive the jury verdict in his absence. The parties agreed to this arrangement without objection. The jury deliberations continued for three more days. During that time, the magistrate judge not only received the verdict and polled the jury, but also responded to several jury questions and denied Mariculture’s request for verdict clarification. The jury found in favor of PB Legacy. Mariculture appealed, contesting the magistrate judge’s exercise of Article III authority.

    The Eleventh Circuit found that the magistrate judge improperly exercised Article III authority without proper consent. The Court clarified when a magistrate judge may exercise Article III authority, noting that while a magistrate judge’s performance of ministerial acts (such as receiving a jury verdict and polling a jury) do not require party consent, non-ministerial acts (such as responding to jury questions) do.

    The Court also described how party consent is properly obtained. To avoid potential prejudice, consent for a magistrate judge to exercise Article III authority should be sought outside the presence of both the district judge and magistrate judge. Parties usually provide consent through a joint or separately filed statement, and district and magistrate judges are informed of a party’s consent only once all parties have agreed. In limited circumstances, consent may be implied when the parties are given advanced notice of the magistrate judge’s proposed Article III authority, are made aware of the need to consent, and voluntarily appear to try the case before the magistrate judge.

    Against that background, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the parties consented to the magistrate judge’s acts in the current case. The Court found that although the district judge had notified the parties that the magistrate judge would receive the verdict in his absence, this act was a ministerial act that the magistrate judge could already perform without consent. However, the district court neither sought nor obtained the parties’ express consent for the magistrate judge to also perform the non-ministerial acts of responding to jury questions and ruling on a party’s request to have the jury clarify the verdict. Implied consent was also lacking because the parties were not given notice of need for consent or their right to refuse it. Therefore, the district court failed to secure the parties’ express or implied consent for the magistrate judge to exercise Article III authority.

    Authors
    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Growing regulatory focus on ‘crossover alcohol products’

    Growing regulatory focus on ‘crossover alcohol products’

    ARTICLE

    Growing regulatory focus on ‘crossover alcohol products’

    Jul 10, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As more companies – including businesses with and without experience producing alcoholic beverages – move to leverage their brands and brand equity across the beverage spectrum, regulators, trade associations and the companies themselves are focusing on ways to responsibly label, advertise, market and display these products to avoid consumer confusion and potential sales to minors.

    Crossover alcohol products are generally categorized as alcohol beverages that use the products and intellectual property (e.g., brand names, logos) of a preexisting non-alcohol brand. While not legally defined (yet), such products include Dunkin’ Spiked Original Iced Coffee, Eggo Brunch in a Jar, Lipton Hard Iced Tea and SunnyD Vodka Seltzer, among others. As illustrated by these examples, products such as Lipton Hard Iced Tea leverage the non-alcoholic Lipton Iced Tea branding for a new product in the alcohol space.

    As crossover alcohol products have become more prevalent across the market, state regulators have started taking notice and providing guidance to alcohol producers as to how to assure these products are not “false or misleading,” as defined by alcohol regulations, or tend to induce minors to drink the alcoholic product either through the products’ labels, packaging or store-display locations. The Commonwealth of Virginia, in particular, has taken the lead through the issuance of Circular Letter 23-01, which provides guidelines for alcohol producers as they develop these products. These guidelines focus on the following, among other issues:

    • Ensuring that the crossover product clearly indicates the type of alcohol it contains, with such information visible in at least three to six different locations.
    • Ensuring that the sizes of the alcohol references and warnings are sufficiently large and noticeable in comparison to other writings on the product label.
    • Ensuring that any and all changes to product labels, containers and secondary packaging clearly distinguish the crossover products from the original non-alcoholic products so as to prevent consumer confusion; such changes may involve the color palette, font type, imagery, placement of words, images and descriptions, or background elements.
    • Ensuring that secondary closures, such as foil lids, plastic wrapping, lip guards, stickers or other “child-proof” packaging, are present, to prevent accidental consumption by a minor.

    Recently, a coalition including the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DISCUS), Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America (WSWA), FMI – The Food Industry Association, and the National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) (representing the three tiers of the industry: suppliers, wholesalers and retailers), issued a joint commitment related to the responsible marketing and merchandising of crossover alcohol products. Similar to Virginia’s guidance, the coalition is focused on assuring that these products are not confused for their non-alcohol counterparts and do not appeal to those under the legal purchase age, based on the appeal of the underlying brand. Accordingly, the coalition looks to alcohol producers to commit to responsible production, packaging and marketing of crossover alcohol products by:

    • Adhering to responsible advertising codes, such as the Distilled Spirits Council Code, to ensure these products are packaged and marketed appropriately and responsibly.
    • Creating product packaging and branding that is clearly and easily distinguishable from non-alcohol beverage counterparts.
    • Providing sufficient and clear notice, through product labeling and packaging, that the product contains alcohol.
    • Focusing on packaging and advertising campaigns that appeal to and target adults of legal drinking age, not individuals under the age of 21.

    Taken together, this guidance creates an initial outline of steps companies can take to assure that such crossover products are marketed and sold responsibly and without violating applicable alcohol beverages laws and industry codes.

    Authors

    Alva C. Mather

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Supreme Court Overrules Chevron, Opening Door for New Tax Reg Challenges

    Supreme Court Overrules Chevron, Opening Door for New Tax Reg Challenges

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Overrules Chevron, Opening Door for New Tax Reg Challenges

    July 10, 2024

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States reshaped the federal tax landscape when it overturned the long-standing Chevron doctrine in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451. The Chevron doctrine, a pillar of US administrative law for four decades, required courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute even where the court concluded that a different interpretation was better supported. As a result, Chevron empowered and encouraged agencies, including the US Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to promulgate regulations based on statutory interpretations favorable to the agency’s goals. So long as these interpretations did not stray too far from the bounds of reason, the regulations would often survive under Chevron.

    By ending the Chevron doctrine, Loper Bright has created new opportunities for taxpayers to challenge federal tax regulations. While taxpayers have long challenged federal tax regulations, particularly after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Chevron’s deferential regime hampered many challenges to tax regulations because where there was statutory ambiguity or silence, courts generally deferred to agency interpretations. Loper Bright has evened the playing field between taxpayers and agencies because now both must convince courts that their interpretation of the statute is the best interpretation.

    For practical purposes, that means:

    • Challenges to some regulations that would have failed in the Chevron era may now succeed after Loper Bright.
    • Challenges that failed in the Chevron era may be worth reexamining.
    • Challenges that were not worth pursuing before Loper Bright may be worth pursuing now given the increased likelihood of success.
    In depth

    Whirlpool: A Case Study of Chevron in Action

    The Chevron doctrine has often served to advance the IRS’s interests against taxpayers. For example, Chevron played a major role in the US Tax Court’s decision in Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 142 (2020). The Tax Court relied on Chevron to reject Whirlpool’s challenge to the manufacturing branch rule in Treasury Regulation Section 1.954-3(b)(1)(ii). (The Tax Court’s decision was ultimately upheld by the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on different grounds.)

    Employing Chevron’s two-step process, the Tax Court first asked whether Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 954(d)(2) is ambiguous or silent on the distinction between manufacturing and sales branches. The Tax Court answered affirmatively (“954(d)(2) [could] plausibly envision regulations dealing with any sort of branch” and “there is nothing in the statute that prevents the Secretary from prescribing regulations that also address manufacturing branches”) and then turned to Chevron’s second step, asking whether the Treasury Regulation is a “reasonable interpretation” of the statute. In a brief analysis, the Tax Court, as courts often did, deferred to Treasury and again answered affirmatively. In a final paragraph that underlined the Chevron framework’s looseness, the Tax Court held for the IRS because “whether section 954(d)(2) is viewed as ambiguous or silent,” the regulations are a “reasonable interpretation” of the statute, which is to say that the statute does not “unambiguously foreclose” the interpretation set forth in the regulations.

