Content Type: Article

  • Third Circuit Permits Reopening of Reorganization Case to Enforce Debtor’s Purchase Option in Real Estate Lease

    Third Circuit Permits Reopening of Reorganization Case to Enforce Debtor’s Purchase Option in Real Estate Lease

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Third Circuit Permits Reopening of Reorganization Case to Enforce Debtor’s Purchase Option in Real Estate Lease

    August 19, 2013

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on July 30, 2013, that a reorganized Chapter 11 debtor could reopen its closed case, enabling the debtor assignee to enforce a purchase option in a real property lease despite the lease’s “anti-assignment provisions.” In re Lazy Days’ RV Center Inc.,2013 WL 3886735, *5 (3d Cir. July 30, 2013). Agreeing with the Delaware bankruptcy court, but reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals held that “the anti-assignment provision [in the lease] was unenforceable [under Bankruptcy Code § 365 (f)(3)] and that [the landlord’s] refusal to honor the purchase option violated” a separate court-approved “Settlement Agreement” between the parties. Id.

    Relevance

    The court confirmed the vitality of Code § 365(f)(3), which makes contractual “anti-assignment clauses … unenforceable in bankruptcy.” Id. The case also shows the many procedural obstacles that a party can raise over a two-year period in a 2009 Chapter 11 case that had been successfully closed in 2010, and reopened in 2011 only to be followed by a 2012 district court reversal. Among the legal issues resolved by the Third Circuit were the following: (a) the meaning of a settlement agreement; (b) when a bankruptcy court should abstain from ruling; (c) when a bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction to reopen a closed case; (d) what constitutes an improper advisory opinion by a court; (e) what constitutes an improper taking under the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment; and (f) when is a party deprived of “due process” right to “present [a] case in a meaningful way.” Id., at *6.

    Facts

    One of the debtors in this case leased a parcel of land in Florida with an option to purchase the property. Id., at *1. The Lease prohibited the debtor from assigning or transferring the Lease without the landlord’s “prior written consent,” except to affiliated entities. Id. By 2008, the debtor tenant had failed to pay rent, informing the landlord of its intention to file a Chapter 11 petition, assume the Lease, and then assign the Lease to its affiliate, which would also file a Chapter 11 petition. Before filing their petitions, the debtors negotiated with the landlord and reached a “Settlement Agreement” under which the landlord consented to the assignment of the lease to the affiliate. The tenant debtor agreed not to “argue against the Bankruptcy Court abstaining from consideration of lease interpretation issues … except to the extent necessary in connection with the assumption and assignment of the Lease as contemplated herein.” Id. The parties also agreed that they had “no intent, nor is the Lease modified in any respect and the lease and all terms and conditions thereof remain in full force and effect.” Id. The parties made no mention of the purchase option in the Lease.

    The bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan, which incorporated the Settlement Agreement, for both the original tenant and the debtor assignee in December 2009, and closed the case in 2010. The tenant debtor thereafter assigned the Lease to its debtor affiliate.

    The assignee debtor attempted to exercise the purchase option in 2011, but the landlord refused to honor it, forcing the parties to litigate in the Florida state courts. Both reorganized debtors simultaneously moved in the bankruptcy court for a ruling that “the lease’s anti-assignment provision was unenforceable” under Code § 365(f)(3), which renders unenforceable any “provision in an … unexpired lease of the debtor … that terminates or modifies … a right … under such … lease on account of an assignment of the lease.” Id. Appeals to the district court and court of appeals followed the bankruptcy court’s holding the “anti-assignment provision [to be] unenforceable and that [the landlord’s] refusal to honor the purchase option violated the Settlement Agreement.” The bankruptcy court thus ordered the landlord “to honor the option.” Id.

    District Court

    The district court reversed and vacated the bankruptcy court’s opinion. In its view, the bankruptcy judge had rendered an improper advisory opinion directed at the Florida state court litigation.

    Substantive Merits

    The court of appeals easily dealt with the substantive merits of the appeal after it disposed of the procedural obstacles generated by the landlord. First, nothing in the parties’ Settlement Agreement eliminated the purchase option at issue. In fact, not only did the Settlement Agreement provide that the parties would “remain liable for all obligations under the Lease, after assignment,” but it also went on to provide that the parties had no intention to modify “in any respect … the Lease….” Id. at *5. If anything, the court stressed that the assignee debtor affiliate had stepped into the tenant debtor’s “shoes and acquire[d] all the rights and obligations that [the original debtor tenant] had, notwithstanding any anti-assignment provisions.” Id. In short, the Settlement Agreement merely provided for the landlord’s waiver of the debtor tenant’s prior defaults and consent to the “contemplated assignment of the Lease” as part of the tenant debtor’s Chapter 11 reorganization. The affiliated debtor assignee thus had “the same rights in the Lease that [debtor tenant] had, including the purchase option.” Id.

    Most important, the Settlement Agreement provided no waiver of Code § 365(f)(3), enabling the court to invalidate the anti-assignment clause in the lease and enforce the purchase option. Nor had the reorganized debtors waited too long to reopen their case as the landlord argued. The reorganized debtors “could have reasonably read the purchase option to survive the Settlement Agreement,” and thus had no reason “to sue to enforce” it until the landlord “actually decided not to honor it.” Id. at *6. Moreover, the bankruptcy court “did not modify the Settlement Agreement, but only clarified that it did not void the purchase option.” Id.

    No Advisory Opinion by Bankruptcy Court

    The Third Circuit quickly rejected the district court’s holding that the bankruptcy court had rendered an advisory opinion. In its view, the bankruptcy court issued a “two-page decree, declaring the anti-assignment clause invalid and ordering [the landlord] to honor the purchase option. Because this decree actually invalidated the anti-assignment clause and ordered the parties to do something, it ‘affect[ed] the rights of litigants,’ … and was not an advisory opinion.” Id. at *2, quoting In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2000) (bankruptcy court opinion not advisory when it “resolved the litigation”). Regardless of whether the reorganized debtors “sought to impact the [Florida litigation],” the bankruptcy court effectively voided “the anti-assignment clause.” Id.

    Reopening of Case Proper

    The court further confirmed the broad discretion given bankruptcy courts under Code § 350(b) to reopen cases after they have been administered. Id. at *3. Despite the landlord’s argument that the court had lacked “statutory subject matter jurisdiction over the motion to reopen,” the bankruptcy court here “was asked to reopen proceedings to resolve a dispute regarding the Settlement Agreement it had previously confirmed.” Id. at *4. Relying on ample precedent, the court easily disposed of this argument: “the Bankruptcy Court plainly had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior orders.” Id., quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 151 (2009).

    Jurisdiction

    The court also rejected the landlord’s argument that the bankruptcy court had unconstitutionally “asserted subject matter jurisdiction over a private rights dispute” that belonged in the Florida state courts. Id., citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011). The Third Circuit found that Stern and its precedents, however, dealt only with the question of whether a bankruptcy court “may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over common law claims.” Id. The bankruptcy court here was not ruling on a state law issue, “but rather … whether, in light of [Code] § 365(f)(3), an anti-assignment clause survived the settlement agreement it had confirmed as part of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.” Id. Because the relief requested by the reorganized debtors turned on a “federal bankruptcy law provision with no common law analogue,” the landlord’s constitutional challenge easily fell.

    Abstention

    The landlord argued that the bankruptcy court was also required to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (abstention required from “proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11”). Although this litigation may “have been provoked by state court actions,” the court of appeals found that the motion to reopen the bankruptcy case “was founded upon a quintessentially federal claim, viz., whether the anti-assignment clause was invalid under [Code] § 365(f)(3).” Id. Moreover, the dispute arose in the bankruptcy case because the debtors had asked the court to “interpret and enforce” its own order. Id. Although the debtors had agreed in the Settlement Agreement that they would not argue against abstention “except to the extent necessary in connection with the assumption and assignment of the Lease,” this particular litigation was, in fact, brought “in connection with the … assignment of the Lease.” Id., at 5.

