Content Type: Article

  • Accommodations for Disabilities Under the New York City Human Rights Law

    Accommodations for Disabilities Under the New York City Human Rights Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Accommodations for Disabilities Under the New York City Human Rights Law

    November 26, 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005, N.Y.C. Local Law No. 85 (2005) (the “Restoration Act”) amended the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) by requiring that its provisions “be construed independently from similar or identical provisions of New York State or Federal statutes.” Thus, in Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 477-78 (2011), the New York Court of Appeals declared that the NYCHRL should be interpreted “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible.”

    For employers in New York City, the presumption of a broad, pro-plaintiff reading of the NYCHRL is likely to have considerable significance in the disability discrimination context, as demonstrated by the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, No. 152, 2013 N.Y. LEXIS 2755 (Oct. 10, 2013).In Romanello, the plaintiff worked as an executive at his employer’s financial services firm for approximately 25 years before being diagnosed with multiple medical disorders, including depression. After the employee missed almost five months of work, his employer informed him that his FMLA leave would soon expire and that it would “appreciate knowing whether he intends to return to work or abandon his position.” In response, the employee’s counsel told the employer of the employee’s illness and that the illness prevented the employee “from working in any capacity.” The employee’s counsel also stated that his client had not “at any time evinced or expressed an intention to abandon his position,” and that his return-to-work date was “indeterminate.” The employer apparently construed the employee’s response as a request for an indefinite leave of absence, which courts previously had held to be unreasonable, both as a matter of federal and state law. The employer terminated the employee’s employment.

    The employee then commenced an action claiming, among other things, that the employer had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and the NYCHRL. After losing on his disability claim in the lower courts, the employee appealed to the Court of Appeals. Consistent with prior decisions under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the NYSHRL, the state high court confirmed that “indefinite leave is not considered a reasonable accommodation” under the NYSHRL.However, the Court stated, unlike “the State HRL (as well as the ADA) . . . there is no accommodation (whether it be indefinite leave time or any other need created by a disability) that is categorically excluded from the universe of ‘reasonable accommodation’ under the [NYCHRL].” Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted).

    The Court of Appeals held that an employer has a higher burden of proof under the NYCHRL. Under both the ADA and the NYSHRL, the employee has the burden of proving that a reasonable accommodation exists that would allow the individual to perform the essential functions of the job. The Romanello court reasoned, however, that unlike its federal and state law counterparts, the NYCHRL “definition of ‘disability’ does not include the term ‘reasonable accommodation’ or the ability to perform a job in a reasonable manner. Rather, the [NYCHRL] defines ‘disability’ solely in terms of impairments.” Id. at *6. The NYCHRL “provides an affirmative defense if the employee cannot, with reasonable accommodation, satisfy the essential requisites of the job.” Id. Therefore, the Court continued, under the NYCHRL “the employer, not the employee, has the ‘pleading obligation’ to prove that the employee could not, with reasonable accommodation, satisfy the essential requisites of the job.” Id. The Court of Appeals reinstated the employee’s cause of action for disability discrimination under the NYCHRL, because the employer did not meet its pleading or proof burden.

    These significantly higher pleading and proof standards for employers not only change how employers will respond to claims under the NYCHRL in their pleadings, but also will make it more difficult for employers to obtain summary judgment dismissing claims under the NYCHRL. The Court’s interpretation of the NYCHRL also highlights the importance of exploring possible accommodations with disabled employees, documenting carefully the steps taken during the necessary “interactive process” between the employee and the employer, and ensuring that adverse employment decisions with respect to disabled employees are justified.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the following attorneys: Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman and Holly H. Weiss.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Derivatives Update: ESMA Announces the Approval of Trade Repositories and Central Reporting Obligation Date

    Derivatives Update: ESMA Announces the Approval of Trade Repositories and Central Reporting Obligation Date

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Derivatives Update: ESMA Announces the Approval of Trade Repositories and Central Reporting Obligation Date

    13 November 2013

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) press release dated 7 November 2013,[1] the pan-European regulator announced that it had approved the first trade repositories. Trade repositories are firms that collect and maintain the records of derivatives contracts. The registrations will take effect on 14 November 2013, with the reporting obligation beginning 90 calendar days after the official registration date on 12 February 2014. The obligation to report impacts all EU counterparties, counterparties trading with an EU counterparty and central counterparties.[2]

    The Regulation on Derivatives Transactions, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (also known as “EMIR”)[3] sets out framework requirements in relation to: (i) central clearing; (ii) reporting of derivative trades to trade repositories; and (iii) risk mitigation obligations. Certain obligations are expanded upon and given effect by regulatory technical standards (“RTS”) published by the European Commission. The reporting obligation may be met by reporting to any ESMA-approved trade repository.

    The trade repositories approved by ESMA are:

    • DTCC Derivatives Repository Ltd. (DDRL), based in the United Kingdom;
    • Krajowy Depozyt Papierów Wartosciowych S.A. (KDPW), based in Poland;
    • Regis-TR S.A., based in Luxembourg; and
    • UnaVista Ltd, based in the United Kingdom.

    ESMA stated in its press release that it is currently processing further applications from trade repositories.

    EMIR’s reporting requirement applies to all derivative trades, whether they are entered bilaterally (OTC) or are exchange traded derivatives. Trade details must be reported no later than the working day (T+1) following the conclusion, modification or termination of the trade. Transactions between non-EU counterparties (also called “third-country entities”) will be reported when entered into with an EU counterparty. EMIR permits counterparties to delegate the reporting of the trade to their counterparties or third parties however, it should be noted that the delegating party, such as an alternative investment fund, remains responsible for its own regulatory obligation under EMIR.

    Alternative investment managers should consider engaging with trade repositories with a view of establishing a reporting environment or engage with their service providers now to discuss the delegation of the reporting to such service provider for this purpose.

    The reporting obligation applies to any trades which were outstanding on the date EMIR came into force (16 August 2012) and are still outstanding on 12 February 2014. There is a three-year deferral to 12 February 2017 for trades (i) that were entered into prior to 16 August 2012 and were outstanding on 16 August 2012and (ii) trades that were entered into on or after 16 August 2012, but in each case that are not outstanding on 12 February 2014, the date EMIR’s reporting obligation begins.

    Authored by Craig Stein and Ron Feldman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] http://www.esma.europa.eu/news/PRESS-RELEASE-ESMA-registers-DDRL-KDPW-Regis-TR-and-UnaVista-trade-repositories.

    [2] Title II, Article 9(1) of EMIR.