    Not “unambiguously foreclosed” is a low bar, but Loper Bright has raised it. Without the Chevron doctrine, courts can and must employ all traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine the best interpretation of a statute, regardless of whether the statute is ambiguous or what the IRS’s own views are.

    Loper Bright’s Scope: Implicit and Express Delegations

    Loper Bright overruled Chevron because the Supreme Court rejected the notion that when US Congress passes an ambiguous or incomplete statute, it intends that agencies will fill in the gaps. On the contrary, the Supreme Court held that when Congress is silent about an agency’s role in a given statute, it is not “implicitly delegating” interpretive authority to the agency. Instead, that authority falls to the courts.

    The Code, however, often expressly delegates regulatory authority to Treasury, either through the general grant of regulatory authority in Section 7805(a) or through specific grants in individual Code sections. For example, Section 1061(f) instructs that “[t]he Secretary shall issue such regulations . . . as [] necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section,” and Section 59A(i) states that the “Secretary shall prescribe regulations . . . necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section.”

    Loper Bright states that when there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to write regulations, courts will continue to analyze whether the agency is acting within its scope of delegated authority and exercising its discretion consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. But here, too, the case has significant implications for regulations that purport to rely on general rulemaking authority. In United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), for example, the Supreme Court stated that Chevron deference is appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority” (emphasis added). This same approach applies in the context of tax regulations, per Mayo Found. for Med. Ed. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011), in which the Supreme Court declined to “carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only” and thus applied the standard Chevron doctrine to a tax regulation.

    As a result, post-Loper Bright, we expect courts to embrace a far less deferential posture to Treasury regulations that rely on general rulemaking authority such as Section 7805(a) or even specific grants of rulemaking authority to “carry out the provisions” of the statute (or similar formulations). Courts will need to wrestle more closely with whether the regulation at issue exceeds the scope of the delegated authority, including by determining the best interpretation of the statutory text. In other words, taxpayer challenges to regulations that purport to rely on general rulemaking authority are likely to become more prominent, with an increased likelihood of success.

    New Questions Where Regulations Dwarf the Code

    Many short Code provisions do not expressly delegate regulatory authority to Treasury, but the agency nonetheless promulgates lengthy regulations, typically pursuant to its authority under Section 7805(a) to prescribe “all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title.” For example, Code Section 482 (relating to transfer pricing) is only three sentences and fewer than 200 words, yet its regulations are over 100 pages and almost 50,000 words. This is one example where Treasury has taken its general rule-making authority quite a long way. In such circumstances, it begs the question of whether there will be more challenges to transfer pricing regulations in the post-Loper Bright era. A Code section’s purported “silence” is no longer an implicit delegation of authority to fill the gaps.

    More specifically, the validity of the requirement to include amounts attributable to stock-based compensation under the cost sharing regulations has already been on taxpayers’ radars since the Ninth Circuit’s questionable decision in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 926 F.3d 1061 (2019). These newer challenges, however, are coming from taxpayers outside the Ninth Circuit. In light of Loper Bright, we anticipate that more taxpayers, including taxpayers in the Ninth Circuit, may come forward to challenge this aspect of the cost-sharing regulations.

    Impact on IRS Appeals

    The IRS Independent Office of Appeals (IRS Appeals) historically has been a good option for taxpayers to try to resolve their disputes short of litigation. Unfortunately, an increasing number of taxpayers now feel that IRS Appeals has lost its independence and no longer fairly considers all of the relevant issues. (See Taxpayer Advocate Service, Annual Report to Congress 2023, at 132-42 (raising the “lack of independence” at IRS Appeals as a serious problem that “undermines taxpayer trust.”)) One area of particular frustration is IRS Appeals’ internal policy of not considering regulation validity issues: “In settling cases, Appeals does not apply litigating hazards to arguments raised by a taxpayer regarding the validity of Treasury Regulations . . . .” I.R.M. 8.1.1.3.1(5). Even worse, this internal policy is now included in proposed Treasury Regulation Section 301.7803-2(c)(19). This proposed regulation has been pending finalization since September 2022 and expressly prohibits IRS Appeals from hearing arguments that a Treasury Regulation is invalid. It is difficult to square this policy and proposed regulation with the proposition that IRS Appeals evaluates “litigating hazards,” where the potential invalidity of regulations in some cases may be the primary hazard of litigation from the IRS’s perspective.

    In light of the demise of Chevron and the anticipated wave of regulatory challenges, it’s possible that IRS Appeals may reconsider its internal policy. The IRS may not wish to force all of these regulatory validity challenges into court where the IRS and Treasury will be on their least favorable footing in some 40 years. Pushing taxpayers to litigate regulation validity issues may have been a reasonable strategy for the IRS when taxpayers were handicapped by Chevron, but in the Loper Bright era, the results may be more taxpayer-friendly than the IRS had hoped. It is not clear why IRS Appeals should view a regulation validity argument, which now will turn on which interpretation of a statute is the best interpretation, as substantively different from an argument by a taxpayer about the proper application of statutory or regulatory language that does not involve a validity argument. In this new era, a better option would be to allow IRS Appeals to do what it does best: consider hazards of litigation.

    To discuss regulatory challenges of interest post-Loper Bright, reach out to your regular McDermott lawyer or the authors of this article.

    Authors

    Timothy S. Shuman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Susan E. Ryba

    Partner

    Chicago

    Parisa M. Griess

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Samuel J. Preston

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Texas Court Postpones FTC Noncompete Ban

    Texas Court Postpones FTC Noncompete Ban

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Texas Court Postpones FTC Noncompete Ban

    July 9, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    What Happened

    On July 3, 2024, the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas stayed the September 4, 2024, implementation date (the effective date) of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Final Rule that bans all new noncompete agreements nationwide and renders existing noncompete agreements binding most workers unenforceable. The court preliminarily enjoined the FTC from enforcing the Final Rule against the parties to a lawsuit filed by Ryan LLC, a private tax services firm. The court will make its final injunction decision on August 30, 2024.

    In depth

    The Preliminary Injunction Is Not National – It Narrowly APPLIES to the Parties in the Lawsuit

    The court did not issue a nationwide injunction or extend relief to the members of the US Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber). Because the parties challenging the Final Rule did not brief “associational standing” or say why “nationwide injunctive relief is necessary to provide complete relief to Plaintiffs” at the preliminary stage, the court limited the scope of the injunctive relief to the named parties challenging the Final Rule in the lawsuit, including the Chamber (but not to its members), the Business Roundtable, the Texas Association of Business and the Longview Chamber of Commerce.

    The Court’s Preliminary Findings as to the Plaintiffs’ Likelihood of Success on the Merits

    The court found that the plaintiffs would likely be successful in arguing that:

    1. The FTC lacked the authority to impose the Final Rule under Section 6(g) the Federal Trade Commission Act, a “housekeeping statute” that does not confer “substantive rulemaking power.”
    2. The Final Rule is “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act, the federal law governing agency “rulemaking,” because it is “unreasonably overbroad without a reasonable explanation” and “imposes a one-size-fits-all approach with no end date.”

    Next Steps and Anticipated Litigation Strategies

    1. We anticipate that the FTC will seek to challenge the court’s reasoning in the preliminary injunction opinion. More importantly, the Chamber will likely seek to (1) brief the issue of “associational standing” and (2) perhaps file an amended preliminary injunction motion to establish “associational standing” to seek relief on behalf of all its members with the goal of expanding the scope of the final injunction.
    2. We think the Chamber may challenge the scope of the injunction at the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and (likely) the US Supreme Court should the judge decline to extend the injunction in her final injunction decision.
    3. Presently, the court’s reasoning in the preliminary injunction opinion is merely a preview of what it may or may not decide in its August 30, 2024, final injunction decision. We do not anticipate that the court will radically depart from its reasoning in the preliminary injunction hearing. However, the FTC will have the opportunity to offer additional administrative records that may undermine some of the court’s preliminary findings.
    4. If the final decision provides that the Final Rule is unlawful and the injunctive relief remains limited to the Ryan LLC parties, the Final Rule will not be enforced against the Ryan LLC parties. In the absence of injunctive relief stemming from other litigation, the Final Rule will go into effect for non-Ryan LLC parties. However, companies will likely rely on the Ryan LLC decision to challenge the Final Rule in other courts.