    Improper Taking

    The court also rejected the landlord’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s order reopening the case “was a taking under the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at *6. As the Court of Appeals found, the bankruptcy court’s order took none of the landlord’s “established property rights, but rather adjudicated the parties’ bona fide dispute regarding their rights under the Settlement Agreement.” Id. An “adjudication of disputed and competing claims cannot be a taking.” Id. (citation omitted).

    Denial of Due Process

    Finally, the court rejected the landlord’s argument that it had not been able to “present its case in a meaningful way” because the bankruptcy court “should have held an adversary proceeding….” Id. In fact, the landlord “was able to present its case” with lengthy opposition papers, “and the Bankruptcy Court conducted a hearing with oral argument on that motion.” Id. In other words, the relief sought by the reorganized debtors was merely the enforcement of an order previously entered by the bankruptcy court, making an adversary proceeding unnecessary. Id.

    Comment

    This case shows, unfortunately, how much time and money can be expended over a straightforward bankruptcy court order. It turned on a debtor’s assumption and assignment of a lease containing a purchase option. Nevertheless, the landlord raised a raft of procedural obstacles obscuring the real dispute over a two-year period in two appellate courts.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and Lawrence V. Gelber.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • SEC Custody Rule Update for Private Fund Managers

    SEC Custody Rule Update for Private Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Custody Rule Update for Private Fund Managers

    August 15, 2013

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Investment Management recently issued a Guidance Update regarding the Custody Rule (Rule 206(4)-2 under the Investment Advisers Act). The Guidance Update states that the Division will not require a registered investment adviser to hold certain certificated “privately offered securities” with a qualified custodian, thereby resolving a Custody Rule issue faced by many private fund managers. The Guidance Update should be evaluated in the context of other actions and statements on the Custody Rule recently issued by SEC staff.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • CFPB Updates Remittance Rule Compliance Guide and Issues Clarifying Amendment and Technical Correction

    CFPB Updates Remittance Rule Compliance Guide and Issues Clarifying Amendment and Technical Correction

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Updates Remittance Rule Compliance Guide and Issues Clarifying Amendment and Technical Correction

    August 13, 2013

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Aug. 8, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) released an update of its small business guide for international fund transfers. The revisions reflect changes made to the remittance rule earlier this year that: (1) delayed the rule’s effective date; (2) revised the error resolution provisions that apply when a sender provides an incorrect account number or recipient institution identifier; and (3) made optional, under certain circumstances, disclosure requirements regarding fees charged by a recipient’s bank and taxes charged by a person other than the remittance transfer provider. Along with the guide, the CFPB also released a video that provides an overview of the rule, including the recent changes.

    Separately, the CFPB also published a clarificatory amendment and technical correction to the final rule. The amendment relates the remedies for errors that occur because a sender provided incorrect or insufficient information to the remittance transfer provider. Under such circumstances, the rule requires providers to refund or, at the consumer’s request, reapply to a new transfer “the amount of funds provided by the sender” less “any fees actually imposed on or, to the extent not prohibited by law, taxes actually collected on the remittance transfer as part of the first unsuccessful remittance transfer attempt.” The amendment clarifies that the “amount of funds provided” refers to the total amount that the sender paid to the provider, rather than just the principal amount.

    The technical correction restores the inadvertent deletion of comment 33(c)-5 and renumbers the newly added comment relating to the form of refund to 33(c)-6.

    The changes to the final rule will take effect on Oct. 28, 2013.

    Authored by Joseph P. Vitale, Donald J. Mosher, Kara A. Kuchar, and Diana E. Whitaker.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Fifth Circuit Protects Secured Lender Who Bypasses Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

    Fifth Circuit Protects Secured Lender Who Bypasses Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Protects Secured Lender Who Bypasses Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

    August 12, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on August 5 that a secured lender’s disputed “lien on [the debtor’s] principal asset survived . . . confirmation of [the debtor’s] Chapter 11 . . . reorganization plan” because the lender had not participated in the bankruptcy case. S. White Transportation, Inc. v. Acceptance Loan Co., 2013 WL 3983343, *1,*3 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2013). Had the lender participated in the case, the court reasoned, its lien might have been avoided. Id., at *1, citing In re Ahern Enterprises, Inc., 507 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 2007) (held, Code §1141(c) only voids liens held by a “lien holder [who] participate[s] in the reorganization.”). This decision, based on established precedent, has practical significance to both lenders and troubled companies.

    Facts

    The debtor had contested the lender’s lien on its office building prior to bankruptcy, resulting in years of unresolved litigation in the Mississippi state courts. Id. Three other lenders later perfected junior liens on the building, which constituted the debtor’s “principal asset.” Id.

    The debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition in May 2010, scheduling the lender’s lien as “disputed.” The lender received notice of the pending reorganization case, but never filed a claim and never “involve[d] itself in any way with the ongoing bankruptcy.” Id. In its later filed reorganization plan, the debtor noted that the lender had never filed a claim, “contested the validity of” the lender’s lien, and provided no recovery for the lender in the plan. Id. The bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor’s plan on Dec. 1, 2010. The lender later moved on Jan. 4, 2011 for “a declaratory judgment that its lien had survived the Plan’s confirmation or, alternatively, for the bankruptcy court to amend its confirmation order to provide for [the lender’s disputed] lien.” Id.

    The Lower Courts

    The bankruptcy court denied the lender’s motion, relying on the plain language of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §1141(c), which provides that property dealt with by a reorganization plan is “free and clear of all claims and interests.” The court reasoned that the lender “had ‘participated’ [in the Chapter 11 case] . . . by having received notice of the bankruptcy.” Id. The district court reversed, “holding that mere notice does not constitute participation. . . .” Id.

    The Fifth Circuit Analysis

    Substantial Fifth Circuit precedent governed this case. A “secured creditor ‘with a loan secured by a lien on the assets of the debtor who becomes bankrupt before the loan is repaid may ignore the bankruptcy [case] and look to the lien for satisfaction of the debt.’” In re Howard, 972 F.2d 639, 641 (5th Cir. 1992) (“A secured creditor is therefore not bound by a plan which purports to reduce its claim where no objection has been filed. . . . Strict adherence to the requirement that an objection be filed to challenge a secured claim is necessary. . . . [T]he secured creditor [has an interest] in being confident that its lien is secure unless a party . . . objects to it.”) citing In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547, 552, 556 (5th Cir. 1985) (held, a plan may not substitute for an objection to a secured creditor’s claim; once creditor files claim, “Code and . . . Rules clearly impose the burden of placing the claim in dispute on any party in interest desiring to do so by means of filing an objection”).

    The court of appeals rejected the bankruptcy court’s finding that the lender had “participated” in the reorganization merely “by having received notice of the bankruptcy.” Id. at*1. It first discussed the meaning of Code §1141(c), explaining that the plan will bind the secured lender only if the lender participates in the reorganization case. Id., at *2. The key issue, therefore, was whether the lender’s “passive receipt of notice constitutes participation” in the case. Id.

    Conceding that the requirement of participation by the secured lender “is a judicial gloss on section 1141(c),” the court agreed with two other courts of appeals who “required more than notice” for a secured lender to be bound by the terms of a plan. Id. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, “a secured creditor seeking to retain the value of a security interest has two options: he ‘can bypass his debtor’s bankruptcy [case] and enforce his lien in the usual way’ outside of bankruptcy, or he can ‘decide to collect his debt in the bankruptcy [case], and to this end may file a proof of claim in that [case].’” Id., quoting In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1995). Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary 1229 (9th ed. 2009), the Fifth Circuit added “that the word ‘participation’ connotes activity, and not mere nonfeasance.” 2013 WL 3983343, *2.

