Content Type: Article

  • ISDA to Publish Second Addendum to the August 2012 Protocol

    ISDA to Publish Second Addendum to the August 2012 Protocol

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    ISDA to Publish Second Addendum to the August 2012 Protocol

    February 28, 2013

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The International Swaps and Derivatives Association published the second addendum (the “Addendum”) to the ISDA August 2012 Protocol Questionnaire (the “August Protocol”) on February 22. It will be available for completion electronically on Markit’s ISDA Amend on April 1. This Alert summarizes the content of the Addendum, which includes a fund’s (i) option to waive the right to receive disclosure of pre-trade, mid-market marks, (ii) self-identification as a U.S. person or non-U.S. person, and (iii) self-identification as a “category 2 entity,” if applicable, for purposes of the upcoming June and July clearing deadlines. Completion of the Addendum is optional and will not affect the August Protocol. In addition, funds are not required to answer all questions, but may choose to answer one or more questions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Seventh Circuit Extends Competition Rule to Insider in New-Value Reorganization Plan

    Seventh Circuit Extends Competition Rule to Insider in New-Value Reorganization Plan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Extends Competition Rule to Insider in New-Value Reorganization Plan

    February 20, 2013

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on Feb. 14, 2013, held that an insider of a Chapter 11 partnership debtor cannot avoid the “competition rule” in a new-value reorganization plan. The debtor’s equity owner arranged for his wife, also an “insider,” to contribute new value to obtain the equity of the reorganized debtor. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, — F.3d –––, 2013 WL 537269 at *1 (7th Cir., Feb. 14, 2013). In so holding, the Seventh Circuit overruled the bankruptcy court and confirmed that a competitive process is “essential” whenever a plan leaves an objecting creditor unpaid but distributes an equity interest to an insider. Id.

    The Competition Rule

    The Supreme Court established the so-called competition rule in Bank of America Nat’l Trust and Savings Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (203 N. LaSalle). Applying the absolute priority rule embodied in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] the Court held that current equity holders of a debtor cannot, over the objections of impaired senior creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership interests in the reorganized entity when that opportunity is given exclusively to those equity holders without consideration of alternatives. See203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 435. As the majority explained, “it is that the exclusiveness of the opportunity, with its protection against market scrutiny of the purchase price by means of competing bids or even competing plan proposals, renders the partners’ right a property interest extended ‘on account of’ the old equity position and therefore subject to an unpaid senior creditor class’s objections.” Id. at 456. Accordingly, “plans providing junior interest holders with exclusive opportunities free from competition and without benefit of market valuation fall within the prohibition of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) [in violation of the absolute priority rule].” Id. at 458.

    The Seventh Circuit in Castleton expanded 203 N. LaSalle to apply to insiders of the debtor, not just equity holders.

    Who is an Insider?

    The Seventh Circuit held that its holding applied to insiders, as that term is defined in the Code. SeeCastleton, 2013 WL 537269 at *1. “Insider” is defined in section 101(31) of the Code to include officers and directors, but does not purport to be exhaustive. In particular, paragraph (C)(ii) of section 101(31) includes as an insider a “relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in control of the debtor.”11 U.S.C. 101(31)(C)(ii). Thus, the wife of the person owning 100 percent of the debtor’s direct and indirect equity interests is, under Code § 101(31), an insider.[2]

    Facts

    The debtor, Castleton Plaza, was a single-asset real estate entity that owned a shopping center in Indiana. Castleton, 2013 WL 537269 at *1. The equity owner, an individual, held 98 percent of Castleton’s equity directly and two percent indirectly. Id. The debtor had one secured lender (“Lender”). Lender held a $9.5 million note that had matured before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. Id. The debtor did not pay and instead filed a Chapter 11 petition. Id.

    The debtor proposed a reorganization plan proposing to pay Lender $300,000 on the plan’s effective date, writing the balance of the debt down to about $8.2 million and treating the difference as unsecured. Id. The $8.2 million secured loan would be extended with a reduced interest rate, but with virtually no repayment for about eight years. Id. Any extra security features of the note (e.g., lockbox arrangements) would be abolished. Id.

    The plan nominally left the equity holder with nothing, presumably recognizing the absolute priority and competition rules from 203 N. LaSalle that would require an auction before he could receive any equityon account of a new investment. Id. The debtor’s plan provided, however, that 100 percent of the equity in the reorganized debtor would be issued to the equity holder’s wife for an investment of $75,000. Id. The wife also owned all the equity in a corporation (of which the equity holder was the CEO) that managed the debtor under a management contract. Id.

    Lender, believing that the debtor’s assets were undervalued by the plan, offered $600,000 for the equity and to pay all other creditors in full. Id. at *2. In contrast, the debtor’s plan offered a 15 percent recovery for unsecured claims. Id. The debtor rejected the offer, but revised the plan to increase the wife’s investment to $375,000. Id. Lender asked the bankruptcy court to subject the wife’s bid to an open competition process and to condition confirmation on her winning that process. Id. The bankruptcy court held that competition was unnecessary and confirmed the debtor’s revised plan. Id.

    Issue and Ruling

    On direct appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the issue was “whether competition is essential when a plan of reorganization gives an insider an option to purchase equity in exchange for new value.” Id.

    The bankruptcy court had held that competition was unnecessary because the wife owned no equity interest in the debtor and because Code § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) deals only with the “holder” of a claim or interest that is junior to the impaired creditor’s claim. Id. In reversing this decision, however, the Seventh Circuit noted that the competition rule meant “to curtail evasion of the absolute priority rule.” Id.

