Content Type: Article

  • District Court Dismisses Insider Preference Claim Despite Affiliates Holding Equity and Board Seats

    District Court Dismisses Insider Preference Claim Despite Affiliates Holding Equity and Board Seats

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    District Court Dismisses Insider Preference Claim Despite Affiliates Holding Equity and Board Seats

    April 19, 2013

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed an insider preference complaint by Capmark Financial Group Inc. and its affiliates (“Capmark”) seeking to recover a $145 million pre-bankruptcy payment from a lender group. Capmark Financial Group Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 1420243 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2013) (Sweet, J.).[1] According to the court, the complaint failed to show that the defendants were insiders despite their affiliates’ (a) equity position in the debtor; (b) management services contract with the debtor; and (c) seat on the debtor’s board of directors. Nor could Capmark offer facts to support the court’s disregarding (“veil-piercing”) the corporate form between the defendant lenders and their affiliates.

    Facts

    Capmark financed a 2006 leveraged buyout with $8.7 billion of unsecured debt from various lenders, including the defendants (the “Lender Defendants”). Id. at *1. In the transaction, all the LBO lenders formed a limited liability company (the “LLC”) to hold 74 percent of the equity of the debtor’s parent company. Id. Affiliates of the Lender Defendants (collectively, the “Affiliates”) collectively owned 19.8 percent of the LLC’s equity. Id. at *3. As indirect equity owners, the Affiliates also had a representative on Capmark’s board of directors. Id. at *3. Additionally, another affiliate of the Lender Defendants agreed with Capmark to provide “management monitoring and advisory services.” Id. at *4.

    In 2009, Capmark entered into a $1.5 billion secured credit facility with new lenders, including the Lender Defendants. Id. at *1. Capmark used the new secured loan proceeds, in part, to repay $145 million owed to the Lender Defendants on their existing unsecured claims. By obtaining secured claims, Capmark alleged that the Lender Defendants “were better positioned to receive payment in full when the Plaintiff’s predecessor entity declared bankruptcy in October 2009.” Id. at *1. After emerging from bankruptcy in 2011, the reorganized debtors (the “Plaintiffs”) sued the Lender Defendants (but not the Affiliates) to avoid and recover the $145 million payment as an insider preference.[2] The Lender Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the payment was not a preference because (a) it was paid more than five months prior to bankruptcy; (b) they were not “insiders”; and because of (c) the parties’ corporate separateness. For the court, the main issue was whether the Lender Defendants were “insiders,” which, if true, would extend the normal 90-day preference period to a year.

    No Statutory Insider Claim

    The court first addressed whether the Lender Defendants were “statutory insiders” under the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”). Code § 101(31)(B), (E) defines the term “insider” of a corporate debtor to include a (a) director; (b) officer; (c) “person in control”; (d) general partner of the debtor; (e) relative of one of those; or (f) an “affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor.” An “affiliate” is an “entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds the power to vote 20 percent or more of the voting securities of the debtor …” Code § 101(32)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

    Capmark alleged that the Lender Defendants were statutory insiders because of the Affiliates’ “extensive control” over the LLC (as opposed to the Debtor), which held 74 percent of the Debtor’s equity. Id. at *7. This allegation, the court found, was insufficient to show that the Affiliates had “actual authority or control” over the Debtor (as opposed to the LLC). Id. Citing Second Circuit precedent, the court held that control must be “substantial” and “extensive” for a party to be considered an insider. Id., citing In re 455 CPW Assocs., 225 F.3d 645, at *5 (2d Cir. 2000) (“. . . required evidence of extensive control before finding insider status. . . .”).

    Capmark also alleged that the Affiliates were statutory insiders because their indirect equity interest (19.8 percent of the LLC’s 74 percent) in the debtors should be aggregated with the equity holdings of the other LLC members under Rules 13d-3 and 13d-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at *8. According to Capmark, because the Affiliates and other LLC members acted together to acquire the Debtor’s equity, they were part of a Rule 13(d) “group,” resulting in all members of the group being “deemed,” pursuant to Rule 13d-5, to be the beneficial owner of all equity securities of that issuer beneficially owned by the group members (in this case, 74 percent). Id. The court rejected this argument. Although “courts have recognized Rule 13d in the bankruptcy context,” Rule 13d cannot “supplant the definition of ‘insider’ set out in the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. “[T]he Second Circuit has rejected similar attempts to supplant definitions set out in the Bankruptcy Code with dissimilar definitions from the Exchange Act.” Id. at *8 citing Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329 (2d. Cir. 2011).

    Capmark also sought to disregard the corporate separateness of the Affiliates and the Lender Defendants. Id. at *8-9. Given the strong presumption of limited liability with separate entities, the court reiterated that “the standard for veil-piercing is very demanding” and warranted “only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at *10. Conclusory allegations of “domination and control,” without more, are insufficient to hold a parent company liable for the acts of its subsidiary. Although “domination and control” are elements of the veil-piercing analysis, the analysis does not stop there, and more must be shown (e.g., how the control was abused or caused an injustice). Id. at *10. Here, the court rejected Capmark’s attempted veil-piercing because the complaint failed to allege that the “corporate formalities separating” the entities “were in any way disrespected.” Id. at *12. There were no allegations that (a) “funds were commingled”; (b) the entities “were inadequately capitalized”; or that (c) “any other corporate formalities (such as maintaining separate books and records, or maintaining a functioning board of directors for each entity) were not respected.” Id.

    No De Facto Insider Claim

    The court also rejected Capmark’s assertion that the Lender Defendants were non-statutory, de facto insiders. Like other courts, it examined “(1) the closeness of the relationship between the debtor and the transferee, and (2) whether the transactions between the debtor and transferee were conducted at arm’s length.” Id. at *14; See alsoShubert v. Lucent Tech. (In re Winstar Communc’s, Inc.) 554 F.3d 382, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2009). The court cited the legislative history of the Code’s insider definition, noting that “Congress was concerned with situations in which ‘[a]n insider … has a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arms-length with the debtor.’” Id. (citations omitted). Here, Capmark’s allegations never suggested that the Lender Defendants had a “close” relationship with the debtors, or that the Lender Defendants “exercised anything resembling the high level of control required for non-statutory insider status.” Id. There were no allegations of domination and control, and no allegations showing that lenders dictated day-to-day management or made decisions regarding replacement of management. The court also rejected Capmark’s attempt to impute to the Lender Defendants the Affiliates’ “closeness” to the debtors (by virtue of a board seat and management consulting agreement). Capmark had also failed to “adequately allege veil-piercing claims that would attribute the [Affiliates’] conduct to the [Lender Defendants.]” Id. at *15.[3]

    Comments

    The Capmark decision is important for lenders. It confirms that bankruptcy trustees face significant pleading hurdles and proof requirements when relying on a defendant’s purported insider status. Superficial allegations of control will not suffice. Instead, a plaintiff must allege particular facts showing that the lender actually controlled the debtor.

    The court also recognized the corporate separateness of related entities in the absence of concrete and particularized evidence showing (a) complete domination and control and (b) the misuse of the corporate entity to perpetrate some form of injustice or fraud. Lenders may now be more comfortable when their affiliates merely hold debt and equity of their borrowers.

    Authored by David M. Hillman, Eleazer Klein, Howard O. Godnick  and Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] View the decision. The district court was the trial court in this matter.

    [2] A transfer is voidable as a preference if it was (a) the debtor’s property; (b) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (c) on account of an antecedent debt; (d) made while the debtor was insolvent; and (e) made within 90 days of bankruptcy or between 90 days and one year of bankruptcy if the defendant creditor was an “insider.” See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).