    The court was “unable to find any case voiding a lien in the face of no involvement by a secured creditor other than the passive receipt of notice.” Id., at * 3. It thus held that “the participation requirement in In re Ahern Enterprises Inc. [507 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 2007)] requires more than mere passive receipt of effective notice.” Id. Because the lender here had only received notice of the bankruptcy and had not otherwise participated in the case, its lien would be unaffected by the debtor’s reorganization plan. As a result, post-bankruptcy litigation over the validity of the debtor’s lien will continue in the Mississippi courts.

    Comments

    1. Secured lenders will like the result in White. Unless the debtor actively litigates against the lender or the lender seeks to enforce its lien in the bankruptcy court, the lender can simply wait and attack the debtor later in a more favorable forum. [Nevertheless,] “once a debtor has objected to a claim, the creditor is on notice that full participation in the [plan] confirmation proceedings is required or its lien will be at risk.” In re Howard, 972 F.2d at 642.

    2. The White case is not only consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent and the Seventh Circuit’s Penrod decision, but also with an Eighth Circuit case. In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1996) (held, despite creditor’s receiving notice and litigating merits of its late filed secured claim, it “was not permitted to participate as a secured creditor[;] its lien was never brought into the bankruptcy [case] and could therefore not be extinguished by confirmation of the plan.”).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

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  • Case Highlight: District Court Affirms Bankruptcy Court Order Confirming SRZ Client Quigley’s Chapter 11 Asbestos Reorganization Plan

    Case Highlight: District Court Affirms Bankruptcy Court Order Confirming SRZ Client Quigley’s Chapter 11 Asbestos Reorganization Plan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Case Highlight: District Court Affirms Bankruptcy Court Order Confirming SRZ Client Quigley’s Chapter 11 Asbestos Reorganization Plan

    August 7, 2013

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the order confirming SRZ client Quigley Company Inc.’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan on July 30, 2013. As noted in our Alert of June 28, 2013, the plan enables Quigley to emerge from Chapter 11 over the objection of a dissenting creditor class and another group of asbestos personal injury claimants.

    The district court’s affirmance of the plan ensured that Quigley and its corporate parent, Pfizer Inc., would be released from at least $5.6 billion of current and future asbestos liability. The district court also approved the permanent injunction staying all further litigation against Pfizer arising out of Quigley’s asbestos claims. Finally, the court affirmed Quigley’s “cramming down” a rejecting class of silica personal injury claimants.

    The Quigley team was led by business reorganization partners Michael L. Cook and Lawrence V. Gelber, and consisted of litigation partner Robert J. Ward, tax partner Kurt F. Rosell and real estate partner Robert S. Nash, associates Victoria A. Lepore, Aaron B. Wernick, and Brian C. Tong and paralegal Donna Angiulo.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Case Highlight, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Robert J. Ward

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • ERISA Liabilities of Private Equity Funds: First Circuit Addresses Control Group Liability

    ERISA Liabilities of Private Equity Funds: First Circuit Addresses Control Group Liability

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    ERISA Liabilities of Private Equity Funds: First Circuit Addresses Control Group Liability

    August 2, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a decision of significance to private equity funds, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that: (1) a private equity fund can be liable as a “trade or business” for the withdrawal liability of its portfolio company; and (2) by structuring its portfolio company investment to avoid ERISA’s 80 percent parent-subsidiary common control threshold, the private equity fund did not engage in a transaction to “evade or avoid” withdrawal liability. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, No. 12-2312 (1st Cir. July 24, 2013). Although the decision concerns a private equity fund’s liability for the withdrawal liability of a portfolio company that contributed to a multiemployer pension plan, it is also applicable to ERISA-controlled group liability arising from single-employer pension plan terminations.

    In 2007, Sun Capital invested in Scott Bass Inc. (“SBI”), a metal manufacturer. Sun Capital divided its investment between two of its funds (the “Sun Funds”), so that one fund owned 70 percent of SBI and the other owned 30 percent of SBI. SBI had an obligation to contribute to the New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund (the “Teamsters Plan”) pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. In October 2008, SBI stopped making contributions to the Teamsters Plan and became liable for withdrawal liability. The Teamsters Plan assessed withdrawal liability against SBI and the Sun Funds as alleged members of SBI’s controlled group. Under ERISA, to be liable as a member of a contributing employer’s controlled group, the entity must be: (1) under “common control” with the obligated entity; and (2) a “trade or business.” 29 U.S.C. §1301(b)(1). Asserting that they were merely passive investors, the Sun Funds challenged the Teamsters Plan’s withdrawal-liability assessment under both prongs of the test.

    “Trade or Business” Under ERISA

    In rejecting the Sun Funds’ assertion that they were not engaged in a “trade or business,” the court reversed, in large part, a 2012 district court decision. That decision had rejected the opinion of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) that a private equity fund can be a “trade or business” for purposes of assessing ERISA-controlled group liability (the “2007 PBGC Opinion”). The court likewise declined to give the 2007 PBGC Opinion deference. Instead, it took a “very fact specific” “investment plus” approach to evaluate whether the Sun Funds were engaged in a “trade or business.” The court considered a number of factors, focusing on the Sun Funds’ operation and management of SBI, and the financial advantages they obtained as a result:

    • Goal of Making Profits Derived from Intervention in Management and Operations. The funds seek to invest in companies that need to improve their management and operations and to provide necessary intervention, with the goal of ultimately selling the companies for a profit.
    • Involvement in Portfolio Company Management and Operations. The funds (through their agents) are actively involved in the management and operation of the companies in which they invest. For example, they can and do make decisions about hiring, terminating and compensating employees of their portfolio companies.
    • Governance Control. The funds’ controlling ownership stakes enable them to control the portfolio companies’ boards.
    • Direct Economic Benefit. The funds obtain a direct economic benefit that a passive investor would not obtain.

    Holding that no single factor is dispositive, with respect to one of the Sun Funds, the court concluded that “the sum of all of these factors” satisfied “the ‘plus’ in the ‘investment plus’ test.” With respect to the other fund, however, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine, after further development of the record, whether the fund received a direct economic benefit via an offset against the management fees the fund would otherwise have paid its general partner for its management services and whether the fund is a trade or business under ERISA.

    The court also rejected the Sun Funds’ argument that they cannot be trades or businesses because that determination would be inconsistent with certain Supreme Court decisions under the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) interpreting the term “trade or business.” The court held that “trade or business” can have a different meaning under ERISA than under the Code, and, in any event, decisions under the Code are factually distinguishable, and the court’s interpretation is consistent with relevant decisions under the Code. Finally, the court rejected the Sun Funds’ argument that the relevant activities of their agents cannot be attributed to them.

    It is difficult to square the court’s decision to remand the case to the district court for further factual development with its explicit cautioning that none of the factors it described “is dispositive in and of itself.” This difficulty creates uncertainty. Nonetheless, the decision gives insight into the factors courts may consider in determining whether a private equity fund is a trade or business under ERISA. Private equity funds should be aware of these factors when investing in, and engaging in activities with respect to, portfolio companies that contribute to multiemployer pension plans or that sponsor single-employer pension plans.

    Evade or Avoid

    To be in a parent-subsidiary group under “common control,” the parent must have at least an 80 percent interest in the subsidiary. 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(i). Since at least the 2007 PBGC Opinion, some private equity funds, like the Sun Funds, have purposefully structured their investments to split their ownership interests among two or more entities to avoid exceeding the 80 percent threshold. The court held that structuring ownership in this manner does not give rise to “evade or avoid” withdrawal liability under Section 1392(c) of ERISA. The court focused on the language of the statute: “[i]f a principal purpose of any transaction is to evade or avoid liability under this part, this part shall be applied (and liability shall be determined and collected) without regard to such transaction.” In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that ignoring the allegedly fraudulent transaction — the acquisition of SBI — would result in the Sun Funds having no interest in SBI, and therefore no possible controlled group liability for SBI’s withdrawal liability. The decision gives comfort to private equity funds that they can structure their investments to avoid ERISA’s 80 percent common control threshold without becoming liable for pension liabilities as a result.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman,Ronald E. Richman and Holly H. Weiss.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The SEC’s JOBS Act Rulemaking: What It Means for Private Fund Managers

    The SEC’s JOBS Act Rulemaking: What It Means for Private Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The SEC’s JOBS Act Rulemaking: What It Means for Private Fund Managers

    July 24, 2013

    Read time: 21 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission took three significant actions on July 10, 2013:

    Final Rules

    1. The SEC approved final rules implementing the Congressional mandate under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) to lift the ban on general solicitation and advertising in private securities offerings made in reliance on Rule 506 or Rule 144A of the Securities Act;[1] and

    2. The SEC approved final rules disqualifying so-called “bad actors” from Regulation D securities offerings, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.[2]

    These final rules will be effective 60 days after they are published in the Federal Register.