    A new-value plan bestowing equity on an investor’s spouse can be just as effective at evading the absolute-priority rule as a new-value plan bestowing equity on the new investor. For many purposes in bankruptcy law, such as preference recoveries … an insider is treated the same as an equity investor. Family members of corporate managers are insiders under § 101(31)(B)(vi). In 203 N. LaSalle the Court remarked on the danger that diverting assets to insiders can pose to the absolute-priority rule … It follows that plans giving insiders preferential access to investment opportunities in the reorganized debtor should be subject to the same opportunity for competition as plans in which existing claim-holders put up the new money.

    Id. (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).

    The Court then reviewed various ways in which the equity holder himself would receive value from the equity to be issued to his wife. Id. at *2-3. Because the equity holder would receive value on account of his investment, he would also have control over the plan. Id. at *3. Therefore, the Court explained, “[t]he absolute-priority rule therefore applies despite the fact that [the wife] had not invested directly in [the debtor and] [t]his reinforces our conclusion that competition is essential.” Id.

    Application of the competition rule from 203 N. LaSalle did not depend on the debtor’s proposing the plan during its exclusivity period or on the identity of the plan proponent. Instead, said the Court, “Competition helps prevent the funneling of value from lenders to insiders, no matter who proposes the plan or when. An impaired lender who objects to any plan that leaves insiders holding equity is entitled to the benefit of competition.” Id.

    Conclusion

    In sum, a new-value plan granting equity to insiders contributing new capital, but leaving creditors impaired, cannot be confirmed by a court over the objection of creditors unless the insider’s contribution is subjected to a competitive process. Castleton expands the competition rule soundly to insiders. Proponents of new-value plans (whether the debtor or another interested party) cannot skirt the competition rule by merely channeling the new value through an insider.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook, Lawrence V. Gelber and Karen S. Park.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The absolute priority rule, described by the Supreme Court in 203 N. LaSalle, has at its “core” Code § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, “[a]s to a dissenting class of impaired unsecured creditors … a plan may be found to be ‘fair and equitable’ only if the allowed value of the claim is to be paid in full, § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i), or, in the alternative, if ‘the holder of any claim or interest that in junior to the claims of such [impaired unsecured] class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property,’ § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)” (emphasis added). 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 441-2.

    [2] For purposes of its opinion, the Court apparently viewed the distinction between a corporation and partnership as immaterial. SeeCastleton, 2013 WL 537269 at *2 (“Family members of corporate managers are insiders under § 101(31)(B)(vi).”).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Maintaining Apartment for Parents Drags Out-of-State Resident Into New York Income Tax

    Maintaining Apartment for Parents Drags Out-of-State Resident Into New York Income Tax

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Maintaining Apartment for Parents Drags Out-of-State Resident Into New York Income Tax

    February 12, 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The New York Appellate Division recently affirmed a noteworthy case[1] involving a New Jersey taxpayer who lived in New Jersey and worked in New York. The taxpayer did not maintain any home or other living space for himself in New York and was not subject to tax in New York. This all changed, according to the New York tax authorities and now the New York Appellate Division, when the taxpayer purchased a three-unit residential property in New York. He rented out two units for investment purposes and moved his parents — who were dependent on him for their support — into the third unit. This loving act is what New York seized on.

    Under New York law, a person whose domicile is outside of New York can only be treated as a tax resident if he meets a two-prong test: the person (i) must maintain a “permanent place of abode” in New York and (ii) must be physically present in New York on more than 183 days in the year. In the Gaied case, the taxpayer commuted to a job in New York so there was never a question that he met the 183-day requirement. The issue turned on whether his ownership of an apartment that his parents lived in constituted a “permanent place of abode.” Common sense dictates that it should not — but New York felt otherwise. The court was moved by the facts that the taxpayer allowed his parents to live in one of the rental units rent-free, their telephone and utility bills were in his name and he paid for these as well as other apartment expenses, he would occasionally spend the night at his parents’ apartment (sleeping on their couch) in order to assist his parents with their medical conditions and he had a key to the apartment giving him unfettered access. On these facts the Appellate Division upheld the Tax Appeals Tribunal’s determination that the taxpayer maintained a permanent place of abode in New York and, because the taxpayer was present in New York for more than 183 days of the year, was a New York resident for New York State income tax purposes.

    This case should immediately raise issues for all non-New York residents who have more than 183 days of presence in New York and who buy or rent an apartment for their children, parents or other persons. The case is currently pending an appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals. The audit staffs of the New York State and City tax authorities, however, are already using this case to find more revenue by auditing property owners who commute to New York. Such individuals should take steps to avoid having their support of family members used against them. Suggestions include making gifts of occupancy costs to their children or parents so that the occupants can pay those costs themselves, putting utilities in their children’s or parents’ name(s) and entering into a lease or other document which provides that the property owner has no rights of access to the premises but may only enter as a guest of the residents.

    If you maintain a living space in New York State or City for third parties — or if you are considering doing so — and you are not already a New York State or City tax resident, you should contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel to determine if you may be vulnerable to a residency claim.

    Authored by Dan A. Kusnetz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] Gaied v. New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal (No. 513285, N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div., Dec. 27, 2012).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

    In depth
    Authors

    Dan A. Kusnetz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The New Tax Act Brings Certainty to Estate and Gift Taxes

    The New Tax Act Brings Certainty to Estate and Gift Taxes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The New Tax Act Brings Certainty to Estate and Gift Taxes

    February 5, 2013

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (the “Act”), which was signed into law by President Obama on Jan. 2, 2013, made permanent the $5 million exemption (indexed for inflation) for federal gift, estate and generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) taxes and set the maximum rate at 40 percent (up from 35 percent in 2012) with respect to transfers in excess of these exemptions. The indexed amount for 2013 is $5.25 million. The Act also makes permanent the so-called “portability” rules, which allow a surviving spouse to use a deceased spouse’s unused exemption from federal gift and estate tax (but not from GST tax). In addition, certain techniques that were threatened under prior proposals remain intact. In light of this new certainty on taxes and rates, as well as the continued viability of certain estate planning strategies, you may wish to take advantage of the techniques described in this Alert. We also recommend that you review your estate plans in light of the new legislation.