    [3] Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 is also known as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

    In depth
    Authors

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Patent Strategies in the Focus of Art. 102 TFEU – The Concept of Abuse of Power According to AstraZeneca

    ARTICLE

    Patent Strategies in the Focus of Art. 102 TFEU – The Concept of Abuse of Power According to AstraZeneca

    November, 2013

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Deniz Tschammler authored the article “Patentstrategien im Fokus von Artikel 102 AEUV – Der Begriff des Machtmissbrauchs nach AstraZeneca“, featured in WuW 2013, p. 1071-1079. in November 2013.

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  • Reminder for Fund Managers on the November 20 Identity Theft Red Flags Rules Deadline

    Reminder for Fund Managers on the November 20 Identity Theft Red Flags Rules Deadline

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reminder for Fund Managers on the November 20 Identity Theft Red Flags Rules Deadline

    November 6, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 10, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission approved joint final identity theft rules, codified as Regulation S-ID (“Identity Theft Red Flags”) by the SEC and as new subpart C (“Identity Theft Red Flags”) to Part 162 by the CFTC.[1] Managers registered with the SEC or the CFTC must make determinations of coverage (and may have to implement responsive policies) by Nov. 20, 2013.

    Are You Covered?

    Whether a manager is covered by these SEC and CFTC Red Flags Rules — and what the manager’s obligations are under those rules — depends in large part on the answers to two questions:

    1. Whether the manager would be categorized as a “financial institution” or a “creditor”[2] under the Red Flags Rules and, if so,

    2. Whether the manager holds “covered accounts.”

    Financial Institution Determination. A “financial institution” is a person that offers and maintains “transaction accounts” (i.e., accounts that permit withdrawals for the purpose of making payments or transfers to third persons) for “consumers” (i.e., natural persons). In issuing the Red Flags Rules, the regulators expressly directed private fund managers to review whether they are covered financial institutions; the adopting release states that if a registered investment adviser to a private fund “has the authority . . . to direct [redemption proceeds] . . . to third parties, then that adviser would indirectly hold a transaction account.”

    Following the issuance of the final rule text, a number of managers initially determined that they were not covered by the rule because their managed accounts and fund interests do not constitute transaction accounts. This initial conclusion was often supported by the general prohibition against sending redemption proceeds to a person or account not reflected on the subscription agreement or a similar document. However, many of these managers subsequently concluded that they would likely permit transactions to accommodate investors’ estate planning, charitable giving, and other requests and that those transactions could cause a fund interest to fall within the definition of “transaction account.”

    Covered Account Determination. Managers that may qualify as covered financial institutions and that have natural persons as clients or investors in funds that they manage would have obligations under the Red Flags Rules if they maintain “covered accounts” (i.e., accounts primarily for personal, family or household purposes that permit multiple payments or transactions or accounts for which there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of identity theft). Managers concluding that they are (or might be) financial institutions generally have also concluded that the private fund interests that they directly or indirectly manage could satisfy at least one of the prongs of the covered account definition (and, therefore, that the manager may be covered by the Red Flags Rules).

    What Obligations Do Covered Managers Have?

    Managers covered by the Red Flags Rules have to design, adopt and manage an identity theft prevention program, which — among other things — must include policies and procedures designed to:

    • Identify;
    • Detect; and
    • Respond appropriately to identity theft “red flags.”

    A covered manager also has an express obligation to actively administer, review and update the program. This would generally be expected to include training, periodic reviews and testing (all of which would generally be directed at the manager’s personnel and at third-party service providers, such as administrators, who directly or indirectly participate in the identity theft prevention effort).

    As with all compliance policies, a good identity theft prevention program will be tailored to the manager’s specific business and the risks that it presents.

    What Are My Next Steps?

    Managers who have not adopted an identity theft prevention program should review their assumptions and confirm whether their initial conclusions are still valid. All managers must either implement a prevention program (or confirm that they are exempt) by Nov. 20, 2013.

    For private fund managers, an important part of an identity theft prevention program will be clear communication with the administrator for any private funds. Managers should review the administrator’s identity theft procedures (or get representations as to their key provisions and protections) and ensure that the administrator will not take any unilateral actions that would require further investigation or other actions under the manager’s policies. For many managers, this means that they will require the administrator to agree not to take, without the specific approval of the manager, actions such as the following:

    • Not to direct any redemption proceeds to an account not listed in the original subscription document;
    • Not to change wire instructions;
    • Not to partition, retitle, or otherwise change any indicia of ownership of an investment or account (including changes purportedly for estate planning and domestic relations reasons); or
    • Not to consent to liens or control agreements being placed on an investment or account.

    Our experience to date is that many managers already have arrangements in place with their administrators (albeit often informal and undocumented) that approximate these safeguards.

    As a related matter, managers may also want to review, update or formalize their information security program in conjunction with the implementation of an identity theft prevention program.

    What Resources Are Available?

    SRZ’s Alert, “Update on Privacy Requirements Affecting Private Investment Fund Managers” (published in 2010 prior to the Dodd-Frank changes), discusses much of the substance covered by the identity theft rules. The firm also conducted a webinar on May 14, 2013 regarding the rules. SRZ clients who were not able to log in to the webinar, or would like a refresher, can contact their SRZ attorney for access to a replay of the webinar. SRZ also has a team of attorneys drawn from our investment management and bank regulatory practices available to assist clients on interpreting the Red Flags Rules and in designing, reviewing and applying responsive policies. Clients should feel free to contact their SRZ attorney or one of the authors of this Alert with any questions or requests for assistance.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly, Marc E. Elovitz and Jessica Sklute.


    [1] The SEC and the CFTC were mandated to issue identity theft regulations by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which transferred identity theft rulemaking responsibility and enforcement authority over registered investment advisers and commodity pool operators (and commodity trading advisors) to the SEC and CFTC. Prior to Dodd-Frank’s amendment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, identity theft regulatory responsibility for these entities resided with the Federal Trade Commission.

    [2] In our experience, few managers have satisfied the definition of a “creditor” (i.e., a person that “regularly extends, renews or continues credit . . . [and] advances funds to or on behalf of a person . . .”) with respect to its advisory clients and investors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Confirmation that Fixed-Income Commissions Can Satisfy the Section 28(e) “Soft Dollars” Safe Harbor

    SEC Confirmation that Fixed-Income Commissions Can Satisfy the Section 28(e) “Soft Dollars” Safe Harbor

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    SEC Confirmation that Fixed-Income Commissions Can Satisfy the Section 28(e) “Soft Dollars” Safe Harbor

    October 29, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Registered investment advisers in the process of planning an annual compliance review will generally include a review of their best execution processes and their use of so-called “soft dollars.” Managers that trade in fixed-income securities may find it useful to review a no-action letter issued earlier this year by the Division of Trading and Markets of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This letter, granted to Carolina Capital Markets Inc.,[1] confirmed that institutional asset managers, in reliance on the safe harbor of Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, may purchase eligible third-party brokerage and research services with commissions generated by qualifying transactions in fixed-income securities.