    [3] The court also rejected Capmark’s attempt at arguing that the transaction was not negotiated at arms-length. During the bankruptcy case, Capmark’s predecessor in interest conceded that the transaction had in fact been negotiated at arms-length. Id. at *16-17.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Authors

    Ele Klein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Focuses on Broker-Dealer Registration Issues Facing Private Fund Managers

    SEC Focuses on Broker-Dealer Registration Issues Facing Private Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Focuses on Broker-Dealer Registration Issues Facing Private Fund Managers

    April 9, 2013

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Securities and Exchange Commission recently has made broker-dealer registration an area of focus for private fund managers. On March 8, 2013, the SEC filed and settled charges against a private fund manager, one of the manager’s senior executives and an external marketing consultant regarding the consultant’s failure to register as a broker-dealer. Just a few weeks later, on April 5, 2013, the Chief Counsel of the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets spoke at an American Bar Association meeting, and posted his remarks on the SEC’s website, indicating his views with respect to broker-dealer registration concerns raised by (1) sales of interests in private funds and (2) fees related to portfolio company transactions. Managers of hedge funds and private equity funds should review and consider their marketing and business practices in light of the current SEC focus in this area.

    Recent Enforcement Action

    On March 8, 2013, the SEC filed and settled charges against Ranieri Partners LLC, Donald Phillips (a former senior executive at Ranieri Partners) and William Stephens (an external marketing consultant to Ranieri Partners).[1] The Ranieri case has two particular points of interest for private fund managers:

    • First, unlike many other cases brought for failure to register as a broker-dealer, there were no allegations of fraud.[2] The SEC filings did not indicate that any investors or potential investors were defrauded by Stephens or by the actions of Ranieri Partners.
    • Second, in addition to charging the consultant for failing to register as a broker-dealer, the SEC charged the private fund manager itself and a former senior executive at the manager. Ranieri Partners was charged with causing Stephens’ violations of the Securities Exchange Act and Phillips was charged with willfully aiding and abetting that violation.

    The SEC alleged that Stephens acted as an unregistered broker in violation of Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in marketing and receiving placement fees for the sale of interests in two real estate funds organized and advised by Ranieri Partners. The settlement orders cite a number of factors as support for this allegation, including the fact that Stephens received “transaction-based compensation totaling approximately $2.4 million.” The SEC cited additional conduct by Stephens as evidence of broker-dealer status,[3] including:

    • Stephens repeatedly sent private placement memoranda, subscription documents and due diligence materials directly to potential investors;
    • He personally (and repeatedly) attempted to convince at least one investor to invest with Ranieri Partners;
    • The solicitation efforts included in-person meetings and telephone calls in which Stephens was a participant;
    • Stephens provided potential investors with his analysis of the strategy and performance of the Ranieri Partners funds; and
    • He provided potential investors with confidential information (i.e., the identities of current investors and details on their capital commitment amounts).

    The SEC concluded that Stephens had “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities” without being properly registered as a broker or dealer or being associated with a registered broker or dealer. In addition to the imposition of cease-and-desist orders: (1) Stephens was barred from the securities industry and ordered to pay an amount of nearly $3 million in disgorgement and interest;[4] (2) Ranieri Partners was assessed a penalty of $375,000; and (3) Philips was assessed a fine of $75,000 and suspended from holding a supervisory position in the securities industry for nine months.

    Remarks by the SEC’s Chief Counsel to the Division of Trading and Markets

    On April 5, 2013, David Blass, the Chief Counsel to the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, addressed a subcommittee of the American Bar Association in remarks posted later that day on the SEC’s website.[5] While these remarks reflect the personal view of the Chief Counsel, they — along with the Ranieri Partners enforcement action — indicate increased attention at the SEC to issues related to broker-dealer registration in the private fund context. The Chief Counsel’s remarks raise two separate issues: (1) whether marketing by a fund manager’s internal personnel requires broker-dealer registration and (2) whether the receipt of transaction-based fees in connection with the sale of portfolio companies requires broker-dealer registration.

    Internal marketing personnel: The Chief Counsel suggested that private fund managers consider how they raise capital from investors and whether their activities could be viewed as “soliciting securities transactions.” He noted that this suggestion “is not to say that all investment-raising by a private fund adviser results in the adviser being a broker-dealer[;]” he acknowledged that the receipt of transaction-based compensation has long been viewed as a “hallmark” of being a broker and that the SEC alleged that such compensation was paid to the consultant in the Ranieri case. The Chief Counsel specifically stated that advisers might want to consider: “How are personnel who solicit investors for a private fund compensated? Do those individuals receive bonuses or other types of compensation that is linked to successful investors? As previously noted, a critical element to determining whether one is required to register as a broker-dealer is the existence of transaction-based compensation.” Broker‑dealer registration “makes sense” when there is transaction-based compensation for securities sales, the Chief Counsel indicated, in order to manage the conflict that arises from acting as a “securities salesman.”

    In addition to transaction-based compensation, the Chief Counsel noted other relevant factors, such as whether the private fund manager has a dedicated “marketing” department. He indicated that having an internal group designated as the “marketing” department with a dedicated sales staff “may strongly indicate . . . that they are in the business of effecting transactions in the private fund” and notes that this may be true “regardless of how the personnel are compensated.” He also questioned whether the employees involved in marketing have other responsibilities, including whether the “primary functions” of these personnel consist of soliciting investors. Based on these statements from the Chief Counsel, private fund managers will want to consider not only the titles and terminology used with respect to internal personnel involved in soliciting investments, but also the full spectrum of activities engaged in by such personnel.

    Noting that it “could be difficult for private fund advisers” to fit within the specific conditions of the “issuer exemption” under Exchange Act Rule 3a4-1, the Chief Counsel also asked whether an exemption from broker-dealer registration written specifically for private fund advisers is needed or would be helpful, and invited a dialogue on these and similar issues.

    Fees related to portfolio company transactions: The Chief Counsel separately indicated his belief that private fund managers — for example, advisers to private equity funds executing a leveraged buyout strategy — may receive fees in addition to advisory fees that could require the adviser to register as a broker-dealer. Fees for investment banking activity, such as for negotiating transactions, finding buyers and sellers of the company’s securities or for structuring transactions were specifically mentioned. The Chief Counsel noted his view that “to the extent the advisory fee is wholly reduced or offset by the amount of the transaction fee” that could be viewed as just another way to pay the advisory fee and, therefore, not raise the broker-dealer registration concern.

    The Chief Counsel also considered a rationale brought to the SEC staff’s attention focusing on situations where a fund’s general partner, and not its investment manager, receives what may be characterized as a transaction-based fee. According to this rationale, there is no brokerage activity for “the account of others” because the general partner and the fund are effectively the same entity. The Chief Counsel did not find this rationale plausible because the fund and the general partners are “distinct entities with distinct interests.”

    Summary

    It is clear that there is increased focus at the SEC on issues related to broker-dealer registration in the private fund context. Private fund managers should re-examine their internal and external marketing and solicitation efforts, including reviewing compensation agreements as well as the scope of responsibilities of personnel involved in soliciting investors. Private fund managers who receive fees in connection with the sale of portfolio companies also should review these practices in light of the SEC’s concerns.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    [1] In the Matter of Ranieri Partners LLC and Donald W. Phillips, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69091, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 3563, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-15234 (March 8, 2013); In the Matter of William M. Stephens, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69090, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 30417, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-15233 (March 8, 2013).

    [2] The orders did note that (i) Stephens was subject to an industry bar for previous violations and (ii) the time period for that bar had expired and Stephens was eligible to apply to have it lifted.

    [3] In two cases in 2011, courts required more than just the receipt of transaction-based compensation to find that a party was functioning as a broker-dealer, focusing on whether the party was involved at “key points in the chain of distribution” of the relevant securities: SEC v. Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (M.D. Fla. 2011)(rejecting the argument that the defendant’s receipt of transaction-based compensation, without more, caused him to be a “broker” as an “inaccurate statement of the law”); and Maiden Lane Partners v. Perseus Realty Partners, 28 Mass. L. Rep. 380 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2011)(rejecting the assertion that the receipt of transaction-based compensation in connection with a securities transaction automatically triggers “broker” status for the recipient, stating, “the evidence must also show involvement at key points in the chain of distribution, such as participating in the negotiation, analyzing the issuer’s financial needs, discussing the details of the transaction, and recommending an investment”).