    Consider Making Lifetime Gifts and Creating Trusts Now

    You should consider making lifetime gifts, in trust or outright, in order to use your federal lifetime gift tax exemption now instead of waiting to use your federal estate tax exemption at death. A married couple can transfer $10.5 million during their lifetimes, which can benefit multiple generations with no additional wealth transfer tax. (This amount will increase annually with inflation.)

    • Lifetime Gifts. A lifetime gift will appreciate outside of your estate, thereby avoiding federal and state estate tax on the appreciation.
    • State Tax. Certain states, such as New York, impose state estate taxes but do not currently impose state gift taxes. Residents of these states will avoid state wealth transfer tax by making lifetime gifts.
    • Inflation Adjustment. Even if you made gifts in the amount of the 2012 federal lifetime gift tax exemption — $5.12 million — you can still take advantage of inflation adjustments to the federal lifetime gift tax exemption. The federal lifetime gift tax exemption has risen to $5.25 million in 2013, thereby enabling you to shield an additional $130,000 from federal gift tax this year (or $260,000 total per married couple).
    • Short-Term GRATs. Short-term grantor-retained annuity trusts, or “GRATs,” which had been threatened under earlier legislation, remain a viable technique. With this technique, the donor retains the right to receive an annuity for a period of time. After that period expires, any remaining property passes to specified beneficiaries — usually the donor’s descendants (outright or in trust) — free of any gift tax. Short-term GRATs significantly reduce the volatility embedded in a longer-term GRAT. Legislation has been introduced on numerous occasions that would require the minimum annuity term to be 10 years. Such a rule was not included in the 2012 legislation.
    • Gifts of Discounted Assets. Valuation discounts (e.g., discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability), while targeted in the past, remain viable at present.
    • Grantor Trusts/Sales to Grantor Trusts. A popular estate planning technique is the sale or gift of assets to an “intentionally defective grantor trust” (a trust that is out of your estate for federal estate tax purposes but taxable to you for income tax purposes). You would either gift assets (frequently at a discounted value) to the grantor trust or sell assets in exchange for a note. Because of the grantor trust status, no gain is realized on the sale. In the case of a sale, if the transferred assets earn more than the required interest rate, the note can be paid down; this is a very effective technique presently since interest rates are at historic lows. In addition, any appreciation will ultimately pass to the specified beneficiaries. The president’s 2012 budget proposal recommended legislation that would include property transferred to a grantor trust in the donor’s estate for federal estate tax purposes. Since no such legislation has yet passed, the use of grantor trusts remains an effective technique.

    Review Your Wills/Revocable Trusts Now

    • Many married couples’ estate plans include so-called “credit shelter” (or “by-pass”) trusts, which have historically been needed in order to use the federal estate tax exemption of the first spouse to die. With portability now permanent, certain of these trusts may no longer be needed. The state estate tax exemption is not portable, however.
    • Since the GST tax exemption is not portable between spouses, you should, however, consider including a trust in your Will (to the extent you have not already done so) to maximize the use of your GST tax exemption.
    • Your estate plan should be revised as required to reflect any gifts made in 2011 or 2012 that would alter the plan.
    • Many Wills and revocable trusts include a provision creating a credit shelter trust that will be funded with the maximum amount that can pass free of federal estate tax at the person’s death. Your estate plan and your finances should be reviewed to determine whether it is appropriate for you and your spouse to fund your respective credit shelter trusts with the full $5.25 million (or possibly a lesser amount). In addition, consideration should be given to the resulting state estate tax. For example, in New York, a credit shelter bequest funded with the maximum federal exemption will result in over $400,000 of New York estate tax on the death of the first spouse. However, for this amount of tax, you will have successfully sheltered the full federal exemption amount from federal estate tax on the death of the second of you to die.

    Please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel at your earliest convenience if you wish to discuss these or other gifting opportunities as they may apply to your specific financial and personal situation.


    This Alert is a service to our clients and friends. It is designed only to give general information on the legal developments actually covered and is not a substitute for the advice of counsel or an investment adviser. Neither this Alert nor the lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts or matters, nor does the distribution of this Alert to any person constitute the establishment of an attorney-client relationship.

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 98

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 98

    February, 2013

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Commercial

    High Court of England and Wales Upholds Lengthy Restrictive Covenant as Reasonable Restraint of Trade Clause
    In Cavendish Square Holdings BV and Another v El Makdessi [2012] EWHC 3582, the High Court of England and Wales held that a restrictive covenant that would last for a minimum of eight years in the absence of a breach was reasonable and enforceable. The Court also held that an option for the seller to sell his shares to the buyer in the event of a breach of contract was not, on its own, a penalty clause.

    Copyright

    UK Court Rules That Computer Program Functionality is Not Protected by Copyright
    On 25 January, Mr Justice Arnold handed down his decision in SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Limited [2013] EWHC 69 (Ch), following the Court of Justice of the European Union referral judgment on 2 May 2012, concerning the extent to which copyright protects the functionality of computer programs.