    Allowing for general solicitation in private offerings has the potential to significantly alter capital-raising by private fund managers. The SEC’s final rules provide for a strict “opt-in” approach, requiring fund managers to choose — with respect to each fund offering — whether to engage in a general solicitation by checking a box on the revised Form D. Managers will only be in a position to opt-in to general solicitation if they take reasonable steps, as required by the final rules, to verify that all investors meet the accredited investor standard. The final rules provide for both a “principles-based” approach to verification — which takes into account the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the nature of the investor and the size of the investment — as well as specific examples of documentation that will provide sufficient verification that individuals meet the accredited investor tests. In addition, managers seeking to use general solicitation in connection with private fund offerings must be in compliance with any other applicable regulatory requirements, including those of foreign countries and of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

    With this potential liberalization of the offering process comes concerns about the potential for fraud. There are existing anti-fraud rules applicable to private fund marketing materials, and those rules will continue to apply to any marketing materials used as part of a general solicitation. The SEC has stated that OCIE examinations will in particular focus on compliance by managers using general solicitation. The SEC has also proposed new rules to address fraud concerns, including changes to the private offering process that would apply both to funds offered using a general solicitation, as well as to all privately offered funds.

    Proposed Rules

    3. The SEC proposed for comment rules regarding changes to Form D filing requirements and content and other aspects of private offerings under Rule 506 (the “Proposed Rules”).

    The Proposed Rules would penalize managers for failing to comply with the Form D filing requirement in an offering under Regulation D by barring them from using Rule 506 for new fund offerings for one year.[3] This proposed bar rule would apply to Form D filings for all Rule 506 offerings, not just those that use general solicitation. The Proposed Rules also would make the “sales literature” rule (Rule 156 under the Securities Act), which currently applies to registered investment companies, also applicable to all private funds. Finally, under the Proposed Rules, private funds electing to engage in an offering that utilizes general solicitation or advertising would be required to supply all written general solicitation materials to the SEC (for, at least, an initial two-year period) and to include certain required disclosures and legends in such materials.

    The Proposed Rules — which were approved for proposal by a split SEC vote of 3–2 — will be subject to a 60-day comment period commencing on the date of publication in the Federal Register. Because of their breadth and implications for private funds, and because many of the provisions of the Proposed Rules apply to traditional Regulation D offerings as well as the new offerings using general solicitation, these proposals merit a great deal of thought; comments may be prepared and sent to the SEC at any point during the comment period.

    I.    General Solicitation

    A. Removal of the Prohibition on General Solicitation

    Rule 502(c) of Regulation D and Rule 144A(d)(1) of the Securities Act contained prohibitions against general solicitation and general advertising for offerings made pursuant to Regulation D and Rule 144A, respectively. As mandated by the JOBS Act, the SEC removed these restrictions, provided that, for Regulation D offerings, the issuer takes “reasonable steps to verify” that the investors are accredited investors.[4] Firms relying on Regulation D and desiring to engage in general solicitation would rely on new Rule 506(c),[5] which includes a new verification requirement. The Proposed Rules contain additional requirements which would also accompany reliance on new Rule 506(c).

    1. Verification Requirement

    The SEC retained the principles-based approach for the verification process that it articulated in the proposing release.[6] The SEC described these principles as “interconnected and . . . intended to help guide an issuer in assessing the reasonable likelihood that a purchaser is an accredited investor — which would, in turn, affect the types of steps that would be reasonable to take to verify a purchaser’s accredited investor status.” The SEC indicated that requiring specified methods of verification is impractical, given the numerous ways in which a purchaser can qualify as an accredited investor and the wide range of verification methods. As part of a principles-based approach, the SEC would expect a firm to look at factors such as:
    • The nature of the purchaser;
    • The amount of information the firm has about the purchaser; and
    • The nature of the offering (e.g., how the individual was solicited and the minimum investment amount).

    For example, the SEC indicated that where the minimum subscription requirement is sufficiently high (e.g., requiring a minimum that is higher than the accredited investor net worth standard), the likelihood of that purchaser satisfying the definition may make it reasonable to take fewer verification steps and to simply confirm that the purchaser did not borrow the investment amount.[7] The SEC stated: “[t]he more likely it appears that a purchaser qualifies as an accredited investor, the fewer steps the issuer would have to take to verify accredited investor status, and vice versa.”

    The SEC also included in the final rule examples of verification steps which could be used to verify that an individual meets the accredited investor test. The list of methods provided in the non-exclusive safe harbor includes: (i) reviewing an investor’s tax forms or bank statements and credit reports; (ii) obtaining confirmation from a third party (e.g., broker-dealers, investment advisers, attorneys, accountants, etc.); or (iii) for additional subscriptions, simple re-confirmation by the investor.

    A private fund manager intending to engage in general solicitation should consider what methods it will be using to verify investor status. The methods used should be addressed in the firm’s compliance manual (and several service providers have stated that they intend to offer accredited investor verification services). Regardless of the particular procedures adopted, records of the steps taken by the fund manager or a service provider to verify investor status should be maintained and available for examination. The SEC has made clear that it is not enough for the investor to be, in fact, an accredited investor; the issuer must have taken reasonable steps to verify this. (As discussed below, the SEC is also proposing to require that firms specify in their Form D filings which verification methods they are using.)

    2. Additional Requirements

    The SEC is also requiring firms to specifically indicate on the Form D whether they are relying on Rule 506(c) (allowing general solicitation), or Rule 506(b) (which replaces the current “Rule 506” option and which would be used where there will be no general solicitation), but not both. This is important as fund managers will need to determine at the outset whether they wish to engage in general solicitation and take on the additional requirements, such as the accredited investor verification process (and potentially other additional requirements which the SEC is proposing, as discussed below), or whether they prefer to pursue a traditional offering, without general solicitation and its accompanying requirements. The opt-in/opt-out to the general solicitation option can be done on a fund-by-fund basis. It is also worth noting that fund managers choosing to use Rule 506(c) and engage in general solicitation will no longer be able to accept any non-accredited investors for that offering, unlike Rule 506(b), which still allows up to 35 non-accredited investors. Accordingly, private fund managers will need to identify in advance situations where prospective investors may qualify as “qualified purchasers” under the Investment Company Act but not satisfy the accredited investor test under the Securities Act (e.g., certain “knowledgeable employees”).

    3. The Transition

    For ongoing offerings under Rule 506 that commenced before the effective date of the final rules (i.e., 60 days after they are published in the Federal Register), a fund manager may choose to continue the offering as either a Rule 506(b) or Rule 506(c) offering, despite the offering not previously having been in compliance with Rule 506(c) (e.g., the manager not having taken the new verification steps for existing investors). Fund managers may also choose to continue offering a fund under Rule 506(b) after the effective date and later switch to a Rule 506(c) offering.

    The SEC also indicated that it will be closely monitoring the market to see what firms are doing to take advantage of the removal of the general solicitation ban and what steps are being taken to meet the verification requirement. Modifications to the rules in the future may be necessary, depending on what the SEC observes.