    [4] Payment of this amount was waived based upon Stephens’ financial condition.

    [5] David W. Blass, Chief Counsel, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, “A Few Observations in the Private Fund Space” (April 5, 2013).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Unemployed Persons: A New Protected Class in NYC

    Unemployed Persons: A New Protected Class in NYC

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Unemployed Persons: A New Protected Class in NYC

    April 4, 2013

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The New York City Council enacted, over Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s veto, legislation that will amend the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to -703, to include unemployed persons as a protected class for employment purposes. This law takes effect June 11, 2013.

    The new law defines unemployment as “not having a job, being available for work, and seeking employment,” and it prohibits covered New York City employers — those with four or more employees (including independent contractors who further the business enterprise of the employer and are not employers themselves) — from using an individual’s unemployment status as a basis for decisions about hiring, compensation and employment terms, conditions or privileges. Unless otherwise permitted under federal, state or city law, all employers (including those with fewer than four employees) may not publish any job advertisement indicating that current employment is required or a qualification for a job in New York City, or that unemployed persons will not be considered for the job. The law’s prohibition on retaliation against persons who sue, testify, assist the City Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”) or oppose discriminatory practices will also apply to the NYCHRL’s latest protected classification.

    The statute establishes several important limitations to the new law that protect employers’ rights. Employers may lawfully take a job applicant’s unemployment into account when “a substantially job-related reason for doing so” exists. The statute explicitly allows employers to ask about the circumstances regarding separation from prior employment. Employers may consider qualifications that are substantially related to the job and publish them in advertisements. These qualifications include valid professional or occupational licenses, credentials (such as certificates, registrations or permits), minimum levels of education and training, and minimum levels of professional, occupational or field experience. Employers may limit employment opportunities to their own current employees or give their own employees priority in hiring, compensation or employment terms, conditions and privileges. Employers may base compensation, terms or conditions of employment on an employee’s actual amount of experience. Employers may exercise any rights they have under collective bargaining agreements.

    Employers that violate this new law are subject to penalties under the NYCHRL. Individuals may bring lawsuits against employers for civil damages (including punitive damages), injunctions and other remedies. Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to costs and attorney fees. The statute of limitations for such litigation is three years. Alternatively, individuals may file complaints with the Commission within one year of the discriminatory act. The Commission is empowered to order employers to hire the individuals as employees, to cease and desist the discriminatory practices, and to pay aggrieved parties damages, back pay and front pay. Additionally, the Commission may fine an employer up to $125,000 for any violation or up to $250,000 for a willful violation.

    Several details of the new law’s impact on employers remain unclear. For example, an earlier version of the bill defined “unemployment status” as “an individual’s current or recent unemployment.” The City Council, however, deleted this language after the Bloomberg Administration noted that the term “recent unemployment” was vague and unnecessary. The City Council did not accept the Administration’s recommendation that the statutory language explicitly limit the law’s application either only to currently unemployed persons or to individuals unemployed within a certain timeframe. Some of the legislative history suggests that the law covers past unemployment even though the statutory language of “not having a job, being available for work, and seeking employment” could be read to suggest only the present tense. Therefore, whether the law applies only to individuals who are currently unemployed or to persons who have had periods of unemployment in the past remains unresolved. The line between unlawful discrimination and permissible “substantially job-related” inquiries into a job applicant’s unemployment is also ambiguous. During a City Council hearing on the previous version of the bill, advocates offered conflicting interpretations of the law’s effect on employers. Mayor Bloomberg described the “substantially job-related” standard in his veto message as too nebulous to offer employers any help.

    To protect themselves from liability, employers should review their existing policies and update them as appropriate or develop and implement policies to comply with the new law. For example, covered employers should consider adding “unemployed persons” to any list of protected classes. All employers who advertise jobs in New York City are advised to ensure that their job advertisements contain no explicit or implicit statements that currently unemployed persons are ineligible for the job. In particular, employers that use external advertising professionals or companies should communicate clearly to these third parties that statements about current employment status are not permitted. Employers should also consider adding affirmative statements to their advertisements indicating that unemployed status will not be used as a basis to deny employment.

    New York City employers, furthermore, should ensure that all individuals involved in their employment decisions refrain from impermissibly taking into account any prospective or current employee’s current or past unemployment, particularly because the NYCHRL holds employers strictly liable for the discriminatory actions of their managers and supervisors.[1] For example, employees involved in the hiring process should understand that while they may ask candidates about their previous jobs, including how and why their previous jobs ended, they must avoid questions about unemployment, including inquiries regarding whether the candidate is currently employed, reasons for current or past unemployment, and length of unemployment periods. By implementing appropriate safeguards, New York City employers will be well-positioned to avoid litigation under the new law and to lessen their risks of liability.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss and Scott A. Gold.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors. 


    [1] SRZ’s June 11, 2010 Alert , “New York City Employers Are Subject to Strict Liability for Supervisors’ Unlawful Discriminatory Conduct, Court Rules.”


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Eighth Circuit BAP Affirms Lender’s Loss of Possessory Lien

    Eighth Circuit BAP Affirms Lender’s Loss of Possessory Lien

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eighth Circuit BAP Affirms Lender’s Loss of Possessory Lien

    April 4, 2013

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) for the Eighth Circuit held on March 25, 2013, that a lender “lost its possessory lien when it turned the Debtor’s account funds over to the Trustee without first seeking adequate protection.” In re WEB2B Payment Solutions, Inc., _____ B.R. 2013 _____, 2013WL 1188041, *5 (8th Cir. B.A.P. March 25, 2013) (emphasis added). Affirming the bankruptcy court’s granting of summary judgment to the trustee, the BAP stressed that “a possessory lien is, by definition, released when possession of the collateral is relinquished.” Id., at *3.

    Relevance

    Trustees and Chapter 11 debtors in possession routinely ask secured lenders to turn over, if not to permit the use of, encumbered cash accounts — here, a cash deposit account encumbered by a contractual lien. The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) explicitly provides for mandatory “adequate protection” when a secured lender does not consent to the use of its collateral (§ 363(e)); or when a secured lender’s lien will be primed (§ 364(d)). Code § 361 gives examples of “adequate protection,” including “periodic cash payments” or “an additional or replacement lien.” But a lender must ask. This case shows how a lender’s well-intentioned cooperation can backfire if it fails to seek adequate protection.

    Facts

    The debtor provided check-clearing and payment-processing services for its customers. The debtor’s retail customers would send the debtor checks which it would then deposit with the bank (“Bank”) under a “Remote Deposit Capture Service Agreement” (“Agreement”). Id., at *1.

    The Bank then immediately credited the debtor’s account at the Bank for the full amount of the checks. Id. According to the Bank, when it received third-party claims rejecting particular checks received from the debtor, it was “entitled to recover the funds from the Debtor’s accounts. . . .” Id. The United States Treasury, for example, would make “chargeback claims” when fraudulent, counterfeit or forged Treasury checks had been presented to the debtor by its customers and then processed by the Bank. Id.

    The Agreement: Security Interest and Setoff Rights

    The Bank relied on provisions in the Agreement to claim “both a security interest in the Debtor’s funds deposited with [it] and rights of setoff.” Id. Specifically, the Agreement contained an assignment of “all of [the Debtor’s] deposit accounts with [the Bank] . . . to secure its obligations . . . under this Agreement.” Id. The Agreement also authorized the Bank “to debit any account maintained by [the Debtor] with [the Bank] . . . and/or set off any of [the Debtor’s] obligations . . . under this Agreement against any amount it owes to [the Debtor . . . .” Id.

