Content Type: Article

  • ISDA August D-F Protocol Deadline Delayed Until May 1, 2013

    ISDA August D-F Protocol Deadline Delayed Until May 1, 2013

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    ISDA August D-F Protocol Deadline Delayed Until May 1, 2013

    December 21, 2012

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Dec. 31, 2012 deadline for adhering to the ISDA August 2012 Dodd-Frank Protocol published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) has been delayed until May 1, 2013.

    Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issued a number of business-conduct rules that require swap dealers and major swap participants to obtain information from their swap counterparties and to provide disclosure to their swap counterparties, which include funds. The ISDA August 2012 Dodd-Frank Protocol is an industry document that provides a means for funds to incorporate provisions into their swap documentation to enable the swap dealers and major swap participants to satisfy the CFTC rules. Given the effective dates of the rules, funds and other swap counterparties were required to enter into the ISDA August 2012 Dodd-Frank Protocol by Dec. 31, 2012 to continue trading or face a disruption in trading if the December 31 deadline passed without their incorporating the ISDA August 2012 Dodd-Frank Protocol.

    On Dec. 18, 2012, the CFTC released interim final rules which extend compliance dates related to the relevant CFTC rules for swap dealers and major swap participants until May 1, 2013. According to the release, less than 1 percent of counterparties had submitted completed information to swap dealers and major swap participants. In addition, the interim final rules extend the compliance dates for regulations concerning portfolio reconciliation and swap trading relationship documentation until July 1, 2013.

    Funds are encouraged to sign-up to the ISDA August 2012 Dodd-Frank Protocol before the 2013 deadline. Please contact your SRZ attorney if you have any questions.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • New Requirements for Employers’ Background Checks and Social Security Number Usage

    New Requirements for Employers’ Background Checks and Social Security Number Usage

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Requirements for Employers’ Background Checks and Social Security Number Usage

    December 3, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), an employer that plans to make an employment decision adverse to a prospective or current employee based at least in part on information contained in a “consumer report” (which includes background checks performed by third parties) must provide that employee or applicant with a notice that includes a summary of consumer rights before taking the contemplated adverse action. Any summary of consumer rights that employers provide to employees or applicants pursuant to the FCRA on or after Jan. 1, 2013 must comply with new federal regulations adopted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”), which now shares jurisdiction over the FCRA with the Federal Trade Commission.

    New CFPB regulations prescribe the information that must now be included in the summary of consumer rights.[1] Employers likely will receive up-to-date forms from credit reporting agencies when they obtain consumer reports.

    New New York Law Further Restricts Employer Use of Social Security Numbers

    Unless an exception applies, New York General Business Law § 399-ddd, effective Dec. 12, 2012, mandates that most employers in New York refrain from requiring that employees disclose their full or partial social security numbers, and from denying to employees “any service, privilege or right” due to nondisclosure.

    Two statutory exceptions are potentially quite broad, and the courts will need to clarify their scope. First, the restrictions do not apply if the employee “consents to the acquisition or use of his or her social security account number.” Because an employer typically would need to ask an employee for his or her social security number before the employee could consent, it is uncertain whether a court would deem that an employer that has merely requested a social security number has “required” it for purposes of the statute.

    Second, employers may compel the disclosure of social security numbers “for purposes of employment,” which include claims and benefits administration as well as the administration of any “procedure related to the individual’s employment . . . including the individual’s termination from employment, retirement from employment, [or] injury suffered during the course of employment.” This exception also allows an employer to procure a social security number “to check on an unemployment insurance claim of the individual.” Guidance from the courts will be necessary to clarify precisely what the terms “purposes of employment” and “procedure related to . . . employment” cover. This exception does not address explicitly the use of social security numbers in hiring and promotion decisions.