    Companies should stay informed about any updates or changes related to this case and the Final Rule’s effective date. In the meantime, they should continue to consult with counsel to assess their existing use of noncompetes and other restrictive covenants to prepare for the Final Rule’s pending effective date. For any questions about the Final Rule, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors of this article.

    Other Litigation on Our Radar

    We’re watching ATS Tree Services, LLC v. FTC in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Judge Kelley Brisbon Hodge (a Biden appointee) is slated to issue her decision on the preliminary injunction on July 23, 2024.

    Authors

    Brian Mead

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • SEC Political Contributions Rule Refresher

    SEC Political Contributions Rule Refresher

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Political Contributions Rule Refresher

    July 9, 2024

    Read time: 18 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) continues to charge investment advisers with violations of the “pay-to-play” rule even where there is no intent to influence a state or local pension investment. With the 2024 election season in full swing, it is particularly important for investment advisers to take steps to comply with this highly technical rule that has a strict liability standard.

    Just as recently as April 1, 2024, the SEC settled charges against an investment adviser for violations of Rule 206(4)-5 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, otherwise known as the “Pay-to-Play Rule” (or “Rule”), due to a $4,000 campaign contribution from one of its covered associates to a candidate seeking a position on the Minnesota State Board of Investment. Together with prior SEC enforcement actions involving Pay-to-Play Rule violations, this case highlights the SEC’s continued interest in bringing enforcement actions for violations of the Pay-to-Play Rule, even in the absence of quid quo pro arrangements[1] and for contributions that seem immaterial.[2] Accordingly, investment advisers, including both registered investment advisers and exempt reporting advisers, should take steps to review their compliance policies and procedures to ensure that they are properly designed to comply with the Pay-to-Play Rule.

    Overview of the Pay-to-Play Rule

    The Pay-to-Play Rule prohibits registered investment advisers and exempt reporting advisers[3] from providing investment advisory services for compensation to a government entity (defined to mean state and local government bodies and instrumentalities) for two years if the adviser or its “covered associates” make political contributions over a de minimis threshold[4] to certain “officials.”[5] The Rule defines “officials” as individuals that either hold or are seeking political offices, with the ability to directly or indirectly influence the hiring of investment advisers (or appoint individuals capable of doing the same) on behalf of a government entity.[6] The definition of “covered associate” is broad and it includes an investment adviser’s executive officers, employees who solicit government entities on behalf of an investment adviser, and any person who directly or indirectly supervises such employees.[7]

    Look-Back and Look-Forward. The Pay-to-Play Rule includes a look-back provision that is applicable to existing employees that become covered associates and new employees that become covered associates once hired.[8] The Rule attributes to an investment adviser the contributions made by an individual within two years of becoming a covered associate, regardless of whether the individual was associated with the investment adviser at the time that the contribution was made. This look-back period is reduced to six months for covered associates who are not involved in the solicitation of clients. Similarly, advisers must “look forward” with respect to political contributions made by covered associates who either stop working for an investment adviser or who otherwise cease to qualify as covered associates. In other words, the covered associate’s employer at the time of the contribution is subject to the Rule’s prohibition for the entire two-year period, regardless of whether the covered associate remains a covered associate for that two-year period or remains employed by the investment adviser.[9]

    Soliciting Others to Contribute is Prohibited. The Pay-to-Play Rule also includes a prohibition against coordinating or soliciting any person or Political Action Committee (“PAC”) to (i) contribute to an official of a government entity to whom the investment adviser is providing or seeking to provide investment advice and (ii) make any payments to a political party of a state or locality where the investment adviser is providing or seeking to provide investment advisory services to a government entity.[10] The Rule defines solicit in this context to mean “to communicate, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of obtaining or arranging a contribution or payment.”[11] This broad definition of solicitation limits the ability of an investment adviser and its covered associates to participate in the political campaigns of officials, as any activity that involves coordinating or soliciting contributions for an official or their political campaign can trigger the Rule’s two year time out period.

    Not Limited to Cash Contributions. It is important to note that the Pay-to-Play Rule is not limited to cash contributions and that providing an official with “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value” can trigger the Rule’s two-year time out period.[12] Thus, providing resources other than cash contributions to an official or their political campaign may violate the Rule. The Pay-to-Play Rule does not, however, prohibit covered associates from volunteering their time in support of an official or an official’s political campaign, so long as the covered associate is not involved in any fundraising activities.[13]

    Anti-circumvention Provision. The Pay-to-Play Rule includes an anti-circumvention provision that prohibits investment advisers and covered associates from doing “anything indirectly which, if done directly, would result in a violation of [the Rule].”[14] For example, a covered associate providing cash to a spouse or friend, with the intent that the cash be given to the political campaign of an official, could violate the Pay-to-Play Rule despite the fact that the contribution was not given to the official directly. Accordingly, this prohibition requires that any potentially covered activity must be carefully vetted to ensure that covered associates are not indirectly acting in violation of the Pay-to-Play Rule, which could trigger the Rule’s two-year time out period.

    Compliance with the Pay-to-Play Rule. Compliance with the Pay-to-Play Rule requires investment advisers to adopt and maintain policies and procedures designed to prevent improper political contributions from being made. One of the most effective ways for an investment adviser to help prevent improper political contributions is to require pre-clearance of all political contributions made by covered associates, regardless of the dollar amount of the contribution or its intended recipient. Given the complexity of the Rule and its strict liability standard, investment advisers should consider requiring all employees to comply with the same pre-clearance requirements as covered associates.

    Training and Testing. Compliance training and testing are also effective at preventing and detecting violations of the Pay-to-Play Rule. Periodic trainings that cover the Pay-to-Play Rule, as well as the investment adviser’s policies and procedures on political contributions, are an effective way to educate employees about the complexities of the Rule and prevent violations. Refresher trainings before major elections are especially helpful, as they are a great way to remind employees of the Pay-to-Play Rule during times when they may be considering how to support their favorite political candidates. Investment advisers should also consider conducting periodic testing of their Pay-to-Play-related policies and procedures by reviewing employee political contributions on public campaign contribution databases. Many compliance-related service providers offer this type of periodic compliance testing for a reasonable fee.

    Evaluating Specific Campaign Contributions. It is also important for investment advisers to understand which political offices have influence over the hiring and firing of investment advisers, or are otherwise responsible for appointing individuals that have such influence, as this analysis is essential to determining whether contributions to a political candidate implicate the Pay-to-Play Rule. Generally, political contributions to candidates seeking federal office are not covered under the Rule. However, if, at the time of the contribution, a candidate for federal office holds a state or local political office that makes them an “official” within the meaning of the Pay-to-Play Rule, a political contribution to that candidate may implicate the Rule. Investment advisers should not forget that local and municipal political offices are covered by the Pay-to-Play Rule as well. For example, the Office of the Mayor of New York is significantly involved in the management of all five of New York City’s public pension plans[15], with the board of trustees for each pension plan having at least one member that is directly appointed by the mayor.[16]

    Investment advisers must also consider how a presidential candidate’s running mate may impact the application of the Pay-to-Play Rule. For example, in 2024 a political contribution to the campaign of former President Donald Trump would not implicate the Pay-to-Pay Rule, as former President Trump himself is not an “official” under the Rule. However, if former President Trump were to choose a running mate that currently holds state or local office and is considered an “official” under the Rule, a political contribution to the campaign of former President Trump would implicate the Pay-to-Play Rule.[17] Similarly, a contribution to the campaign of President Joe Biden would not implicate the Pay-to-Play Rule, since neither President Biden nor Vice President Harris are “officials” within the meaning of the Pay-to-Play Rule. This would change, however, if President Biden, for example selects a new running mate who meets the definition of an “official” under the Pay-to-Play Rule.