    The Turnover

    The Bank had “over $933,000 on deposit in its accounts” for the debtor as of the date of bankruptcy. Despite the statutory automatic stay in effect when the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition, the Bank later set off $27,180.54 “to cover an overdraft,” and “froze the account shortly after the bankruptcy filing.” Id. When the trustee asked the Bank to turn over the funds in the debtor’s accounts, the Bank proposed to “retain $50,000 of the funds (the ‘Holdback Funds’) to cover potential future reclamation requests.” Id. This last “Holdback” calculation was based on the debtor’s prior history of reclamation claims. Shortly thereafter, the Bank and the trustee agreed on the terms of the Bank’s proposal regarding the Holdback Funds and the earlier setoff, requiring the Bank to turn over the sum of $883,120.46 to the trustee. Most significant, the Bank “never asked the Court to order that the Trustee provide adequate protection for any lien it claimed on” the released funds. Id. In other words, the Bank never even suggested that the released funds remained subject to its lien.

    The Bank’s Attempted Clawback

    “[A]n unanticipated and unprecedented volume and dollar amount of Treasury reclamations of tax refund checks” were processed by the debtor and deposited in its accounts at the Bank shortly prior to bankruptcy. Id. at *2. Although the Bank set off these reclamation claims from the Holdback Funds, these funds were soon depleted, causing the Bank to tell the trustee “that the reclamation claims . . . were significantly larger than anticipated,” with a request “that a portion of the [released] funds be returned to . . . satisfy these claims.” Id. The Bank asserted a lien on the funds it had turned over to the trustee, stating that it had already paid $512,457.39 “to satisfy the unanticipated reclamation funds,” and demanding the return of the entire $883,120.46 previously turned over. Id.

    The Bank sued the trustee nine months later, after he rejected its demand, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had a first lien on the funds turned over after bankruptcy. Both parties cross-moved for summary judgment, conceding the material facts. Id.

    The Bank also conceded on appeal the first part of the bankruptcy court’s adverse ruling that it had lost its contractual right of setoff when it turned the funds over to the trustee, “since there were no longer any funds in its possession to set off.” Id. The Bank did dispute, however, the bankruptcy court’s holding that the Bank had “lost its possessory lien in the funds” turned over because it had failed to first obtain a court order granting adequate protection of its possessory lien. Id.

    Applicable State Law

    Section 9-314(a) of the Minnesota version of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) provides that “a security interest in . . . deposit accounts . . . may be perfected by control of the collateral under . . . Section 9-104 . . ..” The filing of a UCC financing statement will not perfect a security interest in a deposit account. See UCC § 9-312(b)(1) (“security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by control”). UCC § 9-104(a)(1) further provides that “[a] secured party has control of a deposit account if . . . the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained.”

    The trustee conceded the Bank’s contractual security interest in the account funds that “was perfected by possession as of the [bankruptcy] petition date.” Id. Moreover, the Bank’s “lien survived the bankruptcy filing itself.” Id. The only issue was “the effect of the [Bank’s] turnover” on its possessory lien. Id.

    The Bank’s Bankruptcy Argument

    The Bank could not argue that its possessory lien had survived its turnover of the funds under applicable Minnesota law. Instead, it argued that the Code’s turnover requirement and automatic stay provisions forced it to “turn over the funds to the Trustee.” Id. at *3. Arguing that its lien was preserved because of the forced turnover, it relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in U.S. v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 207 (1983) (held, secured creditor may be compelled under § 542 to turn over collateral in its possession, but if creditor has validly perfected security interest, it is entitled to “adequate protection” for its interest in turned over property; “. . . Code provides secured creditors various rights, including the right to adequate protection, and these rights replace the protection afforded by possession.”).

    The BAP distinguished Whiting Pools because that case turned on a statutory tax lien, not a contractual possessory lien like the one held by the Bank. With a federal tax lien, the property remains subject to the lien once the government files a notice and “follows the property of the taxpayer, no matter into whose hands the property goes.” Western National Bank, Odessa, Tex. v. U.S., 812 F. Supp. 703, 705 (WD Tex. 1993). In contrast, the Bank’s contractual lien on the proceeds in the debtor’s deposit account here was “dependent on possession.” Id. at *3.

    The BAP heavily relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995), to confirm that a bank’s right of setoff will be lost if it relinquishes possession of funds in the debtor’s bank account. The Supreme Court unanimously held in Strumpf that the bank’s “freeze” of the debtor’s bank account was not a setoff, and thus did not violate the automatic stay contained in Code § 362(a)(7). In order not to lose its setoff rights, the bank in Strumpf had to freeze the account temporarily while it sought a modification of the stay under Code § 362(d) that would permit a setoff.

    The critical fact in WEB2B was the Bank’s holding of a possessory lien which, “by definition, released when possession of collateral was relinquished.” Id. at *4. In other words, the Bank “voluntarily and affirmatively release[d] its lien by operation of law when it relinquished possession.” Id. Unlike the secured lender in Whiting Pools, the Bank here had no non-possessory statutory lien and no other lien “perfected by the filing of a UCC-1 . . . .” Id. The Bank’s possessory lien in account funds is essentially the same as a setoff right. As the BAP put it, “in either situation the creditor’s rights in funds are lost when possession is given up.” Id.

    Whiting Pools and Strumpf “provide a roadmap for creditors whose rights in collateral will be relinquished with possession,” explained the BAP. Id. First, the lender “may withhold turning the collateral over until the bankruptcy court is able to make a determination as to” the creditor’s entitlement “to adequate protection.” Id. By following this procedure, the secured lender may “both comply with a trustee’s demand for turnover of assets of the estate, as required by Whiting Pools, but at the same time preserve its possessory lien in the manner approved in Stumpf.” Id.

    In sum, the Bank could and should have asked the bankruptcy court for “an order providing that [its] lien continue in the proceeds being turned over.” Id. Because the Bank never sought “adequate protection, and waited more than nine months before” seeking a court ruling as to the validity of its lien, it lost that lien. Id. Indeed, reasoned the BAP, given the Bank’s prior setoff and its obtaining a $50,000 Holdback Fund, it believed there was “no need to hold back anything.” Id. at *5.

    Finally, the BAP rejected the Bank’s argument that Code § 552(b)(1) (pre-bankruptcy lien insulates pre-bankruptcy collateral and its proceeds) protected its possessory lien. The funds here were not “proceeds, products, offspring, or profits” covered by § 552(b)(1), making the section inapplicable.

    Comments

    1. The Bank here could have done nothing more prior to bankruptcy under applicable state law (i.e., the Uniform Commercial Code) to protect its lien. Filing a UCC-1 financing statement would have been meaningless. UCC §§ 9-310(b)(8) and 9-312(b) provide that a security interest in a deposit account may only be perfected by control under UCC § 9-314. In short, the Bank simply misunderstood applicable bankruptcy law when it turned over the funds to the trustee.

    2. Lenders should object at every opportunity in a bankruptcy case to the trustee/debtor’s use of their collateral and seek “adequate protection” under Code § 361. See, e.g., In re California Webbing Industries, Inc., 2007 WL1953018 (Bankr. D.R.I. July 5, 2007) (“lender had, at every opportunity, stressed that it was not consenting to a surcharge of its collateral for payment of professional fees”; “a clearer statement of a secured creditor’s intention would be hard to find, and for this Court to conclude, on this record that [the lender] consented to a carve-out would last about as long on appeal as it would take the reviewing court to write REVERSED”; relevant cash collateral orders and stipulations required debtor to use lender’s cash collateral to pay only necessary business operating expenses and monthly payments to lender.). See generally Cook, “Court Insulates Lender’s Collateral From Professional Fee Surcharge,” 3 Pratt’s J. Bankr. L. 218 (2007).