    Fund managers wishing to engage in general solicitation should still consider the potential reach of their solicitation and advertising efforts. Although the SEC will now permit general solicitation, there are still many foreign restrictions in place which may restrict such activities. The SEC has indicated that securities offered pursuant to a Rule 506(c) offering are deemed to be “covered securities” and therefore state blue sky registration requirements do not apply.

    B. General Solicitation Under CFTC Rules

    Despite the SEC’s removal of the restriction on general solicitation, it is still unclear whether CFTC rules would still restrict fund managers from general solicitation. Both exempt commodity pool operators (“CPOs”) relying on the Rule 4.13(a)(3) de minimis exemption and registered CPOs relying on the Rule 4.7 exemption face uncertainty absent any further action taken by the CFTC or its staff. Specifically, Rule 4.13(a)(3) contains a general restriction on marketing to the public as one of the requirements to be able to rely on the exemption. Rule 4.7 is only available if a fund is offered or sold “solely to qualified eligible persons.”[8]

     

    II. “Bad Actor” Disqualification

    The Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the SEC adopt rules disqualifying securities offerings involving certain felons and “bad actors” from reliance on the Rule 506 private placement safe harbor regime. In adopting the final rule (the “Bad Actor Rule”), the SEC emphasized that adoption of this rule will provide additional investor protection from unscrupulous actors taking advantage of the removal of the ban on general solicitation and advertising.

    The Bad Actor Rule mandates the disqualification of the following “covered persons:”

    • Executive officers of the issuer and officers who participate in the offering;
    • Beneficial owners of 20 percent or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity securities, calculated on the basis of voting power;
    • For investment funds, the fund’s investment managers and their principals (including investment managers is an expansion on what was originally proposed by the SEC);[9]
    • The issuer and any predecessor of the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer (which could have an impact on portfolio companies that are affiliates of private funds and on private funds that are affiliates of a portfolio company or another fund);
    • Any promoter connected with the issuer in any capacity at the time of the sale; and
    • Any person who has been or will be paid remuneration for solicitation of purchasers in connection with sales of the securities (and executives of the soliciting entity).

    Notably, there is no standard that includes an individual as a covered person on the basis of control alone. In addition, not all officers are considered covered persons.

    The Bad Actor Rule covers certain triggering events as disqualifications (unless the SEC or the authority issuing the judgment or order — which can be a state agency or non-U.S. authority — determines that there should not be a Rule 506 disqualification) such as: (i) securities-related felonies or misdemeanors; (ii) covered persons subject to certain orders or judgments of a court or the SEC, or other state or federal agencies;[10] and (iii) covered persons who were expelled from membership with a national securities exchange or association. Although the proposed rule did not do so, the final rule includes SEC cease and desist orders involving scienter-based charges and Section 5 violations to be triggering events.

    In an important change from what was proposed, disqualifications will apply only for triggering events that occur after the effective date of the Bad Actor Rule. However, while previous triggering events will not disqualify the offering, they will be subject to mandatory disclosure in connection with any offering under
    Rule 506.

    III.  Proposed Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Other Proposed Changes to Implement Investor Protection Concerns

    In response to concerns about investor protection expressed in the comments to the proposal to remove the ban on general solicitation and advertising, and to help the SEC monitor how Rule 506(c) offerings affect the marketplace and what verification procedures are being used, the SEC also proposed a number of amendments to Regulation D and Form D to provide additional and more timely information about offerings.

    A. Form D Revisions

    1. Advance Form D Filings

    An “Advance Form D” filing for a Rule 506(c) offering would be required to be made at least 15 days before the issuer engages in general solicitation or general advertising for such offering. Recognizing that the Advance Form D could be problematic in terms of inadvertent missteps in the offering process, the Proposed Rules ask for comments whether an Advance Form D should be permitted to be filed before a specific offering is contemplated.

    2. Amendments to Form D Filings

    For Rule 506 offerings, amendments would be required to be filed not later than 15 days after the first sale of securities (which is the current timing requirement for Form D and which would remain the standard for Rule 506(b) offerings). Amendment filings (currently required annually and for material changes) continue to be required for all Rule 506 offerings. In addition, for Rule 506(c) offerings as well as 506(b) offerings, which do not involve general solicitation — a closing Form D filing would be required within 30 days after termination of the offering. The amended Form D would require the following additional information for all Rule 506 offerings (in addition to the current requirements):

    • Website address;
    • Industry group affiliation (private funds will now be required to fill out the information fields indicating whether they are a hedge, private equity, venture capital or other investment funds);
    • Aggregate net asset value ranges for private funds (although fund managers can request that this information not be made available to the public if they have not otherwise made the information publicly available);
    • The number of accredited and non-accredited investors, whether they are natural persons or legal entities, and the amount raised from each category of investors;
    • The number of investors who qualified as accredited investors on the basis of income, net worth, status at the fund manager (e.g., director, executive officer or general partner of issuer or its general partner), or other;
    • Whether a broker-dealer was used in connection with the offering and whether general solicitation materials were filed with FINRA; and
    • Identification of registered investment advisers and exempt reporting advisers who function directly or indirectly as a promoter.

    3. Additional Information for Rule 506(c) Offerings

    Form Ds filed with respect to Rule 506(c) offering would also be required to:

    • Specify the type of general solicitation used (i.e., mass mailings, email, social media, print media etc.);
    • Identify individuals who directly or indirectly control the issuer; and
    • Provide the methods used to verify accredited investor status.

    B. Penalty Provisions

    The SEC also proposed to disqualify an issuer from relying on Rule 506 for one year for any future offerings if it did not comply, within the last five years, with Form D filing requirements in a Rule 506 offering.[11] There are however, several mitigating factors. First, the disqualification would not apply to the offering for which the issuer failed to make the required Form D filing (the “Non-Compliant Offering”), or any other offering being conducted simultaneously with the Non-Compliant Offering. Second, this only applies to Form D filings required to be filed after the effective date of a final rule. Third, the SEC is also proposing a limited 30-day “cure period.”[12] Finally, the SEC also could waive the disqualification under certain circumstances.[13] Private fund managers should note that this proposed bar on using a Rule 506 offering can be triggered by an affiliated fund having engaged in a Non-Compliant Offering or by a portfolio company affiliated with the fund having engaged in a Non-Compliant Offering.

    C. Additional Requirements for Offerings Using General Solicitation

    The SEC also proposed additional requirements (in proposed Rule 509) for firms that will engage in general solicitation. However, unlike the new Form D proposed requirements, proposed Rule 509 would only lead to a disqualification from use of Rule 506 if the SEC obtains a court injunction for failure to comply with Rule 509. The proposed Rule 509 requirements include:

    1. Submission, on a temporary basis (for two years after the effective date of the new rules), of written general solicitation materials used in Rule 506(c) offerings to the SEC no later than the date of first use (the materials will not be available to the public); and

    2. A requirement that written general solicitation materials used in Rule 506(c) offerings (but not Rule 506(b) offerings) include certain prominent legends and other disclosures such as:

    • The offering is restricted to accredited investors;
    • The SEC has not passed upon the merits of or approved the offering;
    • The securities being offered are not subject to the Investment Company Act;
    • Legal restrictions on transfer and resale;
    • The riskiness of the investment; and
    • If performance data is used, the limitations of relying on performance data (this should also include a telephone number or a website where an investor may obtain current performance data). When providing such data, a fund manager would use the most recent performance data based on the last valuation.

    The SEC indicated that the precise wording of the legends may vary, but they must be clear and easy to understand. Practically speaking, we note that it may be difficult to include the legends in some general solicitation materials (such as online and social media).

    The SEC is also proposing to extend to all private offerings, including those not marketed using general solicitation under Rule 506(c), the anti-fraud guidance regarding “sales literature” contained in Rule 156, which currently only applies to sales literature used by investment companies. This would require managers to review their fund marketing material for consistency with Rule 156. In its release regarding the Proposed Rules, the SEC highlighted concerns about fraud, but did not discuss the existing anti-fraud requirements under the Advisers Act, including the rules governing private fund advertising (Rule 206(4)-1) and communications with investors and prospective investors (Rule 206(4)-8), as well as the existing body of no-action correspondence on these issues.