    Data Protection

    UK Data Anonymisation Code
    The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has published a code of practice on managing data protection risks related to data anonymisation (the code). The code explains the issues surrounding the anonymisation of personal data and the disclosure of such data once it has been anonymised.

    Designs

    Patents County Court Finds Infringement of UK Unregistered Design But no Infringement of Community Registered Design
    In Kohler Mira Ltd v Bristan Group Ltd [2013] EWPPC Civ 2, the Patents County Court found an infringement of a UK unregistered design right (UDR) in an electric shower unit, but no infringement of two registered Community designs (RCDs) relating to the same model of shower unit.

    Patent

    Malaria Combination Patent Invalidated for Obviousness
    In Glenmark Generics (Europe) Limited & others v The Wellcome Foundation Limited & Glaxo Group Ltd [2013] EWHC 148 (Pat) the High Court has held that a patent for the 5:2 ratio combination of two anti-malarial drugs—atovaquone and proguanil—was obvious, based on prior art that disclosed the two drugs in combination, but not at the claimed ratio.

    Trade Marks

    CJEU Confirms Later Community Trade Mark is No Defence in Infringement of an Earlier Community Trade Mark
    On 21 February 2013, in relation to Case C-561/11, Fédération Cynologique Internationale v Federación Canina Internacional de Perros de Pura Raza, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has confirmed that actions for infringement of Community trade marks (CTMs) should be possible against third parties holding a later CTM.

    EU General Court Finds No Likelihood of Confusion Between K Sport Figurative Mark and Earlier K2 Sports Mark
    In Case T-54/12 K2 Sports Europe GmbH v OHIM, the EU General Court has upheld a decision of the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) Board of Appeal (the Board) that an application made by Kahru Sport Iberica (Kahru) to register a figurative Community trade mark (CTM) comprising of the word sport preceded by an element said to resemble a letter “K” did not infringe an K2 Sports Europe GmbH’s (KSE) prior registered word mark “K2 Sports” for goods in Classes 18, 25 and 28.

    EU General Court Upholds OHIM Decision Finding Likelihood of Confusion Between BABILU and BABIDU for Advertising Services
    In Present-Service Ullrich GmbH & Co. KG v OHIM [2013] T-66/11, the EUGC has upheld a decision of the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHM) Board of Appeal (the Board) finding a likelihood of confusion between the word mark BABILU and an earlier Community trade mark (CTM) registration for BABIDU, both registered in respect of advertising services.

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  • IRS Broadens Program for Re-Classification of Independent Contractors as Employees

    IRS Broadens Program for Re-Classification of Independent Contractors as Employees

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Broadens Program for Re-Classification of Independent Contractors as Employees

    January 14, 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Employer misclassification of employees as independent contractors can be a costly mistake with many ramifications, including, but not limited to, the possibility of having to pay retroactive employment taxes with interest and penalties. In an Alert dated Nov. 23, 2011, we advised you of the Voluntary Classification Settlement Program (the “VCSP” or the “Program”), a program announced by the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) which provides employers with the opportunity to voluntarily reclassify workers as employees with limited federal employment tax liability for past non-employee treatment. On Dec. 17, 2012, the IRS announced the expansion of the VCSP.

    Pursuant to Announcement 2012-45, the VCSP was modified to: (i) permit an employer under IRS audit, other than an employment tax audit, to be eligible to participate in the Program (note, however, an employer remains ineligible to participate if it is currently under audit by the Department of Labor (the “DOL”) or by a state government agency concerning the classification of workers); (ii) clarify the current eligibility requirement that an employer that is a member of an “affiliated group” within the meaning of Section 1504(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “IRC”) is not eligible to participate in the Program if any member of the affiliated group is under employment tax audit; (iii) clarify that an employer is not eligible to participate in the Program if the taxpayer is contesting in court the classification of the class or classes of workers from a previous audit by the IRS or the DOL;[1] and (iv) eliminate the requirement that an employer agree to extend the period of limitations on assessment of employment taxes as part of the VCSP closing agreement with the IRS.

    In a second announcement published on Dec. 17, 2012, the IRS explained that it is also temporarily expanding eligibility for the VCSP for employers that failed to file Forms 1099 for workers they erroneously considered to be independent contractors. Generally, to participate in the Program, an employer must have filed all required Forms 1099 for its workers for the previous three years. According to Announcement 2012-46, however, an employer that has not filed Forms 1099 for the workers for the past three years is eligible to participate in a modified VCSP through June 30, 2013. Participants in the VCSP Temporary Eligibility Expansion: (i) pay 25 percent of the employment tax liability that would have been due on compensation paid to the workers being reclassified for the most recent tax year if those workers were classified as employees for such year, determined under the reduced rates provided by Section 3509(b) of the IRC; (ii) pay a reduced penalty for unfiled Forms 1099 for the past three years for the workers being reclassified; (iii) are not liable for any interest and/or penalties on the liability; and (iv) are not subject to an employment tax audit with respect to the worker classification of the workers for prior years. The penalty for unfiled Forms 1099 is graduated and based on the number of required Forms 1099 that were not filed up to a maximum amount. A computation worksheet is attached to the IRS Announcement to facilitate the calculation of this penalty. Employers wishing to participate in the VCSP Temporary Eligibility Expansion must agree to treat prospectively the reclassified workers as employees for future tax periods and they must affirm as part of the closing agreement with the IRS that they have provided to the reclassified workers and electronically filed all required Forms 1099 for the past three years.