    Background on the Section 28(e) Safe Harbor

    Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 creates a safe harbor that allows private fund managers (and other investment advisers), under certain circumstances, to use client commission payments to purchase eligible brokerage and research services. The Section 28(e) safe harbor protects a manager from a claim that it breached its “best execution” fiduciary duty by not selecting, in conjunction with a purchase of eligible brokerage and research services, the lowest commission rate available.

    The portion of a client commission that is used to purchase eligible research or brokerage services by a manager is referred to as “soft dollars.” To qualify for the Section 28(e) safe harbor, a “soft dollared” product or service must satisfy a three-step test:

    1. The manager must determine that the product or service is eligible “research”[2] or “brokerage.”[3]

    2. The manager must determine that the eligible research or brokerage product or service provides “lawful and appropriate assistance”[4] to the manager in making investment decisions.

    3. Finally, the manager must determine that the applicable commissions are reasonable in relation to the value of the products or services received.

    The Eligibility of Fixed-Income Commissions Under the Section 28(e) Safe Harbor

    The 1998 OCIE Soft Dollars Study. The use of fixed-income trades to generate soft dollars has been scrutinized for some time. In a 1998 study,[5] the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations focused on fixed-income trades in two contexts:

    First, OCIE noted in its review of problematic principal transactions that a small, but notable, percentage of the trades utilized to generate soft dollars in their sample came from fixed-income principal transactions. The study stated that the SEC staff “has long taken the position that advisers cannot claim the protection of Section 28(e) when generating soft dollar credits through principal trades[,]” and then went on to report that 3.6 percent of the advisers in its sample had earned soft dollar credits on principal trades of fixed-income securities. The study further noted that these fixed-income principal transactions were worrisome, among other reasons, because the confirmations of some of these trades

    “disclosed only the net amount of the trades and did not disclose commission amounts paid by clients . . . [and in] other arrangements, the price quoted may include an express or imputed mark-up or mark-down, a portion of which is used to generate soft dollar benefits.”

    Second, the study also scrutinized fixed-income soft dollar commissions in the context of a review of over-the-counter transactions. It found that 21 percent of the advisers in its sample earned research credits based on OTC agency trades for fixed-income securities, but

    “[b]ecause the OTC market is a dealer market (i.e., securities are normally traded on a principal, and not an agency, basis), the practice of receiving soft dollar credits based on OTC agency transactions raises disclosure and best execution issues . . . because an agent is being interposed between an adviser’s client and an OTC market maker, [and therefore] the adviser is possibly causing the client to pay more than the lowest available cost to execute the trade. These concerns are heightened in the fixed-income market due to limited quote, trade and mark-up information available to advisers and their clients.”

    In other words, the study effectively concluded that the lack of transparency in commission rates and compensation amounts being paid to broker-dealers in fixed-income transactions, whether principal transactions or interposed OTC agency transactions, effectively put a client at risk of paying excessive commissions and therefore placed the transactions outside of the Section 28(e) safe harbor.

    2001 SEC Soft Dollars Guidance. Three years later, however, the SEC reconsidered its general policy of restricting the Section 28(e) safe harbor to agency transactions.[6] In the 2001 release, in recognition of advances in OTC transaction reporting, the SEC modified the interpretation of the term “commission” in Section 28(e) to include “a markup, markdown, commission equivalent or other fee paid by a managed account to a dealer for executing a transaction where the fee and transaction price are fully and separately disclosed on the confirmation and the transaction is reported under conditions that provide independent and objective verification of the transaction.”

    The effect of the 2001 release was to bring a subset of OTC transactions, i.e., those subject to an effective commission disclosure and reporting regime, within the Section 28(e) soft dollars safe harbor. This relief, however, did not expressly extend to fixed-income OTC transactions that were not part of the transaction reporting systems that the relief was predicated upon.

    2006 SEC Soft Dollars Guidance. In 2006, the SEC issued a release that provided a new set of comprehensive guidance on soft dollar practices.[7] The 2006 release reiterated the requirement that “money managers must make a good faith determination that commissions paid are reasonable in relation to the value of the products and services provided by broker-dealers[.]” It also clarified that “research services” are restricted to Section 28(e) “advice,” “analyses” and “reports” and that “brokerage services” within the safe harbor are those products and services that relate to the execution of the trade from the point at which the money manager communicates with the broker-dealer for the purpose of transmitting an order for execution, through the point at which funds or securities are delivered or credited to the advised account.

    The 2006 Release did not, however, specifically address fixed-income commissions other than to state that “[m]anagers may not use client funds to obtain brokerage and research services under the safe harbor in connection with fixed-income trades that are not executed on an agency basis, principal trades (except for certain riskless principal trades), or other instruments traded net with no explicit commissions” (italics added).

    2013 Carolina Capital No-Action Letter

    In 2013, Carolina Capital Markets Inc., which describes itself as a “leading provider of third party fixed income research with superior execution” requested a no-action letter, presumably to provide comfort to its clients, that would confirm that commissions from fixed-income trades can constitute eligible “soft dollars” under the Section 28(e) safe harbor.

    This request addresses a lack of clarity in the marketplace regarding fixed-income commissions. In Carolina Capital’s no-action request, its counsel stated:

    “Notwithstanding our view [that SEC guidance suggests that commissions from agency transactions in fixed-income securities can satisfy the Section 28(e) safe harbor] . . . CCM has indicated to us that there is a fairly widespread misconception among fixed-income asset managers that the Section 28(e) safe harbor is unavailable or its availability is in doubt for acquiring third-party research through fixed-income transactions executed on an agency basis.”

    By issuing its July 2013 no-action letter, the SEC staff confirmed that commissions from fixed-income trades conducted on an agency basis can qualify for the Section 28(e) safe harbor, and that commissions from these fixed-income trades may be used to purchase third-party research, assuming compliance with the other requirements of Section 28(e) and overall best execution.[8]

    This guidance will not extend to all fixed-income transactions, as many of these kinds of trades are conducted on a principal basis (or otherwise do not qualify), but for qualifying trades, private fund managers now have certainty on their ability to utilize the Section 28(e) safe harbor.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly and Marc E. Elovitz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Recent Employment Law Updates for New York Employers

    Recent Employment Law Updates for New York Employers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Recent Employment Law Updates for New York Employers

    October 24, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Employers in New York should be aware of: (1) recent New York State Department of Labor regulations on permissible deductions from wages; (2) changes to New York State unemployment insurance; and (3) a new New York City law requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions.