    We will be in further contact with additional developments regarding these important changes.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly, Marc E. Elovitz and Paul N. Roth.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] “Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings.”

    [2] “Disqualification of Felons and Other ‘Bad Actors’ from Rule 506 Offerings.”

    [3] “Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under the Securities Act.”

    [4] Amended Rule 144A retains the “reasonable belief” standard, but without the additional “reasonable steps” verification requirement regarding the qualified institutional buyer status of the investors.

    [5] Excerpts of the text of new Rule 506(c) follow:

    (c)   Conditions to be met in offerings not subject to limitation on manner of offering

    (1)   General conditions

    To qualify for exemption under this section, sales must satisfy all the terms and conditions of §§ 230.501 and 230.502(a)
    and (d).

    (2)   Specific conditions

    (i)    Nature of purchasers. All purchasers of securities sold in any offering under paragraph (c) of this section are accredited investors.

    (ii)   Verification of accredited investor status. The issuer shall take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of securities sold in any offering under paragraph (c) of this section are accredited investors. The issuer shall be deemed to take reasonable steps to verify if the issuer uses, at its option, one of the following non-exclusive and non-mandatory methods of verifying that a natural person who purchases securities in such offering is an accredited investor; provided, however, that the issuer does not have knowledge that such person is not an accredited investor:

    (A)   In regard to whether the purchaser is an accredited investor on the basis of income, reviewing any Internal Revenue Service form that reports the purchaser’s income for the two most recent years (including, but not limited to, Form W-2, Form 1099, Schedule K-1 to Form 1065, and Form 1040) and obtaining a written representation from the purchaser that he or she has a reasonable expectation of reaching the income level necessary to qualify as an accredited investor during the current year;

    (B)   In regard to whether the purchaser is an accredited investor on the basis of net worth, reviewing one or more of the following types of documentation dated within the prior three months and obtaining a written representation from the purchaser that all liabilities necessary to make a determination of net worth have been disclosed:

    (1)   With respect to assets: bank statements, brokerage statements and other statements of securities holdings, certificates of deposit, tax assessments, and appraisal reports issued by independent third parties; and

    (2)   With respect to liabilities: a consumer report from at least one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies; or

    (C)   Obtaining a written confirmation from one of the following persons or entities that such person or entity has taken reasonable steps to verify that the purchaser is an accredited investor within the prior three months and has determined that such purchaser is an accredited investor:

    (1)   A registered broker-dealer;

    (2)   An investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission;

    (3)   A licensed attorney who is in good standing under the laws of the jurisdictions in which he or she is admitted to practice law; or

    (4)   A certified public accountant who is duly registered and in good standing under the laws of the place of his or her residence or principal office.

    (D)   In regard to any person who purchased securities in an issuer’s Rule 506(b) offering as an accredited investor prior to the effective date of paragraph (c) of this section and continues to hold such securities, for the same issuer’s Rule 506(c) offering, obtaining a certification by such person at the time of sale that he or she qualifies as an accredited investor.

    [6] “Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings,” 77 FR 54464 (Sept. 5, 2012).

    [7] On this particular point, the SEC stated: “For example, if the terms of the offering require a high minimum investment amount and a purchaser is able to meet those terms, then the likelihood of that purchaser satisfying the definition of accredited investor may be sufficiently high such that, absent any facts that indicate that the purchaser is not an accredited investor, it may be reasonable for the issuer to take fewer steps to verify or, in certain cases, no additional steps to verify accredited investor status other than to confirm that the purchaser’s cash investment is not being financed by a third party.” [Emphasis added.]

    [8] The MFA submitted a letter to the CFTC in 2012 asking for clarification. See MFA letter “Harmonization of Compliance Obligations and The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act and CFTC Regulations” (July 17, 2012).

    [9] This includes the directors, executive officers, other officers participating in the offering, general partners and managing members.

    [10] Specifically, orders, judgments or decrees of any court of competent jurisdiction, entered within five years before any sale in the offering that, at the time of such sale, restrains or enjoins such person from engaging or continuing to engage in any conduct or practice: (i) in connection with the purchase or sale of any security; (ii) involving the making of any false filing with the SEC; or (iii) arising out of the conduct of the business of an underwriter, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, investment adviser or paid solicitor of purchasers of securities.

    [11] The SEC would not require looking back prior to the effective date of a final rule. The look-back period would only require determining if, during the five-year period after the Proposed Rules are effective, there was a failure to file a Form D (or required amendment).

    [12] A cure period of 30 days would be available to address inadvertent errors, but would only be available for an issuer’s first failure to timely file a Form D or Form D amendment in connection with that offering. For a continuous offering, this cure would have very limited use (as it can only be used once).

    [13] Further, the SEC is also considering if there should be a different filing deadline for the Advance Form D where there is an inadvertent general solicitation prior to filing, as well as whether Advance Form D filings should be permitted even if no specific offering is commenced to avoid the issue of inadvertent general solicitations.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

    In depth
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    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Paul N. Roth

    Senior Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • District Court Rejects Trustee’s “Clever” Assignment of Fraudulent Transfer Claims to Avoid Code’s Safe Harbor Defense

    District Court Rejects Trustee’s “Clever” Assignment of Fraudulent Transfer Claims to Avoid Code’s Safe Harbor Defense

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    District Court Rejects Trustee’s “Clever” Assignment of Fraudulent Transfer Claims to Avoid Code’s Safe Harbor Defense

    July 19, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, applying the swap agreement safe harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) §546(g), dismissed a Chapter 11 litigation trustee’s state law fraudulent transfer complaint against a bank on June 11, 2013. Whyte v. Barclays Bank, PLC, 2013 WL2489925 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013). Like the Code’s “settlement payment” safe harbor in §546(e), discussed in our recent July 8, 2013 Alert , the “swap agreement” safe harbor “deprives a bankruptcy trustee of the power to bring” fraudulent transfer or preference claims arising out of “a [pre-bankruptcy] transfer made by or to . . . a swap participant . . . under or in connection with any swap agreement . . . .” Id. at * 2. Although the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan documents provided that “certain creditors . . . and the relevant debtors . . . putatively assigned ‘any and all’ of their claims, [including fraudulent transfers], to the [litigation] Trust,” the court held that the §546(g) safe harbor “impliedly pre-empts state-law fraudulent [transfer] actions seeking to avoid ‘swap transactions’ as defined by the Code.” Id. at * 4. According to the court, the trustee’s “clever” attempt to assert her state law rights as an “assignee,” but not “as the trustee of the bankruptcy estate . . . would, in effect, render section 546(g) a nullity.” Id. at *2.

    Facts

    The debtor, SemGroup, “was a large energy transport and storage company that filed” a Chapter 11 petition on July 22, 2008 in the District of Delaware. Id. at * 1. Five weeks prior to bankruptcy, on June 15, 2008, the debtor and the defendant bank had entered into a “novation” agreement in which the bank acquired the debtor’s “portfolio of commodities derivatives traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”)” for roughly $143 million. Id. That portfolio later became profitable, apparently causing creditors to assert that the transaction with the bank was a fraudulent transfer, “not under the Bankruptcy Code, but as defined by various provisions of New York’s Debtor-Creditor law (“NYDCL”).” Id. at *1 *2.

    The Trustee’s “Clever” Theory

    The “Trustee [was] not seeking to avoid the novation under [any section] of the . . . Code.” Id. at * 2. Had the trustee used Code §544, she “might, in the ordinary case,” be able to “assert a state-law fraudulent [transfer] action” subject to the safe harbor limitation of §546(g). The parties agreed, in any event, that the novation here qualified “as a ‘swap’ transaction benefiting from the safe harbor of [§] 546(g).” Id. For that reason, the trustee chose to assert “her rights under state law as ‘holder and assignee of all claims and causes of action against’” the defendant bank. Id. According to the trustee, §546(g) “applies only to ‘an estate representative who is exercising federal avoidance powers under’” Code §544. Id. Thus, the safe harbor of §546(g) should, in the trustee’s view, “not apply to ‘claims asserted by creditors’ after the bankruptcy concludes” when those claims are preserved in the reorganization plan. Id.