    Other statutory exceptions permit employers to obtain the social security numbers of employees and applicants for one or more of the following purposes:

    • Disclosures of social security numbers explicitly mandated by federal, state or local law, such as disclosure on a Form I-9 or to comply with New York reporting requirements;[2]
    • Fraud investigations or internal verifications;
    • Any business function that the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act authorizes;
    • Consumer reports or investigative consumer reports authorized by law and credit dealings between the employer and the employee initiated by the employee;
    • Direct deposit or investment services on the employee’s behalf;
    • Tax compliance;
    • Blood or organ donations, collection of child support or alimony, or criminal record verification;
    • “[A]ny interaction with a governmental law enforcement agency or . . . the enforcement of a judgment . . . by a sheriff or marshal”; or
    • Confirmation of a current or prospective employee’s eligibility for a marketing program targeted exclusively at certain age groups.

    In addition to the purpose-specific exceptions above, the statute also categorically exempts certain types of employers, such as banks and their affiliates, from these restrictions.

    Although there is no private right of action under § 399-ddd, the Attorney General may prosecute violators. The first violation carries a $500 maximum civil penalty, while each subsequent violation carries a civil penalty up to $1,000. The statute, however, provides a safe harbor for employers that implement procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the statute, so long as such violations were not intentional. These procedures should supplement the procedures that New York employers should already have in place to comply with extant restrictions on social security number use, such as restrictions on publishing, printing or electronically transmitting an employee’s social security number under certain circumstances.[3]

    Employers that wish to obtain and use their prospective and current employees’ social security numbers should develop and implement procedures to ensure that social security numbers are not unlawfully obtained. Employers should make sure that they use employees’ social security numbers only for the purposes contemplated by the statute, such as to investigate fraud, to receive consumer reports, to obtain applicants’ criminal records or when the law otherwise requires them to use employees’ social security numbers.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, and Scott A. Gold.

    If you have any questions concerning this client alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 96

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 96

    December, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Commercial

    European Commission to Review Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive
    On 27 November 2012, the European Commission issued a Communication describing how the current legal framework set out in the Directive on Misleading and Comparative Advertising (Directive 2006/114/EC) has been implemented in the European Union. Highlighting current problems with its implementation, the Communication sets out how the Commission intends to clarify certain provisions of the Directive to eliminate harmful, misleading marketing practices and increase protection in the business-to-business (B2B) sector.

    EU Commission Launches Consultation on Protection of Business and Research Know-How
    The European Commission has launched a public consultation on the protection of business and research know-how (the consultation) within the European Union with a view to understanding public opinion on whether greater harmonisation across Member States is required, and whether current options for redress provide adequate protection for businesses, particularly those entering into cross-border transactions.

    Data Protection

    Information Commissioner’s Office Publishes Report on Enforcement of New Cookie Rules
    Six months after the entry into force of amendments to the E-Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/ EC (the Directive), the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has published an activity report (the report) that summarises general public concerns about the use of cookies by UK website providers. The report also sets out further action the ICO is taking, where appropriate, to ensure full enforcement of the requirements.

    Patent

    Court of Appeal Upholds Invalidity of Alzheimer’s Drug Patent
    In Novartis AG v Generics (UK) Ltd (trading as Mylan) [2012] EWCA Civ 1623,the Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of the High Court that a patent for rivastigmine, protecting one stereoisomeric form of a racemic compound, was invalid for obviousness.

    High Court of England and Wales has Jurisdiction to Try Pan-European Declaration of Non-Infringement Action
    In Actavis Group HF v Eli Lilly and Company [2012] EWHC 3316 (Pat) the High Court of England and Wales has held that, in cases where there is no challenge to the validity of the European patent concerned, the English court has jurisdiction to try an action claiming declarations of non-infringement of patent designations in other European countries.

    Trade Marks

    Use of Community Trade Mark in Single EU Member State is Not Necessarily Sufficient to Constitute Genuine Use
    In Leno Merken BV v Hagelkruis Beheer BV [2012] C-149/11, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that use of a Community trade mark (CTM) in a single European Union Member State is not necessarily sufficient to constitute genuine use, and that territorial borders of Member States must be disregarded.