    New York State Regulations on Wage Deductions

    In September 2012, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed legislation that amended Section 193 of the New York State Labor Law (“Section 193”) to expand permissible employee wage deductions. The amendments were designed to counter the New York State Department of Labor’s view that only deductions specifically enumerated under Section 193 were permitted. See SRZ’s Sept. 11, 2012 Alert, “New York Expands Permissible Employee Wage Deductions.” On Oct. 9, 2013, the state’s Department of Labor’s regulations on permissible deductions took effect. The regulations address when deductions from an employee’s wages for the benefit of the employee comply with Section 193. Employers most likely will focus on the detailed regulations for deductions of overpayments and advances.

    Deductions for Overpayments

    Section 193(1)(c) now expressly permits an employer to make deductions from an employee’s wages for “an overpayment of wages where such overpayment is due to a mathematical or other clerical error by the employer.” Under the regulations, prior to any deduction for overpayments, the employer must provide the employee with notice, within a specified time period, of its intent to make such deductions. The notice must also specify the amounts and dates the deductions will be made. Employers may only recover overpayments that were made in the eight weeks prior to the issuance of the notice.[1] The regulations also set a maximum amount that may be deducted from each wage payment due to an overpayment.

    Deductions for Advances

    Section 193(1)(d) now expressly permits an employer to make deductions from an employee’s wage for “repayment of advances of salary or wages made by the employer to the employee.” An “advance” is the “provision of money by the employer to the employee based on the anticipation of earning of future wages.” Loans are not advances. Under the regulations, the employer and employee must agree to the timing and duration of the repayment deduction, and the employee must give written authorization for the deductions to be made before any advance is made. No further advance may be made or deducted until any existing advance is repaid in full. If an employer gives an employee anything in excess of the agreed amount, the excess may not be recovered through wage deductions.

    Employee Disputes of Overpayments and Advances

    The regulations provide for specific procedures that each employer must establish to allow employees to dispute an overpayment and the terms of recovery or dispute the amount and frequency of deductions for advances.

    New York State Unemployment Insurance Reform

    Several changes to the New York State Unemployment Insurance system recently became effective and other important changes will take effect next year.

    Effective Oct. 1, 2013, the New York State Department of Labor must receive an employer’s response to a notice of potential charges to the employer’s account within 10 calendar days of the date on the claim notice. If there is an overpayment to a claimant due to an employer’s late response or a response with insufficient information, the employer will not be able to receive a credit to its account. Employers soon may use the newly established online State Information Data Exchange System (SIDES) to receive and respond to inquiries from the Department of Labor.

    Changes that will take effect Jan. 1, 2014 include:

    • The basis on which employers’ unemployment insurance premiums are calculated is changing and, due to the insolvency of the unemployment insurance system, the six lowest rates for employers are being eliminated. These changes will likely increase many employers’ unemployment insurance costs going forward.
    • If a claimant receives severance or dismissal pay which exceeds the maximum weekly benefit rate, the claimant will not be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits during any week that the claimant is receiving dismissal pay, and no day within such week will be considered a day of total unemployment. Dismissal pay does not include payments for pension, retirement, accrued leave, and health insurance or payments for supplemental unemployment benefits. This provision does not apply if the initial payment of dismissal pay is made more than 30 days from the last day of the claimant’s employment. Employers will need to consider this change in the law when structuring separation agreements.
    • If a claimant is collecting pension benefits from the employer and that employer contributed to the pension, the claimant’s unemployment benefits will be reduced by the amount of the prorated weekly amount of the pension.

    New York City Pregnancy Accommodation

    On Oct. 2, 2013, Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed into law an amendment to the New York City Human Rights Law that requires employers with four or more employees to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions, unless the employer can prove that the accommodation would cause an undue hardship. Prior to the passage of this amendment, employers were required to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled employees under various federal, state and city laws, but pregnancy was not, in and of itself, a disability. The law provides examples of the types of reasonable accommodations employers may be expected to provide, such as restroom breaks, breaks to facilitate increased water intake, periodic rest for those who stand for long periods of time and assistance with manual labor. Employers are required to provide employees with written notice of their rights under the law in a form and manner to be determined by the New York City Commission on Human Rights. New employees must be notified of their rights at the commencement of their employment beginning on Jan. 30, 2014 and existing employees must be notified prior to May 30, 2014.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the following attorneys: Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold and Adam B. Gartner.


    [1] After notice is given, an employer may make deductions for a period of up to six years to recoup the overpayment.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam B. Gartner

    Special Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • A Decade of Lessons From Litigating State Tax False Claims Act Cases

    ARTICLE

    A Decade of Lessons From Litigating State Tax False Claims Act Cases

    October 14, 2013

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
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  • Reminder for Private Fund Managers: New Form D Is In Effect

    Reminder for Private Fund Managers: New Form D Is In Effect

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reminder for Private Fund Managers: New Form D Is In Effect

    October 3, 2013

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A new Form D is now effective and must be utilized by private fund managers in making future filings and amendments. Changes to this form were needed as a result of recent changes to the Regulation D private placement safe harbor, including (1) a new set of procedures for issuers to follow in conducting certain general solicitation activities within a private placement safe harbor and (2) the imposition of certain “bad actor” disqualifications that now apply to all Regulation D offerings.

    Private fund managers not conducting a “general solicitation” will need to check a box marked “Rule 506(b)” (as opposed to “Rule 506”) and — by signing the Form D — to certify that the issuing fund is not subject to any “bad actor” disqualification.

    Form D Overview

    Rule 503 of Regulation D requires that any issuer offering or selling securities in reliance on Rule 506 (which many private funds utilize), Rule 505 or Rule 504 must file a Form D with the SEC for each new offering of securities. These filings are required to be made no later than 15 calendar days after the first sale of securities in the offering and are generally made electronically through the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual and other updating amendments, also generally made through EDGAR, are required.

    Form D currently[1] requires the consideration of 16 numbered items; issuers are required to provide information such as:

    • The name of the issuer;
    • The issuer’s year and place of incorporation or organization;
    • Information about certain related persons (e.g., executive officers, directors and promoters);
    • The exemption or exemptions being claimed for the offering;
    • Certain information regarding placement agents and other solicitors; and
    • Factual information about the offering, such as its duration, the type of securities offered, the total offering amount and certain disclosures on intended uses of the offering’s proceeds.

    One point that was made clear in the three SEC releases[2] adopting the changes described above (and proposing additional changes to Regulation D) (collectively, the “Reg D Releases”) is that the SEC views Form D data as an important source of information. The SEC staff has noted that effective rulemaking is predicated on accurate marketplace data and that existing Form D disclosures are deemed not to be sufficient.