    Contributions to PACs and Parties. Investment advisers must not forget to consider the ways in which contributions to PACs or political parties can implicate the Pay-to-Play Rule. A donation to a PAC or a political party does not always implicate the Pay-to-Play Rule; however, the Rule can be implicated under certain circumstances if the contribution is known to be provided for the benefit of a particular political candidate that is considered an “official” under the Rule.[18] This is because the Pay-to-Play Rule covers direct and indirect contributions and includes a prohibition against doing anything indirectly which would be prohibited if done directly.[19] Therefore, when evaluating any request to make a political contributions to PACs or political parties, investment should evaluate whether the contributions are being directed to benefit a political candidate that is an “official” under the Pay-to-Play Rule.[20]

    Fundraisers and Political Events. Investment advisers should also be mindful of the Pay-to-Play Rule’s prohibition against coordinating or soliciting contributions to officials and their political campaigns, PACs, and state and local political parties. Because of this broad prohibition, investment advisers should institute pre-clearance requirements for their employees and covered associates with respect to certain activities that may trigger this part of the Pay-to-Play Rule, such as hosting fundraisers for political candidates or otherwise being engaged in a political candidate’s fundraising activities.

    State and Local Pay-to-Play Rules

    Investment advisers should also be aware that many states and municipalities have their own pay-to-play rules, some of which may vary significantly from the SEC’s Pay-to-Play Rule. In addition, many states and municipalities, and their related pension plans often require disclosure of political contributions. For example, New Jersey law requires that business entities (including investment advisers[21]) file an annual disclosure statement with the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission if it receives $50,000 or more from agreements or contracts with New Jersey state and local entities.[22] The disclosure statement must be completed even if no political contributions were made during the year. New York City, for example, also has its own pay-to-play law that includes a set of disclosure obligations, including that the principal owners, principal officers and senior managers of an investment adviser register with New York City’s “Doing Business Database” in order to provide, or seek to provide, advisory services to New York City pension funds.[23] Requiring all employees to pre-clear all political contributions enables investment advisers to track political contributions that may require disclosure.

    Recent SEC Enforcement Action

    The recent SEC Pay-to-Play enforcement action discussed above is an important reminder of the technical and “strict liability” nature of the Rule. In that case, the Minnesota State Board of Investment had already invested in the funds advised by the investment adviser prior to the political contribution. While this could be viewed as a mitigating factor, it did not stop the SEC from filing charges because a quid pro quo or intent to influence an elected official or candidate is not required under the Rule. Based on the contribution of $4,000 to a candidate for elected office in Minnesota made after the Minnesota pension allocation had been made, the SEC charged the adviser, who agreed to pay a $60,000 penalty and cease and desist from any future violations of the Rule.

    The recent Minnesota case is consistent with the SEC’s past enforcement actions in regards to the Rule. On Sept. 15, 2022, the SEC settled enforcement actions against four investment advisers for violating the Pay-to-Play Rule.[24] In all of these cases, the political contributions were less than $1,000 (one contribution was for only $400[25]) and there were no allegations of any intent to influence the allocation of pension investments. Furthermore, each investment adviser already had an established investment advisory relationship with the relevant pension plan prior to the political contributions.

    These enforcement actions serve as an important reminder of the SEC’s willingness to bring enforcement actions under the Pay-to-Play Rule even where there is no quid pro quo or intent to influence. They also serve to remind advisers about the importance of developing and implementing policies and procedures that include pre-clearance, training and testing in order to ensure compliance with the Rule.

    Authored by Allison Scher Bernbach, Michael S. Didiuk, Joseph Daly and Ahsan A. Sayed.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See Schulte Alert: SEC Pay-to-Play Rule Update: Recent SEC Enforcement Activity and What it Means for the November Midterms (Sept. 21, 2022) (explaining that none of the Pay-to-Play enforcement actions brought by the SEC in 2024 alleged any intent to actually influence the allocation of pension investments).

    [2] See Press Release, US Securities and Exchange Commission, 10 Firms Violated Pay-to-Play Rule By Accepting Pension Fund Fees Following Campaign Contributions (Jan. 17, 2017), available at link.

    [3] See Rule 206(4)-5(a)(1) – (a)(2) (the SEC’s Pay-to-Play Rule applies to investment advisers registered with the SEC, investment advisers required to register with the SEC, exempt reporting advisers and exempt advisers relying on Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act).

    [4] Certain contributions below a de minimis threshold are excepted from the Rule. Covered associates may contribute up to $350 per election to each official that the covered associate is entitled to vote for at the time that the contribution is made and up to $150 per election to each official whom the covered associate is not entitled to vote for at the time of the contribution.

    [5] The two-year timeout period applies to investment advisers that provide advisory services to a relevant government entity both directly and/or indirectly through “covered investment pools,” which generally include hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds and collective investment trusts, as well as registered investment companies (e.g., mutual funds) that are investment options of a participant-directed plan or program of a government entity (e.g., “529 plans”).

    [6] See Rule 206(4)-5(f)(6) (defining official as “any person (including any election committee for the person) who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate for elective office of a government entity, if the office: (i) Is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an investment adviser by a government entity; or (ii) has authority to appoint any person who is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an investment adviser by a government entity.”).

    [7] See Rule 206(4)-5(f)(2) (defining covered associate as “(i) Any general partner, managing member or executive officer, or other individual with a similar status or function; (ii) Any employee who solicits a government entity for the investment adviser and any person who supervises, directly or indirectly, such employee; and (iii) Any political action committee controlled by the investment adviser or by any person described in paragraphs (f)(2)(i) and (f)(2)(ii) of this section.”). While a “covered associates” family members are not covered by the Rule, due to the anti-circumvention rule (Section 208(d) of the Advisers Act), firms will include spouses/spousal equivalents and family members sharing the home in their pre-clearance policies as a best practice.

    [8] See Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule, Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Release No. IA-3043; (July 1, 2010) (hereinafter, Final Rule) at 59, available at link. (“The “look back” applies to any person who becomes a covered associate, including a current employee who has been transferred or promoted to a position covered by the rule. A person becomes a covered associate for purposes of the rule’s look-back provision at the time he or she is hired or promoted to a position that meets the definition of “covered associate” in rule 206(4)-5(f)(2).”)

    [9] See id.

    [10] See Rule 206(4)-5(a)(2)(ii) (“. . . [it shall be unlawful] . . .To coordinate, or to solicit any person or political action committee to make, any: (A) Contribution to an official of a government entity to which the investment adviser is providing or seeking to provide investment advisory services; or (B) Payment to a political party of a State or locality where the investment adviser is providing or seeking to provide investment advisory services to a government entity.”)

    [11] See Rule 206(4)-5(f)(10)(ii)

    [12] See Rule 206(4)-5(f)(7) (defining payment as “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value.”).

    [13] Final Rule at 23 (“[The Pay-to-Play Rule] does not in any way impinge on a wide range of expressive conduct in connection with elections. For example, the rule imposes no restrictions on activities such as making independent expenditures to express support for candidates, volunteering, making speeches, and other conduct.”)

    [14] See Rule 206(4)-5(a)(2)(ii) (“. . . [it shall be unlawful] . . .To coordinate, or to solicit any person or political action committee to make, any: (A) Contribution to an official of a government entity to which the investment adviser is providing or seeking to provide investment advisory services; or (B) Payment to a political party of a State or locality where the investment adviser is providing or seeking to provide investment advisory services to a government entity.”)