    Scrabble Tile Trade Mark Declared Invalid
    In J.W. Spear & Sons Limited & Ors v Zynga, Inc [2012] EWHC 3345 (Ch), the High Court of England and Wales declared invalid a trade mark registered to protect the tiles used in the board game Scrabble. The Court found that the trade mark did not comply with Article 2 of the Trade Marks Directive (2008/95/EC).

    Updated Trade Mark Not Filed in Bad Faith
    In pelicantravel.com s.r.o v Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) T-136/11, an attempt to invalidate a trade mark based on bad faith failed because the EU General Court was not persuaded that an application for an updated trade mark had been made to prevent the Applicant from losing its rights in respect of an earlier trade mark due to non-use.

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  • Fifth Circuit Holds That Political Contributions From Ponzi Schemers Are Fraudulent Transfers

    Fifth Circuit Holds That Political Contributions From Ponzi Schemers Are Fraudulent Transfers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Holds That Political Contributions From Ponzi Schemers Are Fraudulent Transfers

    November 29, 2012

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 22, 2012, held that $1.6 million in political contributions made to five different political committees by Ponzi scheme defendants between 2000 and 2008 were fraudulent transfers made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors” under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 5207460 ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 2012). Affirming the district court, the Court of Appeals explained that the court-appointed receiver stood “in the shoes of the creditors of the” Ponzi scheme defendants, enabling him to bring the fraudulent transfer claims, and that the receiver timely sued under Texas law “within one year after the transfer[s] . . . w[ere] or reasonably could have been discovered . . . .” Id., at *3. Finally, the court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that the Federal Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, did not preempt the receiver’s state law claim. Id., at *5. Because the defendant committees could not show that they had given “reasonably equivalent value” for the contributions, they were unable to raise a good faith defense. Id., at 2.

    Relevance

    The case confirms the legal significance of a Ponzi scheme. Just seven months earlier, on March 20, 2012, the Fifth Circuit had reversed a district court’s fraudulent transfer judgment based on a financially troubled entity’s gift to a charity because there was no proof of a Ponzi scheme. American Cancer Society v. Cook, 675 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Not all securities frauds are Ponzi schemes.”). As in Janvey, the transferor in American Cancer Society was the subject of a Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) receivership, not a bankruptcy case, and the plaintiff was its court-appointed receiver. Unlike Janvey, where the existence of a Ponzi scheme was undisputed, the court in American Cancer found no evidence in the record of “a traditional Ponzi scheme,” enabling it to hold that the “district court erred in applying the presumption of [actual] fraudulent intent,” applicable in Ponzi scheme cases. Id., at 528.

    Courts have regularly held that a so-called “Ponzi scheme” debtor presumptively makes transfers to its investors with actual fraudulent intent to hinder, delay or defraud other creditors. Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 558-59 (5th Cir. 2006) (held, receiver satisfied burden of showing fraudulent intent with evidence that transferor had created Ponzi scheme, and was thus, “as a matter of law, insolvent from its inception”), citing Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).

    Ponzi Scheme Definition

    The receiver’s fraudulent transfer claim in Janvey, based on the transferor’s actual intent, turned on the existence of a Ponzi scheme. According to the Fifth Circuit, a “Ponzi scheme is a ‘fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends or returns for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger investments.’” American Cancer Society, 675 F.3d at 527, citing, Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 597 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 1198 (8th Ed. 2004). Accord, Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623, 625 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2011) (“the essence of a Ponzi scheme is to use newly invested money to pay off old investors and convince them that they are earning profits rather than losing their shirts.”).