    New Changes to Form D

    In the Reg D Releases, the SEC adopted two changes to Form D that are relevant to private fund managers:

    • The first relevant change was to “rename” a check box under Item 6 (“Federal Exemptions and Exclusions Claimed”) from “Rule 506” to “Rule 506(b)” and to add another option for “Rule 506(c)” (general solicitation). By “renaming” the Rule 506 indicator, the SEC effectively bridged the old and new forms by equating Rule 506 elections on the old form with Rule 506(b) filings on the new Form D.New filings and amendments to existing filings,[3] therefore, will require the issuer to make an express choice (i.e., 506(b) or 506(c)), but amendments solely to reassert a Rule 506(b) claim are not necessary. In other words, in future Form D filings and amendments, private fund managers not employing general solicitation will now check “Rule 506(b)” instead of “Rule 506” and issuers seeking to utilize Rule 506(c)’s general solicitation option on a prospective basis will need to affirmatively amend and elect that option in a timely manner.[4] (If you rely on Schulte Roth & Zabel to make your Form D filings and you intend to make a general solicitation under Rule 506(c), please notify us of your intention as soon as possible.)
    • The second change that affects private funds involves a new “bad actor” certification to be made by issuers claiming a Regulation D exemption. This certification, found in the signature block of the new Form D, states that “the issuer is not disqualified from relying on Regulation D for one of the reasons stated in Rule 505(b)(2)(iii) or Rule 506(d).” All Regulation D issuers will be required to make this certification.

    These changes are currently in effect and a paper version of the new Form D can be found at: www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.

    Next Steps

    In the wake of the Reg D Releases and the new and proposed changes to Regulation D, all private fund managers should review their controls around the Form D reporting of sales of unregistered interests and other securities. In the new environment, accuracy, completeness and timeliness are all important. In addition, given the Rule 506(d) certification, managers should confirm that their diligence procedures satisfy the “reasonable care” exception under the “bad actor” disqualification rules.

    In terms of actually making the required filings, managers should: (1) ensure that all personnel in the data-gathering and reporting chain understand the differences between a Rule 506(b) offering and a Rule 506(c) offering and (2) know which option each managed fund is pursuing. While we expect that most managers will — at least initially — be electing to continue conducting Rule 506(b) offerings, if and when that changes, a manager’s personnel and service providers should be informed of the change in advance.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly, Marc E. Elovitz and Jason S. Kaplan.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Additional changes to Form D have been proposed in Release No. 33-9416.

    [2] Release No. 33-9414, “Disqualification of Felons and Other ‘Bad Actors’ from Rule 506 Offerings“ (July 10, 2013); Release No. 33-9415, Release No. 34-69959, Release No. IA-3624 “Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings” (July 10, 2013); and Release No. 33-9416; Release No. 34-69960; Release No. IC-30595, “Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156” (July 10, 2013).

    [3] Proposed changes in the timing and content of Form D filings, and possible new consequences for failures to file, are the subject of Release No. 33-9416.

    [4] As a reminder, the SEC also cautioned issuers in the Reg D Releases that:- An issuer is not permitted to check both the Rule 506(b) and the Rule 506(c) boxes for the same offering; and – An issuer is precluded from making a claim of Rule 506(b) reliance subsequent to a general solicitation of purchasers in an offering.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Jason S. Kaplan

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The Nonprofit Revitalization Act of 2013

    The Nonprofit Revitalization Act of 2013

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Nonprofit Revitalization Act of 2013

    October 1, 2013

    Read time: 20 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Nonprofit Revitalization Act of 2013 (the “Act”), a bill reforming New York not-for-profit law based on the input of several leaders in the nonprofit community, has passed the New York State legislature unanimously. If signed by Governor Cuomo, the Act will become effective on July 1, 2014 and will be the first major modification of New York not-for-profit law in over 40 years.

    The Act amends the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, in addition to several other statutes relevant to nonprofit organizations, and seeks to reduce bureaucracy, enhance oversight and modernize governance. It applies to all nonprofits incorporated in New York.[1] This Alert summarizes several key provisions of the Act.[2] All New York not-for-profit organizations should review the Act and evaluate any changes it may necessitate to their existing governance structure and oversight procedures.

    Classifications

    Under the Act, theType A, B, C and D classifications[3] are eradicated, and nonprofits will be classified as either “charitable” or “non-charitable.” Nonprofits that have already formed as Type A, B, C or D are not required to make any submissions or filings with a new classification. Type B and C organizations, as well as Type D organizations formed for a charitable purpose, will be automatically considered “charitable.” Type A and all other Type D entities will be considered “non-charitable.”

    Electronic Communication

    The Act provides that copies of board and membership meeting notices may be transmitted by fax or email and posted on the homepage of any website maintained by the nonprofit organization. Electronic communication may also be used for waiver of notice, proxy designations by members and for members and directors to give unanimous written consent in lieu of an in-person meeting. The Act also permits board members to participate in meetings through video communication (such as Skype), unless restricted by the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws. Participation through such means shall constitute in-person presence at a meeting, provided that all members can hear each other at the same time.

    Mandatory Conflicts of Interest Policy

    The Act creates a new Section 714-a which mandates that all nonprofits adopt a conflict-of-interest policy requiring its directors, officers and key employees to act in the nonprofit’s best interest. The conflict of interest policy must at a minimum include the following: (1) a definition of the circumstances that constitute a conflict of interest; (2) procedures for disclosing a conflict to the audit committee or the board; (3) a requirement that the individual with the conflict of interest not be present at or participate in board or committee deliberations or voting on the matter considering such conflict; (4) a prohibition on any attempt by the person with the conflict to influence board deliberations; (5) procedures for documenting the existence and resolution of the conflict; and (6) procedures for disclosing and addressing related-party transactions. Prior to the initial election of a director, and annually after that, such director must complete a written statement identifying any potential conflict of interest known to the director.

    Related-Party Transaction

    The Act prohibits nonprofits from entering into a transaction with a related party unless the nonprofit’s board determines that the transaction is fair, reasonable and in the nonprofit’s best interest.

    A “related party transaction” is defined by the Act as any transaction, agreement or other arrangement in which a related party has a financial interest and in which the corporation or any affiliate of the corporation is a participant. The definition of a “related party” is: (1) any director, officer or key employee of the corporation or any affiliate of the corporation; (2) any relative[4] of any director, officer or key employee; or (3) any entity in which any individual defined in (1) or (2) has a 35 percent or greater ownership or beneficial interest, or for a partnership or professional corporation, a direct or indirect ownership interest in excess of five percent.

    For charitable nonprofits, an independent board, or committee of the board, must: (1) consider alternative transactions to the extent available; (2) approve the transaction as fair and reasonable through a majority vote; and (3) contemporaneously document its approval of the transaction and consideration of alternative transactions. A related party is prohibited from participating in the deliberations or vote concerning the transaction, but may provide information relating to the transaction if requested. The Attorney General may bring an action to enjoin, void or rescind any transaction or proposed transaction between a nonprofit and a related party that was unreasonable or not in the best interest of the nonprofit at the time the transaction was approved.