    [15] See New York City Office of Payroll Administration: NYC Pension Plans, available at link (New York City’s public pension plans include (1) the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, (2) the New York City Board of Education Retirement System, (3) the New York City Fire Pension Fund, (4) the New York City Police Pension Fund, and (5) the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York.)

    [16] See Employees Retirement System: Board of Trustees, available at link; Board of Education Retirement System: Board of Trustees, available at link; New York City Administrative Code § 13-316; New York City Fire Department: Fire Commissioner, available at link; New York City Administrative Code § 13-202; New York City Police Department: Police Commissioner, available at link; Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York: Our Retirement Board, available at link. (The board of trustees of each of New York City’s pension plans either (A) have a trustee appointed by the New York City mayor to serve as the mayor’s representative or (B) have a trustee that is a New York City official directly appointed by the mayor (i.e., the mayor appoints the police commissioner of New York City, who serves on the board of trustees for the New York City Police Pension Fund).)

    [17] For example, former Vice President Mike Pence served as the Governor of Indiana during the 2016 presidential election. Because the Board of Trustees for the Indiana Public Retirement System is composed of trustees that are appointed by the Governor of Indiana, a donation to former President Donald Trump’s campaign in 2016 would have implicated the Pay-to-Play Rule. See IN Code § 5-10.5-3-2(a) (2021).

    [18] See Release n. 154 (Noting that “[c]ontributions to political parties” would not “trigger the rule’s two-year time out unless they are a means to do indirectly what the rule prohibits if done directly (for example, the contributions are earmarked or known to be provided for the benefit of a particular political official).”); SEC Staff, “Staff Responses to Questions About the Pay to Play Rule,” Question II.5, available at link (noting that “a chain of contributions through PACs made for the purpose of avoiding the pay to play rule, would violate the rule’s, and section 208(d) of the Advisers Act’s, general prohibitions against doing anything indirectly which would be prohibited if done directly.”).

    [19] See 206(4)-5(d) (“ . . . it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser registered (or required to be registered) with the Commission . . . or that is an exempt reporting adviser, or any of the investment adviser’s covered associates to do anything indirectly which, if done directly, would result in a violation of this section.”). See also Section 208(d) of the Advisers Act.

    [20] PACs and political parties sometimes provide written representations upon request, stating for example that political contributions will not be earmarked for specific candidates or will only be spent on overhead costs associated with the PAC’s or political party’s operations.

    [21] See NJ Rev Stat § 19:44A-20.27(d) (2023) (Defining “business entity” as a “for-profit entity that is a natural or legal person, business corporation, professional services corporation, limited liability company, partnership, limited partnership, business trust, association or any other legal commercial entity organized under the laws of this State or of any other state or foreign jurisdiction.”).

    [22] See NJ Rev Stat § 19:44A-20.27(a) (2023).

    [23] See Local Law No. 34 (2007) of the City of New York § 37; see also New York City Campaign Finance Board: Doing Business FAQs, available at link. (Noting that “proposing on or holding a contract for the investment of [New York City] pension funds” is a type of transaction that falls within New York City’s “doing business regulations.”).

    [24] See In re Asset Management Group of Bank of Hawaii, Advisers Act Release No. 6127 (Sept. 15, 2022); In re Canaan Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 6126 (Sept. 15, 2022); In re Highland Capital Partners, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 6128 (Sept. 15, 2022); In re StarVest Asset Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 6129 (Sept. 15, 2022).

    [25] In re StarVest Asset Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 6129 (Sept. 15, 2022).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Quarterly Sanctions Update | Q2 2024

    Quarterly Sanctions Update | Q2 2024

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Quarterly Sanctions Update | Q2 2024

    July 2024

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 24, 2024, the European Union adopted its 14th sanctions package (implemented by EU Regulations 2024/1745 and 2024/1739). While the focus of this package was to curb the violation and circumvention of sanctions through the introduction of due diligence obligations for non-EU subsidiaries, or the expansion of “no re-export to Russia” clause requirement, ample other amendments were also introduced, such as those relating to transfer of IP rights, or divestment. The list of restricted goods has also been significantly expanded and additional persons and entities have been added to the list of sanctioned persons in EU Regulation 269/2014.

    On June 29, 2024, the EU also fundamentally expanded its sanctions against Belarus (implemented by EU Regulation 2024/1865) in order to align with the goals of the 14th sanctions package. Additional sanctions under the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Sudan regimes were also published.

    In this Quarterly Sanctions Update, we summarise the most recent and significant amendments introduced, or proposed, by the EU and the United Kingdom between April and July 2024.*

    In depth

    Due Diligence, Circumvention & Enforcement

    • Liability for the actions of subsidiaries: New Article 8a of EU Regulation 833/2014 imposed a ‘best efforts’ obligation on EU companies which are now required to ensure that their non-EU subsidiaries do not participate in activities undermining EU sanctions. As explained by Recital 29 to EU Regulation 2024/1745 such activities are “those resulting in an effect that EU sanctions seek to prevent, for example, that a recipient in Russia obtains goods, technology, financing or services of a type that is subject to prohibitions under EU Regulation 833/2014”. EU sanctions against Belarus now contain the equivalent provision.
    • “No re-export to Russia” and “no re-export to Belarus clauses: Two exemptions from the “no re-export to Russia clause” obligation of Article 12g of EU Regulation 833/2014 have been introduced. Those relate to: (i) contracts relating to machining centres, horizontal lathes and other related goods and (ii) public contracts concluded with a public authority in a third country or with an international organisation. In addition, the new Article 12ga of EU Regulation 833/2014 included within the scope of the “no re-export to Russia” clause a requirement for the transfer of intellectual property in connection with common high priority items. Finally, EU exporters of common high priority items are now required to (i) implement sanctions due diligence and compliance policies, and (ii) ensure that such policies are implemented by their non-EU subsidiaries. This requirement will apply as of December 26, 2024. An equivalent “no re-export to Belarus” clause requirement has been introduced to EU sanctions against Belarus. Note that this requirement does not, however, extend to intellectual property relating to the common high priority items.
    • Definition of circumvention: The existing anti-circumvention provision of Article 12 of EU Regulation 833/2014 has been amended to specifically prohibit participation in arrangements aimed at circumventing EU sanctions, without deliberately seeking such circumvention but being aware of it and accepting the possibility. Recital 37 to EU Regulation 2024/1745 further explains that the amendment reflects the interpretation of ‘circumvention’ provided by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-72/11. EU sanctions against Belarus now contain the same prohibition.
    • Voluntary self-disclosure: The 14th package amended Article 8 of EU Regulation 833/2014 relating to penalties for sanctions violation to expressly provide that voluntary self-disclosure may be taken into account as a mitigating factor. Recital 26 to EU Regulation 2024/1745 clarified in this respect that: “Where a natural or legal person voluntarily, completely and in due time discloses a violation of the restrictive measures, it should be possible for national competent authorities to take that self-disclosure into account when applying penalties, as appropriate, in accordance with national administrative law or with other relevant national law or rules.” In addition, the 14th package imposed a new requirement on EU Member States and the European Commission to share information on sanctions violations and enforcement issues, penalties for breach and judgments handed down by national courts. Access our alert on sanctions violation criminalisation at the EU level. EU sanctions against Belarus have been amended accordingly.
    • List of entities involved in circumvention: 28 Russian and 31 third-country entities were added to the list of entities associated with Russia’s military-industrial complex of Annex IV to EU Regulation 833/2014 (which are subject to authorisation requirements with limited grounds). This list now contains 649 entities incorporated in, among other countries, Russia, China, Türkiye, Thailand, Kazakhstan, India or Singapore.
    • United Kingdom: On May 16, 2024, the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation issued its Guidance on financial sanctions enforcement and monetary penalties. The guidance sets out, among other things, (i) a summary of the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation compliance and enforcement approach, (ii) an overview of how it will assess whether to apply a monetary penalty, and what will be taken into account, (iii) an overview of the process that will decide the amount of the monetary penalty and (iv) an explanation of how it will impose a monetary penalty, including timescales at each stage and rights of review and appeal.