    Authored by Lawrence S. Goldberg, David M. Hillman and Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • SWAPS UPDATE: Investment Fund Deadline for Swap Data Reporting, Recordkeeping and CICIs Is April 10

    SWAPS UPDATE: Investment Fund Deadline for Swap Data Reporting, Recordkeeping and CICIs Is April 10

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SWAPS UPDATE: Investment Fund Deadline for Swap Data Reporting, Recordkeeping and CICIs Is April 10

    March 21, 2013

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)’s April 10, 2013 deadline for investment funds that are U.S. Persons to comply with swap data reporting and recordkeeping rules is fast approaching. Investment funds must also obtain a CFTC Interim Compliant Identifier (“CICI”) by this deadline date.

    Reporting

    If an investment fund is trading with a CFTC-registered swap dealer, the swap dealer is obligated to report the swap, and the investment fund has no reporting requirement. However, if the fund is a U.S. Person and is trading with (1) another financial entity that is not a swap dealer (including such fund’s affiliates), (2) a non-financial entity, or (3) a non-U.S. swap dealer, there may be a reporting obligation. In those situations where an investment fund will be required to report a swap, such reporting will typically be made through a swap data repository. Investment funds should contact a swap data repository to coordinate the operational aspects of reporting. For more details, please see the SRZ Alert “CFTC Publishes Final Swap Data Rules and Real-Time Reporting Rules.”

    Recordkeeping

    Advisers to investment funds are obligated to keep records with respect to each swap for which an investment fund is a counterparty.  Such records must be maintained for the life of the swap and five subsequent years, and must be accessible within five days of a request.  These requirements generally overlap with those already-applicable to registered investment advisers, but advisers should consider maintaining the required records in a format that will be easily accessible.

    CICI

    Investment funds must obtain a CFTC Interim Compliant Identifier by the April 10 deadline if they intend to transact in swaps. CFTC Rule Part 45 requires the use of a CICI in all swap reporting. A CICI is also required when adhering to the ISDA August 2012 DF Protocol and it may be used in Question 5(d) of Form PF (for the Legal Entity Identifier of the reporting fund). A CICI may be obtained through http://www.ciciutility.org. Funds must self-certify the CICI data record, even if the CICI has been issued through a third-party registrant. For a more detailed discussion related to CICIs, please see the SRZ Alert “Update for Swap Counterparties: New Web Portal Launched to Assign CFTC Interim Compliant Identifiers.”

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact Craig Stein or your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Fifth Circuit Upholds “Absurd” Cramdown Interest Rate

    Fifth Circuit Upholds “Absurd” Cramdown Interest Rate

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Upholds “Absurd” Cramdown Interest Rate

    March 20, 2013

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 1, 2013, that a bankruptcy court had not erred in applying a prime plus 1.75 percent interest rate to a secured lender’s $39 million claim under a “cramdown” plan of reorganization. Wells Fargo Bank N.A v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC (In the Matter of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 776317 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2013). Under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 1129(b), a plan of reorganization may be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor, in other words “crammed down,” if the stream of deferred payments under the proposed plan equal the amount of the secured creditor’s allowed claim as of the effective date of the plan, as discounted to present value by applying an appropriate interest rate (“cramdown rate”).[1] Despite its recognition that no willing lender would have extended credit on these terms, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless upheld the “absurd result” as a “natural consequence” of applying the cramdown rate calculation method set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court plurality in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). Texas Grand Prairie, 2013 WL 776317 at *8.

    Facts

    In 2007, Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty LLC and three of its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors”) obtained a $49 million loan to acquire and renovate four hotel properties in Texas. The lender took a security interest in substantially all of the Debtors’ assets and eventually sold the loan to another lender (the “Lender”). After a 2009 downturn in their business, the Debtors were unable to pay the loan as it came due and filed for Chapter 11 protection on May 13, 2010.

    In the bankruptcy court case, the Lender’s appraiser valued the collateral securing the loan at roughly $39 million. The Debtors agreed and proposed a plan of reorganization that called for repayment of the Lender’s $39 million secured claim over a seven-year period at an interest rate of 5 percent, representing the prime rate plus 1.75 percent. The Lender objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing, in part, that the 5 percent interest rate was insufficient. The bankruptcy court nevertheless confirmed the plan over the Lender’s objection, holding that the Debtors had met the requirements for confirmation under the “cramdown” provisions of Code § 1129(b).

    Applicable Law

    Under Code § 1129(b), a plan of reorganization can be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor, if, among other things, it provides for deferred payments that, when adjusted for the time value of money, provide the secured creditor with at least the value of its collateral as of the effective date of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). However, the Code does not specify how to determine the appropriate discount rate (the “cramdown rate”).

    Many bankruptcy courts look to the U.S. Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Till for guidance in determining the appropriate cramdown rate. Texas Grand Prairie, 2013 WL 776317 at *4. In Till, the Chapter 13 debtors financed a 1998 purchase of a truck with a secured loan at a 21 percent interest rate. Till, 541 U.S. at 470. By 1999, the debtors were in default on the loan and filed for Chapter 13 protection. Id. The debtors’ proposed plan provided for the payment of the secured portion of the loan at a rate of 9.5 percent, which was calculated by adjusting the then-national prime rate of 8 percent upward by 1.5 percent to account for additional risk of non-payment due to the debtors’ financial condition. Id. at 471. This method of calculating the cramdown rate is known as the “prime-plus” or “formula rate” approach. Id. The lender objected to the 9.5 percent rate, arguing that it would be entitled to a 21 percent rate if it were to foreclose on the truck and reinvest the proceeds in a loan of equivalent risk. Id. The debtors’ plan was confirmed over the lender’s objection. Id. at 472. On appeal, the District Court rejected the “prime-plus” formulation in favor of a “forced loan” approach, which considers the rate the creditor could have obtained if it had foreclosed on the collateral and reinvested the proceeds in a loan of equivalent risk and duration. Id. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the forced loan approach, but modified it to be merely a presumption, one that could be adjusted upward or downward based on evidence of the debtor’s specific risk profile. Id. For example, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the appropriate rate might be higher given the higher risk in lending to a debtor or lower due to economies produced by court supervision of Chapter 13 plan payments. Id.

    On appeal, the Supreme Court considered, in addition to the prime-plus and forced loan methods, the merits of both the so-called “presumptive contract rate” approach, which looks at the prepetition contract rate and then adjusts upward or downward based on the particular facts of the case, and the “cost of funds” approach, which considers the cost the creditor would incur to obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral. Id. at 477-78. After a lengthy analysis, a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected the forced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches as overly complicated, imposing significant evidentiary costs and focusing on making the creditor whole, rather than ensuring that the stream of deferred payments has the required present value adjustment. Id. at 477. The plurality thus held that the prime-plus approach best comports with the Code because it “entails a straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry,” “minimizes the need for costly additional evidentiary proceedings” and “depends only on the state of financial markets, the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of the loan, not on the creditor’s circumstances or its prior interactions with the debtor.” Id. at 479-80. Although careful not to create a hard and fast rule on the appropriate risk adjustment scale (in other words, the “plus” in prime-plus), the plurality observed that other courts generally approve adjustments in the 1 to 3 percent range. Id. at 480. In footnote 14 of its opinion, the plurality further observed that in a Chapter 11 context, it might make sense to consider the rate that an efficient market would produce, if there exists at the time a free market of willing cramdown lenders. Id. at n.14. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia warned that the plurality’s prime-plus approach would “systematically under compensate” creditors and that the 1.5 percent adjustment to the prime rate could not be viewed as anything except a “smallish number picked out of a hat.” Id. at 501 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

    Battle of the Experts in Bankruptcy Court

    At the plan confirmation hearing in Texas Grand Prairie, both the Debtors and the Lender offered expert witnesses on the issue of what cramdown rate the court should apply. The Debtors and the Lender even agreed that the applicable rate should be determined by applying the prime-plus approach endorsed by the Till plurality, but they disagreed on the application of the approach. Texas Grand Prairie, 2013 WL 776317 at *1. The Debtors’ expert quoted the applicable prime rate at 3.25 percent and then, using the 1 to 3 percent scale mentioned in Till, set the adjustment at 1.75 percent to reflect “just to the left of the middle of the risk scale.” Id. at *7. In reaching that adjustment, the Debtors’ expert considered that the hotels were well-maintained, the Debtors were committed to the business, the revenues exceed projections leading up to the hearing, the collateral was appreciating and the proposed plan was feasible, albeit tight. Id.