    Receiver’s Authority To Sue on Behalf of Creditors

    The court summarily rejected the defendant committees’ argument in Janvey that the plaintiff receiver could not sue on behalf of creditors. First, Texas law makes a receiver “the representative and protector of the interests of all persons, including creditors, shareholders and others, in the property of the receivership.” 2012 WL 5207460, at *2, quoting Sec. Trust Co. of Austin v. Lipsome Cnty., 180 S.W. 2d 151, 158 (Tex. 1944), cited in Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 666 F.3d 955, 966 (5th Cir. 2012). Even though the transferor could not bring a fraudulent transfer suit, a receiver may do so when he “acts to protect innocent creditors.” Jones, 666 F.3d at 966. Other circuits agree. Marion v. TDI Inc., 591 F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2010); Wuliger v. Man. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 2009); Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2008); and Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1995).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

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  • FSA Conflicts of Interest Safeguards: Immediate Action To Be Taken by All UK-Authorised Hedge Fund Managers

    FSA Conflicts of Interest Safeguards: Immediate Action To Be Taken by All UK-Authorised Hedge Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FSA Conflicts of Interest Safeguards: Immediate Action To Be Taken by All UK-Authorised Hedge Fund Managers

    27 November 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The UK Financial Services Authority has recently published an important report that builds upon a series of late 2011 and early 2012 “thematic reviews” of FSA-authorised investment managers (the “Report”). The Report, which focuses (at length and with specific examples) on numerous failures to identify, monitor and mitigate conflicts of interest in ways that meet the FSA’s expectations, is more direct in its tone and in its content than has been seen in such circulars previously and may presage a new era of vigorous FSA enforcement.

    In depth
    Authors

    Christopher Hilditch

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

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  • New FCPA Guidance Highlights Importance of Effective Compliance Procedures

    New FCPA Guidance Highlights Importance of Effective Compliance Procedures

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New FCPA Guidance Highlights Importance of Effective Compliance Procedures

    November 19, 2012

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Nov. 14, 2012, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) jointly issued A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “Guide”).[1] The 120-page Guide provides a detailed analysis of the FCPA from the perspective of the government agencies charged with enforcing it. The Guide was issued after complaints by U.S. business interests about certain gray areas in the statute, and an OECD recommendation to increase the transparency and consistency of enforcement under the FCPA. For the most part, the Guide recites legal interpretations previously advocated by the DOJ and SEC, although in a far more comprehensive manner. But it also contains some important new insights into how the DOJ and SEC apply and enforce what has become a critical feature of the regulatory landscape over the last decade. Additionally, the Guide includes detailed hypotheticals, scattered throughout the chapters, covering a host of important issues, such as: (1) the reach of FCPA jurisdiction; (2) the propriety of gifts, travel and entertainment (“GTE”) expenses; (3) the use of so-called facilitating or “grease” payments; (4) successor liability involving acquired companies that were or were not previously subject to the FCPA and (5) vetting of agents and other third-party intermediaries via risk-based due diligence.

    As summarized in the Guide, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit “offering to pay, paying, promising to pay, or authorizing the payment of money or anything of value to a foreign official in order to influence any act or decision of the foreign official in his or her official capacity or to secure any other improper advantage in order to obtain or retain business.”

    What Does “Anything of Value” Mean?

    While cash is the most obvious form of corrupt payment, “anything of value” may include GTE, charitable contributions and other expenditures. This portion of the Guide is replete with examples, delineating improper versus proper expenses. The FCPA does not prohibit gift-giving (which the Guide notes is often appropriate in business relationships) but does prohibit the payment of bribes disguised as gifts. Although the FCPA does not have a de minimis monetary threshold, the Guide explains that items of nominal value (e.g., cab fare, reasonable meals or entertainment, company promotional items) are unlikely to trigger liability under the FCPA absent corrupt intent to influence a foreign official. Explaining the enforcement history involving GTE expenditures, the Guide notes that the DOJ and SEC have brought such cases where there is also evidence of systemic bribery or other clear indicia of corrupt intent. The Guide recommends that companies include GTE guidelines in their compliance programs, and notes that “many larger companies have automated gift-giving clearance processes” with clear monetary thresholds and annual limitations.

    Who Is a “Foreign Official”?

    The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof. Although the FCPA only prohibits bribery of public officials and not commercial bribery,[2] the phrase “foreign official” has been broadly construed by the government to include employees of state-owned entities or state-controlled entities (“SOEs”), under the theory that SOEs are “instrumentalities” of foreign governments. While defendants in recent cases have asserted (so far unsuccessfully) that the definition of foreign official under the FCPA does not extend to employees of SOEs engaged in commercial activities, the Guide makes clear that the DOJ and SEC interpret the term “instrumentality” broadly to include SOEs. In any event, the Guide provides important new insight on this issue.