    Business Services & Software

    • “Partner countries” subsidiaries’ exemption: The existing exemption for the provision of business services and software for the exclusive use of Russian subsidiaries that are owned or controlled by an entity established in the EU or ‘partner countries’ (including the UK, US, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and South Korea) has been extended until September 30, 2024. The list of ‘partner countries’ has been additionally expanded to include Iceland and Lichtenstein. Further, under a new exemption, EU nationals currently residing Russia, and were in residence before February 24, 2022 are allowed to provide business services to their Russian employers if these employers are owned or controlled by an entity established in the EU or partner countries.
    • Belarus: EU sanctions against Belarus prohibits provision of certain business services and software to (i) the Republic of Belarus, its Government, public bodies, corporations or agencies or (ii) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting on their behalf or their direction. This prohibition is narrower in scope as compared to EU sanctions against Russia as it does not apply to Belarussian entities that are not controlled by the Belarussian State. Two exemptions have been provided, relating to (i) the provision of services that are strictly necessary for the termination by October 2, 2024 of contracts concluded before July 1, 2024 and (ii) the provision of services intended for the exclusive use of Belarussian subsidiaries of EU, UK, US or “partner countries” entities (applicable until January 2, 2025).

    Divestment

    • Divestment licences: Powers of national authorities to authorise a number of activities prohibited under EU sanctions in relation to divestment from Russia or the wind-down of business activities in Russia have been extended until December 31, 2024. In addition, national authorities have been granted the power to authorise the satisfaction of a claim made by a Russian entity that would otherwise be affected by EU sanctions, to the extent such satisfaction is strictly necessary for the divestment from Russia or the wind-down of business activities in Russia.
    • Damages for expropriation: EU companies have been granted powers to recover, in judicial proceedings before the competent courts of EU Member States, any damages, including legal costs, caused by Russian entities that benefited from the expropriation of EU companies in Russia. Further, Member States shall not be liable for judicial decisions rendered in accordance with [the Russian Expropriation Decree] or for the enforcement of such decisions. Member States shall not comply with judgments, arbitral awards, including investor-State arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions which hold them liable”.

    Energy

    • New restrictions on Russian LNG: For the first time, the EU has introduced prohibitions on the provision of goods, technologies and services to LNG projects under construction in Russia. In addition, the transshipment of LNG via EU ports and related technical services will be gradually phased-out over the next 9 months. The import of Russian LNG into terminals which are not connected to the EU gas pipeline network has also been prohibited.

    Exports & Imports

    • Advanced technology and industrial goods: The 14th Sanctions Package extended export restrictions to include quadbikes, microwaves and aerial amplifiers, and digital flight data recorders, as well as certain chemicals, plastics, vehicle parts (including replacement parts for trucks) and machinery (e.g. boring/excavating machinery, appliances for pipes, electrical equipment, monitors, radios, video/audio equipment). EU sanctions against Belarus have been updated accordingly to include the advanced technology, industrial and common high priority items included in EU Regulation 833/2014.
    • Helium: The 14th sanctions package introduced a new prohibition on the import into the EU of helium originating in Russia or exported from Russia. This prohibition also covers any transfer of helium and the provision of technical assistance and financing in relation to any such import or transfer.

    Financial Sector

    • Russian SPFS Financial Messaging System: From June 25, 2024, EU banks outside Russia are prohibited from connecting into, and carrying out transactions using, the SPFS (equivalent to SWIFT). In addition, EU operators to engage with third-country banks listed in EU Regulation 833/2014 that are using SPFS.
    • Transactions with banks and crypto asset providers: Any transactions with banks and asset providers established in Russia and third countries listed in EU Regulation 833/2014, which facilitate transactions supporting Russia’s defence-industrial base are now prohibited.

    Transport

    • Aviation: Subject to a number of exemptions, non-scheduled flights (the origin or destination of which is decided by a Russian individual or company, regardless of the aircraft’s ownership) have been prohibited.
    • Road transport: The existing prohibition relating to transport of goods by road in the EU has been expanded to also cover EU companies with an ownership share of 25% or more by Russian companies or individuals. In addition, companies with an ownership of 25% or more by such persons will no longer be allowed to become ‘EU road transport undertakings’ within the meaning of the relevant EU legislation.
    • Maritime: For the first time, the EU has sanctioned 27 vessels for their contribution to Russian warfare in various sectors (e.g. the transport of military equipment for Russia, the transport of stolen Ukrainian grain, or the participation in the dark fleet transporting Russian oil). These vessels are now prohibited from accessing EU ports and related services.

    Asset Freeze

    • Persons and entities subject to asset freeze: A further 69 individuals and 47 entities were added to the list of persons subject to asset freeze restrictions. The listings touch upon various sectors of the Russian economy, including military companies, companies active in the engineering, chemical or explosives sectors, the leading Russian energy companies as well as companies involved in disinformation activities. In the same vein, the UK introduced 50 new designations targeting Russian shadow fleet, Russian financial institutions as well as companies which supply Russia’s military production.

    Other Sanctions Regimes

    • Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad sanctions: On June 28, 2024, 6 individuals and 3 entities were added to the list of sanctioned persons under EU Regulation 2024/385 for participating in the financing of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The UK imposed similar sanctions on January 22, 2024 and March 27, 2024.
    • Sudan sanctions: On June 28, 2024, 6 individuals were added to the list of sanctioned political persons under EU Regulation 2023/2147 for participating in activities undermining the stability and transition of Sudan. The UK updated its Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 with 3 entities on April 15, 2024.

    *Trainees David Amar and Marine Bahaderian also contributed to this update.

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  • S.D. Texas Bankruptcy Court Finds LME Transactions Violated Credit Agreement, but Limits Recovery to Potential Claim in Robertshaw Litigation

    S.D. Texas Bankruptcy Court Finds LME Transactions Violated Credit Agreement, but Limits Recovery to Potential Claim in Robertshaw Litigation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    S.D. Texas Bankruptcy Court Finds LME Transactions Violated Credit Agreement, but Limits Recovery to Potential Claim in Robertshaw Litigation

    July 8, 2024

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 20, 2024, Judge Christopher Lopez of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a highly anticipated decision rejecting one lender’s (“Lender Defendant”) request to void a prepayment made by the borrower, Robertshaw, to Lender Defendant in December 2023. In the decision, Judge Lopez addressed a narrow contractual dispute centered around a series of liability management transactions conducted by Robertshaw and certain of its secured lenders (“Lender Plaintiffs”) to the exclusion of the Lender Defendant. Judge Lopez found that a prepayment of term loan debt violated the plain terms of the credit agreement, but that the other transactions should stand and Lender Defendant’s sole remedy is a claim against Robertshaw for breach of contract. See Memorandum Decision and Order [ECF No. 351], In re Robertshaw US Holding Corp., et al., No. 24-90052 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 20, 2024).

    Background

    In late 2022, Robertshaw, began experiencing financial difficulties. To alleviate its financial stress, Robertshaw executed an uptiering transaction with certain of its secured creditors who had joined together to provide “Required Lender” consent (i.e., the support of lenders holding more than 50 percent of the outstanding principal) under an existing credit agreement in May 2023.

    The New Credit Agreement

    In May 2023, Robertshaw and certain of the secured lenders amended the original credit agreement to (i) execute a new super-priority credit agreement governed under New York law, (ii) provide $95 million of new first-out new money term loans and (iii) allow the participating lenders to exchange existing first- and second-out term loans under the original credit agreement into second-out and third-out term loans under the new credit agreement.