    Mandatory Whistleblower Policy

    The Act creates a new Section 715-b which requiresnonprofits with 20 or more employees and an annual revenue in excess of $1 million in the prior fiscal year to adopt a whistleblower protection policy. The whistleblower policy must include: (1) procedures for reporting violations and suspected violations of laws or policies, including procedures for preserving the confidentiality of reported information; (2) a designated employee, officer or director tasked with administering the policy and reporting to the audit committee or other committee of independent directors[5] or if no such committees exist, to the board; and (3) a requirement that copies of the policy be provided to employees, officers, directors and volunteers.

    Audit and Financial Procedures

    All organizations subject to registration for charitable solicitation that have gross revenues in excess of $500,000 per year and are subject to the requirement to file an independent auditor’s report with the Attorney General[6] must have a designated audit committee of the board comprised of independent directors responsible for retaining an independent auditor and reviewing the results of the audit. The audit committee is also responsible for overseeing adoption, implementation and compliance with the conflicts of interest and whistleblower policies.

    The Act also raises the revenue thresholds for organizations conducting charitable solicitations in New York which are required to file financial reports with the Attorney General. Organizations with gross revenues under $250,000 (previously $100,000) must file unaudited financial statements signed by the chief financial officer and president or other authorized officer, under penalties of perjury. The Act raises the threshold from $250,000 to $500,000 for organizations that must file annual financial statements accompanied by an independent CPA’s audit report with an opinion that the financial statement and balance sheet fairly present the financial operations and position of the organization. Organizations with gross revenues in the $250,000 to $500,000 range must file audited financial reports with an independent CPA’s review report.

    Real Estate Transactions and Approval Requirements

    Currently, many nonprofits must obtain the approval of the New York Supreme Court and provide notice to the New York Attorney General before they may engage in certain transactions such as sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of substantially all assets. The Act provides a simplified process where the organization may seek approval of the Attorney General instead of going through a court proceeding for transactions such as dissolution, merger, consolidation and change of purposes. The Attorney General may either grant the action or require it to be submitted for the approval of the New York Supreme Court.

    In addition, the Act changes the requirement that organizations with an education purpose as defined by the New York Education Law seek approval of the New York Commissioner of Education prior to incorporation. Under the Act, only those organizations whose purpose is to operate a “school, university, library, museum, or historical society” must seek such approval. Other organizations need only provide notice to the Commissioner of Education within 10 days of incorporation.

    The Act lessens the voting requirements for certain real estate transactions. Under the Act, a simple majority vote will be required (instead of the current two-thirds vote) for any real estate transaction where the property does not constitute all, or substantially all, of the non-profit’s assets. If the property does constitute all or substantially all the assets, the voting requirement remains at two-thirds vote (unless there are 21 or more board members, in which case a majority is sufficient).

    Other

    The Act prohibits an employee from serving as chair of the board or in an officer position with similar responsibilities.[7] In addition, individuals may not be present or participate in any board or committee deliberation or vote concerning compensation if that individual may benefit from such compensation subject to the deliberation or vote. The Act further requires that all compensation paid to members, directors and officers, as well as key employees, be fair, reasonable and commensurate with the services provided to the organization. “Key employee” is defined as “any person who is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the corporation.”

    The Act includes a new definition of “entire board.” If the board size is provided as a range between a minimum and maximum number of trustees, any reference to the “entire board” refers to the number of trustees elected as of the most recent election. Finally, the Act simplifies the classification of board committees by eliminating any distinction between standing and special committees.

    If the Act becomes effective as anticipated, nonprofits incorporated in New York — and those required to register in New York to solicit contributions — should familiarize themselves with the Act’s extensive reforms.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman , Donna Lazarus , LaKeisha M. Caton and Daniel L. Greenberg .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The provision of the Act concerning financial audits and financial reporting to the Attorney General (as described herein and in the Act) applies more broadly to all nonprofits required to register in New York in order to solicit contributions.

    [2] View the full text of the Act.

    [3] Previously, nonprofits were classified as either: Type A (formed for any lawful non-business purpose including but not limited to civic, patriotic, political, social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and for a professional, commercial, industrial, trade or service association); Type B (formed for any one or more of the following non-business purposes: charitable, educational, religious, scientific, literary, cultural or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals); Type C (formed for any lawful business purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objective); or Type D (when such formation is authorized by any other corporate law of the state for any business or non-business, or pecuniary or non-pecuniary purpose specified by such other law).

    [4] A “relative” includes an individual’s spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, sibling, half-sibling, ancestor or the spouse of the individual’s child, grandchild, great-grandchild or sibling.

    [5] The Act includes a new definition of “Independent Director”: an individual who meets all of the following: (1) has not been an employee of, or does not have a relative that was a key employee of, the corporation or an affiliate of the corporation in the past three years; (2) has not received, or does not have a relative that has received, $10,000 or more in direct compensation from the corporation or an affiliate in the last three years (with the exception of expense reimbursement or reasonable compensation as a director); (3) is not a current employee of or does not have substantial financial interest in an entity that made or received payments from the corporation or an affiliate of more than $25,000 or two percent of the corporation’s gross revenue for property or services (whichever is less) in the last three years; and (4) does not have a relative who is a current officer of or has a substantial interest in an entity making or receiving payments of a similar amount to the organization in the past three years.

    [6] Pursuant to Section 172-b of the New York Executive Law.

    [7] This provision has an effective date of Jan. 1, 2015.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Seventh Circuit Changes Its Mind and Reverses “Inconsistent” District Court Fraudulent Transfer and Equitable Subordination Ruling

    Seventh Circuit Changes Its Mind and Reverses “Inconsistent” District Court Fraudulent Transfer and Equitable Subordination Ruling

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Changes Its Mind and Reverses “Inconsistent” District Court Fraudulent Transfer and Equitable Subordination Ruling

    September 4, 2013

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on Aug. 26, 2013 that an investment manager’s “failure to keep client funds properly segregated” and subsequent pledge of those funds “to secure an overnight loan” to stay in business may have constituted: (a) a fraudulent transfer to the lender; and (b) grounds for equitably subordinating the lender’s $312 million secured claim. In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc., 2013 WL 4505152, *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013) (“Sentinel II”). Reversing and remanding the case to the district court for further litigation because of “inconsistencies” in that court’s opinion, the Seventh Circuit found that the debtor manager’s “pledge of segregated funds as collateral for loans” was likely a fraudulent transfer based on an “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” creditors under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §548(a)(1)(A). Id., at 6.