    The Lender’s expert agreed that the applicable prime rate should be 3.25 percent, but then adjusted upward by 6.05 percent to yield a “blended market rate” of 9.3 percent based on the weighted averages the market would charge for multi-tiered exit financing. See id. at *7. The Lender’s expert further adjusted the blended rate downward by 1.5 percent to reflect the favorable circumstances of the estate and then upward again by 1 percent to account for the tight feasibility of the plan, resulting in a cramdown rate of 8.8 percent. Id.

    The bankruptcy court agreed with the Debtors’ expert’s approach and rejected as completely inconsistent with Till the Lender’s expert’s use of a blended market-influenced rate as a benchmark before applying the adjustment. Id. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court ruling. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC, 2011 WL 5429087 (N.D. Tex. 2011).

    Fifth Circuit Sees No Clear Error

    The Lender appealed to the Fifth Circuit. As an initial matter, the Fifth Circuit had to determine what standard of review to apply to the bankruptcy court’s determination of the cramdown rate. While conceding that a bankruptcy court’s findings of facts under a cramdown plan confirmation are subject to review only for clear error, citing Till, the Lender argued that the methodology used for calculating the cramdown rate is a matter of law and, accordingly, subject to de novo review. Texas Grand Prairie, 2013 WL 776317 at * 4. The Fifth Circuit rejected the Lender’s argument that Till is controlling precedent because Till was decided in the Chapter 13 context and, as a splintered, plurality opinion, is of limited precedential value, even in Chapter 13 cases. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that the many bankruptcy courts that have elected to follow Till in Chapter 11 cases have done so not because Till is binding precedent, but rather because they were persuaded by the reasoning in Till. Id. The Fifth Circuit thus declined to bind bankruptcy courts to a specific methodology for determining Chapter 11 cramdown rates and proceeded to review the bankruptcy court’s cramdown rate analysis only for clear error. Id. at *5.

    The Court agreed with the bankruptcy court that the Debtors’ expert’s approach was an uncontroversial application of the Till plurality prime-plus method and that the Debtors’ expert engaged in a holistic evaluation of the Debtors that supported the 1.75 percent upward adjustment. See id. at 7. The Court viewed the Lender’s expert’s approach, which required consideration of evidence of market comparable loans, as expressly rejected by the Till plurality. Id. at *8. It observed that Till’s footnote 14, although criticized by commentators, is used by many courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, to support a market-influenced approach in a Chapter 11 context when there is an efficient market for exit financing. Id. Even assuming that footnote 14 has persuasive value, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it would not support the Lender’s approach in the case at hand because even the Lender’s expert testified that there is no one in the market that would make a $39 million secured loan to these Debtors. Id. Although the Lender’s expert reasoned that exit financing would be possible in the market if comprised of multiple tiers, such as senior debt, mezzanine debt and equity financing, the Fifth Circuit explained that courts have rejected the argument that such hypothetical cobbling together of multi-tiered financing represents an “efficient market,” as envisioned by Till’s footnote 14. Id. In affirming the bankruptcy court’s application of the prime-plus approach, the Fifth Circuit commented that “the ‘absurd result’ is the natural consequence of the prime-plus method, which sacrifices market realities in favor of simple and feasible bankruptcy reorganizations.” Id. The Court further observed, evoking the language of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Till, that “while it may be ‘impossible to view [the Debtor’s expert’s] 1.75 percent risk adjustment as ‘anything other than a smallish number picked out of a hat,’ the Till plurality’s formula approach — not Justice Scalia’s dissent — has become the default rule in Chapter 11 bankruptcies.” Id.

    Practical Considerations

    The Fifth Circuit’s decision provides Chapter 11 debtors with an additional tool to propose low cramdown rates bearing little to no relationship to the risk profile of the loan. Further, more generally, Texas Grand Prairie serves as a good reminder that bankruptcy courts, in considering a plan confirmation, may not feel constrained by market expectations for debtor-creditor relationships, but instead may focus on the objectives of the Code and the prospects of a successful plan of reorganization.

    Authored by Lawrence V. Gelber and Neil S. Begley .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (“[E]ach holder of a claim of such class [must] receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.”).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • New Poster and Forms for US Employers

    New Poster and Forms for US Employers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Poster and Forms for US Employers

    March 19, 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Form I-9

    The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) released a new Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9.[1] Form I-9 is used for verifying the identity and employment authorization of individuals hired for employment in the United States, and employers must complete a Form I-9 for every new employee. The updated Form I-9 may be used immediately by employers, and must be used exclusively for all new hires and re-verifications beginning on May 7, 2013. Until then, employers may continue to use previous versions of the Form I-9 dated Feb. 2, 2009 and Aug. 7, 2009. The new Form I-9 revises the layout of the form (making it two pages), greatly expands the form’s instructions, and adds certain data fields, including voluntary fields such as employees’ telephone and email addresses. Employers should review the updated Employer Handbook[2] issued by USCIS on completing the new I-9.

    Family and Medical Leave

    Covered employers must immediately replace their Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) poster with a new one that is now available.[3] In addition, employers who use the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) model forms should begin to use the DOL’s updated set,[4] which includes a new form for Certification for Serious Injury or Illness of a Veteran for Military Caregiver Leave and a few changes to the prior model forms. These new forms and the new poster are the result of the DOL’s Final Rule,[5] which amends certain regulations of the FMLA, primarily regarding coverage of exigency and military caregiver leaves.

    The eligibility for military caregiver leave has been expanded to cover leave to care for former members of the military and includes a definition of “covered veteran.” The Final Rule clarifies that a “serious injury or illness” can include a preexisting condition aggravated by military service in the line of duty. The Final Rule also addresses the circumstances and terms of qualifying exigency leave available to eligible employees with covered family members in the military.

    The DOL also clarified regulations regarding methods for calculating an employee’s FMLA leave time — specifically, minimum increments to be used in calculating intermittent, reduced-schedule or other forms of leave, and the calculation of leave time when it is physically impossible for an employee to start or end work midway through a shift. The Final Rule adds language to the FMLA’s recordkeeping requirements, setting forth an employer’s obligation to comply with the confidentiality requirements of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”). GINA safe harbor language is not included in the FMLA model forms and should be separately provided to employees along with FMLA certifications as follows:

    The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”) prohibits employers and other entities covered by GINA Title II from requesting or requiring genetic information of an individual or family member of the individual, except as specifically allowed by this law. To comply with this law, we are asking that you not provide any genetic information when responding to this request for medical information. “Genetic Information” as defined by GINA includes an individual’s family medical history, the results of an individual’s or family member’s genetic tests, the fact that an individual or an individual’s family member sought or received genetic services, and genetic information of a fetus carried by an individual or an individual’s family member or an embryo lawfully held by an individual or family member receiving assistive reproductive services.

    Employers must further maintain FMLA records in accordance with the confidentiality requirements of GINA.

    Given the changes in employment verification processes and FMLA leave and recordkeeping requirements discussed in this Alert, employers are encouraged to review and update all of their relevant policies, postings and forms.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert

    , please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The new USCIS Form I-9 can be found at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf.

    [2] Available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/m-274.pdf.

    [3] Available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/fmlaen.pdf.

    [4] Available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/2013rule/militaryForms.htm.