    While the new loan incorporated many of the terms of the original credit agreement, it implemented changes intended to curtail the parties’ ability to engage in future liability management transactions. The new loan also incorporated the original credit agreement’s definition of “Required Lender,”—which defined “Required Lender” as “[l]enders having Loans representing more than 50.0% of the sum of the total First-Out New Money Term Loans and Second-Out Term Loans at such time.”  

    Subsequent Amendments to the New Credit Agreement

    In Spring 2023, Lender Defendant held more than 50 percent of the debt under the new loan —sufficient for it to constitute the Required Lender on its own. The Lender Defendant and Robertshaw then amended the new credit agreement four times — waiving various payment defaults and extending Robertshaw’s runway in exchange for, among other things, additional liquidity. The Lender Plaintiffs learned of these amendments only shortly after execution of the fourth amendment.

    The Lender Plaintiffs Take Action

    In December 2023, the Lender Plaintiffs, Robertshaw and its sponsor, One Rock, executed a series of liability management transactions that provided new financing to Robertshaw, while serving to prepay and dilute Lender Defendant’s position.

    • First, Robertshaw’s ultimate parent, Range Investor LLC, formed RS Funding Holdings, LLC (“RS Funding”).
    • Second, the Lender Plaintiffs and One Rock loaned ~$228 million to RS Funding.
    • Third, Holdings instructed RS Funding to distribute the proceeds of the ~$228 million loan to Robertshaw.
    • Fourth, Robertshaw used the funds to, among other things, voluntarily prepay $117.6 million of the outstanding first-out term loans — including paying more than $90 million to Lender Defendant. After the prepayment, the Lender Plaintiffs now held more than 50.0% of the outstanding debt.
    • Fifth, the Lender Plaintiffs, as Required Lenders, executed an amendment to the new credit agreement, authorizing Robertshaw to issue $228 million in incremental debt.
    • Sixth, Robertshaw issued $218 million in new loans and then returned an equivalent amount to RS Funding, which repaid the loan.

    See Memorandum Opinion at 8-9.

    In late December 2023, Lender Defendant filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York against Robertshaw, One Rock and the Lender Plaintiffs, alleging claims that included breach of the new credit agreement, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and tortious interference with a contract.

    Lender Defendant also sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting both the $90+ million prepayment and the effects of any actions taken by the Lender Plaintiffs in their purported capacity as Required Lenders. 

    Robertshaw filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on Feb. 15, 2024. On the same date, Robertshaw, the Lender Plaintiffs and One Rock commenced an adversary proceeding seeking to, among other things, a declaration that the December 2023 transactions are valid under the new credit agreement. In response, Lender Defendant filed two counterclaims seeking declaratory judgment (i) against Robertshaw that Robertshaw breached the new credit agreement and (ii) that the Lender Defendant was still the Required Lender.

    The Decision

    Judge Lopez held that the Lender Plaintiffs violated the terms of the new credit agreement but Lender Defendant’s sole remedy is a prepetition breach of contract claim against Robertshaw. Judge Lopez also held that Lender Defendant was not entitled to injunctive relief voiding the December 2023 transactions which would have had the effect of restoring the Lender Defendant as the Required Lender. Further, Judge Lopez found that (i) One Rock did not tortiously interfere with Lender Defendant’s contractual rights under the new credit agreement and (ii) none of the Lender Plaintiffs, One Rock or Robertshaw breached New York’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

    To arrive at these conclusions, Judge Lopez looked to the plain language of the new credit agreement. He first analyzed whether the transactions resulting in the December 2023 amendment caused a “Subsidiary” to incur indebtedness in violation of the new credit agreement. Section 2.11 of the new credit agreement requires that Robertshaw make a mandatory prepayment of the “Net Proceeds from the issuance or incurrence of Indebtedness of … any Subsidiary” if such incurrence is prohibited by the terms of the new credit agreement. Relying on fundamental principles of New York contract law, he held that “RS Funding is a ‘Subsidiary’ that incurred ‘Indebtedness’ in violation of” the new credit agreement because, in the ordinary sense of the word, RS Funding is a subsidiary of Holdings. He further held that “[b]ecause Robertshaw failed to pay 100% of the Net Proceeds as a mandatory prepayment, it breached Section 2.11(b)(iii) of the [new credit agreement] only by not paying all the proceeds.”

    Despite ruling that Robertshaw violated the plain terms of the new credit agreement with the December 2023 transactions, Judge Lopez declined to restore Lender Defendant’s Required Lender status because “the [new credit agreement] does not mandate that result.” The court explained that there was “no need to look for remedies outside the four corners of the [loan]” because the “mandatory prepayment provisions… specifically deal[] with unauthorized incurrence of Indebtedness. Had the payment been made in full, the result would still be that Lender Defendant was no longer Required Lender.” Id.

    Judge Lopez also held that One Rock did not tortiously interfere with the Lender Defendant’s rights because “One Rock did not intentionally procure any breach of the [new credit agreement], and One Rock was not the but for cause of any such breach by Robertshaw or the Lender Plaintiffs” and that neither the Lender Plaintiffs nor Robertshaw violated New York’s implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 19-21.

    Takeaways

    • The Robertshaw opinion confronts a narrow issue of contract interpretation. This is not a case deciding the propriety of an uptiering transaction like Serta. See Memorandum Opinion [ECF No.1045], In re Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 23-90020 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 6, 2023). Serta is currently on appeal to the 5thCircuit, so investors will need to wait until the 5thCircuit releases its opinion for further guidance on that issue. Indeed, Judge Lopez concludes that the liability management transaction in fact violated the terms of the new credit agreement here.
    • Judge Lopez’s ultimate decision to “enforce the [new credit agreement] as written” because it was “negotiated between sophisticated parties,” and “on its own terms … does not lead to illogical or absurd interpretations of text” is consistent with the 2023 Serta In Serta, former Judge David Jones, also of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, held that equity has no role where sophisticated parties negotiate, contract and participate in credit agreements that include the potential for liability management transactions. Many courts have followed a similarly strict four-corners approach when interpreting credit agreements in the context of liability management transactions.
    • The Robertshaw decision is also consistent with other holdings declining to hold sponsors liable for tortious interference because the actions the sponsors engage in are done with the objective of preserving their investment. The decision is also consistent with other decisions finding that the borrower did not violate New York’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing — which both bankruptcy courts and New York State courts have generally agreed on.
    • The Robertshaw opinion, like Serta, came after a full trial, which provides greater guidance than other decisions in the context of a motion to dismiss such as Murray Energy, TriMark or Boardriders, where the legal standard requires the court to assess whether the plaintiff stated a plausible claim for relief.[1]
      • However, because these are decisions issued by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas with respect to New York State law, it is unclear whether they may carry great weight in New York State courts.

    Authored by Douglas S. Mintz, Peter J. Amend and Robert D. Brown.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] In re Murray Energy Holdings Co., 616 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2020); Audax Credit Opportunities Offshore Ltd. v. TMK Hawk Parent, Corp., No. 565123/2020 (N.Y.S. Aug. 16, 2021); ICG Global Loan Fund 1 DAC v. Boardriders, Inc., No. 655175/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 2020) (D.I. 160).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • New UK Government: What it Means for Employers

    New UK Government: What it Means for Employers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New UK Government: What it Means for Employers

    July 5, 2024

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The UK will have a Labour government for the first time since 2010 following the outcome of the general election held on 4 July 2024.

    In its manifesto, Change, published on 13 June 2024, Labour committed to introducing in full its “Plan to Make Work Pay: Delivering a New Deal for Working People” (New Deal), launched on 24 May 2024.

    The New Deal signals some significant proposed reforms to existing UK employment laws and promises to deliver the “biggest upgrade to rights at work for a generation”. Underlying this, Labour has identified kickstarting economic growth as its first mission for government and that this means being both pro-business and pro-worker.