    The court stressed that a “good faith-for-value” defense by the lender on remand will be “very difficult because it will have to prove that it was not on inquiry notice of [the debtor’s] possible insolvency.” Id., at *6 – *7n.2. On remand, the lower court also must, because of “inconsistencies throughout” its opinion, “clarify . . . exactly” what the lender knew and whether its “failure to investigate” the debtor was “reckless” or “deliberately indifferent.” Id., at *11. Missing from the recent Court of Appeals decision, however, was any mention of its earlier Aug. 9, 2012 decision (“Sentinel I”) affirming the district court on the same facts. 689 F. 3d 855, 863, 866 (debtor’s failure to segregate “client funds . . . not . . . sufficient to rule . . . that [debtor] acted with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud its customers”; “incompetence alone, however problematic, won’t require the equitable subordination of the [lender’s] lien.”).

    Relevance

    Sentinel II is of critical importance to so-called “rescue” lenders. A close reading of the facts shows that these loans are still risky, but feasible in certain cases. In terms of legal analysis, the decision deals with: (a) the meaning of the Code’s actual intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors’ language; (b) whether actual intent to cause harm to creditors must be proved; (c) what constitutes “egregious and conscience shocking” behavior for a lender’s claim to be subordinated on equitable grounds; and (d) whether the parties’ illegal behavior makes a contract intrinsically illegal. If nothing else, the case shows how the Seventh Circuit itself wrestled with this decision and changed its mind over a two-year period after oral argument on September 8, 2011. Indeed, the district court itself struggled with the issues following a seventeen-day bench trial. “After hearing from more than a dozen witnesses, listening to audio recordings between [the parties], and reviewing hundreds of exhibits,” it dismissed the trustee’s claims. Id., at *5.

    Facts

    The debtor investment manager had “marketed itself to its customers as providing a safe place to put their excess capital, assuring solid short-term returns, but also promising ready access to the capital.” Id., at *1. Its customers “were not typical investors; most of them were futures commission merchants” like broker-dealers in the securities industry. Id. In the debtor’s hands, its “client money could, in compliance with industry regulations governing such funds, earn a decent return while maintaining the liquidity” that clients needed. Id. “[The debtor] constructed a fail-safe system that virtually eliminates risk from short term investing,” said the debtor’s 2004 website. Id.

    The debtor “represented that it would maintain customer funds in segregated accounts as required under the Commodity Exchange Act.” Id. Thus, “at all times a customer’s accounts held assets equal to the amount [the debtor] owed the customer, and . . . [the debtor] treated and dealt with the assets ‘as belonging to such customer.’“ Id.

    The debtor “pooled customer assets in various portfolios, depending on whether the customer assets were” regulated or unregulated funds. Id. at *2. Because the debtor did not differentiate between its own funds and its customers’ non-segregated assets, it “could sell securities or borrow the money” whenever customers wanted their capital back.” Id. “This arrangement allowed [the debtor] to borrow large amounts of cash while pledging customers’ securities as collateral.” Id. Nevertheless, the debtor “maintained segregated accounts [with] assets that could not be subject to any [lender] lien.” Id. The lender agreed it had no lien and would “not assert” a “lien against securities held in a Segregated Account.” Id. Although the debtor was responsible “for keeping assets at appropriate levels of segregation,” the lender’s “main concern was ensuring that [the debtor] had sufficient collateral in the lienable accounts to keep its . . . loan secured.” Id., at *3.

    The debtor went through a liquidity crunch during the summer of 2007. Id. In a series of transactions, the debtor moved securities from segregated accounts to “lienable accounts.” Id., at *4. A lienable account, however, could contain only securities and other assets that belonged to the debtor or that were not subject to segregation. When the debtor’s “segregation deficit grew to $644 million, [the lender] became suspicious.” Id. A managing director of the lender emailed colleagues involved with the debtor’s accounts, asking how the debtor had “so much collateral? With less than [$2 million] in capital I have to assume that most of this collateral is for somebody else’s benefit. Do we really have rights on the whole $300MM?” Id. The lender’s officials knew the debtor “had an agreement that gave the [lender] a lien on any securities in clearing accounts.” Id. By Aug. 13, 2007, the debtor told its customers “that it was halting redemptions because of problems in the credit market,” causing the lender to cut the debtor’s “remote access to its systems, . . . [to send] its officials to [the debtor’s] offices, demand . . . full repayment of the loan, and threaten . . . to liquidate the collateral.” Id. The debtor then filed a Chapter 11 petition, owing the lender $312 million. Id.

    The court ordered the appointment of a trustee who later became the post-plan confirmation liquidating trustee. When the lender filed a $312 million secured claim, the trustee sued the lender, alleging that the debtor had “fraudulently used customer assets to finance the loan to cover its house trading activity”; the lender “knew about it and, as a result, acted inequitably and unlawfully,” giving rise to fraudulent transfer and equitable subordination claims, including invalidation of the lender’s lien. Id., at *5.

    The District Court

    The district court “dismissed the lien invalidation count on the pleadings,” and held a lengthy bench trial on the trustee’s other claims. According to the lower court, after trial, the trustee had “failed to prove that [the debtor] made the Transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors.” Id., at *5. The district court also “rejected the [trustee’s] preference claim because the [lender] was over-collateralized on the transfer dates.” Id. It further rejected the trustee’s equitable subordination claim “because it did not believe that [the lender’s] conduct was ‘egregious or conscience shocking,’“ reasoning that the lender’s employees “had no legal obligation . . . to seek out or analyze the data . . . that would have revealed [the debtor’s] misuse of the segregated funds.” Id.

    Attacking the lender’s secured claim, the trustee made three arguments in the lower court. First, the debtor had “acted with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud when it borrowed money from the [lender],” making the lien avoidable by the trustee for unsecured creditors. Second, the lender had “engaged in inequitable conduct when it allowed [the debtor] to borrow money,” thus entitling the trustee to subordinate the lender’s lien “to the claims of unsecured creditors.” Id. Finally, the trustee asserted that the debtor’s “contracts with the [lender] violated the law on their face,” requiring invalidation of the lender’s lien. Id.