    Congressional Intent

    According to the court, however, “permitting a trustee that is the creature of a Chapter 11 plan to avoid a ‘swap transaction’ by way of a state fraudulent [transfer] action would stand as a major obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress in passing, and then expanding, the 546(g) ‘safe harbor.’” Id. at * 3. Congress meant to “protect securities markets from the disruptive effects that unwinding such transactions would inevitably create. Id. Citing at least three Congressional enactments between 1982 and 2005 expanding the reach of the safe harbor, the court stressed that Congress had made “even more complete the protection of participants in swap transactions and swap agreements by introducing an ‘extremely broad’ definition of swap agreements in order to ‘protect . . . all counterparties to these agreements.’” Id. citing In re Nat’l Gas Distribs., 556 F. 3d 247, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (Code definition of swap agreements “extremely broad, covering several dozen enumerated contracts and transactions, as well as combinations of them, options on them, and similar contracts or transactions.”). In short, explained the court, “Congress intended to place swap transactions totally beyond the inherently destabilizing effects of a bankruptcy and its attendant litigation.” Id.

    The court stressed the impropriety of permitting the litigation trust here “to order its litigation to delay swap-avoidance actions until it might stand solely in the shoes of the creditors.” Id. In its view, such a scheme “would not only run contrary to the expectations of the Bankruptcy Court in approving the Plan but would also make a mockery of Congress’s purpose of minimizing volatility in the swap markets.” Id.

    Effect on Market

    The debtor’s NYMEX “portfolio eventually embraced 20 percent of the nation’s crude oil inventory.” Id. at * 4. By “wearing her non-bankruptcy hat,” the trustee could, if her theory were accepted, “bring actions that would totally imperil the stability of this large corpus of swap positions,” thus increasing “the risk of uncertain, unpredictable, and therefore destabilizing market volatility.” Id. citing Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F. 3d 329, 338-39(2d Cir. 2011) (applying §546(e), after observing that “[w]e see no reason to think that undoing Enron’s redemption payments [totaling over $1 billion and about 200 noteholders] would not also have a substantial and similarly negative effect on the financial markets.”).

    Repackaging Claims Rejected

    The court rejected the trustee’s attempt to thwart Code §546(g) “by the simple device of conveying fraudulent [transfer] claims into a litigation trust for later use, repackaged as creditors’ state law fraudulent [transfer] claims.” Id. at * 4, citing Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2009); In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 274 B.R. 71, 96 (D. Del. 2002)(“Claims that Congress deemed unavoidable under sections 544(b) and 546(e) . . . cannot be avoided by simply re-labeling avoidance claims as [state law] unjust enrichment claims; if they could, the exemption set forth in section 546(e) would be rendered useless.”).

    Exception to Safe Harbor Inapplicable

    Section 546(g), like §546(e), provides an exception to the safe harbor for avoidance claims if the debtor made the transfer with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was . . . indebted.” In her complaint, the trustee relied on the “hinder, delay, or defraud” language so as to avoid the application of the §546(g) safe harbor. Nevertheless, the court found that the trustee had alleged “no facts to support this conclusory allegation, and the Trustee has not pursued the matter further.” Id. at * 2n.4. Relying on the language of the Code, without more, will not survive a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7009, making Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) applicable (“In alleging fraud . . ., a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . .”); Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 673-74 (D.R.I. 1998) (Rule 9(b) satisfied when plaintiff alleged “underlying facts, the transfers alleged to be fraudulent, the reasons those transfers are allegedly fraudulent, and the roles of defendants in the transfers”; defendants had “notice of the allegations against them . . . .”).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or the author.

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  • Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule Regarding Supervision of Nonbanks That Pose Risks to Consumers

    Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule Regarding Supervision of Nonbanks That Pose Risks to Consumers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule Regarding Supervision of Nonbanks That Pose Risks to Consumers

    July 18, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 26, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “Bureau”) issued a final rule setting forth procedures for determining whether a nonbank covered person should be brought within its supervisory authority pursuant to Section 1024(a)(1)(C) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Act”). The Act authorizes the Bureau to supervise “nonbank covered persons”[1] when the Bureau has reasonable cause to determine that such persons are engaging, or have engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with regard to the offering or provision of consumer financial products or services. The Bureau’s reasonable cause determination must be based on complaints collected by the Bureau; however, the Bureau may also include information collected from other sources. Considerations relevant to the Bureau’s assessment of risk include whether the nonbank covered person’s conduct involves potentially unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or otherwise violates applicable federal consumer financial law.

    In addition to the Bureau’s Section 1024(a)(1)(C) supervisory authority, the Bureau also has supervisory authority over: (1) nonbank covered persons of any size that offer or provide: (a) residential mortgage loans, including origination, servicing, or brokerage services; (b) private education loans; and (c) payday loans; and (2) larger participants of markets of other consumer financial products or services, which the Bureau defines by rule. The procedures established by the final rule will be used only to assess whether a nonbank covered person will be subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority based on a reasonable cause determination. Therefore, the Bureau will likely have no reason to make such a determination if a nonbank covered person is already subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority pursuant to one of the other enumerated bases.[2]

    Nonbank covered persons subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority will be required to provide reports and to permit the Bureau to conduct examinations on a periodic basis for the purposes of: (1) assessing compliance with the requirements of federal consumer financial law; (2) obtaining information about activities and compliance systems or procedures; and (3) detecting and assessing risks to consumers and to markets for consumer financial products and services. This supervisory authority extends to all of the nonbank covered person’s activities involving consumer financial products or services, not just the products or services that rendered the nonbank covered person subject to supervision.

    The final rule outlines a four-part process that the Bureau must follow when making its reasonable-cause determination:

    1.   Issuance of Notice of Reasonable Cause. The Bureau will initiate the supervisory process by delivering a Notice of Reasonable Cause (“Notice”) to a person stating that the Bureau may have reasonable cause to determine that the respondent (“Respondent”) is a nonbank covered person that is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with regard to consumer financial products or services. Under the final rule, a Notice does not constitute a notice of charges for any alleged violation of federal consumer financial law or other law.

    2.   Opportunity to Respond. The Respondent may provide a written response to the Bureau within 30 days of receipt of a Notice, including a request for an opportunity to present a supplemental oral response in person or by telephone. Failure to respond in a timely manner to a Notice will result in a waiver of the right to respond and may result in a default determination. Alternatively, the Respondent may voluntarily consent to the Bureau’s authority.[3] The proceedings under the final rule are informal and do not constitute an adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. Accordingly, no discovery is permitted, as a supplemental oral response does not constitute a hearing on the record, and no witnesses may be called.

    3.   Determinations. The Associate Director of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending will make a recommended determination to the Director of the Bureau within: (a) 45 days after receiving a timely filed response; (b) 45 days after the service of a Notice when a Respondent fails to file a timely response; or (c) 90 days after service of a Notice if the Respondent requests an opportunity to present an oral response. The Director will make a determination whether to adopt the Associate Director’s recommended determination within 45 days.

    4.   Post-Determination Procedures. If the Director subjects the Respondent to the Bureau’s supervision, the Respondent must wait two years before it can petition for termination of the order. The Respondent may only submit one petition per year. Not later than 90 days after submission of a petition, the Director will issue a written decision either terminating or modifying the order, or denying the petition.

    Due to the short 30-day time frame permitted for response, nonbank covered persons should be proactive in compiling documents, records, or other evidence that supports why they should not be subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority. To be prepared for a Notice, nonbank covered persons should focus on managing indicia of consumer risk, including their procedures for handling consumer complaints, and should review their compliance with all aspects of federal consumer financial law.