    According to the Guide, whether a particular entity constitutes an “instrumentality” under the FCPA requires a fact-specific analysis of an entity’s ownership, control, status and function. The Guide provides a non-dispositive and non-exclusive list of factors to consider.[3] Even more significantly (because the legal community and market participants have been pushing for guidance on this issue for years), the Guide states that “an entity is unlikely to qualify as an instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority of its shares.” The Guide then explains the limited circumstances in which DOJ or SEC enforcement actions have involved foreign officials employed by entities in which a foreign government has less than 50 percent ownership, i.e., only where the foreign government has “substantial control” over the entity at issue.

    What Affirmative Defenses Are Available?

    Certain business groups have been lobbying for an expansion of affirmative defenses available under the FCPA, such as a “safe harbor” defense for companies, based upon an adequate compliance program. The Guide does not endorse any such suggestion. Instead, the Guide clearly states that the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions contain only two affirmative defenses: (1) the payments are lawful under the written laws of the foreign country in question (a defense that is rarely successful as a practical matter) and (2) the payments are reasonable and bona fide expenses incurred in connection with the execution or performance of a contract or a product demonstration. The Guide also contains a non-exhaustive list of safeguards that businesses may take to ensure that an expenditure is legitimate.

    What Are Facilitating or Expediting Payments?

    The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions contain a narrow exception for “any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official … the purpose of which is to expedite or secure the performance of a routine governmental action” that involves non-discretionary acts.[4] In addition to a hypothetical scenario with real-world application, the Guide provides examples of routine governmental actions: “(a) obtaining permits, licenses or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (b) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (c) providing police protection, mail pickup and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (d) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration or (e) actions of similar nature.” The Guide warns that facilitation payments, although not illegal under the FCPA, may violate local laws in foreign countries or other countries’ foreign bribery laws.[5]

    How To Reduce FCPA Risk in Mergers and Acquisitions

    The Guide provides practical advice to companies pursuing mergers and acquisitions, encouraging acquiring companies to: (1) conduct thorough risk-based due diligence on potential new business acquisitions; (2) ensure that the acquiring company’s code of conduct and compliance policies/procedures apply as quickly as possible to newly acquired businesses or merged entities; (3) train the directors, officers and employees of newly acquired businesses or merged entities, and when appropriate, train agents and business partners; (4) conduct an FCPA-specific audit of all newly acquired or merged businesses as quickly as practicable and (5) disclose any corrupt payments discovered as part of its due diligence of newly acquired entities or merged entities.

    The Guide summarizes predecessor versus successor liability, based upon a matrix of factors. Analyzing the factors militating against successor liability, the Guide notes that the “DOJ and SEC have declined to take action against companies that voluntarily disclosed and remediated conduct and cooperated with DOJ and SEC in the merger and acquisition context.” According to the Guide, the DOJ and SEC only take action against successor companies in limited circumstances, generally in cases involving egregious and sustained violations or where the successor company directly participated in the violations or failed to stop the misconduct from continuing after the acquisition. More often, the DOJ and SEC bring enforcement actions, if any, only against the predecessor company.

    The Guiding Principles of Enforcement

    In what many businesses will find the most enlightening chapter, the Guide emphasizes the importance of cooperation and outlines the components of effective compliance programs. “Both DOJ and SEC place a high premium on self-reporting, along with cooperation and remedial efforts, in determining the appropriate resolution of FCPA matters.” In the throes of an investigation or in the face of potential FCPA violations, however, companies should remember that cooperation doesn’t necessarily mean succumbing to all requests by the government. The Guide explicitly states: “In assessing a corporation’s cooperation, prosecutors are prohibited from requesting attorney-client privileged materials with two [limited] exceptions …. Otherwise, an organization’s cooperation may only be assessed on the basis of whether it disclosed the relevantfacts underlying an investigation — and not on the basis of whether it has waived its attorney-client privilege or work product protection.”