    The IRS has received a large number of applications to the VCSP from employers. Given the Obama Administration’s attention to worker misclassification over the past four years, it is likely that the heightened focus on this issue by both federal and state agencies will continue. Employers should evaluate their workers’ classifications and, if workers have been misclassified, consider the benefits of participation in the VCSP and the VCSP Temporary Eligibility Expansion.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Holly H. Weiss, Ronald E. Richman, Scott A. Gold and LaKeisha M. Caton.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] However, if an employer was previously audited by the DOL or the IRS concerning the classification of employees, and the employer complied with the results of that audit and is not currently contesting the results of that audit in court, the employer is eligible to participate in the VCSP.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2013

    Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2013

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2013

    January 14, 2013

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (as amended, the “HSR Act”) requires parties to acquisitions of voting securities, assets or non-corporate interests meeting certain thresholds to make a premerger notification to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and to observe a waiting period prior to consummating such acquisitions. On Jan. 10, 2013, the FTC announced its annual adjustments to the current HSR Act thresholds. Any transaction that will be consummated on or after the effective date of Feb. 11, 2013 may be reportable under the HSR Act if, as a result of such transaction, the acquiring person will hold voting securities, assets and/or non-corporate interests of the acquired person valued above $70.9 million (the current adjusted minimum threshold is $68.2 million). The new adjusted thresholds reflect changes in the gross national product for the preceding fiscal year.

    In depth
    Authors

    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Das Recht Der Industriellen Revolution (The Right of the Industrial Revolution)

    ARTICLE

    Das Recht Der Industriellen Revolution (The Right of the Industrial Revolution)

    January 2013

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    Dr. Sebastian Keding wrote the chapter “Banking supervision in 19th century as an act of repressive regulation? – On the history of ideas behind the implementation of an governmental obligatory supervision of the German Hypothekenbanken in the 19th century.”

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 97

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 97

    January, 2013

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Copyright

    UK IPO Launches Consultation on Extension of Copyright Term for Sound Recordings
    The UK Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) has launched a public consultation on the UK Government’s proposed approach to the implementation of Directive 2011/77/EU (the Directive) within the United Kingdom. The purpose of the consultation is to obtain public opinion on the adoption of EU requirements concerning copyright protection for sound recordings and certain related rights.

    Design

    UK IPO Publishes Responses to Consultation on Reform of UK Designs Legal Framework
    The UK Intellectual Property Office (the UK IPO) has published responses to the Consultation on the Reform of the UK Designs Legal Framework. The responses were submitted by a range of interested parties including design focused small and medium sized enterprises and legal representatives. They were largely supportive of the UK Government’s proposals to simplify current legislation and harmonise UK and EU regimes, and to update and revise dispute resolution, enforcement and sanctions procedures.

    General IP

    New EU Counterfeit Goods Regulation
    On 24 January 2013, the Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee of the European Parliament endorsed new Regulation 5129/2013/EC setting out customs procedures for goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights (the new Regulation). The new Regulation, which is poised to replace the Counterfeit Goods Regulation 1383/2003/EC, forms part of a wider European intellectual property (IP) strategy. It will extend customs-enforcement measures to a number of IP rights that is larger than under the current regime and will provide for the uncontested destruction of small consignments of goods.

    Changes to The European Quality Assurance Regime Enter Into Force
    A number of changes to the European quality assurance regime, including Protected Geographic Indications (PGIs), Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) and Traditional Specialities Guaranteed (TSGs), have come into effect recently. These changes include the reduction of the period during which an application can be opposed and increased recognition of the role of producer groups.

    Patent

    Launch of EU/US Cooperative Patent Classification scheme
    The European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have launched a global classification system for patent documents called the Cooperative Patent Classification scheme (CPC). The CPC has been developed to harmonise the patent granting processes of the two offices.

    Final Form Unified Patent Court Agreement Published
    The final version of the agreement on a Unified Patent Court and related statute (UPC Agreement) was published on 11 January 2013. It is anticipated that the UPC Agreement will be signed at a diplomatic conference in February 2013 and will then undergo the ratification process.

    Passing Off

    High Court of England and Wales Allows Survey Evidence in Greek Yoghurt Passing Off Case
    In Fage UK Ltd and another v Chobani UK Ltd and another [2012] EWHC 3755 (Ch), the High Court of England and Wales allowed Chobani’s request to adduce survey evidence on consumer perceptions on the attributes of Greek yoghurt, finding that the evidence went to the heart of Fage’s passing off claim.

    Trade Marks

    EU General Court Upholds OHIM Decision Rejecting Community Trade Mark Application for ECODOOR for Household Appliances
    In BSH Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte GmbH v OHIM [2013] T-625/11 the EU General Court has upheld a decision of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM), rejecting a Community trade mark (CTM) application for ECODOOR for various household appliances in Classes 7, 9 and 11 finding that the mark was descriptive of an essential characteristic of the goods applied for, namely, the ecological character of their doors.

    “STEAM GLIDE” Trade Mark Held To Be Descriptive
    The EU General Court has found “STEAM GLIDE”, a Community Trade Mark (CTM) for electric irons, to be descriptive. It held that there was a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the expression and the goods in question to enable the public concerned to perceive immediately, without further thought, a description of the goods in question or one of those characteristics.

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  • IP Update, Volume 6, No. 1

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Volume 6, No. 1

    January 1, 2013

    Read time: 18 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Summary

    IN THIS ISSUE

    • Copyright– Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 Upheld by U.S. Supreme Court
    • Patents/Biotech- Federal Circuit Rules on Enablement and Written Description in Two Biotech Cases
    • Patents/Obviousness– Claimed Range Encompassed by Prior Art Is Prima Facie Obvious
    • Patents/Litigation– Standing Must Be There from the Get Go or Plaintiff Has No Leg to Stand On
    • Patents/Germany– German Federal Supreme Court: Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Their Storage Media
    • Patents/Reexamination-Only Prior Art from a Completed Proceeding Is Prohibited from Being Relied Upon in Subsequent Reexams
    • Trademarks- Fame and Actual Confusion Are Not Prerequisites to Proving a Likelihood of Confusion Under the Lanham Act

    In Depth

    Copyright

    Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 Upheld by U.S. Supreme Court
    Contact Paul Devinsky

    In a 7-2 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia upholding the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). Eldred v. Ashcroft, Case No. 01-618 (Jan. 15, 2003).