    This article sets out the key proposals that UK employers can expect to see.

    In depth

    Labour’s Key Proposals for Employment Law Include:

    • Removing the qualifying period for unfair dismissal protection and making it a day one right – employees in the UK have the right not to be unfairly dismissed. This is subject currently to a qualifying period of two years’ continuous service, save in exceptional cases (e.g. where the reason for dismissal is that the employee is a whistleblower). Labour proposes to make this a day one right for all workers. It has, however, been indicated that it will remain permissible for employers to operate probationary periods with fair and transparent rules to assess new hires. It remains to be seen what precisely it means by this.
    • Restricting fire and rehire – “Fire and rehire” is a shorthand term describing the practice of an employer dismissing an employee and reengaging them on different terms and conditions. There have been calls, particularly from trade unions, for this practice to be banned outright. In its New Deal, Labour has recognised, however, that it is important that businesses can restructure to remain viable, to preserve their workforce and the company when there is genuinely no alternative. It proposes to continue to allow “fire and rehire”, but provided that businesses follow a proper process based on dialogue and common understanding between employers and workers. A new code of practice in this area was already due to come into effect from 18 July 2024, which Labour has said that it proposes to “strengthen”.
    • Banning “exploitative” zero hours contracts – zero hours contracts are casual worker agreements under which typically an organisation is not obliged to offer any minimum amount of work and the worker is not obliged to accept any work offered. Labour has committed to end “one-sided” flexibility, ban “exploitative” zero hours contracts and ensure that workers have the right to a contract that reflects the number of hours they regularly work, based on a twelve-week reference period.
    • Lowering the threshold for collective redundancy consultation – currently, collective redundancy consultation obligations arise where an employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 20 or more employees at one establishment within a period of 90 days or less. Case law has found that an establishment for this purpose is the local unit or entity to which workers are assigned. Labour has indicated that it will broaden this to be determined by the number of people impacted across the business as a whole rather than in one workplace. As such, the obligation for an employer to engage in collective consultation in relation to redundancy proposals could arise more frequently in future.
    • Further strengthening and expanding collective rights – Labour proposes a range of changes to remove what it has termed “unnecessary red tape on trade union activity that work against their core role of negotiation and dispute resolution”. This is expected to include measures:
      • repealing the strike minimum service legislation introduced by the previous Conservative government
      • allowing statutory trade union ballots to be undertaken electronically
      • simplifying the process of trade union recognition, including by lowering the thresholds at which recognition can be achieved
      • ensuring that workers in “precarious and gig-economy sectors” have a meaningful right to organise through trade unions
      • introducing a right for trade unions to access workplaces to meet, represent, recruit and organise members, subject to giving appropriate notice and complying with reasonable requests by the employer
      • ensuring that employers provide sufficient facilities time for all trade union representatives
      • introducing a new duty on employers to inform all employees of their right to join a trade union (e.g. as part of the mandatory written employment particulars issued on hiring) and to inform all staff of this on a regular basis
      • revising the current laws on blacklisting
    • Introducing a mechanism for raising collective grievances – Labour proposes to introduce a mechanism enabling workers to collectively raise grievances about conduct in their workplace. It has stated that it anticipates that this will be in line with the existing ACAS code of practice for individual grievances.
    • Ethnicity and disability pay gap reporting – currently, UK employers must publish gender pay gap data if, on a specific date each year, they employ 250 or more employees. Labour proposes to expand this obligation for such employers to also report on disability and ethnicity pay gap data. Labour has also indicated an intention to introduce, via a new Race Equality Act, race equal pay claims and the strengthening of dual discrimination protection.
    • Equal Pay – Labour has committed to put in place (as yet unspecified) measures to ensure that outsourcing of services cannot be used by employers to avoid paying equal pay, including for work of equal value, to women.
    • Introducing a right to “switch off” – Labour proposes to introduce a “right to switch off”. It has committed to following similar models to those that are already in place in Ireland and Belgium, giving workers and employers the opportunity to have “constructive conversations and work together on bespoke workplace policies or contractual terms that benefit both parties”.
    • Banning unpaid internships – Labour proposes to ban unpaid internships except where they are part of an education or training course.
    • Greater protection from dismissal for new mothers – Labour has committed to strengthening protections for pregnant women by making it unlawful to dismiss a woman who is pregnant for six months after her return, except in “specific circumstances”.
    • Greater accessibility to statutory sick pay – Labour proposes to remove both the waiting period and lower earnings limit in order to make statutory sick pay available to all workers.
    • Minimum wage reform – Labour proposes to remove the age bands currently applicable to the national minimum wage and also to change the remit of the Low Pay Commission so that, alongside median wages and economic conditions, the minimum wage will also take account of the cost of living.
    • Parental leave rights – Labour has committed to review the current parental leave system and as part of which it will ensure that parental leave is a day one right.
    • Further enhanced duty to prevent sexual harassment – Labour proposes to strengthen the new legal duty already due to come into effect in October 2024 by requiring employers to take “all” reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment, including by third parties.
    • Single status of worker – the UK currently recognises three categories of employment status for employment rights purposes: employee, self-employed and worker. Labour proposes to consult on introducing a simpler binary two-part framework that differentiates between workers and the genuinely self-employed.
    • Increased time limit for employment tribunal claims – Labour proposes to increase the time limit within which employees are able to submit a claim to an employment tribunal from the three months that applies in most case currently to six months.
    • Creation of a Single Enforcement Body – Labour proposes to introduce a “Single Enforcement Body”, with trade union and TUC representation, whose remit will be to “enforce workers’ rights”, including “strong powers to inspect workplaces and take action against exploitation”. Labour has stated that this body will be given the power to bring civil proceedings upholding employment rights.

    What Happens Now?

    Clearly, the New Deal sets out a wide-ranging and significant programme for reform of existing UK employment laws.

    Labour has committed to hit the ground running and introduce legislation in Parliament within 100 days of entering government (so, by mid-October). That does not, however, necessarily mean that new laws will take effect by then.

    Employers will, of course, rightly now be eager to understand the full detail of Labour’s proposals as soon as possible.

    In the meantime, employers can take some comfort from the fact that, alongside its stated intention to move quickly, Labour has also committed to consulting fully with businesses, workers and civil society on how to put its plans into practice before legislation is passed.

    *Rebecca Geers (Trainee Solicitor) contributed to this article.

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  • Federal Judge Rules FTC Lacked Authority to Issue Non-Compete Rule

    Federal Judge Rules FTC Lacked Authority to Issue Non-Compete Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Judge Rules FTC Lacked Authority to Issue Non-Compete Rule

    July 4, 2024

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 3, 2024, Judge Ada Brown of the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a ruling in the litigation challenging the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) final rule (the “Rule”) prohibiting the use of noncompetition restrictions in the workplace. Judge Brown granted a stay and preliminary injunction preventing the Rule from taking effect against the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors in the action while the litigation is pending. Judge Brown held that the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors were likely to succeed on the merits in their action to vacate the Rule because the FTC lacked authority to issue a non-compete ban and that the Rule was arbitrary and capricious. While the stay and preliminary injunction only applies to the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors, Judge Brown committed to issuing a final ruling on the merits of the action, including ruling on the plaintiff’s request that the Rule be vacated in its entirety, by Aug. 30, 2024. For context, the effective date of the Rule is Sept. 4, 2024. Given Judge Brown’s legal rationale that the FTC lacked authority to issue the Rule, it would seem likely that she will ultimately rule to vacate the Rule in its entirety. 

    We will continue to monitor and keep you apprised of any further developments to the legal challenges to the Rule, including the separate challenge to the Rule that is ongoing in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for which a decision is expected by July 23, 2024. Please reach out to your Schulte contacts to discuss the decision and any related restrictive covenant issues.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. © 2024 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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