    Authored by Joseph P. Vitale, Diana Whitaker and Donald J. Mosher.

    SRZ summer associate Emily Goodman (not admitted) assisted in the preparation of this Alert.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The final rule, effective Aug. 2, 2013, applies to any person that engages in offering or providing consumer financial products or services,including their affiliated service providers. It does not apply to insured depository institutions or credit unions, or, in the case of such entities with assets of more than $10 billion, their affiliates. The final rule is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-07-03/pdf/2013-15485.pdf.

    [2] Potentially, however, if the Bureau believed that a nonbank covered person qualified for supervision under another provision of Section 1024 and such entity disagreed, and the Bureau believed that there might be reasonable cause to determine that the nonbank covered entity was engaging, or had engaged, in conduct that posed a risk to consumers, the Bureau could use the procedures set forth in the final rule to establish supervisory authority under Section 1024(a)(1)(C).

    [3] A Respondent’s voluntary consent can be given in one of two ways: (1) by completing and executing the consent agreement provided with the Notice; or (2) by negotiating a consent agreement with the Bureau. If the Respondent chooses the former option, the respondent will be subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority for two years before the respondent may petition for a termination order. Alternatively, if the Respondent chooses the latter option, the duration of supervision must be specified in the negotiated consent agreement.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Supreme Court’s DOMA Decision Sparks Changes in Employee Benefits

    Supreme Court’s DOMA Decision Sparks Changes in Employee Benefits

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court’s DOMA Decision Sparks Changes in Employee Benefits

    July 16, 2013

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 26, in a 5-4 decision called a “historic step forward” by President Obama, Justice Kennedy announced the Supreme Court’s long-awaited decision to strike down a key part of the Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA. Section 3 of DOMA defined “marriage” as a legal union between members of the opposite sex and defined “spouse” as an individual of the opposite sex for purposes of all federal laws. The Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Windsor that Section 3 of DOMA violated basic due process and equal protection as it prohibited same-sex couples who are legally married in the states in which they reside from enjoying many of the federal benefits opposite-sex married couples enjoy, including social security benefits, certain pension and welfare benefits and rights, favorable estate tax treatment and the ability to file joint tax returns.

    Section 2 of DOMA, however, which was not before the Court, still does not require states to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages performed in other states that have legalized same-sex marriage. In addition, the Court simultaneously ruled in another decision that it did not have proper jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a state law that prohibits same-sex marriage in California. Because Section 2 of DOMA remains valid law, it appears that states can continue to prohibit same-sex marriages regardless of the Court’s decision to strike down Section 3 of DOMA. Currently, only the following states and the District of Columbia have legalized, or have passed legislation that will legalize, same-sex marriages: Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington.

    The Court’s rulings have raised many questions. Though it is now clear that same-sex, legally wed spouses are eligible for the same benefits as opposite-sex spouses, it remains unclear: (1) whether the rulings are retroactive to 1996; (2) how employers and plan sponsors must implement the rulings; and (3) how plans can administer benefits for same-sex couples that were legally wed in a state that has legalized or recognizes same-sex marriages but now reside in a state that has not legalized, or does not recognize, same-sex marriages. To help ease confusion, President Obama has ordered all federal agencies to comply with the Court’s rulings as quickly and smoothly as possible, so plan sponsors should expect additional guidance over the coming months clarifying how and when the Court’s decision will affect the more than 1,300 laws, regulations and programs that rely on DOMA’s definition of “spouse” and “marriage.”

    Employers and other benefit plan sponsors of tax-qualified pension and welfare benefit plans should be aware of the following potential changes they may need to make to their plan documents, participant communications, payroll systems and employment practices while waiting for the agencies to issue guidance on how to implement these changes:

    Pension Benefits. If an employer sponsors a tax-qualified pension plan, the plan must provide same-sex spouses with certain benefits and protections:

    • Survivor Annuities. Pension plans must provide that same-sex spouses are eligible to receive benefits under a pension plan’s Qualified Joint and Survivor, Optional and Pre-Retirement Annuities. Same-sex spouses must also provide written notarized consent to an alternate form of benefit like a lump-sum payment.
    • Beneficiary Designations. 401(k) plans must now treat same-sex spouses as the automatic beneficiary for a distribution upon a participant’s death, unless the spouse consents to the participant’s designation of an alternate beneficiary.
    • Minimum Required Distributions. If a participant dies prior to commencing receipt of his or her plan benefit, that participant’s same-sex spouse can now defer receipt of distributions until the participant would have attained age 70 ½ (and can receive such distributions over a longer period of time).
    • Loans. If a plan requires spousal consent for a loan, same-sex spouses must now consent to a participant’s request for a loan.
    • Hardship Distributions.Plans must now treat same-sex spouses as the primary beneficiary of a hardship distribution, which will allow for distributions due to the medical, tuition or funeral expenses of the same-sex spouse.
    • QDROs. A same-sex spouse who obtains a divorce will now be able to receive a portion of his or her former spouse’s pension benefits under a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”).
    • Rollovers. A same-sex spouse who receives a distribution upon the death of his or her spouse, will now be able to roll over the distribution to his or her own IRA or plan, rather than an inherited IRA.

    Health Benefits. If an employer sponsors a group health plan, the plan must provide same-sex spouses with certain benefits and protections:

    • Taxation of Health Benefits. Generally, the cost of providing health coverage is tax deductible for employers, and the cost of such coverage and the amount of benefits received are excluded from an employee’s income (including amounts for coverage and benefits for spouses). Even though prior to the Court’s rulings employers could offer coverage to employees’ same-sex spouses, such health coverage was treated as taxable income to the employee. After the Court’s decision, employees will be able to pay for their same-sex spouses’ health coverage on a pre-tax basis. Further, there will be no payroll taxes (FICA or FUTA) on the value of employer-provided coverage to same-sex spouses.
    • Reimbursements of Medical Expenses. Employees can use arrangements that provide for reimbursement of qualified medical expenses, including flexible spending accounts (“FSAs”), health savings accounts (“HSAs”) or health reimbursement accounts (“HRAs”), to pay for their same-sex spouse’s medical expenses on a tax-free basis, regardless of the spouse’s status as a federal tax dependent.
    • COBRA. Employers must provide same-sex spouses the opportunity to elect to continue their health coverage under COBRA if employees lose coverage in a manner that would give rise to a COBRA obligation.
    • HIPAA. Employers must permit same-sex spouses to enroll in their group health plans if an employee or the employee’s same-sex spouse has a special enrollment right under HIPAA. For example, if the same-sex spouse loses coverage under his or her own plan, that spouse is immediately eligible to enroll in the employer’s group health plan.
    • DCAP. Employees can now use their dependent care assistance program (“DCAP”) accounts on a pre-tax basis to cover expenses incurred for the care of the dependents of same-sex spouses.
    • FMLA. Employers will now be required to provide employees with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in order to care for their same-sex spouses under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

    Action Items

    It is important for employers and other benefit plan sponsors in states that have legalized same-sex marriage or that recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states to review existing benefit programs and policies to determine the scope of any necessary changes or clarifications that may be required as a result of the Court’s decision, including:

    • Reviewing and analyzing existing HR policies and procedures, including employee handbooks, to assess the current rights of same-sex spouses, and consider any changes;
    • Reviewing benefit plan documents, summary plan descriptions, enrollment forms, distribution forms, beneficiary designation forms, consent forms and administrative procedures to assess the current rights of same-sex spouses and consider any changes;
    • Conferring with insurance providers and third party administrators, and working with payroll departments to address taxation and withholding concerns; and
    • Communicating the applicable rules and changes, once made, to employees and their family members.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman , Ronald E. Richman , Susan E. Bernstein and Melissa J. Sandak .

    If you have any questions about the Court’s ruling or its impact on your benefit plans please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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