    The Unmentioned Sentinel I

    The trustee appealed the dismissal of his complaint, leading to the Seventh Circuit’s original affirmance of the district court on Aug. 9, 2012 — Sentinel I. In re Sentinel Management Group Inc., 689 F. 3d 855, 861; 862-63; 865-66 (7th Cir. 2012) (held, debtor had not transferred “customer assets out of segregation” to lender with “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors”; trustee proved “at most” only debtor’s insolvency at time of transfers; debtor’s failure “to keep client funds properly segregated is not, on its own, sufficient to rule . . . that [the debtor] acted with requisite intent”; “proving actual fraud . . . requires more than simply showing that the transfer resulted in an under-segregation of client funds”; “use of customer assets as collateral for a loan that served purposes that did not directly benefit the customers [to repay debtor’s repurchase agreement counterparties] does not mean” debtor had requisite intent; debtor’s “preference of one set of creditors (the [lender], whose funds paid off the repo counterparties) over another (its customers) is properly reserved for [trustee’s] preferential transfer claims,” which district court properly rejected because lender was “over-collateralized on the transfer dates”; debtor “made transfers to pay off one set of creditors in an attempt to save the enterprise from sinking”; “actions taken to survive a financial storm” don’t require finding of actual intent; defendant lender’s secured claims should not be equitably subordinated because bank “was not an insider,” and was not guilty of “egregious misconduct”; “incompetence alone, however problematic, won’t require the equitable subordination of the [lender’s] lien”) (citing Boston Trading Grp. v. Burnazos, 535 F. 2d 1504, 1508-09 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.) (fraudulent transfer law does not include attempts “to choose among” creditors); Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 444 (1917) (Brandeis J.) (“Making a mortgage to secure an advance with which the insolvent debtor intends to pay pre-existing debt does not necessarily imply an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors”); In re Sharp Int’l Corp, 403 F. 3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The $12.25 million payment was at most a preference between creditors and did not ‘hinder, delay or defraud either present or future creditors.’”). The Court of Appeals withdrew Sentinel I in late 2012 with no explanation, merely stating that the opinion had been withdrawn and the judgment vacated.

    The Later Court of Appeals Decision: Sentinel II

    The court never even mentioned Sentinel I in its Aug. 26, 2013 opinion (Sentinel II). It first found that the debtor had transferred the funds to the lender with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors, thus enabling the trustee to avoid the Lender’s lien as a fraudulent transfer. Id., at 7. “[I]nconsistencies in the district court’s opinion regarding the extent of the” lender’s knowledge prior to bankruptcy “lead to further inconsistencies regarding the mental state of” the lender’s employees. Id., at 10. “If [the lender’s] employees knew that [the debtor’s] insiders were misusing loan proceeds, then it certainly suggests that [those] employees (at the very least) turned a blind eye to the rest of [the debtor’s] misconduct.” Id., at 10. “The district court . . . appears to waffle back and forth between characterizing their mental states as negligent and as reckless.” Id. On remand, after the district court “clarifies” the facts, it will have to “revisit the ultimate issue of whether the [lender’s] claim merits equitable subordination.” Id., at *11.

    Fraudulent Transfer

    The district court, while conceding the debtor’s insolvency, “did not believe [that the debtor’s] behavior was enough to prove that [the debtor] possessed the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud other creditors. . . . [It apparently believed] that [the debtor] had robbed Peter ([other clients]) to pay Paul ([the lender]) in the months before it filed for Chapter 11, . . . [concluding] that this behavior was not enough to show . . . actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud [other creditors]. Rather, [it] characterized [the debtor’s] behavior as a desperate ‘attempt to stay in business.’“ Id., at *6.

    The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s analysis. “[W]e disagree with the district court’s legal conclusion that such motivation was insufficient to constitute actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” the debtor’s clients. Id. “Such a result too narrowly construes the concept of actual intent. . . .” Id. Although the debtor may have genuinely believed that it was merely trying to stay in business, it “certainly should have seen our treating these transfers as fraudulent as consistent with our construction of actual intent to defraud in other contexts.” Id.

    The court also dismissed the district court’s findings as to the debtor’s good intentions. “[E]ven if we assume that Sentinel had the best intentions for its . . . clients when it pledged the segregated funds, the fact remains that Sentinel knowingly exposed its . . . clients to a substantial risk of loss of which they were unaware.” Id., at 7. The debtor’s “pledge of the segregated funds as collateral for its own loan” became “particularly egregious when viewed in light of the legal requirements imposed . . . by the Commodity Exchange Act . . . .” Id. “. . . Sentinel did more than just expose its . . . clients to a substantial risk of loss of which they were unaware; Sentinel, in an unlawful manner, exposed its . . . clients to a substantial risk of loss of which they were unaware.” Even if it did not intend to harm its clients, its “intentions were hardly innocent.” Id. More important, if the lender had “sufficient knowledge to place it on inquiry notice of the debtor’s possible insolvency,” it will have a “very difficult time proving that it was not on inquiry notice of” the debtor’s egregious conduct. Id., n.2. In other words, the Lender’s knowledge of sufficient facts showing egregiousmisconduct will deprive it of any “good faith-for-value” defense.

    Equitable Subordination

    The district court found the lender’s conduct here to be neither “egregious nor conscience shocking.” Id., at *9. But the Seventh Circuit found the lower court’s findings to be “internally inconsistent.” Id. On one hand, the district court found the lender to have known “Sentinel was engaging in wrongful conduct before its collapse.” Id. On the other hand, the lower court found that the lender’s “employees . . . neither knew nor turned a blind eye to the improper action of Sentinel.” Id. This waffling “throughout the opinion” caused the Court of Appeals to question the district court’s ultimate findings that the lender’s claims should not be equitably subordinated. Id., at *11. On remand, therefore, the district court must “clarify” exactly what the lender knew; what it knew of the debtor’s misconduct; and the level of the lender’s failure to investigate — “was it reckless? Or was it deliberately indifferent?” Id.

    Legality of Contracts

    According to the Court of Appeals, the district court had “correctly dismissed the trustee’s claim that the lender’s contracts with the Debtor were ‘inherently illegal.’” Id. Because the “contracts did not require either [the debtor] or the [lender] to do anything illegal, and because there was no “evidence [suggesting that the contract between the parties] was connected with an illegal scheme or plan,” the defense of “illegality” was “inapplicable” here. Id.

    Comments

    1. Rescue lending is not dead because of Sentinel II. The seminal Dean v. Davis Supreme Court decision, cited in Sentinel I, confirms that an arm’s length, good faith commercial loan will not be undone. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. at 444 (securing a loan to an insolvent debtor for payment of “a pre-existing debt does not necessarily imply an intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. The mortgage may be made in the expectation that thereby the debtor will extricate himself from a particular difficulty and be enabled to promote the interests of all other creditors by continuing his business. The lender . . . may be acting in perfect ‘good faith’ . . . . It is a question of fact in each case what the intent was with which the loan was sought and made.”).

    2. In Dean, the rescue lender (the debtor’s brother-in-law), lost his mortgage because of his special knowledge and participation in the debtor’s misconduct. “. . .[K]nowing the facts, [he] cooperated in the bankrupt’s fraudulent purpose, lacked the saving good faith . . . .” Id., at 445. The lender in Sentinel II, however, still has an outside chance of proving that it had made a secured loan in good faith, without knowledge of the debtor’s improper activities. The lender lives for another round of litigation.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


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