    [5] Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-06/pdf/2013-02383.pdf.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Secured Lender’s Full Credit Bid Barred Later Recovery From Guarantors

    Secured Lender’s Full Credit Bid Barred Later Recovery From Guarantors

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Secured Lender’s Full Credit Bid Barred Later Recovery From Guarantors

    March 6, 2013

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 28, 2013, that a secured lender’s full credit bid for a Chapter 11 debtor’s assets at a bankruptcy court sale barred any later recovery from the debtor’s guarantors. In re Spillman Development Group, Ltd., ___ F.3d ___, 2013WL 757648 (5th Cir. 2/28/13). A “credit bid” allows a creditor to “offset its [undisputed] claim against the purchase price,” a right explicitly granted by Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(k). 3 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 363.06[10], at 363-59 (16th rev. ed. 2010). According to the Court, the lender’s “credit bid . . . had the effect of retiring the Senior Indebtedness . . ..” Id., at *6.

    Noteworthy subsidiary holdings in Spillman are the following:

    • The bankruptcy court had “related-to” jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b)) over the third-party dispute between the lender and the guarantors. Id., at *2–*3.
    • The bankruptcy judge had statutory authority (28 U.S.C. §157(b)) to enter judgment in this “core” proceeding based on the effect of the lender’s “credit bid, … purely a creature of the Bankruptcy Code, … without reference to the district court” for entry of judgment. Id., at *3.
    • The bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional because the lender’s claim was “inextricably intertwined with . . . federal bankruptcy law,” unlike the counterclaim in Stern v. Marshall,131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600-01, 2611 (2011) (held, unconstitutional for bankruptcy court to issue judgment on state-law tortious interference counterclaim “independent of . . . federal bankruptcy law….”). Id., at *4.
    • The bankruptcy court properly declined “to enforce the forum selection clauses” in the guarantees because this dispute was “a core proceeding involving the adjudication of the effect of [the lender’s] exercise of its right to credit bid, a right created by the Bankruptcy Code.” Id.
    • The district court’s transfer of venue of the dispute to the bankruptcy court was the proper exercise of a lower court’s discretion. Id., at *5.
    • The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment against the lender because its senior secured claim had been “paid in full” by the lender’s credit bid, “a cash equivalent.” Id., at *5–*6.
    • The bankruptcy court properly declined to assess “the fair-market value of the assets” purchased by the lender with its credit bid. Id., at 11.

    The facts of the litigation, set forth below, are important.

    Relevance

    This case shows the practical effect of a lender’s credit bid on its rights to proceed against third-party guarantors. Equally important, it shows how a classic third-party dispute between a lender and a guarantor can be litigated in the bankruptcy court, ordinarily a rare event.

    Facts

    The debtor was a developer of a golf course that had borrowed $8.1 million from the lender, secured by liens on its assets and eight separate guarantees. An unsecured creditor with a claim of $4.1 million eventually bought the senior secured claim found by the bankruptcy court to total $9.3 million. After the bankruptcy court ordered the sale of the debtor’s assets under Code §363(b), a prospective purchaser bid $9.2 million for the assets. The lender made a competing bid of $9.3 million, leading the bankruptcy court to hold later that the lender’s full credit bid caused the underlying indebtedness to be paid in full, eliminating any deficiency claim against the debtor’s estate.

    The debtor, joined by seven of eight guarantors, promptly sought a declaratory judgment from the bankruptcy court that the guarantors had been released from their guarantees because of the sale. Although the lender moved to dismiss the suit in the bankruptcy court on jurisdictional and other grounds, it then sued the remaining eighth guarantor in a Louisiana federal court. That court transferred the suit to the bankruptcy court in the Western District of Texas, where the guarantee litigation had already been pending. In both the bankruptcy court litigation and in the Louisiana litigation, the lender argued that its credit bid “had not paid in full” the senior secured debt and that it “could therefore still collect against the guarantees.” Id., at *1. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to all the guarantors, and the district court affirmed. Id., at *2.

    Jurisdiction

    Citing 28 U.S.C. §1334(b) (bankruptcy court jurisdiction extends to “all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”) (emphasis added), the court explained that “related to” jurisdiction turns on whether the “outcome” of a dispute “could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Id., at *2, quoting In re Bass, 171 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1999). To have a “conceivable effect,” the outcome need only “alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and . . . in any way impact . . . upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.” Id., quoting In re Majestic Energy Corp., 835F. 2d 87, 90 (5th Cir. 1988); (emphasis added); Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).

    Despite the “attenuated, hypothetical effect of third-party litigation, ‘related-to’” bankruptcy jurisdiction existed here, held the Fifth Circuit. It reasoned that if the lender “were to succeed on the merits of this suit and proceed to recover against the guarantees . . . such a recovery would presumably diminish [the lender’s] deficiency claim against the bankruptcy estate, conceivably allowing a greater recovery for other unsecured creditors against the estate.” Id., at *3. Accord, In re Stonebridge Techs., Inc., 430 F.3d 260, 266-67 (5th Cir. 2005) (held, related-to jurisdiction existed over third-party claims when collection could affect “need for [a third party] to seek reimbursement from . . . bankruptcy estate”).

    Bankruptcy Court’s Statutory Authority

    Citing 28 U.S.C. §157(b) (bankruptcy judge “may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 . . . and may enter appropriate orders and judgments [in such core proceedings]” (emphasis in original), the court found the dispute with the guarantors here to be core, enabling the bankruptcy judge to enter judgment “without reference to the district court.” Id. It viewed the litigation with the guarantors to turn on “a right created by the federal bankruptcy law,” and thus found it to be “a core proceeding.” Id., citing In re Wood, 825 F. 2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987). As the court explained, the dispute turned on whether the lender’s “credit bid had the effect of extinguishing” the lender’s senior secured indebtedness. Id. “[B]ecause the right to credit bid is purely a creature of the Bankruptcy Code,“ the proceeding was core. Id.

    Bankruptcy Court’s Constitutional Authority

    The court found the lender’s claim against the guarantors to be “inextricably intertwined with the interpretation” of a federal bankruptcy law right — a credit bid. Id., at *4. “[T]here was [thus] no constitutional bar” to the bankruptcy court’s taking jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. As the court explained, the Supreme Court’s Stern decision was easily distinguishable because the counterclaim in that case was “a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy.” Id., quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.

    Forum-Selection Clause

    The forum-selection clause in the Spillman guarantees provided for litigation to be brought in the Eastern District of Texas, but the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Texas adjudicated the dispute. Despite judicial precedent ordinarily enforcing forum-selection clauses, “a bankruptcy court may decline to enforce” those provisions when “a core proceeding involves adjudication of federal bankruptcy rights wholly divorced from inherited contractual claims . . . .” Id., citing In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 18F.3d 1056, 1068 (5th Cir. 1997). Again, because the dispute here was a core proceeding turning on the exercise of the lender’s right to credit bid — a federal bankruptcy issue —, the Fifth Circuit found a “sufficiently strong public-policy interest in justifying the non-enforcement of” the forum-selection clause. Id.

    Venue

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the debtor’s first-filed declaratory judgment proceeding against the lender in the Western District of Texas, joined in by all but one of the guarantors. The lender’s later suit against the remaining guarantor in the Eastern District of Louisiana had been properly transferred by the Louisiana court to the bankruptcy court, explained the Fifth Circuit. “. . . [W]hen related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Id., at *5, quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999). Because the later Louisiana suit against one guarantor “presented precisely the same, purely legal dispute,” the court easily found that the Louisiana district court had properly transferred venue to the Texas bankruptcy court, the forum in which the dispute had originated. Id.

    Effect of Credit Bid On Guarantees

    The court rejected the lender’s final assertion that its credit bid had not resulted in the senior secured debtor’s “being paid in full.” Id. Nor did the court require the bankruptcy court to “assess . . . the fair market value of the assets [the lender] purchased . . . .” Id., at *6.