    According to the Guide, “an effective compliance program is a critical component of a company’s internal controls” and may result in a downward departure under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in criminal cases or reduced sanctions in civil cases. The “hallmarks” of an effective corporate compliance program include:

    1.  Commitment from senior management and a clearly articulated policy against corruption; 

    2.  An effective code of conduct with associated policies and procedures that are periodically updated;

    3.  Oversight by senior management, autonomy in decision-making, and adequate resources;

    4.  A risk-based approach tailored to the organization’s specific needs and challenges;

    5.  Training for all directors, officers, relevant employees, and, where appropriate, agents and business partners;

    6.  Positive incentives to drive complaint behavior and clear disciplinary procedures to deter unethical/unlawful behavior;

    7.  Third-party due diligence;

    8.  Confidential reporting and internal investigations; and

    9.  Continuous improvement via periodic testing and review.

    Companies ought to consider implementing the basic elements set forth in the Guide in order to avoid FCPA violations before they occur and, in the event they do occur, preserve the opportunity for substantial mitigation credit by the government. Citing the 2012 Peterson case, in which the government declined to bring any enforcement action against Morgan Stanley, the Guide states: “DOJ and SEC may decline to pursue charges against a company based on the company’s effective compliance program, or may otherwise seek to reward a company for its program, even when that program did not prevent the particular underlying FCPA violation that gave rise to the investigation.”[6] As evidenced by the Guide, instituting corporate compliance programs designed to detect and prevent corruption are no longer optional measures taken by model corporate citizens; effective corporate compliance programs are the cost of doing business in today’s global economy.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Sung-Hee Suh, Peter H. White and Nora Lovell Marchant.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] A copy of the Guide is available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/29520121114101438198031.pdf. See also Fact Sheet available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/85120121114101420662750.pdf.

    [2] While the FCPA only prohibits the bribery of foreign officials, bribery in the private sector may violate other laws, such as: the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952), the U.S. mail and wire fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346), the anti-money laundering laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957), the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Dec. 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37), and the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 (applies to both public and private sector bribery).

    [3] The list of factors to be considered include: “(1) the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity; (2) the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity (including whether key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government officials); (3) the foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its employees; (4) the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; (5) the purpose of the entity’s activities; (6) the entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s law; (7) the exclusive or controlling power vested in the entity to administer its designated functions; (8) the level of financial support by the foreign state (including subsidies, special tax treatment, government-mandated fees and loans); (9) the entity’s provision of services to the jurisdiction’s residents; (10) whether the governmental end or purpose sought to be achieved is expressed in the policies of the foreign government and (11) the general perception that the entity is performing official or governmental functions.”

    [4] 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).

    [5] E.g., Facilitating payments are illegal under the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010.

    [6] United States v. Peterson, No. 12-cr-224 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Peterson, No. 12-cv-2033 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). See Press Release, DOJ, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 23, 2012) (declining to bring criminal case against corporate employer that “had constructed and maintained a system of internal controls, which provided reasonable assurances that its employees were not bribing government officials”), available at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive with FCPA Violations and Investment Adviser Fraud, No. 2012-78 (Apr. 25, 2012) (indicating corporate employer was not charged in the matter and had “cooperated with the SEC’s inquiry and conducted a thorough internal investigation to determine the scope of the improper payments and other misconduct involved”), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • License Agreements in an Insolvency of the Licensor after the Decisions Reifen Progressiv, Vorschaubilder, M2Trade and Take Five of the German Federal Court

    ARTICLE

    License Agreements in an Insolvency of the Licensor after the Decisions Reifen Progressiv, Vorschaubilder, M2Trade and Take Five of the German Federal Court

    November,2012

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
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  • Wind vs. Water: Insurance Coverage for Storm Damage

    Wind vs. Water: Insurance Coverage for Storm Damage

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Wind vs. Water: Insurance Coverage for Storm Damage

    November 6, 2012

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Our thoughts are with those affected by Hurricane Sandy. In 2005, after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, SRZ partner Howard B. Epstein and special counsel Theodore A. Keyes published an article addressing insurance coverage for loss following a severe weather event. The authors noted that despite the rarity of destructive hurricanes in the northeast, New York City ranked only behind Miami/Fort Lauderdale in vulnerability for total economic loss from hurricane damage. The insight in this article is now directly relevant to losses faced by NY businesses.