    The CTEA extended copyright protection for future and existing works by an additional 20 years, preventing these works from entering the public domain until 70 years after the creator’s death. Copyright protection for works owned by corporations was extended by 20 years to a 95-year term. Eldred, the named petitioner, along with several others who primarily deal in goods and services related to previously copyrighted works that passed into the public domain, challenged the CTEA under the “limited times” requirement of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, §8, cl. 8 and the free speech guarantee under the First Amendment.

    Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority, rejected Eldred’s assertions that Congress exceeded its authority under the Copyright Clause by extending copyright protection for existing works in an attempt to create “perpetual copyrights.” Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the “limited time” restriction of the Copyright Clause is not violated since the copyright terms under the CTEA are “still limited, not perpetual, and, therefore, fit within Congress discretion.”

    The Supreme Court found that the term extensions reflect a typical type of congressional judgment. The Court explained that “[b]y extending the baseline United States copyright term to life plus 70 years, Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts,” possibly enticing more U.S. and international authors to produce and distribute their works in the United States. Finding the CTEA “rational,” the Court explained “we are not at liberty to second guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”

    The Supreme Court also found no impediment to extending the term of an existing copyright by another limited term, noting the amendment applied equally to existing and future copyrights: “‘[J]ustice, policy, and equity alike forb[id]’ that
    an ‘author who had sold his [work] a week ago, be placed in a worse situation than the author who should sell his work the day after the passing of the [act].’”

    The Court also rejected Eldred’s First Amendment challenge that the CTEA is
    a content-neutral regulation on free speech and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny: “In addition to spurring the creation and publication of new expression, copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations.” First, the Court noted, copyright protection is restricted to creative expression, not the ideas themselves. Second, the “fair use” defense even allows the public to use copyrighted expressions under certain circumstances, such as scholarship and comment.

    Practice Note: The Supreme Court’s ruling was not surprising as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had unanimously ruled against Eldred. Nonetheless, the decision is already being hailed as a victory for media and entertainment interests such as AOL Time Warner Inc. and the Walt Disney Co. and a defeat for internet publishers.

    Patents/Biotech

    Federal Circuit Rules on Enablement and Written Description in Two Biotech Cases
    By Paul Devinsky and Krista Vink Venegas

    In the first of two recently decided biotech cases where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had an opportunity to discuss written description and enablement issues, it upheld a district court’s finding that a written description of a particular embodiment was sufficient to support broad patent claims to a pharmaceutical composition. Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Case No. 01-1191 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2003).

    The Amgen patent related to the production of erythropietin, an endogenous hormone that regulates red blood cell formation. In part, Hoechst argued the patent specification failed to satisfy the written description requirement in support of a claim to a “pharmaceutical composition…of erythropietin…purified from mammalian cells grown in culture” because the patent failed to sufficiently describe “all vertebrate and mammalian cells as engineered in the claimed invention.” The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of validity stating “…the descriptions adequately described to those of ordinary skill in the art in 1984 [the filing date of the application for the patent] the use of the broad class of available mammalian and vertebrate cells to produce the claimed high levels of human erythropoietin in culture.”

    The Federal Circuit distinguished its Eli Lilly (1997) and Enzo Biochem(2002) discussions regarding the written description of claims encompassing genetic material (DNA). In Eli Lilly, claims to a human cDNA sequence of an insulin gene were held invalid where only the insulin gene of a rat cDNA sequence was disclosed. In Enzo Biochem, the Court clarified that the written description requirement may be satisfied where one of skill in the art would have knowledge that a functional description of genetic material is correlated to a particular, known structure. Here, the Court found the claim terms at issue are not directed to “new or unknown biologic materials that ordinarily skilled artisans would easily miscomprehend.” Rather, the claims simply recite “types of cells that can be used to produce recombinant human EPO.” Therefore, according to the majority of the panel, while Hoechst might have been justified in challenging the adequacy of disclosure of the vertebrate or mammalian host cell, the Court found it was not warranted in challenging the adequacy of the disclosure of the DNA itself.

    Hoechst also challenged the district court finding that a skilled artisan could have used various cultured vertebrate and mammalian cells to produce EPO. Here, the district court credited Amgen’s witnesses stating “any challenge which one of ordinary skill in 1984 may have encountered in attempting to make and use the claimed invention using other than cultured mammalian cells could be resolved by experimentation falling short of undue.”

    The majority found no “clear error” in this finding as a factual determination and affirmed. However, there was a vigorous dissent on this point. Judge Clevenger, citing Federal Circuit precedent, including Eli Lilly, called into question the written description holding “disclosure of a species may not suffice to describe a genus” and citing In re Vaeck,“claims failing to recite a necessary element of the invention fail for lack of an enabling disclosure,” called into question the enablement holding “[a]t the very least, the absence of structural limitations in the patent [claims] raises questions of its enablemen. …”

    In the second case, much to the patentee’s chagrin, the Federal Circuit did not apply such deference to the predictability of cell transformations in the plant kingdom. In Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. (now Aventis Crop Science, N.V.) v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., Case No. 02-1011 (Fed. Cir., Jan. 13, 2003), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the asserted patent claims were invalid for lack of enablement.