    The Fifth Circuit found that the “credit bid did in fact pay in full the Senior Indebtedness,” giving at least three reasons. Id., at *5–*6. First, the lender’s credit bid was the “equivalent to a cash payment for the assets purchased.” Id., at 6. Second, because the senior secured debt “was in fact repaid in full with cash or a cash equivalent,” the case was distinguishable from those cases holding that “modification or elimination of a debt” in a bankruptcy reorganization case will not affect the rights of a lender with a guarantee. Id., at *6. Finally, nothing in Code § 363(b) requires “an assessment of the fair-market value of the assets” purchased by the lender with its credit bid. Id. Although other provisions in the Code, such as § 506(a), do provide for valuations of the kind sought by the lender, at least one other Circuit has held that it was not required in the context of a credit bid. Id., citing In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 461 (3d Cir. 2006).

    Comments

    1. Despite the breadth and relative novelty of Spillman, the court’s reasoning is sensible. The court’s seemingly broad interpretation of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction either on statutory or constitutional grounds is hardly surprising.

    2. The debtor’s preemptive declaratory judgment action effectively kept the dispute in the bankruptcy court, defining it as a dispute turning on applicable federal law. Had the debtor not moved quickly, the guarantors would have run the risk of a non-bankruptcy court holding them liable on a different, novel approach.

    3. Spillman is unusual only in the sense that the lender had not moved quickly to prosecute the guarantors outside the bankruptcy court. The lesson for lenders here is move quickly in a non-bankruptcy forum to enforce a guaranty of payment.

    4. One more lesson for lenders with a third-party guaranty is to assess the dollar amount of your credit bid wisely. It may be better to take partial payment from the debtor’s sale of your collateral to someone else. You may then be able to preserve a deficiency claim against the guarantors instead of buying the debtor’s assets with a full credit bid.

    Authored by Adam C. Harris , Lawrence V. Gelber and Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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    Adam C. Harris

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    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Supreme Court Rules Securities Class Action Plaintiffs Need Not Prove Materiality at Class Certification Stage

    Supreme Court Rules Securities Class Action Plaintiffs Need Not Prove Materiality at Class Certification Stage

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Rules Securities Class Action Plaintiffs Need Not Prove Materiality at Class Certification Stage

    March 4, 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Feb. 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that securities fraud class action plaintiffs are not required to prove the materiality of alleged misstatements as a prerequisite to class certification. The decision, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, 568 U.S. ___ (2013), resolves a conflict among several Courts of Appeals over whether district courts must require plaintiffs to prove, and permit defendants to rebut, the materiality element before certifying a Rule 10b-5 claim.

    In Amgen, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (“Connecticut Retirement”) brought a securities fraud class action against Amgen Inc. and several of its officers (“Amgen”), alleging that the market price for Amgen stock was artificially inflated due to alleged misrepresentations and omissions regarding two of Amgen’s flagship products. Connecticut Retirement moved to certify the action as a class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of certain purchasers of Amgen stock. Connecticut Retirement invoked the fraud-on-the-market presumption, endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), to establish the reliance element of its Rule 10b-5 claim.

    The fraud-on-the-market presumption allows courts to presume that the price of a security traded in an efficient market will reflect all publicly available information about a company and that, accordingly, a buyer of the security may be presumed to have relied on that information in purchasing the security. Absent the fraud-on-the-market theory, individual reliance issues will typically preclude class certification, making it impossible for plaintiffs to show that common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members.

    In Amgen, Amgen conceded that its stock was traded in an efficient market and that the alleged misstatements were public. It argued, however, that the plaintiffs could not rely on the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in seeking class certification because the alleged misstatements were immaterial. The theory underpinning Amgen’s argument was that because immaterial information, by definition, does not affect market price, it cannot be relied upon by investors whose reliance on public information under the fraud-on-the-market theory is presumed because of the integrity of the market price.

    The Supreme Court viewed the “pivotal inquiry” as “whether proof of materiality is needed to ensure that the questions of law or fact common to the class will predominate over any questions affecting only individual members as the litigation continues.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, slip op. at 10, 568 U.S. ___ (2013) (emphasis in original; quotation marks and citation omitted). In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the answer to that question was “clearly no.” Id. (quotations omitted).

    The Court provided two reasons for its holding. First, materiality is an objective question involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor which can be proved by evidence common to the class. Accordingly, the answer, whatever it ultimately is, will be a common one. Id. at 11. Second, the Court reasoned there is no risk that failing to prove materiality by classwide evidence would result in “individual questions predominating” because it would “end the case for one and for all.” Id. The Court explained, therefore, that “the potential immateriality of Amgen’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions is no barrier to finding that common questions predominate,” and, accordingly, “proof of that sort is a matter for trial.” Id. at 25, 26.

    The Supreme Court’s ruling in Amgen will likely make it easier for securities class action plaintiffs to pass the certification stage, which, as Amgen argued, puts substantial pressure on defendants to settle a case rather than continue litigation. But the Court rejected this “policy consideration,” acknowledging that Congress has already enacted legislation geared to address the settlement pressure associated with securities fraud class actions “through means other than requiring proof of materiality at the class certification stage” and “rejected calls to undo the fraud-on-the-market presumption of classwide reliance.” Id. at 19, 20.

    Authored by William H. Gussman, Jr. and Stacy Ma.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    William H. Gussman Jr.

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 99

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 99

    March, 2013

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    Patent

    UK Supreme Court Provides Guidance on “Making” a Product
    In Schütz (UK) Limited v Werit (UK) Limited [2013] UKSC 16 the UK Supreme Court has provided guidance on the meaning of “making” a product, as opposed to repairing a product, in the context of patent infringement disputes.

    Osteoporosis Patents Found Invalid
    Two osteoporosis treatment patents have been found to be invalid following the ruling by the High Court of England and Wales in Hospira UK Ltd & Anor v Novartis AG [2013] EWHC 516 (Pat). The Court found that none of the claims were entitled to the claimed priority and were invalid on the ground of insufficiency owing to the open-ended construction of certain claims specifying dosage and administration intervals.

    Angiogenesis Patent Found to be Valid by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales
    In Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Bayer Pharma AG v Genentech Inc [2013] EWCA Civ 93 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales found that a patent for therapeutic agents for the treatment of non-cancerous diseases associated with blood vessel growth was valid and infringed.

    Civil Litigation

    The Jackson Reforms Come Into Effect
    The Jackson reforms, the result of a one-year review of costs in civil litigation by Lord Justice Jackson, were largely implemented on 1 April 2013. The reforms present the most radical changes to the civil litigation system since the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules in 1999 and are aimed broadly at controlling the costs of civil litigation.

    Copyright

    CJEU Ruling Confirms Live Internet Streaming of TV Broadcasts Infringes Copyright
    On 7 March 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v TV Catchup Ltd [2013] C 607/11 EUECJ that live internet streaming of terrestrial TV broadcasts constitutes a “communication to the public” within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive. Without broadcaster permission, such retransmission may infringe broadcast copyright.

    Trade Mark

    EU General Court Upholds Partially Successful Opposition to CAFFE KIMBO
    In Bimbo, SA v OHIM [2013] T-277/12, the EUGC has upheld a decision of the Board of Appeal of the Office for the Harmonization of the Internal Market (OHIM), allowing a Community trade mark (CTM) application for the figurative mark CAFFE KIMBO to proceed to registration in relation to a limited scope of goods. The General Court confirmed that while the signs at issue were similar, the opposition could only succeed in relation to those goods for which the prior mark BIMBO was well known.

    Survey Evidence Admitted in Trade Mark Dispute
    Interflora Inc and another v Marks and Spencer plc and another [2013] EWHC 273 (Ch), 21 February 2013 is another example of the application of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales’ two step test to assess whether survey evidence should be permitted in trade mark infringement proceedings. The test requires the party seeking to rely on the evidence to
    show that it i) will likely be of value at trial and ii) the costs involved are justifiable.

    Data Protection

    New “Bring Your Own Device” Guidance Published by Information Commissioner’s Office
    On 7 March 2013, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) published new guidance on “bring your own device” (BYOD), which explains the risks organisations must consider when allowing personal devices such as smart phones, laptops and tablets to be used to process work-related personal information.

    In depth
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