    To read the article that appeared in the New York Law Journal.

    For questions regarding insurance coverage for loss arising out of Sandy or other insurance questions, contact Howard B. Epstein or Theodore A. Keyes.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Howard B. Epstein

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Theodore A. Keyes

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 95

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 95

    November, 2012

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Commercial

    High Court Rules No Proprietary Interest in E-mail Content
    In Fairstar Heavy Transport NV v Adkins and Another [2012] EWHC 2952 (TCC) the High Court of England and Wales held that there is no proprietary interest in the content of e-mails. The Court deemed the laws relating to copyright and misuse of confidential information sufficient to protect such content and, therefore, the establishment of any other interest was not necessary.

    CJEU Confirms That Article 5(3) Jurisdiction Should be Applied to Declarations of Non-Liability in Tort
    The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held in Fofitec AG v Ritrama SpA [2012] C-133/11 that an action for a negative declaration seeking to establish the absence of liability in tort is within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation, thereby harmonising the rules of contract and tort.

    Data Protection

    European Data Protection Supervisor Adopts an Opinion on The European Commission’s Cloud Computing Agenda
    The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), an independent authority dedicated to protecting personal data in the European Union, has adopted a European Commission opinion on Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe.

    Patents

    Patents County Court Has Wide Jurisdiction to Determine Claims Ancillary to Patent and Design Matters
    In Ningbo Wentai Sports Equipment Co Ltd v Wang [2012] EWPCC 51 the Patents County Court (PCC) held that it has jurisdiction over an action for breach of confidence, if it is associated with a previous patent infringement claim under the PCC’s special jurisdiction in proceedings ancillary to proceedings relating to patents or designs.

    Patents County Court Offers Guidance for Orders for Dissemination
    In Brigade (BBS-TEK) Limited v Back-Tec Worldwide Ltd and Another[2012] EWPCC 52, the Patents County Court (PCC) dismissed an order for dissemination made by Brigade (as one of several consequential orders to an application for judgment in default) for lack of evidence.

    Trade Marks

    EU General Court Finds PHOTOS.COM Lacks Distinctive Character
    In Getty Images (US) Inc. v OHIM [2012] T-338/11, the EU General Court has upheld a decision of the Board of Appeal of the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM), rejecting a Community trade mark application for the word mark PHOTOS.COM. The General Court found that it lacked distinctive character and had not acquired distinctiveness through use.

    A Later Community Trade Mark Should be No Defence to Infringement of an Earlier Community Trade Mark
    In response to a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Advocate General Mengozzi (the AG) has suggested that actions for infringement of Community Trade Marks (CTMs) should be possible against third parties holding a later CTM.

    Descriptive Trade Marks Cannot Hide Behind The “Fig Leaf of Distinctiveness”
    In Starbucks (HK) Ltd and others v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc and others [2012] EWHC 3074 (Ch) the High Court of England and Wales has held that Starbucks’ figurative Community Trade Mark (CTM) was descriptive and therefore invalid.

    CJEU Holds That Use of a Trade Mark in a Different Form May Constitute Genuine Use
    In Bernhard Rintisch v Klaus Eder [2012] 553/11, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that in order to establish genuine use, a trade mark owner is not precluded from relying on the fact that it has used its mark in a form differing from its registered form, provided that the differences do not alter the distinctive character of that trade mark. This applies even where the different form is itself registered as a trade mark.