    Aventis’ claims were drawn to genetically engineered, herbicide-resistant plant cells, which Aventis contended applied broadly to dicot and monocot plants. The Federal Circuit concluded that the full scope of the invention as claimed by Aventis was not enabled. While the specification disclosed transformation of dicots, the Court found that DeKalb proved by clear and convincing evidence that “practicing stable gene transformation for monocot cells [at the time of patent filing] in 1987 required undue experimentation.” Based on In re Hogan (1977) (enablement is determined as of the effective filing date of the patent) the Court held that if “an inventor [claims] what was specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time the application was filed,” the claims are enabled only “[if] the patent discloses how to make and use it.” While transformed monocots were desired, as of the filing date “stable transformed monocot cells were difficult to produce and the … patent gave no instruction how.” Further, the Court found that the district court properly used a post-filing date report, indicating the first transformation of corn cells, to support its holding.

    The Court also rejected Aventis’ argument that the district court erred in not making any finding regarding the pioneering nature of the invention. The Court explained that “pioneer inventions” are not deserving of a lower standard of enablement and that any statement in Hogan to the contrary was dicta.

    Patents/Obiousness

    Claimed Range Encompassed by Prior Art Is Prima Facie Obvious
    By Bernard P. Codd

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a prior art reference that discloses a brand range, which encompasses narrower claimed range, is sufficient to establish prima facie obviousness. In re Peterson, Case No. 02-1129 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2003).

    Peterson’s application included the claims directed to a nickel-base alloy. The claims required about 1 to 3 percent rhenium, about 14 percent chromium and other specified ranges of specific elements. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the claims as obvious in view of a prior art reference that disclosed a similar alloy but taught broader ranges. Specifically, the ranges taught in the prior art reference were rhenium (as an optional ingredient) in the range of 0 to
    7 percent, chromium 3 to 18 percent. The prior art also disclosed a preferred alloy containing no rhenium. Peterson appealed.

    On appeal, Peterson argued that the prior art taught broad ranges and that the Board failed to appreciate the criticality of and the unexpected results achieved by the combination of 1 to 3 percent rhenium with, among other elements, about 14 percent chromium.

    The Federal Circuit, affirming the Board’s decision, made a direct comparison of each component of Peterson’s claim and the prior art disclosure, showing that each claimed range lay within a corresponding range disclosed in the prior art. The Court, noting its consistent line of decisions holding that in cases involving overlapping ranges even a slight overlap establishes a prima facie case of obviousness, affirmed. The Court reasoned “[s]electing a narrow range from within a somewhat broader range disclosed in a prior art reference is no less obvious than identifying a range that simply overlaps a disclosed range. In fact, when, as here, the claimed ranges are completely encompassed by the prior art, the conclusion is even more compelling than in cases of mere overlap.”

    The Court also addressed the issue of motivation to select the claimed ranges by noting that “[t]he normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages.”

    The Court also affirmed the Board’s finding that Peterson’s evidence of unexpected results was not commensurate in scope with the claimed range of rhenium content.

    Patents/Litigation

    Standing Must Be There from the Get Go or Plaintiff Has No Leg to Stand On
    By Cynthia A. Lock

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to recognize standing to bring a lawsuit based solely on a state corporate revival statute that purported to confer standing retroactively where it did not exist at the time that the complaint for patent infringement was filed. Paradise Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales, Inc., Case No. 02-1283, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 44. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 3, 2003).

    Paradise Creations, Inc. was incorporated under Florida law on March 13, 1985. On August 23, 1996, Paradise Creations was administratively dissolved. It remained administratively dissolved until June 29, 2001. During the period of dissolution, Paradise purportedly obtained “the exclusive, unlimited, irrevocable, worldwide right and license” to U.S. Pat. No. 4,681,471 (the `471 patent) and filed a complaint for patent infringement against UV Sales, Inc.

    UV filed a summary judgment motion, arguing that Paradise did not have capacity to sue under Florida law or standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. After obtaining reinstatement as a corporation, Paradise filed its opposition, arguing that under Florida law, when an administratively dissolved corporation is reinstated, the reinstatement relates back to the date of dissolution and the corporation resumes its business as if the dissolution never occurred.

    The district court rejected Paradise’s argument, finding that standing must exist at the time the action is brought and the Florida law cannot retroactively create jurisdiction that was lacking at the time the action was filed. Paradise appealed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, applying the rule in Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., for example, that a contract could not retroactively confer standing on an exclusive licensee who did not have all substantial rights to the patent at the time that it brought suit. In applying Enzo to the facts of this case, the Federal Circuit “saw no meaningful distinction between a contract provision that purports to vest title retroactively, in the plaintiff and a state law that is alleged to vest enforceable title retroactively.”

    The Federal Circuit distinguished the facts in Paradise from its holding in Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., where it had held that a defect standing was curable where an exclusive licensee with less than all substantial rights in the patent (i.e., no right to sue at the time the lawsuit was brought) filed a motion to join the patentee as a plaintiff, reasoning that as an exclusive licensee, Mentor had a cognizable injury at the time of the inception of the suit. In contrast, Paradise held no enforceable rights whatsoever in the patent at the time
    it filed suit and, therefore, lacked the cognizable injury necessary to assert standing under Article III.

    Patents/Germany

    German Federal Supreme Court: Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Their Storage Media
    By Boris Uphoff

    In a long expected decision, the German Federal Supreme Court ruled patent claims regarding a storage medium (such as a diskette) with a computer program stored thereon are allowable as long as the program itself is patentable. With its decision, the Federal Supreme Court overruled a previous decision by the German Federal Patent Court, which had rejected the patent application for the storage medium. Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court, Case No. X ZB 16/00 (BPatG).

    The case related to a patent application for a computer system for computer-aided spell checking in word processing software. The German Patent and Trademark Office had allowed the patent claim for the computer system as such but refused to grant the patent for the storage medium where the computer program was stored on. The German Federal Patent Court had confirmed this decision on the grounds that claims for a storage medium did not comprise the essential means for a technical solution and were exempted from patent protection pursuant to Section 1(2)(iii) of the German Patent Act. In accordance to Section 52(2)(c) of the European Patent Convention, this provision of the German Patent Act excludes computer programs as such from patent protection.

    In its decision, the German Federal Supreme Court held that the patent court’s interpretation of the exclusion for computer programs had been too narrow. Despite the exemption relating to computer programs, the Federal Supreme Court found that claims directed to computer programs are patentable if the claimed invention contributes to the solution of a specific technical problem. The Federal Supreme Court also offered an answer to the obvious question “when does a computer program contribute to the solution of a specific technical problem?” The court explained that a program may be patentable if it is involved in a technical process, for example, in measuring the results or monitoring the operation of some technical device. Claims may also be patentable if they related to data processing equipment that checks and compares data and, thus, operates as an intermediate step within the framework of manufacturing technical objects, provided that such a solution is based on technical considerations and the realisation or implementation of the solution. The same standard applies if the subject matter relates to the functioning of data processing equipment and enables immediate interaction of the elements of the data processing equipment.

    Having outlined the prerequisites for patent protection for computer programs, the German Federal Supreme Court concluded that the applicant’s claim for a storage medium was also patentable subject matter, reasoning that if the program stored thereon was patentable, a patent claim relating to the storage medium as a physical object is nothing more than a special embodiment of the inventive idea as already claimed in the process claim relating to the computer program.

    Practice Note: The German Federal Supreme Court’s decision is a fundamental ruling for companies involved in software development. It outlines the prerequisites under which computer programs can be subject to patent protection, despite the exemption for computer programs pursuant to the German Patent Act. Secondly, it reminds software developers to include in their patent application a claim for the storage medium. Covering the storage medium will make it easier for the patentee to claim infringement when diskettes or other media with the program are distributed.

    Patents/Reexamination

    Only Prior Art from a Completed Proceeding Is Prohibited from Being Relied Upon in Subsequent Reexams
    please contact Paul Devinsky

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in affirming a rejection by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals and Interferences, clarified that for any reexamination proceeding declared prior to enactment of the amended reexamination statute (November 2, 2002), only prior art from a prior completed reexamination proceeding is prohibited from being relied upon to establish a “substantial new question of patentability” in the subsequent reexamination proceeding. In re Bass, Case No. 02-1046 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2002).

    A third party requested reexamination of U.S. Pat. No. 4,473,026 owned by Bass (the `026 patent). During the reexamination, the examiner found the patent to be allowable over the cited prior art. Before the PTO issued a reexamination certificate, the third party submitted a second reexamination request citing the same prior art. The PTO granted the second request and subsequently rejected the claims, using the twice-cited prior art. The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection and Bass appealed.

    Relying on In re Portola Packaging and MPEP §2242(A)(2), Bass argued that the PTO could not consider the prior art references considered in the first reexamination either in granting the second reexamination request or in determining the validity of the claims. In Portola Packaging, the Federal Court determined that prior art from a prior proceeding could not be relied on to raise the statutorily required “substantial new question of patentability” in a later reexamination. The Federal Circuit explained, however, that until a reexamination proceeding has been completed, the PTO may reconsider an earlier action and a proceeding is only complete upon the issuance of the statutorily mandated reexamination certificate. The Federal Circuit held that because the prior art had not been considered in a prior completedreexamination proceeding, Portola Packaging did not apply and the PTO was free to reconsider the same prior art.

    Practice Note: The decision in Bass comes on the heels of amendments to the reexamination statute, 35 U.S.C. §§303(a) and 312(a), which effectively overrule In re Portola Packaging for any reexamination declared after November 2, 2002, by codifying that “a substantial new question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.” Thus, the holding in Bass only applies to reexaminations that were declared prior to November 2, 2002.

    Trademarks

    Fame and Actual Confusion Are Not Prerequisites to Proving a Likelihood of Confusion Under the Lanham Act
    By John J. Dabney

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has now held that fame and actual confusion are not necessary in order for a trademark examiner to refuse registration of a mark on the ground that it is confusingly similar to a previously registered mark. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 5 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 2, 2003).

    An applicant applied for the mark RED BULL for tequila. The U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the trademark examiner’s refusal to register based on prior registrations, all owned by a third party (Stroh’s) for RED BULL for malt liquor.

    The Federal Circuit held that tequila (a distilled spirit) and malt liquor (a brewed product) are related goods for trademark purposes because they are both alcoholic beverages that are marketed in many of the same channels of trade to many of the same consumers, and many consumers are not even aware of the different ways each is made.

    The Court also rejected the applicant’s contention that there was no likelihood of confusion because the mark RED BULL for malt liquor was not famous. “Although we have previously held that the fame of a registered mark is relevant to likelihood of confusion, we decline to establish the converse rule that likelihood of confusion is precluded by a registered mark’s not being famous.” Further, the Court discounted the fact that there was no evidence of actual confusion. “A showing of actual confusion would of course be highly probative, if not conclusive, of a high likelihood of confusion. The opposite is not true, however. The lack of evidence of actual confusion carries little weight, especially in an ex parte context.”

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