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  • NY State Legislature Amends Dignity Act to Expand Definition of Harassment and Bullying

    NY State Legislature Amends Dignity Act to Expand Definition of Harassment and Bullying

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    NY State Legislature Amends Dignity Act to Expand Definition of Harassment and Bullying

    October 26, 2012

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The New York State legislature recently passed amendments to the Dignity for All Students Act (the “Dignity Act”) to expand the definition of harassment and bullying under the law to explicitly include cyberbullying and other forms of off-school-property conduct. The Dignity Act took effect on July 1, 2012, and the newly passed amendments will become effective on July 1, 2013.

    Section 11(7) of the New York State Education Law will be amended to clarify that harassment and bullying have the same definition under the law, to expand that definition to cover some conduct that occurs off school property and to explicitly include cyberbullying. The expanded definition of harassment and bullying includes “the creation of a hostile environment by conduct or by threats, intimidation or abuse, including cyberbullying, that (A) has or would have the effect of unreasonably and substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance, opportunities or benefits, or mental, emotional or physical well-being; or (B) reasonably causes or would reasonably be expected to cause a student to fear for his or her physical safety; or (C) reasonably causes or would reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or emotional harm to a student; or (D) occurs off school property and creates or would forseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment, where it is foreseeable that the conduct, threats, intimidation or abuse might reach school property. Acts of harassment and bullying shall include, but not be limited to, those acts based on a person’s actual or perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group, religion, religious practice, disability, sexual orientation, gender or sex.”

    For purposes of the definition of harassment and bullying, the term “threats, intimidation or abuse” shall include verbal and non-verbal actions. Additionally, according to the new definition above, acts of harassment and bullying are not limited to actions based upon an actual or perceived characteristic specifically listed. All students are protected from harm regardless of whether they are a member of a specific category.

    The amendments add Section 11(8) which defines cyberbulling as harassment or bullying as defined above in section 11(7)(A)-(D) “where such harassment or bullying occurs through any form of electronic communication.”

    The amendments also specify that the policies and procedures which school districts must develop to address cyberbullying, bullying, harassment, and discrimination should (A) identify a school official charged with receiving reports of such acts; (B) enable students and parents to make a report; (C) require school employees who witness or receive a report to promptly notify the appropriate school official orally within one school day and in writing within three school days; (D) require a school official to lead or supervise a prompt and thorough investigation of all reports and to notify law enforcement when appropriate; (E) take prompt responsive action when an investigation reveals harassment, bullying or discrimination; (F) prohibit retaliation against any individual who assists in an investigation; (G) establish a strategy to prevent harassment, discrimination and bullying; (H) require schools to make a regular report on harassment, bullying and discrimination data and trends to the district superintendent; (I) make appropriate references to the code of conduct; (J) inform all school community members of the policies; and (K) post the policies on the school’s website. School districts are also directed to develop guidelines related to “measured, balanced and age-appropriate” responses to harassment, bullying or discrimination by students, with remedies and procedures following a progressive model. Additionally, the trainings already required by the Dignity Act should address the identification, effects and mitigation of harassment, bullying, cyberbullying and discrimination, as well as social patterns of bullying and strategies for effectively addressing problems of exclusion, bias and aggression in educational settings. Finally, Education Law 801-a will be amended to require that the “civility, citizenship and character education” requirement includes components emphasizing discouraging acts of harassment, bullying and discrimination, and teaching safe, responsible use of the Internet and electronic communications.

    The amendments direct the New York commissioner of education to promulgate regulations to assist school districts in developing guidelines relating to measured, balanced and age-appropriate responses, as well as guidance and educational materials related to best practices and engaging families and communities in addressing cyberbullying. The commissioner has not yet issued these regulations.

    The amendments to the Dignity Act, like the original Dignity Act, and the implementing regulations, do not apply to private, religious or denominational institutions. Nonetheless, we continue to advise all schools to review the Dignity Act — along with the amendments, the regulations and the guidance that the State Education Department continues to issue — in addressing bullying, harassment, cyberbullying and discrimination, and in crafting related policies, procedures and codes of conduct.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Donna Lazarus .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights